No. 18-266

__________________________________________________________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States _________________________________

FRANCIS & MARY MARION, CHARLES & MARY PINCKNEY,

JOHN & ELIZABETH RUTLEDGE, JAMES S. THURMOND, AND

ESSIE MAE WASHINGTON-WILLIAMS,

Petitioners,

v.

SALLY’S SEAFOOD SHACK, INC.,

Respondent.

_________________________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

_________________________________

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT,

Sally’s Seafood Shack, Inc.

_________________________________

Team X

Counsel for Respondent

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred by following this Court’s precedent in finding that

the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512, provides vessel owners with an

independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction separate and distinct from general

admiralty tort jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

II. Whether an interlocutory appeal is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) from a

judgment limiting liability under the Limitation Act, but not establishing liability.

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................................ 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ 2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... 4 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................. 8 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................ 8

II. Course of Proceedings .................................................................................................... 8 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................................................................................10 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................11 I. THE LIMITATION ACT, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–12, PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. ..............................................................................................11

A. In Richardson v. Harmon, this Court correctly decided that the Limitation Act establishes

an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction apart and separate from admiralty tort

jurisdiction. ................................................................................................................11

1. In Richardson, this Court correctly held that the Limitation Act provides an independent

basis for admiralty jurisdiction. .............................................................................12

a. The Limitation Act grants an independent basis for federal admiralty jurisdiction that

is consistent with this Court’s previous precedent. ..........................................12

b. The plain language of the statue supports Richardson’s construction of the Limitation

Act. ...................................................................................................................15

2. Adherence to stare decisis supports an affirmance of the holding

in Richardson. ........................................................................................................18

B. The Limitation Act is not tied to the locality or nexus requirements of admiralty tort

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. ........................................................................20

1. There is no navigable waters requirement under the Limitation Act. ...................21

2. The Court’s “maritime nexus test,” first implemented in Executive Jet, does not affect the

Limitation Act’s definition of jurisdiction under Richardson. .............................23

C. The Admiralty Extension Act neither codifies Richardson nor changes the Limitation Act’s

meaning. Thus, Richardson's precedential value is unaffected. ...............................24

D. The Limitation Act, as defined in Richardson, neatly fits within Article III’s Constitutional

grant of admiralty jurisdiction. .................................................................................26

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(A)(3) DOES NOT GRANT INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS WHEN A LOWER COURT

HAS UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF A CLAUSE LIMITING LIABILITY BUT NOT REACHED THE

QUESTION OF ACTUAL LIABILITY. ....................................................................................28

A. Because the Limitation Act confers admiralty jurisdiction, this case meets the first

requirement for granting an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). ....29

B. Granting an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) is improper because the

district court did not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. ...................29

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)’s plain text and historical purpose

support a narrow reading. .....................................................................................30

3

2. As a majority of circuits, this Court should narrowly construe section 1292(a)(3)

as a limited exception to the final judgment rule. .................................................31

3. A broad interpretation of section 1292(a)(3) would not effectively solve the practical

problems posed by limitation of liability. .............................................................36 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................37

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Adams v. Harris Cty., 316 F. Supp. 938, 1971 AMC 2017 (S.D. Tex. 1970),

rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971) .....................................................25

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) ..............................................................................19

Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1985) ...............31

Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) .................................................20

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) ...................................................18

Butler v. Boston & S. S. S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889) ............................................................14

Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, 871 F.2d 897,

1989 AMC 913 (9th Cir. 1989) ........................................................................................33, 34

City of Fort Madison v. Emerald Lady, 990 F.2d 1086,

1993 AMC 2091 (8th Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................29, 31

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) .............................................................15

Emerick v. Lambert, 187 F.2d 786 (1951) ............................................................................32, 36

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ...........................................................19

Evergreen Int’l (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse, 33 F.3d 420,

1995 AMC 635 (4th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................... 30, 36, 36

Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,

1973 AMC 1 (1972) .................................................................................................... 23, 24, 27

Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S. 610,

2001 AMC 595 (1886) ................................................................................................ 13

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) ........................................ 33

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 252 (2010) ...................................... 15

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. of Hartford v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207,

1927 AMC 402 (1927) ................................................................................................ 18, 27

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) .................................................................................. 15

5

In re Aramark Sports & Entm’t Servs., 831 F.3d 1264,

2016 AMC 2138 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 34

In re Bernstein, 81 F. Supp. 2d 176,

2000 AMC 760 (D. Mass. 1999) ................................................................................. 14

In re Ingram Towing Co. v. Adnac, Inc., 59 F.3d 513,

1995 AMC 2441 (5th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................. 32, 35

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,

1995 AMC 913 (1995) ................................................................................................ 20, 23

Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383,

1941 AMC 430 (1941) ................................................................................................ 11, 14, 18

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) ................................................... 19

Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,

1961 AMC 833 (1961) ................................................................................................ 23, 27

The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894) ..................................................................... 12

Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, & Abandoned Steam

Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1988 AMC 1109 (1st Cir. 1987) ............................................ 31

Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911) ............................................................................... 25

MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140,

2012 AMC 485 (2d Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 17

The No. 6, 241 F. 69 (2d Cir. 1917) ................................................................................. 14

Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104,

1871 AMC 2061 (1871) .............................................................................................. 12, 17

O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) .............................. 22

Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375,

1924 AMC 551 (1924) ................................................................................................ 26

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ........................................................................ 18

The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20,

1999 AMC 2403 (1865) .............................................................................................. 13

6

Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96,

2001 AMC 1207 (1911) .............................................................................................. passim

Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Bluewater P’ship, 772 F.2d 565,

1986 AMC 1296 (9th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................. 34

Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454,

1935 AMC 423 (1935) ................................................................................................ 32

Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012,

2006 AMC 1290 (7th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................. 20

St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co. v. Petroleum Barge Co., 249 F.2d 906,

1958 AMC 506 (8th Cir. 1957) ................................................................................... 29, 31

The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271,

1941 AMC 1147 (D. Mass. 1941) ............................................................................... 18

U.S. v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1985) .................................................................. 33

U.S. v. Lake George, 224 F.2d 117,

1955 AMC 1519 (1955) .............................................................................................. 30, 32, 35

Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165,

1999 AMC 1168 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................. 34

Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827,

2002 AMC 2270 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 33, 36

OPINIONS BELOW1

The opinion of the court of appeals is reprinted in the appendix at “Pet. App.” and reported at 890

F.3d 1384 and 2018 AMC 3333.

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ........................................................................................................ 26

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (2012) ...............................................................................................passim

28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) .......................................................................................................20, 26

1This is the formal citation for this case’s prior proceedings. Any reference to the facts in this brief

is cited as follows: R. (page number).

