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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF AUGUST, 2021

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.996/2021

c/w CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1003/2021

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1157/2021

IN CRL.A NO.996/2021

BETWEEN:

SMT. RAJESHWARI SHETTY

W/O LATE BHASKAR SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,

RESIDENT OF ‘ESHWARI NILAYA’ HAYAGRIVA NAGAR, SHIVALLI,

UDUPI TALUK, UDUPI DISTRICT – 571405.

... APPELLANT

(BY SRI HASHMATH PASHA, SR. ADV. FOR

SRI NASIR ALI, ADV.)

AND:

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MANIPAL POLICE STATION,

BY DY.S.P.H & B, CID, BANGALORE. REPRESENTED BY LEARNED SPP,

HIGH COURT OF KARNATKA. ... RESPONDENT

R

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(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR. ADV. FOR

SRI JAGADEESHA B.N FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT.)

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION

374(2) CR.PC PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SENTENCE DATED 08.06.2021

PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, UDUPI IN S.C.NO.2/2017 – CONVICTING THE

APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.1 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 120B,302,201 R/W 34 OF IPC.

IN CRL.A NO.1003/2021

BETWEEN:

NAVANEET SHETTY

S/O LATE BHASKAR SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,

RESIDENT OF ‘ESHWARI NILAYA’ HAYAGRIVA NAGAR, SHIVALLI,

UDUPI TALUK, UDUPI DISTRICT, UDUPI.

... APPELLANT

(BY SRI HASHMATH PASHA, SR. ADV. FOR SRI NASIR ALI, ADV.)

AND:

STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MANIPAL POLICE STATION,

BY DY.S.P.H & B, CID BANGALORE.

(REPRESENTED BY SPP)

... RESPONDENT

(BY SRI A.S.PONNANNA, SR. ADV. FOR SRI JAGADEESHA B.N FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT.)

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THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION

374(2) CR.PC PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE DATED 08.06.2021 PASSED BY THE PRL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, UDUPI IN S.C.NO.2/2017, CONVICTING THE

APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.2 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 120B,302,201 R/W 34 OF IPC.

IN CRL.A NO.1157/2021

BETWEEN:

SMT. GULABI SHEDTHI W/O LATE SHEENAPPA SHETTY

AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS, R/AT DEVI NIVASA, SARAKARI GUDDE,

SHANKARAPURA POST, UDUPI DISTRICT – 574115.

... APPELLANT

(BY SRI JAGADEESHA B.N., ADV.)

AND:

SMT. RAJESHWARI SHETTY

W/O LATE BHASKAR SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,

R/AT ESHWARI HAYAGREEVA NAGAR, 2ND CROSS, INDRALI SHIVALLI VILLAGE, UDUPI – 571405.

2. NAVNEETH B SHETTY S/O LATE BHASKAR SHETTY

AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, ESHWARI HAYAGREEVANAGARA

2ND CROSS INDRALISHIVALLI VILLAGE UDUPI TALUK,

UDUPI DISTRICT-576 102.

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3. NIRANJAN BHAT S/O SHRINIVASA BHAT

AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, RESIDENT OF YASHASWINI NADIBETTU NANDALIKE VILLAGE, KARKALA TALUK,

UDUPI DISTRICT-576111.

4. RAGHAVENDRA S/O PARAMESHWARA AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,

R/AT SRI MATHRKRIPA HOUSE KAIROLI, NANDALIKE,

KARKALA TQ, UDUPI DISTRICT, UDUPI - 576111.

5. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

THROUGH MANIPAL POLICE STATION

UDUPI DISTRICT INVESTIGATED BY C.I.D. BANGALORE

REP BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT BUILDING,

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE-560001.

... RESPONDENTS

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 377

CR.P.C PRAYING TO ALLOW THE PRESENT APPEAL AGAINST

THE JUDGMENT OF PRL. DISTRICT AND SESSION JUDGE,

UDUPI IN S.C.NO.02/2017 AND ENHANCE THE SENTENCE OF

LIFE IMPRISONMENT TO THE SENTENCE OF DEATH AND FINE

TO RESPONDENT NO.1 TO 3 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 302 OF

IPC ETC.

THESE CRIMINAL APPEALS COMING ON FOR ORDERS

ON IAs THIS DAY, G.NARENDAR J, MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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ORDERS ON I.A.NO.2/2021 in Crl.A.No.996/2021 &

I.A.No.1/2021 in Crl.A.No.1003/2021

Heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. Sandesh J.

Chouta along with Sri. B. N. Jagadeesh, learned counsel

for the impleading applicant/intervener in

Crl.A.No.996/2021 and learned Senior counsel Sri. A.S.

Ponnanna along with Sri. B.N.Jagadeesh, learned counsel

for the impleading applicant/intervener in

Crl.A.No.1003/2021 and the learned Senior counsel Sri.

Hasmath Pasha along with Sri. Nasir Ali, learned counsel

for the appellants.

2. The instant applications are preferred invoking

the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 301 r/w the

proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 24 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

Cr.P.C’ for short), praying that the de-facto complainant

be permitted to come on record as an intervenor and be

impleaded as a party/respondent in the appeals preferred

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by the accused. The appeals are preferred being

aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 08.06.2021 passed by the Court of the

Principal District and Sessions Judge, Udupi.

3. That the appellants No.1 to 3 have been

convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302,

120B, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to

undergo imprisonment for life for the offence punishable

under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and

further sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for the

offence punishable under Section 120B read with Section

34 of IPC and further sentenced to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for a period of four years for the offence

punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 of

IPC. It is ordered that all the three sentences shall run

concurrently.

