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In-Flight Anomalies and Radiation Performance of NASA Missions -
Selected Lessons Learned
Kenneth A LaBelCo- Manager NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program
Group Leader Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)NASAGSFC
kenlabelnasagov301-286-9936
httpneppnasagov
httpsntrsnasagovsearchjspR=20090004168 2018-05-08T235216+0000Z
2In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Outline of Presentation
bull Investigative Approachbull An Optocouplerrsquos Talebull On the Matter of Small Probabilitiesbull Whatrsquos with the Noise Spikesbull The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Linkbull Considerations
Latent damage sites device did not fail during ground irradiationbut at some time afterward during operation
Could this have been observed in-flight
3In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Anomaly Resolution ndash Root Cause Investigation for Radiation Engineers
bull Determine orbital location and time of eventndash Look for the obvious such as solar events or South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA)bull Review electronic parts list for potential sensitive devicesbull Review identified device in specific circuit application
ndash Factors such as duty cycle operating speed voltage levels and so forth
bull Obtain existing SEE dose and damage data or gather new datandash Compare applications between in-circuit and ground datandash Perform ground testing if needed
bull Determine risk probabilitiesndash SEE rates etcndash Failure potential
bull Recommend mitigative action(s) if possible
4In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
An Optocouplerrsquos Tale - Background
bull Optocouplersndash Used extensively for the isolation of signals between
systems or boxesndash Translate electrical signals to optical then back to
electricalbull What radiation-induced failure modes may exist
ndash Long-term degradation such as current transfer ratio (CTR) ndash outputinput
ndash Single particle eventsbull Photodiodes for example have a history of being used as
energetic particle detectors
Typical Block Diagram of an Optocoupler
5In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
An Optocouplerrsquos Tale ndash NASArsquos Most Famous Science Spacecraft
bull Hubble Space Telescope (HST)ndash Flying for over 18 yearsndash Tremendous scientific discoveries (as well as gorgeous images)
bull HST has had several servicing missions (SM) ndash New instrumentsndash System upgrades and maintenance
bull On the SM2 launched Feb 14th 1997 two new instruments were installed
ndash Multiple anomalies were observed during the on-orbit engineering calibration for these instruments
ndash HSTrsquos main radiation concern is SAA
6In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
An Optocouplerrsquos Tale ndash Resolving the Anomaly
bull What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and actionndash Review of environment during anomalies
bull All events occurred in the SAAndash Review of parts list
bull Optocoupler highlighted as most likely candidatendash Review of circuit application
bull SETs simulated showing possible causendash SET could trigger a high-voltage portion of the instrument and cause failure
ndash Review or gather radiation test databull No data existed accelerator test performed
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
(ns)
Am
plitu
de (V
)
0
1x10-7
2x10-7
3x10-7
0 20 40 60 80 100Angle of Incidence (degrees)
Dev
ice
Cro
ss s
ectio
n (c
m2 )
Typical Measured TransientDuring Proton Irradiation
63 MeV Proton-InducedTransients on Suspect Device
Versus Angular Incidence
7In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Optocoupler ndash Final Analysisbull What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and action -
continuedndash Determine risk probability (ie upset rates)
bull Optocouplers are not just electricalbull Considerations for tools beyond CREME96 began with this and
related workndash Determine actions to mitigate or reduce risk
bull In-flight hardware is not easily modified o(ndash FPGAs improve this ability (but not here)
bull Operational change installed via software updatendash No instrument operation during SAAndash Critical science was NOT impacted but some science data loss
incurred
8In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
On the Matter of Small Probabilities - Background
bull Solid State Recorders (SSRs)ndash A means for storing science data on-board a spacecraftndash Use high-density memory ICs for densitypower advantages
bull SRAM (early 1990rsquos) bull DRAM (mid-1990rsquos and later) bull Flash (being considered)
bull DRAMs What radiation-induced failure modes may existndash TID
bull Traditional leakage increases cell failures etchellipndash SEE
bull Destructive SEL stuck bitsbull Upset bitmultiple bits block errors mode errors SEFI
1 Gb SDRAM circa 2006Feature size is 90nm
9In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
On the Matter of Small Probabilities ndash NASArsquos Most Famous Science Spacecraft (yet again)
bull On the SM2 Feb 14th 1997 a new SSR was installed to increase data storage capacityndash HST passes through the SAA several times daily
bull Bit upsets tracked fairly well with predicted rate based on ground data (3 samples one proton energy)
