IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT · IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002959

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-48140)

ON TWO

POVERTY REDUCTION SUPPORT CREDITS

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR65.9 MILLION AND 65.2 MILLION(US$100 MILLION AND US$100 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

January 27, 2014

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 5Country Management Unit AFCE 1Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 12, 2013)

Currency Unit = Uganda ShillingUshl.00 = US$ 0.0004US$1.00 = Ush2,550

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BoU Bank of Uganda MoPS Ministry of Public ServiceCAS Country Assistance Strategy MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MoWE Ministry of Water and EnvironmentCG Central Government MoWT Ministry of Works and TransportCHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government MTEF Medium Term Expenditure

Meeting FrameworkCPIA Country Policy and Institutional NDP National Development Plan

AssessmentCPT Customized Performance Target NMS National Medical StoresCSO Civil Society Organization OOB Output Oriented BudgetingDFID Department for International O&M Operations & Maintenance

DevelopmentDP Development Partner(s) OAG Office of Auditor GeneralDPO Development Policy Operation OPM Office of the Prime MinisterDPT Diphtheria Pertussis Tetanus PCC Policy Coordination CommitteeDTM Data Tracking Mechanism PEAP Poverty Eradication Action PlanEU European Union PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial

Accountability ProgramFINMAP Financial Management and Accountability PER Public Expenditure Review

ProgramFY Fiscal Year PFAA Public Financial Accountability ActGAPR Government Annual Performance Report PFM Public Financial ManagementGDP Gross Domestic Product PP Partnership PolicyGoU Government of Uganda PPDA Public Procurement and Disposal of

AssetHTR/S Hard To Reach/Service PRSC Poverty Reduction Support CreditIDA International Development Association PSM Public Sector ManagementIFMIS Integrated Financial Management PTR Pupil-to-Teacher Ratio

Information SystemsIGG Inspector General of Government ROM Results-Oriented ManagementIMF International Monetary Fund SB Sector Budget

ii

IPPS Integrated Personnel and Payroll SDR Special Drawing RightsManagement System

JAF Joint Assistance Framework SMC School Management CommitteeJBSF Joint Budget Support Framework SWGs Sector Working GroupsLG Local Government TASU Technical and Administrative

Support UnitM&E Monitoring and Evaluation UBOS Uganda Bureau of StatisticsMDAs Ministries, Departments and Agencies UNRA Uganda National Roads AuthorityMDG Millennium Development Goals UPE Universal Primary EducationMoES Ministry of Education and Sports URA Uganda Revenue AuthorityMoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and VFM Value for Money

Economic DevelopmentMoH Ministry of Health WfP Water-for-ProductionMoLG Ministry of Local Government

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Philippe Dongier

Sector Manager: Albert Zeufack

Task Team Leader: Anton Dobronogov

ICR Team Leader: Anton Dobronogov

111

REPUBLIC OF UGANDAPoverty Reduction Strategy Credits 8 and 9

ContentsBasic Data Sheet ................. . ....................... ...... vi

A. Basic Information....................... ................ viB. Key Dates ................................................... viC. Ratings Summary ................................................. viiD. Sector and Theme Codes.................................. ..... viiiE. Bank Staff................. . ....................... ....... ixF. Results Framework Analysis ...................................... ixG. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs ....................... ..... xviH. Restructuring (if any)............. .................. ............... xvii1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................. 1

1. 1 Context at Appraisal ............................................... 11.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators........... 21.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification ..... ......... 31.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program: ................ ..... 41.5 Revised Policy Areas ............................................. 51.6 Other significant changes.....................5.... ............. 5

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................ ..... 62.1 Program Performance ........................................... 62.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation: ...................... 92.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization.... 132.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation: ................... ...... 14

3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................... 153.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation .................. 153.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives .............. ...... 163.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ..................... 213.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ................... 213.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops... 22

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. .................... ..... 225. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................ ........ 23

5.1 Bank Performance........................................... 235.2 Borrower Performance ....................................... 24

6. Lessons Learned................................................... 257. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners..... 26Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.......... 27Annex 2. Beneficiary Survey Results............................... 29Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results............ .............. 30Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......... 31

iv

Annex 5. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders . .......... 32Annex 6. Status of Prior Actions of Programmatic Series PRSC 8-9 and................ 33Annex 7. Letter for MOFPED Explaining to Ministries the Purpose of the JBSFWorkshop May 2009..................................... ......... 36Annex 8. Example of Flowchart Used to Build Results Framework for PRSC 8-10Series-Education Sector ..................................... ..... 38Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ......................... ...... 39MAP........................................................ 41

V

Basic Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

Program 1

Uganda Eighth PovertyCountry Uganda Program Name Reduction Support

Credit

Program ID P101232 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-48140

ICR Date 1/27/2014 ICR Type Core ICR

REPUBLIC OFLending Instrument DPL Borrower UGANDA

Original Total XDR 65.90M Disbursed Amount XDR 65.90MCommitment

Implementing Agencies Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Finance

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners

Program 2

Uganda Ninth PovertyCountry Uganda Program Name Reduction Support

Credit

Program ID P097325 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-50610

ICR Date 1/27/2014 ICR Type Core ICR

REPUBLIC OFLending Instrument DPL Borrower UANDA

UGANDA

XDR 65.20M Disbursed Amount XDR 65.20MCommitment

Implementing Agencies Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Finance

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners

B. Key DatesUganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P101232

Revised / ActualProcess Date Process Original Date es)

Date(s)

Concept Review: 05/18/2009 Effectiveness: 11/25/2010

Appraisal: 04/07/2010 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 09/30/2010 Mid-term Review:

Closing: 03/31/2012 03/31/2012

vi

Uganda Ninth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P097325

Revised / ActualProcess Date Process Original Date es)F Date(s)

Concept Review: 07/07/2010 Effectiveness: 09/19/2012

Appraisal: 01/13/2012 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 02/28/2012 Mid-term Review:

Closing: 06/30/2013 06/30/2013

C. Ratings SummaryC.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Overall Program Rating

Outcomes Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome Moderate

Bank Performance Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Overall Program Rating

Bank Ratings Borrower RatingsQuali:Hty at Entr M oderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory]

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Moderately SatisfactoryAgency/Agencies:Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moe S ferl BModerately Sat sfactory Moderately SatisfactoryPerformance Performance

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Uganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P101232

Implementation QAG AssessmentsPerformance (if any)

Potential Problem Quality at EntryProgram at any time No (QEA) None(Yes/No):

Problem Program at any No Quality of Nonetime (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA)

DO rating beforeClosing/Inactive status Satisfactory

vii


Implementation Indicators QAG Assessments Rating:Performance (if any)

Potential ProblemQuality at EntryProgram at any time No (QEA) None

(Yes/No):

Problem Program at any Yes Quality of Nonetime (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA)

DO rating before ModeratelyClosing/Inactive status Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme CodesUganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P101232

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 45 45

General education sector 11 11

General transportation sector 22 22

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 11 14

Health 11 11

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Administrative and civil service reform 11 11

Infrastructure services for private sector development 22 22

Other human development 22 22

Public expenditure, financial management and 34 34

procurement

Water resource management 11 11


Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 60 60

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 10 10

Health 10 10

Primary education 10 10

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 10 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Administrative and civil service reform 10 10

viii

Other accountability/anti-corruption 10 10

Other human development 20 20

Other rural development 20 20

Public expenditure, financial management and 40F procurement1400

E. Bank StaffUganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P101232

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Philippe Dongier John Murray McIntire

Sector Manager: Albert Zeufack Katherine Krumm

Task Team Leader: Anton Dobronogov Paul Wade


ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll


Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili

Country Director: Philippe Dongier Mercy Miyang Tembon-Acting

Sector Manager: Albert Zeufack Humberto Lopez

Task Team Leader: Anton Dobronogov Paul Wade/Suleiman Namara


ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll

F. Results Framework Analysis

Program Development Objectives (from Program Document)

The PDO for the PRSC series is: "improved access to, and greater value for money(VFM) in, public services."

Revised Program Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

No revision.

1x

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Uganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P101232Original Target Formally Actual Value

Baseline Values (from Revised Achieved atValue approval Target Completion or

documents) Values Target YearsIndicator 1: Budget Variance (%)

Value (quantitative or 5.00 5.00 4.12qualitative)

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target metachievement)Indicator 2 a.: % Clean audit reports-Local GovernmentsValue (quantitative or 9 29 45qualitative)

[Date achieved IJune 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target metachievement)

Indicator 2 b.: % Clean audit reports-Central GovernmentValue (quantitative or 35 45 40qualitative)Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not yet met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)Indicator 2 c.: % Clean audit reports-Statutory BodiesValue (quantitative or 49 59 27qualitative)

[Date achieved IJune 30, 2008 IJune 30, 2013 1 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)Indicator 3.: DPT3 immunization- %age

Value (quantitative or 82 90 80qualitative) _F 82 go 80

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.% Target not yet met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)Indicator 4.a.: Primary Pupils Passing PLE with grades I-III at public primary schools-NumberValue (quantitative or 262,337 280,000 316,483qualitative)

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 1 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.%_____________________ Target met.

achievement)Indicator 4.b.: Girls in public primary school passing PLE with grades I-III-NumberValue (quantitative or 45.2 46.0 48.0qualitative) _

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.% Target met.achievement)Indicator 5.a.: Improved water sources that are functional at the time of spot check-Rural-%ageValue (quantitative or 82 84 83

x

qualitative) I_I_ IDate achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not yet met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)

Indicator 5.b.: Improved water sources that are functional at the time of spot checks-Valley tanks/dams-%age_Value (quantitative or 23 30 24

qualitative)Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not yet met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)

Indicator 6.: Paved national roads in fair to good condition

Value (quantitative or 65 80 74qualitative)


Comments (incl.%Chiement) iTarget not yet met by PRSC 8 target date.achievement)


Original Target Formally Actual ValueBaseline Values (from Revised Achieved at

Value approval Target Completion ordocuments) Values Target Years

Indicator 1: Budget Variance (%)

Value (quantitative or 5.00 5.00 1.83%


Target met not just for target year but for multiple years including mostComments (incl.% recently budget year 2012/13. Indicator is for aggregate of JBSF sectors.achievement) Budget variance for individual JBSF sectors varies between -29% (water)

and +5% (transport).

Indicator 2 a.: % Clean audit reports-Local Governments

Value(quantitative or 9 29 45Iqualitative)


Comments (incl.% Target metachievement)

Indicator 2 b.: % Clean audit reports-Central Government

Value (quantitative or 35 45 59

qualitative)[Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2012

Comments (incl.% Target met.achievement)

Indicator 2 c.: % Clean audit reports-Statutory Bodies

Value (quantitative or 49 59 61Iqualitative)



Indicator 3.: DPT3 immunization- %age

[Value (quantitative or 82 90 87

x1

qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Target almost met, Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2012/13.achievement) 88% male, 85% female.

Indicator 4.a.: Primary Pupils Passing PLE with grades I-III at public primary schools-Number

Value (quantitative or 262,337 267,133 317,353qualitative)



Indicator 4.b.: Girls in public primary school passing PLE with grades I-III-Number

Value (quantitative or 45.2 46 48.1qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Target met.jachievement)

Indicator 5.a.: Improved water sources that are functional at the time of spot check-Rural-%age

Value (quantitative or 82% 84% 82% 84%qualitative)

Date achieved June 30, 2010 June 30, 2012 June 30, 2012 June 30, 2013

[Comments (incl.% Target met. Includes fully and partially functional sources.achievement)Indicator 5.b.: Improved water sources that are functional at the time of spot checks-Valley tanks/dams-

%ageValue (quantitative or 23 30 71

qualitative)[Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2012

Comments (incl.% Target met and exceeded. Water and Environment Sector Report Octoberachievement) 2013.

