Implications of the Ukrainian crisis for the trade relationship of the EU with Russia

Implications of the Ukrainian Crisis for Trade

Relationships of the EU with Russia

Economic Policies of the European Union

Gartnar Marko 19486522

Marmai Martina 19131311

Mladenović Kosta 19821606


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Executive Summary

The aim of this research assignment is to provide an assessment of the effects on trade

relationships between the EU and Russia stemming from the so-called “Ukrainian crisis.” The

term points at the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, and the public response that this

event generated. In particular, the analysis will regard the repercussions on Euro-Russian trade

due to the Council’s diplomatic reply to the violent annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the

Russian Federation.

Since March 16th

, when - with the unconditional support of Russia - the referendum for

the independence of Crimea took place, the events in Ukraine escalated, giving rise to a number

of restrictive provisions which, increasing in scope and gravity, aimed on one side to discourage

military intervention by Russia, while on the other punished illegal misappropriation of

Ukrainian public property.

Such sanctions may not have played an important role, were it not for the current shaky

state of the Russian economy. Nevertheless, that of sanctions is a two-sided sword, and the

European Union, barely stepping on the road to recovery, can’t exactly afford being too picky

when it comes to deciding who to do business with.

The high level of interconnectedness and dependence on each other’s economy seem to

drive these two players into a situation of stalemate: hurting the other without hurting themselves

appears to be almost impossible, as both have lots to lose from a bilateral trade reduction.

To conclude, things may take a decisive turn only if one of the participants were to

somehow succeed in neutering the effect of the other’s sanctions, hence becoming more

independent from the other.


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Table of contents

1. Introduction

1.1 Economic relationship between the European Union and the Russian Federation

1.2 Imports from Russia to the European Union

1.3 Exports from The European Union to Russia

1.4 Investment

1.5 Role of the World Trade Organization

1.6 Timeline of the Ukrainian conflict

2. The Sanctions

2.1 On Sanctions Imposed by the EU

2.2 The Context

2.3 The Sanctions

3. Effect of European Sanctions

3.1 The financial sector

3.2 The real market

3.3 Gripping onto Natural Resources

3.4 Effect of Russian Sanctions

4. Conclusion

References

Appendix


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1. Introduction

1.1 Economic relationship between the European Union and the Russian

Federation

Before we examine the impact of the Ukrainian crisis we need to understand the

economic relationship that existed between the European Union and Russia before the conflict

began. This section provides the overview of economic cooperation between the two partners.

We chose to emphasize certain aspects of that relationship, that have been most affected by the

crisis in Ukraine or are likely to be affected in the future. This information can help us estimate

where the effects of this crisis will be felt the most. We also review certain other areas that may

become relevant.

The European Union and Russia have a close relationship in terms of trade and

investment. Bilateral trade is important for both sides. Russia ranks as EU's third trading partner

(after the United States and China) and the EU accounts for about half of all Russian foreign

trade (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2014). Trade

between Russia and EU member states increased dramatically leading up to the year 2008. Then,

this trend was interrupted and volume of trade sharply decreased. Nevertheless, the international

trade returned to pre-crisis levels in 2012 (338 billion Euros). The following year total trade

reached 326 billion. The EU ran a significant foreign trade deficit (European Commission,

2014). These numbers are broken down below.

1.2 Imports from Russia to the European Union

In 2013 the EU imported about 206 billion euros worth of goods from Russia. EU

imports are generally dominated by the supply of energy. Various fossil fuels and related

products accounted for about 160 billion or about 78 per cent of all imports. Unclassified goods

come in as a distant second at around 8 per cent. The imports of energy have actually increased

quite sharply from only about 89 billion euros in 2009. The imports of of fuel have therefore

increased by nearly 80 per cent in four years (European Commission, 2014).

The EU has become increasingly dependent on the supply of fuel from Russia. Since the

year 2006 Russia has been the main supplier of solid fuel and retains its leading role in the

supply of crude oil and natural gas (Eurostat 2014). In 2012 imports from Russia accounted for

34 per cent of all crude oil (European Commission, 2014) and 23 per cent of all natural gas

(Eurogas, 2013) used in the EU. But the dependence is not one sided. Russia is heavily

dependent on the revenues from energy exports to Europe. We can take the example of crude oil.

