Idealist Ontology: what is real?

8/12/2019 Idealist Ontology: what is real?

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Idealist ontology, philosophy of science, cognition, reality, psychological Now, collective

conscious experience, egoless experience, philosophy of mind, mind-brain relations, mind-

matter relations, collective consciousness, egolessness, spirituality, shamanism, science and

religion, God.

Idealist Philosophy: hat is !eal "

#onscious $xperience %een as &asic to 'll (ntology. 'n (verview

&y 'xel !andruparandrup)mobilixnet.d*

International #enter for Interdisciplinary Psychiatric !esearch, #I!IP

ritten +-+. $lectronic publication only.

Content

'bstract

Introduction

#ontent and emporal $xtension of the Psychological Now

he (ntology of #onsciousness

he (ntology of Nature Including /ind - &rain !elations

Individual and #ollective #onscious $xperience. he (ntology of Intersub0ectivity

#ollective #onscious $xperience 'cross ime. he (ntology of 1istory

$goless $xperience. he (ntology of orlds ithout an $go

he (ntology of orlds #omprising %piritual $xperiences

%hamanism

!eligion. God, !ationality, %pirituality

Note

!eferences
mailto:[email protected]://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/1/index.htmlhttp://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/1/index.htmlmailto:[email protected]


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Abstract

he idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the assumption that only conscious

experience in the Now is real. #onscious experience in the Now is supposed to be *nown

directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I thin* it constitutes the basis of all ontology.

#onsciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience in the Now, the ontology ofconsciousness is thus derived directly from the basis. he ontology of nature is derived

more indirectly from the basis. %cience is regarded as a catalog of selected conscious

experiences 2observations3, ac*nowledged to be scientific and structured by means of

concepts and theories 2also regarded as conscious experiences3. /aterial ob0ects are

regarded as heuristic concepts constructed from the immediate experiences in the Now and

useful for expressing observations within a certain domain with some of their mutual

relations. 1istory is also regarded as a construct from conscious experiences in the Now.

#oncepts of worlds without an ego are seen to be in harmony with immediate egoless

experiences. orlds including spirituality are conceived as based on immediate spiritual

experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist or immaterial philosophies

have been critici4ed for implying solipsism or 5solipsism of the present moment5. hiscriti6ue is countered by emphasi4ing the importance of intersub0ectivity for science and by

introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious experience and collective

conscious experience across time. #omprehensive evidence supporting the heuristic value

of these concepts is related.

I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent comprehension of natural science

including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream materialist approach entails

contradictions and other problems for a coherent understanding. he idealist approach

and the notion of collective conscious experience also facilitates cross-cultural studies and

the understanding of intersub0ectivity.

Key-words : Idealist ontology7 philosophy of science7 cognition7 reality7psychological Now7 collective conscious experience7 collective consciousness7

egoless experience7 egolessness7 philosophy of mind7 mind-brain relations7 mind-

matter relations7 spirituality7 shamanism7 science and religion7 God.

Introduction

In preceding papers the author has tried to expound an idealist ontology stating that only

conscious experience in the Now is real. his challenges the currently dominant materialist

ontology in the natural sciences, nevertheless it does maintain the methodological

presupposition that all scientific research - materialist, idealist, or dualist - rests on

empirical observations from which concepts and theories are derived 2!andrup 899, 8999,

++3.

In this ontology, or philosophy the immediate conscious experience in the psychological

Now is fundamental, and I shall therefore begin with this topic and from that develop the

ontology of consciousness, nature, intersub0ectivity, history. worlds without an ego, and

worlds comprising spiritual experiences.


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Content and Temporal Extension of the Psychological ow

' number of time studies and psychological experiments indicate that the psychological

Now is experienced with a certain temporal extension and therefore differs from the

physical moment or point of time, which is regarded as infinitesimal with 4ero duration.

hus the psychologist !ubin 289;3 performed experiments with 5 two very short sound

stimuli in the outer physical world succeeding one another.5 hen the interval between the

two sound stimuli was short, a fifth of a second 2in physical time3, !ubin


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time of science and of daily life is an abstraction from these immediate experiences. I find

that &ergson


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In the $nglish scientific and philosophic literature the term 5consciousness5 is used with

several very different meanings. 1ere are some examples showing the span of the variation:

5#onsciousness is a neurological system li*e any other, with functions such as the long-

term direction of behavior ... 5 2&ridgeman 89B3

5#onsciousness ... is best regarded as an aspect of the system


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subse6uently develop is that of awareness per se, irrespective of the ob0ects or contents of

awareness ... this fundamental sense is at bottom simple and indefinable, and we are forced

to rely, in part, on each personrom Israel I have been

informed that it is difficult to give a good translation of the $nglish word 5mind5 in

1ebrew, since there are ? - @ possible words, each of them with a special shade 2/iriam

%chwar4 89B+, personal communication, 3.

