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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,vs.THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515),Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) withwords which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitutionand laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in thesubject now to be considered.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and theissues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of theAmerican Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that theMaguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions aresaid to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christianpeople of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyanwork of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanentsettlement,

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found isauthorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such

inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by himapproved by the provincial board.

"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a pconvenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

"Resolved , that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of TiNaujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the apthe Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and

"Resolved further , That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said hom

applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the SecretInterior of February 21, 1917.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sTigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the InteriorFebruary 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townshipNaujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dul

and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not lDecember 31, 1917.

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned noin sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of thgovernor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of theMangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilicustoms among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao aliable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindohe is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in qutake up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approveprovincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of thisof the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decid

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:



SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor . — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found isauthorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants totake up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincialboard.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation . — Any non-Christian who shall refuse tocomply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundredand forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction beimprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No.1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69,Act No. 387.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is also foundin varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order tounderstand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it iswell first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," withparticular regard for the legislation on the subject.

II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in thefollowing language.

LAW I.

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that theymay forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in acivilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means mostconvenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies andother religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with adesire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they aredeprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and fromthat which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized thatconvenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered theviceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causinginconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and theprotection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained thatthey be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater

part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the latitle.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW VIII.

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.

THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. landmountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can halive stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.

LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that nshall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that tcultivate them and profit therefrom.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW XIII.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor , or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove the puethe reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, oroyal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interenot for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change wiconsidered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judgeor encomendero who should violate this law.

LAW XV.

Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."



We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if therebe more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be abig one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indiosbut not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nineothers, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.

LAW XXI.

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," ANDMULATTOES.

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesandtowns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associatewith the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and uselessmen; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and thenegroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which wedesire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of gravepenalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that theviceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and availthemselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian andChinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them fromtheir parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advancedinhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of thePhilippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of anation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and tohumanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in theobscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages thatmay be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.

It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question,and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have

even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity,but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guardedagainst, thus giving and customs of isolation.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account theprestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect andobedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded inthe premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all

the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after findunanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, anprovincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as alsmeeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate convictioinevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated rwell as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the fo

DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants ( indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the commsave those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of thecustoms, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided into thrclasses; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a hoanother, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and thethose mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, prmissionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these racethese rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as tocompliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means wzeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; fconstruction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoriregards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the firsnext July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which a

remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obligrender personal services other than those previously indicated.

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, theinhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessnew residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which pthe least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with tof the sound of the bell.

5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composedprecisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations basthat of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil ).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties athem and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thwith the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditallowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engag

commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished withdeportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indiosshaand whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever co

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, allfact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.



9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued ( aetas and mountains igorrots thefollowing advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem mostproductive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in sofar as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to beChristians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect,and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption fromcontributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that thosewho are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of theauthorities of the province or district.

10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, havethe obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place

them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distantfrom their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, andprovided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committingfrom now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General'sOffice shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shallnecessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order adetachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conduciveto the successful accomplishment of the same.

12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities, localauthorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effectiveaid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.

13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of theArchipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanentcommission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulationsthat may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.

15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about duecompliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with theprimitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law .

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was PresidentMcKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the PhilippineBill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequentcongressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followedCongress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and govand under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization tthey are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise anregulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevebarbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.

Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines.purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name theprerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the PhilippineCommission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The PhilipCommission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian t

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, coknown as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by tPhilippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial dthe twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of MindanaSulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the twhich, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twdistrict (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have gesupervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators arepresentatives( sec. 22).

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moronon-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited byother non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law .

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislmost notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing foorganization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 139Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio chargeNo. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carrieinto the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.

Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning wit387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission , having reference to the PNueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enathe provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva VPangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMETHE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that :

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilmake it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authosubject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officersamong them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Providthe powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by ANumbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civilGovernments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."



SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, whenhe deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period notexceeding sixty days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledgeand experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shallbe exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.

SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advancedsufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-

seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.

SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited inaccordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Actincorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Codeof 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with

reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.

The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in section 7of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the PhilippinesCommission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forwardinto sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain thephrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.

"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076,

2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in ActsNos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.

The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec.2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)

D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religioussignification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be thodo not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor FerdiBlumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898p. 107.)

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning.

In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many lawsaccording to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands

inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorizationtwelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislaturetime and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Mother non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article, prsection 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organprovinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to whPhilippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactlywith the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographicaldescription.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and someare not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)

If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The reasothe motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of

location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.

At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The sonon-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under h jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, coknown as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, SCongress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the futupolitical status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to leg judicial, and executive authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to cond"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicameans for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."

As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of tfollowing language:

. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes , celebrated within that province without compliance with the reqprescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a mem



uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated , should be taken into consideration as asecond marked extenuating circumstance.

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce thelaw. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-calledChristians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906,this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:

Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian buthave recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposesof Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far incivilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislatefor people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, totheir own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code .

The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptizedhas attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embracedChristianity.