Indicator 6.: Paved national roads in fair to good condition 78%Value(quantitative or 65% 80% 78% 77%Iqualitative)Jue3,21

un302Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013

[Comments (incl.% Target almost met.achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)


Original Target Actual ValueFormally AcivdaIndicator Baseline Values (from Revised Achieved at

Value approval Completion ordocuments) Target Years

Indicator 1: Local Governments publishing financial transfers and budgets at local level

Value (quantitative or 48.0% 90.0% 95.0%



Indicator 2: Contracts with complete procurement records in compliance with PPDA regulations


Xii

qualitative) I_I_ IDate achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not met.achievement)

Indicator 3: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Primary Schools

Value (quantitative or 12.75% N.A. 7.90%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Progress achieved, but no target set.achievement) IIndicator 4: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Secondary Schools

Value (quantitative or 65.0% 60.0% 63.0%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Target not yet met.achievement)

Indicator 5: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Medical Workers




Indicator 6: Employees whose computerized HR processes related to pay are managed by the employer



Comments (incl.%Commets (icl.%Target not yet met.achievement)Indicator 7: Proportion of approved posts filled by qualified health workers

Value (quantitative or 51.0% 65% 56.0%



Indicator 8: Absenteeism rate-health workers

Value (quantitative or 31.0% 25% 28%qualitative)



Indicator 9: Proportion of health facilities without drug stock outs for tracer drugs

Value (quantitative or 28% 65% 43%

qualitative) IDate achieved June 30, 20081 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011


Indicator 10: Teachers at task in 12 districts with the weakest education sector indicators

Value (quantitative or N.A. 70% 60%qualitative)

Date achieved IJune 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Comments (incl.% Target not yet met.

xiii

achievement)Indicator 11: People accessing hand washing with soap facilitiesValue (quantitative or 14.0% 30% 33%qualitative)Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.% Target met.achievement)Indicator 12: Pupil to latrine/toilet stance ratio in schools (and hand washing facilities)Value (quantitative or 6,500 4,300 5,400qualitative)

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.%Commets (icl.%Target not yet met.achievement)Indicator 13: Funds released to UNRA on time (as per performance agreement)Value (quantitative or 80.0% 95% 50%qualitative)Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.%Commnts(inc.% Target not yet met.achievement)Indicator 14: Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector-NationalValue (quantitative or 89% 80% 76%qualitative)


Target met. Originally goal was to increase share of private sector works,acomevment ibut GOU subsequently purchased maintenance equipment which needed to

be used so private sector share would decrease during PRSC series.Indicator 15: Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector-DUCARValue (quantitative or N.A. 30% 78%qualitative)Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011

Target not yet met. Originally goal was to increase share of private sectorworks, but GOU subsequently purchased maintenance equipment whichneeded to be used so private sector share would decrease during PRSCseries.

Indicator 16: Vehicles overloaded

Value (quantitative or 60% 5% 64%qualitative)Date achieved I June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2011Comments (incl.% achieved) I Target not yet met.

Uganda Ninth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P097325Original Target Actual Value

__________________Values__ __ (from___ - omly Achieved atIndicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised cmplet

approval Completion ordocuments) Target Years

Indicator 1: Local Governments publishing financial transfers and budgets at local levelValue (quantitative or 48.0% 90.0% 100.0%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Target met and exceeded. All transfers are published in local papers.achievement)

X1v

Indicator 2: Contracts with complete procurement records in compliance with PPDA regulationsValue (quantitative or 32.0% 70.0% 17.1%qualitative)

Date achieved June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013Target not met. Negative progress. Main reason was the weak compliance

Comments (incl.% in providing contract plans in procurement documents. All otherachievement) documents have compliance rates of 81.5% or higher with exception of

'evidence of contract completion' (60.2%).

Indicator 3: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Primary Schools

Value (quantitative or 12.75% N.A. 10.0%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% Progress achieved, but no target set.achievement)

Indicator 4: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Secondary Schools



Comments (incl.% Target almost met.achievement)

Indicator 5: Vacancy rates for education and health staff in HTS Locations-Medical Workers



Comments (incl.% Target almost met.achievement)

Indicator 6: Employees whose computerized HR processes related to pay are managed by the employer


Date achieved IJune 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013Comments (incl.% Target met and exceeded.achievement)

Indicator 7: Proportion of approved posts filled by qualified health workers

Value (quantitative or 51.0% 65% 63.0%

qualitative)Date achieved 1June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013

Comments (incl.%achievement)

Indicator 8: Absenteeism rate-health workers



Comments (incl.% Target not met. Negative progress. The Health Sector Performance Reportachievement) had no data on reduction in absenteeism rate between 2011/12 and 2012/13.Indicator 9: Proportion of health facilities without drug stock outs for tracer drugs


qualitative)Date achieved 1June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013

Comments (incl.% Target not yet met, but substantial progress achieved. Health Sectorachievement) jPerformance Report 2013

Indicator 10: Teachers at task in 12 districts with the weakest education sector indicators

XV

Value (quantitative or N.A. 70% 77%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% achieved) Target met and exceeded.

Indicator 11: People accessing hand washing with soap facilities

Value (quantitative or 14.0% 30% 29% 29%qualitative)


Comments (incl.% achieved) Target met as revised.

Indicator 12: Pupil to latrine/toilet stance ratio in schools (and hand washing facilities)

Value (quantitative or 69:1 4,300 50:1 70:1qualitative)


Target not met. Indicator target and baseline updated in Water andEnvironment Sector Performance Report 2013.

Indicator 13: Funds released to UNRA on time (as per performance agreement)



Comments (incl.% achieved) Target met and exceeded.

Indicator 14: Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector-National



Target met. Originally goal was to increase share of private sector works,Comments (incl.% achieved) but GOU subsequently purchased maintenance equipment which needed to

be used so private sector share would decrease during PRSC series.

Indicator 15: Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector-DUCAR

Value (quantitative or N.A. 30% 0.0% 83.1%qualitative)

Date achieved2 June 30, 2008 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2013 June 30, 2012

Target not met. Originally goal was to increase share of private sectorworks, but GOU subsequently purchased maintenance equipment whichneeded to be used so private sector share would decrease during PRSCseries.

Indicator 16: Vehicles overloaded

Value (quantitative or 60% 5% 54%qualitative)


Commnts(inc.% chieed)Target not yet met. Ministry of Works and Transport Performance Report2013.

G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs


Date ISR ActualNo. IP Disbursements

Archived (USD millions)1 07/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 100.92

Xvi

Uganda Ninth Poverty Reduction Support Credit - P097325Actual

Date ISR AtaNo. Ate DO IP Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 03/12/2013 ModeratelyModerately Satisfactory 0.00Unsatisfactory

2 07/29/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 98.67

H. Restructuring (if any)

N.A.

xvii

1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Overview. Poverty in Uganda declined in the 20 years leading up to the PRSC8-10 series, with the poverty head count falling from 44 percent in 1997 to 31 percent by2005/06 (Uganda National Household Survey). However, inequality persisted amongregions, between rural and urban areas, and within cities. War in the North had preventedthat region from developing with the rest of Uganda. Uganda's level of inequality wasabout average for Sub-Saharan African non-mineral exporting economies.

2. Uganda has one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.4 percentand the third highest fertility rate in the world, with 6.1 children per woman. Thepopulation doubled since 1986 to 34.5 million inhabitants (2011). Considering this rapidpopulation growth, the decline in poverty was a significant achievement. At the time ofappraisal, the population was estimated to grow to 68 million in 2035 and to 100 millionin 2050. Uganda's dependency ratio of 1.12 was high, which decreased household abilityto save and invest productively and put pressure on public services. Uganda'sdemographic trend was a key theme in the 2010 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS).

3. Progress toward MDGs. Uganda was considered likely to achieve MDG 1,poverty reduction and hunger eradication; MDG 2, universal primary education; andMDG 3, gender equality and empowerment of women. With the introduction of universalprimary education, primary enrollment increased to 92 percent, with near gender parity.Access to safe water in both rural and urban areas was on target; 65 percent of ruralhouseholds and 71 percent of urban households had access, compared with MDG targetsof 62 and 77 percent, respectively. Access to sanitation facilities was 68 percent,compared with the MDG target of 72 percent.

4. Child and maternal mortality remained high and the MDG was unlikely to be met,with under five mortality of 137/1,000 and maternal mortality of 435 per 100,000 births.MDG 6, combating HIV/AIDS and malaria, and MDG 7, environmental sustainability,were still attainable. The HIV/AIDS prevalence had fallen from 15 percent in 1990 to 6.2percent in 2000, although it was rising again. Malaria continued to be a main cause ofmortality.

5. History of budget support. At the time of the appraisal the GOU and the Bankhad already partnered on seven previous Poverty Reduction Support Credits with PRSC 1effective November 29, 2001. The total resource envelope of the seven operations wasUS$1.06 billion equivalent. This partnership had resulted in considerable capacitybuilding in government institutions, including the capacity to identify and respond togovernance failures. This capacity was developed in independent institutions such as theInspectorate General of Government (IGG) as well as within ministries including theMinistry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED).

1

6. Governance context. Despite this improved capacity, serious governancechallenges persisted at PRSC8-10 appraisal. The Program Document (PD) citeddeficiencies in the way public servants were recruited, deployed and rewarded, which ledto high vacancy and absenteeism rates in public institutions. Weak accountability wasevident from the lack of consequences for inadequate performance by public officialswith only 38 percent of cases of abuse of public office being investigated. The PublicExpenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators showed weaknesses intransparency and accountability in the use of public resources. These governancechallenges were made more difficult by the creation of new districts which stretchedscarce human capacity while burdening local authorities with additional administrativeoverhead at the expense of public service delivery.

7. Rationale for PRSC 8, 9 and 10. The PRSC 8-10 series was a core component ofthe Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) FY2011-2015 that was discussed by the Board inMay 2010. The series aimed at CAS objectives 2. enhance public infrastructure; 3.promote human capital development; and 4. support good governance and accountability.The PRSC series was intended to complement a range of investment projects, including ahealth sector operation to improve national capacity to deliver the Uganda NationalMinimum Health Care Package, with special emphasis on maternal and newborn care.Higher level objectives to which the operation contributed included support to theGovernment's National Development Program (NDP).

8. The PRSC series was prepared within the Joint Budget Support Framework(JBSF). The overall objective of the JBSF was to enhance service delivery and tocontribute to poverty reduction in Uganda through support to the implementation of theGOU's poverty eradication policies within the framework of the NDP. The JBSF was toprovide a long-term, transparent and predictable framework for providing budget supportthat harmonized performance assessments and aligned the timing of budget supportdecisions to the national budget process. The JBSF had three components:

* An agreement among development partners and government about structures for

cooperation.

* A Joint Performance Assessment Framework (JAF), endorsed in October 2009,which development partners used to enhance policy effectiveness and to assess

the recipient's (Government) performance in agreed areas.

* A Technical and Administration Support Unit (TASU) to support the JBSF.

1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

9. The PDO for the PRSC series was: "improved access to, and greater value formoney (VFM) in, public services." This PDO is from the Program Document (PD). 1 The

1 While the Financing Agreements contained all of the legally binding prior actions for each operation, itdid not contain the PDO for the series.

2

series was designed to improve expenditure efficiency and value for money in the 'JBSFsectors,' health, education, transport, and water and sanitation by addressing cross-cuttingand sector-specific bottlenecks. Sub-objectives were organized in separate PolicyClusters (Table 1). In line with the Government's strategy, these operations placed astrong emphasis on performance-based management through tools such as output-oriented budgeting and results-oriented management. The broad sub-objectives are madeprogram-specific by their associated key indicators.

