Report of Investigation

into the Collision between

“CSCL HAMBURG” and “LIAN HUA FENG”

in the position 30º 36.2’N 123º 10.5’E

on 5 March 2008

Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the

Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly

Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident

Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to

determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the

safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the

incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular

organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be

taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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Table of Contents

Page

1 Summary 1

2 Description of the vessels 3

3 Sources of evidence 7

4 Outline of events 8

5 Analysis of evidence 20

6 Conclusions 26

7 Recommendations 28

8 Submissions 29

Summary

1.1 At about 2101 on 5 March 2008, a Hong Kong registered container ship CSCL

HAMBURG collided with a Chinese registered bulk carrier LIAN HUA FENG near

Zhoushan Islands in East China Sea at approximate position 30º 36.2’N 123º 10.5’E

(Figure 1).

Figure 1 – The position of collision and the planned routes of the vessels CSCL Hamburg and Lian Hua Feng

1.2 CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG were in converging course when

approaching to an alteration point of the planned route by CSCL HAMBURG in

approximate position 30º 32.25’N 123º 10.55’E with the 3rd Officers on navigational

watch on both vessels. At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine,

the wind was north-easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 8 to 10 nautical

miles (n.m.).

1.3 Large area of the port side abaft midships (hull structural and cargo hold transverse

bulkheads between container Bay 38 and Bay 42) and port quarter (near Bay 62) of

CSCL HAMBURG sustained serious hull damages. Four containers also fell onto the

forecastle deck of LIAN HUA FENG. LIAN HUA FENG lost her starboard anchor

and sustained damage on the bow and starboard side between No.2 and No.3 cargo

holds after the collision. No casualties and oil pollution were reported from both

vessels.

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1.4 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision:

CSCL HAMBURG was the vessel overtaking the other vessel LIAN HUA

FENG, the 3rd Officer of CSCL HAMBURG failed to keep clear of LIAN HUA

FENG which was the vessel being overtaken as required by the Collision

Regulations (COLREGS).

LIAN HUA FENG was the stand-on vessel and being overtaken by CSCL

HAMBURG. When the 3rd Officer on navigational watch of LIAN HUA

FENG found his vessel so close that collision could not be avoided by the

give-way vessel CSCL HAMBURG alone, he failed to take necessary actions

to avoid collision.

Both 3rd Officers relied on VHF radio communication and the unreliable

agreement of the intention of the other vessel rather than calling the master or

taking positive and early action to avoid collision.

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2. Description of the vessels

2.1 CSCL HAMBURG

Port of Registry : HONG KONG, CHINA

Call Sign : VRBH6

IMO No. : 9224300

Type : Container Vessel

Year of Built : 2001

Gross Tonnage : 39,941

Net Tonnage : 24,458

Length Overall : 245.15 metres

Breadth : 32.25 metres

Summer Draft : 12.626 metres

Main Engine : HSD-MAN B&W 8K90MC-C

Engine Power : 36,480 kW

Service Speed : 25.2 knots

CSCL HAMBURG is a container ship classed with Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The

navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has

totally 9 cellular cargo holds and has a maximum container carrying capacity of 1,584

Twentyfoot Equivalent Unit (TEU) below deck and 2,669 TEU on deck.

The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic

identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting

Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

The vessel was proceeding to Shanghai from Hong Kong at the time of the accident.

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Figure 2 – Photograph of CSCL HAMBURG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circles after the collision

2.2 LIAN HUA FENG

Port of Registry : GUANGZHOU, CHINA

Call Sign : BRUM

IMO No. : 9230361

Type : Bulk Carrier

Built: Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Co. Ltd., Shanghai of China

Year of Built: 2001

Gross Tonnage : 39,894

Net Tonnage : ` 25,925

Length Overall : 225 metres

Breadth : 32.26 metres

Maximum Draft : 14.017 metres

Main Engine : MAN-B&W5S60MC – MK6

Engine Power : 10200 kW

Service Speed : 15.9 knots

LIAN HUA FENG is a bulk carrier classed with China Classification Society (CCS). The

navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has

totally 7 cargo holds.

The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic

identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting

Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

The vessel was bound for Qinhuangdao from Zhangzhou, China.

