Identity & Culture - OxGAPS · Autumn 2016 A Publication based at St Antony’s College Featuring...

Autumn 2016 A Publication based at St Antony’s College

FeaturingH.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali

H.E. Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa

Ali Al-Youha

Nada Al Hassan

Foreword byAbdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain

Minister of Culture and Sports

President

Secretary General

Chief of Arab States Unit

State of Qatar

Bahrain Authority for Culture & Antiquities

Kuwait National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters

UNESCO

Identity & Culturein the 21st Century Gulf

OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum

OxGAPS is a University of Oxford platform based at St Antony’s College promoting interdisciplinary research and dialogue on the pressing issues facing the region.

Senior Member: Dr. Eugene Rogan

Committee:

Chairman & Managing Editor: Suliman Al-AtiqiVice Chairman & Partnerships: Adel HamaiziaEditor: Jamie EtheridgeChief Copy Editor: Jack HooverArabic Content Lead: Lolwah Al-KhaterHead of Outreach: Mohammed Al-DubayanCommunications Manager: Aisha FakhrooBroadcasting & Archiving Officer: Oliver Ramsay GrayResearch Assistant: Matthew Greene

Copyright © 2016 OxGAPS ForumAll rights reservedAutumn 2016

Gulf Affairs is an independent, non-partisan journal organized by OxGAPS, with the aim of bridging the voices of scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers to further knowledge and dialogue on pressing issues, challenges and opportunities facing the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessar-ily represent those of OxGAPS, St Antony’s College, or the University of Oxford.

Contact Details:OxGAPS Forum62 Woodstock RoadOxford, OX2 6JF, UKFax: +44 (0)1865 595770Email: [email protected]: www.oxgaps.org

Design and Layout by B’s Graphic Communication.Email: [email protected]

Cover: A visitor looks at photographs from Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum’s, the Crown Prince of Dubai, personal collection at the Dubai Photo Ex-hibition on 19 March 2016.

Photo Credits: Cover - Karim Sahib/AFP/Getty Images; 2 - Pool/Bandar Algaloud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images; 6 - Xinhua/Alamy Stock Photo; 10 - Rabih Moghrabi/AFP/Getty Images; 13 - Nelson Garrido; 17 - Yasser Al-Zayyat/AFP/Getty Images; 22 - Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images; 38 - REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo; 42 - BACA; 45 - NCCAL; 49 - UNESCO.

The Issue ‘Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf’ was supported by:

Table of Contents

I. Overview

Foreword

II. Analysis

III. Commentary

Identity and Culture in the 21st Century GulfMagdalena Karolak, Theme Editor

Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain

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ii Gulf Affairs

Challenges of Cultural Identity in the GCCby Ahmad Al-Dubayan

The Gulf States’ National Museumsby Sultan Al Qassemi

The Local Evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Contemporary Art Scene by Alia Al-Senussi

Understanding the Evolution of the Khaleeji Identityby Lulwa Abdulla Al-Misned

Khaleeji Identity in Contemporary Gulf Politicsby Gaith Abdulla

“Emiratization of Identity”: Conscription as a Cultural Tool of Nation-buildingby Eleonora Ardemagni

Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving Trading Cultureby Robert Mogielnicki

IconiCity: Seeking Identity by Building Iconic Architectures in Kuwaitby Roberto Fabbri

The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatarby Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa

Monolithic Representations and Orientalist Credence in the UAEby Rana AlMutawa

H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al AliMinister of Culture and SportsState of Qatar

H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-KhalifaPresident, Bahrain Authority for Culture & AntiquitiesKingdom of Bahrain

Ali Al-YouhaSecretary GeneralKuwait National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters

Nada Al HassanChief of Arab States UnitUNESCO

Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCCby Rana Jarbou

Timeline

Table of Contents

IV. Interviews

V. Featured Photo Essay and Timeline

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Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 iii

In the 1960s, the Gulf states experienced a cultural renais-sance and the start of intellectual modernization. Khaleeji so-ciety has evolved over the ensuing 50 years due to four key reasons. First is the progressive vision of civil society. This in-cludes cultural foundations, institutions, clubs, and non-profit organizations as well as poets, sheikhs, thinkers, artists, and writers from the region. They all believe in culture and its val-ue in evolving society’s virtues, principles, and wisdom. The second is communication. Across the region, daily editorials, columns, analyses, interviews, TV programs, radio programs and more recently, social media have all focused on cultural activities, and the cultural dimension of these societies has be-come a facet of daily life. It orients common opinion and adds understanding and value to our view of life.

A third factor that has promoted cultural production and ex-change across the GCC region is the development of printing and translation and the explosion of information available to a

large segment of the population. Finally, governments of the Gulf states all play an important, central role in promoting local cultural production. Through the allocation of funds and encouragement of local societ-ies, competitions, awards, and other efforts, public institutions have supported a well-entrenched tradition of indigenously-produced arts and culture. Today, the Arabic culture is much more universal than before because it has been disseminated internationally through cultural and civilizational centers for dialogue established in the big historical cities.

My own efforts should be understood within the framework of civil society and corporate social responsi-bility. In 1989, I established the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Foundation, which now functions through six bodies: the Prize of Poetic Creativity, the Centre of Intercultural Dialogue, the Institute of Peace, the Centre of Communication, the Centre of Social Development, and the Directorate of Libraries.

We organize and co-organize a number of cultural events with international institutions and finance oth-ers, forming a bridge between the Arab world and countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Recently, we were honored by re-endowing the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Laudian Chair in Arabic at the University of Ox-ford, which is one of seven other chairs ensuring the same mission in different universities in Chad, China, Comoros Islands, France, Italy, Spain, and Togo.

After 25 years, the foundation is known all over the world, and we have organized 15 conferences and ses-sions in Arabic poetry and intercultural dialogue. We work closely with governmental institutions, interna-tional bodies, and NGOs, as the goals of the foundation resonate deeply with their missions. For example, in 2006, during the Foundation’s 10th session held in Paris, France, under the auspices of His Excellency

iv Gulf Affairs

Foreword

Forewordby Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain

Foreword

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 v

the former French President Jacques Chirac and in coordination with UNESCO, we organized a seminar which was described by the former Director-General of UNESCO Koichiro Matsuura as an “excellent op-portunity to reflect on the notion of intercultural dialogue, as well as on the role of the poet in encouraging mutual understanding and respect among cultures.” We are, Matsuura added, “encouraging creativity, and enabling it to flourish in a spirit of diversity and freedom. This is one of the best ways of promoting cultural vitality and sustaining human development.”

Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain is a prominent Kuwaiti businessman and founder of the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Foundation. He is also a renowned poet and his first book Bauh Al-Bawadi (Intimations of the Desert) was pub-lished in 1995. Al-Babtain holds 14 honorary doctorates, has received numerous awards, honors, and medals including the Kuwait Order of the Sash from the Amir of Kuwait, Order of Civil Merit from the King of Spain and National Order of the Cedar from the President of Lebanon.

Identity and Culture in the 21st Century Gulf

by Magdalena Karolak, Theme Editor

I. Overview

vi Gulf Affairs

Overview

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries entered the 21st century with greater maturity. Across the region, these states consolidated the many political, economic, and social projects that had been in progress since independence and state formation in the 20th century.

New challenges abound, however, as Gulf millennials enter a rapidly changing world facing regional con-flicts and socioeconomic pressures. One of the core questions likely to shape the coming decades in the Gulf is the issue of identity. States must continue to forge strong national identities, while the creation of the GCC has paved the way for the growth of a pan-khaleeji identity. Formation of national identities in the Gulf has not been an easy project, as exemplified elsewhere in the Middle East. Religious, ethnic, tribal, and settlement cleavages that cut through the population are factors that make identification and loyalty with non-state structures more salient. The structures of power often determine these specific patterns of identification. Yet, it is also clear that identities, once crystallized, in turn impact the social structure.

The creation of strong national identities requires anchoring the nation’s history in founding myths shared by all citizens. Indeed, a community exists thanks to a shared perception of the past, present, and future events that transcends individuals, linking their lives to those of their predecessors and their successors in a meaningful way. Attempts to revive and, most importantly, reconstruct history based on present needs, are widely observed in the Gulf. New museums, monuments, archaeological sites, and the revival of tradi-tion all testify to this need. In the process, new meanings and national narratives are formed.

However, in search of uniformity and consolidation, what is inscribed in the collective memory often omits minority identities that do not easily fit the mainstream. Such strong national identities have been active-ly sought as the GCC attempts to move away from the rentier model and new generations of citizens are asked to contribute to their countries in various ways. Gulf newspapers often celebrate the talents and achievements of young citizens in various disciplines, while Saudi Arabia recently called on its citizens to sacrifice for their country with salary cuts in public jobs. Other types of sacrifice may be even more palpable as GCC countries intervene militarily in conflicts at home and abroad. Sacrifice for the country is, in turn, cherished through public celebrations of citizens’ commitments and achievements, further strengthening national narratives.

The needs of the present also dictate another trend that shapes the Gulf, that of construction. Lacking monuments that could rival others in the Middle East, the GCC countries have embarked on extravagant building programs that put Gulf cities on the map among the most impressive architectural undertakings. With the tallest building in the world in Dubai (soon to be overshadowed by Jeddah Tower), and many oth-er daring constructions and developments on the way, the Gulf cities have been transformed from some-what sleepy trading towns to world centers, places to see and to be seen. The glamour that is a by-product of modernity does not undermine the fact that the Gulf strives to continue the legacy of Middle Eastern achievements. Many iconic buildings in the GCC stand out juxtaposed with the Egyptian pyramids in the Priceless Arabia MasterCard advertisement for the MENA region, for example. So far, facilitated by oil re-

I. Overview

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 vii

sources, the Gulf further sets itself as a center of world banking, tourism, trade, shopping, and innovation, projecting its identity toward the future with a sense of pride.

Indeed, in a Middle East torn by conflicts and upheavals, the Gulf seems to hold a special place character-ized by stability and progress. This search for stability was the reason for the creation of the GCC in the first place and makes “othering” from neighboring states easier. Yet, the khaleeji identity tied to the GCC project is characterized by fluidity, with cooperation at times closer or further away. However, the need for security and preservation of the Gulf’s political systems may dictate closer ties in the future. It is not a coincidence that the proposal of a Gulf union followed the GCC intervention in Bahrain. With the rising rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over dominance in the Middle East, the GCC project, and hence khaleeji identity building, remains as valid as ever.

Lastly, it is clear that individuals need to self-identify with specific communities, practices, and institutions with which they form attachments. The study “Psychological Effects of Globalisation on Young Women and Men” conducted by the Dubai School of Government concluded that bilingual students in the UAE and Saudi Arabia are bicultural, as they identify with both local and global cultures. The GCC has some of the highest per-capita rates of internet use in the world and offers a particularly interesting case study. While at this point the internet has not eradicated local cultures, appropriation of cultural elements from elsewhere will have important effects in the future. This may raise interest in institutionalizing the pro-tection of local cultures, taking into account the large presence of expatriates. In addition, networking opportunities offered by the internet have already proved important in the creation of collective identities on national and regional levels. The shift towards responsible and active citizenship will no doubt create more grassroots activism facilitated by the use of internet. Collective activism may ultimately be based on identities of groups that feel left out of the mainstream, bringing us back to the question of strong national identities.

This volume is a fine selection of analyses highlighting the many debates and multi-dimensional develop-ments that are taking place. These extremely interesting intersections invite us to closely follow the subject of Gulf identities, no doubt leaving us with more questions than answers, which makes the reading even more rewarding.

Dr. Magdalena Karolak is Assistant Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Zayed University, UAE. She has published more than 30 journal articles and book chapters on various aspects of social, political and economic transformations in the GCC.

II. Analysis

Khaleeji Identity in Contemporary Gulf Politics

by Gaith Abdulla

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II. Analysis

haleeji identity has great potential to explain the contemporary politics and international relations of the Gulf. However, it is by no means a widely recognized concept; you’d be hard pressed to find even

passing reference to the term in the literature on Gulf politics.1 Khaleeji (meaning ‘of the Gulf’ in Arabic) denotes a socio-political regional identity that is shared by citizens of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Khaleeji identity is the next step in the evolution of political identity in the Gulf, which began with tribal identities and developed to include national identities with the advent of nation-states in the region in the mid-20th Century.

Khaleeji identity builds on strong cultural homogeneity within the Gulf states, the result of a long history of sustained social engagement and intermarriage. It also features prominently in popular culture, music, television, sports, civil society, and reaches all the way to the top decision-making levels of government. In the regional milieu, khaleeji identity has had a defining role in the creation and durability of the GCC, what is today the most stable and highly functional regional institution in the Middle East.2 Although fear of an expansionist post-revolution Iran was one of the primary motivations behind the establishment of this regional architecture,3 the underlying khaleeji identity common to the Gulf states was the social glue that allowed such regionalization to take place. What’s interesting about the GCC is that since its creation

Gulf Affairs

Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman chairs the meeting of defense ministers of the GCC states in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 15 November 2016.

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016

II. Analysis

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in 1981 it has become a key driver of khaleeji identity. The GCC is the most tangible manifestation of the regional identity and this international institution has “contributed decisively to the creation of a khaleeji persona in international relations.”4

Khaleeji – in theory

Despite its significance and potential, khaleeji identity has remained an under-theorized term. This is pri-marily the result of the overriding influence of oil on the conceptualization of the politics of the Gulf. Many of the existing theories of the socio-political structures of the Gulf have developed with oil as a central unit of analysis. As these conceptions reflect the strategic, political, and economic security concerns of great powers (namely the US) in the region, it is only natural that oil has had such a defining role in shaping the theories and perceptions of Gulf politics.5

Because elite and ruling social classes in the Gulf are the most relevant to oil production and policy, they are the most notable classes to account for in the oil-centric theories. And these theories, which are mostly concerned with security and oil output from a great power perspective, content themselves by discussing the internal dynamics of Gulf states as a relationship of the elite/ruling classes with the rest of ‘society’ measured in terms of material resources.6 The inflated influence of oil, great power strategic interests, and the elite/ruling classes on existing theories points to the importance of developing concepts such as khaleeji identity that open avenues to constructivist approaches to the politics of the Gulf as opposed to the hawk-eyed realist conceptualizations.

Identity and the interests of the state

Realism plays a big role in the behavior of khaleeji states given the region’s strategic significance. But among other nebulous state-society relationships, institutional policy production is often mired in self-in-terests. Hence taking a step back and re-theorizing could possibly yield a better understanding of policy production and state behavior in the Gulf. On the other hand, with a sight set beyond material interests and security concerns, constructivism recognizes that states are social actors, seeing identity and other “ideational forces” as important motivators “on political interests and thus on national security policies.”7

From a constructivist perspective, khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics and would be a cornerstone in any project of regional integration in the Gulf. Constructivism defines regionalism as a product of “regional awareness, a shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community. . . Therefore, sub-regional integration is dependent on the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making.”8

The potential of a shared regional identity, like khaleeji identity, for policy production and grass-roots re-gionalization is evident. However, bygone failed integration projects based on the perception of a shared identity (e.g. Arabism) call for caution. The issues that plague Arabism are for the most part the same prob-lems faced in the Gulf, that the project of integration exists at the level of states, is informed by the ruling/elite classes, and lacks functioning democratic avenues. These factors hinder the effective representation of the social dimension. 9

However, the homogeneity of the socio-political climate in the Gulf states is something that did not fea-ture in the Arab integration project. This is where khaleeji identity comes to play: it represents not only common popular culture, history, traditions and heritage, but also complements the existent prevailing

socio-political identities, namely Arab, Is-lamic, tribal and national identities. This regional identity represents a shared po-litical culture amongst citizens and not only common ideals limited to the ruling/

elite classes.

The Middle East today is probably in the worst shape in its modern history. Amidst this, the Gulf states contrast starkly with their surroundings. Although by no means unscathed by the turmoil, the six mem-bers of the GCC find themselves as the most stable and coherently functional states in the region. As the rest of the Arab world has ground to a halt, Gulf cities are argued to be the new centers of the region. They are now the “nerve center of the contemporary Arab world’s culture, commerce, design, architecture, art and academia.” 10 The Gulf states need to reflect on their particularities, strengths, and weaknesses as they find themselves occupying positions of power and influence in the Middle East that they are unaccustomed to. Khaleeji identity is an invaluable particularity to the Gulf states, both shaping and being shaped by ac-tions and policies. It acts as a dynamic force strengthening intra-GCC relations at the elite and grass roots levels and informs more coherent and consistent regional interaction.