It thus seems that it is not impossible to learn from other cultures about concepts of

consciousnes and the ontology of consciousness, but great care will be necessary, because of

the linguistic and general cultural differences. his applies to what I write in the following

sections about #hinese, &uddhist, Capanese and other foreign views. I rely on texts written

in $nglish or Aanish by authors with insight in the respective cultures.


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The !ntology of ature Including $ind- %rain &elations

he dominant ontology of the estern scientific culture is materialist realism which

assumes that what scientific theories describe is a material world existing independent ofhuman consciousness and cognition. his view has proved useful and productive within a

certain, large domain of the study of nature, but it has been contested by many

philosophers 2night +87 !andrup 899, with references3, and a number of scientific

findings made in the +th century have been difficult to accomodate in this ontology. hus

cognitive

neuropsychology assumed from the beginning, li*e all biology, the existence of an external

world independent of the human observer. he studies in this discipline led, however, to

the conflicting result, that all our cognitions, including the assumption of an external

world, must depend on the cognitive apparatus in our brain. he same contradiction has

emerged in the discipline evolutionary epistemology 2the study of cognition in the context of

biological evolution3 and has been discussed within this discipline, during later years in the0ournal $volution and #ognition. (ther examples of contradictions and problems

conse6uential to the assumption of a material world 5out there5 are found within the

disciplines second order cybernetics, statistics, and physics. 2!andrup 899 and submitted3.

Aoubts about the materialist ontology 2or realism3 have been expressed by various

physicists. hus Jas4lo 2899@, p. +3 writes: 5's of today the mainstream theorists of the

6uantum world have not succeeded in giving an unambigous answer to the 6uestion,


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are thus regarded as heuristic concepts useful for expressing observations within a certain

domain with some of their mutual relations. his reinterpretation of materialist ob0ects

allows a direct understanding and use of traditional scientific theories without accepting

their ontology 2/arshall +8, p. @, !andrup 899, section ;3. he idealist ontology

emphasi4es the role of the evidence in science and is particularly open to new theories and

to the application of more than one theory and set of concepts to a domain of observations2Jindsay and /argenau 89;9, pp. 8-, !andrup 899+, 899;, 899b, allace 899@, pp. +?-

+, 88-88;,8;B-8?, 893.

he idealist ontology of nature also readily accomodates the intense nature experiences

*nown as nature spirituality 2!andrup 8993. hese intense, direct nature-experiences are

felt by the experient to be essential and important, indicating that they must be real and

that nature primarily is an experience. hese experiences are thus felt to be in conflict with

the materialist view that nature exists separated from and independent of the 5observer5.

'lso on more secular ground many people resist the alienation from nature entailed by

strict materialist realism, and tend to retain naive 2or direct3 realism, where material

nature is believed to be as perceived.

he mind-body or mind-brain problem is now often called 5the hard problem5, meaning

that it is hard to understand how a material brain can produce consciousness. I believe that

the hardness of the problem is a direct implication of the materialist ontology, and that

therefore the problem cannot be 5solved5 as long as this ontology is applied. /aterialist

realism is the problem. 2Dery recently /arshall 2+8, p. @3 has expressed similar views

on the hardness of the mind-brain problem3. ith the idealist ontology the mind-brain

relations are relations between conscious experiences 2observations3 constituting the

material brain 2here seen as a heuristic concept3 and other conscious experiences. It is

readily understood that such relations are possible, and they can be studied in detail by

comparing the results from neurophysiology and from attention to conscious experiences.

In a number of non-estern cultures and belief systems we encounter conceptions of the

world and the human which are very different from the dominant conceptions of

contemporary estern science. #learly those cultures have made different extractions and

constructions from their immediate experiences in the psychological Now.

riting on $ast 'sian thought u 289B3 gives a clear account of such differences. 1e

states that according to $ast 'sian thought it is fallacious to define human nature merely in

terms of biological, psychological or sociological structures and functions because, viewed

holistically a more comprehensive grasp of its many-sidedness is re6uired. he uni6ueness

of being human is an ethicoreligious 6uestion7 #h


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international diagnostic system in psychiatry, acceptable also in the developing countries.