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Figure 3 – Photograph of LIAN HUA FENG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circle after the collision

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3. Sources of Evidence

3.1 Master and duty crew members of CSCL HAMBURG;

3.2 Master and duty crew members of LIAN HUA FENG;

3.3 Zhou Shan MSA (Maritime Safety Administration) of The People’s Republic of

China;

3.4 Marine Department of Hong Kong SAR, The People’s Republic of China.

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4. Outline of events

All times are local (UTC+8) ship’s time.

4.1 Account of CSCL HAMBURG

.1 On 4 March 2008 CSCL HAMBURG departed from Hong Kong to Shanghai.

.2 After departing Hong Kong, she was making an economic speed of about

19.5 knots at 86-87 revolutions per minute (RPM) to Shanghai. She was

scheduled to pick up pilot at Chang Jiang Kou Pilot Station at 0530 on 6

March 2008.

.3 At 2000 on 5 March 2008, 3rd Officer and the Able Seaman were on

navigational watch on the bridge. The voyage-planned course was 017°T and

the steering course was 012°T to counteract leeway and current set with

speed at 21.8 knots. The visibility was more than 8-10 n.m. with a slight sea

and no current.

.4 The ship does not require to install sound reception system onboard to enable

navigator in an enclosed navigational bridge to listen the environment and

sound signal outside the ship. The bridge doors were closed until the Master

was called by the 3rd Officer just before collision.

.5 Two radars (one X-band and one S-band radar with ARPA used for radar

plotting) were in operation and both were set on 12 n.m. range scale. The 3rd

Officer set the radars on 6 n.m. range scale when the other vessel was at short

distance before collision.

.6 There were about 4 to 5 fishing boats and other vessels in sight. The stern

light of the other vessel (later known as LIAN HUA FENG) with an unknown

heading and a speed of 15 knots, was sighted about 2 points on the port bow

and at a distance of about 6-7 n.m.

.7 At 2015, the 3rd Officer informed the Master that his vessel would be at the

marked position of one-hour notice to engine room on the working chart (see

Fig. 4) at about 2045. The 3rd Officer also informed the Master that there

were very few fishing vessels and the route was well clear.

.8 At 2030, the course recorder indicates the heading was changed from 013° to

022°T to give a wide berth for a south bound vessel passing on port side

between LIAN HUA FENG and CSCL HAMBURG (see Fig 4).

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Figure 4 The AIS position plot of the southbound vessel passing between Lian Hua Feng and

CSCL Hamburg at 2030

MMSI

Time of

Data

Ship

Name

Call S

IMO

ig

ati

n

English

translation Ship

Type

Destin

on

ETA

Longitud

.9 At 2035, the vessel position was plotted on the working chart and the GPS

position fix was on the planned route. The stern light of LIAN HUA FENG

was sighted with an unknown heading and the speed remained at 15 knots

bearing about 4 points on the port bow and at a distance of about 3 to 4 n.m.

.10 At 2042, LIAN HUA FENG was found proceeding at a constant speed of 15

knots at a distance of about 2 n.m.

.11 The 3rd Officer reported to the Master by telephone that the vessel was at the

position marked one-hour notice to engine room and also informed the engine

room to prepare manoeuvring of main engine after one hour. The Master

asked the 3rd Officer the traffic condition again and was informed it was well

clear. At about the same time, the 3rd Officer called LIAN HUA FENG with

the ship name obtained from AIS by VHF radio and inform that CSCL

HAMBURG would be altering course after 10 minutes. The 3rd Officer later

informed the Master that a vessel was approaching the alteration waypoint in

10 minutes time and he had requested the vessel (LIAN HUA FENG) to alter

course to port to allow safe passing.

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.12 At this moment, the vessel was about 6 minutes to go and at a distance of about

2.0 n.m. prior to alternation of next course 324°T at the waypoint WP135

ahead (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 - The working chart of CSCL Hamburg

.13 At 2052, LIAN HUA FENG was at a distance of about 1.5 n.m. and bearing 5

points on the port bow with a speed of 15 knots obstructing the alteration

point of the planned route by CSCL HAMBURG. The 3rd Officer called LIAN

HUA FENG again by VHF radio to inform CSCL HAMBURG would

overtake her and subsequently would alter course to port, and received the

agreement that LIAN HUA FENG would take avoiding action to alter course

to port. As the 3rd Officer found LIAN HUA FENG was on her port side with

a wreck ahead and some fishing boats fine on her starboard bow, the Master

was called to the bridge. The Able Seaman switched the steering from

autopilot to hand steering. When LIAN HUA FENG was almost abeam, the 3

rd Officer gave helm order port 5 for few seconds, then port 10 and midships.

