Impact Investing in Developing Countries...6 Impact investing often takes place in developing or...
Transcript of Impact Investing in Developing Countries...6 Impact investing often takes place in developing or...
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STANFORD
Policy Practicum: Impact Investing In the Absence of
Credible Legal Institutions
559 Nathan Abbot Way Stanford, CA https://law.stanford.edu/education/only-at-sls/law-policy-lab//
Impact Investing in
Developing Countries: Legal Institutions and Work-Arounds
PRACTICUM RESEARCH TEAM:
Shereen Griffith, JD ’16; Damira Khatam, JSM ’16
Demoni Newman, JD ’17; Reirui Ri, JSM ‘16
Kunal Sangani, BA ‘16, Economics;
Alessandra Santiago, MS ‘16, Earth Systems Science;
Mengyi Xu, JD ’17; Lucie Zikova, MA ‘16, Int’l Policy Studies
INSTRUCTOR:
Paul BREST Former Dean and Professor of Law, Emeritus
Faculty Director, Stanford Law and Policy Lab
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Impact Investing In the Absence of Credible Legal Institutions
Stanford Law School Policy Lab Practicum, Impact Investing in Developing Countries: Legal Institutions and Work-Arounds
Autumn Quarter of 2015
Impact investors are investors who place capital in enterprises that they expect to generate
social or environmental goods, services, or ancillary benefits, with expected financial returns
ranging from the highly concessionary to risk-adjusted market rates or better.
Impact investors include foundations making program-related investments (PRIs),
family offices, high net worth individuals, and investment funds. The investee enterprises
range from startups to small and medium enterprises in developed and developing countries.
The enterprises provide goods and services in industries as diverse as urban development,
health, sanitation, environmental goods, education, and care for the elderly.
Impact investors are a subgroup of private equity or venture capital investors with these
three distinguishing characteristics. First, as mentioned above, impact investors seek social
outcomes as well as financial returns, which entails that they must try to ensure that an
organization delivers on its social mission. Second, most impact investments are relatively
small, which means that the costs of due diligence may be disproportionately high compared to
the size of the investment. Third, while investors who seek only financial returns can reduce
the volatility of their portfolio by diversifying their investments within and across countries,
diversification does not bring the same advantages to the social goals of impact investments.
Money is fungible, so that a loss in the investment of one company can be compensated for by
good returns from another. In contrast, the failure of an impact investment intended to reduce
malaria is not compensated for by the success of one intended to provide solar lighting.
When disputes between investors and their investees, or between the enterprises and
their major business partners, come to a point where their rights can only be protected through
litigation or arbitration, everybody usually loses. But the very existence of legal regimes that
recognize the parties’ rights with threats of enforcement can play an important background role
in inducing the parties to live up to their agreed-upon obligations.
Investors and enterprises in highly developed countries count on the existence of
mature legal regimes, even as they use other measures—such as doing due diligence on the
reputations of prospective counterparties, maintaining strong relationships with them, and
monitoring their performance—to ensure adherence to contractual obligations. But an
increasing number of impact investors are investing in enterprises in countries that lack stable
property rights, independent judiciaries, and other elements of the “rule of law” that are taken
for granted in more developed countries. How can investors protect their rights when these
legal institutions are absent? This is the question that this paper addresses.
The paper is aimed at impact investors who wish to invest in developing countries. It is
based on interviews with experienced impact investors and private equity investors in those
countries, from organizations including:
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● Acumen Fund
● Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE)
● Blackrock
● FSG’s Inclusive Markets Group in India
● Helios Investment Partners
● LGT Venture Philanthropy Foundation
● Mulago Foundation
● Omidyar Network
● OPIC
● Schulze Global Investments
● SEAF
● Technoserve
The paper is a product of a Stanford Law School Policy Lab Practicum, Impact Investing in
Developing Countries: Legal Institutions and Work-Arounds, taught in the Autumn Quarter of
2015. Paul Brest, former dean and emeritus professor (active) at Stanford Law School was the
Practicum instructor, and the students were:
Shereen Griffith, JD candidate, Stanford Law School
Damira Khatam, JSM candidate, Stanford Law School
Demoni Newman, JD candidate, Stanford Law School
Reirui Ri, JSM candidate, Stanford Law School
Kunal Sangani, BA candidate, Economics
Alessandra Santiago, MS candidate, Earth Systems Science
Mengyi Xu, JD candidate, Stanford Law School
Lucie Zikova, MA candidate, International Policy Studies
Kunal Sangani played a particularly valuable role in assisting Paul Brest in editing this essay.
Although the seminar participants surveyed some of the relevant foundational literature,
including Robert Ellickson’s study of self-regulation by farmers and ranchers in Shasta County1
and Lisa Bernstein’s study of the diamond industry,2 we decided that our comparative advantage
would be in learning from the experiences of impact investors and the broader community of
private equity investors of which they comprise a subset.
We are grateful to the experts from the organizations mentioned above, who gave
generously of their time, and to lawyers from Omidyar Network and faculty at Stanford Law
1 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
2 Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, Journal
of Legal Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 115-157
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School who provided critical feedback on earlier versions of this article. They are responsible for
the insights reflected in this paper. We alone are responsible for any errors.