The relationship between identity, the state, and society has become more complex and pronounced than ever in the history of the Gulf. The roles, actions, and attitudes of the Gulf states are changing, and with that the role of identity becomes ever more salient. It is necessary to appreciate the role that khaleeji iden-tity plays in the social milieu as a fundamental driver of domestic attitudes and regional and international policy positions, as doing so will create more strategic, sustainable, and perhaps democratic policies. In-deed, khaleeji identity will remain highly dynamic as it defines the societies and states of the Arab Gulf in the 21st Century.

Gaith Abdulla is a doctoral candidate at Durham University focusing on khaleeji identity, youth and re-gionalisation in the Gulf.

4 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis

A notable exception is Adam Hanieh’s conceptualization of khaleeji capital in his book Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States

(Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2011). In defining khaleeji capital he explains “The Arabic word khaleej is literally translated as “Gulf” but

goes beyond a geographic meaning to convey a common pan-Gulf Arab identity that sets the people of the region apart from the rest of the

Middle East.” (p.2).

Abdullah Al Shayji, “Salman doctrine is the best option,” Gulf News, April 3, 2016.

Kristian Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (London: Hurst, 2011).

Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p.153. In his book, Legrenzi argues that the GCC has been responsible for a Gulf popular identity

becoming a substantive reality and “working its way into the political and economic landscape of the six Gulf monarchies.” (p.2)

Current Gulf politics are clearly shaped by U.S. policy and oil security. For example, the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia’ is seen as one of the main

driving forces behind Saudi Arabia’s newfound assertiveness and hard power projection in the region, the Saudi-led military campaign in

Yemen being the prime example of this. And the perception is that current record low oil prices have motivated the governments of the

Gulf states to seek to expedite processes of economic diversification and escape the dependency on oil. See Roberts, David, “Shake up for

the sheikhs as the oil slump hits home,” Chatham House, June/July 2016.

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Khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics and would be a cornerstone in any project of regional integration in the Gulf.

II. Analysis

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 5

Commonly referred to as the ‘ruling bargain’, in which the elite/ruling classes use their oil money to subsidize their societies in return

for political acquiescence. See Davidson, Christopher, “Diversification in Abu Dhabi and Dubai: The Impact on National Identity and

the Ruling Bargain,” in Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States, Alsharekh, A.&R (Springborg London: Saqi

Books, 2008), 143-153.

Legrenzi, 46.

Ibid, 46-47.

Although Arabism and Arab integration was a populist ideal and had huge popular support in its heyday, the lack of functioning

democratic apparatus meant this popular dimension was never able to manifest itself in policy production. The contagion effect of the

Arab Spring is a great example of these deeply ingrained shared attitudes amongst Arabs. See Lynch, Marc. “The Big Think Behind

the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy. November 28, 2011.

Sultan Al-Qassemi, “Thriving Gulf Cities Emerge as New Centers of Arab World,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2013.

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n 2014, the United Arab Emirates introduced compulsory military service for nationals. However, this new requirement will not change the fundamental factors shaping the UAE’s security reality.

First, Emiratis comprise a tiny percentage of the country’s total population, representing only 20 percent of the UAE’s total inhabitants. Secondly, persistent coup-proofing strategies remain fundamental to pre-serving regime stability. The Emiratis maintain a small army that is directly controlled by Abu Dhabi’s royal family and contains a mix of ‘asabiyya-based officers and foreign manpower. In addition to a strict military rationale, the government’s plan for conscription has a deep cultural intent: the “Emiratization of identity.” Emiratization is “a policy of national unity”,1 and with the introduction of the military draft, the government aims to enhance the collective national Emirati identity, which remains fragmented by different tribal affiliations, emirate-specific identities, social classes, and the overwhelming numbers of expatriates in the country. In recently-unified states, conscription has often helped central institutions to build a national political discourse.2 National identity, as a dynamic set of shared beliefs and historical legacies, is a theoretical concept, but at the same time it is an incessant social construction.3 Looking at post-colonial state-building in Arab republics, compulsory military service was a driver of nationalism and enhanced regime security. In a time of multidimensional challenges, the UAE’s conscription and military engagement abroad may be seen as practical devices to forge a recognizable group identity and a modern

II. Analysis

6 Gulf Affairs

“Emiratization of Identity”: Conscription as a Cultural Tool of Nation-building

by Eleonora Ardemagni

A service man talks with a child during a military show to celebrate the 43rd anniversary of the founding of the UAE in Abu Dhabi on 1 December 2014.

II. Analysis


and effective national discourse.

From a federation towards a nation

The UAE federation-building process has succeeded through top-down policies, even if state-centralization is still ongoing. In the 1970s, the UAE’s state-building process was pri-marily rent-driven, but armed forces became late federation-building drivers from the 1990s onwards.4 In 1997, Dubai integrated its military system into a federal one. The modern inte-gration into a single force allowed Abu Dhabi to include members from the northern emirates, which was important because at least 61 percent of Emirati nationals live in the north.5 How-ever, this did little to expand national identity, as the step was primarily used to expand Abu Dhabi’s neo-patrimonial leadership over the whole federation. Today, nation-building is still a “work in progress.”

This work in progress is geared towards nurtur-ing a national mythomoteur built on perceived myths, memories, and symbols. For example, the Bedouin mythology is a fundamental heritage, al-though it is sometimes stereotyped.6 But it alone has not been successful in conveying a sense of belonging among contemporary young Emiratis. The politics of militarization has gradually differentiated the UAE from its neighbors. Emirati foreign policy is currently driven from a geopolitical and security viewpoint. As a matter of fact, the security sector has recently become a pillar of the UAE’s institution-building. The UAE’s military engagement in Yemen represents an unprecedented effort in terms of regional securi-ty, and economic diversification projects target the defense sector more and more, as confirmed by the development of Abu Dhabi’s military industrial complex.

Conscription and geopolitics

In the UAE, compulsory military service involves male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30. The service is optional for women, who can serve for nine months with the consent of their par-ents. Federal Law 6/2014 has extended national service from nine to 12 months for high school graduates, while it remains two years for nationals with lower levels of education. The 2015-2017 Emirati Strategy for the National Service establishes three batches each year of between 5,000 and 7,000 total recruits. The first phase of national service is about study, exercises, and lectures on patriotism.7 Recruits then join the Presidential Guard for practical training.

The Emirati government’s decision to introduce conscription as a tool of nation-building has to be framed in a specific geopolitical context. Currently, the Middle East is marked by several intertwined variables of insecurity which have a direct impact on national identity. First of all, the Arab uprisings have introduced into the Emirati public debate ideas such as active citizen participation in the decision-making process and government accountability.

Secondly, the phenomenon of jihadi transnational networks, such as the self-proclaimed Is-lamic State, challenges Arab states, suggesting the physical presence of the imagined umma. The objective of these non-state actors is to erode the political legitimacy of traditional states, labeling them “un-Islamic” and contesting established boundaries. Such challenges press state

The Emirati government’s decision to introduce conscription as a tool of nation-building has to be framed in a specific geopolitical context.

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8 Gulf Affairs

institutions to implement intricate counter-narratives. In the UAE’s case, military service sym-bolizes the rhetoric of a nation that citizens want to proudly defend.

Thirdly, the political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony, where sectarianism is a tool of power politics, exacerbates national spirits, prompting states to choose alliances and produce counter-alignments. With regard to the Yemeni conflict, the UAE aligned with Saudi Arabia from the beginning despite considerable economic interests with Iran, the presence of a remarkable Iranian diaspora within the federation, and Dubai’s traditional com-mercial and cultural relations with Tehran. The mission, which serves geopolitics and nation building, took precedence over other important interests.

The Yemeni laboratory: militaries as identity-mobilizers The UAE’s military intervention in Yemen has bolstered a sense of national identity among Emirati citizens. The federation has been operating in Yemen since March 2015, participating first in airstrikes against Shia militias, then heading de facto ground operations in the south-ern regions, with a specific focus on counterterrorism (anti-AQAP operations) within Aden, Mukalla and the Abyan region. In the summer of 2015, Abu Dhabi’s Presidential Guard and some drafted soldiers were deployed to Yemen, and more than eighty Emirati soldiers have lost their lives in Yemen so far. On September 4, 2015, forty-five Emirati soldiers were killed by a Houthi attack near Mareb, an unprecedented number of single-day military casualties for the federation.

Since the beginning, UAE official declarations and media coverage framed the unexpected event through a patriotic lens: the ‘collective mourning’ was immediately juxtaposed with referenc-es to the ‘epic of sacrifice’ and the ‘celebration of the Nation,’ evoking the “soldiers martyred in Yemen.”8 To commemorate what happened in Mareb, a day of National Celebration was established on November 30. The day also emphasizes the novel nature of the UAE’s military commitment abroad, which transcends traditional internal security tasks and marks a “para-digm shift” for Gulf military forces.9 The ‘heroic militaries’ have enhanced a ‘rally around the flag’ feeling. They might become identity-mobilizers, the government’s best example of Emirati identity. By analyzing the recent Federal National Council’s elections, we see that military prestige has started to play a mobilizing role in the electoral competition—of 341 candidates, 46 came from a police or military career,10 as well as five out of the 20 who were eventually elected. One of those elected, former Dubai chief of the police Matar bin Amira Al-Shamsi, campaigned with the slogan “military service and patriotism.”11 Soldier Khalifa Al-Hamoodi from Fujairah, injured in Yemen, received extensive media coverage while he was at the electoral poll to cast his ballot.12 The government hopes that Emiratis will develop communal bonds and an in-group awareness by looking at their soldiers, a mindset that would modernize and bolster the Emirati mythomoteur. Moreover, the “mediatization” of the militaries sheds light on their new social role, which also includes a counter-radicalization message against the phenomenon of foreign fighters. From this perspective, the shahid is the heroic soldier or pilot who sacrifices himself to protect the nation, not the suicide bomber who kills “the infidels.”

Conclusion It is possible to identify a circular relationship between the UAE’s armed forces and the domes-


II. Analysis

tic realm. Militaries contribute to a sense of federal belonging and national consciousness. At the same time, the country’s institutions are attempting to maximize this bottom-up popular phenomenon, introducing top-down measures, such as military conscription, aimed to shape a shared collective identity and cope with rising internal security threats. Through military ser-vice, the federal government aims to promote nationalism above Islamism, the Muslim Broth-erhood, and jihadism.

For the UAE, yesterday’s challenge was passing from ‘many tribes’ to a ‘unified federation.’ Nowadays, the aspiration is instead to construct ‘the Nation,’ where identity generates social cohesion and nurtures state legitimacy.13 The geopolitical context is highly unstable, and the UAE has also been confronting the domestic effects of globalization—among them expatriate communities which claim for naturalization—raising fear of identity dilution and, to a lesser extent, cultural assimilation. Bedouin ancestry and khaleeji culture are essential pillars of the UAE’s national identity. Nevertheless, the national mythomoteur seeks new symbols, beliefs, and shared myths to face post-modernity, especially now that the Arab Gulf region is marked by growing and sometimes competing nationalisms. Therefore, in line with the government’s aspirations, conscription is not only a military institution, but rather a cultural tool of na-tion-building and the Emiratization of identity.

Eleonora Ardemagni is a Gulf Analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation and a regular contributor for the Aspen Institute Italy and the Italian Institute for International Political Stud-ies (ISPI, Milan).

Karen E. Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates: Between the Majilis and the Mar-ket (Palgrave Macmillan: 2014), p. 33.

See for instance the case of Italy. Vanda Wilcox, “Encountering Italy: Military Service and National Identity during the First World

War”, Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol.3, No.2, 2011, 283-302.

Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).

Eleonora Ardemagni, “United Arab Emirates’ Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process: Seeking for Ambitious Engagement,”

International Studies Journal 47, vol.12, no.3, Winter 2016, pp.43-62.

Victor Gervais, “Du pétrole à l’armée: les stratégies de construction de l’état aux Émirats Arabes Unis,” Institut de Recherche Stratégique

de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Études de l’IRSEM 8, 2011.

Ronald Hawker, “Imagining a Bedouin Past: Stereotypes and Cultural Representation in the Contemporary United Arab Emirates,”

Beirut Institute for Media Arts conference paper, Lebanese American University, 2013.

Samir Salama, “National service will reinforce patriotism, national identity, says FNC Speaker,” Gulf News, 16 June, 2014.

“UAE salutes 45 soldiers martyred in Yemen,” Khaleej Times, 5 September, 2015; The National, “UAE news in review 2015: A year of

sacrifice and honour for Armed Forces,” 30 December, 2015.

On this topic, refer to David B. Roberts, “A New Era for Gulf Military Forces,” Gulf Affairs, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies

Forum, University of Oxford, Spring 2016, pp.6-8.

Samir Salama, “Revealed: Names of 341 FNC poll candidates,” Gulf News, 31 August, 2015.

“Profiles: Meet the preliminary 20 newly elected FNC members,” The National, 4 October, 2015.

“FNC Election 2015: as it happened,” Gulf News, 3 October, 2015.

Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, ed. Mehran Kamrava

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1-28.

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10 Gulf Affairs

Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving Trading Culture

by Robert Mogielnicki

A cargo ship is docked at Jebel Ali port in Dubai, UAE on 14 March 2006.

ecent discoveries at the Saruq Al-Hadid archeological site located outside of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) demonstrate the emirate’s connection to key trading routes dating as far back

as 4,000 years ago. In light of the July 2016 inauguration of the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeology Museum by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, it is clear that the government is making a conscious effort to reconstruct this early trading identity and promote it broadly to the public. Sheikh Mohammed’s comments at the museum’s opening reinforced the links between the archeological museum and Dubai’s trading culture: “Museums reflect the culture of the nation.”1

Saruq Al-Hadid

While the museum links the region’s early trading culture to that of today, it is important to note the contin-ual evolution of Dubai’s mercantile traditions, which can be broadly categorized into three distinct phases: i) Saruq Al-Hadid, ii) Dubai Creek and iii) the proliferation of free zones. The evolution in the location of trading hubs and nature of trade over these periods had clear implications for the infrastructure of modern Dubai and for the identity of its inhabitants. Indeed, Dubai’s free zones are the modern-day manifestations of the trading culture that started in Saruq Al-Hadid and further developed around Dubai Creek.

II. Analysis


The fortuitous position of Saruq Al-Hadid between strategic trading routes shaped Dubai’s early trading culture. The ancient Iron Age site of Saruq Al-Hadid is located in the Rub Al-Khali desert area of Dubai’s southern border. Nestled further inland than the coastal cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the area flour-ished as a center for metalwork manufacturing. Evidence from the site suggests that its inhabitants used domesticated camels to facilitate trade to current day Egypt, Syria, Iran, Oman, Bahrain, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Rashad Bukhash, director of the Heritage Department of Dubai Municipality, explained that the site “shows the age-old tradition of Dubai being a hub for trade even in those days.”2 Appropriate-ly, the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeological Museum is located along the historic Dubai Creek in the Shindagha district of Dubai.

Dubai Creek

Before the discovery of Saruq Al-Hadid, historians tended to trace the early history of Dubai to the 18th cen-tury settlements around Dubai Creek. The arrival of the Al-Maktoum tribe to Dubai in the 1830s helped formalize much of the commercial activity around the creek and also encouraged the immigration of new waves of Indian and Persian merchants. This early influx of non-Arab merchants helped to shape the mod-ern socio-economic demographics of Dubai. Today, Indians serve as the largest national demographic of residents in Dubai, with Indians and Pakistanis contrib-uting 25 and 12 percent respectively to the emirate’s pop-ulation of approximately 2.5 million residents.3 Similar-ly, Iranians continue to play key roles in social, business and advisory circles, and estimates suggest that Iranians may account for 16-20 percent of Dubai’s population.4

Located in the northeastern corner of the emirate, the Dubai Creek area consists of the historic districts of Bur Dubai and Deira. The original spice and gold markets, poignant remnants of the area’s more promis-ing past, are situated near the northern shore of the creek in Deira.