4. It is the case of the applicant that she is the

mother of the deceased Bhaskar Shetty and mother-in-

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law of accused No.1 and grand-mother of accused No.2.

That accused No.3 is a stranger to the family.

5. It is the case of the applicant that her son

deceased Bhaskar Shetty went missing on 28.07.2016

and that she set the criminal law in motion on

29.07.2016 by lodging a complaint with the respondent –

Manipal Police Station, Udupi District.

6. That based on the complaint, the respondent

have commenced the investigation and in the course of

the investigation, they have come to the conclusion that

the deceased was attacked by accused Nos.1 and 2 and

done to death and suspecting the same, subjected

accused Nos.1 and 2 to interrogation and based on their

voluntary statements, Crime No.199/2016 came to be

registered against the accused on 07.08.2016 for the

offence punishable under Sections 302, 201, 204, 120B

and 34 of IPC. After filing of charge sheet and

committing the case to the Sessions Court, it came to be

registered as S.C.No.2/2017 and after a full fledged trial,

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the Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge,

Udupi was pleased to convict them for the offence

punishable under Sections 302, 120B, 201 and 34 of IPC

and it was further pleased to sentence them to undergo

imprisonment for life and other sentences by its

judgment and order of sentence dated 08.06.2021.

7. That the de-facto complainant/applicant being

the mother of the deceased is a victim as defined under

Section 2 (wa) of the Cr.P.C.

8. The learned Senior counsel Sri. Sandesh J.

Chouta would take the Court through the Proviso to sub-

Section (8) of Section 24 of the Cr.P.C., which reads as

under:-

“(8) The Central Government or the

State Government may appoint, for the

purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate

for not less than ten years as a Special Public

Prosecutor:

[Provided that the Court may permit

the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution under this sub-

section.]”

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He would then invite the attention of the Court to

sub-section (2) of Section 301 of Cr.P.C., which reads as

under:-

“301. Appearance by Public

Prosecutors.—(1)The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of a case

may appear and plead without any written

authority before any Court in which that case is

under inquiry, trial or appeal.

(2)If in any such case any private

person instructs a pleader to prosecute any

person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor

or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of

the case shall conduct the prosecution, and

the pleader so instructed shall act therein

under the directions of the Public

Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor,

and may, with the permission of the Court,

submit written arguments after the evidence is

closed in the case.”

9. The learned Senior counsel Sri. Sandesh J.

Chouta would contend that pursuant to the amending Act

No.5 of 2009, Section 2 (wa) came to be inserted into

the Cr.P.C., with effect from 31.12.2009 and so also the

Proviso to sub-Section (8) to Section 24 and the Proviso

to Section 372, came to be inserted by the amending Act

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No.5 of 2009. He would contend that the amendments

came about in view of the law makers’ recognition of the

fact that victims of crime did not have a say in the fight

against the crime and because of which crime they stood

victimized and suffered losses. Elaborating further, the

learned Senior counsel would contend that the

recognition of this fact gave birth to the concept of

victimology whereby the legislature recognized the need

to vest the victims with certain rights.

10. That this concept of victimology and the right

of victims, has by exposition of law by the Hon’ble Apex

Court and various High Courts, the horizon has been

greatly expanded. That today the victims are been

vested with a right to assist the prosecution and thereby

ensure and avert a mis-trial and has greatly helped in

averting the acquittals of the accused on account of

minor lapses in the case of the prosecution. He would

contend that the law as it stands today virtually places

the victim’s Lawyer/Advocate on an equal footing as the

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Public Prosecutor, which hitherto was not the case. He

would contend that prior to the amendment, the victims

were conferred only with a limited right of assisting the

prosecutor and filing written submissions on grant of

permission by the Court under sub-Section (2) of Section

301 of the Cr.P.C. That post amendment, the law in this

regard has greatly evolved and the law as it stands

today, virtually permits the Advocate of the victim to

represent the case before the Court on an equal footing

as the Public Prosecutor appointed under the various

provisions of Section 24 of the Cr.P.C.

11. The learned Senior counsel Sri. Sandesh J.

Chouta elaborating further would contend that there is a

stark difference and distinction in the scope and ambit of

Section 301(2) and Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C.

Elaborating further, the learned Senior counsel would

contend that the rights of the victim under Section 301

(2) of the Cr.P.C. was limited to the extent of assisting

the prosecutor, whereby the pleader appointed by the

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victim was required to act only under the direction of the

prosecutor and additionally a right to submit written

submissions in the case. He would contend that the

legislature realizing the effect of the limitations ‘of

assisting the prosecutor’ has by its amending Act

inserted the Proviso to Section 24 (8) and while so

amending Section 24 (8) has been pleased to employ the

words ‘assist the prosecution’. That with the deployment

of the word ‘prosecution’, the legislature intended to

bring about a sea change in the domain of victimology or

rights of victims. He would take the Court through

statement of objects and reasons of the Code of Criminal

Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act No.5 of 2009)

(received the assent of the President on 07.01.2009 and

published in the Gazette of India on 09.01.2009).

Paragraph No.2 of the same reads as under:-

2. Amendment of section 2. — In

section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the principal

Act), after clause (w), the following clause

shall be inserted, namely:—

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‘(wa) “victim” means a person who has

suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused

person has been charged and the expression

“victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir;’.

12. The learned Senior counsel in essence would

strive to contend that the role to be played by the

Advocate engaged by the victim is amplified and

enlarged, post the amendment of 2009 when viewed in

comparison with the position that obtained prior to

amendment and as provided under Section 301 (2) of the

Cr.P.C.