7

46 U.S.C. app § 189 (2006) ..................................................................................................14

46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012) ............................................................................................ 21,24, 26

46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2012) .....................................................................................................21

46 U.S.C. § 30502 (2012) .....................................................................................................16, 21

46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2012) ............................................................................................. …….15,16, 24

OTHER AUTHORITIES

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TESTS (2012) .......................................15

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY § 5 (7th ed., rev. 2018) ....................12

Brief of the Maritime Law Association of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16,

Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990) (No. 88-2041) ...........................17

Cong. Rec., 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1108, 1111 (February 3, 1886) .........................................17

David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does Lozman Set a

New Course, 44 J. Mar. L. & Com. 393 (2013) ...................................................................27

GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,

THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 846 (2d ed. 1975) ....................................................................14, 16

ROBERT FORCE, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 143 (2d ed. 2013) ..................................11

Note, A Sea of Confusion: The Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act as an Independent Basis

for Admiralty Jurisdiction, 108 MICH. L. REV. 229 (2009) .............................................17

8

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 7, 2018. R. 1a. A timely petition

for rehearing was denied on June 26, 2018. R. 7a. The petition for certiorari was filed on September

4, 2018, and granted on December 3, 2018. R. 1b. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Statement of Facts

On July 17, 2015, the F/V Flamingo sank on the banks of the Cooper River in Charleston,

South Carolina. R. 2a. The Flamingo was a former fishing vessel that was indefinitely moored,

surrounded by a cofferdam, and converted into a floating seafood restaurant, “Sally’s Seafood

Shack.” R. 2a, 10a. Respondent owned and operated the vessel until an explosion in the galley

“ripped a hole in the hull beneath the waterline and the vessel quickly sank at its anchorage.” R.

2a, 10a. The explosion was caused by gas that had accumulated in the galley — an employee, John

Calhoun, “had been instructed to light the range” and “turned on the gas,” but “forgot to complete

his task.” R. 14a. Consequently, the explosion injured eight patrons and the Flamingo’s post-

incident value was “conceded to be less than a thousand dollars.” R. 2a.

II. Course of Proceedings

This is a writ of certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

issued on May 7, 2018. R. 1a. The case originated with Petitioners filing tort actions in state court.

R. 9a. In response, Respondent filed the present action and deposited $1,000 with the district court,

which stayed those state court actions pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30511. R. 9a. The district court

proceeded, bifurcating the trial into two phases: (1) “evidence regarding [Respondent’s]

entitlement to limitation of liability”; and, (2) “issues of liability and damages.” R. 9a.

9

During phase one, Respondent sought under Supplemental Rule F of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure to limit its liability. R. 9a. However, the parties agreed that: (1) the Grubart

requirements were unmet; and, (2) the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101, did not confer

jurisdiction. R. 4a. Thus, the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12, presented the only grounds

for admiralty jurisdiction. R. 4a. The court found that it had admiralty jurisdiction under the

Limitation Act. R. 14a. In addition, Respondent was entitled to limit its liability (if any) under the

Act. R. 2a.

Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal “challenging the district court’s ruling that

Seafood Shack [was] entitled to limit its liability.” R. 2a. This appeal occurred before the district

court heard phase two, which would determine whether Respondent was “liable to any of the

claimants and the extent of the liability.” R. 2a. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that the Limitation

Act conferred an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction but dismissed the appeal for want of

appellate jurisdiction. R. 4a, 6a. Petitioners argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) granted the court

of appeals jurisdiction. R. 3a. The court recognized a “long-standing conflict” between circuits

when interpreting section 1292(a)(3) and deciding whether a district court had “determined the

rights and liabilities of the parties.” R. 4a. Following the strict construction approach, the court

dismissed the appeal. R. 5a, 6a.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to decide: (1) whether the Limitation Act presents

an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction; and, (2) whether the court of appeals had appellate

jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(3). R. 1b. The Supreme Court of the United States then granted

this petition. R. 1b.

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under the Limitation Act, the court of appeals properly found that Sally’s Seafood Shack,

Inc. was entitled to limit its liability. Congress intended for the Act to promote shipbuilding by

providing protections to vessel owners, thus increasing the overall demand for vessels. As such,

the Limitation Act allows vessel owners to limit liability to the value of their vessel. In Richardson

v. Harmon, this Court further interpreted the Limitation Act, holding that the statute’s plain

language and Congress’s intent demonstrated that the Act grants an independent basis for

admiralty jurisdiction apart and separate from general admiralty tort jurisdiction. This long-held

and unchallenged precedent should be affirmed because no new circumstances or reasons support

overturning the decision. Furthermore, because Richardson supports an independent basis for

admiralty jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the Limitation Act grants Sally’s

Seafood Shack, Inc. admiralty jurisdiction.

In addition, the Fourth Circuit properly found that the court of appeals did not have

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). During phase one of the bifurcated trial, the

district court determined that Respondent’s liability, if any could be limited. Petitioners filed an

interlocutory appeal under section 1292(a)(3) before the district court decided the issue of liability

(phase two). In response, the Fourth Circuit properly dismissed the petition for lack of appellate

jurisdiction because the district court had not yet established the rights and liabilities of the parties.

There is a long-standing conflict concerning the scope of section 1292(a)(3). A majority of

circuit courts have narrowly interpreted the statute as an exception to the final judgment rule, which

generally discourages appellate courts from hearing interlocutory appeals. The plain language and

historical purposes of section 1292(a)(3) further support the practical reasons for a narrow

interpretation. In this case, the court of appeals correctly found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction

11

because the district court did not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. As a result, this

Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

ARGUMENT

I. THE LIMITATION ACT, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–12, PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.

The parties agree that, if applicable, the Limitation Act provides the sole grounds to

establish an “independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction” and, hence, federal jurisdiction. R. 4a.

The Limitation Act “[p]ermits a shipowner to limit its liability following maritime casualties to

the value of the owner’s interest in its vessel and pending freight, provided that the accident

occurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” ROBERT FORCE, ADMIRALTY AND

MARITIME LAW 143 (2d ed. 2013). Because proceedings under the Limitation Act can only be

brought in admiralty jurisdiction, Respondent cannot limit liability unless admiralty jurisdiction is

present. Id. at 145. This Court has interpreted the Limitation Act as conferring an independent

basis for admiralty jurisdiction upon those successfully bringing a limitation proceeding.

Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106, 2001 AMC 1207, 1212 (1911); see also Just v.

Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386, 1941 AMC 430, 432 (1941). Thus, because Respondent meets the

Limitation Act’s requirements, this Court should find independent admiralty jurisdiction.

A. In Richardson v. Harmon, this Court correctly decided that the Limitation

Act establishes an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction apart and

separate from admiralty tort jurisdiction.

The Fourth Circuit did not err in affirming the district court’s ruling that 46 U.S.C. §§

30501–12, the “Limitation Act,” provides an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In doing

so, the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with this Court’s holding in Richardson, the plain language of

the statute, and Congress’s intent. Based on these findings, Respondent has appropriate subject

matter jurisdiction in admiralty to bring a liability petition.

12

This Court should uphold Richardson and affirm that the Limitation Act grants an

independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. First, as shown by the Act’s history and plain

language, the Richardson Court rightly harmonized the Limitation Act with its original purpose.

Second, the Richardson decision interpreted a federal statute and should be upheld because stare

decisis urges this Court to not stray from precedent without special reason. Third, this Court’s

admiralty jurisprudence, specifically the Grubart test for determining admiralty tort jurisdiction,

carves out an exception for Acts of Congress. Because the Limitation Act is a clear Act of

Congress, the Limitation Act is not tied to the nexus test developed in Grubart; and thus, the

holding in Richardson is unaffected. For the following reasons, we respectfully ask this Court to

affirm the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

1. In Richardson, this Court correctly held that the Limitation Act

provides an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction.

Richardson was soundly decided, both regarding statutory interpretation and in relation to

other decisions of this Court. Therefore, the precedent of Richardson should not be disturbed.

a. The Limitation Act grants an independent basis for federal

admiralty jurisdiction that is consistent with this Court’s

previous precedent.

