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2   1 EFFECTS IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS 

not jokes were funny), and were asked to evaluate their

performance on these tasks relative to the rest of the

group, enabling a direct comparison of their actual and

perceived performance.[8]

Results were divided into four groups depending on actual

performance and it was found that all four groups eval-uated their performance as above average, meaning that

the lowest-scoring group (the bottom 25%) showed a very

large illusory superiority bias. The researchers attributed

this to the fact that the individuals who were worst at per-

forming the tasks were also worst at recognizing skill in

those tasks. This was supported by the fact that, given

training, the worst subjects improved their estimate of

their rank as well as getting better at the tasks.[8]

The paper, titled “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How

Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence

Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” won a 2000 Ig No-

bel Prize.

[9]

In 2003 Dunning and Joyce Ehrlinger, also of   Cornell

University, published a study that detailed a shift in peo-

ple’s views of themselves influenced by external cues.

Participants in the study (Cornell University  undergrad-

uates) were given tests of their knowledge of geography,

some intended to positively affect their self-views, some

intended to affect them negatively. They were then asked

to rate their performance, and those given the positive

tests reported significantly better performance than those

given the negative.[10]

Daniel Ames and Lara Kammrath extended this work

to sensitivity to others, and the subjects’ perception ofhow sensitive they were.[11] Work by Burson Larrick and

Joshua Klayman has suggested that the effect is not so

obvious and may be due to noise and bias levels.[12]

Dunning, Kruger, and coauthors’ latest paper on this sub-

ject comes to qualitatively similar conclusions after mak-

ing some attempt to test alternative explanations.[13]

1.1.4 Academic ability and job performance

In a survey of faculty at the University of Nebraska, 68%

rated themselves in the top 25% for teaching ability.[14]

In a similar survey, 87% of  MBA  students at Stanford

University rated their academic performance as above the

median.[15]

Findings of illusory superiority in research have also ex-

plained phenomena such as the large amount of stock

market trading (as each trader thinks they are the best,

and most likely to succeed),[16] and the number of law-

suits that go to trial (because, due to illusory superiority,many lawyers have an inflated belief that they will win a

case).[17]

1.2 Self, friends and peers

One of the first studies that found the effect of illusory

superiority was carried out in 1976 by the College Board

in the USA.[18] A survey was attached to the SAT exams

(taken by approximately one million students per year),

asking the students to rate themselves relative to the me-dian of the sample (rather than the average peer) on a

number of vague positive characteristics. In ratings of

leadership ability, 70% of the students put themselves

above the median. In ability to get on well with others,

85% put themselves above the median, and 25% rated

themselves in the top 1%.

More recent research[19] has found illusory superiority in

a social context, with participants comparing themselves

to friends and other peers on positive characteristics (such

as punctuality and sensitivity) and negative characteristics

(such as naivety or inconsistency). This study found that

participants rated themselves more favorably than theirfriends, but rated their friends more favorably than other

peers. These findings were, however, affected by several

moderating factors.

Research by Perloff and Fetzer,[20] Brown,[21] and Tajfel

and Turner[22] also found similar effects of participants

rating friends higher than other peers. Tajfel and Turner

attributed this to an “ingroup bias” and suggested that this

was motivated by the individual’s desire for a “positive

social identity”.

1.2.1 Popularity

In Zuckerman and Jost’s study, participants were given

detailed questionnaires about their friendships and asked

to assess their own popularity. By using social network

analysis, they were able to show that the participants gen-

erally had exaggerated perceptions of their own popular-

ity, particularly in comparison to their own friends.[23]

1.2.2 Relationship happiness

Researchers have also found the effects of illusory supe-

riority in studies into relationship satisfaction. For exam-

ple, one study found that participants perceived their own

relationships as better than others’ relationships on aver-

age, but thought that the majority of people were happy

with their relationships. Also, this study found evidence

that the higher the participants rated their own relation-

ship happiness, the more superior they believed their re-

lationship was. The illusory superiority exhibited by the

participants in this study also served to increase their own

relationship satisfaction, as it was found that – in men es-

pecially – satisfaction was particularly related to the per-

ception that one’s own relationship was superior as well

as to the assumption that few others were unhappy withtheir relationship, whereas women’s satisfaction was par-

ticularly related to the assumption that most others were

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3

happy with their relationship.[24] One study found that

participants became defensive when their spouse/partner

were perceived by others to be more successful in any as-

pect of their life, and had the tendency to exaggerate their

success and understate their spouse/partner’s success.