13. The Learned Senior counsel reverting to the

case on hand and the instant application would submit

that in the light of various expositions of law on the

concept of victimology and the rights of victims, the

applicant, who undoubtedly falls within the definition of

‘victim’ is entitled to be heard in the matter, more

particularly, in the application preferred under Section

389 of the Cr.P.C., which enables the Appellate Court, for

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reasons to be recorded in writing, to order the

suspension of sentence appealed against and if in

confinement, direct he be released on bail. He would

contend that the appellant has preferred I.A.No.1/2021

in Crl.A.No.996/2021 invoking the provisions of Section

389 of the Cr.P.C. and has prayed for suspension of the

sentence, sentencing her to undergo various

punishments. That the applicant/intervener being the

mother of the deceased and the victim, is required to be

heard in the matter.

14. This Court after hearing pointed out the

absence of any provision under the Cr.P.C. similar to one

of Civil Procedure Code, enabling an interested party to

come on record in an appeal. It was also pointed out that

the victim was also not arrayed as a party before the

Trial Court. The learned Senior counsel fairly concede

that the relief sought for in the applications is not happily

worded and the same may be read as an application for

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permission to assist the prosecution in terms of Section

24 (8) of the Cr.P.C.

15. The learned Senior counsel would place

reliance on the following rulings:-

(i) (2000) 2 SCC 391 (R Rathinam vs. State

by DSP District Crime Branch, Madurai and

another)- Reliance is placed on paragraph Nos.1, 6, 7, 8

and 11 to contend that the victim is entitled to be heard

on bail and seek cancellation of bail. That this right of

victim has been recognized even prior to the coming into

force of the amendment. On perusal of the facts, it is

seen that it is a case of hearing of cancellation of bail at

the pre-conviction stage.

(ii) (2001) 3 SCC 462 (J K International vs.

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others) – Reliance

is placed on the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10, 14 and 16 to contend

that even in a proceedings for quashment of charge

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sheet, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the de-facto

complainant/victim is entitled to an opportunity of being

heard before an order quashing proceedings is passed.

On perusal it is seen yet again, the proceedings are of a

pre-conviction stage and there has been no

determination of guilt of the accused.

(iii) 2005 SCC Online Ker 147 (Kunhiraman

vs. State of Kerala) – Reliance is placed on the

observations in paragraph Nos.7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16

and more particularly, paragraph Nos.16 and 17. This is

yet again a case where the Hon’ble High Court was

hearing a petition under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. and

admittedly, at the pre-conviction stage. The learned

Single Judge taking note of the absence of any

prohibition has proceeded to hold that there is no barrier

to hear the de-facto complainant/aggrieved person. But it

is interesting to note that in paragraph No.9, the Court

has categorically held that the provisions of Section

301(2) cannot be invoked to seek audience in a petition

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under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C as the provision relates

to an inquiry, trial or appeal and hence concluded that it

has no application to a proceedings under Section 438 of

the Cr.P.C.

(iv) 2010 (2) MWN (Cr.) 273 (Sathyavani

Ponrani vs. 1. Samuel Raj, 2. The State, through

the Inspector of Police, Umachikulam P.S.) –

Reliance is placed to demonstrate that the victim has a

right of audience in the criminal proceedings. Reliance is

placed on paragraph Nos.19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30,

33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 52, 55, 56, 60, 70 and 71 and

more particularly, emphasis is on the observations in

paragraph No.38, which accordingly to the learned Senior

counsel is the correct exposition of the law relating to the

right vested in the victim under Section 24 (8) of the

Cr.P.C. On perusal of the facts, it is seen that the case

pertains to consideration of the right of a victim to be

heard in an application under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.

Admittedly, it is yet again a case of pre-conviction case.

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In paragraph Nos.45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52, the

High Court has placed reliance on the rulings in the

domain of interpretation of statutes not involving criminal

jurisprudence. The rules of interpretation involving

criminal statutes are governed by different parameters,

which will be shortly set-out in the succeeding

paragraphs. In that view of the matter, we disagree with

the principles of interpretation adopted by the learned

Judge as tools to interpret the provisions of statute in the

domain of criminal law.

(v) Crl. O.P. No.28041/2015 (S

Venkataramanan vs. State, represented by

Inspector of Police, Central Crime Branch, Chennai

and another) – Reliance is placed on paragraph Nos.4,

5, 6 and 9, where the Court placing reliance on the

preceding ruling has held that the Court can also look

into the material produced by the victim/de-facto

complainant while considering the application/petition

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under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. The instant case also is one

at the pre-conviction stage.

(vi) 2019 SCC Online All 957 (Suneel Kumar

Singh vs. State of U.P.) – The issue involved therein is

the right of the counsel, who earlier argued in the appeal

opposing interim bail application thereafter put-in an

appearance on behalf of the victim to oppose a

subsequent application for short-term bail by the

accused, who stood convicted for the offence under

Section 302 of the IPC. The opposition by the victim

appears to be on the ground that the short-term bail

granted on the earlier occasion was mis-used by the

appellant-convict. The Division Bench, after examining

the provisions of Section 2 (u), 2 (wa), 24, 12, 301 and

302 of the Cr.P.C. and after placing reliance on the

decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of the said Court in

Brijesh Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh was pleased

to hold in paragraph No.52 (b) and (c) as under:-

“52. (b) If a person has already been

engaged as G.A/A.G.A. etc. and subsequently,

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he has been discharging his duties from the

said capacity, then there is no legal impediment in his way to appear on behalf of

the complainant in an appeal which has been

filed by the accused-appellant against his conviction under Section 374 Cr.P.C. or to

oppose in the bail application filed under

Section 389 Cr.P.C but only with the permission of the Court otherwise he shall

only assists the State Government.