In the year 2013 all Russian exports of this commodity were worth about 131 billion euros (Bank

of Russia, 2014). In the same period EU imports of crude oil from Russia reached the value of

around 99 billion EUR (European Commission, 2014). That means that over three quarters of


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crude oil exports were sold to the European markets. Any reduction of supply would therefore

severely impact the Russian economy. This point is emphasised by the fact that about half of the

revenues of the Russian federal budget are provided by the mineral extraction taxes and export

duties on the exports of gas and oil (United States Energy Information Administration, 2014).

The above figures give us an idea of Europe’s dependence on Russian energy. But they

are aggregate numbers, that tell us about energy imports for the Union as a whole. But they mask

important differences among individual countries. Some (like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

Finland) import all of their gas from Russia. Certain other countries import no gas from Russia

(Eurogas, 2013). This means, that some countries may be disproportionately affected if Russia

decides to use natural gas as a diplomatic tool. In the graph below we show the countries, that are

most dependent on Russian gas supply.

Source: Eurogas

1.3 Exports from The European Union to Russia

In 2013 the EU exports to Russia reached the value of 120 billion euros. EU’s exports to

Russia are significantly more diverse than its imports. The largest share of exports is provided by

machinery and transport equipment at 47.4 per cent of total exports. Cars represent a large share

of those exports. Chemical and related products account for 16.8 per cent.

Food and live animals (as an item in the SITC classification) come in at fifth place at 7.3

per cent. They generate about 8.8 billion euros of exports. Trade with Russia represents 11.6 per

cent of all EU’s exports in these commodities. These supplies are important for Russia because it

is a net importer of food. The gap between imports and exports reached 20 billion euros in 2013


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(European Commission 2014). Russia relies heavily on foreign supplies of many product such as

fruit and vegetables, meat, cheese.

1.4 Investment

Companies from the EU have invested heavily in Russia. Currently about 75 per cent of

all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in one of the EU member states (European

Commission, 2014).

In the last few years Russia experienced very high growth in foreign investment. Just in

2013 FDI inflows to Russia rose by more than 80 per cent. This made Russia the third largest

FDI recipient in the world behind The US and China. This latest increase was largely fueled by

the acquisition of a significant stake in Rosneft by British Petroleum. Estimates, made before the

current crisis, predicted that this trend would continue (United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development, 2014).

According to Ernst & Young (2013) in 2012 about 21 per cent of projects were in the

automotive sector, 13 per cent in business services in 11 per cent in chemicals. European car

manufacturers made significant investments into production capacity in recent years. This is

most apparent in the city of Kaluga, where several European car manufacturers (Volkswagen,

Volvo Trucks and a joint venture between Peugeot-Citroën and Mitsubishi) have recently opened

factories (Crouch, 2013). These investments within Russian borders may shield them against the

possible future ban on imports of cars from abroad (Golubkova, 2014).

1.5 Role of the World Trade Organization

The WTO is an organization that promotes the liberalization of trade and maintains a set

of trade rules. It is also provides a platform for governments to negotiate trade deals and settle

trade disputes. The EU has been a member of the WTO since the its inception in 1995. All EU

member states also maintain their separate WTO memberships (World Trade Organization, n.d.).

Russia became a member of WTO in 2012 after almost two decades of negotiations. The

European Union welcomed Russia’s accession. It did so because this would reduce Russian

import duties and other barriers to trade. Also, the Russian government and Russian businesses

would need to follow common rules. WTO rules would also provide European investors in

Russia with a more predictable legislative framework and an overall favorable business climate

(European Commission, 2014).

The first year of WTO membership was rather disappointing for Russia. Exports decreased and

imports increased. Liberalization of trade was quite damaging particularly to Russian agricultural

producers. They are just not yet efficient enough to compete with foreign competition. Therefore

a significant increase in imports of some agricultural products was recorded within the first year.

But these negative consequences had been predicted and were a part of Russia’s calculation.


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Economic analysts have predicted that Russia would not begin to feel the positive effect before

the year 2016 (Balibouse, 2013). But this date may be further delayed by the current political

crisis and overall economic conditions.