's one of the obstacles he mentioned conceptual bias, i.a. the body-mind dichotomy.

%tanner 28983 gives an account of 'boriginal 'ustralian beliefs and conceptions. 1e states

that our contrast of body versus spirit is not there and the whole notion of the person is

enlarged. he 'ustralians 5enfold into some *ind of oneness the notions of body, spirit,ghost, shadow, spirit-site, and totem5. he 'ustralians can also conceive that 5man, society

and nature and past, present, and future are at one5.

erblows*y 2898, p. 3 writes about Cewish thin*ing. Aistinction between body and

soul2s3 occurs, but the essential feature of rabbinic anthropology was not the opposition

body-soul, but the doctrine of the two inclinations, the good yeser and the evil yeser. his

dichotomy is still fundamental in contemporary Cewish thin*ing.

Purely idealist ontologies have been developed by schools within &uddhism. hus ayman

2898, p. ;+@3 writes about 5the idealistic standpoint of the Di0naptimatra school by which

there is no external ob0ect independent of consciousness5. 'nd 1su 28993 has written aboo* about the 5theory of Pure #onsciousness considered one of the sub0ective and


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Indi'idual and Collecti'e Conscious Experience(

The !ntology of Intersub"ecti'ity

Immaterialist views such as the idealism proposed here, phenomenalism, and radical

constructivism have been met with the ob0ection that they are based entirely on private2individual3 experiences. hus 1irst 289?9, pp.9;-9?3 states that material ob0ects are public,

while sense data are private to the percipient, and he as*s how sets of statements about

these private sense data can give the meaning of a statement about a public ob0ect..

Ji*ewise it has been critici4ed that the immaterialist views are *inds of solipsism 2the idea

that the world has no existence outside the thin*eroerster 89B;, pp. ?9-@, Don

Glasersfeld 89BB, p. B@, at4lawic* 89B;, p. 8?3. hitehead 289B, p. 8?+3 states that if

experience be not based upon an ob0ective content, there can be no escape from a solipsist

sub0ectivism, and he critici4es the philosophers 1ume and Joc*e for failing to provide

experience with an ob0ective content. 1e also states that with ant


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be possible to study relations between changes in two or more brains associated with

collective experiences and with processes leading to collective experiences.

%ome conscious experiences, such as intersub0ective scientific observations and concepts,

are readily seen to be shared with a collective of persons, while other experiences appear to

be more individual7 sometimes I feel that experiences I have are not shared or only partlyshared by persons with whom I communicate. his feeling may be reciprocal and even

shared, so it forms a *nown and directly experienced part of a common collective

consciousness. his feeling may also give rise to a belief that the other person has

individual experiences different from mine, and even give rise to thoughts about the nature

of these experiences. %uch thoughts are, however, only con0ectural, we cannot *now the

contents of other individual minds, but I thin* we *now and experience directly the

collective experiences. his I regard as an answer to the much discussed problem of 5other

minds5, thoughts about the complete content of another mind remain con0ectural, but

what we share collectively we can and do *now by direct experience. I also regard this view

as the beginning of an approach to another much discussed problem, that of animal mind

2!andrup submitted a3.

he boundary between individual and collective consciousness is, however, blurred. If we

tal* together about our experiences, the intersub0ective or collective part will be expanded.

his aspect of intersub0ectivity has been studied thoroughly by the phenomenological

school of psychology at #openhagen Fniversity 2!ubin, rane*0Mr !asmussen, >rom3.

rane*0Mr !asmussen 289@B, chapter , with references3 writes that through

communication it is possible to ma*e certain conscious experiences 5intersub0ectively

transportable5 within a group of people. ' set of intersub0ectively transportable

experiences he calls a recursive basis. %uch recursive bases are established within scientific

disciplines 2technical languages3, but rane*0Mr !asmussen thin*s that within the

disciplines little has been done to state the recursive bases explicitly, and he thin*s that

wor*ing to accomplish this will be an important tas* for both epistemology and

pedagogics. (btaining intersub0ectivity in psychologypsychiatry aided by communication

between scientists has been described recently by /archais 2+, pp. 8+;-8+?3 and by

/archais, Gri4e, and !andrup 2899?, p. 83. I thin* that carefully established recursive

bases can be regarded as collective consciousness within a group of persons. %ince recursive

bases in science can be 6uite comprehensive, we may envisage that scientists, particularly

scientists within one discipline, have a significant part of their consciousness in common, a

collective consciousness.