Prior to 1851, neither common nor civil law recognized a federal limitation statute. 3

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY § 5 (7th ed., rev. 2018) (citing The Main v.

Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894) (Justice Brown stating that shipowners could limit liability “only

by the amount of the loss and by [the owners] ability to respond”). Congress enacted the Limited

Liability Act of 1851 with no discussion in the House and limited discussion in the Senate;

however, it has been universally agreed that the Act’s purpose was to encourage investment in

shipbuilding by limiting the venture of shipowners to the loss of the ship itself. See Norwich &

N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 117, 1871 AMC 2061, 2068 (1871) (“[I]t is evident that,

13

by [the Limitation Act], the owner’s liability was coextensive with his interest in the vessel and its

freight and ceased by his abandonment and surrender of these to the parties sustaining loss.”).

This Court first addressed the Limitation Act’s independent grant of jurisdiction in

Phenix. Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S. 610, 2001 AMC 595 (1886). In Phenix, a vessel caused

a fire on land damaging multiple buildings. Id. at 611, 2001 AMC at 595–97. At the time, this was

a non-maritime tort because under the leading case, Plymouth, no admiralty tort jurisdiction existed

when the injury occurred on land. Id. at 618, 2001 AMC at 598–99; see also The Plymouth, 70

U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 1999 AMC 2403 (1865). The vessel owner claimed that the Limitation Act

granted an independent basis for jurisdiction. Ex Parte Phenix, 118 U.S. at 613, 2001 AMC at 597.

Finding there was no foundation in admiralty tort jurisdiction “and none in the special provisions

of the statute for the limitation of liability,” the Court held that the original Limitation Act did not

grant an independent basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 619, 2001 AMC at 599–600 (emphasis added).

However, the italicized phrase implies that an added provision for admiralty jurisdiction in the

Limitation Act would have satisfied the Court. As held in Richardson, such a provision was added

in the 1884 amendment.

Richardson was the first case to interpret the Limitation Act after the 1884 amendment. In

Richardson, a vessel owner attempted to limit his liability via the Limitation Act after his vessel

caused damage to a land-based bridge. Richardson, 222 U.S. at 102, 2001 AMC at 1208–09. As

in Phenix, the tort was non-maritime because it occurred on land, and thus outside the scope of

admiralty tort jurisdiction. Id. Nonetheless, the Limitation Act amendment (found in section 18 of

the Shipping Act of 1884)2 provides that a vessel owner may seek limitation for “any and all debts

2 This Amendment was codified at 46 U.S.C. app § 189 until the 2006 recodification of title 46 and now is

incorporated into 46 U.S.C. § 30505.

14

and liabilities . . . .” 46 U.S.C. app § 189 (2006). Recognizing that “liability may arise out of a

contract as well as from a tort,” the Court found that “the addition of the words ‘and liabilities’

would be tautology unless meant to embrace liabilities not arising from ‘debt.’” Richardson, 222

U.S. at 103–04, 2001 AMC at 1210. Relying in part on the dicta in Butler, the Court further

reasoned that “it is possible that [the added language] was intended to remove all doubts of the

application of the limited liability law to all cases of loss and injury caused without the privity or

knowledge of the owner.” Id. at 105, 2001 AMC at 1211 (quoting Butler v. Boston & S. S. S. Co.,

130 U.S. 527, 554 (1889)). As a result, the Richardson Court concluded that “the section in

question was intended to add to the enumerated claims of the old law ‘any and all debts and

liabilities’ not therefore included.” Id. at 106, 2001 AMC at 1212. Moreover, the Court explained

that this harmonized the Limitation Act with Congress’s intent to protect the investment interests

of vessel owners “in respect of all claims arising out of the conduct of the master and crew, whether

the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort non-maritime.” Id. In other words, the amended

Limitation Act extended an independent grant of federal admiralty jurisdiction. GRANT GILMORE

& CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 846 (2d ed. 1975).

Richardson’s holding that the Limitation Act so provides an independent basis for federal

admiralty jurisdiction has not been overturned. Post-Richardson, a multitude of courts, including

this Court, have relied on Richardson. E.g., The No. 6, 241 F. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1917) (interpreting

Richardson to mean that the Limitation Act “is an independent head of jurisdiction, without regard

to whether the claims limited against [are] such as might have been sued in the admiralty or not”);

In re Bernstein, 81 F. Supp. 2d 176, 2000 AMC 760 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that the Limitation

Act provides an independent basis for jurisdiction over injures on non-navigable waters); Just, 312

U.S. at 383, 1941 AMC at 430 (deciding that “limitation extends to tort claims even when the tort

15

is non-maritime”). Today, the Limitation Act continues to be interpreted under title 46 as

understood by Richardson; hence, Richardson remains binding law. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2012).

b. The plain language of the statute supports Richardson’s

construction of the Limitation Act.

The Richardson Court correctly construed the Limitation Act as granting an independent

basis for admiralty jurisdiction. This construction is consistent with both the statute’s plain

language and Congress’s intent. When interpreting a federal statute, this Court “always turn[s]

first” to “the words of [the] statute” because “courts must presume that a legislature says in a

statute what it means and means in a statute what it says . . . .” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503

U.S. 249, 253 (1992). In addition, “every word and every provision [of a statute] is to be given

effect” so that “no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” ANTONIN

SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TESTS 174 (2012);

see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (the Court following “the cardinal rule that

statutory language must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around

it”). Accordingly, this Court “enforce[s]” the “plain and unambiguous statutory language

according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 252, 251 (2010). These

rules ensure that a court applies Congress’s policy preferences rather than its own.

Analyzing the 1884 amendment’s plain language, the Richardson Court properly found

that the Act allows limitation proceedings for “any and all debts and liabilities that [an owner’s]

individual share of the vessel bears to the whole.” Richardson, 222 U.S. at 102, 2001 AMC at 1209

(emphasis added). This amended language differs from the original Limitation Act, which

“embraced liabilities for maritime torts, but excluded both debts and liabilities for non-maritime

torts.” Richardson, 222 U.S. at 103, 2001 AMC at 1210. The amendment’s addition of “any and

all debts and liabilities” allows owners to proceed under the Act for “any . . . liabilities,” including

16

those incurred by non-maritime torts. Id. Because limitation proceedings require admiralty

jurisdiction to proceed, the Act’s application to non-maritime torts means that the Limitation Act

must independently grant admiralty jurisdiction — the holding of Richardson. Since Richardson,

this language has had a significant affect — apparent from the current codification of the

Limitation Act allowing owners to limit the liability “of a vessel for any claims, debt, or liability.”

46 U.S.C. § 30505 (emphasis added). Based on the Limitation Act’s plain language, this Court

should reaffirm Richardson.

In addition, the plain text of section 30502, formerly section 188, also illustrates that

Congress intended for the Limitation Act to apply to non-maritime torts. Section 30502 states that

“this chapter . . . applies to seagoing vessels and vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland

navigation . . .” 46 U.S.C. § 30502 (2012) (emphasis added). Despite numerous statutory

amendments, this language has generally remained unchanged. GILMORE & BLACK, supra at 818–

25. Assuming Congress does not draft superfluous language into an Act, any reading of the statute

with a navigable waters requirement renders the words “lakes or rivers” meaningless. Furthermore,

the use of the disjunctive shows Congress’s intent to provide protection to “all” vessel owners —

a broader protection than held by many recent circuit opinions. Had Congress intended to limit the

breadth of the Limitation Act to vessels that are within the admiralty jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §

1333, it could have easily done so. However, it did not, and according to the Limitation Act’s plain

language, the scope is not limited to torts falling under section 1333 admiralty tort jurisdiction.