The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularlyorganized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization towhich they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion aboveexpressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under theProvincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say on thesubject:

As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification hasas yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the samemeaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It isindicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The questionarose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of theInterior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of InternalRevenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. TheCollector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some formof Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it tomean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedulatax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so longas they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of aman's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more

dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religbelief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East InArabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are pmen belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throthe Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial toCedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground thcivilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not sthereto.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the SecretaFinance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due fromembers of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becmembers of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such qand digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do noChristianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of thPhilippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far acedula tax law is concerned . . .

Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatev

relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politthereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that communitfrom and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes arefrom him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the sshould apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequeexpiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnishedwithout penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subjregular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintor failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this recalled "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in sthe application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recogntribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorromembers of other recognized non-Christina tribes.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,Collector of Internal Revenue,

Approved:(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,Secretary of Finance and Justice.



The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated byVenancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa,Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of theAttorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questionswere these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No.1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:

In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question remainsa non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves

liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be theconstructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.

Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrativecode which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include allnon-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers tothose uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence,roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live intribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life,did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on thedifficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislationemployed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not onlybecause this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law nulland unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureauof non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that theclassification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-divisionunder the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficientlyshows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.

In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join in theproposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, tonatives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.

The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas ,says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inof Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense toforgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the napplied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the intthe modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."

The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Ncivilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manhave shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficcivilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippin[1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)

III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Chrispeople is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealinthe Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." Trecognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardiward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always the plenary authority of the United States.

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress passein 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion g— "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, a

proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."

A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 37Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate cowith foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshallin Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Reto the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.

Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who where, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in tha possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to onations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its laany part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mowhich this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to ma purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define.were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their trelations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separatwith the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of thor of the State within whose limits they resided.

The opinion then continues:



It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependentfor their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of thelocal ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their veryweakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and thetreaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always beenrecognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, isnecessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in thatgovernment, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within thegeographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce itslaws on all the tribes.

In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those landsnotwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendentcharged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of thegovernment "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in thealienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress toregulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising afostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the CherokeeTobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; LoneWolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84;

Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281;35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has fullauthority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection intheir persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)

All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.

The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, isthat of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issuedagainst Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the PoncaTribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribeof Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completelysevered their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring tomaintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they werethus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators areindividual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situatedsome place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at

the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent toarrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused therelators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.

The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The secondquestion, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for thepurpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, thecourt reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, thecourt said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with

the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go uporeservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commIndian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existingexercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the rigout a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confcustody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the coor laws of the United States.

2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the resphas been directed to do.

4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not tresforbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereorelators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the Mpetitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Acsuch, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decid

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admittsimilarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been tadifferent parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishethat, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this pfor the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segreexisted for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincialauthorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its fullresponsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, weAn understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed inmultitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, whichnecessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (C



W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall inWayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. TheLegislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed theexecution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in thedecision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the AdministrativeCode? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and theDepartment Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?

The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior toapprove the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by

the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President mayprescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said:"We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that thislanguage was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless peopleconcerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some suchsupervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by theIndian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned byimmemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The PhilippineLegislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and theprovincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administrationof the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most

favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislatureto provincial official and a department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that — "Thestatute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express,it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes anattempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,unconstitutional."

Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be understood to mean what ithas plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statutehas violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard thelong continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers tonatives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, doesnot discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, thePhilippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Thconstitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provhas been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any dof race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.

The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberevery other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on rig

authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilwhich the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protecinjury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (FieldCrowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, whollyfrom restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common gany other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule thaone is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could notunder the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whet

respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of cosphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authohuman government — especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to interferexercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conservisafety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure odangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the genemay demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable cof the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistentpeaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to ethe right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he haendowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in aarray of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right ocitizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawfuto pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essenticarrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, thchoose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free mencan be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L261.)



One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood indemocracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individualand for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by generallaw for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, depriveother citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Libertyof the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within theproper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz[1914], 189 Al., 66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of theargument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, saidthat the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the

protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicialproceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especiallytrue where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (SeeMcGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceedingenforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislativepower, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to bedue process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that thereshall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that thislaw shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedureprescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan[1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends oncircumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to allof a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitutionparticularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shallinvoluntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quitepossible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, hasforce in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery andinvoluntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one toanother." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has beenapplied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come adescription of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescriberegulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increasethe industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptlythe 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to pthings hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, pthe purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrinterfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police pothe Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and tfundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Raffe32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any consprovision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the iof the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remassigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Cpeople of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protectpublic forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the SecretaryInterior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good on

creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appeencouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children whollyunaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtaiduring the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuancedevelopment.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expectthe Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:

"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic lifeevade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into pocommunities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on accouignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involunservitude by those who may want to abuse them."

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has adoppolaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unificwith the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave thhabitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabthe non-Christian people.



(c ) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and theextention of government control.

(d ) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social andcommercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.

( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people. Thesepeople are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate thebenefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of theGovernment to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under thecontrol of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educatetheir children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they arebeing impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, andpolitical equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of theDepartment for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and topromote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos.2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Governmenttowards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, andcomplete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having inview the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian andnon-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By thefostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it beadvisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of thesepeople?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have on the Islandof Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in theways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do bybringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health andmorals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells."The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the

same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there liveunder restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation reallyconstitutes protection for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not preciselyaccurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their morefortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed,they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a dragupon the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the lathe executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Codbecause these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouradevelop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessnesconducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. Thelaw of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are ethe works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not brinbenefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these peothe sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately beheavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredationnot they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in themountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are bedeprived thereof without due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightfu

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to whatIt will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the moand in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in itsnoble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alteeither letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the oin accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the edu

and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelaGovernment is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when tbecome useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gramost of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of tGovernment to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and evonly to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his libertydue process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leaveGovernment without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They



left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge,the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guidedto improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is toorganize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from themin order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do notwork for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life,do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of livingwarrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being landsof public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt ameasure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about whichthey are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as peopleaccustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unlessa penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not, however,be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again thesame law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted andfollowed time and again without question.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison atthe mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer wouldnaturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppressthese people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the lawintelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal inthe hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems thatthe Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individualmembers of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it hasbeen transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the veryexistence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the

necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive cango in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity.The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressivemarch.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic rem

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of theManguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can onthat due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protectionlaw, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedureprescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determinationsection 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In adecision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chof the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi . Every really new question that comes bcourts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a pror line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is pto tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rulprinciple. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contDistinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain, to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. Tunify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equthe law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoropopulated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is swith a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, mustconfined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branexercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenepolitical ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, sa"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be withupholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's peits duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive anda force as are the other departments of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of hiswithout due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservaaccordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This isruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:



I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing, opinion.

The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as adescriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provincesthroughout the Islands.

Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our statute-book, denote the 'lowgrace of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add that the tests for thedetermination of the fact that an individual or tribes is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910, and set outin the principal opinion.)

The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which aspecific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life withinthe tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws andregulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of the Islands;a made of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch themembers of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who maybe brought in contact with members of the tribe.

So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or anyindividual member of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the classembraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normallyresult in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any timeadhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond thehabitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such tribe, buta mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands withwhom they are brought in contact.

The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by the reconcentrationorder, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount toa contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.

If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that degree of civilization which wouldhave made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the members of the tribeaffected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular case, could theoffices of any province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a head-huntingtribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousandManguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro.

Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the practice in the United States whentribes or groups of American Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since non-Christian head men and chiefs in thePhilippines have no lawful authority to bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have thesame force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.

The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon analogous principles to thoseupon which the liberty and freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and isproperly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual are found to be of such a low grade of civilization thattheir own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.

The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and necessarily paternal attitude assumethem by the Insular Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917

SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). — It shall be the duty of the Bunon-Christian tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by noChristian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner tmaterial, economic, social and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of renpermanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and non-Christian elempopulating the provinces of the Archipelago.

SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund . — There shall be maintained in the provincial treasuries of therespective specially organized provinces a special fund to be known as the township and settlement fund, wshall be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the provnon-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.

As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands corpus proceedings, to review the action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration ordersunder authority of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at this time.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I cannot give my conany act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Chripersons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice will not permit me to let this decision gorecord without expressing may strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the coshall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, thand human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.

The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appeathe resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acre

which about three hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservationtaken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservatiManguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation o

The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the majority opinion which states thatprovincial governor of Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the placing of thpetitioners and others on a reservation.



The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture. They have considerable Negritoblood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. Theynumber approximately 15,000 (?). The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preambleto Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipalgovernment."

It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not including smaller islands whichtogether make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361 of which 7, 369 arewild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total populationwas less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).

The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.

It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and by Manguianes.

The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored hisboats in the water of Cebu. They have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid,primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of civilization and progress.

The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like Dadalos do not take kindly to theways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the punishment.

The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the fundamental one will be considered byme. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion, are in violation of the firstparagraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without dueprocess of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws .

It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision.

The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that accorded the Indians in theUnited States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court withreference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nationsin the United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separatetreaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties, reservationswere set apart for them on which they lived and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some thesereservations were larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles.

The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which theyhave agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands.Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when theprovincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the littlereservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they weredenied the equal protection of the law.

The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines."

They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backwardand deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "bought under the bells" andmade to stay on a reservation.

Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippiof any crime having been committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."

A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in the majority opinion, agather the nature of their offense which is that —

Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engthe works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñginsthereon. No bringbenefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of those pthe sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately becheavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredationot they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them .

There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to anothemountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they are being deprived thewithout due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightfu

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to whatIt will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountainspermanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true andsense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alteeither letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the oin accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the eduand civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens.

There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the Manguianes destroy the forest by a caiñgin. What is a "caiñgin?" Simply this. These people move their camp or place of abode frequently and when themove to a new place, it is necessary to clear the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cuthe smaller trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires nevein the tropical undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caiñgin are killed and crops are planted a

harvested. This land may be abandoned later on — due to superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poofrom exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.

Granting that the Manguianes do make caiñgins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them for the more fertile lanevery man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse as to justify incathem on a small tract of land — for incarceration it is and nothing less.



The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on account of their ignorance theywill commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abusethem." They have never been a burden to the state and never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."Their history does not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But theSecretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to besubjected to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have been accustomedto for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not escape withoutfacing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the greatboon of binding themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and clothe them inreturn of their services.?

It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their

freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them money with which tobuy food on the promise that they will work for them. And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we haveanother law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be fined not more thantwo hundred pesos or imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence expires they must again gointo debt or starve, and if they do not work will again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are castadrift.