Indeed, *nowledge generally and many concepts such as 5eleven,5 5energy,5 and even

5solipsism5 cannot be individual at all, because from the beginning they are shaped by

communication and education. his view is supported by several reflections in the

literature. hus COrgensen 289@, p. 8@3 describes in detail how two persons can arrive at

common names of certain phenomena such as 5head5, 5arm5, 5green5 etc. by ma*ing

observations together and communicate about the names. 1e contends that originally we

have all learned the names of things and their properties in this way7 in science further

education and communication has lead to the technical terms. In a personal letter of /arch

+, 8999 Pierre /archais asserted that the number ? is an educational, not a sub0ective


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phenomenon, an example of collective *nowledge. 1e told me that the ? exists in me only

because I have been taught arithmetic. autischer 2899B, p. 8+3 maintains that in most

cultures *nowledge is seen as belonging to a group of people rather than being the result of

individual effort. Ji*ewise Jut4 2899+, p. +3 regards psychological and anthropological

thought systems as developing in a sociocultural context and as constructed in interaction

with that context. %he also finds an essential similarity between the cultural processeswhich structure academic psychology and anthropology and those which structure other

forms of ethnopsychology and ethnoanthropology. hornton 2899@3 states that language is

an irreducibly public form of life which is encountered in specifically social contexts, and

since a solipsist re6uires a language, hornton sees solipsism as an inherently incoherent

theory. 'llwood 28993 writes in a similar vein7 he regards dialogue as collective thin*ing

and contends that 5language is an instrument for 2collective3 activation of information 2or

thin*ing35. 'rtigiani 2899@3 proposes an hypothesis defining mind as an emergent attribute

of complex social systems. 1e thin*s that mind becomes the experience of brains in social

networ*ing 5computing5 environmental flows released by cooperative actions.

Cung has written comprehensively about the collective unconscious. his might be regardedas something different from collective conscious experience, but the Cungian analyst

&ernstein writes 5....the collective unconscious which clearly implies a collective conscious5

2&ernstein 899+, p. +?3. 'nd &ernstein 2+3 has reported examples of directly felt

collective conscious experiences. Ji*ewiseKoung-$isendrath and 1ill 2899+3 thin* that

Cung


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he soul that empathetically identifies with both the pain and the 0oy of others

begins to see that in the inner world we are not separated from each other. Peace

and 0oy, no less than pain and sorrow, are shared, collective experiences. 2p. ?3.

'nd in a recent special issue of the 0ournal&e)ision2!othberg and /asters, 899B3 several

authors have given examples of collective and egoless consciousness in couples living andacting together in intimate relationships. %ome excerpts from this special issue follow:

..... they felt they were ..... one soul residing in two bodies. 2p. B3.

'lso, a deep spiritual bond - which may be felt during the most routine

activities and even far away - may develop. !obert &ly uses the metaphor of

the 5third body5 as a way of describing the transpersonal dimension that unites

a couple. It is the 5soul5 of the couple as one respondent expressed it 2p. +3.

1olding to a sense of self and to the bond feels at times to be overwhelming.

!epeated dancing bac* and forth - now self, now disappearing, wave to particleand bac*..... separateness and union..... 2p.93.

hese examples show directly experienced, lived collective consciousness7 it is also possible

to understand collective conscious experience conceptually as described above in this

section. he last example given shows difficulties with reconciling the individual and the

collective. Personally I have experienced such difficulties too, a temporary fear of losing

myself. &ut these difficulties have not been serious for me, after all the collective experience

is or becomes as familiar as the individual experience. hen an experience moves from

individual to collective 2by communication for example3, my immediate feeling is that the

sub0ect changes from I to e, while the rest of the experience remains the same. In certain

cases the sub0ect 2I as well as e3 vanishes altogether as described below in the section on

egoless experience. ' sudden change from experienced sub0ect to no sub0ect is particularly

clearly described in the report by 'ustin 6uoted in that section.

It seems probable that living and acting closely together in smaller family and other groups

has contributed to the experience and concepts of collective consciousness encountered in

various non-estern cultures. In these cultures collective and relational features of

humans and their minds are emphasi4ed at least as much as individual features. I thin*

this yields significant evidence supporting the heuristic value of the concept of collective

consciousness for cross-cultural studies, and I shall relate some examples of this evidence.