Since its accession the EU and Russia have both filed several trade disputes against each

other (WTO, n.d.). Most of them predate the current crisis. However, since the beginning of the

crisis both sides have imposed sanctions on the other. Russia maintains that EU sanctions are

illegal under WTO rules (Astakhov, 2014). Sanctions and their effects are discussed in more

detail below.

1.6 Timeline of the Ukrainian conflict

In this section we briefly summarise the events of the current crisis. Sources for this

information are Aljazeera (2014) and the BBC (2014).

● On November 21 2013 Ukrainian President abandons an association agreement with the

EU. Under the agreement the EU would drop its tariffs on Ukrainian imports. Ukraine

would be expected to gradually lower tariffs over time. However, Ukraine would not be

able to join the customs union of the Commonwealth of independent States as some of

it’s members are not members of WTO.

● The rejection of the treaty immediately provokes large scale and sometimes violent

protest. Protesters occupy municipal buildings and clash with police. Meanwhile Russia

agrees to buy Ukrainian debt and reduce gas prices.

● In January The Ukrainian government adopts amnesty for protesters in an effort to de-

escalate the situation. Ukrainian prime minister resigns for the same reason.

Nevertheless, the protest continue into February when many protesters and police are

killed. On February 21th The government and the opposition reach a deal to end the

violence. Shortly after the president flees the capital and is dismissed by parliament. The

opposition leaders adopt leadership positions in government.

● Later that month Russian soldiers gradually take control of Crimea. The EU strongly

condemns Russian actions and calls on them to withdraw. In March a referendum is

organized in Crimea on joining the Russian Federation. The proposal is adopted, but only

Russia recognizes the referendum as valid. Russia then annexes the peninsula while

Ukraine vows never to recognize this unilateral act. The EU and the US enact sanctions

against Russia in the form of asset freezes and travel bans for certain Russian officials.

● In April and May Pro-Russian separatist occupy government buildings in eastern Ukraine

and declare independence. Ukraine responds with military force.

● In June Ukraine finally signs the originally rejected Association agreement with the EU.

The Ukrainian and the European parliament ratify the agreement at the same time. The


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agreement is set to come into force in January of 2016. Until then Ukraine will enjoy

duty-free trade with CIS countries. Russia seeks to adjust the deal. However, their

initiative is rebuffed because this is a “bilateral agreement”.

● In July a civilian plane is shot down over the separatist regions prompting international

condemnation. Following this event western powers decide to expand Russian sanctions.

● On September 5th a deal between the pro-Russian rebels and Ukraine is struck in Minsk.

Negotiations take place in the presence of representatives from Russia and the

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However Ukrainian President

expresses little confidence in the deal. Hostilities resume soon after.

2. The Sanctions

2.1 On Sanctions Imposed by the EU

According to the press office of the Council of the European Union, “Sanctions are one

of the EU's tools to promote the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.” In its

April 29th

, 2014 Updated Factsheet on Restrictive Measures, the Council specifies that such tools

should not aim at punishing the country they target, but should rather act as a strong incentive for

the target subject to change its practices or policies. With respect to sanctions, the difficulty

consists in designing measures that will hit only the target and only with regard to the

controversial activity, without impacting negatively the rest of the civilian population or

disrupting other legitimate activities conducted by the same agent.

Imposed by the Council through specific CFSP decisions, which must be adopted by

unanimity, the restrictive measures are – for arms embargoes and travel bans – implemented

directly by Member States, else, in case of economic measures such as asset freezes or export

bans, implementation requires additional regulations by the Council. The measures apply to the

territory of the Union and any entity under the jurisdiction of a Member State, on the nationals of

Member States, be it natural or legal persons.

Sanctions may be of different kinds. They may forbid the trade in arms, and more in

general, items included in the EU common military list, annex services being banned as well.

Besides arm embargoes, sanctions may encompass visa or travel bans – when a specific group of

people is denied entry at the external borders of the Union (but individual Member States may

grant exemptions) – or asset freezes, in order to outlaw economic activity of targeted entities on

the territory of the Union.

2.2 The Context

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Catherine Ashton, the then-High Representative of

the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called for an extraordinary Foreign Affairs

Council session which adopted a first Conclusion on February 10th

2014, immediately followed


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by another one on February 20th

. The documents expressed the growing concern of the Union's

headquarters with the deteriorating situation of human rights in Ukraine, as well as the intention

of the European Union to extend peace talks in order to avoid conflict by all means.

