In the Matter of Attorney Lope e

8/12/2019 In the Matter of Attorney Lope e

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IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member ofthe Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.REMIGIO ESTEBIA,accused-appellant.

SANCHEZ, J .:

Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task ofascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a member of theBar deserve disciplinary action.

The problem arose because of facts that follow:

One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of FirstInstance of Samar,

1and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment.

His case came up before this Court on review.

On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, wasappointed by this Court as Estebia's counselde oficio. In the notice ofhis appointment, Adriano was required to prepare and file his briefwithin thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him toexamine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adrianoreceived this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19, 1967,

Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief inmimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a third filed onMarch 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for fifteen

days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. OnApril 21, he even sought a special extension of five days. All thesemotions for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26,1967. But no brief was filed.

On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause withinten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action should not betaken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapseof the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.

For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, thisCourt, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine ofP500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with awarning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution ofSeptember 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more

drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counselpaid no heed.

Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to showcause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not besuspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct andviolation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of thisCourt, the resolution was personally served upon him on December18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.

Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment.

1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to renderprofessional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who isunable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposedupon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service."

2A

lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", ourCanons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert hisbest efforts" in the indigent's behalf.

3

No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant'sbrief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he receivednotice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the lastshow cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient timewas afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. Thedeath sentence below imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The recordof the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists ofbut 31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. Infact, in his third motion for extension of time, he manifested that thedrafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way through" and that"additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessarycorrections, put in final form and print the said brief." In his motion forfourth extension, he intimated that the preparation of the brief "isalmost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and


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rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the samestencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text."His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse thathe "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting andrehashing some significant portions of said brief, which ailment

hampered and interrupted his work thereon for sometime." Finally, inhis "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that heneeded only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in finalform and have the same stencilled and mimeographed.lawphi1.nt

In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel'sstatements in his motions for extension have gone down to the levelof empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim toveracity.

It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that assuch counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one

employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case ofthe latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability inbehalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effectiveassistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, notmere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox thatresponsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It has beensaid that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding highstandards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend indigent personscharged with crime."

4For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the

bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of socialconscience and a little less of self interest. Because of this, a lawyershould remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he

defends.

Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose RoblesLahesa.

5He was counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court in two

cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other for homicide. He failedto take any action in behalf of the defendants in both eases. ThisCourt imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is thepronouncement we there made that: "This court should exact from itsofficers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of theirofficial duties, especially when negligence in the performance ofthose duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution of

criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pendingappeal." The validity of the foregoing observation remains to thepresent day.

6It applies to the present case.

Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The

effect of this long delay need not be essayed. We, therefore, find thatAttorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he will conducthimself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge anddiscretion".

2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe andmaintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintaintowards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of thetemporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance ofits supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertookto "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted

authorities." In People vs. Carillo,8

this Court's pointed observationwas that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moralduty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteemand regard towards the courts so essential to the properadministration of justice."

Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willfuldis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thuspresent for suspension or disbarment.

9Counsel has received no less

than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its orders.To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directedhim, in ten days from notice, to show cause why disciplinary action

should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's briefdespite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counselfor over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeatedfailure to obey this Court's orders, on October 3,1968, a fine of P500was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days.He was in that order also required to file his brief in fifteen days. Hewas warned that more drastic disciplinary action would be takenupon his failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, thisCourt issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968commanding him to show cause within ten days from notice thereofwhy he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross


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misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made itcertain that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledgedreceipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing.

This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the

fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourthextension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented to thisCourt that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash somesignificant portions of the brief which was almost through and to havethe same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of adefinitive text.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinaryaction is in order.

Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. FiloteoDianala Jo.

10There, as here, counsel failed to file appellant's brief

(in a criminal case) despite extensions of time granted him by thisCourt. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order whydisciplinary action should not be taken against him. The explanationwas considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of P50payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay thatfine. Came the subsequent resolution of this Court advising him topay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam.This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Courtresolved to give him ten days from notice within which to explain whyhe should not be suspended from the practice of law. Despite receiptof this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour which thisCourt considered as "consumacy and unwillingness to comply with

the lawful orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conducthimself as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of office." He wassuspended from the practice of law for three months.

In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem tous, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumbappreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesyand respect that should be accorded this Court.

For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adrianofrom the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one(1) year.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in

this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.