Although it served as a bustling commercial hub for centuries, the creek’s shallow waters prevented the trading hub from receiving large maritime vessels. After various attempts to dredge the creek throughout the later part of the 20th century, as well as the opening of Port Rashid in 1972, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al-Maktoum commenced plans to construct the Jebel Ali Port a further 50 kilometers along the coastline toward Abu Dhabi.

Free Zones

The Jebel Ali Port heralded a new age in Dubai’s trading legacy—the Free Zone Era. The Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (JAFZA), originally created in 1985 to facilitate the warehousing and storage of shipments entering the port, became the first free zone to operate in Dubai. Today, the free zone hosts over 7,000 companies and houses approximately 60,000 residents. The success of Jebel Ali served as a model for other well-known free zones, including the Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority (DAFZA) and the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC). And while earlier trading cultures in Dubai naturally developed around strategic locations, the rise of free zones represented a more direct, pragmatic development of Dubai’s trad-ing culture on the part of the government.

The evolution in the location of trading hubs and nature of trade over these periods had clear implications for the infrastructure of modern Dubai and for the identity of its inhabitants.v

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12 Gulf Affairs

Yet not all free zones in the emirate conform to the standard free zone definition or emulate the Jebel Ali Free Zone model. TECOM Group, a developer and operator of business communities and member of Dubai Holding, manages eleven free zones that contain 5,100 companies and employ 76,000 people. The group refers to these free zones as ‘business communities,’ and they tend to be less involved with imports and ex-ports. Instead, these business communities function as knowledge hubs that attract a diverse demographic of human capital and offer a varied set of commercial, tourist, and residential services.6 For example, Dubai residents can live, work and shop in Dubai Media City. When compared to more traditional zones like Jebel Ali Free Zone and the Dubai Airport Free Zone, TECOM Group’s free zones are seamlessly inte-grated into the social fabric of Dubai.

While the traders of Saruq Al-Hadid and Dubai Creek settled in strategic overland trading routes or along natural saltwater inlets, the trading culture of 21st century Dubai was shaped predominantly by manmade projects. Technological innovations in cargo shipping, commercial aviation, and services further changed the nature of trade, and Dubai’s government responded by developing the most advanced free zone sector in the region. Free zones shifted the nexus of trade away from Dubai Creek and distributed commercial activity more broadly throughout the emirate. At the same time, these new commercial hubs attracted foreign professionals, tourists, and residents from across the globe. Free zones will continue to dominate Dubai’s trading culture for the foreseeable future, but it is important to remember that these zones are intrinsically linked to a much older trading legacy.

Robert Mogielnicki is a DPhil candidate in Oriental Studies and member of Magdalen College where he examines the political economy of free zones in GCC countries.

“Mohammed bin Rashid inaugurates Saruq Al Hadid museum at Al Shindagha,” Emirates News Agency, July 4, 2016.

Sajila Saseendran, “Dubai’s trade links date back 4,000 years,” Gulf News, July 22, 2016.

Statistics from Euromonitor; reported in Khamis, Jumana, “Indians, Pakistanis make up 37% of Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman population,” Gulf News, August 6, 2015.

Jure Snoj, “UAE’s population – by nationality,” Business Qatar Magazine, April 12, 2015.

Based on the author’s latest D.Phil research on free zones in the GCC. However, it is important to note that new zones are often emerging

and announcements for new zones appear regularly.

Well-known free zones operated by TECOM Group include Dubai Internet City, Dubai Media City, Knowledge Village and Dubai Inter-

national Academic City.

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Broadly speaking, a free zone is a duty-free area outside of customs control. The traditional free zone model consists of a physical location wherein firms are incentivized to increase domestic exports, gen-erate foreign direct investment (FDI), employ locals, and transfer new technologies and skills to the na-tional workforce. However, a critical component of free zones in Dubai involves the right for foreign in-vestors to maintain 100% ownership of their com-panies, rather than sharing ownership with a local Emirati citizen. Currently, there are approximately 24 functioning free zones operating in Dubai, and the number of Dubai-based free zones vastly out-numbers those in neighboring emirates (Figure 1).5

Table 1: Free Zone Distribution in the UAE


II. Analysis

IconiCity: Seeking Identity by Building Iconic Architectures in Kuwait

by Roberto Fabbri1

View of Sharq district with Al-Hamra tower in the center. Kuwait City, Kuwait, 2015.

he Emirates Airlines website welcomes visitors by stating that Dubai’s iconic architecture is not only encouraged, but “actively pursued.” A subsequent list of evidence describing extreme heights, uncon-

ventional shapes, and cutting-edge materials supports the claim.2 The Gulf states have turned to architec-ture as a way to build globally-recognized skylines. This wave of new, iconic buildings is often an attempt to build an urban uniqueness which, moreover, is part of the quest for a stronger national and social identity.

A landmark is traditionally a symbol that raises a sense of belonging in the local population, but normally monuments are few in the urban fabric, and they are limited to specific spaces of public interest. But what happens when the city itself becomes composed of a significant number of icons, and the urban fabric is just the “in between”? Kuwait is an interesting case in the Gulf because it has a more consolidated pre-ex-isting urban form, and these ‘new objects’ are not related at any level, neither in scale nor in language to the surrounding context. The current transformation process focuses on the development of isolated ele-ments, self-standing on their own plot and auto-referential. Around them, the connective fabric is left with poor design and modest construction quality.

II. Analysis

14 Gulf Affairs

Icon & media

The architectural press normally welcomes these ‘photogenic’ buildings and presents the city not by its ‘nature’ but by its ‘suit.’ One can argue that, apart from the different layers of reading or meaning that a building can generate, architecture is the expression of the society that produces it. In other words, archi-tects and clients are transforming the building into a sort of ‘tridimensional logo’ implementing a series of design choices: an unusual, unique, and symbolic shape different from any other ‘competitor.’ There are certain requirements: The icon shall be a technical challenge that raises engineering to an extremely high standard, where complexity consolidates its identity. Size is another crucial aspect, and specifically the vertical dimension. Iconic architecture has to be big to stand out in the city fabric. Furthermore, the name and the fame of the designer are also major factors in establishing an iconic building.

This design approach often brings these buildings very close to an industrial-design object, self-centered and self-referent. Consequentially iconic architecture has, in most cases, a conflicting dialogue with its context, because it is meant to communicate to a worldwide audience, while the local ‘assimilation’ is more problematic.

Iconizing Kuwait

Iconic buildings are a worldwide phenomenon, and the examples in the Gulf are not too different from what is happening in the rest of the world. One could argue that prestige projects are more prevalent in the region due to the lack of pre-existing local monuments which can catalyze the sense of belonging. However, this would not entirely reflect reality, since at the very initial inception of the urban and social modern-ization in the Gulf in the mid-20th century, the construction of representative buildings was at the center of every governmental plan.3 Today, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Dubai have all become archetypes for cities in transformation in the region, while Kuwait, on the other hand, is somehow different from its neighbors.

Kuwait has a more complex urban fabric and a longer urban history, one punctuated by a large number of highly experimental projects since the early 1950s.4 The city is also in transformation, but the vision is less evident, cohesive, and advertised than in the other Gulf states. In the last decade many projects were announced to modernize the city and keep pace with the region, including a new airport, two new towers for the Central Bank and the National Bank of Kuwait, and a new hospital center, among others.

The city center is now also in transformation, and despite the fact that this part of the city would need more consolidation than ‘intrusions,’ the construction of skyscrapers is now mostly focused here, where large plots are abandoned or under-used. These are mostly initiatives by private actors investing in sepa-rate plots without a coordinated vision. The ‘in between’ is a non-space left with no integrated functions or quality: a very loose and undefined canvas amid vertical objects unrelated to each other or the city itself.

In contrast, Yasser Mahgoub’s reading of the build environment of Kuwait concludes that multiple identi-ties should be accepted as a natural result of the actions of different groups in the society, and architecture is the representation of this local contemporary condition and desire.5 In principle, this argument is convinc-ing, but the quid pro quo is the acceptance of a heterogeneous approach to shapes, forms, and languages. This tradeoff was well described in the early 1960s by Saba George Shiber in his critique of Kuwait City’s transformation: “Architecture became an exercise in acrobatics and not an endeavor in creation, economics and organicism. . . . It has become rare to find lines anchored to the earth. Instead, they all seem pivoted


II. Analysis

to point restively to outer space.”6 Paraphrasing Shiber, proportions, shapes, materials, colors, and placements are so different that it is very difficult to perceive urban unity.

In 2011 Kuwait City received its own internation-ally recognizable iconic building: Al-Hamra tower. It has everything necessary to be considered an icon: a prominent designer, oversized structure, technical challenges, and a unique shape. It is not difficult to imagine the role that this 400-meter high business hub plays in the skyline of the city. Its sculptural shape and flaring walls demanded extreme engineering work and placed Al-Hamra among the world’s most complex tall buildings.

The official company brochure highlights a long list of technical data and new records achieved: the tall-est carved skyscraper in concrete, the largest office building in the country, and the largest stone façade.7 Among other technical marvels, one specific design solution is worth mentioning. The tower is, in a way, site-specific. Its design is still not related to the urban scale nor to the city context, but it is partially the re-sult of solar condition studies. The tower is oriented so that the inclined flaring wall protects and shades the southern elevation, where the desert sun can be more powerful. Nevertheless, when the building touches the ground there is no sign of urban mitigation or integration with the fabric. It sits on its own plot just like any other object in the surrounding area, demonstrating once again the lack of urban design of this part of the city.

Gary Haney, from the design firm SOM,8 defines Al-Hamra as “a statement (that) will be the landmark of Kuwait for the next generation.”9 In general, the local population seems to have embraced Al-Hamra as a new landmark. On the contrary, tenants did not find it completely attractive: the high-end shopping mall on the lower levels provides a vast array of restaurants and boutiques, but a large number of office floors are still empty. So what kind of statement does Haney refer to? Which ideals or which shared feelings will the future generations of Kuwait see in this tower? An answer comes from the brochure issued by the building management company: “Hamra is a business monument!”10 So the icon is a monument, and in a contemporary commercial-oriented society the monument is essentially a ‘business memorial.’

Connecting the past to the present

In the same brochure a picture showcases Al-Hamra facing the sea with the Kuwait Towers, the country’s 1970s national monument, in the background. The intention probably was to present a sense of continuity with the past despite the fact that to make space for the new tower, one of the oldest cinemas in town, a vivid expression of 1960s modern heritage, was demolished. All this leads to a few considerations on how much the two towers reflect the changing needs of Kuwaiti society in their current time. Just like Al-Ham-ra, the Kuwait Towers are definitely an icon representing the country’s goals of modernization, but the latter also form a narrative space recounting the motivations behind a project of public interest. The towers are a water reservoir with all the meanings that water has in a desert land like Kuwait. With their shape, materials, position, and scale, the Kuwait Towers are evocative objects that bring back memories of the past, reminding the country of its roots. On the other end, Al-Hamra does not show any sense of continuity with the past. It is presented to the public as a display of current financial power, but it could be better interpreted as an expression of a higher

Iconic architecture has, in most cases, a con-flicting dialogue with its context, because it is meant to communicate to a worldwide au-dience, while the local ‘assimilation’ is more problematic.

level of confidence in the country. The lack of trust and the uncertain international situation in the after-math of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait virtually froze, with a few exceptions, major investments for more than a decade. This traumatic event and its long tail arrested the drive toward modernization that had been consistently pursued for over 40 years through the erection of highly symbolic architecture. Unlike other Gulf countries, recent iconic architecture in Kuwait seems to express a general feeling of recovered confidence, perfectly reflected in bald technical features, more than the quest for a national identity or the homogenized vision of a contemporary city.

Dr. Roberto Fabbri is an architect and professor at University of Monterrey; he worked five years in Kuwait and is the co-author of Modern Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (2016).

16 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis

Acknowledgement: This research and paper was developed during a fellowship research program at the Center for Gulf Studies – Amer-ican University of Kuwait.“Iconic Dubai Architecture | Sightseeing in Dubai | Discover Dubai | Emirates,” www.emirates.com, accessed 01 September, 2016.

Compare for example Todd Reisz’s analysis of the World Trade Center in Dubai, in Structures of Memory, catalogue of the exhibition of

the National Pavilion United Arab Emirates, La Biennale di Venezia, 2014, pp. 81-82.

Regarding Kuwait’s architectural production in the recent past, see Roberto Fabbri, Sara Saragoça Soares, and Ricardo Camacho, Mod-ern Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (NiggliVerlag: Zurich, 2016).

Yasser Mahgoub, “Hyper Identity: the Case of Kuwaiti Architecture,”Archnet-IJAR, International Journal of Islamic Architecture, 1:1

(March 2007): 84.

Saba George Shiber, “Architecture and Urban Aesthetics in Kuwait: Significance or Superficiality,” The Kuwait Urbanization: Docu-mentation, Analysis, Critique (Governmental Press: Kuwait, 1964), 306.

Al Hamra Business Tower Facts and Figures, www.alhamra.com.kw, accessed 2 October, 2016.

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill was the lead consultant, together with Al Jazeera as local partner, Al-Ahmadiah as contractor, and Turner

as project manager.

“Record breaker,” Gulf Construction Online, accessed 22 Sept. 2016

Al-Hamra Tower, Company Brochure, undated, p.20

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II. Analysis

The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatarby Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa

Kuwaiti men rally in front of the parliament building to demand the dissolution of the 2009 parliament in Kuwait City, Kuwait on 1 October 2012.

iven restrictions on public protest and political organizing across much of the Arab Gulf, a New York Times reporter noted in 2011 that social media seemed “tailor-made for Saudi Arabia” and its fellow

monarchies.1 In the midst of the Arab Spring, online pages for the now-defunct Eastern Province Revolu-tion helped coordinate protests in the Kingdom, even as @angryarabiya—now in exile in Denmark after repeated arrests—documented the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bahrain on Twitter. In the years since, though, protests have disappeared as Gulf governments have variously deterred activ-ists with harsh crackdowns and forestalled grievances with generous handouts. Subsequent portrayals of Gulf social media have shifted to emphasize the online expression of collective identities over the potential for collective action, however much the two may be linked. Alexandra Siegel has highlighted the Gulf as a key nexus of polarizing sectarian rhetoric on Twitter, driven by the regional rivalry between the mostly Sunni Gulf monarchies and Shia Iran.2 At the opposite extreme, social media platforms are presented as windows into the region’s conspicuous consumption, exemplified by young and restless Kuwaiti men pos-ing with exotic animals in the VICE documentary “The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram.”3

Beyond broad sectarian clashes and individual excess, the enduring image of GCC nationals as “rentier

G

18 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis

citizens” prevails, supposing quiescent subjects content to receive handouts fuelled by state-controlled oil and gas revenue. The dearth of formal institutions of accountability—aside from a dysfunctional parlia-ment in Kuwait and a few minor elected bodies—militates against most individuals effecting meaningful political or policy change through official channels.

Yet discontent, though muted, is far from absent online. Citizens lodge many claims and complaints with ‘the government’ on Twitter, Facebook, and even Snapchat. Much as these online campaigns can seem banal, only reinforcing a transactional relationship between ruler and subject, they lead Gulf citizens to articulate a sense of political and social identity from below, in contrast with top-down visions engineered by the region’s ruling elites.

On the campaign trail This dynamic has played out even in Qatar, which is domestically quiet and has less of the overt online sur-veillance increasingly visible in the neighboring United Arab Emirates.4 Unlike elsewhere in the MENA region, where various formal parliaments (however unrepresentative) have been operational for decades, Qatar has no tradition of formal political representation beyond a heavily circumscribed Municipal Coun-cil.

One article by Justin Gengler, among the few insightful articles on Qatar’s body politic, outlines the many factors that militate against political activism, from a small native population to the country’s extreme per-capita resource wealth.5 To be sure, collective protests against foreign oil companies helped foster a sense of a “Qatari” national identity in the 1950s and 1960s, linking merchants, slaves, and free Qataris on the peninsula.6 For more than 30 years, though, most citizens’ public complaints about government agen-cies and regulations have been channeled through a state-run call-in radio show entitled “Good Morning, My Beloved Country.”7

When semi-official complaints go nowhere, though, Qataris on Twitter and other social media often act in tandem with influential col-umnists and cartoonists to push back against corporations and state agencies they portray as unresponsive, incompetent, and even corrupt.