Besides responding to the escalating violence in Ukraine, the Foreign Affairs Council

restated the commitment of the international community to assist Ukraine on the way out of its

difficult economic conditions, and the aim of the Union to keep on pursuing the path towards the

Association Agreement with Ukraine, with a view to going beyond its original scope – i.e. the

establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area – eventually even welcoming

Ukraine in the EU. In this view, observing the unprecedented Ukrainian support for the EU

voiced by the Euromaidan (literally: “European Square”) demonstrations in Kiev (BBC 2013),

the Council’s February 10th

conclusions emphasized ”the right of all sovereign states to make

their own foreign policy decisions without undue external pressure” hinting at Moscow’s

involvement in sparking the events that would eventually develop into the current situation.

What at first appeared as tensions due to conflicting interests between the EU and Russia,

later turned into a real diplomatic crisis following the referendum in Crimea and its subsequent

occupation by Russian troops. In response to the aggression, the Council adopted a series of

measures outlined in a Decision taken on March 17th, 2014 (Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP)

which were later implemented and amended in compliance with the legal procedure for

sanctions. To the present date, the above decision has been amended on a monthly base; the

latest amendment - the eighth - was issued on Nov 18th (Council Decision 2014/801/CFSP).

Parallel to that first Decision, a Regulation with the necessary specifications for asset freezes and

trade bans was issued on the same date (Council Regulation No 269/2014). These provisions

have been amended several times in the past months, adding new entities to the target list or

increasing the severity of the measures.

2.3 The Sanctions

In the context previously depicted, the Council was concerned with sanctioning on one

side the Russian threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, and on the other the

misappropriation of Ukrainian public property. The provisions defined the criteria for listing (last

amended by Council Decision 2014/801/CFSP of November 18th

2014), while periodically

amending the list of target entities, together with, for each entity, the specific reason behind the

listing. Lester (2014) illustrates the measures, consisting of: for natural persons, mainly travel

bans and asset freezes, whereas legal entities face a vast variety of measures, such as bans on the

trade of military equipment with the involved parties, prohibition for EU financial institutions to

provide financial services to Russian banks defence and energy companies, together with import

bans for goods originated in the Crimea/Sevastopol region, the prohibition to invest or develop

infrastructure and industry in that region, restrictions on access to European capital markets,


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restrictions on trade with regard to oil technologies, and prohibition on associated services for

the Russian oil industry.

Russia, on its part, replied soon after with a ban on food products originated in the EU.

As reported by the Financial Times, the EU - and besides, the US, Australia, Canada and Norway

- have been banned for a year from exporting meat, fish, seafood, dairy products, vegetables,

fruit, milk, to Russia (see also appendix). Threats of further measures, like protecting specific

industrial sectors or banning European and American airlines from the Russian air space have

not yet found implementation.

3. Effect of European Sanctions

3.1 The financial sector

As described in the context, according to the press office of the Council of the European

Union, the first wave of sanctions was imposed by the EU against the Russian federation on

March 17th

2014. Sanctions included travel bans and asset freezes against senior Russian and

Ukraine officials. The official list includes 119 persons, all placed in administrative positions in

Ukraine and Russia (among them there are also people from the Crimean peninsula, which were

actively involved in facilitating the Russian aggression). This first round of sanctions also lead to

the cancellation of the G8 summit, which was to be held in the Russian town Sochi. Instead, a

G7 summit was implemented in Brussels (as reported by the European Union Newsroom, all

members were invited except Russia).

All ground war activities which played a role in the destabilization of Ukraine, as a

consequence, lead to another round of sanctions by the EU against the Russian federation. The

US Department of State announced that further sanctions have been imposed by the US as well:

however, analysing in detail the effects of those measures would be beyond the scope of this

research assignment. This second round of EU sanctions, which was implemented on September

12th

2014 is still in place today. These have had a much bigger impact on the EU – Russia

economic relationship because they affected the three main Russian industries. The newly

imposed sanctions have widened their scope to finance, energy and the military sector (Council

Decision 2014/659/CFSP).

