REVIEWS 301

tyre then follows the same format to'w Thorn A .'d as qumas integrated the Ig. I. eas of both Augustine and ~Ithl~ t~e thirteenth-century debates t.pr~nclples, rational justification .d~~stlce. The relationship betwee~ Itl~ns and the synthesis of the

~ ;ews are of central interest to :. rom there he proceeds to the i~~l an~ theological foundations of 'he Enhghtenment~ placing David . o,ry o~ th~ passions and justice peClfic hlstoncal and social Context : the evolution of the chairs of morai y at the Scottish universities in

Aberdeen,. and Edinburgh, he tra~sfo~atl.o?s within the debates

I ratIOnal JustIfication and justice In concludes that the market eco '

3 , nomy ~ pr,operty relatIOns framed Hume's l~stICe and moral consensus (com­'tlme.nt of morals). His only chapter sm IS used more to set off and the differences of the . , prevIOus

Ions f:om modernity than it is to bstantIve analysis of ll'b I'w'th . era Ism

I ItS entirely different ph'l .lthr I' I 0­opo ogy, Its rejection of a eory of the good, and its rejection ,~course within a particular intel­'.lOn: en~s m ethical relativism. I~t In hiS analysis, MacIntyre has ~I~tory o~ ideas and philosophical It .a SOCIOlogy of knowledge If ~ hiS work here, he would h~ve .r .valuable contribution to the ,0ClOlo.gy of ideas. But he adds s, w~lch appear to change the j clanty) of this work. :ms to be. pUIling back from the , porary ,discussion surroundin foundatlOnalism" and "th ,g

mol " e cn­?gy. He eXamines what he

~re Impo~nt and prior question , of t~e ~Istorical traditions of y .and Justification. His purpose

Ina?equacy of the Enlighten­~avIn~ discovered a priori uni­

clples Ind~pendent of both his­ms. He wishes to indicate how I the first three above-mentioned )ped within the context of their ratIOnal enquiry - which have ~ey were dismissed by the En­relevant, if not dangerous. He

is also trying to broaden the framework within which we think about the issue of justice and rational justification. Thus it is the social struc­ture underlying rational enquiry that frames the philosophical discourse and response about the nature of justice.

However, what began as an interesting history of ideas in which MacIntyre traces the relationship between practical rationality and forms of justification on the one side with various moral claims to justice on the other, finaIly become a discussion of hermeneutics and the interpretation of meaning in different traditions. Here he responds to the two post-Enlightenment schools of thought: rela­tivism (there is no truth, objectivity, or universal standard of rationality) and perspec­tivism (pluralism and incommensurability of truth-claims between different traditions). At times, he appears to borrow from the cultural hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer in a critique of Habermas' theory of rationality. MacIntyre states clearly that his goal "is to provide an account of rationality presupposed by and implicit in the practice of those enquiry-bearing traditions" (p. 354). Tracing the history of these traditions as distinctive "communities of discourse," "practices of enquiry," and "tradition-constitutive enqui­ries" from the Greeks to modem liberalism has thus been an introduction to a broader undertaking: the development of the formal aspects of rationality in the public discourse of intellectual traditions.

Though he does not explicitly say so, MacIntyre seems to be responding to Ha­bermas ' pursuit of a theory of formal rationality inherent in discourse (discursive rationality and communicative interaction) by pursuing his own theory of formal rationality inherent in the history of Western "commu­nities of discourse" found in the philosophical traditions, MacIntyre argues that only within modem liberalism is the public arena of discourse abandoned in favor of establishing ahistorical and asocial first principles, thereby undermining the very possibility of engaging in these rational "practices of enquiry, "

MacIntyre never answers his original ques­tions about a true account of justice and the corresponding everyday ethical concerns about it application, One can only speculate about MacIntyre's intentions. Within the framework of the debates between the proponents of cultural hermeneutics and critical theory, he

has decided to reestablish the links among consensus, traditions, and society. Though this is an enjoyable, superbly written work containing a great deal of information, the real purposes of chapters 18 to 20 remain unclear and undeveloped.

