IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW …€¦ · v. NO. 18-CV-1119 RB-LF AFSCME...
Transcript of IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW …€¦ · v. NO. 18-CV-1119 RB-LF AFSCME...
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM AND HECTOR BALDERAS' MOTION TO DISMISS Page 1 of 12
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
BRETT HENDRICKSON,
Plaintiff,
v. NO. 18-CV-1119 RB-LF
AFSCME COUNCIL 18 et al.,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM AND HECTOR BALDERAS' MOTION TO DISMISS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 4
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
I. The governor and attorney general are proper defendants under Ex Parte Young .............. 5
II. Hendrickson states a valid claim as to Count I of the First Amended Complaint.. ............. 7
A. Hendrickson’s claims are not moot. ............................................................................... 7
B. The limited revocation period is unconstitutional. ......................................................... 9
III. Hendrickson states a valid claim as to Count II of the First Amended Complaint. ........... 10
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 11
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
568 U.S. 85 (2013) ................................................................................................................... 8
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................................................. 5
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................................................................. 5
Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992) ............................................................................................................... 11
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S 663 (1991) .................................................................................................................. 9
Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908) ............................................................... 5-7
Fisk v. Inslee,
No. 17-35957, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35317 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2018) .................................. 8
Harris v. Quinn,
573 U.S. 616 (2014) ................................................................................................................. 7
Janus v. AFSCME,
138 S. Ct. 2448 ............................................................................................................... 5, 9-11
Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................ 6
Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000,
567 U.S. 298 (2012) ............................................................................................................... 10
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
431 U.S. 209 (1977) ............................................................................................................... 10
Petrella v. Brownback,
697 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 6
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984) ............................................................................................................... 10
Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper,
859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 6
Tenth Circuit. Bishop v. Okla.,
333 Fed. Appx. 361 (10th Cir. Unpublished Opinion June 5, 2009) ........................................ 6
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Brett Hendrickson, submits this opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 37)
(“MTD”) filed by Defendants Michelle Lujan Grisham, in her official capacity as Governor of
New Mexico, and Hector Balderas, in his official capacity as Attorney General of New Mexico
(collectively “State Defendants”). Because Plaintiff has already presented his affirmative case in
a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 33) (“Plaintiff MSJ”) and a secondary case in his
Opposition to AFSCME’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“AFSCME’s MSJ”), both to be
considered simultaneously with the State Defendants’ motion, for judicial economy the related
briefs are incorporated and in this brief he focuses on those aspects of the State Defendants’
Motion that require further elaboration.
Hendrickson’s First Amended Compliant (Dkt. 21) (“FAC”) asserts two claims. Count I
alleges that the imposition of dues deductions on Hendrickson by the State Defendants and
AFSCME Council 18 (“AFSCME”) after he requested they stop violated his First Amendment
rights to Free Speech and Freedom of Association because these exactions were not supported by
constitutionally sufficient affirmative consent. See FAC ¶¶ 2, 46. Count II alleges that, by
recognizing AFSCME as Hendrickson’s exclusive representative in bargaining negotiations, the
State Defendants are compelling association and, likewise, abridging his rights under the First
Amendment. See FAC ¶¶ 8, 63. The State Defendants, AFSCME, and Hendrickson agree that
“there are no material facts in dispute, [and] that all the relevant questions are matters of law.”
Joint Status Report and Provisional Discovery Plan (“JSR”) at 2 (Dkt. 27). Hendrickson set forth
these facts in his Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff MSJ at 7-8.
LEGAL STANDARD
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To survive this Motion to Dismiss, Hendrickson need only state in his First Amended
Complaint “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). He should prevail provided his First Amended Complaint demonstrates
something “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
ARGUMENT
I. The governor and attorney general are proper defendants under Ex Parte Young.
The State Defendants are the proper parties under Ex Parte Young because they are the
officials responsible for carrying out and enforcing the withholding of union dues from state
paychecks and recognizing unions as exclusive representatives of state employees. The State
Defendants contend that they are not proper parties under Ex Parte Young because they do not
handle these matters day-to-day and because there is a separate labor board in New Mexico, the
Public Employee Labor Relations Board (“PERLB”), that regulates labor relations. MTD at 5-8.
But the question in this case is not whether the PELRB is properly interpreting New Mexico
labor law. Hendrickson presumes that it is. The question in this case is a federal constitutional
one and, more specifically, the proper view and reach of the Janus decision. Janus v. AFSCME,
138 S. Ct. 2448. The question is whether the public official that oversees the departments of the
state which are entering into contracts with ASFCME to withhold union dues (the governor) and
the public official who is charged with defending the constitutionality of state laws (the attorney
general) are proper parties in a suit that argues that the terms negotiated between the state and a
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union and the statutes governing those negotiations are unconstitutional. Hendrickson asserts that
they are proper parties.