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NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,vs.ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. :

In a letter-complaint1dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez chargedrespondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conductunbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan,Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, severalsuspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them SonnyBoy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the policeauthorities; that respondent went to the municipal building ofCalabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and maderepresentations that he could secure their freedom if they sign theprepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused,respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that onthe strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed againstthem, including herein complainant who was implicated in theextrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activitiesfor which they were being charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that

while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avilasought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confessionregarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom,murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about hisdecision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of hisconstitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized asa state-witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executinghis extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence ofhis parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under

undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing theextrajudicial confession.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

2On August 16,

2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report with thefollowing recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de laTorre be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legalprofession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation byincreasing the period of suspension to two years.

In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests,the Investigating Commissioner opined that:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden ofproving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence hischarge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that hisservices as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez wasable to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representingthe said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the

victims family. This was declared by the victims daughter, Vicky deChavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court ofCamarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty. Danilode la Torre to prosecute the case against her fathers killers. Sheeven admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met withand advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that therespondent consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo despitethe fact that he was already representing the family of the twoaccuseds victim. It may not even be improbable that respondentpurposely offered to help the accused in order to further his otherclients interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or offer
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competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ampleopportunity given him.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, alawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing twoparties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doingprecisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured thewritten consent of both parties after explaining to them the existingconflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommendedpenalty.

There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistentinterests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not

in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue orclaim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if heargues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when heargues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in whichconfidential communications have been confided, but also those inwhich no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.

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There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance ofthe new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which willinjuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he representshim and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, touse against his first client any knowledge acquired through theirconnection.4

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded onprinciples of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with theclients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Thenature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence ofthe highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolatethe clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance ofimpropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be

encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is ofparamount importance in the administration of justice.

5

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offerhis legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused

who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicialconfessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act ascounsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and afterbeing convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to givetheir confession.

The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate himfrom the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflictinginterests except by written consent of all concerned given after a fulldisclosure of the facts.

As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avilaand Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim ResurreccionBarrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly,his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invitessuspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.

What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by thetwo accused of their confessions whereby they admitted theirparticipation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully wellthat he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims.Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law,should have exercised his better judgment before conceding toaccuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibithimself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assistedthem in executing the extrajudicial confession.

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment assought by the complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under thepresent circumstances, we find that a suspension from the practiceof law for three years is warranted.
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WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violationof Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forrepresenting conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREEYEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of thisDecision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts

will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondentand served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator whoshall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.


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ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtuallyabandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation withouteven informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That thelawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might beperceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does notmitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from thepractice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate fromthe norm in this case.

A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of theBar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose MaxOrtiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged thatCanoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his formeremployer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filedwith the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional

Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.[2] Atty. Ortiz appeared ascounsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiterhearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respectiveposition papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents andrecords to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortizto follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of

Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to comeback as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up thecase himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that hiscomplaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure toprosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.[3]The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortizhad never communicated to him about the status of the case, muchless the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.

The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his lawpractice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-incomeclients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortizclaims that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual

adjunct of the Public Attorneys Office with its steady stream of non -paying clients in the hundreds or thousands.[5] At the same time,he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flungmunicipalities and reaching the people who need legal advice andassistance.[6] Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until hiselection as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generouslyattributes to the help of the same people whom he had helped byway of legal assistance before.[7]

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortizdeigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident that theillegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of

compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper ofCanoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter hadalready issued the order dismissing the case.[8] Atty. Ortiz admitsthough that the period within which to file the position paper hadalready lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the positionpaper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City,he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a localgovernment official and as a practicing lawyer. Eventually, hisdesire to help was beyond physical limitations, and he withdrewfrom his other cases and his free legal services.[9]

According to Atty. Ortiz, Mr. Canoy should have at least understood

that during all that time, he was free to visit or call the office and beentertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to theoffice in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report tothe Sanggunian office.[10] He states that it was his policy to informclients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with hisoffice, as it would be too difficult and a financial burden to attendmaking follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents withonly two office personnel.[11]


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Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoyscomplaint was without prejudice, thus the prescriptive period hadbeen tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether heimmediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though asfar as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that

he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist onrefiling the same.[12]

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report and recommendation.[13] Canoy eventuallysubmitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was notfavorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that theinvestigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated byreason of withdrawal of the charges.[14] Eventually, the investigatingcommissioner concluded that clearly, the records show that [Atty.Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and diligencerequired of him in prosecuting his clients (sic) claim, and

recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.[15] The IBPCommission on Discipline adopted the recommendation, with theslight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a repetitionof the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in thefuture.

The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legalrepresentation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart from theheroic efforts of government entities such as the Public AttorneysOffice, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid andthe Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise beenat the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those

who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts ofprivate practitioners who assist in this goal are especiallycommendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyondthe call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward.

Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-incomeclients is just as grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable asthe apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs legal practice may have been, hisparticular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal dismissalcase leaves much to be desired.

Several of the canons and rules in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty.Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case.

CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS

CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST ANDCONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

. . .

Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted tohim, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render himliable.

Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status ofhis case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clientsrequest for information.

. . .

CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLYFOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THECIRCUMSTANCES.

. . .

Rule 22.02A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subjectto a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property towhich the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor inthe orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessaryfor the proper handling of the matter.


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Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to hisduty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted tohim. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owesfidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him. He must serve the client withcompetence and diligence and champion the latter's cause withwholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owesentire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in themaintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of hisutmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken orwithheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. Thissimply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and everyremedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and hemay expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If

much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrustedprivilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not onlyto the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. Alawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not onlyprotects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of thecommunity to the legal profession.[16]

If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition wassuch that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he shouldhave informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-clientbeing one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client

to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the caseand should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner inwhich his/her interests are being defended.[17]

There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty.Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of suchfact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, ormaybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty.Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessarydegree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informingCanoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the

ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecutecould not be avoided.

That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoyto refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz,

as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule18.03.[18]

Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizselection as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of theseadditional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior.The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer towithdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to apublic office.[19] Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant ofparticular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such asgovernors and mayors,[20] and in such instance, the attorney-clientrelationship is terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed

to practice their profession or engage in any occupation exceptduring session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz,subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case.[22]In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdrawhis/her services.[23] Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or amanifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court ortribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and untilthen, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24]

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he,however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold

unprotected.[25] Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer whowithdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turnover all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter.

Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action onthe case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired theservices of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was noapparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.


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In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that theposition paper had not been filed and that the case had beendismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more soconsidering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty.Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the

Courts attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequatelyfollowing up the case with his office.[26] He cannot now shift theblame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of thecase, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform hisclients of the status of cases entrusted to him.[27]

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court.In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Courtconsisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos withwarning, suspension of three months, six months, and evendisbarment in aggravated cases.[28] Given the circumstances, theCourt finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and

instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1)month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of anadmonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortizs undisputednegligence in failing to timely file the position paper wascompounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and thesuccessive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representinglitigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation.However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, nomatter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts.It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of

legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is orderedSUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from notice,with the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealtwith more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached torespondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant andcopies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.


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ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS,JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS, complainants, vs. ATTY.VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint[1] filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut, TiburcioB. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesteros against Atty. Valentin O.Boncavil for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio Ballesteros,engaged the services of respondent as counsel in two cadastralcases then pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, PagadianCity, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD RMC No. N-475,Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Pet itioner, v.Faustina Calibo, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant, andCadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098,Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. BelindaTagailo-Bariuan, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant; thatdespite receipt of the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8,1991, respondent did not inform herein complainants of the same norfile either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal toprevent the decision from becoming final; that respondent did not f ileeither a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive forhim to do so; and that it took respondent four years from the timecomplainants father died before he filed a motion to substitute hereincomplainants in the trial court. The foregoing acts and omissions of

respondent are alleged to be in violation of the following provisions ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESSAND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONSWITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HISCLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST ANDCONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted tohim, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render himliable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status ofhis case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clientsrequest for information.

Complainants pray that such disciplinary sanctions as may beappropriate be imposed against Atty. Valentin Boncavil.

In his answer,[2] respondent alleges that the day before thecadastral court rendered its decision, he met by chance hereincomplainant Julian Ballesteros, who, after inquiring as to the statusof the cadastral cases and learning that the same had already beensubmitted for resolution, told him You are too busy to attend to ourcase, it would be better if somebody else would take over, to which,according to respondent, he replied, It is all right with me, it is yourprivilege; that as a self-respecting legal practitioner, he did not wantto continue rendering unwanted legal services to a client who haslost faith in his counsel; that he thus considered himself dischargedas counsel in the two cadastral cases and relieved of the obligationeither to move for a reconsideration of the decision or to file a noticeof appeal and to notify herein complainants of the decision againstthem; that, contrary to complainants assertion, he did make an offerof evidence, although he reserved the right to submit authenticatedcopies of the documentary evidence from the Bureau of Lands inManila; that the delay in the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros withhis heirs was because neither the heirs nor the administrator of theintestate estate of Tiburcio Ballesteros informed him of the lattersdeath despite the heirs knowledge that he was the counsel in thetwo cadastral cases.