A more specific objection to MacIntyre's work is that he missed an ideal opportunity for developing a tradition-bound or consensus the­ory of truth in his treatment of Aristotle and the distinctions made between justice, practical ra­tionality (deliberation), and rational enquiry (di­alectical method). Though he sees the polis as a condition for asking ethical and political ques­tions and for deliberation, MacIntyre seems to re.duce deliberation to a practical syllogism about technical ends. The result is thatphronesis (prac­tical wisdom) is turned into techne (technical knowledge). The opportunity of integrating Aristotle's concepts of deliberation and public discourse in the Athenian polis is lost. Cer­tainly this connection has its own etymological foundations in the relationship between delib­eration (bouleusis) and public discourse (boule). These ties can also be seen by comparing Book ill, chapter 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics on deliberation and Book ill, chapter 10 of the Politics on the epistemological reasons for pub­lic discourse within a true democracy. Thus, for MacIntyre the sociological is brought in as a general framework for understanding philo­sophical discourse, but not as the actual form and substance within which rationality and truth may be determined, He is still caught in the Kantian antinomies of individual and society, individual deliberation and social traditions, practical syllogism and intersubjective dia­logue, first principles and "the fragility of good­ness."

The Cunning of Reason, by MARTIN HOLLIS.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 222 pp. $39.50 cloth. $12.95 paper.

DMITRI N. SHALIN

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Rational choice theory, a mainstay of modem microeconomics, has many a virtue. It starts with simple assumptions, grafts on them increasingly complex propositions, and offers nontrivial predictions concerning possi­ble courses of action. The problem with this theory is that it situates the actor in a

l

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302 REVIEWS

never-never land where our assumptions hold true, other factors are always equal, and actors behave as perfectly rational beings. Martin Hollis' book is simultaneously an ingenuous critique of rational choice theory and a valiant attempt to safeguard its pertinent insights. What makes this philosophical essay interesting for sociologists is that the author summons homo sociologicus to avoid the traps into which homo economicus leads modem economic analysis.

Rational choice theory, Hollis argues, is based on assumptions that are too limiting. It presup­poses a rational agent with "fully ordered pref­erences, perfect information and faultless com­puting powers" (p. 13). None of these assumptions holds true in the real world. Per­sonal preferences are not always clearly or­dered, and when they are, the ranking is subject to revision over time. Information about the possible consequences of rational action is no­toriously hard to come by. And the individual's capacity to juggle in one's head all variables pertaining to a given choice is far more limited than the theory implies.

Equally troublesome is the fact that rational choice theory fails to consider the actor as a member of a community constrained by the choices others make. In a compelling example illustrating this point, Hollis invites readers to decide which course of action the rational mo­torist should take when he or she hears the fore­cast projecting traffic buildup on a road ahead. Should the driver continue or take an alternate route? The decision depends on what our mo­torist expects other drivers to do. If he or she thinks that other drivers familiar with the fore­cast would switch to an alternate route, the driver may decide to stay the course, since the alter­nate route might soon become more crowded than the main road. But then he or she might think that other drivers, rational beings that they are, have reached exactly the same conclusion and stayed on the main road, which means the driver is better off changing the original route. And so it goes. The game of rationality leads to infmite regress, with the solution to the prob­lem of most rational action remaining indeter­minate..

In his search for an answer to the paradoxes of rational choice theory, Hollis taps various sources, including Hegel's philosophy, Lukes' concept of power, Giddens' constitutional theory of society, and, most signally, We­ber's interpretive sociology. He is not pre­

pared to conclude with Hegel that the World Spirit, in its infmite cunning and wisdom, weaves individual actions together according to the grand design· of history, Yet he accepts his insight that individuals' choices produce systematic results largely unforeseen by individual actors. One such result is the appearance on the social scene of norms and institutions, which, according to Hollis, "can emerge as the unintended sum of intended consequences" (p. 48). Institutions are impor­tant not simply because they constrain, but also because they enable and empower actors by providing individuals with the rationales that can justify the chosen course of action in the eyes of the community. Rational choice theory effectively ignores this facet of ration­ality, the fact that individuals are not only profit maximizers driven by personal desires and preferences, but also role players who depend vitally on justifiable reasons for securing their private agendas. Without the institutionalized inventories of norms, rules, and rationales, our subjective desires would be perennially frustrated and the war of each against all would become a logical necessity.