The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not appear they were ever consulted abouttheir reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It seems they weregathered here and there whenever found by the authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because theyare "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination becauseof religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes andvarious others, about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made greatprogress in civilization. The have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor — they have herds of cattle and horses and some fewof them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization,but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in fact.

All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their homes and herded on a reservationat the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state such a monstrousproposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the factthat he can do it and has done it in the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary andunrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.

It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; thatthe constitutional principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play andaction of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisionswhich the people have, the through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all controlexercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof,forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was intendedto prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.

As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or which singles out anyparticular individuals or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional asbeing opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain

case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)

When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they aresupposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not meanto leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, notsubject to law, for its is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to theagencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government existsand acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always belodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere

administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the pub judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental righliberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims oconstitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to menblessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachof Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of men." For the very idone man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjolife, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being theof slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)

It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has nevebrought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmaklawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.

In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative Code nodeprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of their lifedue process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer themnarrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in the Islands, I say that it would be a crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have recwilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria valleys which they look down upon from their fields — than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.

There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as tManguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation — in eopen air jail — then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, andthe Moros.

There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the papproval of the head of the department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their diprovinces form their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines

court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their livbe, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.

And who would be safe?

After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a non-Cand that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he cono defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fia

The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion, should be quoted at lenDistrict Judge Dundy said:

During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of my country, I have nevecalled upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consOn the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignifiunlettered, and generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of the most powmost enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the one side, we have the represent

this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adboasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on side, we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application with the determisending these people back to the country which is to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in their owland. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and distinguished officer who is made resherein to say that he has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear aconspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say that, if the strongest psympathy could give the relators title to freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the moment thearguments in their behalf were closed. no examination or further thought would then have been necessary



expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by law, something more satisfactory and enduring than meresympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that this case must be examinedand decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent of the government.

On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during the session of the court held atthat time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus andtheir final discharged from custody thereunder.

The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, andcompletely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then

endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the generalgovernment; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the UnitedStates, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.

The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the distance between the placewhere the writ was made returnable and the place where the relators were confined being more than twenty miles,ten days were alloted in which to make return.

On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and detention is therein shown. Thesubstance of the return to the writ, and the additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individualmembers of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservationsituated in some place within the limits of the indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from thegovernment; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had issued an order whichrequired the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to thesaid order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in hiscustody for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.

It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time,their connection with the tribe to which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony producedby either party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to be true; sothat the questions to be determined are purely questions of law.

On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certaintract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of the aidIndians, in which the government agreed to protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or why,or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does notappear.

xxx xxx xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when determined, will be decisive of thiswhole controversy. This relates to the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for thepurpose of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vainenough to think that I can do full justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes

so much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it as viewed from myown standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially invited, will be sure tofollow.

xxx xxx xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation bill, and in it we find a authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territoryproviding them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)

xxx xxx xxx

The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of the same, until two years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At all event, portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony seshow, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five hundreeighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-ewithin a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great measuredoubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble re

his little band of followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, toown language, "he might live and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informagent of their final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers had finally, fully, and foresevered his and their connection with the Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, orIndians, and to cut loose from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits ancustoms of a higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, awere able to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language, and wmany of the Poncas have long continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so make them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus employed, that theyarrested by order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claimunable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their own natand blood relations to a far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their rThe land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and native land was strenough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die where thbeen reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be forever, but were carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy prohomeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love home and native land, may be heathen in but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle.

And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in violation of their righliberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from custody.

This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.

I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, nvoid, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protectiolaw, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

Footnotes

1 218 U.S., 302; 54 L. ed., 1049.


EN BANC



G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,vs.BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appe llant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON,intervenors-appellants.

Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been accordeddue recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3decided in 1937, was quitecategorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under considerationmay prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to theperson invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, wouldbe construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4

Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was heldthat a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at theinstance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that hecould not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrativecharge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.

Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was

alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case7

for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announcedthat he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exemptfrom being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the sametime stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify assuch witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners wasguilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, theadministrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board fromcompelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Boardcommanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witnessstand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminatinganswer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted withgrave abuse of discretion.

There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in theadministrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as interveSuch a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the porespondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opfrom the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incriminatiobe availed of in an administrative hearing.

A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be weand prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, tGatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.

1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in C

Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that anadministrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, 9the complarequested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was grantedpetitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondentHe filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, take the witness stand."

It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administracharge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a peproceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocationlicense as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.

To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Copinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incriminatiof the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to othindividuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livas a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly rthe loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.

2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellanconstitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the anwhich could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow theof another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehebe used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there isbecomes diluted.lawphi1.ñet

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declaaccused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the righdefendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettexercise of his own free genuine will."