TABLE 1: Program Sub-Objectives for PRSC 8-10 by Policy ClusterSub-Objectives Key Indicators

Policy Cluster 1: Reforms in Public Expenditure Management, Public Financial Managementand Public Service Management that Improve Service Delivery

Improved budget credibility Budget variance <5%. in JBSFsectors

Transparent and efficient public financial 70% of contracts with full set ofmanagement and public procurement documents (II)Strengthened public sector management and % of clean audits at Central/localaccountability levels and statutory bodiesStrengthened local government system for service LGs publishing financial transfersdelivery and budgets (II)

Policy Cluster 2: Improving Value for Money in Public Service Delivery SectorsWider access to and better quality of primary and Primary pupils passing PLE withsecondary education grades I-III, also girls %age passingWider access to and better quality of health DPT3 immunizationservicesImproved sexual and reproductive health care Dropped. Adopted by the Healthservices and control of major communicable Systems Strengthening Project.diseasesImproved water and sanitation system Improved water sources that are

functional at spot check-individualand water for production

Improved national road network to lower transport %age of paved national roads in faircost, raise competitiveness and facilitate economic to good conditionactivity

10. There were also 16 intermediate indicators (denoted as IIs) to supplement the keyindicators, two of which are used in Table 1 (contracts with a full set of documents andpercentage of LGs publishing financial transfers and budgets). Some sub-objectives covermore than one component (e.g., strengthened public sector management covers bothtransparency in funding service delivery and accountability and anti-corruptioncomponents-Section 1.4) so there is not always a one-to-one correspondence betweenobjectives and components.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

11. There were no revisions to the PDO or the PDO indicators. The sub-objective forsexual and reproductive health care was dropped under the PRSC series because it wasadopted by the Health Systems Strengthening Project.

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1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program:

12. This PRSC series addressed the two most critical performance impediments inpublic expenditure management with a bearing on service delivery - (i) insufficientcredibility of the budget; and (ii) inadequate funding at the service delivery level andpoor reporting on the use of the funds. In the component descriptions below, referencesare made to specific prior actions and PRSC 10 triggers in parentheses. Prior actions forPRSC8-9 and triggers for PRSC 10 are presented in Annex 6, Tables A., B. and C.

Policy Cluster 1: Reforms in Public Expenditure Management, Public FinancialManagement, and Public Service Management that Improve Service Delivery

13. Component 1.1 Credibility of the Budget: i) Adhere to a 5 percent variancethreshold for the GOU budget in the four JBSF sectors; ii) change from monthly toquarterly budget releases; and iii) piloting the use of quarterly work plans andprocurement plans in the ministries/agencies corresponding to the four JBSF sectors(PRSC 8 prior action 1, PRSC 9 prior action 1, PRSC 10 trigger 1)

14. Component 1.2 Transparency in Funding at Service Delivery Level: Toimprove transparency of local government expenditures, the MOFPED was to develop,produce and publish quarterly reports on actual Local Government (LG) expenditures andoutputs (PRSC 9 prior action 2, PRSC 10 trigger 2).

15. Component 1.3 Public Financial Management (PFM): i) better compliancewith PFM laws and regulations with greater emphasis on performance-based assessmentof public servants, with an emphasis on both rewards and sanctions; ii) strengtheninginternal and external audit capacity; iii) improve compliance, control arrears in the periodcovered by PRSC 9 and 10; and iv) PFM legislation to add provisions related tomanagement of oil revenue and strengthening in other areas (PRSC 8 prior action 2,PRSC 9 prior action 3, PRSC 10 trigger 3).

16. Component 1.4 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulations: i)strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for procurement; ii) improved monitoringfor better enforcement of procurement laws and sanctioning of breaches by establishingand piloting a system for measuring performance in public procurement; and iii) improveprocurement capacity within spending entities (PRSC 8 prior action 3, PRSC 9 prioraction 4, PRSC 10 trigger 4).

17. Component 1.5 Performance of Public Servants: i) address the inequitabledistribution of public servants across the country, as well as the significant variation inthe level of their performance; ii) address weaknesses in the inspection and disciplinarysystem for public servants that lead to poor accountability and performance; iii) instill astronger sense of ethic and accountability in the public service by enhancing andcoordinating performance management tools; and iv) rolling out performancemanagement tools and pay reforms and improving management systems for personnel

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and payroll (PRSC 8 prior actions 4, 5 and 6, PRSC 9 prior actions 5 and 8, PRSC 10trigger 5).

18. Component 1.6 Accountability and Anti-Corruption: i) strengthen the trackingof corruption trends by the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and other keyinstitutions by developing evidence-based data to promote anti-corruption reform andfacilitate the demand side of governance, and by deepening the public dialogue aboutcorruption across all stakeholders; and ii) supporting GOU's effort to disseminate keyData Tracking Mechanism (DTM) findings, and reach out to and involve non-state actorsin monitoring (PRSC 9 prior action 6, PRSC 10 trigger 6).

Policy Cluster 2: Improving Value for Money in Public Service Delivery Sectors

19. Component 2.1 Health: i) improve the availability of essential medicines andhealth supplies in health centers; and ii) improve the availability of qualified health staffat task (PRSC 8 prior action 5, PRSC 9 prior action 7).

20. Component 2.2 Education: i) improve the equitableness of teacher deploymentand ii) improved accountability of head teachers (PRSC 8 prior action 6, PRSC 9 prioraction 8, PRSC 10 trigger 7).

21. Component 2.3 Water and Sanitation: i) increase the functionality of ruralwater facilities and Water for Production (WfP) facilities; and ii) improve the levels ofsanitation and hygiene (PRSC 8 prior action 7, PRSC 9 prior action 9).

22. Component 2.4 Transport: i) help ensure stable funding for road maintenanceand increased quality of the maintenance work by year-by-year monitoring of roadquality by first generating national, district and sub-district data on the quality of roads,starting with the set of baseline data, and establishing a monitoring and evaluationframework to systematically track improvements in the sector; and ii) improvetransparency and accountability in the roads subsector (Uganda National RoadsAuthority-UNRA) which would seek to obtain procurement accreditation from PPDAand begin implementation of an independent and parallel bid evaluation process (PRSC 8prior action 8, PRSC 9 prior action 10, PRSC10 trigger 8).

1.5 Revised Policy Areas

No revisions.

1.6 Other significant changes

23. PRSC 8 was delayed by several months because of difficulties fulfilling prioractions related to procurement and civil service reform. Because of non-fulfillment, theBank had planned to reduce the amount of PRSC 8 to US$60 million. However, becauseof macroeconomic concerns, Bank management made available an additional US$40million through the financial crisis window (CW) and so the total amount of PRSC 8

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became US$100 million.2 PRSC 9 disbursement was delayed until June 2013 for tworeasons: First, because of a material error in the documentation for Parliament on theSDR/US$ exchange rate which was outdated (delay from April 2012 to October 2012-5months) and, second, because of a Government corruption scandal that interrupted budgetsupport operations until the matter could be remedied (October 2012 to June 2013-8months)-See Box 1. Though it achieved almost all of its triggers, PRSC 10 was droppedby mutual agreement with the GOU, and never went to the Board.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Program Performance

24. Macroeconomic framework summary. Two external factors and one internalfactor caused a degree of macroeconomic instability during the program. A globaleconomic crisis, a prolonged drought, and increased election related spending in 2010contributed to a drop in annual GDP growth to 3.4 percent in FY12, less than half theaverage of the previous decade. There was also a peak in the fiscal deficit of 7.2 percentof GDP (9.5 excluding grants). The economy stabilized in FY13 with public expendituresubsiding to 18.6 percent of GDP in FY12. The inflation rate during 2011/12 spiked to23.4 percent, but settled to 6.2 percent (estimated) the following year as Table 2 shows.

25. There was not a specific prior action to deal with macroeconomic stabilitybecause this issue was addressed in the context of broader JAF. As described in Section 1of the JAF, if preconditions for joint budget support, in particular the conditions formacroeconomic stability (and a number of other areas such as good governance, povertyfocus, etc), were not met then also the PRSC series could not go ahead. Because of thestringent prerequisites in JAF section 1, to include a duplicate prior action would havebeen "wasting" a prior action. The GOU had also a long history of strong performancewith respect to its macroeconomic performance.

2 The PD for PRSC 8 provided a detailed explanation of the reason for the changes in total financing: "Theamount of PRSC 8 budget support is US$100 million, comprising US$60 million country IDA and US$40million from the Crisis Response Window to help GoU mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis.The total credit amount is a reduction from the planned amount of US$140 million as a result of inadequatestrengthening of the legal framework for public procurement and slow progress in public service reform.The draft Amendment to the Procurement Law presented to Parliament meets international best practice inmost areas, with the exception of the amendment to allow unrestricted use of force account. This originallyagreed prior action has therefore been dropped. It is given high weight in the assessment of governmentperformance under the program since achieving efficiency in public procurement is critical to Uganda'sreforms to achieve value for money in public spending, especially given that at least 55 percent of thegovernment budget is expended through public procurement. Unrestricted use of force account couldcompromise value for money in public works as well as stifle development of the local construction sector.Furthermore, progress against key reform actions has been slow in public service reform - also a centralaspect for achieving higher value for money in public spending. The government has not yet finalized asingle framework for performance management by linking results oriented management and outputoriented budgeting, and its implementation must now be accelerated to achieve program objectives of theseries. Government is expected to finalize this framework under PRSC 9.

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26. The Bank was in close partnership with the other JBSF donors and had a firm,joint stand on the JAF prerequisites. Their effectiveness was tested in the spring of 2011where in the run up to presidential elections (February 18, 2011) massive spendingincreases were pushed through in some areas, funded to a large extent by reallocatingbudget funds from social sectors. The Bank team was able to use the JAF Section 1precondition on budget predictability, limited reallocations during the year etc. combinedwith an exercise in budget analysis (using PEFA methodology) by TASU and a similarone by PREM to show World Bank management and the JBSF countries' ambassadorsthat on purely objective, technical grounds the Government was not meeting the saidprecondition in JAF Section1, and therefore recommended that the Bank halt budgetsupport disbursements (and some other donors followed suit). After that halting of thePRSC 9 disbursement (for 6 months until agreed budget credibility measures had beenimplemented in October 2011) MOFPED focused greater attention on budget credibility,and budget execution was stronger

TABLE 2: Macroeconomic Indicators2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13

Indicator _______

Real GDP growth 5.9 6.7 3.4 5.8Real GDP per capita 2.2 2.9 -0.2 2.3Domestic inflation 9.4 6.5 23.4 6.2

Fiscal revenues(domestic) 12.2 13.3 13.1 13.1

Grants 1 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.7

Fiscal spending 19.6 22.8 19.4 18.6

Fiscal deficit -4.9 -7.2 -4.0 -4.1External debt (% ofGDP) L 15.4 19.6 20.2 20.1

Sources: Compiled from information from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Uganda,World Bank and the International Monetary fund

27. Meeting Program Prior Actions. Policy actions covering budget, servicedelivery in health and education, PFM, procurement reform and civil service reform weremet (Annex 6). The delay in the action to present a procurement amendment bill toParliament that meets international best practice delayed the approval of PRSC 8 untilSeptember 30, 2010. PRSC 9 was approved on February 28, 2012. In some cases theGOU expanded the coverage of the prior actions from a pilot to a government-wide level,including performance contracts, control of HR processes by the employing agency,publishing of LG transfers and expenditures and some procurement reforms.