The 3 rd Officer could not remember and was not sure whether the CPA

(Closest point of approach) and the course of other vessel had been checked

on the radar.

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.14 At 2053, after the steering was on midships, the Master was present on the

wheel house and sighted a vessel about 5-6 points on the port side at a very

close range of about 2 to 3 cables (0.2 to 0.3 n.m.) by his visual judgment.

The 3rd Officer explained the situation to the Master, who then ran out to the

bridge wing to assess the situation and returned to the wheelhouse and

instructed the 3rd Officer to increase the engine RPM in order to have better

rudder effect and then ordered the wheel hard to starboard. At this time the

vessel was only about 1 cable apart from LIAN HUA FENG on the port side.

.15 At 2055, despite the action taken to avoid collision by the Master, the vessels

collided with LIAN HUA FENG in position 30º37’N 123º 10.5’E. However

the ship’s time and position given above by the witnesses onboard were found

different from the AIS time 2101 and the position 30º 36.2’N 123º 10.5’E of

the time of collision recorded by China MSA (see Section 4.3 to compare

them with the AIS record).

.16 The heading CSCL HAMBURG was recorded by ship’s course recorder

during the accident (see figures 6 & 7).

Figure 6 - The course recording paper shows the un-calibrated heading of CSCL HAMBURG during the accident

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Figure 7 The enlarged portion of CSCL Hamburg heading record after calibrated to the stylus margins by

the imposed vertical blue course line.

4.2 Account of LIAN HUA FENG

.1 On 4 March 2008, the vessel LIAN HUA FENG departed from Zhangzhou (漳

州), China for Qinhuangdao (秦皇島), China to load cargo.

.2 At about 1950 on 5 March 2008, the 3rd Officer came on the bridge and

relieved the 2nd Officer at 2000 with a duty sailor on watch. The visibility

was over 5 n.m. with a leeway about 2º-3º to port, wind was NE with force 5,

and sea had a height of one meter.

.3 The Master was also on the bridge to ensure the traffic condition was all right

before he went down to have a rest 10 minutes later. The traffic density was

not very high and the engine was under bridge control at full sea speed (93-94

RPM) that was making about 13 knots.

.4 At about 2030, the vessel was proceeding on course 022º with a speed of 15.6

knots in position 30º 31.2N 123º 09.12E. A vessel (later known as CSCL

HAMBURG) was first observed on radar screen with an unknown bearing at a

distance about 3 n.m., she was on a course of 005º and a speed of 22.1 knots.

.5 At about 2045, CSCL HAMBURG requested to overtake LIAN HUA FENG

by VHF radio and the 3rd Officer of LIAN HUA FENG replied that CSCL

HAMBURG could overtake his vessel but keep a safe distance when passing

the vessel. An affirmative reply was received from CSCL HAMBURG. Both

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ARPA radars were in operation and in North up true vector moment mode,

port radar was set on 6 n.m. range and starboard radar was set on 3 n.m. range

in order to prevent changing range scale frequently. After the VHF radio

contact and the CPA of CSCL HAMBURG on the ARPA was about 0.4 n.m,

LIAN HUA FENG changed to hand steering.

.6 At about 2052, the 3rd Officer observed that CSCL HAMBURG was

approaching at a distance of about 0.7 n.m. on the radar. He requested the

overtaking vessel by VHF radio to keep a safe distance when passing from his

vessel. Later he gave 5 rapid flashes of light signal to the overtaking vessel.

.7 At about 2053, CSCL HAMBURG was overtaking from a bearing 30-40º

abaft the starboard beam with a distance of 0.5-0.6 n.m. and her course and

speed was about 007º and 21.8 knots. About 4-5 fishing vessels were

observed and stayed together about 10-15º on her port bow at a distance of

0.6 n.m. and also a few isolated fishing vessels without clear intention was

observed on radar screen.

.8 At about 2059 the distance was about 0.3 n.m. when CSCL HAMBURG’s

bow overtook the stern of LIAN HUA FENG, the 3rd Officer ordered to put the

helm hard to port and gave a warning light signal of 5 short flashes to the

vessel overtaking.

