Immigration and Perceptions of the Political System in Britain

Immigration and Perceptions of the PoliticalSystem in Britain

LAUREN M. MCLAREN

POST-SECOND World War immigration toBritain has generally been controversialand unpopular. For instance, as early asthe 1960s, 85 per cent of British surveysamples were saying that too manyimmigrants had been let into the coun-try.1 More recently, in 2012, 51 per centsaid they would like to see levels ofimmigration reduced ‘a lot’—a figurewhich has risen from 39 per cent in 1995—and a further 24 per cent said theywould like to see levels of immigrationreduced ‘a little’.2 Though other issues,such as the economy, often take prece-dence in terms of media attention,3 inalmost every Ipsos MORI poll since May2002 at least 20 per cent of those polledhave identified immigration or race rela-tions as one of the most important issuesfacing Britain, and there are many peri-ods in which one-third or more ofrespondents identified this as one of themost important issues.4 In other words,the issue of immigration has been on theagenda for a significant proportion ofthe public for more than a decade. Theimpact of public concern about immigra-tion has been less clear in Britain than inmany of its European neighbours, how-ever, in that there is not a popular far-right party through which voters canexpress their concerns about immigra-tion, and the degree to which immigra-tion has affected voting for mainstreamparties is also somewhat limited.5

While the electoral consequences ofconcern about immigration may be rela-tively limited in Britain, previousresearch by this author draws the con-clusion that concern about immigrationmay be having potentially devastating

consequences for the British political sys-tem as a whole by undermining trust inBritish politics, including trust in boththe institutions and the elites in Britain.6

Specifically, my article in the British Jour-nal of Political Science (BJPolS) publishedin January 2012 contends that immigra-tion is having detrimental effects on pub-lic attitudes to the political system inBritain because immigration is perceivedas a threat to the cultural connectionsthat bind citizens to their political sys-tem, and because British citizens specifi-cally blame their government elites andinstitutions for failure to protect Britainfrom the potentially negative effects ofimmigration. To prove that this relation-ship exists, the BJPolS article analysed the2005 British Election Study (BES) andsupplemented this with an analysis ofthe 2001 British Election Study and thefirst round of the European Social Survey(ESS), conducted in 2002–3. The resultssupported the argument, with the panelcomponents of the two BES surveys andan instrumental variables analysis of theESS data used to show that the relation-ship is as predicted—that is, concernabout immigration causes distrust in pol-itics—and appears to be robust.

Some may question the generalisabili-ty of these findings, however, becausethe evidence used to support the argu-ment—that concern about immigrationis causing distrust in politics—is surveydata collected while the Labour partywas in power. The reason why this ispotentially problematical is that Labouris largely identified by voters as beingweaker on immigration issues than theConservative party. Thus, it is possible

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that the concern about immigration–political distrust linkage found in myprevious research is limited to Labourgovernments only, and so there are nobroader implications of concern aboutimmigration for the political system as awhole. Using the most recent round ofthe European Social Survey, conductedafter the 2010 British general electionwhich produced a defeat for the Labourparty, this paper investigates whetherthe association found in the previousresearch continues to hold for the mod-ern period of non-Labour rule. First,however, the paper outlines the reasonswhy some may be sceptical about thegeneralisability of my previous findings.

A time-bound analysis?Although it has often been argued thatthe major parties’ positions on immigra-tion have not been all that different inthe post-Second World War era,7 thepublic seems to perceive differencesbetween parties when it comes to immi-gration. This is likely to have begun inthe 1960s, with Conservative party candi-date Peter Griffiths’ unexpected defeat ofLabour candidate Gordon Walker in1964, using the widely touted slogan ‘Ifyou want a nigger for a neighbour, voteLabour’,8 and Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers ofBlood’ speech in 1968. The perceptionthat the Conservative party was tougheron immigration is likely to have contin-ued into the Thatcher years, with Thatch-er’s infamous ‘swamping’ statementabout immigration during the 1979 gen-eral election campaign.9 Election cam-paigns in the current century may havealso led British citizens to the conclusionthat the Conservatives were tougher onimmigration, as illustrated, for instance,by the 2005 Conservative party poster(under Michael Howard’s leadership)stating ‘It’s not racist to impose limits onimmigration’, with the foot of the posterposing the question: ‘Are you thinkingwhat we’re thinking?’.10 As noted by

Bale, Hampshire and Partos, in the lead-up to the 2010 general election, Toryparty leader David Cameron took a moresubtle approach, raising the issue ofimmigration in terms of pressure on ser-vices rather than as a cultural issue, andthen allowed other Conservatives to con-tinue raising the issue ‘while he stoodabove the fray’.11 Moreover, many of theCameron Conservatives turned immigra-tion into a valence issue; that is, accept-ing that Labour and the Tories wantedthe same thing—limits on numbers12—but portraying Labour as incompetent atmanaging the immigration and asylumsystems.