1.3 Health

Illusory superiority effects have been found in a   self-

report study   of   health   behaviors (Hoorens & Harris,

1998). The study involved asking participants to esti-

mate how often they, and their peers, carried out healthy

and unhealthy behaviors. Participants reported that they

carried out healthy behaviors more often than the aver-

age peer, and unhealthy behaviors less often, as would be

expected given the effect of illusory superiority. These

findings were for both past self-report of behaviors and

expected future behaviors.[25]

1.4 Driving ability

Svenson (1981) surveyed 161 students in Sweden and the

United States, asking them to compare their driving safety

and skill to the other people in the experiment. For driv-

ing skill, 93% of the US sample and 69% of the Swedish

sample put themselves in the top 50% (above the me-

dian). For safety, 88% of the US group and 77% of the

Swedish sample put themselves in the top 50%.[26]

McCormick, Walkey and Green (1986) found similar re-sults in their study, asking 178 participants to evaluate

their position on eight different dimensions relating to

driving skill (examples include the “dangerous-safe” di-

mension and the “considerate-inconsiderate” dimension).

Only a small minority rated themselves as below aver-

age (the midpoint of the dimension scale) at any point,

and when all eight dimensions were considered together

it was found that almost 80% of participants had evalu-

ated themselves as being above the average driver.[27]

A survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates

showed that 36% of drivers believe they are an above av-

erage driver while using a phone for things like textingor email compared to other drivers who are using their

phones for things like texting or email, while 44% con-

sidered themselves average, and 18% below average.[28]

1.5 Immunity to bias

Main article: Bias blind spot

Subjects describe themselves in positive terms compared

to other people, and this includes describing themselves

as less susceptible to bias than other people. This effectis called the bias blind spot  and has been demonstrated

independently.

2 Cultural differences

A vast majority of the literature on illusory superior-

ity originates from studies on participants in the United

States. However, research that only investigates the ef-

fects in one specific population is severely limited as this

may not be a true representation of human psychology as

a whole. As a result, more recent research has focused

on investigating quantities and qualities of self-esteem

around the globe. The findings of such studies suggest

that illusory superiority varies between cultures.[29]

3 Self-esteem

Main article:  Self-esteem

While a great deal of evidence suggests that we com-pare ourselves favorably to others on a wide variety of

traits, the links to self-esteem are uncertain. The theory

that those with high self-esteem maintain this high level

by rating themselves over and above others does carry

some evidence behind it; it has been reported that non-

depressed subjects rate their control over positive out-

comes higher than that of a peer; despite an identical level

in performance between the two individuals.[30]

Furthermore, it has been found that non-depressed stu-

dents will also actively rate peers below themselves, as

opposed to rating themselves higher; students were able

to recalla great deal more negative personality traits aboutothers than about themselves.[31]

It should be noted though, that in these studies there was

no distinction made between people with legitimate and

illegitimate high self-esteem, as other studies have found

that absence of  positive illusions may coexist with high

self-esteem[32] and that self-determined individuals with

personality oriented towards growth and learning are less

prone to these illusions.[33] Thus it may be likely that

while illusory superiority is associated with illegitimate

high self-esteem, people with legitimate high self-esteem

don't exhibit it.

4 Relation to mental health

Main article: Depressive realism

Psychology has traditionally assumed that generally ac-

curate self-perceptions are essential to good   mental

health.[3] This was challenged by a 1988 paper by Taylor

and Brown, who argued that mentally healthy individuals

typically manifest three cognitive illusions, namely illu-

sory superiority, illusion of control and optimism bias.[3]

This idea rapidly became very influential, with some au-

thorities concluding that it would be therapeutic to de-

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4   6 EXPLANATIONS 

liberately induce these biases.[34] Since then, further re-

search has both undermined that conclusion and offered

new evidence associating illusory superiority with nega-

tive effects on the individual.[3]

One line of argument was that in the Taylor and Brown

paper, the classification of people as mentally healthyor unhealthy was based on self-reports rather than ob-

jective criteria.[34] Hence it was not surprising that peo-

ple prone to   self-enhancement   would exaggerate how

well-adjusted they are. One study claimed that “men-

tally normal” groups were contaminated by defensive de-

niers  who are the most subject to positive illusions.[34]