This is not to suggest that the author intends to sacrifice the self-seeking homo economicus to the public-minded homo socio­logicus. The individual, for Hollis, is an autonomous being, "his own artificer" or self as distinct from its role. The point is rather that the standards for judging an action's rationality cannot satisfactorily be gleaned from economics alone-a sociological correc­tive is needed. Which brings us to Weber's problematics of rationality.

The reason why Hollis finds Weberian soci­ology so congenial is obvious: both consider intentionality key to understanding social ac­tion, yet neither is prepared to equate the task of social science with identifying the subject's own reasons for action. Erkliiren and Verstehen must complement each other if social science is to be possible. Figuring out intentions and sub­jective motives comes in handy as the first step, to be followed by objectively analyzing stated reasons, which mayor may not pass the test of rationality in light of the values prevalent in the community, the role the individual was enact­ing at the time, and the self he or she claimed to be, What Hollis is up to is laying out objec­tive standards for judging how rational (or ir­rational) a course of action chosen by the indi­vidual is.

. . HoUis's analysis sc Not everythmJI~ his argument tenta

off. Som~ stran ,s m arts of the text j outlined m earher P t the grand finale

ak appearance a , mean hole its overarchmg me the b?ok as a, w is' less than the sum notwlthstandmg, . ted in the pi

arts. Still, aU those mteres 't 'IS tackP . d the way I of rationahty an . 1 gl'sts today w

. t and SOCIO 0 .nusecono s 1 e delightful readmg, this sl~n~er vo u: xquisitely British' fresh mSlghts an e

Les solidarites da;~:~ ;~~~~~s t~:e YVES DURAIN9~7 280·PP. 145 FF palde France, .

GEORGE STEINM~TZ University of Chicago

This book adheres to the projec~ ~ d' teacher, the renowne

Duran s . investigate thl Roland Mousmer, to. He Whil flictual aspects. of sO~~;k I h~S bee Durand's prevIous I'd/' Les so I aFrench ancien reg~me, mue

. /.( humames has a les soeteleS I d theore! h' I tempora , an geograp IC\, the book's Webe Unfortunate y, with the tions contrast sharply and of its theoretical approac~ .

. of its hlston( occasional thmness arkabl h'p Durand shoWS a rem ,

s I . t soCIal insula~ion fr~m rec~: France 01 histoncal SOCIOlogy . and fails to address the apona

within his own work. I's te Durand's apparent g~a I f 1

ce wally arranged Itst 0 con P of solidaristic huma stances . of

h the sheer accretion Throug "f 'end

l'darity (ranging from n. ~~~litY circles in.U .s:,fact~le~, the reader to reject soc

. which would reduce s theones fl' t T to (usually binary) co~ IC, . h'ch will be raIsed bytlOn w I

is that contemporaryreader 'chehardly so narrowly mam this is certainly an erroneo~s n Marxist theory , Duran~ s I

f U Western MarXIsm A ter at 'hegemony legitimae consen, ' I' even to the point of ,n.eg ectl

. as such cntlcS ascoerclOn ­

REVIEWS 303 IUde with H Iinfi ' e~e that the WorId

mite Cunnmg and . d u"l actions to h WIS om, o 0 , get er according

eSl,gn of history , Yet he It mdividuals' h' accepts ults largely c o;ces produce rs, One untoreseen by h ,such result is the t e SOCial Scene of noich . nns and

~ acCordmg to Hollis "can unmtended Sum f' '

( 48 0 Intended•p, ). Institutions are . r because they cOnstrai~mp~r­ey enable and ' ut ldividuals Wit;~owe~ actors

h ratIOnalesUte

e c osen COurse of action ' comm' . Inrc , UnIty, RatIOnal choice r ~g?or~s, this facet of ration­~a I,ndlvlduals are not I s dnven by on y b personal desires

onut 0als,o role players who o Justifiable reasons for IVate agendas W'th' lOut the ~ventories of nonns I Irsub' , ,rues,

~ectIve desires Wo Id ;trated and the war of u )ecome I ' each

a oglcal neceSSity 0esuggest that the autho; o t?e self-seeking homo lubltc-minded h ' ,. omo SOCLO-Idual, for HOllis I'S a"h' , n

IS own artificer" 0 Ifrole Th ' . r se

'. e pomt IS rathfor d' er , JU gmg an action's

atlsfactorily be glean d e a' e ,- ,SOCIOlogical correc­.h bnngs us to W b ' lality, e er s