Stanford Law School
April 2016
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Contents
SECTION I: Government and other Overarching Risks of Doing Business in Less Developed Countries
1.1. Political Risks
1.2. Regulatory Challenges and Risks
1.2.1. What is Regulatory Risk?
1.2.2. How Can Impact Investors Minimize Regulatory Risks?
1.2.3. The Pros and Cons of Government Relationships as Risk Mitigation
1.3. Currency Risk
1.4. Security Risks
1.5. Social Risks
1.6. Environmental Risk
1.7. Risks of knockoffs and other intellectual property infringement
SECTION II: Counterparty Risks
2.1 Due Diligence—The Counterparty’s Reputation and Track Record
2.1.1. Reputation as a due diligence metric
2.2. Cultivating The Investor-Investee Relationship
2.2.1. The Importance of a Local Presence
2.2.2. Adding Future Value
2.3. Reputation as a deterrence mechanism and enforcement channel 2.4.
Mission Drift
SECTION III: Deal Structuring
3.1. Debt Investments
3.1.1. Debt Due Diligence Process Comparison
3.2. Equity Investments
3.2.1. Ownership Structure
3.2.2. Follow-on Investment Considerations 3.2.3.
Exit Strategy
3.3. Debt vs. Equity Comparison
3.4. Quasi-Equity and Other Creative Finance 3.5.
Corporate Governance
SECTION IV: Impact Investing and Planning for Disputes
4.1. Disputes with Sovereign Parties
4.2. Disputes with Private Parties
Conclusion
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Impact investing often takes place in developing or frontier markets, and, as a result, impact
investors will likely encounter problems unique to investing in countries where legal institutions
are weak, ineffective, or entirely absent. The absence of credible legal institutions—and hence
the lack of credible penalties for misbehavior—gives counterparties a wider berth to act in ways
that are disadvantageous for the impact investor. Beyond the possibility of adverse behavior by
investees or co-investors, impact investments are vulnerable to a second set of broader risks that
result from the higher levels of political and market uncertainty often present in
developing/frontier markets.
In the first two sections of this paper, we disaggregate these types of risk and offer techniques for
mitigation: Section I provides an overview of country-level risks, including those from dealing
with government regimes and those flowing from from broader characteristics of developing
markets, and Section II addresses the exacerbated risks of dealing with counterparties in the
absence of realistic contract enforcement. Two aspects of the impact investing process, deal-
structuring and dispute resolution, deserve special attention, and we spend Sections III and IV
providing best practices as described by our interviewees on each.
SECTION I: Government and other Overarching Risks of Doing Business in Less Developed Countries
Impact investors concerned with improving the lives of the world’s poorest communities invest
in less developed countries. Unstable political regimes in these countries can expose investors to
distinctive governmental risks, including abrupt and sometimes violent changes in government,
frequent changes of government officials, perilous socio-economic conditions, religious and
ethnic conflicts, and corruption. We begin by considering risks of this sort.
1.1. Political Risks
The national security of a developing country is less predictable than that of developed
countries. War, famine or other causes of social upheaval in a country can create instability that
interferes with a business’s capacity to operate, thus making investments risky. Political
instability poses a problem for an investor seeking to establish long-term and stable ties with
local governments: for example, a change of regime may leave the business aligned with the
wrong political party. In the category of political risks, we consider these sorts of country-
specific risks that threaten a business model's viability or an enterprise's day-to-day operations.
Experienced private equity investors (including impact investors) have checklists to
assess the risks of investing in a particular country—a basis for balancing the risks against the
potential financial value of an investment. They may also retain a firm, such as The PRS Group,
with expertise in country risk assessment.
Investors may also seek political risk insurance to compensate for losses caused by
political upheaval. Such insurance is available to American investors through Overseas Private
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Investment Corporation (OPIC), an independent U.S. government agency that provides investors
with insurance, funding, and guarantees for projects in developing countries and emerging
markets. OPIC’s political risk insurance is available to American investors, lenders, contractors,
exporters, and NGOs for investments in 150 developing countries.3 For example, one of OPIC’s
political insurance products is Political Violence coverage, which compensates investors for
equity assets (including property) and income losses caused by (i) declared or undeclared war;
(ii) hostile actions by national or international forces; (iii) revolution, insurrection, and civil
strife; and (iv) terrorism and sabotage.
1.2. Regulatory Challenges and Risks
1.2.1. What is Regulatory Risk?
By “regulatory risk” we mean (1) the risks flowing from vague and conflicting laws,
whose interpretations may depend on the whims of courts and officials subject to political or
economic pressures or corruption, and (2) the risks of unexpected changes in the law that will
adversely affect the investee business or the investor, including changes in taxation laws,
reversal of previously granted incentives or subsidies, and revocation of licenses or permits. The
revocation of licenses is a particular risk in regulated markets, such as utilities and
telecommunications, and in investments related to land use and ownership. These regulatory
risks can increase the cost of doing business, reduce the value of an investment, provide an unfair
advantage to competitors, or even prevent the business from continuing operations altogether.
In addition, some regimes, though purporting to encourage foreign investment, have
lengthy and burdensome regulatory procedures for permitting flows of funds into and out of the
country. These can result in uncertainties and delays in investment funds getting to investees and
interest payments and profits being returned to investors.