Thus, although the actual differencesbetween the two major parties on the issueof immigration may have been relativelysmall, the persistent raising of the issue byConservative ministers and MPs is likelyto affect how the public perceives thesetwo parties with regard to the issue ofimmigration. These differences are, in fact,reflected in modern-day survey research.As shown in Table 1, for instance, in thepast decade the Labour party has beenperceived as handling immigration or asy-lum issues badly by a clear majority ofBritish citizens, while only 22–31 per centhave thought that the Conservative partywould handle these issues badly. Table 2shows Ipsos MORI poll results for a sur-vey item asking which party has the bestpolicy on immigration and/or asylum.These results illustrate a persistent Con-servative lead in this area, with the leadgenerally in double digits except in Sep-tember 2004 and September 2007—although, as mentioned above, these dif-ferences appear to have a relatively lim-ited effect on vote choices and electionoutcomes. It is important to note that theIpsos MORI results also indicate that a sig-nificant portion of respondents eitherthink none of the three main parties hasthe best policy on immigration and asy-lum or ‘don’t know’ which has the bestpolicy. That is, there appears to be farmore ambiguity about the handling of this

I MM I G R A T I O N AN D P E R C E P T I O N S O F T H E P O L I T I C A L S Y S T E M I N B R I T A I N 91

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Table 1: Handling of immigration, British Election Study, 2005 and 2010 (percent-age saying fairly or very badly)

Labour Conservative

BES 2005Handle asylum seekers (pre-election) 74.5% 30.8%Handle asylum seekers (post-election) 68.7% 29.6%BES 2010Handle immigration (pre-election) 68.6% 25.0%Handle immigration (post-election) 68.6% 21.6%

Note that the 2001 BES only asked about the current government’s handling of asylum seekers, not how theConservatives would handle it and so we could not include the comparison for this survey here; the 2005 and2010 surveys are available from http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/BES 2005 question wording: How well do you think the present government has handled each of the followingissues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN Bq3: (How well do you think the present government has handled this issue:)The number of asylum-seekers coming to Britain (Please take your answers from this card). 1 Very well 2 Fairlywell 3 Neither well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly… How well do you think a Conservative governmentwould handle each of the following issues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN Bq4: (How well do you think a Conservativegovernment would handle this issue:) The number of asylum-seekers coming to Britain (Please take youranswers from this card). 1 Very well 2 Fairly well 3 Neither well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly.BES 2010 pre-election question wording: How well do you think the present government has handled each ofthe following issues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN PreQ4: How well do you think the present government has han-dled this issue: (Please take your answers from this card – CARD A) … Immigration… 1 Very well 2 Fairlywell 3 Neither well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly… How well do you think a Conservative govern-ment would handle each of the following issues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN PreQ5: How well do you think aConservative government would handle this issue: (Please take your answers from this card – CARD A) …Immigration… 1 Very well 2 Fairly well 3 Neither well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly.BES 2010 Post-election question wording: How well do you think the Labour government handled each of thefollowing issues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN PostQ3: (How well do you think the Labour government handledthis issue:) (Please take your answer from this card – CARD B). Immigration. 1 Very well 2 Fairly well 3 Nei-ther well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly… How well do you think a Conservative government wouldhandle each of the following issues? IF NOT FIRST ITEM IN PostQ4: (How well do you think a Conservativegovernment would handle this issue:) (Please take your answer from this card – CARD B). Immigration. 1Very well 2 Fairly well 3 Neither well nor badly 4 Fairly badly 5 Very badly.

Table 2: Party with best policies on immigration and asylum

Conservative % Labour % LiberalDemocrat %

None/Don’tknow %

LabourLead %

‘Immigration’25–26 October 1977 34 20 4 38 �1412–13 April 1978 51 22 3 19 �2914 August 1978 50 21 3 21 �29

‘Asylum’11–16 September 2003 26 14 8 49 �1210–14 September 2004 21 14 8 52 �77–11 April 2005 35 17 9 35 �18

‘Asylum and immigration’7–11 April 2005 36 18 10 33 �1831 August–6 September 2006 28 11 9 49 �1720–26 September 2007 21 17 7 50 �415–17 August 2008 35 14 10 34 �2125–27 September 2009 29 15 10 36 �1419–22 March 2010 28 17 9 35 �11

Available from Ipsos MORI at http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemID=19&view=wide. The survey item used here is: ‘I am going to read out a list of problems facingBritain today. I would like you to tell me whether you think the Conservative party, the Labour party or theLiberal Democrats has the best policies on each problem’. Base: c. 1,000 GB adults aged 18+.