(c) If G.A./A.G.A. etc. who has been

appointed as per under Section 24 (1) of

Cr.P.C.by the State Government, filed any

objections/conduct of the case filed on behalf

of the State in an appeal filed by the accused-

persons against his conviction or in a bail

application under Section 389 Cr.P.C.,

subsequently, disengaged from the said

capacity, then in that circumstances, he

cannot appear on behalf of the complainant.”

A reading of the above would leave no doubt in the mind

of this Court that the primary question that was being

adjudicated is whether a government advocate

discharging functions is entitled to also represent the

complainant and appear on his behalf and oppose the

application under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. Though the

case is post-conviction stage, it is pertinent to note that

there is no consideration of the provisions of Section 372

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of the Cr.P.C. Much emphasis is placed on the

observations in paragraph No.51, more particularly,

paragraph Nos.14 and 15 of the extracted portion.

(vii) (1984) 2 SCC 500 (A R Antulay vs.

Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another) – Reliance is

placed on this ruling to buttress the contention that the

counsel, who represented the complainant is deemed to

be a public prosecutor. There can be no doubt that in a

proceedings before a Magistrate, the Magistrate in

exercise of powers under Section 302 read with Section

303 of the Cr.P.C., is entitled to permit the prosecution

to be conducted by any person other than the

prosecutor. There can be no dispute with the proposition

as the said procedure is applicable only to proceedings

before a Magistrate only. This fact has also been

amplified in (2001) 5 SCC 407 (Manohar Lal vs.

Vinesh Anand and others).

(viii) 2015 SCC Online Del 9802 (Ram Phal vs.

State and others) – In paragraph No.3, the Court has

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formulated the two questions for consideration by the

Full Bench on an order of reference. The questions

formulated for consideration by the Full Bench leave not

doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the

applicability of the said ruling. The said ruling is

inapplicable to the facts of the case.

(ix) (2019) 2 SCC 752 (Mallikarjun Kodagali

(dead) Represented through Legal Representatives

vs. State of Karnataka and others) – The said ruling

revolves around that right of a victim to prefer an appeal

in terms of Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Paragraph No.9 of

the said ruling details the issue determined by the

Hon’ble Apex Court. A reading of the ruling reveals that

the same has no bearing on the issue at hand. A useful

reference could be made to the observations in

paragraph No.96.

(x) 2017 SCC Online Mani 79 ( Khumukcham

Nikita Devi and another vs. The State of Manipur

and another) – The said ruling has been rendered on a

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conjunctive reading of Sections 24(8) and 301(2) of the

Cr.P.C.

(xi) (2020) 2 SCC 474 (Rekha Murarka vs.

State of West Bengal and another) - Reliance is

placed on paragraph No.11, more particularly, paragraph

No.11.5.

16. Per contra, the learned Senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant/accused has

endeavored to resist the claim of the applicant. He would

take the Court through Section 24 (1) of the Cr.P.C. to

contend that an appeal is a distinct proceeding and that

the defence counsel is only intended to have a secondary

role to that of the public prosecutor. He would contend

that originally the amendment bill use the words ‘co-

ordinate with the prosecution’. That the law makers, after

a reflection, deemed it wiser to substitute the word ‘co-

ordinate’ with the word ‘assist’. Elaborating, he would

contend that this change by the legislature is suffice to

demonstrate that what is assigned to the victim under

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the amendment is only a supportive role and does not

empower the victim to conduct a parallel prosecution by

oneself. That this is the most plausible view in view of

the primacy accorded to Public Prosecutor under Sections

225 and 301 (2) of the Cr.P.C. and any other

interpretation resulting in a free-hand would go against

the scheme envisaged under the statute. In support he

would placed reliance on paragraph No.11.1 of Rekha

Murarka case supra.

17. He would nextly contend that legislative intent

is manifest in clear terms and that prosecution before a

Sessions Court can only be conducted by the Public

Prosecutor as it is the intention of the legislature that

fairness of trial is of prime importance.

18. That a Public Prosecutor is not expected to

show a thirst to ensure the case concludes with a

conviction. That the Courts have repeatedly held that the

expected attitude of a Public Prosecutor, while conducting

prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the

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Court and to the investigating agencies but to the

accused as well. That if an accused is legitimately

entitled to any benefits during trial, it is the duty of the

Public Prosecutor not to scuttle or conceal it. That, it is

the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore

and make it available to the accused even if the defence

counsel has overlooked it.

19. That if a private counsel and more

importantly, a counsel engaged by a victim is allowed to

conduct the prosecution, it would turn adversarial and

the counsel would attempt to secure a conviction by hook

or by crook and he would contend that it is for that

reason that the Parliament in its wisdom has applied a

bridle and reduced the role of the victim’s counsel to

imparting instructions or assisting the public

prosecutor/prosecutor. In support of the above

contention, he would place reliance on the ruling of the

Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Shiv Kumar

vs. Hukam Chand reported in (1997) 7 SCC 467.

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20. Nextly, the learned Senior counsel would place

reliance on the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in

paragraph No.13 of the ruling rendered in the case of

Sundeep Kumar Bafna vs. State of Maharashtra

reported in (2014) 16 SCC 623. The learned Senior

counsel would contend that in the light of the

observations, wherein a right to be heard would occur to

the victim only if the Appellate Court were to infer

anything adversely against the prosecution and that in

the matter of bail, it is purely between the Court and the

convict and the hands of the Division Bench cannot be

tied down.

21. Nextly, the learned Senior counsel has placed

reliance on ruling reported in AIR 1966 SC 911

(Thakur Ram and others vs. State of Bihar)

(paragraph No.9) which is rendered in terms of the

erstwhile provisions of Section 435. He would contend

that provisions of the criminal law cannot be permitted to

be invoked by a private party to wreck vengeance and

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that barring a few instance, the party that is treated as

aggrieved is the State, which is the custodian of social

interest of the community at large.