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objeshould not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the humpersonality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspethe most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation undeprivilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14



It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right ispredicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion placesequal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in itsSelf-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to hisdetriment." 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may leada private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that nopossible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in anadministrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without hisconsent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69198 April 17, 1985

VENECIO VILLAR, INOCENCIO F. RECITIS, NOVERTO BARRETO, RUFINO G. SALCON, JR., EDGARDO DE LEON, JR.,REGLOBEN LAXAMANA, and ROMEO GUILATCO, JR., petitioners,vs.TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES (T IP), DEMETRIO A. QUIRINO, JR., in his capaci ty as Chairman of the Board of TIP, TERESITA U. QUIRINO, in her capacity as President of TIP, and OSCAR M. SOLIVEN, in his capacityas Vice-President/Dean for Students and Alumni Affairs of TIP, respondents.

Daniel M. Malabonga and Edgardo R. Abaya for petitioners.

Magno & Salita Law Office for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The crucial question in this petition, inappropriately entitled "extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction," which this Court considered as a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, is whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of respondent Technological Institute of thePhilippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment. The answer is supplied by our decision in Malabanan v.Ramento, 1 where it was held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for anegative answer. If that were an then, the petitioners 2 are entitled to the remedy prayed for. There is, however, this other circumstance to be taken into consideration. In the opposition to the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, reference wasmade to the academic records of petitioners. Two of the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., 3 and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., 4 hadonly one failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear and thesecond having failed in only one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Venecio

Villar failed in two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984. 5 Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis 6 passed all his subjects in the first semester of 19831984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during itssecond semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner NovertoBarreto, 7 had five failing grades in the first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second semester of thesame schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., 8 hadthree failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana 9 had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. PetitionersBarreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades. Respondent educational

institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on academic frenjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal. 10

Petitioners Venecio Villar, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. and Inocencio F. Recites are entitled to the wcertiorari and prohibition.

1. In the aforementioned Malabanan v. Ramento decision, this Court held: "As is quite clear from the opinion in ReyesBagatsing , the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is Identifiedliberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is nlimited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state hato prevent." 11 An equally relevant excerpt from the opinion therein follows: "Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceableassembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express th

and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, tfrom the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" 12 Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from responCollege.

2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is theducation not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provisionState maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and msystem of free public education" 13 up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colluniversities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise ofright because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has theducation. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall becompulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be eqaccessible to all on the basis of merit." 14

3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is eqmanifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and heducation, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is jusfor excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to dunder what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that stanshould be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitrights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thusprejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause 15 being disregarded.

5. While the dispositive portion refers only to petitioners of record, the doctrine announced in this case should apply tostudents similarly situated. That way, there should not be any need for a party to apply to this Court for the necessary

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohlikewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents from acts of surveillance, black-listing, suspension and refuallow them to enroll in the coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to Noverto Ba

Edgardo de Leon, Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and AlaJJ., concur.

Plana J., took no part.



Concepcion, Jr., and Escolin, JJ., are on leave.


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,

vs.HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON.JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITYFISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging thatno prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks thisCourt to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, amember of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. OnSeptember 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killedhimself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCAbuilding in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime inMay, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb.Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together withother guests, including Lovely.

As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his twobrothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.

On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an Americanlady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons.

On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo statedthat Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag whenhe left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner'shouse. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother.

The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to thevarious bombings in Metro Manila.

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the oCol. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.

On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namPhilippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the GenMilitary Council was called for October 6, 1980.

On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International ConferenAmerican Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within ttwenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently impVictor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered hims"state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings

On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Centerwas confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arrestingshowed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some timpetitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoñez v. Gen. Ver, et al ., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by courespected.

On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation roowindows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he wastransferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.

Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and"under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in PeoBenigno Aquino, Jr., et al . (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the

entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days froof the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that uptime martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copiecharges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the MinistryJustice.

On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violateRepublic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the RevisedCode. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.

On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undercomprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodgemillimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is completely blind and pthe left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deafear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.

On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by GeProspero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A.amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conductedprosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Lo



Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Commandand Victor Lovely himself.

On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of theprosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.

On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filingof an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including hereinpetitioner.

The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. It isthe contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an

information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be toadmit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establisha prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.

However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.

The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutoryin character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court whenit decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interestdictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.

The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions when apetition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.

In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal caseshall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the groundsinvoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he maytake therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;Echarol v. Purisima,et al., 13 SCRA 309.)

On this argument, we ruled:

There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is alsorecognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari,prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interestof "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero,G.R. No. L-12669,

April 30, 1969."

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right tobe free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of ademocratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the stillunresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchialasthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to

him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (OrdGen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the petitioner infothe first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismcomplaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of aninformation after finding that a prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, tdisregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifavorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there ar38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt agaand every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge for subversion. The prosecustar witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the alleged link between the petitioner andseries of terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of internatiodispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify againpetitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be made to testify wcharges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his din issuing the questioned resolutions.

The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, bynot sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of this cawhat cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system?

The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain theproposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a convquestion raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplainuncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conv

We do not think so.

The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizthe United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Phil(MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidewas able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-SeSalonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact thaSalonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor BLovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a coexists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "docas well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negateknowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizawhether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:

A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a memHonor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: firstSalonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under thof to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1914-15)

Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidesubversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objectenot, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See PeopLabinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examthe court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investiVictor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which eveled to the filing of the information.



Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made beforeCol. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as aprosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were bothincluded in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his counsel andcross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella.After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecutionwitness.

According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:

36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?