1.2.2. How Can Impact Investors Minimize Regulatory Risks?
As an initial regulatory risk mitigation strategy, investors’ due diligence should include
identifying laws and regulations that might apply to the specific business venture at various
stages. However, acquiring reliable information about appropriate laws may be difficult in
countries with a limited number of qualified lawyers and where legislative documents are not
easily obtained or are so vague as to make it impossible to determine the rule. Even approaching
government agencies may not be a solution when different agencies provide inconsistent answers
about the country’s licensing and regulatory procedures.
Some particular regulatory burdens placed on capital flows can be mitigated through
special investment vehicles and side agreements. For example, to overcome regulatory
challenges related to foreign ownership of domestic companies, an investor may consider
owning shares in a holding company in the target country, which in its turn owns the desired
investee. In countries where local regulations limit the size of loans, side agreements can set up a
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https://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance
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mechanism for the business to pay for the investor’s technical assistance, thus (for better or
worse) evading regulatory caps.
American impact investors may also consider OPIC’s special regulatory risk insurance.4
To date, this relatively new insurance product is offered only for investments in the renewable
resources field and protects against these regulatory actions by the host government: (i) changes
to feed-in tariffs, (ii) changes to the taxation laws and other regulations that interfere with the
renewable energy project’s operations; (iii) revocation of the necessary licenses and permits; (iv)
wrongful interference with carbon credit generation or sales; and (v) repudiation of a concession,
technical assistance, or forestry-related service agreements by a foreign government.
1.2.3. The Pros and Cons of Government Relationships as Risk Mitigation
Some investors try to either steer clear of markets that are highly regulated or dependent
on licenses and permits (e.g. utilities or projects involving land use or ownership), or choose to
invest in smaller companies that can stay under the government radar. Alternatively, some
investors search for market segments that a government has identified as important to growth and
has invited foreign investors to help develop. In any event, maintaining a good relationship with
the government is an important aspect of regulatory risk mitigation.
Some investors, while striving to maintain good government relationships, keep
government stakeholders at arm’s length. They avoid investing alongside government bodies and
persons and minimize investment in areas that depend on government payment and licensing.
They may also try to invest in small companies to avoid intrusion, including nationalization, by
host country governments. Once a business becomes profitable, however, it opens the door for
government intervention and manipulation, providing concomitant trouble for the investor at that
point.
At the other end of the spectrum, investors may seek government support and
government contracts for their investees. This strategy is particularly important in highly
regulated or publicly owned industries, or in sectors deemed vital for national welfare, such as
education and healthcare. One interviewee explained that a government contract has been the key
for its success in an education business. Investors who wish to gain government cooperation or
expect that their investments will be monitored meet with government officials to understand
their priorities and develop relationships, conveying the message that they care about the
country’s development and wish to be of help.
Internationally-known investing firms may even use their brand to impress government
regimes and stimulate cooperation. This can also be a win for governments in developing and
frontier markets, too, as cooperation with internationally recognized business organizations can
contribute to their government’s reputation in domestic and international markets. In any event,
it is essential to have a local person who can maintain government relationships day-to-day—
4 https://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance/types-of-coverage/regulatory-risk
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usually the CEO or a local well-informed entity that can act on behalf of the investor and the
business in the face of external conflict.
It should be noted that managing government relationships can be potentially dangerous
in developing countries with high levels of corruption. Instead of spurring economic
development, careless investment can feed corruption. Moreover, dealing with corrupt officials
may harm the investor’s reputation—and, in the case of American investors, can leave the
investor vulnerable to significant civil and criminal penalties under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign government officials and, in certain cases,
private commercial bribery. Before investing in countries where bribery or other forms of
corruption are common practice, impact investors should understand the corruption present in the
political and economic fields in these countries, as well as activities prohibited under the FCPA,
and carefully consider whether investing in these countries is worth the risk.
1.3. Currency Risk
Impact investors usually choose to both provide and receive capital in their own country's
currency—dollars, euros, and the like. But since their investees do business in their local
currencies, investments are susceptible to fluctuations in the value of those currencies. The
impact investing industry has only just begun to identify potential methods for de-risking
currency fluctuations. A solution proposed by one of our interviewees was to partner with
foundations who may be willing to take on currency risk by providing a cushion of capital
through their program related investments (PRIs).
The International Institute for Sustainable Development offers several solutions for
mitigating currency risk, though the authors note that these strategies are typically costly to one
of the parties involved (the investee, the investors, or the government). Among these long-run
strategies is local currency financing.5
1.4. Social Risks
In addition to changes in governments and government officials, the attitudes of local
communities, civil society leaders, and politicians can be a powerful risk variable for investors.
If ties to the local community in which the business is based are not well-managed, social
entrepreneurship can be stunted by civil society blowback. A notable example is the public
backlash against microfinance in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh in October 2010. Reports
citing links between microfinance institution practices and suicides in the Indian state stirred
public opinion against the microfinance institution SKS, and resulted in a steep drop in the firm’s
share price. A report published by the World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
5 https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/currency-risk-project-finance-discussion-paper.pdf
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(CGAP) notes that the crisis “exposed issues of reputation management for an industry whose
very existence is based on doing good by serving poor people.”6
Ventures with foreign leadership or staff may be especially vulnerable to these social
risks. Mitigating these risks requires thoughtful reputation management, as the CGAP report
mentions. It is important to build local networks, strengthen relationships with local community
representatives, and foster dialogue, so that the social venture’s mission is well understood by the
communities it intends to benefit.