22. The learned Senior counsel would place

reliance on the observations made in paragraph Nos.9

and 10 of the ruling reported in 2013 2 KCCR 994

(Shankar vs. State of Karnataka and others),

whereby this Court has been pleased to hold that the

insertion of the proviso to sub-Section (8) of Section 24

of the Cr.P.C. does not in any manner detract from the

object, intent and scheme of the Court and he would

reiterate that the permissible role of the victim is only a

supportive role or to assist the Prosecutor.

23. Having adverted to the contentions, we are of

the opinion that the definition of the following words,

namely, ‘assist’ and ‘prosecution’ as defined in the

Lexicon 5th Edition need be relied upon, in view of the

fact that the said words are not defined under the Code.

The words are defined to mean as under:

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“Assist : To aid ; succour ; help ;lend

encouragement to.

Prosecution: Prosecution means a criminal

action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before a competent

tribunal, for the purpose of determining the

guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime.”

That apart, it is necessary to extract certain

provisions for the sake of easy reference and

convenience, namely, Section 24, Section 301, Section

372 and Section 389. Section 24, Section 301, Section

372 and Section 389 read as under:

“24. Public Prosecutors.—(1) For

every High Court, the Central Government

or the State Government shall, after

consultation with the High Court, appoint

a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint

one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for

conducting in such Court, any prosecution,

appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the

Central Government or State Government, as the case may be.

(2)The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors

for the purpose of conducting any case or

class of cases in any district or local area.

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(3)For every district, the State

Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more

Additional Public Prosecutors for the district:

Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed for one

district may be appointed also to be a Public

Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for another district.

(4) The District Magistrate shall, in

consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare

a panel of names of persons, who are, in his

opinion fit to be appointed as Public

Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors

for the district.

(5) No person shall be appointed by

the State Government as the Public

Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for

the district unless his name appears in the

panel of names prepared by the District

Magistrate under sub-section 94).

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained

in sub-section (5), where in a State there

exists a regular Cadre of Prosecuting

Officers, the State Government shall

appoint a Public Prosecutor or an Additional

Public Prosecutor only from among the

persons constituting such Cadre:

Provided that where, in the opinion

of the State Government, no suitable person is available in such Cadre for such

appointment that Government may appoint

a person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may

30

be, from the panel of names prepared by the

District Magistrate under sub-section (4).

[Explanation.—For the purposes of this

sub-section,—

(a)“regular Cadre of Prosecuting

Officers” means a Cadre of Prosecuting Officers which includes

therein the post of a Public

Prosecutor, by whatever name called,

and which provides for promotion of

Assistant Public Prosecutors, by

whatever name called, to that post;

(b)“Prosecuting Officer” means a person,

by whatever name called, appointed

to perform the functions of a Public

Prosecutor, an Additional Public

Prosecutor or an Assistant Public

Prosecutor under this Code.]

(7) A person shall be eligible to be

appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an

Additional Public Prosecutor under sub-

section (1)or sub-section (2)or sub-section

(3)or sub-section (6),only if he has been in

practice as an advocate for not less than

seven years.

(8) The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the

purposes of any case or class of cases, a

person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a

Special Public Prosecutor:

[Provided that the Court may permit

the victim to engage an advocate of his

31

choice to assist the prosecution under this

sub-section.]

(9) For the purposes of sub-section

(7)and sub-section (8),the period during which a person has been in practice as a

pleader, or has rendered (whether before or

after the commencement of this Code) service as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional

Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public

Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer, by

whatever name called, shall be deemed to be

the period during which such person has been

in practice as an advocate.]”

“301. Appearance by Public

Prosecutors.—(1)The Public Prosecutor or

Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of a case

may appear and plead without any written

authority before any Court in which that case

is under inquiry, trial or appeal.

(2)If in any such case any private

person instructs a pleader to prosecute any

person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor

or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of

the case shall conduct the prosecution,

and the pleader so instructed shall act

therein under the directions of the Public

Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor,

and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence

is closed in the case.”

“372. No appeal to lie unless

otherwise provided.—

Proviso-1: No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court

32

except as provided for by this Code or by any

other law for the time being in force:

Proviso-2: [Provided that the victim shall

have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the

accused or convicting for a lesser offence or

imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an

appeal ordinarily lies against the order of

conviction of such Court.]”

“389. Suspension of sentence

pending the appeal; release of appellant on

bail.—(1)Pending any appeal by a convicted

person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons

to be recorded by it in writing, order that the

execution of the sentence or order appealed

against be suspended and, also, if he is in

confinement, that he be released on bail, or

on his own bond:

[Provided that the Appellate Court shall,

before releasing on bail or on his own bond a

convicted person who is convicted of an

offence punishable with death or

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a

term of not less than ten years, shall give

opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for

showing cause in writing against such release:

Provided further that in cases where

a convicted person is released on bail it

shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the

bail.]

33

Section 24 is placed in Chapter II and deals with

Constitution of Regular Courts and Offices that is the

offices of the Public Prosecutor, Additional Public

Prosecutor and Special Public Prosecutor. Section 301 is

placed in Chapter XXIV, which deals with general

provisions as to enquiries and trials. Section 372 and

389 are placed in Chapter XXIX and deals with the

appeals arising out of the judgments of the trial Courts.

24. The instant application prima facie calls for an

interpretation in the background of the above provisions.