Rather, the plain text supports the Richardson Court’s holding that the Limitation Act applies to

non-maritime torts. Therefore, the Limitation Act’s plain language supports Richardson’s holding

that the Limitation Act grants an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction — a basis distinct

and separate from admiralty jurisdiction under section 1333.

17

Richardson is further supported by the Limitation Act’s congressional history and purpose.

It is widely accepted that the Limitation Act’s original purpose was to protect vessel owners and

encourage investment in ships. See, e.g., Norwich Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 116 (stating that the

history of a shipowner’s limitation of liability is common knowledge and explaining the

circumstances of its creation). Congressional records indicate that Congress specifically amended

the Limitation Act to encourage ownership of vessels to aid the shipbuilding industry. See Cong.

Rec., 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1108, 1111 (February 3, 1886). As held in Richardson, construing the

Limitation Act to independently grant a basis for admiralty jurisdiction harmonizes the Act with

this purpose. If the purpose of the Act is to protect vessel owners and encourage investment in

ships, “it should not matter whether the vessel is at sea, in a river, or tied to a dock when the loss

occurs.” Note, A Sea of Confusion: The Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act as an Independent

Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction, 108 MICH. L. REV. 229, 241 (2009). Therefore, any competing

interpretation that limits the class of vessel defeats the Act’s purpose and should be rejected.

Petitioners could claim that the Limitation Act should be narrowly construed because the

“Act’s purpose of making United States shipping more competitive world-wide through the

[Limitation Act] . . . would not be advanced by construing the Limitation Act as conferring federal

jurisdiction . . . .” MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140, 143, 2012 AMC 485, 489 (2d Cir.

2011). This is patently untrue. As explained by the Maritime Law Association, the building of

recreation crafts is an important segment of the shipbuilding industry today. Brief of the Maritime

Law Association of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 1990

AMC 1801 (1990) (No. 88-2041). Because pleasure crafts are included in the Limitation Act and

advance the Act’s purpose, this Court should assume a broad interpretation.

18

The pragmatic purpose of the Act is also furthered by Richardson. The Limitation Act

should be “broadly and liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose to encourage investment

in shipbuilding and to afford an opportunity for the determination of claims against the vessel and

its owner.” Just, 312 U.S. at 385–86, 1941 AMC at 432. By allowing non-admiralty claims to be

brought under the Limitation Act, the Act permits a “complete disposition of what may be a ‘many

cornered controversy.’” Id. (quoting Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. of Hartford v. Southern Pac. Co.,

273 U.S. 207, 216, 1927 AMC 402, 407 (1927)). For instance, proceedings could: (1) involve both

maritime and non-maritime claims; and, (2) occur in different courts. An independent grant of

jurisdiction practically addresses the objectives of concursus and offers a single forum for all

claims. Furthermore, even where damages occur entirely on land, an admiralty court’s expertise

could prove useful when determining a shipowner’s liability and whether liability could be limited.

See, e.g., The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271, 1941 AMC 1147 (D. Mass. 1941) (holding the Limitation

Act applied to a boat explosion occurring entirely on land). Therefore, this Court should find that

the Limitation Act grants Respondent independent admiralty jurisdiction separate and distinct from

admiralty tort jurisdiction found in section 1333.

2. Adherence to stare decisis supports an affirmance of the holding in

Richardson.

The Court’s holding in Richardson should be upheld, adhering to the doctrine of stare

decisis. Stare decisis is this Court’s preferred doctrine because it “promotes the evenhanded,

predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions,

and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Adhering to precedent “is usually the wise policy, because in most

matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” Id.

(citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

19

Furthermore, “stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute.” Kimble

v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015). This is because critics “can take their

objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.” Id. “Any departure from

the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212

(1984).

In the present case, there is no special justification to depart from Richardson. First, as

explained above, the Richardson Court correctly interpreted the Limitation Act by considering the

statute’s plain language and historical purpose. Second, the holding in Richardson was not a

judicial definition of district court jurisdiction but an interpretation of a federal statute. Therefore,

as this Court has long repeated, “stare decisis carries an enhanced force when a decision . . .

interprets a statute.” Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2404. Third, until recently, there have been relatively

few jurisdictional discrepancies and inconsistences between federal courts interpreting the

Limitation Act. Moreover, during that time, Congress has not seen it necessary to alter this Court’s

construction of the statute, despite implementing periodical amendments to the Limitation Act.

This tacit agreement by Congress is notable because “it’s the job of Congress by legislation, not

this Court by supposition, both to write the laws and repeal them.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,

138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, vessel owners have relied on Richardson for the

proposition that liability could be limited for all torts, not just maritime-torts. This is vital as it has

allowed vessel owners to proceed under the Limitation Act without concern that some claims will

be found non-maritime and, consequently, not subject to limitation. Overruling Richardson at this

late hour would greatly disrupt nearly a century of consistent and patterned practice by admiralty

courts that have created a coherent body of maritime law. As the Budinich Court stated, the most

20

important requirement of a jurisdictional rule is not that it appeal to common sense but that it be

clear. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988). Because the statutory

language of the Limitation Act appeals to common sense and Richardson has been this Court’s

undisturbed precedent for over seven decades, Richardson should be upheld under the doctrine of

stare decisis.

B. The Limitation Act is not tied to the locality or nexus test of admiralty tort

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

Under the Limitation Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), admiralty jurisdiction and so-called

admiralty tort jurisdiction are separate species of jurisdiction; therefore, the locality-nexus test

does not apply to the underlying tort in limitation proceedings. Instead, as held in Richardson, the

Limitation Act independently grants admiralty jurisdiction when its requirements are met.

Richardson, 222 U.S. at 105–06, 2001 AMC at 1212.

As stated by Judge Posner, section 1333(1) confers admiralty jurisdiction “but does not

define [it]”; thus, its interpretation has been left to the courts. See Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp.,

445 F.3d 1012, 1014, 2006 AMC 1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 2006). “A party seeking to invoke federal

admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions

both of location and of connection with maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 1995 AMC 913 (1995).

Recent courts of appeals applying the section 1333(1) nexus and navigable waters test in

Limitation Act proceedings have been misguided. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). First, unlike other

statutes that independently grant admiralty jurisdiction outside of section 1333(1), the Limitation

Act does not have a navigable waters requirement. Second, this Court, in its development of the

maritime nexus test, carved out an exception for “litigation to the contrary.” Because the

21

Limitation Act is “litigation to the contrary,” courts of appeals have incorrectly applied the “nexus

test” to Limitation Act proceedings.

1. There is no navigable waters requirement under the Limitation Act.

In granting an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, the Limitation Act does not

require that the underlying tort occur on navigable waters; thus, the navigable waters test under

section 1333 is ill-fitted for determining jurisdiction under the Limitation Act. Consequently,

lower courts have erroneously applied section 1333’s navigable waters requirement to limitation

proceedings.