A longitudinal study found that self-enhancement biases

were associated with poor   social skills  and psycholog-

ical maladjustment.[3] In a separate experiment where

videotaped conversations between men and women were

rated by independent observers, self-enhancing individ-

uals were more likely to show socially problematic be-

haviors such as hostility or irritability.[3] A 2007 studyfound that self-enhancement biases were associated with

psychological benefits (such as subjective well-being) but

also inter- and intra-personal costs (such as anti-social

behavior).[35]

5 Neuroimaging

The degree to which people view themselves as more de-

sirable than the average person links to reduced activation

in their orbitofrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulatecortex. This is suggested to link to the role of these areas

in processing “cognitive control”.[36]

6 Explanations

6.1 Noisy mental information processing

A recent Psychological Bulletin suggests that illusory su-

periority (as well as other biases) can be explained by a

simple  information-theoretic generative mechanism that

assumes a noisy conversion of objective evidence (ob-

servation) into subjective estimates (judgment).[37] The

study suggests that the underlying cognitive mechanism is

essentially similar to the noisy mixing of memories that

can cause the conservatism bias or overconfidence: after

our own performance, we readjust our estimates of our

own performance more than we readjust our estimates of

others’ performances. This implies that our estimates of

the scores of others are even more conservative (more in-

fluenced by the previous expectation) than our estimates

of our own performance (more influenced by the new ev-

idence received after giving the test). The difference in

the conservative bias of both estimates (conservative es-timate of our own performance, and even more conser-

vative estimate of the performance of others) is enough

to create illusory superiority. Since mental noise is a suf-

ficient explanation that is much simpler and straightfor-

ward than any other explanation involving heuristics, be-

havior, or social interaction,[18] Occam’s razor would ar-

gue in its favor as the underlying generative mechanism

(it is the hypothesis which makes the fewest assumptions).

6.2 Selective recruitment

This is the idea that, when making a comparison with a

peer, an individual will select their own strengths and the

other’s weaknesses in order that they appear better on the

whole. This theory was first tested by Weinstein (1980);

however, this was in an experiment relating to optimistic

bias, rather than the better-than-average effect. The study

involved participants rating certain behaviors as likely to

increase or decrease the chance of a series of life events

happening to them. It was found that individuals showedless optimistic bias when they were allowed to see others’

answers.[38]

Perloff and Fetzer (1986) suggested that, when compar-

ing themselves to an average peer on a particular ability

or characteristic, an individual would choose a compari-

son target (the peer being compared) that scored less well

on that ability or characteristic, in order that the individ-

ual would appear to be better than average. To test this

theory, Perloff and Fetzer asked participants to compare

themselves to specific comparison targets (a close friend),

and found that illusory superiority decreased when spe-

cific targets were given, rather than vague constructs suchas the “average peer”. However these results are not com-

pletely reliable and could be affected by the fact that in-

dividuals like their close friends more than an “average

peer” and may as a result rate their friend as being higher

than average, therefore the friend would not be an objec-

tive comparison target.[20]

6.3 Egocentrism

Main article:  Egocentrism

The second explanation for how the better-than-average

effect works is egocentrism. This is the idea that an in-

dividual places greater importance and significance on

their own abilities, characteristics, and behaviors than

those of others. Egocentrism is therefore a less overtly

self-serving bias. According to egocentrism, individuals

will overestimate themselves in relation to others because

they believe that they have an advantage that others do

not have, as an individual considering their own perfor-

mance and another’s performance will consider their per-

formance to be better, even when they are in fact equal.

Kruger (1999) found support for the egocentrism expla-

nation in his research involving participant ratings of theirability on easy and difficult tasks. It was found that indi-

viduals were consistent in their ratings of themselves as

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6.6 Better-than-average heuristic    5

above the median in the tasks classified as “easy” and be-

low the median in the tasks classified as “difficult”, re-

gardless of their actual ability. In this experiment the

better-than-average effect was observed when it was sug-

gested to participants that they would be successful, but

also a  worse-than-average effect was found when it was

suggested that participants would be unsuccessful.[39]

6.4 Focalism

Main article: Focalism

The third explanation for the better-than-average effect

is   focalism, the idea that greater significance is placed

on the object that is the focus of attention. Most studies

of the better-than-average effect place greater focus on

the self when asking participants to make comparisons

(the question will often be phrased with the self being

presented before the comparison target – e.g. “compare

yourself to the average person...”). According to focalism

this means that the individual will place greater signifi-

cance on their own ability or characteristic than that of

the comparison target. This also means that in theory if,

in an experiment on the better-than-average effect, the

questions were phrased so that the self and other were

switched (e.g. “compare the average peer to yourself”)

the better-than-average effect should be lessened.[40]

Research into focalism has focused primarily on opti-

mistic bias rather than the better-than-average effect.