.9 At about 2102, the container vessel was abeam of LIAN HUA FENG. The 3rd

Officer did not check the course of the container vessel, as she was only

0.2-0.3 n.m. from his vessel. However, the container vessel was sighted

proceeding not on a parallel course and was observed on a converging course

toward LIAN HUA FENG. The helm was already on hard to port but the

ship’s heading was still not turning, therefore the 3rd Officer reduced to slow

ahead and later stop the engine.

.10 About 2104, the 3rd Officer saw the bow of the vessel overtaking was slowly

crossing the bow of LIAN HUA FENG and the port side midships section of

the container vessel collided with the bow of bulk carrier afterward. After the

first contact, second contact soon occurred at the port quarter of CSCL

HAMBURG with No.2 and No.3 holds on starboard side of the bulk carrier

due to swinging motion of both vessels. The time shown on radar was 2105

and the collision angle between the vessels was about 10 degrees in position

30º 36.3’N 123º 10.1’E. The time and position recorded by the vessel were

different from the time and position of AIS recorded by China MSA (see

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section 4.3 to compare them with the AIS records).

.11 At the time of collision, 3rd Engineer in the engine room found the engine

room was vibrating seriously with main engine alarm and smoke came out

from turbo charger and also feel the engine was stopped at about 2055 (the

time in engine room and in the wheel house were found not synchronized, see

Section 4.3 to compare with the AIS record).

.12 The Master came to the bridge soon after the collision happened.

.13 The heading of LIAN HUA FENG was recorded by ship’s course recorder

during the accident (see figure 8).

Figure 8 - The enlarged portion of Lian Hua Feng’s heading record

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.14 The following damages were found on LIAN HUA FENG:

starboard anchor was lost;

ship side (frame 234-243) cracked about 8-10m above summer load

line;

frame 234 deformed and ship side plating was dented with an area

about 15m²; and

two cracks were found on the bulbous bow and the frame deformed.

4.3 AIS data recorded by China MSA VTS

Both vessels, CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG, were equipped with AIS

(Automatic Identification System) onboard. The AIS tracks of both vessels recorded

by China MSA revealed their ship identities, GPS (Global Positioning System)

positions, courses and speeds over ground transmitted from their AIS between 2000

and 2102 on 5 March 2008. Actions taken onboard by both vessels between 2000

and 2102 on 5 March 2008 with un-calibrated ship’s time are tabulated against the

time recorded by China MSA for comparison as below:

5.Mar.2008

Local Time

by AIS

record

CSCL HAMBURG

Container Ship

LIAN HUA FEING

Bulk Carrier

REMARKS

2000 All Time is local ship’s time.

CR 015º, AIS 011.6º x 21.8K

OV Brg 3-4 points on port

bow, Dist. 6-7n.m., Visibility

>5.n.m., Leeway 2-3º Port

2015: 3/O informed Master,

2045 ETA to position of 1 hr

notice and traffic clear

All Time is local ship’s time.

CR 022º, AIS 016º x 15.5K

Master stayed on W/H for 10

min, fishing vessel not dense,

wind NE5, sea 1m, 3/0

visibility >5 n.m., leeway 2-3

port.

South bound vessel

“DENG ZHOU HAI” AIS

197.7º x 12.3K

2005 2005 CR 013º, 2020 CR 015º

2025 AC to Starboard

2016 AC to port

2020 CR 018º

2027 AIS 016.5º x 21.5K CR 018º, AIS 015.0º x 15.6K

AC to starboard

South bound vessel

“DENG ZHOU HAI” AIS

206º x 12.2K and passing

between CSCL

HAMBURG and LIAN

15

HUA FENG

2030 CR 022º, AIS 018.2º x 21.5K

OV Brg 350º x Dist 2.98 n.m.

2025 CR 024º

AIS 022º x 15.6K,

3/O first observed CSCL

HAMBURG, overtaking on

starboard quarter distance 3

n.m. at 22º 31.2’N 123º

09.1’E, AIS 005T x 22.1K.

2040 CR 022º, AIS 018.6º x 21.6K

OV Brg 339º x Dist 2.19 n.m.

2042 OOW informed LIAN

HUA FENG that AC after 10

min. and informed Master

arrived in position of 1 hour

notice, about 2 n.m. from

WP135 in 6 min., traffic

clear.