As a result of the restrictive measures implemented due to the Ukrainian crisis, the five

biggest Russian banks were forbidden to obtain debt financing in the EU on long term bases. In

practice, this implied the impossibility for banks to issue bonds for their operating activities. As

consequence, the value of the Euro against the Russian rouble soared abnormally (the same

happened with respect to the US Dollar: overall, the Rouble fell by 23% in three months, as

reported by The Economist). From the aspect of equity financing one could wonder why they

have not started issuing new shares. The reason lies probably with the fact that the Russian state

is the biggest shareholder in those banks, and it may not be interested in diluting its share of


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ownership - which, for Sberbank, Gazprombank, VTB, VEB exceeds 50%, as stated by their

financial reports.

The five banks targeted by sanctions are Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Bank of

Moscow (a subsidiary of the VTB Group) and VEB. Besides the ban on new issues of long term

bonds, they were also restricted from long term interbank offered financing in the EU and

suspended from services of brokerage houses.

Chart 1: Russian roubles for 1 Euro. (Source: bloomberg.com)

Chart 1 illustrates the results of those sanctions. While demand for foreign currency (in

our case EUR and USD) has increased rapidly, in the meantime, the supply of foreign currency

has dropped, causing the Russian rouble to lose 31% of its value over the past twelve months, as

reported by The Economist. The most significant drop was registered from the date of imposition

of the second round of sanctions.

This loss of value of the rouble against the Euro and the prohibition of long term

financing was also reflected in other areas of capital markets. Since the Russian government

retains the majority of ownership in banks (proof of that can be found in these institutions’

financial statements), the yield to maturity as well as the coupon interest rate on government 10-

year bonds has surged. That meant that Russia has to pay more interests on government bonds if

they are issued. Chart 2 shows this dynamic, but it must be noted that the increase was not as

rapid as it was in the currency case.


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Chart 2: Yield on 10yr Russian government bonds. (Source: bloomberg.com)

The increase in government bond interest rates brought about a further increase in the

bank lending rate, which rose by 2 percentage points. The bank lending rate is connected to the

government coupon rate as the state is a major shareholder in the financial institutions targeted

by the measures. The faster increase in lending rates compared to government coupon rates is

depicted in chart 3.

Chart 3: Russian bank lending rate. (Source: tradingeconomics.com | IMF)


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3.2 The real market

To date, it is maybe too early to fully assess the real effects of the Rouble’s drop against

the Euro and the US Dollar, and these will probably take some time to show, mainly due to the

amount of wealth Russia is endowed with, in terms of natural resources. In the long run,

however, things may take a different turn. Russia is a large and populous country: it was home to

over 140 million inhabitants according to the 2012 OECD statistical profile, yet very little value

is added to GDP by agricultural activities, while at the same time total long term unemployment

reached 30% in that same year. This fact casts doubt on whether its economy will be able to

satisfy its own domestic demand. Reading from the 2012 OECD statistical profile, a significant

portion of durable and nondurable products has to be imported: the value of imports of goods

was over 300 billion USD in 2012, balanced by massive exports of goods, presumably fossil

fuels. When an importing country sees the value of its currency drop, imports will become more

costly to its nationals. The facts examined suggest this is the case, and it is reasonable to expect

most Russians will experience lower living standards in the following months, as the cost of

living increases.

Source: tradingeconomics.com | Federal State Statistics Service.

3.3 Clinging onto Natural Resources


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Chart 4: Crude oil prices time series (per barrel). (Source: bloomberg.com)

As chart 4 shows, over the last four years crude oil was selling at an average price of 104

USD, which is much higher than the average of the previous ten years. Public data shows that

until the end of 2013 Russia has been the world’s largest producer of crude oil, with

10.003.000,00 barrels per month, accounting for approximately 16% of the total world

production (Russia Crude Oil Production). In absolute terms, Russia has been earning a revenue

of around 380 billion USD every year from exporting crude oil1. Previously high oil prices

granted Russia a significant increase of foreign currency reserves (mainly in USD), a fact that is

now likely to play a major role in Moscow’s ability to limit the negative effects of sanctions.