28. After approval of PRSC 9, there were, as mentioned, two additional delaystotaling 13 months. When the corruption scandal broke out in GOU (Box 1), all budgetsupport under the JBSF was put on hold. The Bank maintained that the corruptionscandal raised questions about whether the PRSC 9-supported program remained on track

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to achieving its PDO, in particular, improving VFM.3 The GOU took remedial measuresspecified in a High Level Action Matrix (HLAM) and PRSC 9 disbursed at the end ofJune 2013. Thus, the original plan of two PRSCs (8 and 9) to be delivered in FY11 wassubstantially delayed.

BOX 1: Corruption Scandal Potentially Affecting VFM

In October 2012, the Auditor General of Uganda released a report raising serious concernsabout a number of governance issues affecting value for money in public services. Accordingto the report, a substantial amount of funds (approximately US$18 million) provided by theGovernments of Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden as official development assistancewas transferred in 2011 to dormant accounts of the Office of Prime Minister at the Bank ofUganda and then used in a fraudulent way. IDA requested to conduct an exchange of viewswith the Government of Uganda on progress achieved in carrying out the program before anydecisions on disbursement of the credit's proceeds would be made. In December 2012, afterextensive discussions with IDA and other donors, the Government of Uganda committed toimplement a policy actions plan aimed at strengthening governance and improving publicfinancial management. In June 2013, implementation of the plan was deemed satisfactory.

29. In a number of instances, the language of the PRSC 9 triggers was refined tomake the prior action more specific. The most substantive change concerned PRSC 9prior action 4 in which Parliament wanted to issue procurement regulations rather thanthe MOFPED, as was customary. So the language of the prior action changed fromMOFPED issuing the regulations to MOFPED approving the regulations prior tosubmission to Parliament. MOFPED also drafted the regulations.

30. The Decision Meeting for PRSC 9 proposed making the PRSC program morefocused on governance. To do that, the Regional Operations Committee (ROC) suggestedeliminating several of the sector triggers for PRSC 10 and that triggers related to oil andgas revenue and Governance and Accountability (GAC) be strengthened. As a result,PRSC 10 did not have water or health sector triggers and the education trigger only calledfor continued application of the teacher allocation formula. The GOU fulfilled six of theeight triggers and partially fulfilled the other two even though the operation was laterdropped. Implementation progress was measured against annual targets, with ISRmissions updating achievements as of end of the (GOU and Bank) fiscal year using acarefully and intensively coordinated JAF.

' The Bank informed the GOU by letter dated November 16, 2012: "Pursuant to clause 3.01 (a) of theFinancing Agreement, the Association therefore requests to exchange views on progress achieved incarrying out the Program with the objective to ascertain whether the Withdrawal Release Conditions underSchedule I, Section II remain satisfied before the Association takes any decision on processing theapplication for withdrawal of funds."

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2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation:

31. Government Commitment. Government commitment was strong for the mostpart, consistent with its long history in PRSC supported programs and by the fact that theGOU went beyond the targets for many of the actions. Competing with this fact is that,by mutual agreement of GOU and the Bank, the final operation of the series wascancelled, and there was a general shift away from budget support. The cancellation canbe attributed to general governance concerns that had arisen outside of the PRSCprogram as well as to the recognition that budget support could no longer be relied uponas a predictable source of funds on which to base a budget plan, and other types oflending and knowledge were more appropriate in the current context.

32. Applied Lessons from Previous Operations. The design of the PRSC 8-10series made excellent use of key lessons from the ICR from the previous PRSC 5-7 seriesand the 2009 IEG Country Assessment Evaluation. These lessons include:

* Greater focus on public investment priorities for growth and poverty reduction,which recognized the need to preserve expenditures on the JBSF sectors and the

GOU's priority to improve VFM in public expenditures.

* High transaction costs are necessary on the donor side to ensure a strong

PRSC program. A great deal of staff time was needed to coordinate with

development partners and build a good results framework.

* While broad, complex policy operations are valuable at capturing a wide

variety of needed initiatives, they do come at a cost. The lagging parts of the

program tend to get an inordinate amount of attention and may hold up and even

damage other activities that might otherwise perform better and move faster.

PRSC 8-10's design was not as broad as that of the previous series, but it also ran

into some of the same delays that the previous series experienced, partly because

PRSC 8-10 was still broad in coverage, with challenging areas of reform.

* Alignment with the national budget cycle. There are advantages to aligning the

PRSC with the GOU budget cycle. Typically, though project documents

acknowledged that this alignment was an objective, the PRSCs lagged months

behind the government's call for individual ministerial programs. The PD

maintained that the PRSC 8-10 series would improve the predictability of

concessional resources, but that turned out not to be the case with the delays of

PRSC 8 and 9 and the cancellation of PRSC 10.* The need to strengthen the link between the cross-cutting reform agenda in

the PRSC and sectoral reforms. Previous PRSCs have worked at both sectoral

and national levels but had been less successful at engaging government across

sectors. The JBSF workshop for preparation of the PRSC 8-10 series in May

2009, focused on cross-cutting impediments to service delivery that might stem

from procurement, PSM, PFM, or decentralization issues. The workshop focused

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on measures to address underlying causes and reduce the performanceimpediments that lie outside the purview of the sector ministry, and, therefore, todiscuss coordinated actions by different agencies of government (Annex 7).

* Under PRSC 7, the government established that compliance with theprocurement law was low and that it was necessary to strengthen compliancemechanisms. This enforcement mechanism included amendments to theprocurement law (concluded under PRSC 8). There were some setbacks as theproposed draft amendments sometimes differed from international best practice.Improvement in the procurement law was pursued under PRSC 8 along withalignment of procurement and work plans.

* Reforming a law that involves multiple stakeholder interests and possiblerent seeking requires not only reasonable lead time but also extensive timefor dialogue. This dialogue was part of the preparation for PRSC8-10. Forexample, in the process of amending the procurement law under PRSC 7,additional proposals emerged which were likely to restrict open competition inprocurement and would therefore weaken the law. Following extensiveconsultations with stakeholders, most of these weaknesses were corrected in theBill that went to Parliament.

33. Analytical Work. Complementing the lessons from experience was a substantialbody of analytical work including:

* The 2007 Country Economic Memorandum, which helped Government todevelop a prioritized, time-bound and consistent set of policy actions, investmentsand interventions.

* The 2007 Public Expenditure Review (PER) highlighted that the budget should beoriented towards infrastructure spending to support growth. It also indicated thatthis would require public administration reform and more cost-effective publicspending to create the needed fiscal space including efficiencies in publiceducation sector spending.

* The 2009 PER provided an analysis of how to improve efficiency in health sectoroutcomes from public health sector spending.

* The 2010 PER provided recommendations for how to raise technical andallocative efficiency in road construction and maintenance. Poor procurementsystems and contract management were identified as a binding constraint for thesector.

* The 2008 Public Financial Management (PFM) report and the 2009 PEFA haveinformed the reform agenda in PFM.

* Public Service Management, which was a pilot study using actionable governanceindicators to analyze human resource management informed the design of publicservice reforms.

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* The 2010 Oil policy notes provided recommendations for the draft petroleum bill

and the policy framework for the petroleum revenue management paper with an

impact on PRSCs.

Assessment of PRSC design and other factors affecting implementation

34. The scope of PRSC 8-10 broadened with the inclusion of development partners'priorities under the JBSF, which included reforms in the four JBSF sectors, PFM andprocurement, budget credibility and civil service reforms. Despite the broadness, theprogram used the synergies in the cross-cutting themes of compliance, civil serviceperformance, and efficiency of distribution of health and education workers, all of whichworked toward the fulfillment of the PDO of improved access and VFM.

Additional Positive and Negative Factors in Implementation

(i) Donor coordination. The PRSCs helped to streamline and coordinatedonor support, which led to increased resource flows from donors. Donor coordinationwas beneficial to the Government as transactions costs of dealing with many donors werereduced. On the other side, the Bank team bore much of the additional burden of theJBSF coordination effort.

(ii) Special efforts to build a strong results framework. The Bank balancedthe objective of ownership and the objective of results measurement by providingeffective assistance to governments to support the design, implementation, and utilizationof findings from those M&E efforts, and by ensuring selectivity and realism in the choiceof PRSC indicators. These efforts paid off because the JAF was far more effective inmeasuring the operation than was the results framework for the PRSC series 5-7.

(iii) Cross-cutting approach to reforms. In most instances, service deliveryreforms cannot be done without appropriate measures taken across the public sector as awhole, including key ministries such as Ministry of Finance, Planning, and EconomicDevelopment (MOFPED), Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset (PPDA), Ministryof Local Government (MOLG), Ministry of Public Service (MOPS), and Ministry ofGender, Labor and Social Development. Each of these ministries was closely involved inthe PRSC series and, though it was difficult at times to coordinate across sectors, eachwas able to cooperate on key cross-cutting measures, such as performance contracts.

(iv) Technical Assistance Support Unit (TASU). TASU providedtechnical/research analysis which contributed to policy design, as well as administrativeand logistical support to the JBSF. TASU coordinated, and where appropriate,commissioned studies as part of the substantial analytical work needed to inform theassessment of performance under the JAF, and the establishment of policy frameworksfor subsequent years. The TASU work program was supported by the World Bank/PREMin-house expertise, including all aspects of quality control and dissemination.

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(v) Proliferation of districts. The number of districts increased considerablyfrom 56 in 2001 to 80 in 2006 and currently stands at 112, with the argument of bringingservices nearer to a rapidly growing population. Fiscal decentralization has not followedthe same pace, with 90 percent of local budgets still coming from the center. While theimpact of the creation of new districts on public expenditures has been low to date, "thisimpact is apt to increase in the future, however, making district proliferation a potential'time bomb.' This is because the share of vacant positions in district governments(currently about 40 percent) has been increasing along with the number of districts"(Public Expenditure Review 2013). This factor has made the equitable allocation ofteachers and healthcare workers more challenging to achieve.

(vi) Impact of petroleum. Commercial amounts of petroleum are expected by2016 or later, with peak production in 2018. Reserves are estimated at more than 2 billionbarrels and could sustain the country for up to 20 years. GOU is considering limitingdaily extraction to 60,000 barrels and to build a refinery with the same capacity. Such anoption would limit revenue flows to about 3 percent of non-oil GDP, which would reduceinstitutional and macroeconomic risks associated with the "resource curse". Thedisadvantage is that the limited revenue stream would not be sufficient to close Uganda'sfiscal gap, currently covered by foreign aid, and the needed acceleration in infrastructureinvestments. The Bank continued the policy dialogue with GOU on the oil sector. Thefocus on strengthening public sector management and value for money service delivery inthe social sectors was appropriate as the country prepared for oil revenue flows, and theattendant greater risk of wasting money.

(vii) HLAM. In late 2012 the Government developed the HLAM Matrix whichcovered actions ranging from forensic audit of key line ministries and departments tostrengthening accountability institutions such as the Department of Public Prosecution(DPP) and the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG). The disbursement of PRSC 9was linked to the satisfactory implementation of a Government-led plan to strengthen keysystems and improve accountability.

(viii) Cancellation of PRSC 10. After the corruption scandal hit, theenthusiasm for budget support quickly waned, although the scandal had nothing to dowith the PRSC supported program. PRSC 9 was placed on hold as the GOU initiatedremedial actions under the HLAM. An eight-month process ensued where the GOU wasable to restore confidence in governance sufficiently to go forward with the disbursementof US$100 million for PRSC 9 in June 2013. The question remained what to do withPRSC1O. By not going forward with PRSC 10 the GOU budget had to adjust to US$100million less in resources. This represented an important but not decisive impact on theoverall budget as it accounted for 1.8 percent of the total budget. The GOU was able toadjust to the loss of resources without a loss of funding in JBSF sectors.