2045 arrived at WP135 (30º

32’N 123º 10.85’E)

2048 AC from 022º to 001º

CR 024º, AIS 019º x 15.7K

2045, OV contacted by VHF

& overtaking on LIAN HUA

FENG Starboard side,

observed 4-5 F/V on port side

by radar, requested OV to

keep passing at safe dist, OV

replied understood.

OV CPA 0.4, Dist 1.5 n.m. on

ARPA, changed to hand

steering.

2050 CR 001º, AIS 017.7º x 21.4K

OV Brg 317º x Dist 1.5’

CR 024º, AIS 019º x 15.7K

2051 CR 001º, AIS 010.7º x 21.3K

CR 024º

2052 CR 001º, AIS 003.9º x 21.4K

Called OV and informed

overtaking her & AC to port ,

received agreement from OV

to AC to port

2052 OOW found OV Dist

0.7’ and distance closing,

requested CSCL HAMBURG

keep safe distance by VHF &

gave 5 rapid flashes of light

signal to CSCL HAMBURG,

some F/V 10º-15ºP x 0.6’,

CSCL HAMBURG on 30º-40º

abaft starboard beam x

0.5-0.6’, course 007 x 21K

was observed on radar

2053 CR 001º, AIS 357.5º x 21.4K

CR 024º

2055 CR 001º, AIS 358 x 21.7K

OV Brg 312º x. Dist 0.9 n.m.

2057 CR 001º, AIS 359.1º x 22.0K

AC course to starboard

AIS 018º x 15.6K

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2057 to 2058 AC from 001 to

007º

2058 CR007º, AC to port

AIS 006.0º x 22.1K

OV Brg 298º x 0.5’,

2052, 3/O called Master

about problem with OV on

port bow, called OV

confirmed she will AC to

port.,

CR 024º AC to port

205906 AIS 004.9º x 22.0K,

OV Brg 283º x Dist 0.4’

AC to starboard

CR 022º, AIS 017.4º x 15.7K,

CSCL HAMBURG’s bow

passing our stern, 2059 Dist

0.3 n.m., found CSCL

HAMBURG AC toward us,

AC hard to port,

010T when CSCL

HAMBURG collided with our

Stbd bow.

205933 CR 000º, AIS 001.9º x

21.6’K

AC hard to Starboard

Abt 2 min before collision,

helm hard to port, slow

ahead, later stop engine,

205955 AIS 352.7º x 21.1K

2053 Master on WH, sighted

OV abt 5-6 pt on port bow,

Dist abt 2-3 cables. Master

ran to wing and ran back to

WH, instructed to 3/O

increase engine rpm, order

ed Hard to Stbd. Dist of other

abt. 1 cable. No time to

contact and give signals to

OV.

AIS 017º x 15.7K

210020 CR 000º, AIS 347º x 20.9K,

OV Brg 260º x Dist 0.28 n.m.

(abt 500m)

CR 021º, AIS 016º x 15.7K

210103 AIS 336.2º x 20.9K,

OV Brg 240º x Dist 0.12

n.m.(abt 200m)

CR 020, AIS 018º x 15.6,

2102 OOW found OV

heading towards us, not on

parallel course.

17

Sighted OV dist 0.2-0.3 n.m.

abeam closing,

210127

Collision

(figure 9)

CR 332º,

AIS 335.4º x 20.9K,

30º 36’04”N 123º 10’28”E

Master: 2055 collision at

30º36.2’N 123º 10.5’E

CR020º, AIS 021º x 15.6K,

30º 36’04”N 123º 10’24”E

2nd contact on starboard hull

near No.2, 3 hold of CSCL

HAMBURG, Master feel

collision vibration and

arrived WH

The angle of collision was

about 40º

210153 AIS 336.4º x 19.7K

AIS 352.0º x 13.8K, CR

020º-000º,

(figure 10)

* Abbreviations used in the table above: AC: alter course, AIS: COG (Course over ground changed to: colour in red = port, green = starboard) & SOG (Speed

over ground) by Automatic Identification System from GPS position fix, Brg: Bearing, Dist: Distance, CR: Course Recorder gyro compass heading, FV: Fishing Vessel, GT: Gross Tonnage, LOA: Length overall, n.m.: Nautical Miles = 1852 meters, OV: Other vessel, rpm: engine Revolutions Per Minute, WH: Bridge/Wheel house.