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On June 8, 1994, complainants moved for a judgment on thepleadings, alleging that the facts are not in dispute and therespondents answer admits the material allegations of thecomplaint.[3]

On June 13, 1994, IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose requiredrespondent to comment on the foregoing motion within five (5) daysfrom notice.[4] On October 12, 1995, he set the case for hearing onNovember 17, 1995.[5]

On November 17, 1995, however, only complainants TiburcioBallesteros, Jr. and Fe Yabut and their counsel appeared. This fact,together with respondents failure to comment on complainantsmotion submitting the case for resolution on the basis of thepleadings, prompted Commissioner Jose to grant complainantsmotion.[6]

On June 21, 1996, Commissioner Jose submitted his reportrecommending that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for six months with warning that repetition of the same or similaracts shall be dealt with more severely.

On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed ResolutionNo. XII-97-16 approving Commissioner Joses report andrecommendation.

After due consideration of the records of this case, the Court findsthe recommendation of the IBP to be well taken.

The facts clearly show that respondent violated Canon 18 of theCode of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyershall serve his client with competence and diligence. By abandoningcomplainants cases, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the sameCode which requires that a lawyer not neglect a legal matterentrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shallrender him liable. As stated in Santiago v. Fojas:[7]

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owesfidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him. He must serve the client withcompetence and diligence, and champion the latters cause withwholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes

entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in themaintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion ofhis utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken orwithheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any andevery remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the landand he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy ordefense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because theentrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative dutiesnot only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to thepublic. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor notonly protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of

justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of thecommunity to the legal profession.

Nor can we sustain respondents claim that he did not file either amotion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal from the decision inthe two cases because he was under the impression from the remarkof Julian Ballesteros that complainants no longer wanted to retain hisservices. As a member of the bar, he ought to know that the onlyway to be relieved as counsel in a case is to have either the writtenconformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him ascounsel. Thus, Rule 138, 26 of the Rules of Court provides:

An attorney may retire at any time from any action or specialproceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He mayalso retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, withoutthe consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client andattorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed toretire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newlyemployed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of theformer one, and written notice of the change shall be given to theadverse party.


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As a matter of fact, Julian Ballesteros, who allegedly made theremarks which became the basis for respondents inaction, deniedever having made those statements, much less having dischargedrespondent as counsel.[8] Moreover, Julian Ballesteros is only one ofthe heirs of Tiburcio Ballesteros, and it has not been shown that hewas speaking on behalf of the other heirs when he allegedly relievedrespondent of his services. In any case, if respondent had reallybeen discharged as counsel, although not in accordance with theRules of Court, he should have informed the trial court and askedthat he be allowed to withdraw from the cases.[9] Until his dismissalor withdrawal is made of record, any judicial notice sent to him wasbinding upon his clients even though as between them theprofessional relationship may have been terminated.[10] He cannotvalidly claim that, in any case, the decision has not yet become finalfor want of service on the Solicitor General, for the period withinwhich complainants can file a motion for reconsideration or notice ofappeal is counted from receipt of the decision by their counsel ofrecord.

Nor is this the first time that respondent is remiss in his professionalobligation toward complainants. In his answer, he practically admitsthat he was late in moving for the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesterosby herein complainant heirs. Respondents excuse that he was notimmediately informed by complainants of their fathers death iswithout merit. Four years after the death of complainants father issimply too long a period for him not to have known of his clientsdeath, especially as it appears that he and complainants live in closeproximity with each other. During those four years, surely occasionswould have arisen where respondent had to confer with Tiburcio

Ballesteros regarding the cases.

Respondent also, in effect, admits that he failed to file a written offerof evidence as required by the court in its order, dated June 21,1983. What he actually filed was only a provisional written offer ofevidence because the documents offered were not certified truecopies. What the Court makes of respondents garbledexplanation[11] for this lapse is that he could not bother to go to theBureau of Lands in Manila to get certified true copies because acheck with the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City showed the samedocumentary evidence to be substantially the same true copies. If

that were the case, respondent did not explain why he did not thengo to the Pagadian City branch of the Bureau of Lands to get thecertified true copies of his documentary evidence.

The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for

six months for respondents gross negligence in the handling of thetwo cadastral cases is in accordance with our decisions.[12]

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent Atty.Valentin O. Boncavil from the practice of law for six (6) months fromnotice with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will bedealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to

Atty. Boncavils personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidantand copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.


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MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M.JOAQUIN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P.PORTUGAL, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15

August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for

violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross

negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No.

152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan

and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose

behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad

Cautelam) in the case.

The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged

mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to

its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners

therein.

The facts are as follows:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F.

Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No.