1.5. Environmental Risk
Linked to the security risk outlined above, environmental risk in a foreign business
venture may serve as another unpredictable factor in assuring the longevity of a business.
Changing climate conditions may significantly affect the viability of investments, especially in
countries where an unpredictable disaster-prone climate can wreak havoc on existing public
infrastructure. Groups like Omidyar, with investments in agriculture-based businesses in
countries like India, factor unpredictable weather or climatic patterns into their projections of
returns. Encouraging private investors to become signatories to international agreements and
other instruments that hold policymakers accountable to an international body can also mitigate
environmental risks in the medium- to long-term, as these actions specifically call for
“multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions to apply risk-
reducing finance tools that can enable market development and help scale up private investment
in developing countries.”7
1.6. Risks of knockoffs and other intellectual property infringement
One of our interviewees described an investment in a startup that sold solar lanterns in a
rural region of India. A major setback was the discovery that small Chinese businesses were
producing and selling cheap knockoffs of the startup’s lanterns. These imitations had two effects:
reducing the size of the company’s market and, because of the knockoffs’ poor quality,
undermining customers’ trust in the product.
In developed countries, intellectual property law provides innovators with a degree of
protection that is absent in many developing countries. When investing in businesses that
produce easily replicable products, impact investors should ensure that investees strategize
around this possibility.
6 https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Andhra-Pradesh-2010-Global-
Implications-of-the-Crisis-in-Indian-Microfinance-Nov-2010.pdf
7 http://www.unpri.org/press/global-investor-statement-on-climate-change-reducing-risks-
seizing-opportunities-and-closing-the-climate-investment-gap-2/
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SECTION II: Counterparty Risks
By “counterparty risks” we mean risks emanating from the adverse behavior of investees or co-
investors. Counterparty risks arise in any investment, but they are heightened in developing
countries where legal enforcement of contractual obligations is weak or nonexistent. In addition
to the general risk that an investor may be unable to recover capital and returns, an investee or
co-investor may engage in activities—including fraud, embezzlement of funds, double
bookkeeping, failure to fulfill contractual obligations, poor management, and drift from the
social impact mission—that endanger the social as well as financial objectives of the investment.
This final point deserves attention, because concerns of mission drift are unique to mission-
driven investors who desire both social and financial returns.
2.1 Due Diligence—The Counterparty’s Reputation and Track Record
The counterparty’s reputation is a crucial indicator of the likely success of an investment
even when investing in countries with strong legal regimes. It is especially important in the
absence of a robust rule of law. Markets in many developing countries lack the same kind of
credentialing mechanisms available in highly developed countries. A party’s reputation,
therefore, is a critical factor in determining the fitness of potential investees and co-investors.
This knowledge can also serve as a proxy for the investee’s competence and credibility during
the course of an investment when other relevant performance metrics are hard to discern.
In conventional markets, an established, centralized and readily accessible system of
background checks can yield clues to an investee’s character, providing financial, business, and
personal information about the entrepreneurs. Timely access to reliable and vetted information is
relatively inexpensive and straightforward. In developing/frontier markets, on the other hand,
performing even a basic background check often requires a much higher level of investor
involvement. Poor access to reliable local information means that investors need to establish a
trustworthy local network of references who are able and willing to provide unbiased
information about the potential investee’s character. An investor may need to rely on co-
investors for information, raising the stakes involved in choosing resourceful and trustworthy co-
investors as well. These problems add complexity to the due diligence process and add
significant time and expense.
Our interviewees have suggested several ways to gauge the reputation of potential
investees during the due diligence process in the face of these challenges. First, rather than
relying on a single source, it is advisable to cross check assessments from different parties. When
soliciting input from businesses with deep ties to the investee, the investor should consider the
possibility that the information is biased. Second, since the impact investor seeks to understand a
party's reputation along various dimensions, including financial performance and social impact
commitment, it is important to understand how reputational assessments of the potential investee
may differ in the weight they assign to these various dimensions. Some interviewees were
skeptical about conducting due diligence by searching databases altogether, preferring to gather
information on investees by extensively mobilizing the investor’s local networks.
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Some of our interviewees suggested partnering with knowledgeable and trustworthy co-
investors as a risk mitigation strategy, especially when an investor’s unilateral efforts do not
provide adequate information and co-investors could help fill in the gap. The value of a
partnership depends, of course, on the co-investor’s sophistication and independence, and the
extent to which the latter shares the investor’s interests in social and financial outcomes.
Some interviewees recommended investing alongside multinational or listed companies,
or development finance institutions like the IFC. Doing so has several advantages. These public
entities have access to a wide range of reliable information resources. Equally important are the
significant consequences of defaulting on an organization such as the IFC, which are likely to
deter any misbehavior on the part of the investee. Aligned, established co-investors can be
formidable partners in ensuring adherence to an investment contract.
As a complementary strategy, investors can retain a consulting firm to learn about
specific entities’ track records and reputations.