A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel wheresomebody would come to contact me and give the materials needed in theexecution of my mission. I thought this was not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr.Psinakis changed the plan and instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen.Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me there to give thematerials I needed to accomplish my mission

37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?

A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr.Johnny Chua, husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where Ivisited my mother and checked-in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street,Manila.

38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed byPsinakis?

A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21,and the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKEDto him on the phone about three or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I amexpecting an attache case from somebody which will be delivered to your house,"for which Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namangattache case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." Igave him my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so justcome back on the 31st of August at 4 P.M." On that date, I was with friends atBatulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the appointment.I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.

39. Q. What happened then?

A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming togive me the attache case but did not tell me the name.

40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody todeliver your materials?

A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the effortsof Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitmentsat Norfolk, Virginia. I told him, however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I wasable to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. Healso asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition groupactivities but it seems he is well informed.

41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?

A. About thirty (30) minutes.

41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato TañadSalonga was the one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sarilingTañada nung dumating. They talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones not hear what they talked about. After their whispering conversations, Senleft and at this time Atty. "Nits" Tañada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan kotse."

43. Q. Were the materials given to you?

A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave andAtty. "Nits" Tañadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded toBroadway Centrum where before I alighted, Atty. Tañada handed me a "Pcontaining all the materials I needed.

xxx xxx xxx

45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?

A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting calength, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical t(10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1 pound weight each.

However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar as the pparticipation was concerned:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpos

A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the MHotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I wneed. I disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that is famme or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. S

And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salohe was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I

appointment t see him. I went to Sen. Salonga's house the following day.Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for me. He said nAfterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "caagain on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on August at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Tañada arrivhe had a chance to be near me, he (Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that hattache case and the materials I needed in his car. These materials were me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis



During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the latter mentioned in his sworn statement:

Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G"about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthdayparty of Raul Daza wherein Jovito Salonga was also present, was thisdestabilization plan as alleged by you already formulated?

WITNESS:

A. Not to my knowledge.

COURT TO WITNESS:

Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?

A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.

A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.

Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there anypolitical action taken as a result of the party?

A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).

Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of petitioner, hereally implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground.In sustaining the objection, the Court said:

Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, youare widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of thiswitness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in thehouse of Mr. Salonga which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about thebombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would be unfair to Mr.Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)

Respondent judge further said:

COURT:

As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the

witness coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over thestatement and there is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in the UnitedStates is concerned. I don't know why it concerns this cross-examination.

ATTY. YAP:

Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.

COURT:

According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to combut Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the teof the question is also to connect Salonga to the activities in the United Stseems to be the thrust of the questions.

COURT:

In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him qthe focus on Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Grewas the first time that the name of Salonga came up. There was no mentio

Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. Bare bringing this up although you are only cross-examining for Salonga as(Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1973-74).

Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged "particithe bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Tañadawas all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.

However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activitiepetitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:

On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements d'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines blikely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.

It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances suf

a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Phiundoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, anbeing (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose itlinked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens fosupporters and financiers.

The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States inexplicable but without foundation.

The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence orterrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leadsubversive organizations for two reasons-

(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and

(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not ins

President Marcos immediately."

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a bconclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply becauplotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous preceright of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously un



The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tañadacould not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November,1978 . Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he hashundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.

The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga wasa guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posedwith all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting onthe matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the pictureproves nothing.

It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of

all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at abirthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive,much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless,even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecutionevidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.

The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribedactivities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had alreadytestified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of thepetitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he reallystated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v.Schwimmer , 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than anyother it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level thansubstantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental

postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozoin Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate thatfreedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especiallymandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have beenimposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.

The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of themoral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for violentaction and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminalthreats and constitutionally protected speech.

It stated:

We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutoryterm. For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound nationalcommitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open

and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on governmentand public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The language of the political arena,like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We agree withpetitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political oppositionto the President.

In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or aconspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of

violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robcaustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the Americaof Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.

Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedomspeech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membershipsubversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only conprima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:

(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance

plan or enterprise thereof .

As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza'party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the governthrough illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shoadvocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.

Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing incoccurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pJuly 8, 1981). He further testified that:

WITNESS:

Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against thegovernment. My bombing mission was directed against the particular fami(referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].

Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to hcommissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer chargefirst place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:

COURT:

Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, wimplicate Jovito Salonga?

A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.

It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as aprosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stit was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Saloespecially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link betweepetitioner and the bombing incidents.

The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exagainst the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in thebombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including thosby Lovely during his detention.



The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about thebombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by therespondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, andto protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also toprotect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that thepreliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. Apreliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedomand fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as thecase may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficientto sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although

there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judgeconducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictatesof reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on withthe prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of abasic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing andnot denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).

The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and adraft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent JudgeRodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulatingfor concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has beenrendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the sameacts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is notcompletely academic.

Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is notthe totality of the Court's functions.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has thesymbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore,constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of hisescape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:

The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth inlanguage clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to theunequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created thexecutive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legispowers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and developmenFilipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners wereleased from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, suband illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the eof its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish afacie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or asofficer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the pet

We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidencthe petitioner found in the records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Cuevas, JJ., co

Aquino, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas Before this Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this Couresolved to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagthe majority; we expressed the view that despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been resolved onmerits because it posed important legal questions.

Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al. , G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a peprohibition to restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various aspetheir works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this Court disthe petition because the assailed proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot and academic

dismissing the petition a short and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and the undersignedisagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court should rule squarely on the matters raised in the prather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.

I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they become moot and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs.Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.



I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been dropped bythe trial court on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No.Q-18606 insofar as he is concerned.

I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit theprosecution of the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the Court hasbeen preempted by a "first strike" which has occurred once too often.

Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment hadbeen arrived at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision started tocirculate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating overtaken by events.The decision could have had a greater impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.Before this Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this Courtresolved to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed withthe majority; we expressed the view that despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been resolved on themerits because it posed important legal questions.

Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al. , G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for

prohibition to restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this Court dismissedthe petition because the assailed proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot and academic. Indismissing the petition a short and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and the undersigneddisagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court should rule squarely on the matters raised in the petitionrather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.

I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they havebecome moot and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs.Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.

I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been dropped bythe trial court on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No.Q-18606 insofar as he is concerned.

I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit theprosecution of the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the Court hasbeen preempted by a "first strike" which has occurred once too often.

Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment hadbeen arrived at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision started tocirculate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating overtaken by events.The decision could have had a greater impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.

THE CREATION OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTSby Peter BaileyOBE AM In less than half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR) has come to be regarded as possibly most important document created in the twentieth century and as the accepted world standard for human rights. The UDHpreserving messages from the past, and is seen as an essential foundation for building a world in which all human beingscenturies to come, look forward to living in dignity and peace. A CRITICAL HISTORICAL MOMENT As the second World War began to close, the world climate was ready for a great leap forward in the recognition and obshuman rights. When representatives of the four major powers met in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, a stately mansion in Geo

Washington DC, two world wars had been fought in less than 30 years, and cruelty almost beyond belief had been inflictemembers of the Jewish race in Europe and on prisoners of war in detention in Asia and Europe. An atomic bomb was abooff that would show what enormous destructive power humankind could unleash in targeting nations as well as individualsbecause they were members of a particular race or religion. The leaders felt there must be a better way for the nations and peoples of the world to live together and sort out their probplans for establishing what was to become the United Nations. In late 1945, leaders of the world's nations met in San Francisco to form the United Nations. Inspired by the great South Aapartheid leader Field-Marshall Smuts, they included in the preamble to the Charter of the UN, an important reference to (A preamble is an important introductory section of a legal document, and explains the background to it rather than being operative provisions.) The relevant part of the preamble said:

"We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined - .. to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men anand of nations large and small".

This reference to human rights, was followed up by six references throughout the UN Charter's operative provisions to hu

and fundamental freedoms. In addition, largely as a result of pressure brought to bear on the political leaders by some 42non-government organisations, Article 68 was included. It required the Economic and Social Council to set up commissiohuman rights and economic and social fields. The outcome was the establishment of a Commission on Human Rights. TCommission is one of the very few bodies to draw its authority directly from the Charter of the United Nations. PRODUCING THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS In April 1946, Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States was appointed to chair group of 9 members. By June the interim body had suggested that the new Commission should make its first task the devsoon as possible of an international bill of human rights. Later in the year, the new Commission of Human Rights of 18 members, again chaired by Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, was apincluded China's P.C.Chang, FrenchmenRene Cassin and Dr Charles Malik of Lebanon. The Commission met for the firsJanuary 1947 and considered several critical issues. Its decisions have greatly influenced the human rights development including action at national level. It concluded that it should work to develop first a declaration rather than a treaty. (An intdeclaration is a statement of importance, and has high moral and often political significance, and is more than a recommeis less than a treaty, which is binding in international law.) Perhaps most important of all, it decided that the declaration shboth civil and political and also economic and social rights.

The Commission's view was that the declaration should be a relatively short, inspirational and energising document usabpeople. It should be the foundation and central document for the remainder of an international bill of human rights. It thus more difficult problems that had to be addressed when the binding treaty came up for consideration - just what role the stahave in enforcing the rights in its territory, and whether the mode of enforcing civil and political rights should be different freconomic and social rights. It was fortunate that the Commission made the decision to separate the formally legally binding covenant from the initial dAlthough the declaration was endorsed in December 1948, the two covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and PoRights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) that emerged to define the obligations of

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were not ready for ratification (formal approval by the governments of the world) until 1966, some 18 years later. AN INSPIRATIONAL DOCUMENT The Commission then turned to formulating the declaration. It decided to name it the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).The very name emphasises the UDHR was to set a standard of rights for all people everywhere - whether male or female, black or white, communist or capitalist, victor or vanquished, rich or poor, for members of a majority or a minority in the community. In the wordsof the first preamble to the UDHR, it was to reflect

"recognition of the inherent dignity and .. equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family "... and through thatrecognition provide "the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world". Article 1 reflects the inspirational nature of the project. It was included only after much controversy about whether it was just stating theobvious, or whether it should be included in the preamble rather than the main text. It proclaims in ringing terms that

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towardsone another in a spirit of brotherhood". The reason for including it in the main text is to state firmly the basis of all human rights, the rationality of human persons and their obligation to deal fairly with everyone else, regardless of race, sex, wealth and so on. Article 7 follows up this theme by saying that allare to be equal before the law and have a right to protection against any form of discrimination. Articles 3 and 27 are probably the core of the substantive provisions in the Declaration. They give every human being the rights to life,to liberty, to security of person (Art 3) and to an adequate standard of living (Art 27). The first three are core civil and political rights, thelast an economic and social right. The right to an adequate standard of living is interesting in that it specifies as part of it the right tohealth and well-being not only of a person but of his or her family, and also the right to necessary food, clothing, housing and medicalcare, and the right to social security (also covered in Art 22).