As Hootan Shambayati noted in the case of Iran, the largesse of oil-rich states can often channel citizens’ discontent along moral and ideological vectors rather than quelling it outright.8 Accordingly, many Twitter campaigns in Qatar are instances of “moral panic,” denouncing cultural displays deemed to cater to an elite image of Qatar as a cosmopolitan “world city” at the expense of its conservative native population.

In early 2016, a widespread Twitter protest targeted the British-American film “The Danish Girl,” which is about a transgender woman in the 1920s, on the hashtag #No_To_Showing_The_Danish_Girl. The Minis-try of Culture soon tweeted back that they had decided to ban the movie.9 Similar controversy has attend-ed other performances, such as Australian singer Kylie Minogue, with events coordinators going so far as to announce performers at the last possible minute to forestall the potential for protest.10

While rarely straying into overt political demands, citizens also regularly criticize the performance of gov-ernment agencies and state-owned enterprises. Qatar Airways was subject to an online campaign driven by customers demanding better service and more employment opportunities for Qataris.11 Schools, hospi-

The challenge for researchers interested in Gulf political identities is to document and an-alyze discussions of rights and responsibilities across a wide range of online communities.


II. Analysis

tals, and roads frequently attract criticism, with proposed fee hikes in government schools almost provok-ing a boycott in 2013.12

Instead of quietly accepting their government’s stewardship, citizens ratchet their development expecta-tions ever-higher in the knowledge that their country possesses vast financial resources. The more these online discussions link government missteps to a perceived lack of accountability and transparency, the more they reinforce the idea of a Qatari body politic denied real input on key matters of social and economic development.

Death and denial

Two recent online protests exemplify these processes and reflect an online political presence that is far more populist and conservative than the liberal, cosmopolitan image often presented by Qatar’s rulers.

This past May, one Twitter campaign stemmed from the death of Qatari Shorooq Al-Sulaiti in a govern-ment-run women’s hospital following complications from childbirth. When her husband’s official inquiries into the circumstances of her death went nowhere, he reached out to prominent columnist Faisal Al-Mar-zuqi.13 Al-Marzuqi in turn targeted the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) Twitter account with criticisms, popularizing hashtags such as #We_Are_All_ Shorooq_Al_Sulaiti. Ultimately, the online campaign at-tracted coverage from Arabic newspapers Al-Raya and Al-Arab as well as the English-language website Doha News, in addition to a number of pointed satirical cartoons.14 The Ministry finally issued a public up-date on the investigation on July 14th, which was followed by a brief lull in online activity (Figure 1). Sulai-ti’s husband as well as Al-Marzuqi and other Qataris have continued their online criticisms, though, with the public prosecutor’s office finally opening an investigation into the ongoing case this past September.15

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Doha News op-edpublished

Response op-edspublished

Figure 1: Twitter activity mentioning Shorooq Al-Sulaiti, July 2016.

Figure 2: Hashtags targeting Doha News, August 2016.

A more recent incident of “moral panic” occurred after Doha News published an opinion piece about the difficulties of being Qatari and gay.16 This provoked a furious online response by many Qatari Twitter-us-ers outraged by the perceived assault on public morality and Qatar’s Islamic character. First, one minor commentator for Al-Sharq touched off #We_Demand_The_Investigation_Of_Doha_News, with some us-ers tagging the Ministry of Interior (@MOI_Qatar) trying to provoke a more forceful response from the state.17 Columnist Maryam Al-Khater stoked further calls for government action through an article in

20 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis

Al-Sharq and on Twitter with the hashtag #Stop_Promotion_Of_Vice_In_Qatar. In both, she implored the government to take firm action to shut down the website.18 Despite an intense spate of initial activity, though, the hashtags failed to gain much momentum or high-level support on Twitter, dropping from use just a few days later (Figure 2). Conclusion

Various aspects of a nebulous “rentier state theory” have dominated academic discussion of the Gulf for decades, expressing the sense that the vast oil wealth of these monarchies has allowed them to “buy off” discontent time and again. Yet even in Qatar, which is wealthiest per-capita in the GCC and has practi-cally no organized political opposition, nationals have come to use online forums such as Twitter to express and reinforce a sense of Qatari identity. The challenge for researchers interested in Gulf political identities is to document and analyze discussions of rights and responsibilities across a wide range of online commu-nities, as GCC citizens migrate to newer platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat.

At their core, these discussions contribute to a sense of citizenship that demands accountability in state spending and government services as well as the right to define what it truly means to be Qatari, often against elite projects of national identity formation.19 The more this identity is reinforced, the easier it becomes for citizens to challenge or otherwise prod their government. Witness, for example, the mounting success of various campaigns to bar regional figures from visiting the country, or growing exasperation in some quarters with the power of the online “mob.”20 Likewise, more government spending seems unlikely to quell further instances of moral panic in Qatar, given that fully eliminating the country’s cosmopolitan veneer would exact a high price on the global image the country’s leaders have crafted.

Ultimately, as an emerging discourse of citizens’ rights encourages economic and moral claims against the state, GCC governments such as Qatar, with diminished cash reserves at their disposal, may find it difficult to renegotiate implicit social contracts without employing greater repression or affording greater representation.

Andrew Leber is a PhD student at Harvard University, Department of Government. Charlotte Lysa is a PhD candidate at the University of Oslo, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages.

Neil MacFarquhar, “Social Media Help Keep the Door Open to Sustained Dissent Inside Saudi Arabia,” The New York Times, 15 June,

2011.

Alexandra Siegel, “Sectarian Twitter Wars: Sunni-Shia Conflict and Cooperation in the Digital Age,” Carnegie Endowment, 20 Decem-

ber 2015, pgs. 9-12; For more on sectarian polarization in the Gulf, see also Matthieson, Toby, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

“The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram,” VICE Media, March 25, 2015.

See, for example, the United Arab Emirates’ increasingly stringent guidelines on which social media posts can run afoul of federal laws.

Sinclair, Kyle, “Be aware of UAE privacy laws when posting Facebook content, TRA warns,” The National, 20 May, 2014.

Justin Gengler, “Collective Frustration, But No Collective Action, in Qatar,” Middle East Reporting Project, 7 December, 2013.

Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Merchants and Rulers in Kuwait and Qatar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

141-145.

Hassan Ayat Bihi, “Complete Change for ‘Good Morning, My Beloved Country,” Al-Arab, 27 December 2015, http://www.alarab.qa/

story/743338/

Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,”

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Comparative Politics 26, no. 3 (April 1994), pp 308, 324-325.

Peter Kovessy, “Cinemas stop showing ‘The Danish Girl’ after ban in Qatar,” Doha News, 11 January 2016.

Performances of Gwen Stefani and Pharrell Williams at the 2015 Men’s Handball World Championship were confirmed just days ahead

of time for this reason. Author interview, PR consultant, Doha, 20 January 2015.

Despite preferential hiring for Qataris throughout the public sector and strict quotas for the private sector, there is a widespread percep-

tion among Qataris that expatriate labor is implicitly favored.

Shabina Khatiri, “Irate over tuition increases, some locals call for school boycott,” Doha News, 19 September, 2013.

Media figures such as Marzuqi, Hassan al-Sai and Abdullah al-Athbah thus serve as powerful gatekeepers within Qatari society, ad-

vancing stories that conform to their own views on government and society.

“Complete Details of Death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti during Childbirth,” Al-Raya, 12 July, 2016. <http://www.raya.com/home/print/

f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/60c209a1-2d5b-48ac-9de1-0120faa89d04>; Mohammad Abd al-Lateef. Twitter post. 30 June,

2016. 4:00p.m. EST. https://twitter.com/mo7md_alateef/status/748607145063616513/photo/1; Saad al-Muhannadi, Twitter post, 13

July 2016, 12:28 AM EST. https://twitter.com/S3d_78/status/753082153487982592/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

“Prosecutor forms committee to investigate death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti,” Al-Raya, 19 September 2016. <http://www.raya.com/news/

pages/eb920de5-be83-45f0-ab37-64913124d2c3>

Majid al-Qatari (pseudonym), “What it’s like to be gay and Qatari,” Doha News, 5 August 2016.

Hassan Hamoud, Twitter Post, 5 August 2016, 4:30pm EST. <https://twitter.com/BoHomoud007/status/761660789912694784>

Maryam al-Khater, “What is Manliness in Qatar?” Al-Sharq, 8 August, 2016. <http://www.al-sharq.com/news/details/437522>

For more on such elite projects, see “Gulf Societies in Transition: National Identity and National Projects in the Arab Gulf States.”

Workshop Report #3 (2016). The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

“Complete List of People Banned from Entering Qatar by Order of the People… Latest is Al-Afasi,” Rassd, 13 June 2015. <http://rassd.

com/145849.htm>; AlAnood Al Thani, “Twitter mobs and what it means to be Qatari,” Doha News, 20 August, 2016.

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II. Analysis

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) doesn’t have a rich culture, what’s there other than yola dances, falconry and lugaimat?” Ironically, this remark was not made by a Westerner with Orientalist as-

sumptions, but by an Emirati. While many Emiratis would instantly disagree with that statement, they are still likely to think of their heritage within the confines of the images described above. The scenes of women frying lugaimat and men dancing the yola are constantly repeated in heritage festivals. They are charming to witness once or twice, but grow stale with each repetition. While the local cultures of the UAE (and wider Gulf) are diverse and varied, the official national narratives often promote a monolithic history with a narrow, standardized set of ideas and images of culture, such as the ones described above.

It is likely that cultural homogeneity is promoted because local diversity is seen as an obstacle to loyalty to the state. Emirati scholar Ali Khalifa stated that “political loyalty to one’s tribe has not as yet given way to loyalty to the state as an abstract political concept.”1 While tribal affiliations pose some challenges for GCC states, ethnic and cultural diversity may be seen as even more problematic. At the very least, tribes portray images of Bedouins and “pure” Arabs, in line with the image Gulf states often promote. Ethnic and cultural diversity among local citizens, however, indicates that a part of the nation’s history is non-Arab and disputes the storyline of a shared culture and heritage. In attempts to create national cohesion, the

Monolithic Representations and Orientalist Credence in the UAE

by Rana AlMutawa

Emirati men perform a traditional dance late on 28 October 2014 during a festival in the city of Al-Ain celebrating traditional culture.


II. Analysis

local cultures in the UAE, and much of the Gulf, are portrayed as homogenous, pure, Bedouin, Arab cul-tures. These monolithic depictions consequently end up sidelining integral parts of khaleeji history and culture—such as the Ajami, Baluch, and East African cultures.2 It is therefore unfortunate, but not sur-prising, when Emirati citizens believe that their culture is best represented by ahistorical and stereotypical depictions of the lugaimat and the yola—ones which are not too different from Orientalist depictions of the region.

Cultural homogeneity and Orientalist depictions

James Onley states that the populations of the Gulf have been historically intermingled with those of the Indian Ocean to the extent that it is difficult to ascertain whether some khaleejis are Arabized Persians or Persianized Arabs.3 These influences are still prevalent today: the Indian Ocean’s influence can be found in khaleeji food, dialects, and even song and dance. East Africans who were enslaved in the Gulf brought their music with them, and this music has come to represent traditional, local music in the Gulf.4 However, acknowledgment of this diversity is uncommon. The African influence on khaleeji culture is rarely men-tioned, and African-influenced music is depicted as Arab.5 Similarly, Clive Holes states that the diversity of the dialects is eroding as Gulf citizens move towards a single standardized khaleeji dialect.6 This stan-dardization often projects a homogeneous and “pure Arab,” Bedouin image which is similar to some of the simplified and Orientalist depictions of the Gulf region.

Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that Ajamis, Baluchs and East Africans (among other groups) have inhabited the Gulf for a long time, and when these cultures are excluded from the national narrative, a large part of the nation’s history and heritage is similarly excluded. While GCC states may differ in terms of their portrayals of identity and their citizens’ perceptions of it, most of these states homogenize local histories and cultures within their respective national narratives. Neil Partrick argues that the Gulf states have long ignored differences within local society and favored representation of culture and history that fits the national narrative, one which promotes a Bedouin, tribal identity.7 Similarly, Anh Nga Longva states that Kuwaitis define their identity by differentiating themselves from the foreigners within their countries—at times, these “foreigners” are other citizens who are not considered ‘purely’ native.8 Ernest Gellner states that nationalism, which fuels these perceptions, is spread through a “high culture,” such as that of schoolbooks and newspapers, while Ziad Fahmy finds that nationalism spread in Egypt through what he terms a “medium” culture of audio and television that used local dialects.9 High and medium cultures, schoolbooks, heritage festivals, and radio are all tools that promote the official national narrative and shape the perceived boundaries of national culture and identity.

The case of the UAE

When taking the UAE as a GCC-representative case study, one can find many examples of the way social reproductions champion the tribal, Arab narrative. One of the examples comes from the advertisements for the Mleiha archeological sites. Mleiha, a village in Sharjah, has sites dating back some 130,000 years ago.10 Instead of capturing the essence of the ancient site, the dedicated website, Discover Mleiha, strangely describes ancient Mleiha as depicting “traditional Emirati life” and “ancient Bedouin culture.” Clearly, the legacy of the Stone Age hunters represented at this site is neither “traditional Emirati” nor representa-tive of “Bedouin culture.”11 Whatever the reason may be for the use of this type of language, it is certainly not the only example. Al Bastakiya, a traditional neighborhood in Dubai previously inhabited by Ajami Emiratis originally from Bastak, Iran, has become a prominent tourist attraction. However, its name was changed to Al Fahidi, with the argument that Al Fahidi was the area’s original name.12 The renaming

of the neighborhood is a further step on the road to homogenous Arabization.

Similarly, festivals, museums, and ‘traditional’ TV shows which aim to reinvent the past center on the Bedouin cultures almost entirely. The Millionaire Poet, a TV show for Nabati poets, promotes Bedouin poetry, and Qasr Al-Hosn Festival, a major tradi-

tional festival in Abu Dhabi, features activities associated with Arab, Bedouin life, such as falconry and yola dances.13 This is not to say that non-Bedouin backgrounds have been wholly excluded—an Emirati director’s movie on a prominent Emirati Sufi received an award in the UAE, and a popular Ramadan car-toon shown on local channels depicts Ajami Emiratis as central characters.14 However, these examples are much fewer, and sometimes not as public, as efforts of heritage revival that center on the pure, Arab, Bed-ouin image. Thus, simplified images that depict a “pure Arab” way of life are often used to embody Emirati identity, while ones that do not fit that criteria—such as the Mleiha sites, or even well-known activities like pearl-diving—are often removed from the context they existed in. What is therefore left to represent Emirati identity are simplified and romanticized Orientalist depictions of a desert life.

Possible consequences of monolithic representations of identity

Historical accuracy is usually not as influential in informing a national consciousness as national nar-ratives are. While Emiratis are aware that there are many natives of Ajami, Baluch, or East African backgrounds, they do not necessarily view these diverse cultures as representative of Emirati culture and heritage. In fact, some might consider a strong association with them as a form of un-belonging. For ex-ample, Partrick cites an Omani analyst who states that Omani minorities, such as the Baluchs, have an incomplete sense of belonging to Oman. The consequence of such exclusivist narratives manifests in the examples of khaleejis who downplay their own heritage to fit in with the national narrative. Indeed, Onley found that Emiratis of Ajami background sought to downplay their ethnic roots.15 Similarly, Sultan Al-Qa-ssemi recounts an unnamed Ajami Emirati who changed his last name to an Arab-sounding name, stating that he witnessed the same phenomenon happening among many other Ajamis and Baluchs.16

While Gulf states promote a narrative of homogeneity to create an “imagined community” that bonds citizens to one another, they are simultaneously promoting a narrow and rigid sense of identity that ex-cludes a large part of the nation’s socio- and ethno-historic DNA. These monolithic representations strip the region from countless of its histories, cultures, and stories, giving credence to Orientalist stereotypes that depict the region as lacking in history and culture. The myth of the dearth of history and culture in the Gulf becomes engrained even in the minds of its own citizens: rather than understanding the roles of natives from Ajami, Bedouin, Baluch and East African backgrounds in shaping a local society rich in culture, many start believing that their history and heritage is confined to standardized depictions of the desert, the lugaimat, or the yola.