Besides the Limitation Act, other statutes exist granting admiralty jurisdiction outside of

section 1333. However, unlike the Limitation Act, these statutes specifically include a navigable

waters requirement. For example, the Admiralty Extension Act requires, as a condition of

admiralty jurisdiction, that the tort be “caused by a vessel on navigable waters . . . .” See, e.g., 46

U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012). Likewise, the Death on the High Seas Act includes a locality

requirement: “[w]hen the death of an individual is caused . . . on the high seas beyond 3 nautical

miles from the shore.” 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2012) (emphasis added). In contrast, the Limitation Act

has no navigability requirement, stating only that the Act “applies to seagoing vessels and vessels

used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation.” 46 U.S.C. § 30502. While this could be construed

as referring to where the vessel operates or the type of vessel, the Act remains silent on the issue

of navigable waters. Thus, importing the navigable waters requirement from section 1333

jurisprudence is unwarranted.

This Court made a similar finding in O’Donnell concerning the Jones Act. In O’Donnell,

a seaman was injured while working onshore and brought a Jones Act claim in admiralty

22

jurisdiction. See O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 37–39 (1943). Both

the injury and impact of the tort occurred onshore. Id. at 38. As a result, section 1333 admiralty

tort jurisdiction did not apply because the traditional navigable waters requirement was not met.

See id. at 38–39. (explaining that “jurisdiction in admiralty in cases of tort or collision is in general

limited to events occurring on navigable waters”). However, the Court held that there was “nothing

in the legislative history of the Jones Act to indicate that its words ‘in the course of his

employment’ do not mean what they say or that they were intended to be restricted to injuries

occurring on navigable waters.” Id. at 39. Therefore, the Court properly held that admiralty

jurisdiction under the Jones Act neither imported nor required a navigable waters requirement.

O’Donnell illustrates that when a navigable waters requirement is not explicitly stated, a

statute can confer an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Like the Jones Act, the

Limitation Act lacks an explicit navigable waters requirement. Similarly, the tort in Sally’s Seafood

Shack, Inc., as in O’Donnell, did not occur on navigable waters. Nonetheless, O’Donnell shows

that admiralty jurisdiction can be properly established under a statute without a navigable waters

requirement if the Act: (1) independently confers admiralty jurisdiction; and, (2) contains no

express navigable waters requirement. Because the Limitation Act confers an independent basis

for jurisdiction and, like the Jones Act, has no express navigable waters requirement, Respondent

has proper admiralty jurisdiction.

2. The Court’s “maritime nexus test,” first implemented in Executive Jet,

does not affect the Limitation Act’s definition of jurisdiction under

Richardson.

The maritime nexus test for admiralty tort jurisdiction under section 1333 does not change

Richardson’s meaning of the Limitation Act. Therefore, Richardson’s precedent is unaffected and

the Limitation Act grants Respondent an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction apart from

23

the maritime nexus test. Starting with Executive Jet, this Court held that admiralty tort jurisdiction

not only requires “maritime locality alone,” but a showing that the tort “bear a significant

relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S.

249, 259, 1973 AMC 1, 15–16 (1972) (herein “Executive Jet”). Expanding these requirements,

Grubart added that section 1333 tort claims must demonstrate “a potentially disruptive impact on

maritime commerce.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 527, 534, 1995 AMC at 913. Today, these requirements

for admiralty tort jurisdiction still stand.

These section 1333 developments do not affect the Limitation Act as established by

Richardson. First, this Court excluded “legislation to the contrary” from falling under its maritime

nexus test in Executive Jet. The Court in Executive Jet decided whether a plane that crashed into

the ocean was within section 1333(1) admiralty tort jurisdiction. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250–

51, 1973 AMC at 2–3. Applying the new nexus test, this Court stated that unless the test was met,

“claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation

to the contrary.” Id. at 268, 1972 AMC at 16. (emphasis added). By carving out an exception for

“legislation to the contrary,” the Court recognized that the nexus test does not apply to

Congressional legislation that grants an alternative basis for admiralty jurisdiction. To illustrate

this point, the Court explained that depending on a case’s facts, the Death on the High Seas Act

would be “legislation to the contrary.” Id. at n.26, 1971 AMC at n.26. This demonstrates that a

federal court having admiralty jurisdiction under an alternative statute, not section 1333, would

not need to satisfy the maritime nexus requirements. Because the Limitation Act is “legislation to

the contrary,” the maritime nexus test should not apply.

Second, in creating a new test for admiralty tort jurisdiction, the Executive Jet Court did

not propound jurisdictional requirements for all species of admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kossick

24

v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 1961 AMC 833, 837 (1961) (holding that admiralty

jurisdiction in contract does not depend on any tort-nexus requirement). Third, the issue in

Executive Jet was the scope of admiralty tort jurisdiction under section 1333(1). Executive Jet, 409

U.S. at 250–51, 1973 AMC at 2. (“[i]nvoking federal admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1333(1)”). Richardson would have only been affected if it was a case deciding admiralty tort

jurisdiction. Instead, Richardson determined that Congress intended for the Limitation Act to

apply both to maritime and non-maritime torts. Richardson, 222 U.S. at 106, 2001 AMC at 1212.

This is consistent with the Limitation Act’s statutory language, which then as now allows vessel

owners to limit their liability when facing tort damages and “any embezzlement, loss, or

destruction . . . [of] any property, goods, or merchandize, shipped or put on board” the vessel. 46

U.S.C. § 30505(b). Thus, Richardson did not expand admiralty tort jurisdiction (causing it to be

affected by Executive Jet and its predecessors) but construed the Act as providing a separate source

of admiralty jurisdiction that shipowners could invoke regardless of an underlying claim’s nature.

Consequently, the maritime nexus requirement does not affect the Limitation Act’s

independent grant for admiralty jurisdiction. Because Respondent has admiralty jurisdiction via

the Limitation Act, section 1333’s nexus requirement is inapplicable.

C. The Admiralty Extension Act neither codifies Richardson nor changes the

Limitation Act’s meaning. Thus, Richardson's precedential value is

unaffected.

The Richardson Court’s reading of the Limitation Act has not been undermined by the

Admiralty Extension Act of 1948 (“Extension Act”). 46 U.S.C. § 30101. Therefore, because the

Extension Act does not codify Richardson, the case’s precedential value remains unwavering.

The Extension Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction to all cases of damage or injury

caused by a vessel on navigable waters. 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). If Richardson was codified by the

25

Extension Act, the holding in Richardson should be mirrored in the Extension Act. That is,

Richardson would hold that admiralty jurisdiction is extended to all cases of damage or injury

caused by a vessel on navigable waters. However, as seen by this Court’s later decisions,

Richardson did not simply extend section 1333 admiralty tort jurisdiction — it found that the

Limitation Act grants an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction in limitation proceedings.

In the immediate aftermath of Richardson, this Court held that torts occurring on land were

still outside the scope of admiralty tort jurisdiction. For instance, the same year Richardson was

decided, this Court in Martin subsequently found that there was no admiralty tort jurisdiction when

a ship on navigable waters collided with a bridge. See Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191, 196–98 (1911)

(holding no basis for general admiralty jurisdiction exists when the underlying claim is non-

maritime). If Richardson’s holding was an extension of admiralty tort jurisdiction to land-based

torts, this Court would not have found months later that land-based torts were still outside

admiralty jurisdiction. Martin illustrates that Richardson did not, as the lower courts purport,

simply extend admiralty tort jurisdiction as now codified in the Extension Act.