2.2. Cultivating The Investor-Investee Relationship
Once an investor decides on an investee and other co-investors, it is important to develop
sound relationships with them.
The foundation of a strong relationship is alignment with the venture’s mission,
motivation, goals, and operations. Investing at a very early stage can be helpful in this respect.
The Mulago Foundation, whose seed investments usually stem from a two-year fellowship
program where entrepreneurs receive training and advice in developing social ventures, provides
an interesting example. The fellowship program allows Mulago to build a strong relationship
with the investee, as well as familiarity with the venture, before the Foundation makes an early
stage investment. An impact investor considering any early stage investment will benefit from
having played a role in guiding and developing the investee organization and its management
team in its mission, strategies, and business plan.
A clear contractual agreement is an essential anchor of the investor-investee relationship.
Even if this agreement will not be ultimately enforceable in that country’s legal system, it
incorporates mutual expectations and reinforces that the investment is a serious undertaking. One
of our interviewees relayed his experience investing in small enterprises in North Korea. Despite
the fact that no business contract would realistically be enforced in the country, the very creation
of a detailed contract signaled to the enterprise owners the degree of the investor's commitment
and the seriousness of the terms of business. In such cases, clear contractual agreements can
reinforce trust between investor and investee.
Although the impact investor’s ultimate concern is to develop and cement a business
relationship in which the counterparty maximizes both social impact and financial returns, one
cannot overestimate the role of personal relationships in achieving these outcomes. An investor’s
strong personal bond with the investee and, especially in the case of a family-owned business,
with his or her family, reinforces incentives to perform and discourages slacking and cheating.
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The point is so obvious as not to need elaboration, but it was emphasized by many of the
investors we interviewed.
2.2.1. The Importance of a Local Presence
Beyond strengthening the investor’s relationship with the investee, an investor’s local
presence can provide a realistic understanding of the local culture and business environment. The
process of gaining locally-sourced information about the investee can also help an investor
develop a network of relationships with local businesses that create leverage against the
investee’s contract default.
Some of the investors we spoke to felt that, while it was valuable for the entrepreneur to
have significant ties to the Global North, a local team was essential to understand the region’s
culture, community, governmental activity, and business environment. Others believed it
valuable to invest in organizations led by local entrepreneurs.
In any event, it is important to retain a reputable local lawyer. A local lawyer will
understand and navigate the local business environment and be able to draft documents in the
local language—a practice that is often crucial to maintaining the investee’s confidence and trust.
2.2.2. Adding Future Value
One important way to maintain a strong investor-investee relationship is for the investor
to add value beyond providing capital. For example, the Mulago Foundation model makes the
investor an integral participant in the venture, rather than simply an external party seeking to
profit from it. In an ideal relationship, the investee will turn to the investor for advice and
assistance when trouble arises, rather than seeking to hide financial or other troubles. A former
investor with SEAF emphasized that providing advice or other managerial support to the
investee on a continuing basis, thereby creating trust as well as adding value beyond financial
resources.
Investors can also give an investee access to their business networks, thus providing the
venture as well as entrepreneur new opportunities for growth.
2.3. Reputation as a deterrence mechanism and enforcement channel
While a strong relationship between the investor and investee holds the two parties
accountable to each other, investees’ reputations also holds them accountable to a broader
community. Ideally, opportunistic behaviors by investees will tarnish their reputations in
communities that matter for future social and business success, thus helping deter misbehavior.
Just as reputation is an important proxy for investors in ascertaining investment risks, it is
also a valuable way for investees to attract future investments. The incentive to maintain a good
reputation is arguably magnified in emerging markets given the weighty role it plays in the due
diligence process. Several interviewees recommended ways to leverage a party’s reputation or
concerns about its reputation to deter non-compliance.
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Locally, it might be beneficial to invest in companies that have a lot to lose if they engage
in questionable behavior. It might be better to invest in a company with a consistently strong
track record or in an entity that is relying on the current investment to rebound and reestablish
itself. In the case of the former, the company might already be the model investee in the
community and losing that status is more psychologically painful than not being able to achieve
it in the first place. As for the latter, the current investment might represent its last opportunity
for success. Hence the cost of potential reputational damage is considerably higher, and the
incentive to adhere to the agreement is increased. An investor who understands that an investee
would face ostracism as a result of non-compliance with an agreement has a potent deterrent
against opportunism.
The reach of an investee’s reputation, and hence the scope of potential damage, can also
affect the strength of this deterrence mechanism. Whereas an investee with a local presence may
risk engaging in some opportunistic behavior only to try its luck with other investors later on, an
investee with a more global profile may have more at stake.
It is for this reason that some of our interviewees argued for the benefits of investing in
Western or Western-trained local entrepreneurs who are plugged into global business networks.
If they engage in any foul play and prove to be less than trustworthy, they risk damaging their
credibility and losing future business opportunities on a much larger scale. The last thing any
globally ambitious entrepreneur would want is to be blacklisted from the global business
network. Thus, third party reputation may also serve as an effective channel for enforcing party
compliance with contractual obligations in the absence of rule of law.