However, two studies found a decreased effect of opti-

mistic bias when participants were asked to compare an

average peer to themselves, rather than themselves to an

average peer.[41][42]

Windschitl, Kruger & Simms (2003) have conducted re-

search into focalism, focusing specifically on the better-

than-average effect, and found that asking participants to

estimate their ability and likelihood of success in a task

produced results of decreased estimations when they were

asked about others’ chances of success rather than their

own.[43]

6.5 “Self versus aggregate” comparisons

This idea, put forward by Giladi and Klar, suggests that

when making comparisons any single member of a group

will tend to evaluate themselves to rank above that group’s

statistical mean performance level or the median perfor-

mance level of its members – for example, if an individ-

ual is asked to assess his or her own skill at driving com-

pared to the rest of the group, he or she is likely to rate

him/herself as an above-average driver. Furthermore, the

majority of the group is likely to rate themselves as above-

average. Research has found this effect in many differ-ent areas of human performance and has even generalized

it beyond individuals’ attempts to draw comparisons in-

volving themselves.[44] Findings of this research therefore

suggest that rather than individuals evaluating themselves

as above average in a self-serving manner, the better-

than-average effect is actually due to a general tendency

to evaluate any single person or object as better than av-

erage.

6.6 Better-than-average heuristic

Alicke and Govorun proposed the idea that, rather than

individuals consciously reviewing and thinking about

their own abilities, behaviors and characteristics and

comparing them to those of others, it is likely that peo-

ple instead have what they describe as an “automatic ten-

dency to assimilate positively-evaluated social objects to-

ward ideal trait conceptions”.[18] For example, if an in-

dividual evaluated themselves as honest, they would be

likely to then exaggerate their characteristic towards theirperceived ideal position on a scale of honesty. Impor-

tantly, Alicke has noted that this ideal position is not al-

ways the top of the scale, for example, in the case of hon-

esty, someone who is always brutally honest may be re-

garded as rude. Instead, the ideal is a balance perceived

differently by different individuals.

6.7 Non-social explanations

The better-than-average effect may not have wholly so-

cial origins: judgements about inanimate objects suffer

similar distortions.[44]

7 Moderating factors

While illusory superiority has been found to be somewhat

self-serving, this does not mean that it will predictably

occur: it is not constant. Instead the strength of the ef-

fect is moderated by many factors, the main examples

of which have been summarized by Alicke and Govorun

(2005).[18]

7.1 Interpretability/ambiguity of trait

This is a phenomenon that Alicke and Govorun have de-

scribed as “the nature of the judgement dimension” and

refers to how subjective (abstract) or objective (concrete)

the ability or characteristic being evaluated is.[18] Re-

search by Sedikides & Strube (1997) has found that peo-

ple are more self-serving (the effect of illusory superior-

ity is stronger) when the event in question is more open

to interpretation,[45] for example social constructs such

as  popularity   and   attractiveness  are more interpretable

than characteristics such as intelligence and physicalability.[46] This has been partly attributed also to the need

for a believable self-view.[47]

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6   7 MODERATING FACTORS 

The idea that ambiguity moderates illusory superiority

has empirical research support from a study involving two

conditions: in one, participants were given criteria for as-

sessing a trait as ambiguous or unambiguous, and in the

other participants were free to assess the traits according

to their own criteria. It was found that the effect of illu-

sory superiority was greater in the condition where par-ticipants were free to assess the traits.[48]

The effects of illusory superiority have also been found

to be strongest when people rate themselves on abilities at

which they are totally incompetent. These subjects have

the greatest disparity between their actual performance

(at the low end of the distribution) and their self-rating

(placing themselves above average). This   Dunning–

Kruger effect   is interpreted as a lack of   metacognitive

ability to recognize their own incompetence.[8]

7.2 Method of comparison

The method used in research into illusory superiority has

been found to have an implication on the strength of the

effect found. Most studies into illusory superiority in-

volve a comparison between an individual and an aver-

age peer, of which there are two methods: direct com-

parison and indirect comparison. A direct comparison

– which is more commonly used – involves the partici-

pant rating themselves and the average peer on the same

scale, from “below average” to “above average”[49] and

results in participants being far more self-serving.[50] Re-

searchers have suggested that this occurs due to the closercomparison between the individual and the average peer,

however use of this method means that it is impossible

to know whether a participant has overestimated them-

selves, underestimated the average peer, or both.