92 L A U R E N M . MC L A R E N

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issue than is reported in the BES resultsabove, though generally the Ipsos MORIresults confirm that British citizens see theConservatives as the better party to han-dle the issue of immigration.

Also of importance here is that percep-tions of the political system may in part bemotivated by perceptions of the govern-ment of the day. For instance, ChrisAnderson and his colleagues have foundthat those who voted for the winningparty (or parties) in an election tend to bemore satisfied with the way in whichdemocracy is working.13 In addition,empirical research on political trust high-lights the difficulty of separating the dif-fuse from the specific components,particularly when it comes to elected insti-tutions and individuals. As noted byDalton, ‘public sentiments can blend intoadjacent orientations’, and the question ofwhether survey questions about politicaltrust measure ‘orientations towards theincumbents, or broader evaluations ofgeneral political elites and the govern-ment’14 has been particularly contro-versial. This implies that the strongassociation between high levels of concernabout immigration and distrust in thepolitical system noted in the BJPolS articlemay be a result of the perception that thegovernment of the day was mishandling immi-gration or asylum issues and not an indica-tor of weakening diffuse support for thepolitical system, as argued in that article.

Immigration concern and politicaldistrust in 2010–11During both the 2005 and the 2010 Brit-ish general election campaigns, the Con-servative party was extremely critical ofthe Labour party’s policy on immigra-tion and clearly used this issue to try towin the public’s support. One of themain slogans of the 2005 general electionwas discussed above. In the 2010 generalelection, the Conservative party pro-posed imposing a strict quota system tolimit immigration to the UK and shortly

after taking office, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition continued toemphasise the significant changes to thesystem that were forthcoming.15 Giventhese campaign and post-election prom-ises and the historical association of theConservative party with being ‘tough onimmigration’, as well as the above noteddifficulty in empirically separating spe-cific from diffuse support, it seems likelythat the association between concernabout immigration and political distrust,whereby concern about immigrationwould be related to higher distrust (asfound in the BJPolS article), may nolonger exist or could feasibly be reversedafter the 2010 general election. Withregard to the latter possibility, it couldbe the case that by 2010–11 those mostconcerned about immigration would bemost trusting, or least distrusting, ofpolitics precisely because the govern-ment would be seen as trying to tacklethe perceived problem of immigration.

Though some might question whethera change in the relationship could occurthis rapidly, the work by Anderson andcolleagues noted above would lead us toconclude that such a change is indeedpossible. Recall that these authors showthat ‘winners’ in general elections havemore positive perceptions of the politicalsystem. This would imply that attitudeslike trust in politics can change rapidlyin response to changes in government.Moreover, Pippa Norris’s recent workon perceptions of government and gov-ernment institutions clearly shows peaksand troughs in trust in governments andparliaments across a dozen or so democ-racies.16 That is, levels of trust certainlydo fluctuate. This implies that the rela-tionship between political trust andother variables may fluctuate as well.

To examine the possibility that the rela-tionship between concern about immigra-tion and political distrust has changed asa result of a change in government, thispaper uses the 2010–11 European SocialSurvey, the British fieldwork for which

IMM I G R A T I O N AN D P E R C E P T I O N S O F T H E P O L I T I C A L S Y S T E M I N B R I T A I N 93


was conducted between 31 August 2010and 28 February 2011—that is, after theMay 2010 general election which led to achange of government. For this analysis,the same survey items were used that areused in the BJPolS article to measurepolitical distrust (in the analysis of the2002–3 ESS in that article, that is): specifi-cally, indicators of distrust in an electedbody (parliament) and elected officials(politicians), and indicators of distrust inunelected institutions (the legal systemand the police). The indicators of concernabout immigration are also the same asthose used in the BJPolS article and arecombined into an index consisting of sur-vey items that ask about the economicand cultural impact of immigration onthe country, as well as the general impactof immigration on the country. The word-ing of all ESS survey items used here isprovided in the Appendix.

Table 3 shows the bivariate correla-tions between concern about immigra-tion and distrust of parliament, the legalsystem, the police, politicians and poli-tics generally (the latter is an index cre-ated from the previous four politicaldistrust indicators).17 These correlationsclearly indicate that by 2010–11, theassociation between concern aboutimmigration and political distrust is rela-tively strong, with higher levels of con-cern about immigration related to higherlevels of political distrust.