Rana AlMutawa is an Emirati instructor and researcher at Zayed University in Dubai, UAE.

Ali Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates – Unity in Fragmentation (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 99.

James Onley, “Transnational Merchant Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Gulf,” in The Gulf Family: Kinship and Politics, edited by Alanoud Alsharekh (London: Al Saqi Books and London Middle East Institute SOAS, 2007), 37- 56.

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While Gulf states promote a narrative of homogeneity to create an “imagined com-munity” that bonds citizens to one anoth-er, they are simultaneously promoting a narrow and rigid sense of identity.

Ibid and James Onley, “Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar Family,” in Transnational Con-nections and the Arab Gulf, edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 59-89.

Aisha Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati: A Unique Historical Experience,” UNESCO, (2006) and Joseph Braude, “Feature: Africans in the Arabian

(Persian) Gulf,” Afropop, (2007).

Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati”.

Clive Holes, “Language and Identity in the Arabian Gulf,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:2 (2011): 129-145.

Neil Partrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States,” LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf

States, (2009)

Partrick (2009), and Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Social Political

System in Kuwait”, in Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by Paul Dresch and James

Piscatori (London: IBTauris, 2005).

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial

Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919” (PhD Diss., University of Arizona, 2007).

Sabah Jasim, Margarethe Rose Uerpmann and Hans-Peter Uerpmann, Mleiha: The Unwritten History (London: Medina Publishing,

2015).

Discover Mleiha, http://www.discovermleiha.ae/, accessed 28 September, 2016.

Roland Hawker, “Al Fahidi vs. Al Bastakiya: Who Cares and Why,”6 March, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016.

Hala Khalaf, “Million’s Poet Returns with 48 poets Competing for Dh15 million Prize,” The National, UAE. 8 February 2016.

Saeed Saeed, “The animated series Shaabiat Al Cartoon has attracted a lot of fans, and with good reason,” The National, UAE, 24 August

2011.

Onley 2004, 2007, ibid.

Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, Facebook post, June 27, 2016.

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GCC Security Amid Regional Crises | Spring 2016 23

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28 Gulf Affairs

III. Commentary

Challenges of Cultural Identity in the GCC

by Ahmad Al-Dubayan

Marrying heritage and culture with the demands of the modern world

hroughout the history of the Gulf, and until the end of the 19th century, the region was

not considered an important exporter of Islam-ic or Arab culture in its best form, in compari-son to cultural centers such as Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Fez, and Medina. Cultural produc-tion was mostly localized despite extensive trading relations with India, Persia, and even the Far East. The people along the Gulf coast looked to the aforementioned Arab cultural cen-ters as models of civilized Arabic and Islamic culture, from which they imported traditions.

Historical contact

At the end of the 19th century, cultural contact with the West began as a result of a new age of global trade and colonization. This contact trig-gered a local questioning of culture and identity. It also encouraged the growth of local education, civil and social programs, and the expansion of political awareness—particularly in Bahrain and Kuwait. Expanding at a time of growing Arab nationalism, this contact also further enhanced political awareness and increased interest in in-digenous heritage, culture, and identity.

With the dawn of the oil age, the Gulf placed it-self on the global economic and political map as a group of modern nation states. The region became a platform for trade and international commerce. Globalization accelerated cultural exchanges, and modern technology and communication aroused further interest in culture and identity within the Gulf states.

The Gulf’s identity challenge Today, the Gulf faces a few key issues with re-gards to its identity, including the lack of a single, unified political vision, weakness of national edu-cation, changes within Islamic and Arab culture, and the creeping influence of English and the ero-sion of formal Arabic in everyday life.

Despite similarity and shared social, cultural, and religious fabric, Gulf states do not have a uni-fied political vision of the future for the region as a whole. Since the Arab Spring, the Gulf has in-creasingly diverged along different political lines and visions, most evidently on the issues of Egypt and Syria.

While Gulf societies are largely regarded as pre-dominantly Islamic in nature, this is seldom ad-dressed from a cultural and identity standpoint in

III. Commentary


national education curricula. Religious education in schools focuses mostly on practical dimensions, failing to sufficiently present religion as a struc-ture of culture that finds its roots in Islamic civi-lization or regional history. This results in a local culture that stands little hope to maintain itself in the face of globalization, especially in light of phe-nomena such as foreign education, media, and so-cial networking. The increasingly diversified and internationalized nature of Gulf economies and labor markets has facilitated the erosion of the Arabic language as an everyday medium for busi-ness in both the public and private sectors. Gulf states have undertaken initiatives to address such problems and support culture and identity, with national programs, events, exhibitions, and ac-tivities generally falling under national heritage authorities. However, these unfortunately mostly come outside the national curricula, addressing later stages of the cultural “identity question.”

The tribal identity

The tribal element historically presented a form of local cultural cohesion and production. In the modern Gulf, however, it fails to accommodate the increasingly diversified nature and accompa-nying cultural challenges present in Gulf societ-ies. While the tribal element could be said to be slowly fading away, many phenomena report its existence, such as camel beauty pageants and lo-cal tribal poetry, reinforcing the tribe as an identi-ty umbrella. Recent security events in the region, however, such as operation “Decisive Storm” in Yemen, have reinforced in some Gulf states ele-ments of shared culture and identity, of Islamic and Arab elements, and notions of shared hero-ism and memory, ingredients of a collective iden-tity.

Conclusion

Younger generations face a challenge to develop

identities that can encompass both tribal and Is-lamic heritages while also meeting the needs of the modern world. Institutional and educational initiatives have not yet established a middle path for the new generation, helping them to protect the values of their own culture while also con-necting with the rest of the Gulf in a manner that both accommodates a modern world and meets its challenges.

Dr. Ahmad Al-Dubayan is the Director General of the Islamic Cultural Centre in London, editor of the Islamic Quarterly, and an Arabic and Islamic Studies curriculum development expert.

Younger generations face a challenge to develop an identity that can encompass both tribal and Islamic heritages while also meeting the needs of the modern world.

30 Gulf Affairs

III. Commentary

The Gulf States’ National Museums

by Sultan Al QassemiIconic buildings and collections battle-

ground for future identity

uch has been written about what French ac-ademic Alexandre Kazerouni terms ‘visibility

museums,’ such as the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar. Elaborating in Ibraaz, Kuwaiti artist Monira Al Qadiri writes that visibility museums, rather than recreating the tra-ditional heritage museums “filled with dioramas, maps, archeological artefacts and Arabic books” are conceived from the outset with recognized brand name architects and most certainly a signif-icant budget. Aimed at preserving Gulf heritage and serving a slate of political ends, these national museums could emerge as a major battleground for identity and local viewpoints just as smaller, inde-pendent museums and galleries in the region expe-rience exponential growth.

The mega museum

In the coming few years, the Gulf will see the rise of

a multitude of ‘visibility museums’ designed and built by heavyweight architects. In 2017, Qatar will be inaugurating a major new museum de-signed by French architect and Pritzker prize winner Jean Nouvel. The $434 million museum in the shape of a desert rose is built around the former palace of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani who ruled Qatar from 1913 to 1949. In 1999, Saudi Arabia opened its National Mu-seum in Riyadh, which was designed by Ray-mond Moriyama, a Canadian of Japanese de-scent. It comes with an accompanying building called the Darat of King Abdul Aziz, designed by Jordanian architect Rasem Badran. Danish architect Knud Holscher was invited in 1982 to design the Bahrain National Museum, while Frenchman Michel Ecochard (1905-1985) was the architect behind the Kuwait National Mu-seum that opened in 1983, which is undergoing a significant makeover and expansion. The fact that the latter two countries were the first to create visibility national museums may be at-tributed to Bahrain and Kuwait being the first two Gulf states to discover oil, in 1932 and 1937 respectively. They were also the most politically developed and had the most advanced educa-tional sector in the region at the time.

Lying on the eastern side of the Arabian Pen-insula, the Sultanate of Oman has just inaugu-rated a National Museum in Muscat designed by Jasper Jacob Associates in conjunction with Arts Architecture International, both British based firms. Muscat is embarking on another major project called the Oman Renaissance Mu-seum near the Al-Hajar Mountains designed by the Australian firm Cox Howlett & Bailey Woodland. The UAE has commissioned Foster + Partners to design the Zayed National Muse-um, which has yet to be awarded. Perhaps the most interesting of these will be the new $132 million Etihad Museum in Dubai that was de-signed by Moriyama & Teshima Architects, who also designed the Saudi National Museum.

These planned mega museums contrast with past mini-national museums across the Gulf. Examples include Al Ain National Museum—which opened on November 2nd 1971, exactly one month before the UAE was formed—and


III. Commentary

the aforementioned Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani museum in Qatar. These museums no longer align with the global ambitions of these Gulf states.

Heritage and visibility

But what factors drive these Gulf states to em-bark on such a major drive to build national mu-seums?

First, these national museums are intended as domestic political messages to these states’ citi-zenries. The museums are being built to instil a sense of pride in the citizens of these countries and to cultivate a sense of belonging and identity. They also showcase to citizens the governments’ commitments to maintain national identity in a globalizing world. In almost all Gulf states, schools are required to take students—especial-ly citizens—to visit national museums on guided tours. Many of these museums utilize the latest technologies, such as interactive panels, to cap-ture the attention of the teenaged and younger visitors.

In 2012 Qatar Museums organized an exhibition titled Mal Lawal (translated as ‘Belonging to the Past’) in which Qatari citizens and residents were invited to share historic artefacts with the pub-lic, an event that was billed as ‘Uniquely Local.’ It was an ingenious way of uncovering private collections, some of which will no doubt end up in the national museum through donations, which Gulf citizens are making ever more regularly. The Zayed National Museum and Qatar Nation-al Museum have started to record the oral history of the older citizens who witnessed the transfor-mation of their countries—these will presumably be broadcast when these museums open.

These museums are also political statements with their size, location, and contents to be carefully vetted. Often these museums will exclude certain categories such as minorities or even the slave trade. That said, Qatar should be commended for its inauguration of the Bin Jelmood house, which is the first museum in the Gulf dedicated to the slave trade in the region. It is, however, unknown if slavery will be featured in the National Muse-

um down the road or if it will be compartmental-ized into Bin Jelmood. These museums also tell history through the eyes of the victors, who are traditionally the ruling families of the Gulf and their allies. There is, for instance, little or no men-tion of those who have been vanquished or defeat-ed in the past.

Windows to the Gulf

These national museums are also means to edu-cate the millions of foreigners who live in or visit the Gulf states about the original inhabitants of the lands, whom foreigners seldom have a chance to interact with. Signing up major architects also helps Gulf governments to make these museums appealing to international visitors. A famous ar-chitectural brand would come with certain expec-tations of quality and standards.

Despite their grandeur and important collections, national museums will face challenges. In addi-tion to omitting certain segments of society, there is a genuine risk that these museums will become museums of static historical relics rather than a reflection of the dynamism that these states are experiencing. Only the Etihad Museum in Dubai has an explicit mandate to cover the years be-tween 1968 to 1974, and for good reason, since it is a museum dedicated to an event. The other national museums would do well to avoid becom-ing fortresses for the past instead of beacons of an evolving vibrant culture. The Gulf states are in a race against time, with demographics and rapidly accelerating globalization of their youth challeng-ing efforts to preserve traditional identity. In this struggle, national museums have emerged as major battlefields.

Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi is a UAE based writer and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East In-stitute Washington, D.C.

There is a genuine risk that these muse-ums will become museums of static histor-ical relics rather than a reflection of the dy-namism that these states are experiencing.

32 Gulf Affairs

III. Commentary

The Local Evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Contemporary

Art Scene

by Alia Al-Senussi

Local art scene flourishes in Saudi Arabia

audi Arabia has witnessed an explosion of local art production in the 21st century, driv-

en in large part by a variety of grassroots efforts. These efforts are often tied to traditional centers of artistic production like the Abha arts commu-nity or the Hijaz, a crossroads of pilgrims and commerce. The exponential growth of and inter-est in art in the Kingdom has spurred a surge in local collectors and enthusiasm, especially for art with a local viewpoint or voice. Despite its grassroots origins, something uniquely Saudi, art continues to be patronized and overseen by the kingdom’s ruling elite.

A unique Saudi viewpoint

The leading cultural practitioners in Saudi Ara-bia (artists, curators and patrons) incorporate uniquely Saudi qualities in their work—qualities related to Islam, Saudi society, the monarchy and the nature of Saudi power and the ways in which that power has either a direct or invisible hand in cultural production. Saudi patrons have now mobilized in an un-precedented way to support local arts and bring non-Saudis to Jeddah (and elsewhere) to experi-ence contemporary art in the Kingdom and also general Saudi culture. This is not particular to just Saudi Arabia but linked to a general reawak-ening of the importance of art and culture in the non-Western world, a recognition that art and culture play important roles in domestic politics, international relations, and power structures.

Unlike its neighbors, Saudi Arabia has yet to gar-ner significant press and attention for its cultur-al activities. But within the Kingdom there is an increasingly rich and continuously evolving cul-tural scene fed by artists, patrons, and interested locals.

The celebrated artist Ahmed Mater, in ‘Young Soul Rebels’ (published in Asia Art Pacific in De-cember 2012), discusses the local climate in an explicit way in terms of market signifiers but his text is easily read as a manifesto on larger issues of what culture means to him and his fellow art-ists: “2012 was an important year for me and for many artists in Saudi Arabia. We decided to come back to the original movement of contemporary art which began in my hometown of Abha over 10 years ago, and to return again to the source and foundation for our inspiration—namely our role in this society.”

Mater continues to explain that “As Saudi artists, we seek to find a system and platform relevant to our local context, we seek to preserve and nurture our communal voice. Because we know that only

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through a solid, paced and strong movement can we make our way upstream, against the current of society and its potential to materialism. We are full of nervous optimism about the potential of this real movement. We believe that art galleries, institutions, organizations, ministries, patrons, local and social media can support each other to instigate and develop a movement that will be-come part of the change needed in this society.”

The evolution of art and patronage

Even as Saudi artists explore increasingly di-verse subject matters, members of the ruling elite establish organizations to shape and oversee the growing field. For example, the recent creation of the non-profit Saudi Art Council (SAC) was an important step forward in bringing a more official voice to the Saudi art world. The body is chaired by a senior member of the royal family, HRH Princess Jawaher bint Majid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and comprised of a selection of the Saudi commercial elite.

Museums are a prosaic part of life in most West-ern developed countries, but they do not exist in such a visible manner in Saudi Arabia. This only magnifies the importance of organizations like the SAC and Edge of Arabia, the non-profit arts organization co-founded by Mater and his fellow artists and activists Abdulnasser Gharem and Stephen Stapleton.

On the other hand, the involvement of Western museums in the discourse and happenings in the region informs their cultural development and is integral to the evolution of the regional scene, providing an external counterpoint to the more insular goings-on. Culture can be a description of the contemporary situation of a society and a reference point for scholarship related to politi-cal movements and the structure of power. Sau-di Arabia is no different from any other nation with a nascent and evolving art scene, and the relationship between visual culture and power in Saudi Arabia is something that the state has

only recently adopted in a direct manner with the museum.

However, senior government officials and mem-bers of the royal family have involved themselves with cultural initiatives more frequently as offi-cial as well as non-official representatives of the state. Ahmed Mater expressed how cultural pro-duction and politically charged arts are important to Saudi artists, as opposed to those who cater to outside tastes: “How can we paint butterflies and scenes of the past when our region is in turmoil and change is upon us?”

Alia Al-Senussi is a Phd Candidate at SOAS, University of London, and a global representative and consultant at Art Basel; she holds a variety of not-for-profit board and committee positions which promote patronage of the arts such as with Tate, ICA London, Serpentine Galleries, The Chi-nati Foundation, Guggenheim and Art Dubai.

Even as Saudi artists explore increas-ingly diverse subject matters, members of the ruling elite establish organiza-tions to shape and oversee the growing field.