In support of their argument, the State Defendants can muster from the Tenth Circuit only
one unpublished case. Bishop v. Okla., 333 Fed. Appx. 361 (10th Cir. Unpublished Opinion June
5, 2009). Bishop held that the Governor of Oklahoma was not the proper party in a same-sex
marriage case because marriage licenses were given out by clerks of the district court. It may
well be that a governor is not a proper party when the relevant actions must be taken by an
entirely separate branch of government, but here the relevant conduct is that of executive branch
departments, the New Mexico Human Services department and the State Personnel Office. The
governor is the only public official who has responsibility for both executive departments. All
employees of these two departments answer to her, and there is no other single person to whom
they all answer.
In far more analogous cases, the Tenth Circuit has issued published opinions in which it
agreed there was subject matter jurisdiction over high ranking government officials for the
enforcement of state policies. For instance, another same-sex marriage case, Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2014), held that in Utah, where county clerks rather than court
clerks issue marriage licenses, the governor and attorney general were the proper parties to
defend state marriage laws. The Court should also consider Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859
F.3d 865, 896 (10th Cir. 2017), where the court agreed that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction in a suit against the governor of Colorado to challenge Colorado’s Amendment 64,
which legalized recreational marijuana. In that case, the governor had no discretion whether or
not to adhere to the state constitutional amendment, but he was, nonetheless, a proper party under
Ex Parte Young because he was ultimately responsible for the policies implemented by the state.
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Perhaps the clearest statement undermining the State Defendant’s contention comes from
Petrella v. Brownback, 697 F.3d 1285, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 2012):
It cannot seriously be disputed that the proper vehicle for challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute, where only prospective, non-monetary relief is
sought, is an action against the state officials responsible for the enforcement of
that statute. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714
(1908). Nor can it be disputed that the Governor and Attorney General of the state
of Kansas have responsibility for the enforcement of the laws of the state.
Petrella made this observation in the context of a challenge to Kansas’ school funding formula,
where the plaintiffs claimed the legislature had failed to provide proper school funding in
violation of the state constitution. Id. at 1289. The governor and attorney general were not the
actors who determined school funding, but they were indisputably, in the Tenth Circuit’s view,
the proper defendants under Ex Parte Young. Moreover, in the Supreme Court case Harris v.
Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 626 (2014), the governor of Illinois was the proper party sued regarding
Illinois’ policy of deducting agency fees from home healthcare workers and remitting them to the
union.
Each of the above cases is much more analogous to the present case than the State
Defendants’ unpublished opinion holding Oklahoma’s governor was not responsible for the
actions of Oklahoma’s judiciary. And as the State Defendants’ accurately explain in their
motion, Plaintiff seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief against them. MTD at 5. This Court
should, therefore, find that the governor and attorney general are proper parties under Ex Parte
Young.
II. Hendrickson states a valid claim as to Count I of the First Amended Complaint.
A. Hendrickson’s claims are not moot.
The State Defendants argue that Count I of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is moot.
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MTD at 9-10. Hendrickson anticipated this argument and addressed mootness at length in his
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff MSJ at 13-16. Furthermore, AFSCME raised the same
issue in its Motion for Summary Judgment, and Hendrickson addressed the issue in his
Opposition. Plaintiff’s Opposition to AFSCME MSJ at 5-6. He here responds only to the
arguments particular to the State Defendants.
The State Defendants argue that since Hendrickson has been allowed to leave the union,
he lacks standing to challenge their membership revocation policy. But Defendants cannot avoid
judicial scrutiny of their unconstitutional policies simply by making exceptions to them every
time they are challenged. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that a “defendant cannot
automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, LLC v.
Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U. S.
283, 289 (1982)). Because the policy whose constitutionality is in question presents an annual
revocation period, the time window to resign membership will almost always come to pass
before the case can properly be considered by a Court. It is for this reason that the Ninth Circuit,
recently assessing the same argument regarding essentially the same underlying claim, held that
the case was not moot because these “are the sort of inherently transitory claims for which
continued litigation is permissible.” Fisk v. Inslee, No. 17-35957, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35317,
at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2018). The State Defendants, in particular, cannot rely on AFSCME’s
withdrawal of Hendrickson from the union because they continue to enforce and assert the
constitutionality of the state statute that allows dues revocation within a certain time window.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-7E-17(C). This Court should, therefore, find that Hendrickson presents a
live controversy that has not been mooted by Defendants’ actions after the filing of the lawsuit.
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B. The limited revocation period is unconstitutional.