Table 4 investigates the effect of con-cern about immigration on distrust in

politics, with controls for variables iden-tified in previous research as potentiallyconfounding factors — social capital(interpersonal trust18 and how often therespondent meets with friends), unhap-piness, the ‘winner effect’, non-voting,perceptions of the economy, life satisfac-tion, income, education, age and gen-der.19 Even taking these controls intoaccount, concern about immigration con-tinues to have a statistically significanteffect on perceptions of the political sys-tem, and the strength of the relationshipis even larger than that noted in theBJPolS article. Thus, the impact of concernabout immigration under the Conserva-tive–Liberal Democrat coalition govern-ment persists, indicating that thefindings reported in previous researchmay indeed be generalisable nowadaysacross different governing parties. It isimportant to emphasise that this rela-tionship exists even when taking intoaccount levels of concern about theeconomy, one’s own personal financialsituation and perceptions of how gov-ernment is performing in the realms ofhealth care and education, as well asother factors like social capital, life satis-faction and unhappiness. That is, therelationship appears to be robust. Theconclusion discusses the implications ofthese findings.

ConclusionExisting academic research has high-lighted the potentially negative conse-quences of ethnic and cultural diversityfor citizens’ willingness to trust andcooperate with one another20 and thepotentially negative effect of ethnic andcultural divisions on welfare provision,as citizens come to perceive the recipi-ents of public funding as vastly differentfrom themselves.21 The author’s ownresearch points to the conclusion thatconcerns about cultural diversity mayalso have negative consequences fordemocratic political systems, because

Table 3: Bivariate correlations (Pear-son’s r), Concern about immigrationand distrust politics (European SocialSurvey 2010–11)

Distrust parliament 0.36Distrust legal system 0.34Distrust police 0.27Distrust politicians 0.34Distrust politics 0.40

N = 1925; p � 0.001 for all correlations

94 LA U R E N M . MC L A R E N


Tab

le4:

Con

cern

abou

tim

migration

,political

distrust

anddissatisfaction

withdem

ocracy,E

SS2010–1

1

Distrus

tpa

rliamen

tDistrus

tlega

lsys-

tem

Distrus

tpo

lice

Distrus

tpo

liticians

Distrus

tpo

litics

BSE

pB

SEp

BSE

pB

SEp

BSE

p

(Con

stan

t)2.35

0.38

0.00

01.04

0.38

0.00

50.72

0.39

0.06

43.29

0.35

0.00

01.85

0.28

0.00

0Con

cern

abou

tim

migratio

n0.21

0.02

0.00

00.18

0.02

0.00

00.14

0.02

0.00

00.18

0.02

0.00

00.18

0.02

0.00

0Unh

appy

0.00

0.04

0.94

10.02

0.04

0.57

40.06

0.04

0.10

4�0

.04

0.03

0.24

60.01

0.03

0.71

5Dissatis

fied

with

life

0.01

0.03

0.72

70.07

0.03

0.05

40.00

0.04

0.88

80.00

0.03

0.87

50.02

0.03

0.38

9Rarelymeetwith

friend

s0.02

0.03

0.54

0�0

.08

0.03

0.01

2�0

.09

0.03

0.00

3�0

.01

0.03

0.63

9�0

.04

0.02

0.07

2Distrus

tothe

rpe

ople

0.20

0.03

0.00

00.24

0.03

0.00

00.19

0.03

0.00

00.17

0.03

0.00

00.20

0.02

0.00

0Dissatis

fied

with

coun

tryecon

omy

0.32

0.03

0.00

00.19

0.03

0.00

00.13

0.03

0.00

00.33

0.02

0.00

00.24

0.02

0.00

0Difficu

ltto

liveon

presen

tincome

0.02

0.06

0.76

1�0

.04

0.06

0.54

20.04

0.07

0.52

50.04

0.06

0.49

80.02

0.05

0.74

1Dissatis

fied

with

health

services

0.04

0.03

0.15

80.11

0.03

0.00

00.13

0.03

0.00

00.07

0.02

0.00

30.09

0.02

0.00

0Dissatis

fied

with

educ

ation

0.12

0.03

0.00

00.18

0.03

0.00

00.20

0.03

0.00

00.14

0.02

0.00

00.16

0.02

0.00

0W

inne

rin

gene

ralelectio

n�0

.34

0.11

0.00

2�0

.22

0.11

0.05

10.11

0.12

0.33

1�0

.28

0.10

0.00

7�0

.18

0.08

0.02

9Did

notvo

tein

gene

ralelectio

n0.26

0.13

0.04

00.32

0.13

0.01

00.30

0.13

0.02

20.14

0.12

0.23

60.25

0.09

0.00

7Left–righ

tself-placem

ent

�0.12

0.03

0.00

0�0

.03

0.03

0.33

3�0

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0.03

0.00

2�0

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0.03

0.00

0�0

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0.02

0.00

0Hou

seho

ldincome

�0.07

0.02

0.00

0�0

.06

0.02

0.00

1�0

.04

0.02

0.03

9�0

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0.02

0.02

0�0

.05

0.01

0.00

0Age

0.00

0.00

0.37

00.00

0.00

0.12

30.00

0.00

0.25

0�0

.01

0.00

0.00

60.00

0.00

0.03

8Educ

ation

�0.01

0.00

0.01

60.00

0.00

0.42

20.01

0.01

0.28

3�0

.01

0.00

0.02

8�0

.01

0.00

0.16

5Fe

male

0.01

0.09

0.90

40.08

0.09

0.38

1�0

.35

0.10

0.00

0�0

.15

0.09

0.08

4�0

.10

0.07

0.13

9W

ales

0.06

0.20

0.76

3�0

.04

0.20

0.84

40.21

0.20

0.30

20.06

0.18

0.75

80.07

0.15

0.62

5Scotland

0.18

0.15

0.21

7�0

.23

0.15

0.13

00.09

0.15

0.56

0�0

.02

0.14

0.89

50.01

0.11

0.94

5N.Ireland

�0.13

0.28

0.65

3�0

.21

0.28

0.44

10.38

0.29

0.18

7�0

.43

0.26

0.09

6� 0

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0.21

0.63

8Adjusted

RSq

uare

0.32

0.30

0.22

0.32

0.41

SEE

1.97

1.96

2.04

1.83

1.47

N=19

14;c

oefficien

tsareba

sedon

amultiv

ariate

OLSregression

analysis.



such concerns are weakening the senseof connection between citizens and theinstitutions and elites that govern them.Such a conclusion is particularly worry-ing given that most democracies havebecome culturally diverse, especiallyafter the influx of immigrants in thepost-Second World War period. If thisassociation was limited to certain politi-cal parties or certain governments, thefindings would be far less troubling, asthey would indicate that concern aboutimmigration really only affects specificsupport for governments of the dayrather than more deep-seated diffuse orgeneral system support.

The findings here, however, point to apotentially persistent, strong relationshipbetween concern about immigration anddistrust in politics in Britain. These find-ings confirm that the perceived harm tonational community being done bylarge-scale immigration to Britain haspotentially serious consequences for atti-tudes toward the political system as awhole, including all government institu-tions and elites of all political leanings.Thus, despite the British public’s associa-tion of the Conservative party withtoughness on immigration, the findingsreported here indicate that in modern-day Britain, the public may be equallysceptical about all parties’ ability to con-trol immigration.

Of course, the survey used here cameat a fairly early stage of the Conserva-tive–Liberal Democrat coalition govern-ment, and so it will be important tocontinue to monitor this relationship asrelevant survey data become available.At present, though, based on the 2010–11 survey used here, it appears that theconnection between concern about immi-gration and political distrust is strongand robust. Why might this be the case?

While the Conservative party has con-sistently been seen as the best party tohandle immigration and asylum issuescompared with the other main parties,the Ipsos MORI data discussed above

point to the conclusion that for the pastdecade or so, a larger group of surveyrespondents have actually come to thinkeither that none of the three main partiesare best on immigration, or that they areunsure as to which is better. That is,while those who do think one of theseparties is better on immigration tend tosay it is the Conservatives who arestronger, there are often many moreBritish citizens who are not clear aboutwhich party is stronger. This, in turn,perhaps reflects a high level of scepti-cism on the part of the British publicabout the ability of the political systemas a whole to have much impact onimmigration policy, particularly sincethe passing of the Human Rights Act in1998—which had significant repercus-sions for control of immigration and asy-lum policy—and more recently the largeinflux of EU immigrants who were notsubject to UK immigration controls (bythe government’s own choice).

The prospect of reduced levels ofpolitical trust as a result of concernsabout the impact of immigration onBritish culture and society has poten-tially serious consequences for gover-nance. Academic research indicates, forinstance, that individuals are more will-ing to try to cheat the system (not paytaxes and not pay for public transporta-tion) and are more willing to break thelaw when their perceptions of the politi-cal system are negative.22 As notedabove, some research indicates that peo-ple are also less willing to support statepolicies involving redistribution of statefunds when they perceive cultural differ-ences between themselves and thosewho access these funds. In short, thepossibility of reduced levels of politicaltrust resulting from concerns aboutimmigration presents the prospect of aweakened political system. The findingshere point to the conclusion that this isnow a potentially persistent phenome-non which all political parties in Britainmust in some way address.



Appendix: Measurement ofvariables in the analysis

Political distrust‘Using this card, please tell me on ascore of 0–10 how much you personallytrust each of the institutions I read out.0 means you do not trust an institutionat all, and 10 means you have completetrust….…[country]’s parliament?… thelegal system?… the police?… politi-cians?’.