34 Gulf Affairs

III. Commentary

Understanding the Evolution of the Khaleeji Identity

by Lulwa Abdulla Al-MisnedModernity threatens the future of

traditional khaleeji lifestyle

Khaleeji (male) or Khaleejiyah (female) is a person from one of the Gulf Cooperation Coun-

cil (GCC) states—or ‘Gulfie’ in colloquial English. My Gulfie generation was born in the late fifties, sixties, and seventies and witnessed the creation of the GCC states and the formalization of the khalee-ji identity. We were taught in the earliest formal classrooms by the first non-khaleeji Arab-immi-grants, who had strong Arab nationalist pride and enforced a heavy sense of Islamic religious values. By the 1980s, we were pushed into the labor mar-ket to pursue our careers, often in semi-segregated work environments. We lived in extended families with many siblings and cousins in closely connected houses with open yards. The boundaries between homes were almost nonexistent, and kids ran about crossing hypothetical property lines in pursuit of

any stimulating object, whether physically pres-ent or imagined into being. We memorized folk songs and played with dolls handmade from whatever raw materials we could find. By night time, we were ready for the universal bedtime story delivered by our mothers, grandmothers, and aunts.

We are the generation that had the best of both worlds. We were parented by a hardy pre-oil generation but grew up with the early years of the hydrocarbon economy, and we were given the benefits of free public goods and services, education, health, and housing, all facilitated by the rent of the extractive oil industry. It was a homogenous, integrated environment that found itself propelled into a much larger world. We knew who we were in the definitive sense, but we were to encounter several drivers of cul-tural change.

How times have changed

We, in our turn, parented a generation raised within the new city states in the Gulf. The mechanics of this change remain vivid in my memory. Starting in the 1980s, our generation pioneered the dual-bread-winning-parents ap-proach in order to accommodate a contemporary khaleeji lifestyle. This approach would manifest in families building large villas with tall walls encompassing them. These walls stood white and vertical in silent declaration of their propri-etary existence. Behind them came tiled yards, subsidized utilities, and imported domestic la-bor. It became the standard for the khaleeji life-style. This was made possible thanks to a hefty distribution of oil-rents through guaranteed public sector employment for both genders.

Governments owned the hydrocarbon assets and distributed these rents through various transfer mechanisms, without the need for public tax-ation. As such, they became agents of gradual class formation in societies that had never been structured vertically. The role of the tribe faded,

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by the decline of the political and economic func-tions of the tribal structure, into an immaterial self-image anchor called upon only in ceremoni-al events. The nation-state was to take over the formation of self-identity. The institutional for-mation of the modern state and the formation of the civil society did not fully materialize due to the polarization of social power in governments’ hands. Government transfers became handouts that were allocated based on political loyalty. With the absence of the legislative requirements permitting collective association and assembly, there was no chance for ‘socialization’ to build up civic virtues and develop the self- image of a citi-zen rather than one of a subject. Capital cities within the GCC such as Abu Dha-bi, Doha, Manama, and Riyadh underwent rapid development and relied on social capital growth to satisfy the demands of expanding economies. The optimal size of the economy was not based on calculations of the maximum extraction rate of hydrocarbon assets, as we all know. The ex-traction levels were determined most of the time by demand in the international markets for these strategic commodities.

The changing nature of our neighborhoods

In light of this rapid transformation, the spirit of the fareej, the indigenous Gulfie community, was difficult to perfectly preserve with the influx of expatriate neighbors from diverse cultural back-grounds. A new phase of “multiculturalism” in the Gulf was born as the nature of expat populations changed from the low skilled male workers who came to help build the infrastructure of these cap-ital cities to expat professionals who came with their families to work in the growing industrial and services sectors.

These professionals lived on long-term work per-mits and raised their children within the Gulf’s cities. Foreign embassies that represent large ex-patriate communities worked to establish schools for their citizens’ children. Within Gulf cities, both

nationals and expats shop at the same malls, buy from the same grocery stores, and go to the same cinemas. These interactions are reminders that our realities include other identities and cultures. Over time a double value system was created. The traditional and the modern, each brought by different drivers of cultural change, fueled the creation of a complex and often contradictory self-image. This explains the adherence to nation-al cultures in some situations but the relaxation of tradition in others.

The decline of the middle class

The welfare states that the Gulf governments raised through the first few decades of oil rent had become unsustainable with the fluctuation of hydrocarbon revenues. That brought many economic and social challenges, such as growing youth unemployment and struggles with housing and social safety net programs. One important result was the decline of the middle class, which had been gradually formed by educated profes-sional nationals. Moreover, a new “super class” was formed that became dependent on govern-ment transfers through procurements, agency privileges for international contracts, and busi-ness licenses with exclusivity rights. Class polar-ization in the Gulf societies became another factor impacting the sense of one community and one culture.

Ongoing de-Arabization

The phenomenon of the ‘third culture kid’ pre-vailed among our children. During the first de-cade of the 21st century, a new cultural nucleus of American and European higher education centers was established. These universities built regional campuses with the latest architectural

Khaleeji identity continues to evolve along a path that rejects and reduces the value of its traditional heritage.

design, high-tech classrooms, and guaranteed student numbers and numerous financial in-centives. These campuses drive cultural change by omitting the national cultural context from their programs and activities.

Educational reform introduced English as a primary medium of study, undermining the re-gion’s Arabic cultural heritage. The influence of foreign consultancy services like the US-based Rand Corporation, McKinsey and Co, Price Waterhouse Coopers and Booz Allen have been perceived by many locals as a wave of cultural imperialism in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy. Furthermore, neglecting the Arabic language as a paradigm of culture by using En-glish as the medium of learning from the ear-ly years of childhood is a real challenge to chil-dren’s self-identification as Arab. Generations of our children and grandchildren are cut off from many aspects of their history, literature, folk-lore, and lifestyle.

During the last decade, technology has been the main driver of cultural change. This process is facilitated by advanced communication chan-nels and global marketing of cultural products by transnational mega conglomerates. The cur-rent preference is for pop culture, social media, and interactive video games delivered with a “postmodern” set of values. This “current” cul-ture for many thinkers is not universal and not even based on the classical Western culture. The heritage of freedom, justice, and democracy that prevailed in the Western liberal cultural history has become devoid of meaning and decontextu-alized. We live in an era of aggressive inward individualism that is shaped and controlled by market interests rather than moral criteria. The boundaries of such totalitarian virtual dom-inance are amorphous, and so is the khaleeji identity today.

Under threat from its own impetus to mod-ernize, from external influences and govern-

ment pressure, the khaleeji identity continues to evolve along a path that rejects and reduces the value of its traditional heritage. It’s unclear what this will mean for the future of the identity of the khaleeji peoples.

Dr. Lulwa Al-Misned is a former Assistant Sec-retary General of the Gulf Organization for In-dustrial Consulting and is currently a free-lance writer and consultant in the areas of public poli-cy and social reform in the GCC region.

36 Gulf Affairs

III. Commentary

IV. Interviews

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H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al AliMinister of Culture and Sports

State of Qatar

Gulf Affairs: The Ministry of Culture, Arts & Heritage has led the cultural scene for many years in the state of Qatar. What is your evaluation of the role of the Ministry of Culture and Sports that was established in 2016 after the merger of both the Ministry of Culture, Arts & Heritage and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which was established in 2013?

Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali: The Ministry of Culture and Sports has a leading role to play in society and is keen to enhance knowledge and development in all fields. Not only does it lead the cultural scene, but it is concerned with public affairs as well as with all fields that share its noble mission like education and media.

The merging of both ministries comes as a structural reform which does not aim to change the terminol-ogy, but to change perceptions and efficiency of the work in each sector. We cannot assess the role of the ministry in a matter of months, in the sense of a scientific evaluation. Still, we can determine the nature of the steps that have been made and their impact in bringing about a shift in our perception of the role of the ministry itself in this historic stage—it makes sense to outline our vision and strategic plan in light of the historical reality witnessed by the State of Qatar. We announced the vision of the ministry just months after the initial merger and are currently working on the strategic plan. We inaugurated a number of cultural centers with a new perception of the cultural work to be performed and with the aim of giving cre-ative individuals more independence in running their affairs, discussing their causes and expressing their


IV. Interviews

creative product. We launched the Theater’s Affairs Center, the Cultural Conscience Center, the Music’s Affairs Center, The Cultural and Heritage Events Center, and Diwan Al-Arab Center. These are executive structures to embrace intellectuals and to influence society by creating a cultural public opinion as well as stimulating cultural movement.

Unlike traditional cultural ministries, which limited the scope of their work to the executive role only, the ministry will develop the public strategy by providing follow-up, patronage, and governance. We live in a changing world and our society needs a qualitative transformation in the work performed by the ministry without dominating the cultural work.

The Ministry does not claim that it owns culture but rather seeks to provide the proper environment to build a national culture for intellectuals and innovators to help them push the society forward.

Gulf Affairs: How would you sum up the vision of the Ministry of Culture and Sports concern-ing arts and culture in Qatar?

Al Ali: In every historic stage, culture needs a vision to build society and to fulfill its intellectual, psycho-logical and aesthetic security needs. Culture works as a safety valve, which enhances its steps towards achieving a better future and forming a character that distinguishes it from other societies. It gives society a special position in the cultural action of nations.

For that reason, the ministry chose its vision to gear “towards a conscious society with an authentic sen-timent and a healthy body”. This vision is based on the orientations of His Highness Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who referred to the value system taking hold in Qatari society as follows:

“The Qatari people have always been long known for their good manners, generosity and humbleness. They work more and talk less. They have always helped the oppressed. I am afraid that we may miss the opportunity to pass on these core values: the values of work, humbleness, good manners and treating oth-ers with respect. We must make sure that the youth find a meaning to their lives in all of this and under the conditions of this consumptive civilization.”

There is a convergence between these lofty ideals and the vision of Qatar 2030. Our common ambition is to build a new society. Thus, the vision of the Ministry of Culture is based on those two principles. Its pillars are awareness, consciousness, and body, which form the main foundations of building a society.

We deeply need to think about our reality, to get hold of its tools and to explore its methods to be able to use them. Awareness forms the base for both work and methodology. It preserves facts and gives great importance to ideas in order to reach mental common sense and establish a way of thinking which de-pends on the realization of the cultural and social environment. We are in much need of these inherent values derived from the ideals of our ancestors and entrenched in our collective consciousness to protect our personality. Not only is our consciousness filled with such values but also branches off into sensation, perception, attention and imagination which grow with experience. We can only concentrate awareness and consciousness strongly within a healthy body.

Gulf Affairs: Artistic expression takes different forms, which involve changing values. No-tably, in spite of the successful use of technology in Qatari cultural production, heritage re-mains the main source for such production. How do you see this problematic relationship, which somehow may look contradictory?

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Al Ali: It is true that creative expressions develop and take different forms according to time and place. Such forms create new visions and methods. Thus, we cannot separate expression from its form and con-tent. Even though creative expression benefited from modern technology, this does not contradict the de-sire of some creative individuals to use heritage and to harness its content.

Some may consider heritage as a rigid material, nothing more than a legacy that is passed on from ances-tors through generations as if a mummified object. This is not what we have in mind as a meaning of heri-tage. This meaning is more of a legacy than heritage. What we mean by heritage is the vibrant energy that stands the test of time and lives within us now and in the future. If we recognize the difference between heritage and legacy, we will be able to realize the intrinsic value of common ownership of what is symbolic, including firm and constant values of society and elements of its identity. They may change with time to adapt to developments and our perspective of the society we want to build.

The problem in dealing with heritage is the excessive use of old forms in creative fields such as music. We encourage creative people to deal with traditional molds in a creative and innovative way to renovate the social spirit. This way music will keep abreast with the times without betraying its essence. I do not think there is any contradiction between heritage and available technology. The big problem lies with those who are incapable of making this pairing possible. I think that creative expressions of whatever form should reflect the reality of their society and time, and they should contain a new vision and a new project for the society in a creative and artistic form, as this is the real purpose of creativity.

Gulf Affairs: For decades, the educated Arab elite have been a significant cultural stream for artistic production in Qatar and have helped to establish it. Can we talk today about an ed-ucated elite among the rising generation capable of carrying the artistic and cultural load?

Al Ali: It is undeniable that the Arab elite played a role in enhancing the Qatari cultural experience. For decades, our society embraced the Arab cultural momentum. However, we cannot overlook the role of the youth and the new generation in our cultural perception. We do not tend to classify society into new and old elites, but we classify it according to methodology, believing that the movement of culture depends mainly on communication between Arab cultural generations in general. Exchanging and transferring experi-ences among generations creates diversity, which invigorates the general cultural movement. Conflict or discontinuity between generations may be the reason behind the rupture we see in culture today.

Intra-culture discontinuity is a necessary thing for development, but it is based on both separation and communication at the same time. The new generation should not ignore the feats of the previous elite who should not behave in a tutelary or authoritarian manner. We believe in the Qatari youth’s ability to create a paradigm shift when they take in the experience of the Arab elite and understand the challenges faced by Qatari society to achieve the desired response.

Gulf Affairs: Qatar played a prominent role in the Arab uprising that took a different turn in the last three years. What is the impact of these events on culture and arts in Qatar and in the region as a whole?

Al Ali: Qatar believes in the self-determination right of all peoples. Thus, it spared no effort in helping those peoples who seek freedom and a better future. Qatar welcomed the Arab uprising out of respect for the will of the peoples and considered it a paradigm shift that has a positive impact on the entire region.


IV. Interviews

Undoubtedly, this uprising will affect culture and arts. Consequently, innovators will find a new environ-ment of freedom and their creative expressions will take new forms. Cultural momentum needs freedom, which is inseparable from creativity. The intellectuals will be able to discuss the causes of their country with boldness and in full communication with society. Thus, political transformations change the percep-tion of society.

Though none of this has yet been achieved, it shows the huge responsibility that must be shouldered by the intellectuals and innovators at this historic stage in particular. They have a social role to play. They have to deliberate the problems of their peoples and contribute to the change of beliefs, opinions, and mentalities. It is a huge choice that will have consequences not only for the countries which witnessed the uprising, but also for the entire region.

The Qatari cultural scene interacted with the aspirations of the Arab intellectuals in the countries which witnessed the uprising by opening the fields of expression and participation in the events. This contact of Qatari intellectuals and innovators with this new “wave” will undoubtedly create additional enthusiasm to believe in the role of culture in building the future vision of Qatar.

Gulf Affairs: Are you concerned about the fact that the attention given to sports by youth and supported by the state within the GCC states notably exceeds that of culture?

Al Ali: The attention given to sports is a result of the larger media coverage despite the priority given to the youth culture. In addition, scoring goals is much clearer and faster in sports than in culture. This is due to the different nature of each field, without creating a predominance of one over the other. Both culture and sports share roles in society while each field has its own particularity and choices while being integrat-ed. Our vision expressed such integration, bearing in mind that awareness and consciousness should be built within a healthy body. I am not concerned about measurements of attention to each field as it is not a matter of quantity but of degree and quality. Changing and enlightening mentalities through cultural expression takes more time. It is not an automatic thing to do and is not related to a particular period. The more we realize what we aspire from culture and sports at our particular moment in civilization, the better we will be able to give enough attention to each one of them.

Gulf Affairs: Finally, the previous Doha Cultural Festival successfully became a significant cultural forum in the Arab region. Why did it stop? Are there any plans to bring it back? Al Ali: Qatar went through many cultural experiences, including the Doha Cultural Festival, which kicked off its first round in 2002. Still, each historic stage requires forms and means to present the artistic product or accomplish cultural projects. Thanks to the forums and festivals held by several cultural bodies, Doha became a cultural beacon. However, merging all these events into only one festival does not reflect the vitality of culture that extends all year long. At this point, holding festivals is not our main concern, but empowering intellectuals and innovators to reach creativity is. Supporting all events with a vision that advances Qatari society, as well as serious thinking about our cul-tural priorities, are more important than cultural show off. The question is what did all these festivals and forums change in our way of thinking, conduct, and preferences? I think this is the core question, which will guide our plans for the future.

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IV. Interviews

H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-KhalifaPresident, Bahrain Authority for Culture & Antiquities

Kingdom of Bahrain

Gulf Affairs: What is the role of OPEC and how does it support its member states? Gulf Affairs: What are the objectives of the newly founded Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities? Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa: In many ways the strength, richness, and authenticity of Bahraini culture has always been a major component of modern day Bahraini society. One cannot understand Bahrain and its people, the make-up of the society, its open minded, tolerant, and progressive nature, without acquiring an in depth knowledge of its history and its culture. That is precisely why Bahrain recognized that it was absolutely necessary for the Kingdom to place culture, history, and archeology in the center of the King-dom’s national agenda. The establishment of the Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities as an independent body with a wide and encompassing mandate is therefore a natural and logical manifestation of this national priority. The Authority is therefore mandated with exploration, protection, and promotion of Bahrain’s rich history and both tangible and intangible cultural wealth. The mandate of the Authority is crucial for the image, the perception, and the appreciation of modern day Bahrain for its citizens as much as for the world at large.