Risks identified at appraisal and effectiveness of mitigation

35. Risk: Macroeconomic Policy Management. The Bank and the Fund continuedclose monitoring and policy dialogue with GOU to address the potential deterioration of

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the macroeconomic policy stance from lax discipline because of the future availability ofoil resources as well as exogenous factors. Fiscal and monetary indicators were mostlystable except for 2011/12, with inflation at 23.4 percent (which fell to single digits thenext year) and the surge in the fiscal deficit, 9.5 percent of GDP (excluding grants) in thesame year. The risk of a surge in oil revenues did not materialize.

36. Risk: Fiscal and debt sustainability. To combat the risk of unanticipatedexpenditures and growing resistance to ongoing adjustment, such as electricity increasesand non-priority spending, the Bank provided technical support to improve publicinvestment planning, and implementation capacity. There was a risk of possible debtdistress related to higher interest rates on government securities, increased quasi-fiscalrisks associated with contingent liabilities, and lowered growth dividends from publicinvestments. This risk did not threaten the PRSC-supported program. In addition, thePRSC focused on policies designed to improve expenditure efficiency and VFM.

Risks more specific to the PRSC program

37. Risk: Political and governance. The governance environment surfaced as amajor risk to the program. The Bank mitigated the risk by working with GOU over thelong-term to strengthen institutions and accountability systems. Indeed, it was theAuditor General who uncovered the corruption in the PM's office. Thus, the scandal wasdetected by previously built capacity. More importantly, the MOFPED engagedintensively with the Bank to remedy the problem and restore a degree of confidence withthe development partners.

38. Risk: Donor coordination. The PRSC series was part of the JBSF whichembodied donor coordination, but which also led to heightened transactions costs on thedonor side and a degree of rigidity in the implementation framework. While the benefitsof the JBSF materialized, so did the risks. Through the coordination structure, the Bankand its partners were able to work through differences in dealing with design andgovernance issues.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

39. Design. The results framework for PRSC 8-10 was a major accomplishment. Itwas derived from the broader NDP and was part of an intensively negotiated JAF, whichhad GOU, Bank and other development partner buy-in. A key factor in the improvementof results measurement were the staff in the Office of Prime Minister who were stronglycommitted to results measurement. Another important factor was that the selection ofindicators benefited substantially from the ICR assessment of experience from theprevious PRSC series (5-7), whose results framework contained far too many indicators,many of which were not relevant or measurable within the timeframe of the program. ThePRSC 8-10 framework was a stronger tool for management because the JBSFdevelopment partners all shared the same framework. The indicators were monitorablewithin the time frame of the project, were to a significant extent attributable to programactivities, and had realistic targets. There was a close correspondence between

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conditionality and the key indicators. Annex 8 provides an example of a flowchart usedto ensure that the results framework reflected key constraints, relevant activities andindicators.

40. Implementation. The collection methods used standard GOU statistical processesand were part of the normal GOU reporting framework. One innovation in data gatheringovercame an obstacle to measuring absenteeism of teachers and health workers. Ratherthan observing absenteeism directly, households were asked about the presence ofteachers and health workers, which facilitated measurement significantly. Substantialimplementation capacity was built during this and previous PRSC series. During the ICRmission, for example, each of the implementing agencies showed full awareness of thePDO and intermediate indicators and was able to provide updated values for theindicators if they were available. Government results reporting improved significantly asthe annual performance reports from the JBSF sector line ministries were more focusedand adhered to the JAF. The HLAM process itself was evidence of built M&E capacity.The capacity existing at the end of the PRSC series was a cumulative result of theprevious PRSCs' capacity building efforts, and marked a substantial advance in M&Eperformance since the PRSC 5-7 series.

41. Utilization. The data was collected in a timely manner consistent with ministerialtimetables and tracked PDO progress with respect to improved service delivery and valuefor money. The data was utilized to manage the reform program. For example, despitegovernance problems elsewhere in the GOU, the results framework concluded that notonly were PRSC 9 conditions met, but also the promised impact was achieved accordingto the results indicators, which compelled the disbursement of PRSC 9 after the HLAMprocess. Overall, the M&E design, implementation and utilization benefited from arenewed commitment by the GOU to take results measurement more seriously.

2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation:

42. Bank support continues in the JBSF sectors although broad budget support willnot go forward for the time being.4 Other donors such as the EU will continue a programof broad budget support. JBSF sectors are being supported by a series of'transformational' investment projects, notably in the health and transport sectors.Projects in the JBSF sectors include Transport Sector Development, Water SectorDevelopment and Management, Post Primary Education APL II, North-Eastern CorridorRoad Asset Management Project, Local Government and Capacity Building APL II, andAF Health System Strengthening. The recent Service Delivery Indicators exercise5 hasestablished a baseline for several new indicators that, in the future, will help trackprogress in dealing with key constraints in the health and education sectors.

4 As indicated in the CASPR (August 2013), the Bank still considers budget support among its instrumentsof development assistance as long as a credible government-owned governance program is available.

Education and Health Services in Uganda-Data for Results and Accountability, November 2013.

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3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Overall relevance rating: Substantial

Objectives-Substantial

43. The PRSC series objectives were relevant to the current CAS, which covers theperiod July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015 and reflects the priorities of the GOU's 2011-2015National Development Plan. With Uganda's rapidly growing population, access toservices continues to be a priority national goal. It continues to be highly relevant todeveloping ways to improve VFM in JBSF sectors as high inefficiency persists and theopportunities for wasting money will much greater, as revenues from oil exports will beavailable in the coming years. The PDO was broad, but was made more specific by thePDO indicators and targets. One possible shortcoming was that the broadness of the PDOmight have left the impression that VFM and access were to be improved across the JBSFsectors as a whole, rather than with respect only to the specific activities supported by thePRSC series.

Design-Substantial

44. The design of the PRSCs that emphasizes improved delivery of public serviceswith cross-cutting themes remains relevant to Uganda's current priorities. The JAFapproach also remains relevant and will continue to pay dividends in project and programmanagement. The Bank used the broader set of preconditions in the JAF to complementthe PRSC policy matrix to get commitment from GOU to implement jointly agreedpolicies. This affiliation of the PRSC series with JAF meant that there was no need, forexample, to have a separate prior action on macroeconomic stability.

45. The PER for 2013, Uganda-Service Delivery with More Districts in Uganda:Fiscal Challenges and Opportunities for Reforms also provided evidence of currentdesign relevance by concluding: "overall, value-for-money in social sectors can beincreased by shifting funding from districts that are already well-served to districts thatare relatively under-served. Additional spending appears to have a greater impact wherecurrent levels of spending are low; consequently, shifting resources to those areas willhave a larger effect on education and health outcomes." This reallocation was a majorcomponent of the policy supported by PRSC 8-10, and so, it remains relevant to currentconditions in the country. The Service Delivery Indicators exercise provided furtherevidence of design relevance in several of its key findings: i) Service delivery outcomesare determined by the relationships of accountability between service providers andcitizens; ii) high teacher and health worker absenteeism and low 'at task' rates continueto hamper service outcomes. The PRSC series promotion of performance contracts areexpected to further improve results indicators over time.

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46. The CASPR proposed three adjustments to the country strategy to promote fastergrowth and improve governance. i) emphasize transformational investment operationsincluding infrastructure (transport and hydro-power), and raise agricultural productivity;ii) Use DPL in exceptional cases to promote governance or sectoral reforms; and iii)broaden governance efforts including public finance and procurement managementsystems and processes, strengthen country oversight institutions and promoteaccountability mechanisms at the local level to deliver better services. The PRSC seriesobjectives and design and implementation are relevant to most of these new CASPRemphases. The CASPR intensifies its focus on several key areas of the PRSC design. Themain difference is the CAS focus on transformational projects with less reliance onbudget support. In fact, the cancellation of the PRSC 10, as a budget support instrument,was consistent with this new emphasis.

Implementation-Substantial

47. With the cancellation of PRSC 10, it might be argued that the program becameless relevant over time. Indeed, budget support did become the less preferred mode ofdevelopment assistance amongst the development partners, as well as the GOU. Yet, thepolicy actions remained relevant and were almost all implemented despite the fact thatPRSC 10 was never submitted for Board approval. The CASPR did point out that thePRSC series could have incorporated aspects of the 'accountability chain,' includingdetection, inspection and sanctions, which would help achieve better governance.

3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives

Achievement of Objectives rating: Moderately SatisfactoryPDO: Improved access to and greater value for money (VFM) in public services.

Policy Cluster 1: Reforms in Public Expenditure Management, Public FinancialManagement and Procurement and Public Service Management that Improve

6Service Delivery

(i) Improved budget credibility-Achieved. Budget credibility was achievedas measured by the budget variance within the JBSF sectors with a target of 5.0 percentand an achievement of 3.4 percent in FY2008/09. The final ISR (July 2013) also statesthat the 2011/12 budget was within 3.44 percent for the year. The ICR received additionaldata showing that JBSF variation was only 1.83 percent between budget plan and budgetrelease for 2012/13. By ensuring funding levels of at least 95 percent, the PRSC series

6 The sub-objectives are expressed in broad terms and are made program-specific through their associatedindicators. For example, the assessment that the sub-objective "Transparent and efficient public financialmanagement" was achieved means that the specific prior actions of the PRSC series contributed to theachievement of the targeted percentages of "clean audits" at three levels of government. It should not beinterpreted as the achievement of overall PFM transparency and efficiency, which was beyond the scope ofthe PRSC series.

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prevented the previously common practice of short-changing public services andpreserved access to services, as planned in the budget.

(ii) Transparent and efficient public financial management-Achieved. ThePRSC series focused on compliance with PFM regulations and measured success by theinstitution of performance contracts for all financial officers. The indicator met cleanaudit targets for three areas of government: Central (target=45%, actual=59%), Local(Target=29%, actual=45%), and Statutory Bodies (Target=59%, actual=61%). With anincrease in the percentage of clean audits, the use of funds was more likely to be for itsintended purposes, and therefore promote greater access to and VFM in public services.

48. Looking ahead to the accountability for oil and gas revenues in the coming years,PRSC 10 trigger 3 has been completed. Draft amendments are currently being debated inthe Parliament. There are concerns in Parliament was that the new bill would reduce itspower because the former Budget Act would be dismantled.

(iii) Transparent and efficient public procurement-Progress, but notachieved. The PRSC 8 prior action was for the Government to agree on a procurementperformance indicator framework and pilot it in 15 Ministries, Departments and Agencies(MDAs). PRSC 9 required that the MOFPED approve revised procurementimplementation regulations that are consistent with the revised PPDA Act (and meetinginternational best practice) and submit them to Parliament. This action reflects a changeof language from the original trigger which called for the MOF to issue a full set ofProcurement Regulations and Guidelines. The Parliament intervened in this action byrequiring that the regulations receive Parliamentary approval prior to their issuance by theMOFPED.

49. The procurement performance indicator combined the two actions: the percentageof contracts with complete procurement records in compliance with PPDA regulations.The target was 70.0 percent of all contracts and the actual achieved was 17.1 percent(The Third Annual Report on Tracking Corruption Trends in Uganda: Using the DataTracking Mechanism-December 2012). The reason for the low percentage was a single,but quite important category of records, the contract implementation plan, which wasfound in only 17.1 percent of procurement record sets. The next lowest category was"Evidence of contract completion" which was 60.2 percent. The 10 other categories ofprocurement records had compliance rates of 81.5 percent or higher. Despite the lowcompliance in one category, the action was a valuable improvement in publicprocurement, because previously there was not adequate data to measure procurementperformance. Now, at least, the government can pinpoint where compliance issues lie.This action also helps with another PRSC action of aligning procurement plans with workplans and vice-versa, which in turn, produce more accurate quarterly budget estimates.The PRSC 10 trigger that the PPDA issue revised Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs)are ready for issuance upon publication of the regulations, and is expected to improveefficiency and transparency in public procurement by meeting international best practicesfor SBDs.

