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Immediate Audience Responses to Rhetorical Strategies in Televised Debates 3rd European Communica=on Conference
Arne Spieker & Marko Bachl Universität Hohenheim
Hamburg, October 13th, 2010
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Research Interest
„TV-‐Duell“ -‐ most watched poli7cal TV program in the 2009 elec7on campaign1
What effects do different rhetorical strategies have on audience percep7ons?
1 Zubayr, Geese & Gerhard, 2009, S. 643
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Theore=cal Framework
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What are Rhetorical Strategies?2
Acclaims: Highligh=ng own achievements or plans
ADacks: Cri=cizing opponent for failures or plans
Defenses: Reac=ons to previous aXacks (e.g. jus=fying)
2 Benoit, 2007; Martel, 1983
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Theore=cal Framework
Evalua7on of statements
Rhetoric Strategies
congruent: + incongruent : –
all: –
Pre-‐debate aPtudes • Party iden=fica=on • Candidate ra=ng
Acclaims
congruent: + + incongruent: – –
H2: Polarizing effect of aDacks H2a: Posi7ve polariza7on H2b: Nega7ve polariza7on
H3: Nega7ve effect of defenses
ADacks
Defenses H1: Effects of pre-‐debate aPtudes H1a: Posi7ve effect of congruent aPtudes
towards speaking candidate H1b: Nega7ve effect of incongruent aPtudes
towards speaking candidate
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Research Design
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Research design
Live-‐debate watching
Data matching
Real-‐Time Response Survey Content analysis
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Results
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Which strategies did the candidates use?
§ Tradi=onal incumbent-‐challenger-‐paXern: More aXacks by Steinmeier § Acclaims: predominant rhetorical strategy à Acclaims as benchmark
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10 14
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18 16
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Acclaim AXack Defense
Merkel (n = 73)
Steinmeier (n = 76)
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Statements by Steinmeier: Mean RTR Score
Fixed Components Intercept 4,33 (0,05)*** Strategy: Attacks 0,10 (0,03)*** Strategy: Defense –0,18 (0,02)*** Party Identification: CDU –0,03 (0,02) Party Identification: SPD 0,04 (0,03)+ Party Identification: FDP –0,05 (0,03) Party Identification: B90/Die Grünen Party Identification: Die Linke –0,02 (0,02) Candidate Rating: Merkel –0,02 (0,01) Candidate Rating: Steinmeier 0,06 (0,01)*** Attacks X Party Identification: CDU –0,04 (0,01)*** Attacks X Party Identification: FDP –0,05 (0,02)** Attacks X Party Identification: Die Linke 0,03 (0,01)* Attacks X Candidate Rating: Merkel –0,02 (0,01)* Variance of Random Components Intercept (Participant) 0,12 (0,01)*** Residual 0,63 (0,01)***
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Summary of Results
Hypotheses Merkel Steinmeier
H1a: Posi=ve effects of congruent aftudes towards speaking candidate
PI CDU CR Merkel
PI SPD CR Steinmeier
H1b: Nega=ve effects of incongruent aftudes towards speaking candidate CR Steinmeier Not supported
H2a: Posi=ve polariza=on of aXacks Not supported PI SPD, PI Greens, No PI PI Linke
H2b: Nega=ve polariza=on of aXacks Not supported PI CDU, PI FDP CR Merkel
H3: Nega=ve effect of defenses Supported Supported
§ Steinmeier: PaXern of results in line with theore=cal predic=ons
§ Merkel: Some results in line with theore=cal predic=ons, no effects of aXacks
§ Overall: Quite small effect sizes of rhetoric strategies
à Do rhetorical strategies significantly influence immediate audience responses?
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Discussion: Do Rhetoric Strategies MaXer?
§ Poli7cal culture in Germany: AXacks less aggressive and less common
§ 2009 elec7on race: Grand Coali=on of CDU/CSU and SPD à LiXle suspenseful TV debate within the sifng government
§ With a more suspenseful s7mulus, we can expect our findings to be supported in a clearer manner
à Of course subject to further empirical inves7ga7ons
+ =
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Arne Spieker & Marko Bachl U of Hohenheim spieker@uni-‐hohenheim.de marko.bachl@uni-‐hohenheim.de
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