Overarching all the particular rights are Articles 28 and 29. (There are 30 Articles in the Declaration, of which 17 could be regarded asrelating to civil and political rights and 8 to economic and social rights). Articles 28 and 29 have not received much discussion, andhave not been given legally binding force in the two Covenants. But they are explosive in their significance. Article 28 emphasises theresponsibility of the whole international community for seeking and putting into place arrangements of both a civil and political and aneconomic and social kind that allow for the full realisation of human rights. It would be easy to ask questions about current

arrangements or plans that hardly seem to do this, such as those relating to trade and investment arrangements and perhaps some of those planning to eradicate international crimes such as genocide and war crimes. Article 30 is also of high importance, because it underlines the responsibility all people have to their community. Notice that the Articledoes not talk about the state. There is danger in claiming, as so many dictators and even democratic leaders have claimed, that peopleowe duties of an inalienable kind to the state. They do not. But they do have obligations to their fellow human beings, as Article 1 alsoemphasises. Perhaps, looking back at the UDHR after half a century, the only significant lack is in the area of the environment. It can however beimplied from rights such as the right to life and to an adequate standard of living. Tribute should be played to three different groups. Firstly, to Eleanor Roosevelt and her advisers, mainly from the US Department of State. Somehow, she was able to maintain a generally harmonious atmosphere during virtually the whole of the long meeting phase.Second, to the many prominent people who provided drafts to the Committee for its consideration. These included noted internationallawyer, Professor Hersch Lauterpacht of Cambridge University, and British author H G Wells. There was also a draft based on workdone in preparation for an American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Finally, there was the enormous work done by thesecretariat, led by Professor J P Humphrey, that brought all this material together for the Commission to consider. When the Commission finally took its vote on 18 June 1948, twelve of its fifteen members voted in favour. The Soviet Union,

Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia (the Soviet bloc technically had only two members) abstained. The draft then went to the Economic and Social Council, which did not change the text but arranged for it to go to the Third Committeeof the UN General Assembly, where it struck difficulties. It was fortunate that the Committee's chairman at the time was Charles Malik.After no less than 81 long meetings, at which at least 168 amending resolutions were considered, the Committee, on 6 December 1948, at last reached agreement - just in time to be taken by the General Assembly before it concluded its meeting for the year. On the evening of 10 December 1948, the General Assembly endorsed the text of the UDHR without amendment, only two days beforeit rose until the next year. There were no dissenting votes, but the six communist countries then members of the UN, and also Saudi

Arabia and South Africa, abstained. The Assembly, in an rare gesture of appreciation, gave Mrs Roosevelt a standing ova THE GROWING STATURE OF THE UDHR So, just ahead of the advent of the Cold War and the consequent slowing down of many constructive developments, the UDeclaration managed to emerge successfully from the complex and politically hazardous processes of the United Nationshuman rights flagship. The Declaration had not managed at that time to achieve full recognition from the communist and ceastern countries, but at least they had not voted against it. Notwithstanding the initial difficulties and resistance, the Declaration has probably achieved a stature in the world that eveoptimistic of its founders in 1948 would not have expected. First, it has become accepted (often rather reluctantly, it is trueinfluential statement of standards, even by countries that are doubtful about the wholehuman rights enterprise. When couBurma, Argentina, China and the former Yugoslavia feel bound to defend themselves when they are accused of being in UDHR, then it can be said to have achieved an important political and moral status.

Equally important, the UDHR has become almost an extension of the UN Charter. Although, the Charter has only a few arefer to human rights and fundamental freedoms, it is now usual to refer to the UDHR as setting out the content of those rfreedoms. So it has become a part of the fabric of the UN itself, and is often referred to in resolutions of the UN General Ain its debates, for example in relation to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and PeopAt the human rights conference in Teheran in 1978, to mark the 30th anniversary of the UDHR, the representatives of 84 unanimously declared that the UDHR states a common understanding of the inalienable rights of all people and constituteobligation for the members of the international community. Third, most if not all the provisions of the UDHR have almost certainly become a part of international customary law. The steadily growing among international lawyers that practice (always an important source of international law) includes not oas observing rules about navigation at sea but also acts such as voting for resolutions at United Nations and other internagatherings. The very large and increasing number of ratifications of the two human rights Covenants, and the fact that thein the UDHR are commonly recognised as well founded in moral and good practice terms, means that there are now virtuunchallengeable grounds for asserting that the UDHR rights have become part of international customary law. That meantreaties, which only bind a country once it has accepted the treaty obligations, all countries in the world are bound, whatevparticular view may be. A country cannot repudiate international customary law, as it can a treaty obligation. For these three reasons, those who boldly moved to form and then approve the provisions of the UDHR have left an abid

humankind that will rank with the great religious contributions of past centuries. The UDHR is an increasingly powerful insthe achievement of human dignity and peace for all.

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