Moreover, the Extension Act’s legislative history reveals that the Act was enacted “almost

exclusively” to overrule cases like Martin and extend admiralty tort jurisdiction to similar cases

— not to codify Richardson. Adams v. Harris Cty., 316 F. Supp. 938, n.2, 1971 AMC 2017, n.2

(S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971). Congress was concerned

with a vessel owner’s ability to limit liability when crafting the Limitation Act. In contrast,

Congress was focused on the expansion of admiralty tort jurisdiction in the Extension Act. Hence,

a key difference exists between the right of a vessel owner seeking limitation of damages under

Richardson — the Limitation Act — and an injured party seeking maritime-tort damages in

admiralty when the admiralty related damages occur on land — the Extension Act.

26

As a practical matter, the Limitation Act would be weakened if the Extension Act

eliminated the Limitation Act’s ability to independently support admiralty jurisdiction. Without

the independent grant shown in Richardson, some vessel owners would be restricted from limiting

damages based on their physical location alone. For example, without the Limitation Act’s

independent grant of admiralty jurisdiction, Respondent would be unable to limit damages as a

vessel owner. Yet, if the owner was one hundred meters away from its moored location and beyond

the sea barriers, the vessel would be within admiralty jurisdiction under either section 1333 or the

Extension Act, and thus, could proceed under the Limitation Act. This arbitrary distinction is

inconsistent with the Limitation Act’s purpose, which allows vessel owners to limit liability and

benefit the shipbuilding industry. For this reason, the Limitation Act should be read to grant an

independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, thus allowing vessel owners, such as Respondent, to

limit liability in furtherance of the Act’s purpose.

D. The Limitation Act, as defined in Richardson, neatly fits within Article III’s

Constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction.

The Limitation Act, granting district courts admiralty jurisdiction for all actions pursuant

to the Act, is constitutional under Article III of the Constitution. Article III empowers Congress to

grant federal courts jurisdiction over “all cases of admiralty and maritime [j]urisdiction.” See U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388, 1924 AMC 551, 554

(1924) (explaining that “Congress is empowered by the constitutional provision to alter, qualify or

supplement the maritime rules”). Section 1333 authorizes federal courts jurisdiction over “[a]ny

civil cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . . ” 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Admiralty jurisdiction

under section 1333, however, does not cover the full extent of Article III’s grant. For example, the

Extension Act stretches admiralty jurisdiction to include torts committed by vessels consummated

on land. 46 U.S.C. § 30101. Before the Extension Act, jurisdiction under section 1333 was limited

27

to torts on navigable waters. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 253, 1973 AMC at 4–5. Thus, Article III

confers broader jurisdiction to district courts than defined by section 1333.

The Limitation Act, as Richardson characterized, is constitutional under Article III. Section

1333 does not confer all admiralty jurisdiction granted by Article III. Additionally, this Court has

recognized that the Limitation Act’s statutory grant of jurisdiction should be applied broadly,

holding that limitation proceedings “differs[] from the ordinary admiralty suit, in that . . . the court

of admiralty has power . . . to do what is exception in a court of admiralty—to grant an injunction,

and by such injunction bring litigants, who do not have claims which are strictly admiralty claims,

into admiralty court.” Hartford Accident, 273 U.S. at 218, 1927 AMC at 408. (emphasis added).

Therefore, if the Limitation Act’s prerequisites are met, admiralty jurisdiction should be granted

under the Limitation Act if: (1) the structure seeking the benefit of the Act is a “vessel”; and, (2)

the liabilities exceed the value of the owner’s interest in the vessel. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–12. These

requirements, primarily the vessel requirement, limit the scope of admiralty jurisdiction similar to

how section 1333 limits admiralty jurisdiction with the navigable waters requirement. See

Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 253, 1973 AMC at 4.3 Such a limitation, based on this Court’s vessel

test, clearly has a “genuine salty flavor.” Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742, 1961 AMC at 842. As such, the

Limitation Act’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction is limited, and therefore within Article III’s

constitutional grant.

This Court should find that the Limitation Act independently confers admiralty jurisdiction

because: (1) Richardson’s construction of the Limitation Act fits neatly within the constitutional

confines of Article III; (2) Richardson correctly held that the Limitation Act independently grants

3 With recent cases like Lozman and Stewart, satisfying the vessel test is no easy matter. See David W. Robertson &

Michael F. Sturley, Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does Lozman Set a New Course, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 393

(2013).

28

admiralty jurisdiction; and, (3) Respondent has satisfied the Limitation Act’s requirements.

Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should be affirmed.

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(A)(3) DOES NOT GRANT INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS WHEN A LOWER

COURT HAS UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF A CLAUSE LIMITING LIABILITY BUT NOT REACHED

THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL LIABILITY.

The Fourth Circuit properly denied Petitioners’ interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §

1292(a)(3) because the district court had not “determin[ed] the rights and liabilities of the parties.”

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (2012). In general, the final judgment rule permits the courts of appeals to

have jurisdiction over all final district court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (emphasis added).

While appellate courts are generally prohibited from hearing interlocutory orders under the final

judgment rule, section 1292(a)(3) presents an exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Section 1292(a)(3), as

argued by Petitioners, grants jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of “such district courts and

judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, to admiralty cases . . . .” Id.

(emphasis added). Thus, an appellate court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals if: (1) the

case is in admiralty; and, (2) the district court determined the rights and liabilities of the parties.

Id. Although the Limitation Act confers admiralty jurisdiction and thus meets the first requirement,

this Court should uphold the Fourth Circuit’s decision because a ruling on limitation is not a

determination of a right or liability. Specifically, in phase one, the district court found that

“Seafood Shack was entitled to limit its liability (if any) under the Act,” however, the district court

did not meet the second requirement because it did not “determine the rights and liabilities of the

parties.” R. 2a. (emphasis added).

29

A. Because the Limitation Act confers admiralty jurisdiction, this case meets the

first requirement for granting an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §

1292(a)(3).

The court of appeals properly held that “section 1292(a)(3) is generally applicable

[]because this is properly an admiralty case[].” R. 4a. The parties agree that, if applicable, the

Limitation Act provides the only grounds to establish an “independent basis for admiralty

jurisdiction” and, hence, federal jurisdiction. Id. The Fourth Circuit followed the long-held

precedent of Richardson, concluding that the Limitation Act independently confers admiralty

jurisdiction. Id. Because the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that the Limitation Act confers

admiralty jurisdiction, the first requirement of a section 1292(a)(3) interlocutory appeal is met.

B. Granting an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) is improper

because the district court did not determine the rights and liabilities of the

parties.

The Fourth Circuit rightly dismissed Petitioners’ interlocutory appeal because it lacks

appellate jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(3). The court’s narrow construction of section

1292(a)(3) aligns with the statute’s plain text, historical purpose, and the interpretation of most

circuit courts.

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)’s plain text and historical purpose support a

narrow reading.

The statutory language and historical purpose of section 1292(a)(3) justify the Fourth

Circuit’s holding — applying the statute with a narrow scope. Section 1292(a)(3) states that the

courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges

thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Historically,

this statute was enacted to increase efficiency in bifurcated admiralty trials. City of Fort Madison

v. Emerald Lady, 990 F.2d 1086, 1089, 1993 AMC 2091, 2094 (8th Cir. 1993). The district court

would rule first on the issue of liability and, if found, hold a second hearing assessing damages.