25. As contended by the learned Senior counsels

on behalf of the applicant, there is no denying the fact

that victomology as a facet of Criminal law came to be

recognized by the law makers and as a consequence

thereof the amendment Act of 2008 (Act 5 of 2009)

came to be introduced. By Section 3 of the Amendment

Act, Proviso to Section 24 and the Proviso to Section 372

came to be inserted and whereby and as rightly

contended by the learned Senior Counsel, certain rights

34

have been vested in the victims and who is defined under

Section 2 (wa). It is these insertions coupled with the

sub-Section (2) of Section 301 that is made the

foundation for the application seeking impleadment as a

necessary party to the proceedings, i.e., in the appeals

preferred by the accused, who have been convicted and

have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life

and also suffer such other punishments as imposed

under the judgment of conviction and order of sentencing

dated 08.06.2021.

26. It is the case of the applicant, who is none

other than the de-facto complainant and mother of the

deceased that the appeal being a continuation of the

prosecution, the applicant is entitled to be heard in the

appeal, including on the application preferred under

Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. praying to suspend the

sentence and enlarge the appellants on bail. It is

vehemently contended by the learned Senior counsels on

behalf of the applicant that in the light of insertion of the

35

Proviso to Section 24 of the Cr.P.C., the applicants are

entitled to be heard and the Advocate engaged by the

victim is deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. It is the case

of the applicants that in view of provisions of Section 24

(8) of the Cr.P.C., the applicants are required to be heard

before any orders are passed on the application preferred

by the appellants under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C.

27. As noted in the foregoing paragraphs, this

Court has been taken through various rulings including

ruling rendered by the Division Bench of the Allahabad

High Court. The rulings rendered by the Allahabad High

Court has no doubt permitted the victim be heard on the

short term bail application preferred by the convict. It is

also relevant to note that having heard the victim it was

pleased to allow the application of the accused.

28. The point that arises for consideration is,

whether the appeal by an accused, who has been

convicted by a judgment and sentenced can be construed

as a continuation of the “prosecution” of the accused ?

36

29. To determine this issue, it is necessary to

appreciate the word “prosecution” and “prosecutor”. The

word “prosecution” has been defined as a criminal action

or proceeding before a Court of law to determine the

guilt or innocence of a person charged to trial. The

distinction between the words “to prosecute“ and

“prosecution” can be gainfully stated to mean “to set the

law in motion” and as a successful conclusion of the

proceedings by determining the guilt or innocence of the

person charged with a crime”. In effect, the process of

“prosecution” or the proceedings would conclude with the

proclamation of guilt or innocence of the person charged

with a crime. This conclusion can also be inferred by the

very arrangement of the provisions under the Code.

30. As could be seen Section 24 is placed in

Chapter II which deals with the Constitution of the

criminal courts and its offices, whereas the right to

appeal and the right of the convict to seek suspension of

sentence are placed in Chapter XXIX. If it was the

37

intendment of the law makers that the application of a

convict to have himself released on bail was to be treated

as an application by any other person the same could

have been provided under Chapter XXXIII. On the

contrary the right of a convict to seek such suspension of

sentence has been placed in Chapter XXIX as a separate

provision and the provision has an interesting aspect.

The first proviso to Section 389 (1) came to be inserted

by Act 25 of 2005. It places certain fetters on the

Appellate Court, whereby in respect of appeals where the

convict has been sentenced to death or sentenced to life

or imprisonment for not less than 10 years then such

application can be considered only after providing an

opportunity to the public prosecutor to show cause

against the application in writing. Thus, the provision is a

standalone provision.

31. Before we further embark upon interpreting

the provisions it would be advantageous to dwell from

the principles of interpretation in matters concerning

38

statutes in the domain of criminal jurisprudence. In this

regard, we desire to place reliance upon certain rulings of

the Hon’ble Apex Court to act as a guiding light in our

endeavor to settle the law.

32. One of the earliest reported judgments of the

Hon’ble Apex Court is in the case of M.V. Joshi v. M.U.

Shimpi and another reported in AIR 1961 SC 1494

wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe

in paragraphs 11, 12 and 15 as under:

“11. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the rule being a part of a penal statute, it should be construed in favour of the accused. When it is said

that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly it only means that the court must see that the thing

charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. To put it

in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so

construed that no case shall be held to fall within it

which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has also been held

that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction

favourable to the subject should be preferred. But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental

principles of interpretation, namely, that the primary test is the language employed in the Act and when

the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature.

39

12. The latest view on the relevant rule of

construction is found in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., at p. 262, which reads,

“… it is now recognized that the paramount duty of

the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and

rational meaning and to promote its object”.

Adverting to Acts against adulteration, the learned

author quotes Day, J., in Newby v. Sims [(1894) 63 LJMC 229] as follows:

“I cannot concur in the contention that because

these Acts (against adulteration) impose penalties, therefore, their construction should, necessarily, be

strict. I think that neither greater nor less strictness should be applied to those than to other statutes.”

So judged, we have no doubt that the butter prepared out of curd falls within the plain meaning of

the words in the said rule.

xxx

15. The conclusion we have arrived at is not only

supported by the plain words of the rule, but also carries out the clear intention of the Legislature. The

Act was passed to make provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food. Butter is a

favourite edible fat and is consumed in different ways by innumerable persons in this country. As we

have already pointed out, butter is prepared in the rural areas throughout this country by the

indigenous process of churning soured milk, whereas only in a few cities butter is prepared directly from

milk. The interpretation suggested by learned

counsel for the appellant, if accepted, would make the rule a dead-letter, for all practical purposes, and

the object of the Legislature would be defeated. In our view, the intention of the Legislature has been

clearly expressed in the rule.”

40

33. Nextly, we would place reliance on the ruling

of Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in

(1976) 1 SCC 560 (Dilip Kumar Sharma and others

vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) and more particularly

on the observations in paragraph Nos.11, 22, 23 and 24.