Gulf Affairs: What are the major achievements of the Bahraini authorities in the area of cul-ture in recent years?

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Al-Khalifa: We can confidently say that in the relatively short history of the Authority, many achieve-ments and success stories were realized. In addition to the continuous, day to day work of maintaining and protecting cultural heritage, important infrastructures were established on the ground, such as several specialized museums as well as the establishment of the National Theater designed and built with state of the art standards. To date, the Theater hosted several renowned national and international performances that were enjoyed by the people of Bahrain and its visitors. The Authority also succeeded in naming Ma-nama as Arab Capital of Culture (2012), Arab Capital of Tourism (2013), and Asian Capital of Tourism (2014), while Al Muharaq was named Islamic Capital of culture. In addition, the Authority was able to launch an important project on knowledge transfer as well as embark on several research and translation projects placing Bahraini culture and literature on the international stage. The Authority is today bringing the world to Bahrain and taking Bahrain to the world.

Gulf Affairs: How would you describe the role of Bahrain in promoting culture in the Gulf region and beyond?

Al-Khalifa: The progressive, open minded, and international character of the Bahraini society makes it one of the best ambassadors for transmitting the wealth and authentic deep-rooted culture of the Gulf societies to the world at large. This is a crucial task today in a world that is becoming increasingly intol-erant and is suffering from serious stereotyping of each other’s culture. The proper understanding of the richness and the beauty of the diversity of every culture is essential in building a better world. Bahrain understands very well its role in today’s world and in taking the culture of the Gulf societies to the world, and the Authority is one of its important vehicles in achieving this important task.

Gulf Affairs: Bahrain is a country rich in cultural heritage and with a very long history: what is the impact of this heritage on the Bahraini identity? How would you define the Bahraini identity in the 21st century?

Al-Khalifa: Societies are the product of their history, their people, their place, and their unique resulting culture; Bahrain is no exception. As an island that was home to the most ancient civilizations, Bahrain acquired many rich cultural features of openness, ability to connect easily with other cultures as well as a variety of skills connected to sea life, trade, and services. Such characters are still very important features of the Bahraini society. That is why Bahrainis today are tolerant, accommodating, and friendly. They are also naturally skilled at trade, crafts, and services. The recognition and listing of the “pearl trail” as a UNE-SCO World Heritage Site is an example of a rich heritage in skills, trade, and services. Bahraini people to-day are without doubt the product of a culture that is rich, unique, and worthy of international recognition.

Gulf Affairs: What is the role of women in promoting Bahraini culture and shaping the Bah-raini identity? Al-Khalifa: Regardless of gender, we are living in an encouraging atmosphere in the Kingdom of Bahrain, where both men and women can work creatively in various fields based on the principle of equal opportu-nities. The Bahraini woman has always played a significant role economically and socially. In the era prior to the discovery of oil in the 1930s, she worked hard to support her family while her husband was away on long diving trips, thus the Bahraini woman has left her mark throughout history. In fact, any national achievement is hardly devoid of the contributions of Bahraini women.

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Gulf Affairs: In recent years GCC countries have undertaken a variety of efforts to preserve and celebrate their history. What initiatives were undertaken in Bahrain and how do they fit in the national tourism strategy?

Al-Khalifa: Bahrain has always been very active within the GCC group, especially in the field of cultural preservation and cultural promotion, which, as you correctly noted, has been a GCC priority. The best manifestation can be seen in Bahrain’s success and distinction in the tourism industry. We believe that culture is the story of the people, and tourism is the publisher and distributer of the story. The importance that we place on tourism is, therefore, the best way of demonstrating the respect and value we place on our cultural heritage. We want the world to know about it; we want the world to enjoy it; we want the world to come visit Bahrain, and that is why we promote tourism.

Gulf Affairs: What are the future plans for the promotion of culture in Bahrain?

Al-Khalifa: We will continue to work hard on the preservation and the promotion of our cultural heritage. There are many initiatives in the planning. We are planning to establish a dedicated cultural TV channel, promote cruises to visit some of our cultural sites, and introduce “light and sound” shows to selected cultur-al and archeological sites. These are some examples of our future plans on the ground. Our mission, how-ever, remains the preservation, the presentation, and the promotion of the beautiful story of our people.


IV. Interviews

Ali Al-YouhaSecretary General

Kuwait National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters (NCCAL)

Gulf Affairs: What is the mandate and scope of the National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters?

Ali Al-Youha: The National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters was established by Emiri Decree on July 17, 1973 as an independent public body, chaired by the Minister of Information, with a board consisting of a number of representatives from other public departments and arts, culture and literary circles. Over 40 years old, the Council’s role has grown alongside Kuwait’s journey as a country. Its primary duties include educational, literary, artistic, and cultural development nationally, in addition to developing relations with similar Arab and international counterparts. Its role includes:

•Surveying and conducting studies on the Kuwaiti cultural landscape and current efforts of other departments.

•Conducting studies on the status of culture and its development and direction in Kuwait.•Record collecting and conserving.•Publishing, including magazines, journals, dictionaries, and books generally.•Events and outreach: the Council is regularly active in establishing a number of events, including

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conferences, forums, festivals and national competitions, with the aim of developing cultural com-munication and awareness.

•Public and civil cultural engagement and promotion.•Preservation of local and Arab heritage and the promotion of literary culture through series and

ad hoc publications.

Gulf Affairs: What have been the primary achievements of the NCCAL over the past few years?

Al-Youha: Since its inception, the Council has succeeded in supporting and organizing Kuwaiti cultural and artistic movements and consequently established, over four decades, regular cultural phenomena that reflect the Kuwaiti social landscape. These efforts included:

•Kuwait International Book Fair: a book fair prominent internationally and within the Arab world running since 1975.

•The Annual Qurain Cultural Festival: launched in 1994 and eventually transforming from a mere ‘festival’ to an artistic and literary phenomenon within the GCC and Arab-wide.

•Specialized festivals including: The Youth Cultural Festival, The Kuwait Theatrical Festival, The International Music Festival, The Future Generation Cultural Festival, and The Summer Cul-tural Festival.

•Energizing the idea of Arabic and International cultural weeks. •Exhibitions in fine arts.

In addition, the Council is a regular contributor to and supporter of many published materials that attract unprecedented readership in the Arab cultural arena, including:

•“Aalam Al-Ma’rifah” (World of Knowledge): a series of monthly published short books (since 1978).•“Al-Masrah Al-Aalami” (Global Theatre): a series of global theatrical plays from foreign languag-

es, translated to Arabic (since 1969).•“Aalam Al-Fikr” (World of Intellect): a quarterly containing articles and research with a diversity

of academic cultural, artistic, and historical research (since 1970).•“Al-Thaqafah Al-‘Alamiyah” (Global Culture): a magazine publishing translated material on cul-

tural, artistic, and literary affairs (since 1980).•“Ebda’at ‘Alamiya” (Global Creations/Fantasy): a series of global theatrical plays, translated to

Arabic (since 1969).

The Council’s other achievements include its support for the creation of national theatre groups, in addi-tion to the preservation and management of historical architecture and national heritage. The Council is also party to a number of agreements and memorandums with Arab and other foreign counterparts.

Gulf Affairs: How do you describe the state of the cultural movement in Kuwait and what would you say are some of its unique attributes?

Al-Youha: The Kuwaiti government places immense interest and care in culture and even relies on cul-ture as a key to increased human awareness more generally. Many factors have contributed to making Kuwait an Arab regional cultural beacon, including the diversity of the population, the tolerance for which Kuwaitis are known, and their love for culture and arts. The Kuwaiti cultural movement, its roots, and its figures are considered among the most noteworthy in the Arab region and are among the reasons Kuwait


IV. Interviews

was chosen as a capital for Arab culture and a capital for Islamic culture in 2001 and 2006 respectively. The strength of the Kuwaiti cultural movement relies on active publishing and strong roots in theatre, fine arts, literature, poetry, music, and many other activities.

The Kuwaiti cultural scene has included from its early beginnings, which pre-date independence, the ac-tive contribution of women, especially in literature and the arts. This is in addition to increased youth participation, especially in recent years. The role the Council plays, in addition to other governmental departments and the private sector, supports this cultural scene with a constant number of initiatives and achievements, affording a notably cultural visage to Kuwait that we take pride in sharing locally and globally.

Gulf Affairs: How does the NCCAL contribute to supporting the cultural and artistic move-ment in the country?

Al-Youha: As mentioned earlier, as per the Council’s roles and decree of establishment, the Council sup-ports and sponsors a wide range of activities, including talents in writing, literature, acting, music, and other arts. Two examples of how the Council supports these sectors are the Kuwaiti National Encour-agement Prize, which is given annually for achievements in different cultural and educational fields, and the Kuwaiti National Recognition Prize, given for notable cultural and social contributions. These awards come in addition to the Council’s role in supporting other activities in collaboration with local societies and clubs such as publishing, short movies, play scripts, and other art forms.

Moreover, the Council provides regular training on heritage preservation and restoration at many of Ku-wait’s heritage sites, both on its mainland and islands. I would also like to note the signing of a bilateral agreement with the Department of History at Kuwait University for archaeological exploration and pres-ervation.

Gulf Affairs: Despite being a small country, Kuwait exhibits a lot of cultural diversity. Can you tell us more about the characteristics of Kuwaiti identity and how you see them reflected in today’s culture and art?

Al-Youha: The cultural diversity and lively nature found in the Kuwaiti cultural movement owes itself to a number of factors, including, as mentioned earlier, the social tolerance and openness to ‘the other,’ as is evident from trends in migration to Kuwait by a number of nationalities, especially Arab. This is ac-companied by the constant Kuwaiti desire and inclination for the cultural, artistic, and literary exchange, amongst other factors. The combination of such internal and external factors creates what one may deem today as Kuwait’s current cultural visage, perhaps most known for its openness and tolerance to others’ contributions, without incurring a negative backlash to the Kuwaiti identity.

In turn, the Council, within its professional specializations and obligations and alongside other public insti-tutions and civil society organizations, has over the decades contributed to the instilment of this identity. The contribution comes from all segments of society including schools and their activities, Kuwait Univer-sity’s research on all aspects relating to identity, iconic public figures, voluntary efforts, and others directed towards children.

This joint effort has given birth to significant cultural and literary output, be it in theatre, novels and writing more generally, or travel, without departing from the foundation of the Kuwaiti national identity,

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primarily rooted in openness, tolerance, and acceptance of the other.

Gulf Affairs: With the advent of social media, how have you seen this impact the cultural move-ment in Kuwait, particularly among the youth segment?

Al-Youha: It may be more plausible for one to speak of the positives of the social media revolution than it is to speak of the negatives on the cultural scene, especially when referring to the young population.

Today we see the rise of a unique constellation of young Kuwaitis, from both genders, who have been given the chance to translate and widely disseminate their work thanks to advances in communications. The latest of such examples was the award winning “Saq Al-Bamboo” (The Bamboo Stalk) novel by Saud Al-Sanousi, winner of the International Prize for Arabic Fiction—supported by the Booker Prize Founda-tion—whose work was turned into a television series. Similarly, there are many other authors whose work found greater recognition due to social media networking.

Statistically speaking, Kuwaiti society is highly active in such platforms, developing the ability to use them in responsible means that have served the cultural scene rather than harmed it in any way. The young population, in particular, actively uses social networking to promote arts, including fine arts, caricatures, short stories, and as a means to promote workshops and seminars. I also think that Kuwaiti society is immune to the potential negative social and cultural impacts of globalization because of its long-standing openness that precedes phenomena such as social media networking. Consequently, Kuwaitis have suc-ceeded over decades to incorporate diversity without divorcing from the roots of their cultural identity.


IV. Interviews

Nada Al HassanChief of Arab States Unit

UNESCO

Gulf Affairs: How does UNESCO collaborate with Arab states in the Gulf region?

Nada Al Hassan: UNESCO collaborates at different levels with the Arab states in the Gulf region through its office in Doha, which is responsible for the Gulf cluster. This office ensures close collaboration with Gulf countries for the implementation of UNESCO programs. In the area of culture, UNESCO supports Arab states in the Gulf region in the implementation of the cultural conventions they have ratified and with their cultural activities at large.

The Arab states of the Gulf have all ratified the World Heritage Convention. By doing so they have com-mitted to respect the requirements of the Convention in protecting their cultural and natural heritage, be it inscribed or not on the World Heritage List, through appropriate legislative and management modalities and protection measures, to ensure its transmission to future generations. This, in itself, is very important and very demanding.

UNESCO supports the Gulf countries as State Parties to the World Heritage Convention in implement-ing these requirements, in particular at the sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, through technical and policy advice and training. It also supports them in preparing new nominations for inscription on the

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World Heritage List. For instance, UNESCO has supported Saudi Arabia in preparing the nomination file of Al-Hijr Archaeological Site (Madâin Sâlih), advised Qatar on the preparation of Al-Zubarah nomination file, and we are currently supporting Kuwait in preparing the nomination file of the Kuwait Towers (Abraj al-Kuwait). We also involve civil servants and experts from the region in our training activities, regional and international policy-making workshops, and international meetings and conferences.

Gulf Affairs: What does UNESCO view as some of the most important cultural and heritage projects in the region?

Al Hassan: There are a number of interesting cultural and heritage projects in the region. Each country has its own style or focus. Of particular interest are the museums and cultural institutions established by Qatar Museums, which have considerably raised the level of cultural institutions in the Arab states to com-pete with similar institutions at the international level. The urban conservation and revitalization projects undertaken by the Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities in Manama and the interpretation and presentation of their archaeological sites, such as the site museum of Qalat al Bahrain, are valuable initia-tives. The art fairs and shows such as Art Dubai and the Sharjah Biennial have become hubs for discover-ing new talent at the international level. In Saudi Arabia and Oman for example, the focus is on conserving historical sites and on studying and conserving historic cities and cultural landscapes. Much has been going on in the region in the past years—there is a real dynamism in some Gulf countries, directed either towards historic sites or towards creativity, or both.

Gulf Affairs: How would you characterize the heritage of the Gulf states? How does the Gulf identity shape its view toward its cultural heritage and preservation of culture? What is unique or interesting about the Gulf cultural heritage or identity?

Al Hassan: Cultural heritage in the Gulf states cannot be defined as a single entity or typology. It varies from region to region, from country to country, from rock-art prehistoric sites to ancient civilizations such as the Dilmun dynasty, from Nabatean sites, to Islamic cities and forts and later to human settlements linked to the pearl trade, to name but a few. This diversity counters the narrative about the Gulf states being one compact culture versus a multitude of influences and historical layers. Indeed, very rarely do people visit the Gulf states as a cultural destination, but this is changing now thanks to the change in the cultural policies of Gulf governments. Some are investing considerably in cultural activities, the revitaliza-tion of historical cities, and making their historical sites become destinations for visits.

As in any country in the world, public institutions make choices related to which cultural heritage they want to value and protect. What’s interesting is how the options in the Arab states of the Gulf region are growing to include not only Islamic architecture but also ancient sites and pearl trade settlements. In Kuwait, there is even a strong interest for preserving architectural buildings from the Modern Movement period. Public policies are steadily embracing the diversity of cultural heritage in the Gulf region; this is very interesting indeed.

Gulf Affairs: What are the challenges and the opportunities related to the creation, conserva-tion, and maintenance of the status of World Heritage sites in the Gulf region?

Al Hassan: Often sites with national or regional value claim a World Heritage status, but this is not the idea of the World Heritage Convention. When a country ratifies the Convention, it doesn’t mean that they


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need to inscribe all the cultural and natural heritage they have on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Cul-tural and natural heritage in one country is an invaluable asset that we have the responsibility to protect collectively. In this sense, and although UNESCO promotes the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List, I strongly believe that what is important for a given country is to conserve the legacy it has received from past generations, study it, and pass it on to the next ones, regardless of its international status. This being said, the challenge of nominating new sites for inscription on the World Heritage List is not an easy one. First of all, it is about inventorying cultural and natural heritage and creating a Tentative List that bears a potential outstanding universal value; second, it is about protecting those sites with the adequate legislation and ensuring their management; third, it is about preparing a solid nomination file that abides by very detailed and specialized technical requirements, with appropriate arguments and an appropriate narrative that demonstrate their outstanding universal value, authenticity and integrity.