2.4. Mission Drift
While impact investors struggle with the same principal-agent problems endemic to other
kinds of investing, they have the additional responsibility to ensure that their investees achieve
social returns in addition to financial returns. Several of our interviewees mentioned the problem
of “mission drift.” Mission drift occurs, for example, when a business is launched to serve a
base-of-pyramid population, but gradually shifts away from that mission, generally to serve a
wealthier population, for financial gain. Mission drift can also happen when investor and
investee share a social mission but disagree on the best way to identify target populations or
achieve the parties’ goals. Unlike financial returns, social returns can be difficult to measure.
Corporate governance can help ensure alignment of goals and incentives between
investor and investee, and the impact investor may choose to take an active role in the investee's
governance to prevent mission drift. This may take several forms. Like other investors, impact
investors may negotiate information rights, which allow them to examine the investee’s books,
get regular reports on operations, be apprised of problems, and retain an external accountant to
audit the investee’s books. (Access to information is important for monitoring both financial and
social outcomes. In countries where double bookkeeping is rampant, several of our interviewees
mentioned the importance of getting access to the investee’s books that reflect the objective state
of the business and progress toward meeting social impact goals.)
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Impact investors may also negotiate control rights that dictate how much input investors
have in organizational decision-making. Investors may insist on having a seat at the investees’
Boards of Directors. This may help bind the organization to its stated mission and may also give
the impact investor more control over the pool of future investors.8 Several of our interviewees
noted that maintaining a position on the Board of Directors was one of the most important ways
in which they were able to monitor and advance the investee organization's social impact.
Note that while we include negotiating for information and control rights primarily as
techniques for protecting against mission drift, these may be equally effective tools for
monitoring financial outcomes over the course of the investment as well.
SECTION III: Deal Structuring
Contracts serve as the primary mechanism for the often highly structured deals that take
place in developing and frontier markets. As mentioned above, regardless of the likelihood of
enforcement, simply forming a contract signals both the investor’s and investee’s commitment to
the deal. Further, a formal agreement is valuable as a guide to equitable resolution even in
settlements outside the formal judicial system.
A formal contract can also heighten reputational risk for the party that may otherwise
choose to renege on the agreement. In a situation where one party defaults, a contract is a clear
evidence of a formally established business relationship with attendant rights and obligations. A
failure to uphold such an agreement can discredit and undermine the position of the defaulting
party in business networks. The potentially significant consequences of reneging therefore serve
as a self-enforcing risk mitigation strategy for the investors. It is worth repeating, however, that
once litigation becomes necessary, the business deal is typically doomed, and the parties have
little choice but to abandon or renegotiate the agreement. As a result, business partners generally
strive to avoid court dealings and over-reliance on contracts.
Because of the inherent complexity of developing and frontier markets, deals in these
environments tend to be highly structured. Investee companies vary widely and as a result have
unique financing needs. The deal idiosyncrasies often call for approaches other than
conventional debt or equity investments. For example, some investors we spoke with expressed a
preference for self-liquidating securities, such as loans or convertible loans, as well as securities
positioned higher in the capital structure, i.e. securities receiving liquidation preference and/or
priority access to investment cash flows.
Another method sometimes deployed by frontier market impact investors is the creation
of shell investment vehicles. Typically, such investment vehicles are established in a jurisdiction
the investors perceive as friendly. The vehicles are then used to invest in a target market. This
8
One of the interviewed investors mentioned the problem of providing early-stage funding to a mission-driven
enterprise and then having a profit-driven investor provide later funding and shift the mission away from social
impact and toward profits.
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mitigation strategy eliminates some of the uncertainties as the investee is subject to and protected
by the laws of a jurisdiction with a mature legal system. (However, a shell investment vehicle
does not guarantee that the local law enforcement will defer to or enforce the laws of the
vehicle’s country of origin.)
In this section, we will first introduce important concepts for debt investments, then
sketch considerations relevant to equity investments. We will then compare the two approaches,
and offer a few creative finance strategies.
3.1. Debt Investments
As is the case of all investments, due diligence is an essential risk mitigation tool.
Assessment of creditor’s character, capacity to repay, available collateral and the available
collection processes are conventional steps of debt due diligence process that aim to lower the
investment risk. It is worth repeating the importance of understanding the business environment,
the relevant industry, and the particular business in a local context.
While loan collateral is a popular tool for risk mitigation in conventional markets, the
assets typically used as collateral may not be available in developing countries. Business owners
often do not own assets such as land directly; in many cases business owners rent from landlords
or possess permits to use land owned by local governments. Moreover, even when some
collateral is available, impact investors may not be able to execute their rights and seize the
collateral because of risks to their own reputations. For example, seizing land from local small-
size farmers may be ethically challenging for mission-driven investors.
Debt collection is also more difficult for investors in emerging markets. The burden of
debt collection rests often more with the investors themselves rather than with banks or other
centralized loan servicers, and, generally, the investors are forced to be more involved in the
collection process than is typical in conventional markets. To mitigate the risk of widespread
investee moral hazard, it is important for investors to take immediate action at the first case of
payment default. The lender/investor must maintain a reputation of a diligent debt collector in
the community to prevent future defaults.
3.2. Equity Investments
3.2.1. Ownership Structure
Ownership options for equity investors include taking a minority stake, a majority stake,
or participating in a club deal. Selection of an ownership structure defines the amount of risk an
investor wishes to take as well as the amount of control the investor gains. Each ownership
option thus offers a unique set of advantages and disadvantages relevant to investment risk
mitigation in developing and frontier markets.