In paragraph 23 the Full Bench has reiterated the rule of

interpretation as settled in M V Joshi’s case (supra).

34. Thirdly, we place reliance on the observations

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the ruling reported in

(2003) 11 SCC 405 (Assistant Commissioner,

Assessment – II, Bangalore and others vs.

Velliappa Textiles Ltd., and others) in paragraphs 26,

27 and 33.

35. Lastly the observations of the Apex Court in

paragraphs 7 to 11 in the case of Rekha Murarka vs.

State of West Bengal and another reported in (2020)

2 SCC 474.

41

36. From a reading of the above, it is apparent

that in matters involving interpretation of criminal statute

the rule of interpretation to be followed is the rule of

strict or literal interpretation. The Courts have

categorically held where on a plain reading of the

provision, the clear and compelling nature of the

language used in the provision gives a particular meaning

or where there is no ambiguity in the provision, liberal

interpretation of the same is impermissible. Further, as

held by the Full Bench If two constructions are possible

upon the language of the statute, the Court must choose

the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness,

and eschew the other which makes its operation unduly

oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, or which would lead

to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an

element of bewildering uncertainty and practical

inconvenience in the working of the statute.

37. In the background of the above dictum we

now proceed to appreciate the provisions and we

42

commence by delving into the statement of objects and

reasons of Act 5 of 2009. The third sentence in

paragraph 2 reads as under:

“They need to be given certain rights

and compensation, so that there is no distortion of the criminal justice system.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, what can be gathered from the above

statement of objects and reasons are that the law

makers intended to give or confer upon victims “certain

rights”. It makes it obvious that the law makers were

clear that they intended to give or confer specific rights

and it was not their intent to tweak or bring about a

complete transformation in the criminal justice

dispensation system. This our opinion, is fortified by the

Amendments proposed by way of insertions and the

Proviso to sub section 8 of Section 24 came to be

inserted. It speaks of permitting the victim to engage an

advocate of his or her choice to assist the prosecution. It

is now relevant to look into the main provision i.e.,

Section 24. Section 24(8) pertains to appointment of the

43

Special Public Prosecutor. It is needless to state that a

special public prosecutor can be appointed either for a

case or for a class of cases only and he stands apart from

a public prosecutor of the High Court or those appointed

under sub Section (6). Thus, enabling the victim to seek

leave of the Court to assist even in the event a Special

Public Prosecutor is appointed. We are required to

observe the distinction in view of sub Section (1) of

Section 24 which speaks of “any prosecution, appeal or

other proceeding” on behalf of the State or Central

Government. Thus, for the provisions of Section 24 of

Cr.P.C. prosecution does not include appeal. This aspect

has not been considered in the judgments of Allahabad

High Court relied upon by the victim. Thus, Section 24

which is placed in Chapter II relating to constitution of

criminal Court or offices distinctly refers to prosecution or

appeal or other proceeding. Sub Section (2) of Section

301 is placed in Chapter XXIV which provides for general

provisions as to enquiries and trials. Sub Section (2) can

be read in two parts, (1) the pleader who is so instructed

44

by the private party can act under the directions of the

PP or APP (2) may with the permission of the pleader so

engaged, may with the permission of the court submit

written arguments after the evidence is closed in the

case, thereby implying the stage of arguments. Thus the

role permitted is a severely limited one. The use of the

words “shall act” would demonstrate the mandatory

nature of the provision implying thereby no right is

vested in the pleader so engaged to act independently.

Secondly it permits the submission of written

submissions and that too with the leave of the Court and

only after a particular stage i.e., closure of evidence. If

that be the mandatory nature of the provision then it

cannot be gainfully argued that the law permits the

pleader so engaged to act independently or make

independent submissions or oral submissions to the

Court.

38. The words assist the prosecution occurring in

proviso to Section 24(8) have to be construed in such a

45

manner that the principles of liberal interpretation or

purposive construction cannot be adopted as such an

approach is likely to jeoparadise the solemn and

constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused and it

does not require much to turn a “prosecution” into a

“persecution”. The law makers have been categorical

with the rights that they intended to confer upon a

victim. The very use of the word “assist” the prosecution

would clearly demonstrate that the law makers did not

intend to confer any independent role to the advocate or

pleader representing the victim. That apart the sanctity

of Chapter XXIV has also been considered by the

constitutional bench in the case of Hardeep Singh vs.

State of Punjab and others reported in (2014) 3 SCC

92 wherein the constitutional bench has gone into and

considered the aspects of trial, enquiry, etc., Hence we

are unable to accept the case of the applicants.

39. One more provision which fortifies our

conclusion is Section 372 itself which is placed in Chapter

46

XXIX. The proviso to Section 372 came to be inserted by

Act 5 of 2009. Under the proviso, a right to appeal has

been conferred on the victim. Even the said right is not

conferred absolutely, but is a restricted one. The proviso

permits or enables the victim to prefer an appeal in

certain circumstances i.e., one in the event of accused

being acquitted or in the event of accused being

convicted for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate

compensation. Inadequacy of sentence has not been

provided as a ground enabling the victim to prefer an

appeal. Thus, is this limited right under the proviso to

Section 372 and the words “assist the prosecution”

occurring in the proviso to Section 24(8) are juxtaposed

with the words “certain rights” used in paragraph 2 of the

statement of objects and reasons of the amending act 5

of 2009, it becomes clear that the intent of the law

makers was only to confer a limited right on the victim.

40. Thus, if the statement of objects and reasons

and the amendments by way of insertion to Section

47

24(8) and Section 372 are read conjunctively, it is crystal

clear and there is no ambiguity to state that the

construction can be placed. It is pertinent and relevant

to note that the long list of rulings relied upon by the

parties do not reveal the consideration of the insertion of

the proviso to Section 372 and its impact. In that view

the rulings relied upon by the appellant will not be of any

assistance to the applicant.