bull HOWEVER two more complex anomalies were observedndash Each had ~ 100 bits in error (block)ndash Block was not corrected by a re-write
ndash Project in panic
HST SSR utilizesIrvine Sensors DRAM Modules
Comprised of 16 Mb IBM Luna DRAMs
10In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
On the Matter of Small Probabilitiesndash Resolving the Anomaly
bull What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and actionndash Review of environment during anomaly
bull SAAndash Review of parts list
bull Memory controller was rad-hardbull DRAM was not
ndash Review of circuit applicationbull Circuit application was the same as in ground testing (refresh rate
etc)ndash Review or gather radiation test data
bull Proton data no observed block errors (sample size = 3 w 1x environment fluences)
bull HOWEVER heavy ion data exhibited these type of events at low LETsndash Proton events would be expectedndash New test data required for statistics on 1440 device usage
bull With 1440 devices being used for this SSR applicationndash Expected event cross-section of ~a few E-13 cm2 based on 2 events in 9
months versus (predicted) in-flight proton fluence
11In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
On the Matter of Small Probabilitiesndash Final Analysis
bull Review or gather radiation test data (contrsquod)ndash New test undertaken with protons with 100 die and to higher
proton fluence levelsbull 9 events observed with proton fluences ~100x over expected HST
expected levelsndash 2 different event signatures noted
raquo block (columnrow) errorsraquo weak columns (suspect data ndash sometimes good sometimes bad)
bull Determine risk probability (ie upset rates)ndash Predicted error rate of 22yr is the same order of magnitude as
observedbull Determine actions to mitigate or reduce risk
ndash Reset of mode register or power cycle clear the anomalybull Circuitry not included to provide resetbull Power cycle determined to be feasible when needed
ndash Data is Reed-Solomon (RS) Encodedraquo Probability of RS failure is low
ndash No action taken at that time
12In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike - Background
bull Linear devices such as analog comparators arendash Used extensively in instruments power data collection and
morendash Compares the voltage levels between two analog signals
bull What radiation-induced failure modes may existndash Long-term degradation is focused on
bull Enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS) and displacement damage (in bipolars)
ndash Single eventsbull Single event transients (SETs) are the prime concern
-4
-2
0
2
4
12 10-5 14 10-5 16 10-5 18 10-5 2 10-5 22 10-5 24 10-5 26 10-5 28 10-5
Out
put V
olta
ge (
V)
Time (s)
LM139 Vcc
=+-5 δVi=800mV LET=187 MeV-cm2mg
Sample SETs induced by heavy ionsin a PMLM139 comparator
13In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndash Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP)
bull Launched June 30 2001ndash Had phasing orbits prior
to insertion in final orbitbull Reached its final orbital
position on L2 end of September 2001
bull An anomaly occurred causing a reset of the spacecraft processor on November 5 2001
14In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndash Resolving the Anomaly
bull What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and actionndash Review of
environment during anomaly
bull Solar eventndash Significant heavy
ion componentndash Review of parts list
bull Analog comparator (PMLM139) identified as likely problem 10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
103
01 1 10
CREME96 Worst Day Model14 July 005 Nov 01
Background pre-SPE
15 April 0125 Sept 01
Inte
gral
Flu
ence
(c
m2 -s
)
LET (MeV-cm2mg)
Data from NOAASECSWO
after Dyer 2002
15In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndash Resolving the Anomaly (2)
ndash Review of circuit applicationbull Confirmed that LMPM139 could be the causebull Application had changed since initial parts review pre-launch
ndash Review or gather radiation test databull No documented proton sensitivitybull Heavy ion sensitivity documented as a function of the
application using existing data plus new data gathered
R=36k
LM139
LM139
LM139
R=51k
R=10k
R=15k
R=1k
R=100k
10 mF
Vref25V
Vref25V
Vref25V
+5V
+5V
AC14
AC14
AC14
AC14
AC14AC14
EEP_RESET
HW_RESET
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
FitPM139 dVi=200mVLM139 dVi=400 mVLM139 dVi=300 mVLM139 dVi=200 mVC
ross
sec
tion
(cm
2 com
para
tor)
LET (MeV-cm 2mg)
Heavy ion data
16In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndash Final Analysis
bull What steps were needed to determine ROOT CAUSE and action - continuedndash Determine risk probability (ie upset rates with heavy ions)
bull Additional shielding analysis performed for particle transportbull Assumption of sensitive volume thicknesses
ndash Determine actions to mitigate or reduce riskbull Event rates deemed acceptable by projectbull No action taken
Sensitive volumethickness
(μm)
GCR SET rateCREME96 solar maximum
(event comparator-day)
Solar EventCREME96 worst day
(event comparator-day)
10 18E-3 51E-1
15 17E-3 30E-1
20 16E-3 18E-1
30 15E-3 65E-2
40 13E-3 44E-2
60 99E-4 34E-2
17In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) - Background
bull FOLsndash MIL-STD-1773 implementation (1 MHz)
used since the early 1990rsquos in many NASA systems