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(iv) Strengthened public sector management and accountability-Achieved.In addition to performance contracts described above, public sector management andaccountability was promoted by better aligning work plans, procurement plans and cashflow in the line ministries. The indicator for this sub-objective was 'employees whosecomputerized HR processes related to pay are managed by the employer.' The target of50 percent was far exceeded as 96 percent coverage (October 31, 2013) has been reached.One of the key benefits of this action was to have better controls and to be able to linkone person to one job and eliminate the phenomenon of "ghost workers." During the ICRmission, it was reported that the linking of work plans, procurement plans and cash flowhelped staff have a better understanding of their role in their organization.

50. Progress was also made with respect to a fiscally sustainable pay reform strategy.Under PRSC 10, trigger 5, a new sanctions and rewards framework was developed androlled out. MOFPED agreed with the Ministry of Public Service that because of resourceconstraints not all the pay enhancement proposals in the transformation paper could bemet. There was agreement in principle that a decision on pay enhancements would bedone on an annual basis and included in MTEF based on funds availability (an exampleof this is ongoing negotiations with teachers and medical workers). PRSC 10 trigger 6was met and the citizen participation framework was to be concluded under PRSC 10. Itis currently under implementation in the Education Sector.

(v) Strengthened local government system for service delivery-Achieved.The main indicator here was 'Local Governments publishing financial transfers andbudgets at local level', which was met with an actual of 100 percent against a target of 90percent and a 2008 baseline of 48 percent. This achievement is a significant strideforward in transparency because it lets the public know the amount of resources that localgovernments have to provide services. With this information, the public is betterpositioned to insist on value for money.

Policy Cluster 2: Improving Value for Money in Public Service Delivery Sectors

(i) Wider access to and better quality of primary and secondaryeducation-Achieved. To improve access and quality of primary and secondary education,the PRSC helped institute performance contracts for head teachers and the developmentand implement an allocation formula to remedy the mal-distribution of teachers betweendistricts.

51. The PDO indicators which captured the quality of education services were:

* Primary pupils passing PLE with grades I-III at public primary schools-Target

280,000, actual 317,353.

* Girls in public primary school passing PLE with grades I-III-Target 46.0, Actual

48.1.

52. The intermediate indicator targets for each of these measures were also met:

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* Increased percentage of teachers at task (lower absenteeism) in the 12 districtswith the worst education indicators-Primary-70% target, 77% actual.

* Reduced vacancy rates for teachers in HTS (Primary)-No target, Actual 10%,compared with 12.75% baseline, (Secondary)-Target 60%, Actual 61%.

53. In the case of secondary teachers the vacancy target was modest, beginning froma baseline of 65 percent. The reason for this caution was that there were not going to beadditional resources in the sector and so the objective was basically to hold the line onvacancy rates. Because of the allocation formula further reductions in vacancy rates inHTS are expected. With more teachers present and accountable, the value to students fora given education expenditure improves. With higher absentee and vacancy rates thevalue for money is less. Despite the challenges in lagging Districts, the indicator targetsfor education were met; vacancy rates were lowered and the percentage of teachers attask increased.

(ii) Wider access to and better quality of health services-Progress, but notachieved. The PRSCs dealt with a similar uneven distribution in the health sector, withtoo many health care workers in some districts and not enough in others. PRSC 8addressed this problem with a prior condition to establish human resources for a healthMIS, which would provide the necessary data to reallocate workers more efficiently andtherefore improve VFM in service delivery. The PRSC 9 action addressed the problem oflocal governments diverting their budgets for medicines to other purposes. The actioncalled for an MOU between the MOH, the MOLG and the NMS to include a performanceframework for the distribution of essential medicines by NMS. The action represents arevision of the trigger which called for developing and implementing guidelines fordistribution of essential drugs.

54. Wider access to and better quality of health services was measured by:

* DPT3 immunization-Target-90%, actual-87% (Health Sector PerformanceReview-6/30/13).

55. There was improvement in three of four intermediate indicators, though continuedimprovement is needed to meet the targets:

* Vacancy rates for health staff in HTS locations-Target-40.0%, Actual-41.0%(against a baseline of 41.9%)

* Proportion of approved posts filled by qualified health workers-Target-65.0,Actual-58.0% (baseline 51 %)

* Absenteeism rate-Target 25%, Actual 48% (baseline 31 percent)

* Proportion of health facilities without drug stock-outs for tracer drugs-Target65%, actual 53% (baseline 28 percent)

56. The targets for vacancy rates in HTS also reflected a hold-the-line view as thetarget envisioned only a slight improvement. One disconcerting indicator is that the

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absenteeism rate increased sharply. Several factors could explain this trend. First, accessand amenities are still lacking in HTS areas. Also, the Government has been irregular inpaying supplements HTS areas.

(iii) Improved water and sanitation system-PDO Achieved, one intermediateindicator lagging. This objective was to be achieved by establishing i) water usercommunities in the Districts; and ii) water user bodies and piloting private contracting fordaily maintenance of WfP facilities. These measures would ensure improved access tothe public service of water supply and sanitation. The indicators used to measure progresswere:

Improved water sources that are functional at the time of spot checks-ValleyTanks/Dams-Target 30%, actual 71% (from a baseline of 23%).

One intermediate indicator was met, the other was not:

* People accessing hand washing with soap facilities-Target 29.0%, actual 29.0%against a baseline of 14%.

* Pupil to latrine/toilet stance ratio in schools (and hand washing facilities)-Target

50:1, actual 70:1 (from a baseline of 69:1, revised for 2011/12).

57. The PDO targets were met and this did translate into a higher percentage ofpeople with access to hand washing facilities, but did not reach schools to the extentenvisioned at the outset. The difficulty in meeting this target underscores the difficulty inmeeting a target that cuts across sectors, water and education. It was reported that that thepupil-teacher and pupil-classroom ratios and text books are higher priorities for theMinistry of Education than equipping schools with sanitary facilities. Thus, it will takelonger for this target to be achieved.

(iv) Improved national road network to lower transport cost, raisecompetitiveness and facilitate economic activity-Mostly achieved. Improve roadservice was to be achieved by ensuring that: i) the Road Fund had appointed a Director;ii) there was a policy on strengthening the national construction industry; iii) data onnational, district and other roads was collected and an M&E framework established; andiv) UNRA had obtained procurement accreditation from PPDA.

58. The PDO indicator recorded progress, and came close, but did not fully meet itstarget:

Paved roads in fair to good condition-Target 80%, actual 7 7 % from a baseline of 65%

59. Two of the four intermediate indicators were met:

* Funds released to UNRA on time (as per performance agreement)-Target 95%,actual 100% (met).

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* Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector. National

roads-Target 80%, actual 75% (met-against a baseline of 89%).* Expenditure for maintenance works executed by the private sector, DUCAR

roads-Target 0%, actual 83.1 percent (not met, no baseline).

* Overloaded vehicles-Target 5%, actual 54% (not met-against a baseline of

60%)

60. The PRSC series had originally intended to support an increase in the share ofprivate sector works. However, GOU subsequently purchased maintenance equipmentwhich needed to be used so private sector share would decrease during PRSC series.Regarding the trigger for PRSC 10, UNRA's request for procurement accreditation toimplement an Independent and Parallel Bid Evaluation (IPBE) process was approved bythe PPDA Board on October 20, 2011. This approval forms the basis for DFID toconclude the selection of consultants to provide the IPBE services that began in March2012. The services are for two years, ending in February 2014.

61. Six of the nine sub-objectives are assessed to be fully achieved, with one mostlyachieved. In many cases the indicator targets were exceeded. In cases where some of thetargets were not met, such as health and procurement, there was still meaningful progress.Thus, overall achievement of PDOs is substantial.

3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Ratings: Moderately Satisfactory

62. With the program remaining substantially relevant in terms of its objectives,design, and implementation, and a moderately satisfactory achievement of objectives, theoverall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory.

3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

63. The program targeted poorer areas that were hard to serve (HTS) to reducevacancy rates for teachers and health workers and teacher at task rates in the 12 Districtswith the weakest education indicators. These indicators were met or were close to beingmet, so pro-poor impacts are expected. On gender, the target value for the indicator forpercent of girls passing PLE with grades I-III was also met. With the transparency of LGexpenditures improved, better access and VFM benefits are expected to reach non-urbanpopulations. Citizens at the District level will be empowered by the knowledge of whatDistrict governments actually spend money on.

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(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

64. The PRSC 8-10 series demonstrated some of the long-run benefits built from adecade of PRSCs. In the PRSC8-10 series the GOU went quickly from piloting importantchanges such as performance contracts, HR processes managed by employers,transparency of LG expenditures, to government-wide coverage. This phenomenonshows that, over time, the GOU has developed initiative and independence and can carryreforms and process changes forward nimbly and without the constant nudging ofdevelopment partners. There are still exceptions, such as in procurement reforms whereresistance is still difficult. There are also the governance challenges that disrupted thedisbursement of PRSC funds.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

65. The GOU's expansion of processes such as performance contracts, publishing ofLG expenditures, etc., (mentioned above) was one positive but not necessarily expectedoutcome. A negative unintended outcome was the inability to achieve budgetpredictability because of the delays in PRSC 8 and 9, and the cancellation of PRSC 10.

3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

N.A.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

66. Because of the governance challenges that arose late in the PRSC series, it wouldbe tempting to rate the risk to development outcome as substantial. When the PRSCoperation and its achievements are more closely examined, it is apparent that thecorruption scandal had nothing to do with the actions of the PRSC series, and, therefore,did not pose a direct threat to sustainability.

67. Government risk mitigation of corruption. As part of the resumption of thedialogue between the Government of Uganda and Development Partners, following themisappropriation of funds in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), a joint review ofGovernment's performance in the fiscal year 2011/12 took place on October 3, 2013. Thereview was part of a meeting of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) and theDevelopment Partners' Policy Committee. GOU's performance in the fiscal year2011/2012 was jointly assessed by development partners and found satisfactory. Thereview concluded:

68. "Government has improved and strengthened the security of the Public FinanceManagement processes under the Integrated Financial Management System. Thiscapacity building process will be sustained. Government has also fully constituted theOffice of the Inspector General of Government which is now fully operational. Theappointment of the Director of Public Prosecution has been concluded and is now in

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office. Police have undertaken extensive investigations in the affected Ministries,Departments and Agencies and are working with the Office of the DPP to ensure thatthose suspected to have committed crime are charged in courts of law."

69. The World Bank Country Manager and Co-Chair of the Joint Budget Supportgroup of ten development partners (the World Bank, the European Union, and theGovernments of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, andthe United Kingdom) also noted:

70. "Despite a reduction in sector performance both in terms of indicators and actionswhen compared to Financial Year 2010/2011, a majority of targets remain on track.Notable achievements include strengthened budgeting in the water sector, improvedprocurement practices in central government, and increased immunization rates. Inaddition, the assessment presents a clear picture: the strengthening of public financialmanagement, and the ongoing fight against corruption remain areas where Governmentand Development Partners must continue to work together."