The indirect method of comparison involves participants

rating themselves and the average peer on separate scales

and the illusory superiority effect is found by taking the

average peer score away from the individual’s score (with

a higher score indicating a greater effect). While the in-

direct comparison method is used less often it is more

informative in terms of whether participants have overes-

timated themselves or underestimated the average peer,and can therefore provide more information about the na-

ture of illusory superiority.[49]

7.3 Comparison target

The nature of the comparison target is one of the most

fundamental moderating factors of the effect of illusory

superiority, and there are two main issues relating to the

comparison target that need to be considered.

First, research into illusory superiority is distinct in terms

of the comparison target because an individual comparesthemselves with a hypothetical average peer rather than

a tangible person. Alicke et al. (1995) found that the ef-

fect of illusory superiority was still present but was signif-

icantly reduced when participants compared themselves

with real people (also participants in the experiment, who

were seated in the same room), as opposed to when par-

ticipants compared themselves with an average peer. This

suggests that research into illusory superiority may itself

be biasing results and finding a greater effect than wouldactually occur in real life.[49]

Further research into the differences between compari-

son targets involved four conditions where participants

were at varying proximity to an interview with the com-

parison target: watching live in the same room; watching

on tape; reading a written transcript; or making self-other

comparisons with an average peer. It was found that when

the participant was further removed from the interview

situation (in the tape observation and transcript condi-

tions) the effect of illusory superiority was found to be

greater. Researchers asserted that these findings suggest

that the effect of illusory superiority is reduced by twomain factors, individuation of the target and live contact

with the target.

Second, Alicke et al.'s (1995) studies investigated

whether the negative connotations to the word “average”

may have an effect on the extent to which individuals

exhibit illusory superiority, namely whether the use of

the word “average” increases illusory superiority. Par-

ticipants were asked to evaluate themselves, the average

peer and a person whom they had sat next to in the pre-

vious experiment, on various dimensions. It was found

that they placed themselves highest, followed by the real

person, followed by the average peer, however the aver-age peer was consistently placed above the mean point on

the scale, suggesting that the word “average” did not have

a negative effect on the participant’s view of the average

peer.[49]

7.4 Controllability

An important moderating factor of the effect of illu-

sory superiority is the extent to which an individual be-

lieves they are able to control and change their position on

the dimension concerned. According to Alicke & Gov-

orun positive characteristics that an individual believes

are within their control are more self-serving, and neg-

ative characteristics that are seen as uncontrollable are

less detrimental to self-enhancement.[18] This theory was

supported by Alicke’s (1985) research, which found that

individuals rated themselves as higher than an average

peer on positive controllable traits and lower than an aver-

age peer on negative uncontrollable traits. The idea, sug-

gested by these findings, that individuals believe that they

are responsible for their success and some other factor isresponsible for their failure is known as the self-serving

bias.

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7

7.5 Individual differences of judge

Personality characteristics vary widely between people

and have been found to moderate the effects of illu-

sory superiority, one of the main examples of this is

self-esteem. Brown (1986) found that in self-evaluations

of positive characteristics participants with higher self-esteem showed greater illusory superiority bias than

participants with lower self-esteem.[51] Similar findings

come from a study by Suls, Lemos & Stewart (2002), but

in addition they found that participants pre-classified as

having high self-esteem interpreted ambiguous traits in

a self-serving way, whereas participants who were pre-

classified as having low self-esteem did not do this.[19]

8 Worse-than-average effect

Main article: Worse-than-average effect

In contrast to what is commonly believed, research has

found that better-than-average effects are not universal.

In fact, much recent research has found theoppositeeffect

in many, especially more difficult, tasks.[52]

9 See also

10 Notes[1] Hoorens, Vera (1993). “Self-enhancement and Superi-

ority Biases in Social Comparison”.   European Review

of Social Psychology  (Psychology Press)  4  (1): 113–139.

doi:10.1080/14792779343000040.

[2] Pinker, Steven (2011).  The Better Angels Of Our Nature .

P.590: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-141-03464-5.

[3] Colvin, C. Randall; Jack Block; David C. Funder (1995).

“Overly Positive Self-Evaluations and Personality: Neg-

ative Implications for Mental Health”.   Journal of Per-

sonality and Social Psychology   (American Psychologi-

cal Association) 68  (6): 1152–1162.   doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.6.1152. PMID 7608859.