152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were

involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of twoindividuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations

were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and

frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.

After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two

counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein

respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for

Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a

Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent

filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for

Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion forReconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan,

respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on

Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.

Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite

the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When

respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to

respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved

out without any forwarding address.

More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants wereconstrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition

as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor

knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that

the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002,

denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained

finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against the

accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained

unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking

reconsideration from lapsing.

In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that

the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused.

He only met the accused during the promulgation of the

Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of

homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely

requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused,

and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.


15/60

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement

undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and

in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for

Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character,

respondent also made informal but urgent and personal

representation with the members of the Division of theSandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He

asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the

accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that

all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.

As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed

on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3

April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for

Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional

thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he

filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding

docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the

reglementary period.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he

made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the

promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact

that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the

effect of his handling the case on his other equally important

professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration

for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States toexplore further professional opportunities. He then decided to

formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to

PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact

person between respondent and complainants, explaining his

decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to

Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file

with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but

unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the

letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be

discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to

PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3

Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be

difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally

accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this mighthave been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his

office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.

The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing

to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos

Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, theother two complainants were declared as having waived their rights

to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8

The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and

on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and

Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of

penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6)

months.1awph!l.net10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors

of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids

recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to

recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the

facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or

misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to

the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.


16/60

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds

the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.

In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the

accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in

defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accusedwhich stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life

and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules,

ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the

fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and

confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and

good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest

x x x .

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client thatdistinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x12

At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was

actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the

Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion

for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for

Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for

reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound

discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the

motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to

do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long beforerespondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent

cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also

important to note is the allegation of complainants that the

Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its

Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not

dispute.

As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and

complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of

assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights

of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid,

respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the

accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondentrepresented to the accused that he had changed his office address,

still, from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be

gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as

that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point,

respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution

dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that

situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution

since they had constantly called respondents office to check the

status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been

calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.

Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of

complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin

regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case.

However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not

return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have

threshed out all unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the

accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court

procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawalhimself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have

informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he

had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go

about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by

Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in

handling the case of the accused.

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should

have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that


17/60

he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions

on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies

credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the

appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his

representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him

if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the allegedregistry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the

mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin,

the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim,

especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that

they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad

cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as

counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused

and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the

Rules of Court.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to

terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without

cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation

other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an

attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to

carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without

reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its

final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from

a good cause.16

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad

cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of

respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes

fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with

competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with

wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes

entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the

maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of

the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or

withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This

simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every

remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and hemay expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If

much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted

privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only

to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A

lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only

protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,

does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the

community to the legal profession.18

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors

he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However,

complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they

attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine

validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro

Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number

7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having

claimed the deposited amount.

The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal

engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for

the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words ofthen Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty.

Magulta:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity

to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the

attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a


18/60

profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary

consideration.21

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment ofan attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the

relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney

is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

x x x

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he

undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath

and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering.

The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither

diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency ofremuneration.

Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation

respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was

engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police

officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of

Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of

Mario C. Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to

their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense

counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culpritsthat "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as

that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when

even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of

respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty

recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why

such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer

failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the

appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon

the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25 The

Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a

copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate

annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.


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REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIASVILLAR, JR. respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J. :

Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit inprofessionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Farfrom measuring up to the standards of a lawyers conduct set inthe Code of Professional Responsibilitywhich are also the hallmarksof professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtuallyabandoned his clients cause.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainantRedentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr.,who was his counsel in a case, for the latters failure to formally offerthe documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of

the case.

The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil CaseNo. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A buildingcontractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to representhim in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One HundredFive Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos(P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for therepair of the house of the defendants in the case.

[1]The case went its

course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trialcourt, the respondent failed to file his formal offer ofexhibits.

[2]Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued

an Orderthe full text of which reads as follows:

When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. RodrigoC. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up to this date,

Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) thedocumentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by theCourt.

Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was givenan extension period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer

the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes,counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) dayswithin which to comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the saidexhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for thepresentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.

On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing recordsshow that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not compliedyet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff andagain, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr.another period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer thedocumentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of thehearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for thedefendant.

Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for theplaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of documentary

exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counselfor the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty.Reyes the oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff ishereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon furthermotion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon furthermotion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED forlack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further prosecute thiscase.

Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing ofthis case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on thepart of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the

morning.[3]

The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainantto file a verifiedAffidavit-Complaint

[4]dated July 4, 2001 for the

disbarment of the respondent with this Court, wherein he alsoalleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of thecase, viz:that he already terminated the services of the respondentas his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals ofthe documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent
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finally handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heatedargument he had with the complainants wife.

In a Resolution[5]

dated September 10, 2001, this Court requiredthe respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However,the respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2) extensions

of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with thefiling of the respondents comment and referred the case to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report andrecommendation.

[6]

Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required bythe Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.

[7]Hence, the

averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by thecomplainant, are undisputed.

Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBPCommission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable fornegligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of

law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similarconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salientportions of the Report and Recommendationdated March 4, 2003 ofthe Investigating Commissioner are as follows:

Complainants contention that respondent Villarfailed to file plaintiffsFormal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by theOrders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001(Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001(Annex 10 of complainants Affidavit) reads:

. . . .

It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure ofrespondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibitswhich led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice ofrespondents client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar hasfailed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer ofExhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trialcourt to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondentsobligation to complainant as the latters counsel of record in CivilCase No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,

and respondents dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the interestsof respondents client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it wasrespondents obligation to take all measures to protect the interestsof his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility but it was respondents negligence oromission which has caused damage to such interests.

[8]

In its Resolutiondated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board ofGovernors adopted and approved said Report andRecommendationof the Investigating Commissioner.

We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendationof the Investigating Commissioner.

At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondentsdisregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file hiscomment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failingto file his answer when required by the Commission on Bar

Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence and lackof respect for the authority of this Court.

The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languidin the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. Hewas given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, anextension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8,2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from March30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court notedthat no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. Itmust also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twentytwo (22) days between March 8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, andanother interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001 untilMay 7, 2001 when the Orderdismissing the case wasissued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3) months andnine (9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits.

[9]The

respondent did not bother to give an explanation even in mitigationor extenuation of his inaction.

Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competenceand diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinentCanons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
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CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT ANDCONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY ANDEFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

. . . .

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time tofile pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse withoutsubmitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to doso.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OFHIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST ANDCONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

. . . .

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted tohim and his negligence in connection therewith shall render himliable.

. . . .

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITHZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violationof his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression whenhe failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give entiredevotion to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to file theformal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failedhim. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failureconstitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court totake action on the respondents mortal infraction, which causedundeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest, adversely

affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession anderoded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, t herespondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity tothe courts and his clients.

[10]This means that in relation to his duty to

his clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment tobear in representation of their causes.

We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[11]

towit:

Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of hisprofession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his clientwith competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:

"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,September 22, 1999:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owesfidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him. He must serve the client withcompetence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause withwholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owesentire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in themaintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of hisutmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or

withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legallyapplied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit ofany and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law ofthe land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy ordefense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because theentrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative dutiesnot only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to thepublic. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor notonly protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of

justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of thecommunity to the legal profession.

[12]
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This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidencenecessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a highstandard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,the courts and the public.

[13]Every case a lawyer accepts deserves

his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of itsimportance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free .

[14]Certainly, a

member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice theprofession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from theperspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.

The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent fromthe practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find therecommended penalty commensurate with the offense committed.

InAromin v. Boncavil,[15]

this Court suspended a lawyer for six(6) months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite thetrial courts directive.

The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with

failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania deSeguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon

[16]constitutes inexcusable

negligence. In the Saquilaboncase, the respondent lawyer wassuspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon therespondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones,

[17]Spouses

Galen v. Paguinigan,[18]

Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal[19]

for theirfailure to file the briefs of their respective clients.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that the

repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of

respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the BarConfidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court

Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
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HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTSCORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.

Facts:

In this case, respondent ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA is apracticing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines. Lumot A. Jalandoni, who is the Chairman/President ofPenta Resorts Corporation (PRC) and owns the biggest shares ofstocks in the corporation, was sued which involved the possession ofland where Alhambra hotel, the only property owned by PRC, issituated. This is Civil Case No. 97-9865.The latter engaged the legalservices of herein respondent. Respondent as a consequence ofsaid Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni etal in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust andconfidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and

confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of hisclient were entrusted to the respondent. Later on, respondent,without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed aMotion towithdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing.

A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel willconclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity The grounds allegedby respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni,et al. was that he is a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena. Thisis an estafa case filed by the representatives of PRC itself againstspouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena. It is worthy to note that fromthe outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the

son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldestdaughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. Petitioners alleged that as anoffshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committedby respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest,we must look into the cases involved. Petitioners alleged that as anoffshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality was committed by respondent.

In the Matter of Attorney Lope e

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