Next, the State Defendants assert that the time window to withdraw union membership is
constitutional because it is pursuant to a contractual waiver of Hendrickson’s rights. Hendrickson
has already presented his affirmative case as to why the pre-Janus membership agreement does
not represent a valid waiver. Plaintiff MSJ at 9-13. Furthermore, Hendrickson addressed the
issue in Plaintiff’s Opposition to AFSCME’S MSJ at 7-14. He here responds to the State
Defendants’ contentions.
Hendrickson does not seek a “broad expansion” of the holding in Janus. MTD at 11.
Rather, he simply asks that Janus be enforced by its terms. Janus doesn’t say that union
deductions are permissible every time an employee has signed a membership card. Instead,
Janus requires Defendants to show that Hendrickson affirmatively consented to waive his First
Amendment rights. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. Defendants presume that any union authorization
suffices, but Janus holds that such a “waiver cannot be presumed. Rather, to be effective, the
waiver must be freely given and shown by clear and compelling evidence.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Hendrickson never knowingly signed such a waiver; therefore, the
agreements that Defendants invoke cannot serve as affirmative consent to waive his First
Amendment rights.
The State Defendants invoke Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S 663, 672 (1991). But
in Cohen the newspaper contracted away its right to publicize with full knowledge of its First
Amendment rights. There was no intervening change in law that recognized a right that the
newspaper could not have previously asserted. Hendrickson does not deny that one can make a
knowing waiver of First Amendment rights. He simply denies that any such knowing waiver was
made by him.
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III. Hendrickson states a valid claim as to Count II of the First Amended Complaint.
Finally, the State Defendants contend that Count II does not state a valid claim. Plaintiff
has already presented his affirmative case as to why exclusive representation is unconstitutional
under Janus. Plaintiff MSJ at 16-23. Furthermore, Hendrickson addressed the issue in Plaintiff’s
Opposition to AFSCME’S MSJ at 16-19. Here, he responds to the additional points made by the
State Defendants.
The State Defendants begin their argument on this point with a misstatement: they assert
Janus found that labor peace was a compelling state interest. MTD at 13. What the State
Defendants are describing is the holding of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977), which Janus overturned. In overturning Abood, the Janus Court said, “We assume that
‘labor peace,’ in this sense of the term, is a compelling state interest,” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465
(2018). Janus was assuming without deciding that labor peace was a compelling interest. The
Court did so because, even when it granted that initial assumption to Abood, the decision still
warranted overturning.
It is true that Janus recognized that “exclusive representation confers many benefits [on a
union].” Id. at 2467. But Janus made this observation in the context of arguing that the “free
rider” rationale was not sufficient to compel an association. Oddly, AFSCME and the State
Defendants are now demanding that Hendrickson remain a free rider by paying nothing to the
union but still requiring it to represent him. Exclusive representative status accrues power to the
union to speak with Hendrickson’s voice. As the Supreme Court explained, “[d]esignating a
union as the employees' exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of individual
employees.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. The First Amendment should not require such compelled
association: “[M]andatory associations are permissible only when they serve a compelling state
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interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.” Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012) (quoting
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The State Defendants contend that Janus’ discussion of this abridgment of rights “clearly
anticipated the continuation of exclusivity provisions after the Janus decision.” MTD at 14.
Janus, however, simply acknowledged the current status in a question that was before it. The
Motion to Dismiss then cites Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 1990-200 (1992) for the
proposition that “exclusive representatives is necessary to serve the compelling state interest of
maintaining labor peace, which allows it to survive First Amendment scrutiny.” MTD at 14. But
the citations to Janus do not state, establish, or reasonably imply that exclusive representation is
necessary to labor peace. Instead, they stand for the proposition that exclusive representation is
beneficial to the union. Hendrickson does not deny that exclusive representation benefits the
union; he asserts that this benefit should not be granted at the expense of his Freedom of
Association. Because forced union representation does not further a compelling state interest that
can justify this abridgment, Hendrickson has stated a claim on which relief can be granted, and
the motion to dismiss Claim II should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, in the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and in his
Opposition to AFSCME’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion to Dismiss should be
denied.
Dated: June 27, 2019
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Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Brian K. Kelsey
Brian K. Kelsey
Tennessee Bar No. 022874
Jeffrey M. Schwab
Illinois Bar No. 6290710
Reilly Stephens
Maryland Bar, Admitted December 14, 2017
Liberty Justice Center
190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1500
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Telephone (312) 263-7668
Facsimile (312) 263-7702
-and-
/s/ Patrick J. Rogers
Patrick J. Rogers
Patrick J. Rogers, LLC
20 First Plaza
Suite 725
Albuquerque, NM 87102
505-938-3335
Attorneys for Brett Hendrickson
I hereby certify that the foregoing
pleading was electronically filed the
27th day of June, 2019, through the
Court’s CM/ECF filing system,
which causes all parties of record to
be served.
/s/ Brian K. Kelsey
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