Because the argument presented inthe BJPolS article is that high levels ofconcern with immigration are associatedwith distrust in the political system, thecoding of each of the above items wasreversed such that high values representhigh levels of distrust, as in the previousresearch. The items were also combinedinto a single index of political distrust(principal components analysis indicatesthat the items load onto a single factor),though note that the tables also reportthe results for each indicator of politicaldistrust.

Concern about immigrationThis variable is an index consisting ofthree indicators. The items begin: ‘Nowsome questions about people from othercountries coming to live in [country]’,and the three items used are:

‘Would you say it is generally bad orgood for [country]’s economy that peo-ple come to live here from other coun-tries? Please use this card’ (0 = Bad forthe economy; 10 = good for the econ-omy).

‘And, using this card, would you saythat [country]’s cultural life is generallyundermined or enriched by people com-ing to live here from other countries?’(0 = cultural life undermined; 10 = cul-tural life enriched).

‘Is [country] made a worse or a betterplace to live by people coming to live

here from other countries? Please usethis card’ (0 = worse place to live;10 = better place to live).

Again, because the argument pre-sented in the BJPolS article is that highlevels of concern with immigration areassociated with distrust in the politicalsystem, the coding of each of the aboveitems was reversed such that high val-ues represent more concern about immi-gration; the items form a single factor ina principal components analysis and sohave been combined into a single index,which is the average response to allthree items.

Unhappiness‘Taking all things together, how happywould you say you are? Please usethis card’ (0 = Extremely unhappy; 10 =Extremely happy). The coding wasreversed such that the high value repre-sents extreme unhappiness.

Dissatisfied with life as a whole‘All things considered, how satisfied areyou with your life as a whole nowa-days? Please answer using this card,where 0 means extremely dissatisfiedand 10 means extremely satisfied’. Thecoding was reversed such that the highvalue represents dissatisfaction.

Social capitalTwo indicators of social capital havebeen used here: frequency of meetingwith friends and social trust.

Meeting with friends: ‘Using this card,how often do you meet socially withfriends, relatives or work colleagues?Never, Less than once a month, Once amonth, Several times a month, Once aweek, Several times a week, Every day’.The range of this item is 1–7, and thecoding was reversed such that high val-ues represent a lack of social capital(that is, rarely meeting with friends).



Distrust other people: Three items werecombined to create this variable. Theseitems are: ‘Using this card, generallyspeaking, would you say that most peo-ple can be trusted, or that you can’t betoo careful in dealing with people?Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10,where 0 means you can’t be too carefuland 10 means that most people can betrusted’.

‘Using this card, do you think thatmost people would try to take advan-tage of you if they got the chance, orwould they try to be fair?’ (0 = Mostpeople would try to take advantage;10 = Most people would try to befair).

‘Would you say that most of the timepeople try to be helpful or that they aremostly looking out for themselves?’Please use this card’ (0=People mostlylook out for themselves; 10=Peoplemostly try to be helpful).

The coding of each of these wasreversed such that high values representhigh levels of distrust. These items loadonto a single factor in a principal com-ponents analysis and thus have beencombined into a single index, which isthe mean score for each respondentacross the three items.

Dissatisfied with present state ofeconomy in country‘On the whole how satisfied are youwith the present state of the economyin [country]? Still use this card’ (0 =Extremely dissatisfied; 10 = Extremelysatisfied). The coding of each of these wasreversed such that high values representextreme dissatisfaction.

Difficult to live on present income‘Which of the descriptions on this cardcomes closest to how you feel aboutyour household’s income nowadays?Living comfortably on present income;

Coping on present income; Finding itdifficult on present income; Finding itvery difficult on present income’. Therange of this variable is 1–4.

Dissatisfied with the state ofhealth services nowadays‘Still using this card, please say whatyou think overall about the state of healthservices in [country] nowadays?’ (0 =Extremely bad; 10 = Extremely good). Thecoding of each of these was reversedsuch that high values represent extremedissatisfaction with the state of healthservices.

Dissatisfied with the state ofeducation nowadays‘Now, using this card, please say whatyou think overall about the state of edu-cation in [country] nowadays?’ (0 =Extremely bad; 10 = Extremely good).The coding of each of these wasreversed such that high values representextreme dissatisfaction with the state ofeducation.

Winner effectA dummy variable was created for thosewho reported having voted for the Con-servative or Liberal Democrat parties inthe last general election.

Non-votingAnother dummy variable was created torepresent those who did not vote in thelast general election.

Additional controlsThe analysis also controls for left–rightself-placement, reported income, age,education (measured by the age atwhich the respondent finished studying,or current age if the respondent is still

98 L A U R E N M . MC L A R E N


studying) and gender. Dummy variablesfor Wales, Scotland and Northern Ire-land were also included in the analysis.

Notes1 David Butler and Donald Stokes, PoliticalChange in Britain: Forces Shaping ElectoralChoice, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 303.