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Figure. 9 The AIS position plot of CSCL Hamburg and Lian Hua Feng at 210127

Figure 10 - The AIS position plot of CSCL Hamburg and Lian Hua Feng soon after collision at 210153

5. Analysis of Evidence

The analysis was based on the information collected from both vessels.

5.1 Certification and Experience of Personnel

.1 The Indian Master of CSCL HAMBURG holds a valid Hong Kong Licence as

Master which was issued by recognition of his United Kingdom Certificate of

Competency. He has served about 9 months in a commanding position

including previous service contract on this ship.

.2 The Pilipino 3rd Officer of CSCL HAMBURG holds a valid Hong Kong

Licence as Deck Officer Class 3 which was issued by recognition of his

Philippines Certificate of Competency and he has served on board the vessel

as 3rd Officer for 10 months.

.3 The Chinese Master of LIAN HUA FENG holds a valid People’s Republic of

China’s Master Certificate of Competency. He has served onboard the vessel

on 21 January 2008 and has experience in a commanding position since 1992.

.4 The Chinese 3rd Officer of LIAN HUA FENG holds a valid People’s Republic

of China’s 3rd Officer Certificate of Competency and he has served on board

as 3rd officer for 7 months.

5.2 Conditions of weather and visibility

It was reported that the weather was fine with visibility of about 8 to 10 n.m. The

wind was NE’ly with force 3. The weather conditions were not considered

contributory factors to the accident.

5.3 Lookout

.1 The 3rd Officer on CSCL HAMBURG stated that the visibility was about 8 to

10 n.m. by observation and LIAN HUA FENG was sighted at 2000 at a

distance of about 6 to 7 n.m. well before the collision.

.2 The 3rd Officer on LIAN HUA FENG also stated that the visibility was very

good and over 5 n.m.. CSCL HAMBURG was first sighted at 2030 at a

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distance of about 3 n.m. on radar screen.

5.4 VHF Radio Communication

.1 The 3rd Officers on both vessels relied on VHF radio communication and

without realizing that the agreement reached on their proposed action was not

reliable and appropriate for collision avoidance. In case of doubt, they should

call their Master for early action.

.2 It is not safe and sound to use VHF radio communication for collision

avoidance instead of using radar plotting or equivalent systematic

observation (e.g. ARPA and AIS) to ensure the overtaking vessel passing at a

safe distance (i.e. until the vessel being overtaken is finally past clear) as

required by COLREGS. In addition, there is still the possibility of a

misunderstanding of agreement due to language difficulties between persons

of different nationalities. The agreed actions may not comply with the

COLREGS and thus lead to confusion and possible collision.

5.5 Actions taken by CSCL HAMBURG

.1 The 3rd Officer claimed that the course recorder was checked and found in

order during pre-Sailing Check by him in Hong Kong. However he did not

realize that an incorrect course recording paper, which was not matched to the

ship-heading stylus, was used.

.2 The vessel’s planned course was 015ºT, from 2000 the course was set on

012º. The stern light of the other vessel (later known as LIAN HUA FENG)

with an unknown heading with speed at 15 knots (AIS 15.5 knots) was

sighted at a bearing about 2 points on the port bow and at a distance about 6-7

n.m (6.1 n.m. as per AIS record) and from 2027 to 2030 the course (COG*)

was changed from 016º to 018º with a speed (SOG*) about 21.5 knots as per

AIS record.

.3 At 2048, the course recorder indicated that the heading was changing to port

continually from 022º to 001º until 2051. After the course was steady on 001º

* COG: Course over ground, SOG: Speed over ground of GPS transmitted by AIS

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for about 5 minutes, at about 2057 the vessel’s heading was changing to

starboard and stopped at 007º at 2058. However according to the AIS record

from 2050 to 2053, CSCL HAMBURG’s track was altering to port from the

course (COG) 018º to 358º and the course was steadied on about 000º until

2057.

Figure 11 The AIS plot of the vessels compared to the working chart showing

CSCL Hamburg overtaking from 2 points abaft the starboard beam of LIAN HUA

FENG (in the sector of sternlight)

.4 According to Rule 13 of COLREG, this was an overtaking situation when

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CSCL HAMBURG was coming up from a direction more than 22.5º abaft the

beam of LIAN HUA FENG after the first observation by sight. The CSCL

HAMBURG should keep out of the way of LIAN HUA FENG, which was

being overtaken (see Fig. 11).