Taking a minority stake in an investee company often fits the entrepreneur’s goals: A
minority stake does not extensively infringe on the entrepreneur’s ownership and thereby reduce
motivation to lead the company in the most profitable manner. The local business owner’s
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identity may be closely tied to ownership of the business in question. Therefore, a minority stake
prevents moral hazard arising in a situation where an entrepreneur is left with a minor stake in a
company that he or she previously owned. Yet holding a minority position can leave the investor
without control.
A potential solution to this dilemma is to take a large minority position. Considered by
some investors as an investment “sweet spot,” such a position can allow the investor to negotiate
robust risk mitigating mechanisms (i.e., hire/fire rights, control provisions, etc.), while also
preserving the entrepreneur’s sense of responsibility for successfully running the business. A
minority stake may also be more acceptable in local communities.
Of course, taking a majority interest in an investee company accomplishes the objective
of gaining control of the investment outcomes. This may be valuable to investors with local
teams able to monitor and implement desired changes in the company if the above-mentioned
concerns—moral hazard and acceptability to local communities—can be mitigated.
An alternative to having full control is to leverage trusted investment partners and enter
into a club deal. In such an arrangement, while no party has a controlling right in the company,
the “club” can exercise control when acting in consensus. Beyond risk-sharing, this approach
allows sharing of the due diligence process and monitoring responsibilities. The key challenge in
a club deal is finding partners that are trustworthy and hold similar investment values and vision
for the investee company.
3.2.2. Follow-on Investment Considerations and Exit Stategy
Investors must consider the future capital needs of their investee companies. Especially in
a situation where investors are leveraging a local investment partner, it is important to assess the
co-investor's inclination and ability to deploy additional capital in the future.
Since liquidity in developing markets tends to be low or non-existent, investors should
also have a clear exit strategy in place when deploying equity investments. Some of our
interviewees mentioned difficulties with exit execution, for instance, in cases where capital was
deployed into a family enterprise. When the time of exit approached, the family no longer shared
the investor’s vision for selling the company, as the family’s lives were closely tied to the
company. Similar situations can lead to a deadlock and destruction of enterprise value.
3.3. Debt vs. Equity Comparison
Due diligence prior to and monitoring over the course of an equity investment is often
more challenging than on a debt investment. Interest payments made regularly over the course of
a debt investment provide a built-in way of monitoring the investment's continued success.
Equity investments, however, require more active monitoring and governance over the course of
the deal. As a result, investors are forced to rely on a local team providing investment research,
due diligence work, and ongoing monitoring and governance, increasing the expenses required
for an equity investment.
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Debt investments can offer more flexibility than equity investments with respect to
investment size as well as size of the investee company. This is an important advantage for
impact investors, particularly when investing in emerging microenterprises, as investors may be
able to deploy debt capital in smaller installments. Debt also allows investors to provide capital
faster and potentially closer to the bottom of the pyramid. Finally, debt may be more acceptable
to business owners as it doesn’t require relinquishment of company ownership.
Debt lacks the incentive alignment inherent in equity investments, however. While
having less at stake may serve as a risk mitigation technique for investors, some investees view
equity investment as investor commitment to the business. Debt investments may also
incentivize more risk taking by the investee, since 100% of the upside belongs to the owner.
3.4. Quasi-Equity and Other Creative Finance
Quasi-equity is commonly used by impact investors. Quasi-equity is a form of debt with
some characteristics of equity, such that returns are tied to the underlying organization’s
performance. A common form of quasi-equity is a revenue-sharing agreement, under which the
investor gets a certain percentage of quarterly revenues. The investor is thus able to share in the
investee’s profits as an equity owner would, but does not have the voting and control rights that
shareholders usually have. Quasi-equity is helpful for fledgling organizations for whom regular
loans may be too risky, or in places where equity investments are illegal. One investor
interviewed used quasi-equity to create something like ownership when investing in a business in
North Korea.
Quasi-equity can be structured to incentivize entrepreneurs. One investor we interviewed
described an arrangement that his firm used when dealing with investees who might try to hide
revenues. The investor would get the higher of 2% of actual revenue or 2% of projected revenue.
By holding the entrepreneur to his estimates, the investor was able to discourage revenue-hiding.
This structure, though, shifts more risk to the entrepreneur.
SECTION IV: Planning for Disputes
Granted that the value of an investment is likely to plummet if disputes cannot be
resolved through negotiation, the existence of a robust legal system or reliable dispute resolution
mechanism acts both as a deterrence to illegal behavior and provides some possibility of redress
when it occurs.
Impact investors should foresee and plan for possible disputes, whether arising from
political turmoil, regulatory changes, counterparty fraud, breach of contract, or a failed business
venture. Careful contract drafting with a favorable dispute resolution provision can provide a
remediation mechanism down the road and serve as a deterrent to the counterparty’s, co-
investor’s, or host government’s engaging unfavorably with the investor. This final section will
focus on common methods that our interviewees used to prepare for potential disputes.
Depending on whether a dispute involves a governmental agency, a counterparty, or other
private players, there are important nuances in terms of available dispute resolution mechanisms.