2 See the report on the most recent British SocialAttitudes survey at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19621020

3 It is possible to get a rough idea about mediainterest in the topic of immigration by usingGoogle Trends: http://www.google.co.uk/trends/

4 Recent Ipsos MORI poll results (poll conducted31 August–17 September 2012) are availableat http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpubli-cations/researcharchive/3050/Ipsos-MORI-September-2012-Issues-Index.aspx; for earlierperiods see the Issues Index: 1997–2011, TheMost Important Issues Facing Britain Today athttp://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublica-tions/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemID=56&view=wide and Issues Index: 2012 onwards,The Most Important Issues Facing BritainToday at http://www.ipsos-mori.com/re-searchpublications/researcharchive/2905/Issues-Index-2012-onwards.aspx?view=wide

5 J. Green and S. B. Hobolt, ‘Owning the IssueAgenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices inBritish Elections’, Electoral Studies, vol. 27, no.3, 2008, pp. 460–76; S. Carey and A. Geddes,‘Less Is More: Immigration and European Inte-gration at the 2010 General Election’, Parlia-mentary Affairs, vol. 63, no. 4, 2010, pp. 849–65.

6 L. M. McLaren, ‘Immigration and Trust in Poli-tics in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science,vol. 42, no. 1, 2012, pp. 163–85.

7 J. Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immi-gration and the Politics of Demographic Gover-nance in Postwar Britain, Houndsmills, Hants.,Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; R. Hansen, Citizen-ship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: TheInstitutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000; C. Jop-pke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The Uni-ted States, Germany and Great Britain, Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1999; K. Paul, White-washing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Post-war Era, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press,1997.

8 It is not clear whether this was Griffiths’ ownslogan or a slogan written on posters by sup-porters, but it is thought that the slogan helpedhim to win a relatively safe Labour seat; see

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/apr/27/race.world2

9 During campaigning for the 1979 election,Thatcher stated: ‘The moment a minoritythreatens to become a big one, peopleget frightened. The British character has doneso much for democracy, for law, that if there isany fear that it might be swamped, peopleare going to react and be rather hostile to thosecoming in’. ‘Britain: Facing a MultiracialFuture’, Time, 27 August 1979, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,920566-3,00.html

10 On the 2005 election, see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-elec-tion-poster-sparks-complaints-of-racism-from-students-and-teachers-6153026.html. Note thatwork by Paul Whiteley and colleagues inthe 1990s indicated that 91 per cent of themembers of the Conservative party believedimmigration controls should be tightened,compared to 70 per cent of Labour party mem-bers (P. Whiteley, P. Seyd and J. J. Richardson,True Blues: The Politics of Conservative PartyMembership, Oxford, Oxford University Press,1994).

11 T. Bale, J. Hampshire and R. Partos, ‘HavingOne’s Cake and Eating It Too: Cameron’s Con-servatives and Immigration’, The Political Quar-terly, Vol. 82, No. 3, 2011, p. 403.

12 By the 2010 election, Labour had introduced apoints-based system and ministers had for sev-eral years engaged in ‘tough talk’ on immigra-tion (e.g. David Blunkett, Phil Woolas, LiamByrne, Frank Field, Margaret Hodge, JohnDenham, Jon Cruddas and Anne Cryer,amongst others); see Bale, Hampshire and Par-tos, ‘Having One’s Cake and Eating It Too’,pp. 398–406.

13 C. J. Anderson and A. J. LoTempio, ‘Winning,Losing and Political Trust in America’, BritishJournal of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 2, 2002,pp. 335–51; C. J. Anderson and Y. V. Tverdo-va, ‘Winners, Losers, and Attitudes AboutGovernment in Contemporary Democracies’,International Political Science Review, vol. 22, no.4, 2001, pp. 321–38.

14 R. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, DemocraticChoices: The Erosion of Political Support inAdvanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford,Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 23.

15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-1178397316 P. Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens

Revisited, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2011.

17 It must be noted that there is a great deal ofacademic debate about the meaning of trustand how to measure it (see McLaren, ‘Immi-gration and Trust in Politics in Britain’ for a