[4] Dunning, David; Judith A. Meyerowitz; Amy D. Holzberg

(1989). “Ambiguity and self-evaluation: The role of

idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments

of ability”.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-

ogy  (American Psychological Association) 57  (6): 1082–

1090.   doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1082.   ISSN 1939-

1315.

[5] Davidson, J. E. & C. L. Downing: Contemporary models

of intelligence, in: Handbook of Intelligence, edited by:

Robert J. Sternberg, 2000

[6] International Journal of Selection and Assessment, Vol.

13, No. 1, pp. 11–24, March 2005

[7] Schmidt, I.W.; I.J. Berg, B.G. Deelman (1999). “Il-

lusory superiority in self-reported memory of older

adults”.   Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition (Neu-

ropsychology, Development and Cognition)   6   (4): 288–

301. doi:10.1076/1382-5585(199912)06:04;1-B;FT288.

[8] Kruger, Justin; David Dunning (1999). “Unskilled and

Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s

Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments”.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology   77   (6):

1121–34.   doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121.   PMID

10626367.

[9]   “The 2000 Ig Nobel Prize Winners”. Improbable Re-

search. Retrieved 2008-05-27.

[10] Joyce Ehrlinger; David Dunning (January 2003). “How

Chronic Self-Views Influence (and Potentially Mislead)

Estimates of Performance”.   Journal of Personality and 

Social Psychology  (American Psychological Association)

84   (1): 5–17.   doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.5.   PMID12518967.

[11] Daniel R. Ames; Lara K. Kammrath (September 2004).

“Mind-Reading and Metacognition: Narcissism, not Ac-

tual Competence, Predicts Self-Estimated Ability”. Jour-

nal of Nonverbal Behavior  (Springer Netherlands) 28  (3):

187–209. doi:10.1023/B:JONB.0000039649.20015.0e.

[12] Katherine A. Burson; Richard P. Larrick; Joshua Klay-

man; YUTAO (2006).  “Skilled or Unskilled, but Still Un-

aware of It: How Perceptions of Difficulty Drive Miscali-

bration in Relative Comparisons”.  Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology 90  (1): 60–77.  doi:10.1037/0022-

3514.90.1.60. PMID 16448310.

[13] Ehrlinger, Joyce; Johnson, Kerri; Banner, Matthew; Dun-

ning, David; Kruger, Justin (2008).   “Why the un-

skilled are unaware: Further explorations of (absent)

self-insight among the incompetent”   (PDF).   Organiza-

tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes  105: 98–

121.   doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.05.002.   PMC 2702783.

PMID 19568317.

[14] Cross, P. (1977). “Not can but will college teachers be

improved?".  New Directions for Higher Education 17: 1–

15. doi:10.1002/he.36919771703.

[15] “It’s Academic.” 2000.   Stanford GSB Reporter , April24, pp.14–5. via Zuckerman, Ezra W.; John T. Jost

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11 References

•   Alicke, Mark D.; David A. Dunning; Joachim I.

Kruger (2005).   The Self in Social Judgment . Psy-chology Press. pp. 85–106.   ISBN 978-1-84169-

418-4. especially chapters 5 and 4

•   Kruger, J. (1999). “Lake Wobegon be gone! The

“below-average effect” and the egocentric nature

of comparative ability judgments”.   Journal of 

Personality and Social Psychology   77   (2): 221–

232.   doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.221.   PMID

10474208.

•   Matlin, Margaret W. (2004). “Pollyanna Principle”.

In Rüdiger Pohl.  Cognitive Illusions: a handbook on

 fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and mem-

ory. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4.

•   Myers, David G.  (1980).   The inflated self: human

illusions and the Biblical call to hope. New York:

Seabury Press. ISBN 978-0-8164-0459-9

•   Sedikides, Constantine; Aiden P. Gregg. (2003).

“Portraits of the Self” in  Sage handbook of social 

 psychology

12 Further reading

•   Dunning, David; Kerri Johnson, Joyce Ehrlinger

and Justin Kruger (2003).   “Why people fail to

recognize their own incompetence”.   Current Di-

rections in Psychological Science   12   (3): 83–87.

doi:10.1111/1467-8721.01235.

•   E.E. Giladi & Y. Klar (2002). “When standards are

wide of the mark: Nonselective superiority and in-

feriority biases in comparative judgments of objects

and concepts”.   Journal of Experimental Psychol-

ogy: General  131 (4): 538–551. doi:10.1037/0096-

3445.131.4.538.

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10   13 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES 

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