IHis finds Webe . . , nan SOCI­obvIOus: both consider

mderstanding soc'laI ac­pared to equate the task Identifying the SUbiect'sErkJoo Jtaren and Verst h th 'f e en

a e~ I social science is out Intentions and sUb­

I ?andy as the first step tlvely analyzing stated lay not pass the test of ~al~es prevalent in the mdlvidual Was enact­:el~ he or she claimed o IS laying out objec­~ how rational (or ir­n chosen by the indi-

Not everything in Hollis's analysis squares off. Some strands in his argument tentatively outlined in earlier parts of the text fail to make an appearance at the grand finale. And the book as a whole, its overarching metaphor notwithstanding, is less than the sum of its parts. Still, all those interested in the problem of rationality and the way it is tackled by economists and sociologists today will find this slender volume delightful reading, full of fresh insights and exquisitely British wit.

Les solidaritts dans Ies societes humaines, by YVES DURAND. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987. 280 pp. 145 FF paper.

GEORGE STEINMETZ University of Chicago

This book adheres to the project set out by Durand's teacher, the renowned historian Roland Mousnier, to investigate the noncon­flictual aspects of social life. While most of Durand's previous work has been on the French ancien regime, Les solidaritts dans Ies societes humaines has a much broader geographical, temporal, and theoretical scope. Unfortunately, the book's Weberian ambi­tions contrast sharply with the weakness of its theoretical approach and with the occasional thinness of its historical scholar­ship. Durand shows a remarkable degree of insulation from recent social theory and historical sociology in France or elsewhere, and fails to address the aporias that arise within his own work,

Durand's apparent goal is to produce a conceptually arranged list of historical in­stances of solidaristic human relations. Through the sheer accretion of examples of solidarity (ranging from "friendship" through quality circles in U, S. factories) Durand urges the reader to reject "social manicheanism," theories which would reduce social relations to (usually binary) conflict. The first objec­tion which will be raised by any infonned reader is that contemporary theories are hardly so narrowly manicheano Moreover, this is certainly an erroneous representation of Marxist theory, Durand's primary target. After all, Western Marxism has focused on consent, hegemony, legitimacy, and the like, even to the point of neglecting conflict and coercion-as such critics as Perry Anderson

have repeatedly pointed out. Durand similarly distorts the treatment of noncoercive social relations in other theories, and ignores even French authors such as Foucault and Durk­heim (whose name is mentioned just once­and misspelled-in a footnote).

This would be less damaging if Durand were able to construct a compelling alterna­tive account. His framework is based on a sequence of four ideal typical fonns of human "solidarity" that are defined in only the most general tenns: egalitarian and hierarchical solidarities, fidelities (Ies jidelites) , and loyalties (Ie Ioyalisme). But he makes little comparison across fonns, aside from the suggestion that fidelities and loyalties are more prevalent in traditional estate societies (societes d'ordres) than in more modem ones - a point which has been made in Durand's and Mousnier's earlier writings. Nor does Durand discuss the dynamics of transition from one fonn to another. Finally, although he multiplies subtypes of solidarity wi thin each category, the antinomy conflict­solidarity is clearly too crude to exhaust the full spectrum of social relations: interpene­trated modes (e,g., consent backed by coercion, and vice versa) or other principles such as the "dull compulsion" of material conditions are not considered,

In the first chapter, Durand contests the indiscriminate application of the concept "social class" across historical periods, This is unobjectionable, even if it fails to counter recent reassertions of the usefulness of "class" in noncapitalist contexts (e,g., "New Class" theory, Geoffrey de Ste, Croix's discussions of class in ancient Greece, and the work of Wright and Roemer). Yet this interest in limiting the use of "class" seems to assume that class implies conflict, whereas recent class theory has consistently problematized the relations among class, class fonnation, and class consciousness, In the final section of this chapter, concerning the development of individuality and citizen-state relations, Durand proclaims his political faith in "right, liberty, and property" as an "indissoluble trinity" (Hayek), but fails to address the potential contradictions between liberty and his other valued good, solidarity.

Chapter 2 discusses a variety of fonns of "egalitarian solidarity," Here Durand laments the passing of truly "solidary societies," which were "so different from the mass