30

Id. (citing St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co. v. Petroleum Barge Co., 249 F.2d 906, 907, 1958

AMC 506, 509–10 (8th Cir. 1957) (highlighting the practice of establishing liability before

damages). This allowed “parties to appeal the finding of liability on the merits, before undergoing

the long, burdensome, and perhaps unnecessary damages proceeding.” Id. at 1089, 1958 AMC at

2095 (noting Congress’s intended purpose of section 1292(a)(3), which permitted parties to appeal

prior to the lengthy and costly process of ascertaining damages) (emphasis added).

However, because interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored, section 1292(a)(3) serves

only as a narrow exception to the final judgment rule. Under section 1291, the courts of appeals

“shall have jurisdiction in all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 (emphasis added). According to the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he finality requirement of 1291 is

an important component of the judicial structure . . .” Evergreen Int’l (USA) Corp. v. Standard

Warehouse, 33 F.3d 420, 423, 1995 AMC 635, 639 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, section 1291: (1)

“prevents the entanglement of the district and appellate courts in each other’s adjudications in an

unruly and ultimately inefficient way;” and, (2) “helps the appellate courts from issuing opinions

that would tend . . . to be advisory in nature.” Id. For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit has found it

best to approach any ambiguity in section 1292(a)(3) by “constru[ing] this exceptive statute

narrowly, and thus limit[ing] the statute’s special treatment.” Id. at 425, 1995 AMC at 642.

In the present case, the Fourth Circuit properly adopted a strict constructionist approach to

section 1292(a)(3) and dismissed the appeal. The district court bifurcated the trial and “issued an

opinion holding that (1) that it had admiralty jurisdiction under the Limitation Act, and (2) Seafood

Shack was entitled to limit its liability (if any) under the Act.” R. 2a. Because the district court had

not yet “determine[d] whether Seafood Shack [was] liable to any of the claimants,” the court of

appeals could not hear the interlocutory appeal under section 1292(a)(3). Id. Because the district

31

court had not reached a “final determination of rights and liabilities,” allowing an interlocutory

appeal under section 1292(a)(3) would have been inconsistent with Congressional intent. U.S. v.

Lake George, 224 F.2d 117, 118, 1955 AMC 1519, 1521 (1955). The purpose of section 1292(a)(3)

has been to allow “parties to appeal the finding of liability on the merits, before undergoing the

long, burdensome, and perhaps unnecessary damages proceeding.” City of Fort Madison, 990 F.2d

at 1089, 1993 AMC 2095 (citing St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co., 249 F.2d at 906, 1958 AMC

at 509). By hearing an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals would have been challenging the

statute’s core purpose and exposing parties to a potentially lengthy and costly process. Therefore,

Petitioners do not have appellate jurisdiction under the narrow scope of section 1292(a)(3).

2. As a majority of circuits, this Court should narrowly construe section

1292(a)(3) as a limited exception to the final judgment rule.

This Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s judgment because it is consistent with the

jurisprudence of other circuits. A majority of circuits have read and “repeatedly interpreted”

section 1292(a)(3) as a narrow exception “requiring a decision on the merits of the claims or

defenses underlying the dispute as a predicate for jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Martha’s Vineyard Scuba

Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1063–

64, 1988 AMC 1109 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Once the district court's admiralty jurisdiction has been

established, § 1292(a)(3) takes hold if it can be demonstrated that an order which an aggrieved

party seeks to appeal (1) is interlocutory, and (2) finally determines the rights and liabilities of the

parties as to the particular issue.”); Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d

86, 88 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that an order did not fall under section 1292(a)(3) because the

statute “permits interlocutory appeals only when the order appealed from has the effect of

ultimately determining the rights and obligations of the parties with regard to the merits of the

litigation”); St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co., 249 F.2d at 908, 1958 AMC at 511 (dismissing an

32

appeal for want of jurisdiction). This approach properly recognizes that Congress did not intend to

allow interlocutory appeals in admiralty cases other than those where the rights and liabilities have

been determined. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454, 458, 1935 AMC 423

(1935).

For example, the Third Circuit noted that section 1292(a)(3) has “remained constant since

1926,” allowing appeals “upon the final determination of rights and liabilities . . . .” U.S. v. Lake

George, 224 F.2d at 118, 1955 AMC at 1521. Because the lower court’s order was not final in

Lake George, the court of appeals dismissed. Id. at 119, 1955 AMC at 1522. The court explained

that “[f]or an order to be appealable as ‘final’, it must be a complete disposition of the cause, the

guiding principle being against piecemeal or fragmentary review.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit has also warned against piecemeal review for interlocutory appeals

because “there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended [broad appellate jurisdiction] . . .

contrary to its long-established policy.” Emerick v. Lambert, 187 F.2d 786, 788 (1951). In Emerick,

the operator of a motor boat drowned after his boat was struck by petitioner’s motor boat. Id. at

787. Petitioner filed for limitation and exoneration from liability. Id. The court of appeals relied

on section 1292(a)(3) and dismissed the appeal because “all the orders appealed from were

preliminary steps to bring both actions to the final issue and determination.” Id. at 788. The court

clarified that the “rights and liabilities of the parties” or “merits of the controversies between them”

were not decided by the district court. Id. Therefore, this determination requirement in section

1292(a)(3) safeguards against “clog[ing] the wheels of justice” by refusing to hear any and every

lower court ruling. Id.

The Fifth Circuit has also narrowly construed section 1292(a)(3). In In re Ingram Towing,

petitioners sought to limit liability after individuals were injured from an oil spill. In re Ingram

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Towing Co. v. Adnac, Inc., 59 F.3d 513, 514, 1995 AMC 2441 (5th Cir. 1995). The claimants

amended their complaint to include the petitioner’s insurer, but the district court’s order held that

suits against the insurers were enjoined. Id. at 515, 1995 AMC at 2442. To challenge this holding,

claimants filed for an interlocutory appeal, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction. Id. at 514, 1995 AMC at 2443. Appellate jurisdiction under sections 1292(a)(1)

and (3) were inapplicable because the order did not determine the rights and liabilities of the

parties. Id. at 517, 1995 AMC at 2445–46. The Fifth Circuit has held that “an order is final only

when it ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.’” U.S. v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber

Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981)). As a result, the In re Ingram Court found that the order

stayed the state court suit until the federal limitation proceeding concluded, but the district court

had not yet decided whether the insurer was liable. Id. The district court’s only determination was

that the claimants could sue the insurer. Id. Thus, the court strictly applied section 1292(a)(3) to

require that the district court first determine the rights and liabilities of the parties before an

interlocutory appeal.

Alternatively, other circuits have adopted a misguided, overly broad interpretation of

section 1292(a)(3). Under Carman Tool, the Ninth Circuit has permitted courts of appeals to

exercise jurisdiction even though liability vel non has not been determined. Carman Tool &

Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, 871 F.2d 897, 898, 1989 AMC 913, 919 (9th Cir. 1989). For

example, in Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., the court concluded that the district court need not

decide whether the defendant is liable. 306 F.3d 827, 832, 2002 AMC 2270, 2274–76 (9th Cir.