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4.1. Disputes with Private Parties: Commercial Arbitration
As a general rule, a good dispute resolution provision should specify the applicable
substantive law and procedures; location of the adjudicating court or tribunal; and, if the
provision calls for arbitration, how the arbitrators will be selected. Among our interviewees,
international arbitration in a neutral third country was by far the most preferred mechanism for
dispute resolution. Leading international arbitration institutions include the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration
Association (ICDR), the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC), and the Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).
Impact investors and other parties engaged in transnational business and foreign
investment prefer international arbitration for a number of reasons. First, international arbitration
provides an impartial and neutral forum unaffected by the interests of the host country’s
domestic courts. A common mechanism for selecting the arbitrators is for each party to appoint
one arbitrator, with the two arbitrators then selecting the third; but the parties may choose any
other method they deem fit. At least one of our impact investors gave an example of the
difficulties that arise from not carefully thinking through the process of arbitrator selection in a
three-party contract.9
Second, by agreeing to arbitrate, parties centralize all disputes in one forum, instead of
potentially litigating parts of it in different courts. Moreover, parties in arbitration have
flexibility to agree on any procedural rules they want the arbitrators to use, thus simplifying the
process. The arbitration rules of most of the leading arbitration institutions (for e.g. ICC, LCIA,
ICDR, HKIAC and SIAC) allow seeking emergency and interim relief from the tribunals
themselves without the need to go back to local courts of the host country. Of course, this does
not guarantee that local courts will enforce such interim relief.
Finally, with the proliferation of countries that ratified the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, international arbitral awards
enjoy enforceability in 156 state parties around the world.10 Unfortunately, most nations that
have not adopted the New York Convention lie in Africa or other parts of the developing world,
where impact investing predominates.
Among signatories, the New York Convention provides much wider enforceability for an
arbitral award than a foreign country court judgment is likely to have. Enforcing a foreign court
judgment is usually a very lengthy and difficult process with low chances of success, especially
when the judgment arises in a developing country with weak due process guarantees.
9 In one example, each one of three parties—the foreign investor, the local company and a government-owned
entity—had a right to appoint its arbitrator. Later on, though, the government-owned entity acquired majority shares
in the local company, thus creating a situation in which two out of three arbitrators were appointed by parties with
fully aligned interests and hostile to the interests of the foreign investor. 10
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en
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4.2. Disputes with Sovereign Parties: Investor-State Arbitration
When structuring investments in developing countries, it is important to understand the
multilateral and bilateral investment mechanisms that exist in the host country. Is there a
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the investor’s country and the host country? Are there
bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements? Is the host country a party to the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States establishing
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to facilitate arbitration
and conciliation between states receiving investments and private investors operating in those
countries (investor-state disputes)? Or is the host country a party to the Energy Charter Treaty
that provides for state-state and investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms in the energy field?
Answering these questions may aid in identifying the precise scope of investment
protections afforded in a developing country and potential venues for dispute resolution, if the
investment fails due to sovereign actions. A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), for example,
provide that a foreign investor should be treated no less favorably than the host state's own
nationals (“fair and equitable treatment”), or no less favorably than the host state treats investors
from other states (“the most-favored nation treatment”); or guarantees that the host state will not
directly or indirectly expropriate the investment without adequate compensation.11 Moreover,
BITs and membership in the ICSID or the Energy Charter Treaty establish important
mechanisms and venues for investor-state dispute resolution. For example, if both the investor’s
home country and the host country are members of the ICSID Convention and the terms of their
respective countries’ BIT call for the ICSID arbitration, the investor may be able to bring an
investor-state arbitration claim with the ICSID tribunal located in Washington, D.C. In addition,
in investor-state disputes, parties may choose to pursue their claims in other international
arbitration tribunals listed in Section 4.1 above that are open to both private and public
disputants.
CONCLUSION
Investors in businesses in developing countries face risks stemming from problems with
the host government, co-investors in the venture, and other factors determining the local business
environment. We have discussed various strategies for mitigating these risks, but they can be
quite costly, and none of them ensure the safe return on the investments.
Deployment of these strategies is highly contextual and depends on a number of factors
including investment size, the target country’s economic and regulatory climate, investment
vehicle/structure and the investor-investee relationship. For instance, although it is prudent to
include a provision calling for international arbitration, arbitration itself—especially investor-
state arbitration—is very expensive in practice. For some smaller-size impact investment funds,
11 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties
submitting disputes to ICSID with its substantial filing fees and related attorney’s fees may
not be practicable. However, most of our interviewees believed that the formal nature of the
contract matters more than its actual enforcement. As previously mentioned, comprehensive
contractual provisions that clearly set the applicable dispute resolution mechanisms may serve
as an effective deterrent.
As is the case with any investment, the first and most important step involves due
diligence and the willingness to walk away from an investment that is attractive in terms of the
mixture of social impact and financial return if the risks seem excessive. For an investor who
decides to move forward, the strategies we have offered—establishing strong and trusting
relationships with the investee and other stakeholders, structuring a deal with adequate
provisions to deal with potential dispute, taking time to consider risks endemic to the business
environment, and negotiating rights or other means by which the investment can be effectively
monitored—promise to aid the impact investor in achieving the financial and social outcomes
the investment is set out to accomplish.
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