1 Figure obtained multiplying the quantity produced by the average price over the last four years.


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Chart 5: Foreign exchange reserves of the Russian central bank (USD millions) (Source:

tradingeconomics.com | Central Bank of Russia)

Having been banned from obtaining debt financing in the territory of the EU, suffering

from the drop in the value of the rouble, and with an industry facing higher interest rates for

lending, the Russian government decided to intervene through its central bank: The Economist

pointed out how over the past months the Kremlin has been buying roubles to sustain a given

level of foreign currency in the domestic market, in an effort to prevent prices from rising

excessively. This activity on the side of the central bank can be traced in chart 5. Russia spent

around 100 billion USD of its own reserves to keep currency and inflation under control, and

besides missing the goal, it ended up lowering dramatically its foreign exchange reserves. The

appropriateness of such behaviour is now being increasingly put into question, as a simplistic

look on the matter would suggest that the loss in value of the rouble will have a positive impact

on exports. However, with the exception of oil and military equipment, Russia is not a big

exporter of goods and services, and the general fall in prices of oil might erode the benefits of a

cheaper currency. Moreover, a devaluation of the rouble would become a nightmare for Russian

firms, who have some $130 million of debt payable by 2015 (The Economist). This casts the

Federation’s immediate future in a bad light, and would explain president Vladimir Putin’s

recent announcement regarding the intention to let the rouble float (Kelly 2014).

3.4 Effect of Russian Sanctions

Intending to reply to the measures adopted by the European Union and by the United

States, and pressed by the above described issues, the Kremlin has announced their set of

sanctions against EU, US, Canada, Norway and Australia. Sanctions are imposed on imports of

meat, dairy products, vegetables, fruit and milk (see detailed table in appendix).


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The total worth of the sanctions imposed by Russia on the EU has been estimated to be around €

5.064 million, which accounts for 0,03% of the EU-28 GDP in 20132. Some consequences for

Russia of the implementation of such a strategy are depicted in chart 6.

Chart 6: Food inflation in Russia (Source: tradingeconomics.com | Federal State Statistics Service)

The increase in the prices of food in Russia doubled on annual level, soaring from 5,73%

to 11,5 %. This would make the sale of goods in russia even more lucrative, and that is likely one

of the reasons why, as EuroActive reported, European producers have tried to bypass the ban by

establishing joint ventures with counterparts in non EU countries such as Turkey, Serbia,

Belarus, Bulgaria or Switzerland. Out of all the above listed countries, only Switzerland has

taken an open stance against this kind of activity and actually blocked it - and it did so both

ways, also preventing Russia from bypassing European sanctions.

4. Conclusion

Summing up all the gains and losses presented in this paper both for Russia and the

European Union, and considering the high level of connectedness of the two countries, the data

available seems to suggest that the former has more to lose from trade restrictions than the latter.

No matter how are these imposed, the Russian real and financial markets will be heavily

impacted. On the other hand, the crippled European economy will be affected by counter

measures as well, but not with the same impact which Russia is experiencing. However, Europe

currently finds itself in extraordinary conditions, and refusing trade opportunities may end up

causing larger damages than under economic equilibrium. Especially since it has been shown

that Member States have heterogeneous interests at stake: some are heavily dependent on

2 The Statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat, estimated the GDP for the EU-28 in 2013 in the amount of

13,075,000 mln EUR. (2013).


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Russian fuels, while others rely heavily on exports of goods to Russia. Therefore, if the Kremlin

was to implement also restrictions on oil trade, the Member States would be hit asymmetrically,

a fact that could further propel the current euroscepticism.

At this point, it appears to be a matter of time before Russia will be forced to retreat and

come to agreements with the rest of the world, especially now that its economy is weak and

crude oil prices are plummeting. Nevertheless, there may be more in store for Moscow: a

massive player left out in this analysis is China, which has and will not remain passive.

Bloomberg reported (Paton, 2014) that on November 10th, 2014 the Russian Federation and

China have signed a gas deal worth 400 billion USD, which, besides granting China a gas supply

for the next 30 years, lessens Russia’s dependence on the European market. Further agreements

of this kind would lessen the interdependence of the two economies, making Russia immune to

EU sanctions while leaving European trade in shambles.


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Appendix


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Implications of the Ukrainian crisis for the trade relationship of the EU with Russia

Documents

Transcript of Implications of the Ukrainian crisis for the trade relationship of the EU with Russia