2002). The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant after her husband fell from a cruise ship

and drowned. Id. at 830, 2002 AMC at 2271. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for

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partial summary judgment limiting liability. Id. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit decided to hear the

interlocutory appeal, referencing Carman Tool and Vision Air Flight Service. Id. at 832, 2002

AMC at 2276 (citing Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1999 AMC

1168 (9th Cir. 1998)). While the court addressed out-of-circuit cases, it determined that section

1292(a)(3) was read too narrowly — courts were not addressing the “practical problem posed by

limitations on liability” where an “economically rational plaintiff [would] not ordinarily pursue

[a] case to judgment.” Id. at 834, 2002 AMC at 2276. The court reasoned that a strict reading of

section 1292(a)(3) could create an impossible barrier to interlocutory appeals in many admiralty

cases, especially those “where such appeals [were] most needed.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has

similarly held that section 1292(a)(3) gives a broad grant of appellate jurisdiction, holding in In re

Aramark Sports that although the only requirement for section 1292(a)(3) is that “a right or liability

of a party [be] determined,” the “bailiwick of §1292(a)(3) is not final decisions.” In re Aramark

Sports & Entm’t Servs., 831 F.3d 1264, 1275, 2016 AMC 2138, 2149 (10th Cir. 2016).

While the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have generally adopted a broad interpretation, the Ninth

Circuit has been notably inconsistent, at times narrowly reading the statute as an exception to the

final judgment rule. For example, in Seattle First Nat’l Bank, the court refused to assert its

appellate jurisdiction because the requirements of section 1292(a)(3) were unmet. Seattle-First

Nat’l Bank v. Bluewater P’ship, 772 F.2d 565, 568, 1986 AMC 1296, 1304 (9th Cir. 1985). The

court relied heavily on the reasoning and practices of its sister courts to recognize that section

1292(a)(3) is an exception to be construed narrowly. Id. at 568–69, 1986 AMC at 1300–01. In light

of the Ninth Circuit’s inconsistency, courts of appeals should depart from Carman Tool’s broad

approach because without discussion, the court assumed jurisdiction even though liability vel non

had not been determined, and cited no authority for its jurisdictional decision. Carman Tool, 871

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F.2d at 899, 1989 AMC at 914. In contrast, the majority approach respects the plain text and

Congress’s intended purpose for section 1292(a)(3) to be narrowly applied as an exception to the

final judgment rule.

Along with a majority of circuits, this Court should accept a narrow interpretation and

application of section 1292(a)(3). The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Ingram Towing is

comparable to Sally’s Seafood Shack, Inc., with both circuit courts dismissing appeals from the

district courts for failing to establish limitation proceedings. In re Ingram Towing, 59 F.3d 513 at

517, 1995 AMC at 2445; R. 1a. Whereas the district court in In re Ingram Towing decided when

the claimants could sue the insurer, the district court in Sally’s Seafood Shack, Inc. concluded that

if Respondent had liability then it could be limited. 59 F.3d at 517, 1995 AMC at 2445; R. 2a. This

is important because Petitioners will likely note the Fourth Circuit’s appreciation of the Ninth and

Tenth Circuits’ broad approach. R. 5a. (discussing how “it is abundantly clear that the district court

has determined that Seafood Shack will not bear any real liability for the claimants’ injuries.”). In

support, Petitioners will likely cite the district court’s finding that “the explosion that sank the

Flamingo was caused solely by the negligence of John Calhoun . . . . He, and he alone, was simply

negligent.” R. 13a, 14a.

Yet, what Petitioners will likely overlook is the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that “a right or

liability of a party ha[s] been determined.” Id. Here, the situation giving rise to section 1292(a)(3)

is inversed; Respondent’s liability has not been established, but its damages, if any, have been

limited. Because the district court did not establish liability, Petitioners do not satisfy the second

requirement of section 1292(a)(3).

Moreover, this Court should agree with a narrow application of section 1292(a)(3) because

appellate courts should guard against piecemeal or fragmentary review. Lake George, 224 F.2d at

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119. Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Emerick, this Court should refuse to “clog the wheels

of justice” by hearing cases that are not ripe for appeal. 187 F.2d at 788. In fact, if the Fourth

Circuit had accepted jurisdiction over Sally’s Seafood Shack Inc., the reasons generally disfavoring

interlocutory appeals would be present. Evergreen Int’l (USA) Corp, 33 F.3d at 423, 1989 AMC

at 639. Specifically, affirming appellate jurisdiction could: (1) “entangle[] . . . district and appellate

courts . . . in an unruly and ultimately inefficient way;” and, (2) lessen the persuasiveness of

appellate courts issuing opinions. Id. For example, if the district court is not required to determine

rights and liabilities before an interlocutory appeal: (1) the parties could have numerous appeals,

increasing financial and time costs; (2) the courts’ dockets could become further backlogged and

delayed; and, (3) lower courts’ decisions could be challenged and overturned by appellate courts

more frequently, undermining lower courts’ authority. Alternatively, allowing less litigation to

proceed directly through the courts is more efficient and practical. And so, by requiring both

requirements of section 1292(a)(3) be met, this Court encourages judicial efficiency, restraint, and

integrity.

3. A broad interpretation of section 1292(a)(3) would not effectively solve the

practical problems posed by limitation of liability.

The Fourth Circuit recognizes the practical implications of hearing and affirming the

district court’s limitation decision — it could effectively end the case. R. 5a. In Wallis, the Ninth

Circuit explained how narrowly interpreting section 1292(a)(3) does not address the “practical

problem posed by limitations on liability” where an “economically rational plaintiff [would] not

ordinarily pursue [a] case to judgment.” Wallis, 306 F.3d at 834, 2002 AMC at 2276. Here,

Petitioner could argue that if this Court upholds the limitation, the parties would not likely continue

litigating to determine whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner, because the amount in question

would be less than $1,000.00. R. 10a.

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Petitioners’ argument appears logical because this Court’s decision that an interlocutory

appeal is proper, and that Respondent’s limitation applies, could likely terminate litigation. Yet,

this Court has final authority to decide liability. A narrow reading of section 1292(a)(3) permits

plaintiffs to abandon further litigation or for defendants to stipulate and pay limited damages.

Alternatively, granting an interlocutory appeal after a district or appellate decision would not end

a case — a district or appellate ruling limiting liability would be immediately appealable. As a

result, (1) plaintiffs with limited remedies in the district or appeals courts could push for reversal

of interlocutory appeals rather than abandoning cases, or (2) defendants could forego stipulating

liability for fear of reversal. Parties in either scenario would seek a trial on the merits to establish

liability vel non, unless this Court holds that the Limitation Act applies and section 1292(a)(3)

should be narrowly read.

Adopting a strict constructionist approach, the Fourth Circuit correctly refused appellate

jurisdiction over Petitioners’ appeal. The district court did not establish liability during phase one

and thus the court of appeals did not have appellate jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(3). This

Court should uphold the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that such a judgment is not appealable.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Respondent Sally’s Seafood Shack, Inc. requests that this Court affirm

the Fourth Circuit’s finding that the Limitation Act grants an independent basis for Respondent to

limit its liability. Furthermore, Respondent also asks that this Court uphold the Fourth Circuit’s

ruling that denied Petitioners’ petition for an interlocutory appeal because the district court did not

determine the rights and liabilities of the parties as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).