brief overview of this literature; see also theessays in Trust and Governance, ed. MargaretLevi and Valerie Braithwaite, New York, Rus-sell Sage Foundation, 1998; also J. Fisher, J.van Heerde, and A. Tucker, ‘Does One TrustJudgement Fit All? Linking Theory and Empi-rics’, British Journal of Politics and InternationalRelations, vol. 12, no. 2, 2010, pp. 161–88; M.Hooghe, ‘Why There is Basically Only OneForm of Political Trust’, British Journal of Poli-tics and International Relations, vol. 13, no. 2,2011, pp. 269–75; J. Fisher, J. van Heerde andA. Tucker, ‘Why Both Theory and EmpiricsSuggest There is More than One Form ofTrust: A Response to Hooghe’, British Journal ofPolitics and International Relations, vol. 13, no. 2,2011, pp. 276–81; B. Denters, O. Gabriel, andM. Torcal, ‘Norms of Good Citizenship’, in,Citizenship and Involvement in Europe: A Com-parative Analysis, ed. J. W. van Deth, J. Ramo ́nMontero and A. Westholm, London, Routl-edge, 2007, pp. 88–108). As the current paperis intended to extend existing analyses into thecurrent era, we have not reviewed this debatehere. However, we generally contend that theindicators of political trust used here and inMcLaren’s ‘Immigration and Trust in Politicsin Britain’ are useful indicators of individuals’general perceptions of the political system.

18 The extensive debate about the meaning oftrust noted in footnote 17 also applies to inter-personal trust.

19 H. D. Clarke, N. Dutt and A. Kornberg, ‘ThePolitical Economy of Attitudes towards Polityand Society in Western European Democra-cies’, Journal of Politics, vol. 55, no. 4, 1993, pp.998–1021; A. Miller and O. Listhaug, ‘PoliticalPerformance and Institutional Trust’, in CriticalCitizens: Global Support for Democratic Gover-nance, ed. P. Norris, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1999, pp. 204–16; K. Newton, ‘PoliticalSupport: Social Capital, Civil Society and Polit-ical and Economic Performance’, Political Stud-ies, vol. 54, no. 4, 2006, pp. 846–64; J. Brehmand W. Rahn, ‘Individual-Level Evidence forthe Causes and Consequences of Social Capi-tal’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41,no. 3, 1997, pp. 999–1023; S. Zmerli and K.Newton, ‘Social Trust and Attitudes TowardDemocracy’, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 72,no. 4, 2008, pp. 706–24; C. J. Anderson and C.A. Guillory, ‘Political Institutions and Satisfac-tion with Democracy: A Cross-National Analy-sis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems’,

American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1,1997, pp. 66–81.

20 C. J. Anderson and A. Paskeviciute, ‘How Eth-nic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence theProspects for Civil Society: A ComparativeStudy of Citizenship Behavior’, Journal of Poli-tics, vol. 68, no. 4, 2006, pp. 783–802; A. F. Ale-sina and E. La Ferrara, ‘Participation inHeterogeneous Communities’, Quarterly Journalof Economics, vol. 115, no. 3, 2000, pp. 847–904;D. L. Costa and M. E. Kahn, ‘Civic Engage-ment in Heterogeneous Communities’, Perspec-tives on Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2003, pp. 103–12;D. Stolle, S. Soroka and R. Johnston, ‘WhenDoes Diversity Erode Trust? NeighborhoodDiversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediat-ing Effect of Social Interactions’, Political Stud-ies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2008, pp. 57–75; but see N.Letki, ‘Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion?Social Capital and Race in British Neighbour-hoods’, Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2008, pp.99–126; M. Hooghe, T. Reeskens, D. Stolle andA. Trappers, ‘Ethnic Diversity and GeneralizedTrust: A Cross-National Multilevel Study’,Comparative Political Studies, vol. 42, no. 2,2009, pp. 198–223; P. Sturgis, I. Brunton-Smith,S. Read and N. Allum, ‘Does Ethnic DiversityErode Trust? Putnam’s ‘Hunkering-Down’Thesis Reconsidered’, British Journal of PoliticalScience, vol. 41, no. 1, 2010, pp. 57–82.

21 M. Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race,Media, and the Politics of Anti-Poverty Policy,Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999; J.Habyarimana, M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner,and J. M. Weinstein, ‘Why Does Ethnic Diver-sity Undermine Public Goods Provision?’,American Political Science Review, vol. 101, no.4, 2007, pp. 709–25.

22 J. T. Scholz and M. Lubell, ‘Trust and Taxpay-ing: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collec-tive Action’, American Journal of PoliticalScience, vol. 42, no. 2, 1998, 398–417; S. Marienand M. Hooghe, ‘Does Political Trust Matter?An Empirical Investigation into the RelationBetween Political Trust and Support for LawCompliance’, European Journal of PoliticalResearch, vol. 50, no. 2, 2011, 267–91; N. Letki,‘Investigating the Roots of Civic Morality: Trust,Social Capital, and Institutional Performance’,Political Behavior, vol. 28, no. 4, 2006, 305–25; S.Birch and N. Allen, ‘There Will Be Burning andA-Looting Tonight’: The Social and PoliticalCorrelates of Law-breaking’, The Political Quar-terly, vol. 83, no. 1, 2012, pp. 33–43.



Immigration and Perceptions of the Political System in Britain

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