.5 According to Rule 7 of COLREG, 3rd Officer of the CSCL HAMBURG failed

to use all available means to determine the risk of collision, including proper

use of the radar, AIS and ARPA. It appeared that he only relied on the use of

VHF in collision avoidance at sea without properly access the actual situation

by radar/ARPA and unaware of language problem and possibility of

misinterpretation. He failed to take early and substantial action to keep well

clear of the vessel being overtaken and to avoid collision in accordance with

the Rule 8. He did not consider slowing down his vessel to allow more time

to assess the situation or avoid collision (COLREG rule 8e) when the vessel

arrived at the next waypoint for course alteration.

.6 At 2058 large alteration of heading to port was found until 2059 when the

alteration to port stopped on 332º. Then large alteration of heading changed

to starboard was recorded until collision happened at about 2101 as per AIS

record.

.7 The 3rd Officer failed to assess and ensure the situation was safe before

altering course to port. He had contravened Rule 13 of COLREGS by not

keeping clear of the vessel being overtaken or slackening the vessel’s speed

or taking all way off by stopping or reversing the ship’s means of propulsion,

in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation.

.8 The turning circle under normal loaded condition of CSCL HAMBURG at full

sea speed (104 rpm) and with a maximum rudder angle, the advance is 0.477

n.m. and the transfer is 0.262 n.m.. When the Master was present on the

bridge about 1 to 2 minutes before collision, the distance of the other vessel

was only 2 to 3 cables.

.9 The main engine was not on standby for ship manoeuvring before collision,

which requires at least 15 to 20 minutes advanced notice, but crash stop can

be done anytime. The manoeuvring engine speed can be achieved

instantaneously once bypassing the speed programme and the crash stop can

be achieved in about 7.5 minutes within distance advance 1.5 nautical mile

(n.m.).

.10 The Master of CSCL HAMBURG was on the wheelhouse about 2 minutes

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before collision when LIAN HUA FENG was on a bearing 5 to 6 points from

port bow and a distance of 2 to 3 cables.

.11 Master’s Standing Orders of CSCL HAMBURG :

In paragraph 7 of the Master’s Standing Orders (MSO), it is stipulated

that “the master should be called/informed if traffic condition or

movement of other ships are causing concern and difficulty is

experienced in maintaining course and if the minimum required CPA of

2 n.m. cannot be met.”

In paragraph 23 of the MSO, it is stipulated that “Officer of the Watch

(OOW) shall ensure both radars to be running at sea at different ranges

appropriate to the prevailing circumstances, optimum control setting,

reliability on CPA of ARPA should be guarded against.”

In paragraph 25 of the MSO, it is stipulated that “collision avoidance to

be executed well in advance before a close quarters situation develops.”

.12 Both the Master and the 3rd Officer had signed the Master’s Standing Orders

but without entering the date of signature. In addition, there was also a record

of Bridge Team Management briefing note signed by all navigating officers

earlier at about noon time on the same day of the accident occurred that the

MSO has been confirmed by the bridge team including when they should call

the Master.

.13 However, the 3rd Officer did not follow the Master’s Standing Orders and did

not call the Master in accordance with the MSO until few minutes before

collision. There were discrepancies of documented record and the

implementation of the MSO.

5.6 Actions taken by LIAN HUA FENG

.1 In this situation, LIAN HUA FENG was a stand on vessel and she did keep her

course and speed, however as soon as it became apparent to her that CSCL

HAMBURG required to keep out of the way was not taking appropriate action

in compliance with the Rule 13(a) or collision could not be avoided by the

action of the give-way vessel alone, the 3rd Officer failed to take proper action

to avoid collision as required by Rule 17 (a) (b).

.2 According to Rules 7 and 8 of COLREG, the 3rd Officer of the LIAN HUA

FENG did not use all available means to make a full appraisal of the situation

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and to determine the risk of collision, including the proper use of the radar,

and all available means (e.g. ARPA and AIS).