A nomination file for the inscription on the World Heritage List is not a mere file prepared by a handful of experts. It is a process of reflection, identification, research, and demonstration, as well as a process by which management and protection measures are developed to be adequate to a potential World Heritage status of a given site.

When nomination files are prepared by national teams that engage in the process of justification, man-agement, and protection, the results are much more interesting because there is a strong sense of national ownership. This is because the nomination process is a moment in time that fosters capacity building and institution building towards cultural heritage protection. This is also why UNESCO insists on the impor-tance of participative and inclusive planning.

Gulf Affairs: What role do you see for local communities in the management and conservation of heritage?

Al Hassan: Local communities are viewed as the owners, users, and protectors of sites. Their role is crucial in ensuring good management and in keeping sites alive; they are the main beneficiaries of sites and they are their best custodians. Their involvement needs to start from the very beginning of any inscription pro-cess. This will allow building with them, not only an inscription file, but above all a management system in which they are actors and beneficiaries. Only then can you create a win-win situation between public institutions and local communities. Indeed, the World Heritage Committee has attributed a growing role to local communities in the processes and management systems of inscribed sites. The recently adopted policy on World Heritage and Sustainable Development places local communities at the center of World Heritage conservation and management.

Gulf Affairs: Have Gulf countries contributed to the conservation of heritage outside of the Gulf region, for instance, Arab or Islamic heritage?

Al Hassan: Numerous initiatives funded by Gulf countries have contributed to the conservation of cultural heritage in the Arab region, such as in the Old City of Jerusalem. Other contributions support UNESCO’s response in the areas affected by conflicts and natural disasters. However, much more is needed in terms of contribution and exchange with other Arab countries, in particular in view of the ravaging conflicts in the Middle East, which destroyed much of their cultural heritage.

A meaningful contribution to the region’s cultural and natural heritage is also undertaken through the

IV. Interviews

work of the Arab Regional Centre for World Heritage created in Bahrain in 2011. The Centre provides technical support to the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in the Arab region and under-takes a number of training programs and operational and technical assistance activities.

Gulf Affairs: What future directions and what improvements in the preservation of heritage would you suggest in the Gulf region?

Al Hassan: Again, I can’t see that there is one type of cultural heritage in the Gulf states that requires one type of intervention. I would like to stress the importance of the authenticity of sites and call for limiting rebuilding and reconstructing lost structures with new materials. This is a practice that I have witnessed often at some sites in the region. I would also suggest not to overdo things. Very often, less is more, and doing a lot can transform authentic sites into Disneyland-like sites; here, I would raise the red flag. It is important not to fall into this trap. Moreover, historic cities such as Jeddah and the historic district of Dubai need to be conserved by avoiding gentrification and keeping life and economic activities in them, as opposed to turning them into open-air museums that are bound to die.

We face many challenges in the Arab states: our heritage institutions need great support, our managers and civil servants need training and exchange at the regional and international levels, our legislation needs improvement, and our local communities need to be more engaged, to start with through education curricula. This is a long road where the Arab states of the Gulf region can contribute considerably.

Gulf Affairs52

Featured Photo Essay

Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCCby Rana Jarbou

One can easily see the impact of the GCC cities’ rapid modernization by looking at their visual culture and urban discourse, which are manifest in graffiti. However, finding graffiti in the Gulf states is challenging. Only a few buildings have become canvases for graffiti artists and writ-ers, and they are mostly found in old villages in Bahrain, scattered among Kuwait’s abandoned pre-invasion structures, or in Qatif, Saudi Arabia. With little-to-no open-air public spaces, one can go long distances searching for a mere expression or drawing.

It is not a mystery why public spaces are impover-ished or even nonexistent in such wealthy oil-rich countries. There are few green spaces and shaded streets, and thus there exists little street inter-face. These countries afford only isolated spaces, such as shopping malls and commercial centers, to which people most often need to drive. With the exception of the Dubai Metro, which only opened a few years ago, the poor public transportation systems in most Gulf cities cause over-depen-dence on vehicles. The lack of a rich and integrat-ed graffiti culture reflects the ensuing absence of

“Oh Allah, bless Muhammad & the family of Muhammad.” Sar, Bah-rain. To pray for and send blessings for prophet Muhammad is a com-mon practice for Muslims on many occasions, especially during prayer. Bahrain’s closed-off village communities are rich with calligraphy ranging from Quranic verses to religious supplications and aphorisms, depicting a sense of belonging and collective social memory, as some of them emphasize the Shia identity.

In conjunction with the beautiful calligraphy and paintings, dissenting graffiti is in abundance, marked by the village communities’ ongoing struggle. Sectarian tensions are manifest on these angry walls, rang-ing from displays of unequal education and employment opportunities among Bahrainis as well as their undermined representation in the po-litical process. This graffiti, at the entrance of Sar village reads “Stead-fast street,” marking the village boundaries. Police and protestors often clash at these village passageways.

“Free Kuwait” and “Long live Kuwait” Kuwait City, Kuwait. In the Kuwaiti capital, many abandoned buildings and houses from the Iraqi invasion in 1990 remain as canvases for graffiti writers and street art-ists. It is unknown when these walls were graffitied, but their western pop-culture aesthetics and influences are discernable. Some nationalist and religious graffiti can also be found among western idols, popular-ized symbols and graffiti fonts.

Some western inspired graffiti in Muscat’s outskirts, among the very little graffiti to be found in Oman. Nationalism and rap are prevail-ing themes. “Oman is one pulse” is one common Arabic phrase written across the island, found even on rocks and canoes.

“In the name of Allah” is graffitied on an aluminum structure in the middle of Wahiba sands, in the Rub’ al Khali (empty quarter) desert. Religious graffiti, particularly “remember Allah,” “There is no God but Allah,” and “Allahu Akbar” are some of the most abundant in all GCC countries.

Like other cities in the GCC, graffiti in Kuwait is scattered across the city with various aesthetics and purposes ranging from the emerging popular art to the Bidoun (stateless people) writings calling for state-hood. Still dominating this range is graffiti in the spaces where there are remnants of war.

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

54

Featured Photo Essay

an urban ecosystem of social and public spaces, and thus the lack of outdoor activities and rela-tions.

This is why graffiti has become confined to villag-es and residential areas, where there is a sense of community. Censorship and surveillance play roles, too. And yet even on the clean white walls of the new oasis cities, people have left their marks. The walls of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain harbor some degree of social and political commentary, but for the most part religion, love, poetry and

song lyrics, tribal codes, nationalism (and nostal-gia for one’s homeland), football, hip hop, and dig-ital codes (such as blackberry pin numbers) seem to be dominating the graffiti culture of these “cit-ies of salt.”

Rana Jarbou is an independent media artist who researches and documents graffiti and street art throughout the Arab world. These photos are a sample of graffiti captured from 2007 to present as part of an ongoing project documenting graffiti as counter-narrative.

In the Doha outskirts and areas inhabited by expat communities, there is much graffiti that asserts one’s racial or national identity. “Baluch” is one dominant identity marked on Doha’s walls, though Oman and the UAE are more populated by them. 50 Cent is idolized here, in line with many of the western hip hop icons celebrated in other GCC cities.

“No wind shakes you, bu Azooz” comes from the old Arabic proverb, “oh mountain, no wind shakes you,” to mean you’re so strong and resilient, and it became a common expression used in numerous colloquial song lyrics. Bu Azooz is a name tag and also seen here are 3-digit tribal codes, a common graffiti practice in the Gulf.

“Harby and the wafa’ (loyalty) is my path.” Ha’il, Saudi Arabia. “Harby” is in reference to the Harb tribe. This rhythmic phrase is a common practice among young proud tribalists, adding to the “I am here” graffiti motif to say “I am from here.” In addition to their digital codes, ranging from blackberry pin numbers, online social profiles and other modes of communication, there are 3-digit codes signifying tribes’ names. Along with these codes and rhyming in colloquial dialect are proud tribal slo-gans and they extend to other Gulf countries.

Graffiti is uncommon in Abu Dhabi, and in the UAE for that matter, apart from the infamous Dubai writer Arcadia Blank. However, there are a few tags and phrases lurking behind an alleyway here or there, such as joyriding (hajwalah) references to Quranic verses in English. This graffitied phrase is on a main highway heading towards Saadiyat Island and it reads, “Rest in peace, the soldiers of this nation,” assuming-ly in reference to the ongoing war in Yemen.

It is more common to find graffiti in the smaller local and expat commu-nities and towns in the UAE, with themes including hip hop, religion, rebellion and profanity as is depicted here in Sharjah.

“Oh, time, I wish I know what is coming in my life before I pay the price, I’m losing it.” Al Hilla, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Lyrics from the song, “Jizaty,” meaning “my reward” by the Saudi hip hop artist Klash (short for Kalashnikov). Saudi Arabia’s graffiti culture is very rich and di-verse, reflective of the very disparate communities across the country with themes ranging from joyriding to love.

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates


56 Gulf Affairs

V. Timeline

Select Cultural-related Events and Developments across the GCC since 2008

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Dubai’s Technology and Media Free Zone Authority (TECOM) introduces the Gulf Film Festival and Competition

March 31: The al Dhafra Festival happens for the first time; the festival holds a camel pageant and other events and activities known to the region for centuries.

October: Qatar releases its Qatar National Vision 2030 program outlining goals to increase cultural awareness, gender parity, youth participation, and introduce Qatarization quotas.

November 22: Museum of Islamic Art in Doha opens showcasing Islamic art and architecture, the first of its kind in the Arab World.

December 31: Construction of the Burj Khalifa is completed. The structure has become a symbol of Dubai and the emirate’s modernity.

May: Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, ruler of Sharjah, approves the Heart of Sharjah project, the largest heritage project to date in the Gulf that will highlight the historic transformation of the emirate.

November 25: Plans for Sheikh Zayed National Museum unveiled.

December: ‘Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art’ opens in Doha. It serves as Qatar’s centerpiece for modern and contemporary art and is now holding over 9,000 works, making it the world’s largest specialized collection of its kind.

December 21: King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia proposes that all six GCC member states transition from cooperation into a union, and Gulf Arab leaders adopt the Riyadh Declaration calling for a “single entity.”

December: GCC adopts ID card as proof of identity for GCC citizens in both public and private sectors.

Manama, Bahrain designated “Arab Capital of Culture” for the year 2012 by the Arab League and under UNESCO.

May 24: Dubai government sets an agenda to preserve national identity.

June 30: Bahrain’s Pearling Trail is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, the second such site in the country.

November 28: UAE releases national charter outlining a code of values and conduct for Emirati citizens in an effort to define Emirati character and culture.

2013

2014

2015

57

V. Timeline

Dubai Museum records over 1 million visitors for the first time.

Qatar-UK 2013’s year of culture celebrated the long-standing relationship between Qatar and the UK. The bilateral cultural exchange program was an initiative of the Qatar Museums Authority, developed in partnership with the British Council, Qatar’s Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

April 1: Saudi Arabia begins construction on the tallest structure in the world, the Jeddah Tower, which is planned to reach over one kilometer in height.

July 8: Qatar’s al Zubarah archaeological site is inaugurated as the country’s first UNESCO world heritage site.

Sharjah, UAE designated as a “Capital of Islamic Culture” for the year 2014 by the Islamic Conference of Culture Ministers.

Historic Jeddah is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, commemorating the city’s multicultural role as a major Red Sea port and as the historic gate to Mecca for Hajj pilgrims.

January 27: Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed sets up global tourism body to market ‘Brand Dubai,’ an initiative aim-ing to boost the emirate’s global image and bring in more visitors and tourists.

December: Kuwait’s Abraj Al-Kuwait is nominated as a UNESCO world heritage site for the tower’s representation of Kuwait national identity.

December: Qatar opens Al-Wakra Heritage Village, a replica of a traditional Qatari village designed to blend tradi-tional aesthetic with modern society.

December 1: UAE National Archives partners with Google for digital exhibition on the foundation of the country.

February 10: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid forms the Gender Balance Council to show Dubai’s keenness to in-crease the roles of young Emirati women in the nation’s progress.

March 3: Saudi Arabia’s Art Council creates an exhibition to explore the history of the country’s contemporary arts scene.

March 17: Dubai hosts the Arab Social Media Influencers Summit, emphasizing ideas that connect people in inno-vative ways.

March 19: Bahrain pushes for a pan-GCC media strategy in line with the region’s traditions and principles

September 14: GCC Undersecretaries of Culture underscore the importance of strengthening a Gulf identity through joint activities and events.


58 Gulf Affairs

V. Timeline

Kuwait designated as a “Capital of Islamic Culture” for the year 2016 by the Islamic Conference of Culture Minis-ters.

February 3: Saudi Arabia marks the Al-Janadriyah Festival’s 30th anniversary as a key mechanism for preserving culture and a traditional Saudi national identity.

February 8: The UAE transforms the Ministry of Culture into the Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development and creates a mixed-gender Youth National Council to advise the government.

April 7: Saudi Arabia announces a plan to introduce permanent residence for foreigners.

April 20: The UAE’s Federal National Council forms a special committee to address the rising trend of mixed-mar-riages in the country, a phenomenon the Council says may impact national identity.

April 26: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 identifies national identity and pride as a major theme, and calls to strengthen and preserve ancient cultural sites and traditional practices while working to integrate the nation into global cul-tural circuits.

April 30: UAE Ministry of Culture and Knowledge announces workers’ day tribute in nod to the country’s large expatriate workforce.

July 30: Oman opens its National Museum, an institution that aims to preserve the components of Omani cultural heritage by supporting research and scientific and historical studies, and heritage conservation plans.

August 31: The 2,000-seat Dubai Opera opens.

September 13: The UAE announces the World’s First Global Cultural Leadership Summit for April 2017.

2016

Call for ArticlesHigher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future

Submission due date: Friday, December 16, 2016Word limit: 1,000 – 1,500 words

Gulf Affairs invites scholars to submit original analytical articles for its upcoming issue entitled “Higher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future.”Gulf Affairs is a journal founded by OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, a University of Ox-ford-based platform. The journal is exclusively dedicated to furthering knowledge and dialogue on the pressing issues and challenges facing the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Each issue is dedicated to a particular theme, allowing for a comprehensive coverage from various analytical perspectives and fields of study. Accepted articles are submitted to reviewers for comment prior to publication.

To capture the complexity of the various issues and challenges around Gulf Energy Producers, articles are encouraged from a wide range of disciplinary lenses including: Economics, Politics/Political Economy, International Relations, Law, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Area Studies, Education and History. Balanced articles supported by suffi-cient and credible sources which offer a unique perspective on the theme will likely be accepted for publication.

Gulf Affairs welcomes analytical articles on (though not limited to) the following areas:

Submission Guidelines: Please send articles to [email protected] by Friday, December 16, 2016. Au-thors whose articles have been accepted for review will be notified within two weeks after the submission deadline

• What is the state of higher education in the GCC region and how is it preparing citizens for the labor mar-ket?

• How have scholarships played a role in the higher education system? What are the trends of study abroad experiences and their impacts?

• How is the expansion of private universities and international branch campuses in the Gulf changing tra-ditional public education across the region? What is the interplay of the increasing usage of English as a language of instruction in Arabic speaking societies?

• What are unique attributes and characteristics of student life/activities across GCC campuses? How is co-education in universities viewed by these societies?

• What is the status of Technical and Vocational Education & Training and how is this evolving? How do or should multi-national organizations contribute to hands on training? What is the availability of such oppor-tunities and other internships?

• What are the leading research/scientific outputs and in which areas are the Gulf states behind?• How should higher education institutions in the Gulf be ranked/measured and which metrics are applicable?• What are the factors impacting teacher recruitment and turnover and how does this influence the quality of

education?

Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum | St Antony’s College, 62 Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK

www.oxgaps.org

For citing and referencing, use Chicago Manual of Style endnotes.1

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