ndash Transmits electrical data and command signals tofrom optical
bull What radiation-induced failure modes may existndash Similar to optocouplersndash SEUs imply single or multi-bit errors
bull Photodiodes have a history of being used as energetic particle detectors
bull Errors are temporal via photodiodendash Transients may affect more than one
clock cyclebull High-speed electrical circuits also
sensitivebull Major impact is on data bit error rate
(BER)
Representative FOL architecture
18In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL)- Background (contrsquod)
bull Original MIL-STD-1773 transceivers used Si photodiodesndash Sensitive to direct ionization from protons
bull Implies high bit error rate (BER) for space applicationsndash Angle of incidence optical power budget and proton energy effects
notedbull This forced the usage of protocol fault-tolerant features to be
implemented (message retries)ndash Used successfully in NASA misions
bull BUT reduced effective bus bandwidth by ~50bull For higher data rate systems this hardening solution may not be applicable
100E-11
100E-10
100E-09
100E-08
100E-07
100E-06
-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
Link atten in dB
Erro
r Cro
ss s
ectio
n in
cm2
Errors observed
No errors observed Ground data illustratingthe effect of optical power budget
on radiation performance
19In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL)- Making a Better Mousetrap
bull Hardening methodologies exploredndash Change of optical wavelength from 850 nm to 1300 nm light showed
improved SEU tolerance bull Reduced volume of photodiode
ndash Receiver noise filtering techniques and optical power budgets also help
ndash Higher data rate development (20 MHz) ndash AS1773bull Flown as an experiment on Microelectronics and Photonics Testbed (MPTB)
ndash Boeing DR1773 Transceivers
FPGAELECTRICAL8051-BASED
DATACOLLECTIONS
POWERSUPPLIES
IN-LINEATTENUATORS
OPTICAL
OUT 2OUT 1
MPTB DR1773 Test Board
20In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) ndash MPTB Performance
bull MPTB launched in 1997ndash 6 years of in-flight
performance in a highly elliptical orbit (HEO)
bull Transceivers were operated in two modesndash ED mode used a
physical contact (PC) polished fiber optic terminal
ndash DE mode used a flat polished connector (air gap)
bull Which do you think would work better
21In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) ndash In-Flight
bull Did the hardening effort pay offED and DE bit error rates by Year
YearED BER DE BER
1997 1738E-12 NA
1998 4224E-14 3787E-11
1999 3855E-14 5303E-11
2000 0 8501E-11
2001 8168E-15 NA
2002 0 NA
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
157
170
183 52 73 86 114
142
189
218
260
303
331 8 34 61 74 133
146
159
172
185
198
259
272
285
Julian Day of Year
Num
ber
of U
pset
s
UpsetsUpset Average = 103667
1998 1999 2000
MPTB Transceiver DE Mode 1998-2000 Orbits 0036-3111
Physical contact Air Gap
Few errors were noted on the ldquogoodrdquo PC
22In-Flight Electronics and Radiation ndash Presented by Kenneth A LaBel SERESSA West Palm Beach Fl 1222008
Considerationsbull Methodical process for anomaly review takes into account
ndash Environmentndash Selected partsndash Designndash Existing radiation test data andor new datandash Impact (ie risk probability)ndash Actions (mitigative or otherwise)
bull Notesndash Design and parts list reviews are good for flight programs
bull BUT any changes later in design process need to be reviewed as well
ndash Protons arenrsquot always the cause of anomalies during solar events
bull Solar heavy ions must be taken into accountndash System design and not just device radiation tolerance needs
to be taken into accountbull Mechanical issues for example can be related (as in the FOL
example)ndash Spacecraft charging effects not discussed but should be
considered as wellbull Can charging in plastic packages be the next SEU
- In-Flight Anomalies and Radiation Performance of NASA Missions -Selected Lessons Learned
- Outline of Presentation
- Anomaly Resolution ndashRoot Cause Investigation for Radiation Engineers
- An Optocouplerrsquos Tale - Background
- An Optocouplerrsquos Tale ndashNASArsquos Most Famous Science Spacecraft
- An Optocouplerrsquos Tale ndashResolving the Anomaly
- The Optocoupler ndash Final Analysis
- On the Matter of Small Probabilities - Background
- On the Matter of Small Probabilities ndashNASArsquos Most Famous Science Spacecraft (yet again)
- On the Matter of Small ProbabilitiesndashResolving the Anomaly
- On the Matter of Small ProbabilitiesndashFinal Analysis
- Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike - Background
- Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndashMicrowave Anisotropy Probe (MAP)
- Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndashResolving the Anomaly
- Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndashResolving the Anomaly (2)
- Whatrsquos With the Noise Spike ndashFinal Analysis
- The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) - Background
- The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL)- Background (contrsquod)
- The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL)- Making a Better Mousetrap
- The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) ndash MPTB Performance
- The Meaning of an Upset in a Fiber Optic Link (FOL) ndash In-Flight
- Considerations
-