71. Government commitment to PRSC policies. Another factor supportingsustainability is the fact that the GOU including the MOFPED, the Ministry of PublicService and the line Ministries independently expanded the coverage of actions supportedby the PRSCs to cover the entire government. They also completed almost all of thePRSC 10 triggers despite the fact that the operation was dropped, which is evidence of astrong level of GOU commitment to the program.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

72. There was a tremendous preparation effort by the Bank to improve the resultsframework through the JAF and donor coordination through JBSF compared with that ofthe previous PRSC series. The preparation effort included a strong effort to addresssectoral as well as cross sectoral impediments to service delivery (Annex 7). Theanalytical work was comprehensive and relevant to country priorities. These elementsproduced an operation that showed a high level of clarity regarding the PDO, the linkagesbetween prior actions and results indicators, and the types of actions that dealt withbinding constraints, for which Uganda was ready, despite the challenging nature of someof the actions. One shortcoming was the belief that budget support would afford a highdegree of budget predictability, which was an unrealistic expectation. The Bank alsoworked assiduously with other development partners and helped keep the design of theoperation from being broader than it otherwise would have been. For example, the Bankwanted to focus on four sectors and leave the agriculture and energy sectors to beaddressed by investment operations and knowledge services.

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(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

73. Supervision was challenging, partly because of efforts to maintain the high levelof donor coordination. Supervision was regular with a full contingent of country officestaff and TTL covering all relevant sectors of the PRSCs and monitoring progress on adaily basis. Key decision points were handled appropriately. The Bank maintained atough, but flexible stance on several of the prior conditions, e.g., those effectingprocurement and civil service reform by being flexible on trigger language. The mostimportant decision point revolved around the corruption scandal in the PM's office. TheBank intensively engaged the GOU in the development of the HLAM and, appropriately,postponed PRSC-9 disbursement. Once the HLAM was satisfactorily completed, theBank, over some development partner dissent, released PRSC 9 funds. However, theclimate was poor for another US$100 million of general budget support. By mutualagreement between the Bank and the GOU, PRSC 10 was dropped, although itsidentification mission was already completed. The GOU continued to fulfill six of theeight PRSC 10 triggers which the Bank monitored through the results framework.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

74. The Bank performed well in preparing the PRSC 8-10 series and reacted well tochanging circumstances during its implementation. Because the Bank performance forquality at entry was rated moderately satisfactory and Bank performance of quality ofsupervision was rated satisfactory, the overall Bank performance is rated moderatelysatisfactory in accordance with the harmonized evaluation criteria guidelines for ICRs.

5.2 Borrower Performance(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

75. The PM office with the help of the MOF performed well as a designer, negotiatorand implementer of the PRSC series. All prior actions were met. MOFPED was proactiveand responsive. For example, with respect to PFM MOFPED actively pursued globalgood practice examples and incorporated them into the design of PFM legislation. ThePM office had staff that were committed to results and results measurement, which lednot only to an improved results framework for the PRSC series, but also much improvedreporting by the line ministries on their annual performance.

76. One shortcoming was that there were some delays in meeting agreed prioractions, and, as noted earlier, to facilitate implementation, trigger language was modifiedin some instances to facilitate implementation as prior actions. Another shortcoming,though separate from the PRSC series, was that the PM office created serious concernsabout VFM with the misuse of funds in another project. The GOU responded well to thecorruption scandal and engaged the Bank effectively through the HLAM process which

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ended the postponement of the disbursement of PRSC 9. In implementing the HLAM, theGOU demonstrated an ability to remedy governance issues in other parts of the GOU.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

77. Implementing agencies generally engaged well in the policy dialog and completedactions agreed in the program. There was a range of IA performances with the, MOFPED(also considered an implementing agency), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of LocalGovernment and the PFM Reform Secretariat (FINMAP Secretariat) performing well andcarrying out their responsibilities fully under the program. FINMAP was chaired by areform champion who facilitated implementation. The Ministry of Education alsofulfilled its responsibilities, but could have coordinated better on the actions relating toschool sanitation. The Ministry of Public Service and the PPDA had some challengingcross-cutting actions to complete and did experience some delays, but otherwiseperformed reasonably well. The Ministry of Water and Environment performed well,while the Ministry of Works and Transport had somewhat of a mixed performance as itstruggled to establish the results framework, though eventually succeeding. Transport hadlagged behind other line ministries in establishing a foundation of data needed forprogram planning.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

78. The overall rating is a blend of performance that exceeded expectations inexpanding reforms along with difficulties in achieving other reforms and subsequentdelays. Because the Government performance was moderately satisfactory andimplementing agency performance was rated moderately satisfactory, the overallBorrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory in accordance with theharmonized evaluation criteria guidelines for ICRs.

6. Lessons Learned

79. Spending staff time on ensuring an appropriate JAF up front greatlyfacilitates program management and assessment of achievement of programobjectives. Intensive coordination efforts with development partners paid off in terms ofa results framework that could be used for program tracking and management. Theflowchart in Annex 8 provides an example of an effective tool to help coordinate thedialog with counterparts and development partners in building a results framework.

80. Achieving broad cooperation amongst development partners complicates thecountry dialog by introducing many considerations that are particular todevelopment partner's country. The Bank expended a great deal of energy balancingconcerns of bilateral development partners. While these concerns did not significantlyaffect the PRSC supported policies, it was a real cost to deal with political concerns thatwere not germane to Uganda's country priorities.

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81. The benefits of the JBSF probably outweigh the costs of developing it, but itis a fairly close balance. Clearly there were benefits with respect to the resultsframework. In addition, there were significant benefits to the GOU by lowering thetransactions costs of dealing with many development partners. The level of resources fortechnical assistance through TASU was also significantly higher than it would have beenhad the Bank not used the JBSF to augment resources. On the cost side, the cost to theBank was substantial in terms of staff time and resources and the Bank's hand was attimes weakened in dealing with the Government as it sought consensus amongst itsfellow development partners.

82. With the difficulties in achieving procurement reforms, quick and focusedgains should be considered. Innovations such as e-procurement and bulk purchases ofitems across ministries through framework agreements may meet with less resistance.Ministries are willing to give up a small portion of their procurement, more than they arewilling to concede changes to the procurement system as a whole. And these quick andfocused changes that can delivery quick results may make broader reforms easier in thefuture.

83. Budget support does not necessarily offer budget predictability. Although itwas believed that the PRSC budget support would deliver timely support synchronizedwith the GOU budget cycle, like many DPLs, this series had prior conditions that werechallenging to meet and took longer than expected to fulfill. As a result, the PRSC seriesfunds were unpredictable with highly delayed disbursements (for good reasons),including cancellation of nearly one-third of the total PRSC commitment. This oftenposed challenges for the government to fit the PRSC conditions into the alreadydeveloped Ministerial programs. In addition, if budget support was late, the GOU wouldalso have to move resources to adjust to the shortfall in budget support. While this was alesson from the previous series, it did not play out.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

None received

(a) Borrower/Implementing agencies

(b) Cofinanciers

(c) Other partners and stakeholders(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

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Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Responsibility/Unit TSpecialty

Lending/Grant PreparationPaul Wade TTL TTLPeter Okwero Sr. Health Specialist HealthBarbara Magezi Sr. Public Sector Specialist Public ServicePaul Kumechwezi Sr. FMS FinanceParminder Brar Lead FMS FinanceInnocent Mulindwa Sr. Education Specialist EducationVictor Ocaya Sr. Transport Engineer TransportMartin Onyach-Olaa Sr. Local Government Specialist Local GovernmentHoward Centenary Sr. Procurement Specialist ProcurementSuleiman Namara Sr. Social Protection Economist Co-TTL PRSC 8Supervision/ICRPaul Wade TTL TTLPeter Okwero Sr. Health Specialist HealthBarbara Magezi Sr. Public Sector Specialist Public ServicePaul Kumechwezi Sr. FMS FinanceParminder Brar Lead FMS FinanceInnocent Mulinda Sr. Education Specialist EducationVictor Ocaya Sr. Transport Engineer TransportMartin Onyach-Olaa Sr. Local Government Specialist Local GovernmentHoward Centenary Sr. Procurement Specialist ProcurementSuleiman Namara Sr. Social Protection Economist Co-TTL PRSC 8Anton Dobronogov Sr. Economist TTLSamuel Mutono Sr. Water Engineer WaterJean-Pascal Nganou Sr. Economist Economist

Richard Carroll Sr. Economist and Financial EvaluationAnalyst Specialist

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

P101232 - Uganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support CreditStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

USD ThousandsStage No. of staff weeks (including travel and

consultant costs)Lending

FY08 0 5,764.98FY09 61.27 284,242.11FY10 120.99 440,172.99FY11 37.69 149,820.71

Total: 219.95 880,000.79Supervision

FY11 10.14 55,746.67FY12 4.75 25,503.70

Total: 14.89 81,250.37Grand Total: 234.84 961,251.16

P097325 - Uganda Ninth Poverty Reduction Support CreditStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

USD ThousandsStage No. of staff weeks (including travel and

consultant costs)Lending

FY11 0.39 6,098.40FY12 59.11 203,553.73

Total: 59.50 209,652.13Supervision

FY13 5.15 25,848.35FY14 0.94 37,985.83Total: 6.09 63,834.18

Grand Total: 65.59 273,486.31

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Annex 2. Beneficiary Survey Results(if any)

N.A.

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Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results(if any)

N.A.

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Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

GOU accepted the final ICR and opted not to submit further comments.

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Annex 5. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

None received.

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Annex 6. Status of Prior Actions of Programmatic Series PRSC 8-9 andProgram Triggers from PRSC 10

TABLE A. PRSC 8 Prior Actions StatusPrior Action 1: The Recipient has ensured that (a) actual annual budget releases for the Metsum of conditional grants to each of the four JBSF sectors (health, education, waterand sanitation, and roads) were at least 95% of the corresponding approved budgetallocations for the Fiscal Year 2008/2009; (b) budget releases for the sum ofrecurrent wage expenditure across the four sectors, the sum of recurrent non-wageexpenditure across these sectors, and the sum of development expenditures acrossthese sectors were in each case at least 95% of the corresponding approved budgetallocations for the Fiscal Year 2008/2009; and (c) the Recipient's Treasury has madebudget releases to Spending Agencies on a quarterly basis, through the end of thefirst quarter of Fiscal Year 2009/20 10.Prior Action 2: The Recipient has made satisfactory progress in implementing its Metundertakings to develop a format for performance agreements for accounting officersincluding chief administrative officers) with an incentive and penalty system fornoncompliance with public financial management regulations.Prior Action 3: the Recipient has ensured satisfactory implementation and monitoring Metof procurement regulations and systems at the central government and LocalGovernment levels, and has established an agreed procurement performanceindicator framework and ensured the availability of baseline data..Prior Action 4: adopted the framework for attracting and retaining teachers and health Metpersonnel in Hard-to-Reach Areas.Prior Action 5: the Recipient has provided evidence satisfactory to the Association as Metto the establishment of a human resources for health management informationsystem to provide information on levels and distribution of the health workforce.Prior Action 6: the Recipient has provided evidence satisfactory to the Association as Metto the signing of performance contracts, covering customized performance targets,with at least 90 percent of all head teachers in the 12 Districts with the weakesteducation sector indicators.Prior Action 7: the Recipient has provided evidence satisfactory to the Association Metthat water user committees under a community based maintenance system areactively functioning in at least 50% of Districts, and within these Districts at least40% of water points are covered by water user committees.Prior Action 8: the Recipient has provided evidence satisfactory to the Association Metthat: (a) the board of directors as well as the executive director of the Road Fundhave been appointed, and (b) Cabinet has approved a policy on strengtheningnational construction industry.

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TABLE B. PRSC 9 Prior ActionsPrior Action 1: The Recipient has piloted the use of quarterly work plans and procurement Metplans in its ministries/agencies responsible for the education, health, water and works andtransport sectors, and has initiated a process of alignment of such plans with actual cash flow.

Prior Action 2: The Recipient's Ministry of Finance and Economic Development has Metdeveloped and implemented a system to consolidate and analyze quarterly reports to provideaggregate and in-year information about actual local government expenditures and outputs,and has published the summary budget performance report.