41. Thus, on a plain reading the only conclusion

we can draw is that the victims have been conferred with

specific rights only i.e., either to assist the prosecution

before the trial Court and to prefer an appeal only in

specific grounds before the appellate Court. It is relevant

to note that proviso to Section 372 and proviso to

Section 24(8) have been introduced under Amending Act

5 of 2009. If it was the intention of the legislature to

confer a wider or enlarged right on the victims the law

makers would certainly have stated so. The law makers

having consciously decided to insert the provisos to

48

Section 24(8) and Section 372, it cannot be gainfully

argued that the intendment of the legislature was

otherwise, or that a wider construction ought to be given

to the said amendments so as to bring the appeals

preferred against judgment of conviction and the

accompanying application under Section 389 within their

ambit.

42. The legislature having enacted a specific

provision to deal with the subject of suspension of

sentence and having mandated that in certain

circumstances the public prosecutor ought to be given an

opportunity to show cause in writing, would have as well

conferred a similar right on the victim as supposively

enacted under Section 24(8). Section 24 recognises a

distinction between a prosecution and an appeal or other

proceeding. It also recognizes the distinction between

different class of prosecutors and for differently

appointed prosecutors. In respect of appeals by an

aggrieved victim the circumstances under which certain

49

appeals can be lodged is specified. If that being the case

it would be futile to contend that the victim, in view of

the words “assist the prosecution”, is also entitled to

intervene and claim to be heard in appeals not preferred

by the victim, much less oppose the application under

Section 389 preferred in an appeal by the convict.

43. The word “prosecution” as defined clearly

indicates the stage upto and culminating with a

proclamation of the guilt or innocence of the person

charged with the crime. If that be the definition and if

the guilt of a person has been proclaimed and such

convict prefers an appeal it can by no stretch of

imagination can be construed as a continuation of the

“prosecution”. With the proclamation of guilt there is a

conclusion and a transformation in the status of the party

sets in and the guilty is transposed from the status of an

accused to a status of a convict and hence the contention

that the appeal by a convict is a continuation of the

prosecution is unacceptable.

50

44. We deem it necessary to state so in view of

the caution sounded by the Apex Court in Rekha

Murarka’s case supra, wherein the Apex Court has gone

to the extent of cautioning the courts from attempting to

alter the inherent balance and undoubtedly the court has

drawn the scheme to ensure fairness in the trial of an

accused and in the criminal justice dispensation system.

The mischief and damage that can be caused if the

interpretation as placed by the learned Senior counsels

appearing on behalf of the applicants is accepted the

mischief and damage that it can cause to the justice

dispensation system is immeasurable.

45. The arguments that the pleader or advocate of

the victim has to be equated with that of a public

prosecutor, if accepted can cause tremors in the justice

dispensation system and become a spoke in the wheel of

the justice delivery system. It is imperative to quote the

constitutional bench in Hardeep Singh’s case in

paragraph No.42, which reads as under:-

51

” It is a settled principle of law that an

interpretation which leads to the conclusion

that a word used by the legislature is

redundant, should be avoided as the

presumption is that the legislature has

deliberately and consciously used the words

for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The

legal maxim a verbis legis non est

recedendum which means, “from the words of

law, there must be no departure” has to be

kept in mind.”

It is also relevant to note the observations in

paragraphs 43 and 45.

“43. The court cannot proceed with an

assumption that the legislature enacting the statute

has committed a mistake and where the language of

the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court

cannot go behind the language of the statute so as

to add or subtract a word playing the role of a

political reformer or of a wise counsel to the

legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing

that the legislature intended what it has said and

even if there is some defect in the phraseology, etc.,

it is for others than the court to remedy that defect.

The statute requires to be interpreted without doing

52

any violence to the language used therein. The court

cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for

the reason that it has no power to legislate.

xxx

45. This Court in Rohitash Kumar v. Om

Prakash Sharma [(2013) 11 SCC 451 : AIR 2013 SC

30] , after placing reliance on various earlier

judgments of this Court held : (SCC pp. 460-61,

paras 27-29)

“27. The court has to keep in mind the

fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a

statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a

single word. … A section is to be interpreted by

reading all of its parts together, and it is not

permissible to omit any part thereof. The court

cannot proceed with the assumption that the

legislature, while enacting the statute has

committed a mistake; it must proceed on the

footing that the legislature intended what it

has said; even if there is some defect in the

phraseology used by it in framing the statute,

and it is not open to the court to add and

amend, or by construction, make up for the

deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. …

28. The statute is not to be construed in

light of certain notions that the legislature

53

might have had in mind, or what the

legislature is expected to have said, or what

the legislature might have done, or what the

duty of the legislature to have said or done

was. The courts have to administer the law as

they find it, and it is not permissible for the

court to twist the clear language of the

enactment in order to avoid any real or

imaginary hardship which such literal

interpretation may cause. …

29. … under the garb of interpreting the provision, the court does not have the power

to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but

legislation.” (emphasis in original)

46. In the light of the above observations coupled

with the observations in Rekha Murarka’s case we have

no hesitation in holding that the code of Criminal

Procedure Chapter XXIX does not confer any right on the

victim to seek impleadment in an appeal preferred by the

convict. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

placed in Chapter XXIX does not confer any right of

audience on victim in and during the consideration of the

application for suspension of sentence in an appeal

54

preferred by the convict. We hold that the right to assist

the prosecution under 24(8) is not available to the victim

in an appeal by convict under Chapter XXIX.

In view of the above, the applications are rejected.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

dn/ykl