.3 LIAN HUA FENG gave 5 rapid flashing light signal to the overtaking vessel

about 10 minutes before collision, but not together with sound signal. If

warning sound signal was given according to the COLREG, the Master of

both vessels might notice and arrive the bridge earlier and would have more

time to take appropriate action to avoid collision.

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6. Conclusions

The investigation has identified the following probable causes and contributory

factors:

6.1 Probable Causes

.1 the 3rd Officer of the overtaking vessel CSCL HAMBURG failed to comply

with COLREGS by not keeping a safe distance and passing well clear of

LIAN HUA FENG being overtaken;

.2 the 3rd Officers of the vessel being overtaken LIAN HUA FENG failed to

comply with COLREGS by taking avoiding action when he observed the

give-way vessel which was not taking appropriate action to keep clear of his

vessel;

.3 the 3rd Officers on both vessels relied on VHF radio communication and the

unreliable agreement of the intention of the other vessel rather than calling

the master or taking positive and early action to avoid collision.

Misunderstanding of agreement on radio in English might have occured

between the two 3rd Officers.

6.2 Contributory factors

.1 The 3rd Officer of LIAN HUA FENG did not give sound warning signal on the

whistle as soon as he became doubtful that the overtaking ship was taking

appropriate action to keep clear of his vessel.

.2 The collision regulations require that risk of collision should be determined

by all available means. Although the radars were being used by both vessels,

the Officers of the Watch (OOW) were not making use of the information

provided by the ARPA, AIS and the ship’s manoeuvring data to assist in

determining the risk of collision and action to avoid collision.

.3 Chapter VIII of the STCW Code sets out prescribed standards for performing

a navigational watch. It specifies that OOWs shall notify the master when in

doubt as to what action to take in the interest of safety. In this case, there was

no indication that the OOW of either vessel had notified his master early

before the vessels collided. Although the Master of CSCL HAMBURG was

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called and arrived the bridge just before collision but it was too late for him to

take any effective action to avoid collision. The onboard Safety Management

System was not implemented effectively by the bridge team member of CSCL

HAMBURG even a Bridge Team Management briefing was conducted on the

same day with emphasis on when to call the Master.

.4 Both 3rd Officers just faithfully abided by their respective planned route,

regardless of the fact that, both routes were converging to a collision course.

They did not check and maintain an overall appraisal of the situation, nor

were they prepared to modify the planned route or taking other avoiding

action such as to reduce their speed earlier to avoid collision.

.5 Although both OOWs held the required certificate of competency to stand the

watch, their experience as an OOW was not enough for all situations. The

Masters of both vessels had left the inexperienced watchkeeping officers

alone on the bridge in coastal waters. As this was the first vessel for the two

OOWs in charge a watch, the masters should have monitored closely the

performance of the officers and instructed them to act in accordance with the

required standard.

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7. Recommendations

7.1 A copy of the report is to be sent to the owner and Master of CSCL HAMBURG, the

owner and Master of LIAN HUA FENG and the Maritime Safety Administration of

China advising them the findings of the accident investigation.

7.2 The Companies and the Masters involved are required to review and enhance

training of the watchkeeping procedures to ensure:

.1 watch keeping officers, especially junior watch keeping officers, to call the

Master in ample time when necessary or when they are in doubt;

.2 junior watch keeping officers to gain enough practical watchkeeping

experience under close supervision or monitoring by qualified training

officer or Master; and/or by systematic simulator training before posting the

person to take charge of the navigational watch;

.3 watch keeping procedures and the onboard bridge team management to be

implemented effectively and verified by voyage records (e.g. VDR),

particularly with regard to: taking early avoiding action with proper

manoeuvring sound and light signal, in accordance with the COLREGS;

.4 VHF radio communication for collision avoidance aid should be used with

extreme caution.

7.3 A Merchant Shipping Information Note should be issued to draw the dangers in the

use of VHF radio in collision avoidance.

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8. Submissions

8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is criticized in an accident

investigation report, it is the policy of the Marine Department that a copy of the

relevant parts of the report is given to that person or organization so that he can have

an opportunity to rebut the criticism or offer evidence not previously available to the

investigating officer.

8.2 The relevant parts of the final draft of the report were sent to the following parties:

Master and 3rd Officer of CSCL HAMBURG via the management company;

Master and 3rd Officer of LIAN HUA FENG via China MSA.

8.3 No submission was received from the parties of the vessels in 8.2.