Prior Action 3: The Recipient's Head of Public Service and the Permanent Secretary of the MetMinistry of Local Government have signed performance agreements covering Fiscal Year2010/2011 with all Permanent Secretaries in central government ministries and ChiefAdministrative Officers in local governments, said agreements including a requirement forcompliance with the Recipient's public financial management regulations.

Prior Action 4: The Recipient has approved and submitted to the Recipient's Parliament Metrevised procurement implementation regulations which are in line with the Recipient's PublicProcurement and Disposal of Assets Act and which meet international best practice.

Prior Action 5: The Recipient's Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Finance and MetEconomic Development have adopted a single framework for results oriented management,output oriented budgeting and budget monitoring, including a modality for attachingperformance agreements to letters of appointment of civil servants.

Prior Action 6: The Recipient's Inspectorate General has developed and agreed upon a Metmeasurement framework with the Inter-Agency Forum, including indicators, for improvedtracking of corruption trends and has published the first annual report on corruption trends inUganda using said framework.

Prior Action 7: The Recipient's Ministry of Health, Ministry of Local Government and the MetNational Medical Stores have signed and begun implementation of a memorandum ofunderstanding, which includes a performance framework with key performance indicators,for the distribution of essential medicines by the National Medical Stores.

Prior Action 8: The Recipient's Ministry of Education and Sports has approved a new Metteacher allocation formula to ensure a more equitable distribution of teachers, and saidMinistry of Education and Sports has begun implementation of said allocation formula byhiring additional teachers.

Prior Action 9: The Recipient has piloted the country-wide establishment of water user Metbodies for water-for-production facilities, starting with at least 18% established andfunctional bodies, and has piloted the contracting of private operators to handle day-to-daymaintenance of large water for production facilities (dams and valley tanks with capacityexceeding 40,000 cubic meters, starting with at least one large facility, all in accordance withthe Recipient's Manual for Water-for-Production Management Systems.

Prior Action 10: The Recipient has collected data on the condition of national, district, urban Met.and community access roads and established a baseline, and has established andoperationalized a monitoring and evaluation framework to measure key road sectorperformance indicators.

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TABLE C. PRSC 10 TriggersTrigger 1: Government expands the alignment of work plans, procurement plans and actual i and iicash flow in its ministries/agencies by: (i) Rolling-out the use of quarterly work plans and Met. iiiprocurement plans to all line ministries and piloting such roll-out for 4 (four) Local Not MetGovernments [Jinja, Mbale, Mbarara and Masaka districts] with operational IntegratedFinancial Management Information Systems (IFMIS); (ii) Aligning work plans, procurementplans and cash flow for the line ministries responsible for the four JBSF sectors [education,health, water and works and transport sectors] on: (A) a quarterly basis to at least 85 percent[defined by PEFA methodology] at overall sector level, and 85 percent at vote functioncompositional level; and (B) an annual basis to at least 85 percent at overall sector level, and85 percent at vote function compositional level; and (iii) Eliminating wrong reporting ofprocurement start dates in the ministries responsible for the four JBSF sectors in order tostrengthen their procurement systems and controls [in each ministry's four largest projects].

Trigger 2: Cabinet approves a comprehensive revised strategy for Local Government Metfinancing with actionable measures.'

Trigger 3: In order to ensure transparency and strict accountability of oil and gas revenues Metand prudent public financial management, Government submits to Parliament an AmendmentBill for the Public Finance and Accountability Act that includes provisions in line withinternational best practice on the establishment of a Petroleum Fund, an Endowment Fundand a (Petroleum Revenue) Invest-ment Advisory Committee, on the system of sanctions forbreach of PFM regulations, and on legal independence of the Internal Audit Department ofMOFPED.

Trigger 4: PPDA reviews, revises and issues revised Standard Bidding Documents and PartiallyRequests for Proposals (including specialized bidding documents), based on the amended Met.'PPDA Act and Regulations and meeting international best practice.

Trigger 5: Cabinet adopts a revised fiscally sustainable pay reform strategy, including an Metimplementation timeline, plan for enhancing pay and transparency of wage bill management,and a frame-work of sanctions and rewards for performance of civil servants, in accordancewith the recommendations contained in the public service transformation paper.

Trigger 6: Monitor implementation of recommendations from the annual reports on Metcorruption trends in Uganda using the Data Tracking Mechanism, and develop and pilot aframework to institutionalize citizen participation in monitoring corruption in Governmentprograms in one agreed service delivery sector.

Trigger 7: Continue to implement the new teacher allocation formula, as demonstrated by an Metincreasing share of teachers deployed to HTR/S areas.

Trigger 8: In order to improve transparency and accountability in the road sector, UNRA Metobtains procurement accreditation from PPDA and commences the implementation of anindependent and parallel bid evaluation process.

7 Measures to be sequenced in subsequent PRSCs to bring LG fiscal decentralization architecture in linewith the mandates of LGs for service delivery under decentralization.

Bidding documents prepared but not yet issued pending effectiveness of the regulations

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Annex 7. Letter for MOFPED Explaining to Ministries the Purpose of the JBSFWorkshop May 2009

TO: MOE, MoH, MoWE, MoLG, PPDA, AG, MoPS, MoWT (and any others asgovernment see fit)

Re: Joint Budget Support Framework Workshop on May 6, 2009

During the upcoming JBSF mission (please see meeting schedule in Annex 1), JBSFdevelopment partners and government will work together in a JBSF Results chainworkshop. The workshop will take place at Serena Hotel, on May 6, 2009, from 9.00 amto 5:30 pm as per attached program (Annex 2).

Pursuant to subsequent discussions of the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) andthe specific sector Results framework, the World Bank is inviting you to participate in a

The JBSF will provide budget support and means through which Government'sdevelopment partners will harmonize their approaches to the provision of such support.The purpose of the workshop is to ensure that draft results frameworks for JAF 1-3(FY1O-12) are coherent, consistent and logical and reflect a holistic view of theimpediments to service delivery performance in the sector. They will therefore alsoimportantly also discuss cross cutting issues such as procurement, PSM, PFM, anddecentralization issues that can affect service delivery. The results chain workshop willhelp identify the most binding constraints to service delivery performance and theassociated high priority actions to take to resolve them. Eventually, the goal of theworkshop is to complete on the final results frameworks for JAF 1 - 3 and also show thethrust of the reform strategy throughout JAF 5. This will set the stage for subsequentimplementation of the JBSF in this period.

Participants from each sector are only required to participate during the specific sectorsession dealing with the relevant issue (health, education, water and sanitation, transport).

Each sector ministry is requested to prepare a short presentation (maximum 10minutes). identifying the key impediments to effective service delivery. Thepresentation should include impediments stemming from cross cutting issues such as (a)public sector management, (b) public financial management, (c) procurement and (d)local government/decentralization. It could also (e) include suggested reform measures tothe identified cross cutting and sector specific impediments. The sector ministry can usethe attached matrix (Annex 3) to frame the presentation. Annexes 4 and 5 could be usefulfor Ministry of Education and for representatives from agencies covering cross

Participants from institutions covering crosscutting issues (e.g. MoLG, AG, PPDA,MoPS) are requested to participate during the entire workshop. In particular,representatives from cross cutting sectors are requested to carefully considerimpediments to effective service delivery in the four sectors mentioned.

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Follow up meetings are scheduled for May 7th as well as on May 13th. The main focus ofthe follow up meetings is agreeing on the key cross cutting issues, the prior actions andcore indicators for individual sectors. Meeting venue would be in the respective sectorministry.

Please find attached to this letter the following key documents for use in preparation toworkshop:

a) Annex 1 - Schedule of Mission, including all meeting scheduledb) Annex 2 - Program for JBSF - GoU results chain workshopsc) Annex 3 - Matrix to frame the presentation by sector ministryd) Annex 4 - Copy of Minister of Education speech (December 2007) on education

sector reform priorities to address efficiency issues in the sectore) Annex 5 - Example of Problem tree/results chain for educationf) Annex 6 - Example of Problem tree/results chain for health

We thank you for your usual cooperation.

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Annex 8. Example of Flowchart Used to Build Results Framework for PRSC 8-10 Series-Education Sector

Increased non- Poverty Reduction...

mncome welfare

Wages in Labor Market (orreturns to own account farming)rise for those with skills...

Increase supply of skilledlabor (and other externalities'from education...) Increased demand for

skilled labor?

Increased volume of proficientcompleters secondary schools IIncreased volume

proficientcompleters in

TVETReduce

TTEclassroom7

buildingIncreased Increasedcosts: enrollment quality USEMore cost- Increased volume of USE schools schooling Increasedeffective proficient completers m enrollment inprocurement primary schools TVET& school (and% of poor kids???)buildingstandards

Reduc SalschHw?linimppveipiarr

non-ease . Increa

PETstoEffcec IcEas UprPrivat

1.ueP RedceTeiheng Tech ripoment?erfes mreaid?, frox ta-lekae? snteeis 3.ectrgebudgettionfts reduce agecass

TimelyMTEFsceilinfrom X to Y???

In U So

1.ooin pubicprmarrPpi

Chid hshooslcoseut

Im r edueShr o?2 mrvrmr

L_ealoge: 1. InspectInceaheeoalasro

1.T RoEduiceiea cs 2.E Tech riepmn?rt%fomXoY

absnteism 3.E Mergen conditional 3.reduce taveinragecls2.kae techerteons 4.to TageursorcsettT sies i e PlPedtrict

task,y Districtsin from 80 to 5??

relea38

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda for the period FY2011-2015,April 27, 2010.

Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Republic of Uganda for the CASperiod FY2011-2015, June 2013.

Education and Health Services in Uganda-Data for Results and Accountability (Launchedition), African Economic Research Consortium, November 2013.

Financing Agreement (Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Development PolicyFinancing) between Republic of Uganda and International Development Association,November 24, 2010

Financing Agreement (Ninth Poverty Reduction Support Development Policy Financing)between Republic of Uganda and International Development Association, May 14, 2012.

Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount of US$460million to the Republic of Uganda for Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) 5, 6and 7, June, 2010.

ISRs, A-Ms, Minutes, Concept Notes, and other documents in the Project File.

Ministry of Health, Annual Sector Performance Review, 2013.

Ministry of Works and Transport:-Annual Sector Performance Review, September 2013.-The 9th Joint Transport Sector Review, Workshop Program, Papers andPresentations, 17-18 September 2013.

Program Document for a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 65.9 million (US$100Million Equivalent), including SDR26.4 million in Pilot Response Window Resources(US$40 million equivalent) to The Republic of Uganda for the Eighth Poverty ReductionSupport Credit, August 30, 2010.

Program Document for a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 65.2 million (US$100Million Equivalent) to The Republic of Uganda for the Ninth Poverty Reduction SupportCredit, January 30, 2012.

Public Service Performance Agreement Form-Permanent Secretary's AnnualPerformance Agreement with the Head of Public Service and Secretary to Cabinet

Status Report on the Implementation of the Performance Agreement Initiative for SeniorManagers in the Public Service, May 2013.

39

Third Annual Report on Tracking Corruption Trends in Uganda: Using the Data TrackingMechanism, December 2012.

Uganda-Service Delivery with More Districts in Uganda: Fiscal Challenges andOpportunities for Reforms, Public Expenditure Review, June 2013.

Water and Environment sector, Performance Report, October 2013.

World Bank, Uganda: Fiscal Policy for Growth, Public Expenditure Review, 2007.

World Bank, Uganda: Health Efficiency and Future Expenditure Challenges, Public

Expenditure Review, 2009.

World Bank and Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, Uganda: Uganda CountryStudy Report: Raising Productivity and Reducing the Risks of Household Enterprises,2010.

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