I have had some contact with*apanese psychiatry and shall 6uote psychiatrist (*uyama,

who has practiced both in Capan and in the Fnited %tates. %he writes about the three senses

of self among the Capanese: the collective, the social, and the individual sense. (f these, the

collective sense is seen as the most important and fundamental one. (*uyama states

explicitly:

Capanese people commonly thin* that the self exists only in relationships with

others... our mind is thought to exist in a field of relationships. he self


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cannot be considered separate from the relationship field nor having as clear a

boundary, as estern people imagine.....one of the conditions to be an adult

is the ability to feel somebody else


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followed by me 2see the section on consciousness above3.

%orenson 2899B3 has studied indigenous people living in isolated enclaves around the world

more or less 5untouched5 by dominant, con6uering cultures. In these people he found a

state of mind which he callsPrecon+uest Consciousness((ne of the characteristics of this

consciousness is an empathetic, integrative, intuitive rapport between individuals. %orensonfound their way of life to be simultaneously individualistic and collective. each person

constantly enlivening the others by a ceaseless, spirited, individualistic input into a unified

at-oneness. 1e felt strongly that this way of life was very different from the ways of

estern cultures, he was used to, and even difficult to describe in the $nglish language.

he difference was also clearly seen in some cases where a rapid collapse of precon6uest

consciousness 2sometimes within one wee*3 occurred after contact with dominant cultures.

hese non-estern views are difficult or rather impossible to understand on the

bac*ground of a strictly individual concept of conscious experience. If on the other hand

collective consciousness is conceived intellectually and experienced directly on the basis of

scientific activity as described above, this will open opportunities for understanding thenon-estern views and thus be helpful in cross-cultural studies.

!osenstand


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very large in the communication between brains as well as in communications within a

brain.

$xperiences with the Internet have given rise to new thoughts about interaction and

collectivity. hus Gac*enbach, Guthrie and arpen 2899B3 find that the most important

characteristic of the Internet is its emergent collective properties, and de erc*hove 2899?3contends that the real nature of the Internet is to act as a forum for collective memory and

imagination. 1e also thin*s that on-line communications have created a new *ind of

permanence, a new stability of mind, a collective mind, in which one plugs in or from which

one pulls out, but without affecting the integrity of the structure other than by direct

contribution.

%urfing, e-mailing and chatting on the Internet have given rise to new psychological

phenomena. Particularly %uler 289993 who created the word 5cyberpsychology5 has

published comprehensive studies of these phenomena. 'mong other results he reports that

.....users often describe how their computer is an extension of their mind andpersonality - a 5space5 that reflects their tastes, attitudes, and interests. In

psychoanalytic terms, computers and cyberspace may become a type of

5transitional space5 that is an extension of the individual


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Collecti'e Conscious Experience Across Time(

The !ntology of #istory

In estern cultures time is usually conceived as linear, the past and the future separated

from the present. &ut the conception of time and the attitude to the past and the future is

and was different in many other cultures, past and present. here exists a comprehensiveliterature on this, for recent reviews reference can be made to Gell 2899+3, /unn 2899+3,

Datsyayan 2899@3 and ithrow 289BB3. In the following some specific examples of time

concepts will be given..

Na*amura 289983 emphasi4es that the Indian conception of time is very different from that

in the est. ime is conceived staticallyrather than dynamically. It is recogni4ed in India

that the things of this world are always movng and changing, but the substance of things is

seen as basically unchanging, its underlying reality unaffected by the ceaseless flux. he

Indian directs our attention not to the flow of water but to the river itself, the unchanging

universal. Na*amura thin*s that the static conception of time permeates Indian thought.

(ther authors use the wordtimelessnessinstead of 5static time5, for example/ahadevan 2899+3 who writes that timeless &rahman is the source of all orders of creation

and that time is the channel through which it is possible to return to this source. hrough

meditation on time, one gets beyond time to the eternal 'bsolute 2p. ?;93. Gell 2899+, pp.

8-+3 6uoting Geert4 describe &alinese time as 5a motionless present, a vectorless now5.

1e thin*s that this does not mean that the &alinese are living in a different *ind of time

from ourselves, but that they refuse to regard as salient certain aspects of temporal reality

which we regard as much more important, such as the cumulative effects of historical time.

1all and 1all 28993 write about monochronic andpolychronictime. /onochronic time

corresponds with paying attention to and doing only one thing at a time, while polychronic

time corresponds with being involved in many things at once. he cultures of the Fnited%tates, %wit4erland Germany, and %candinavia adhere to monochronic time, while the

/editerranian peoples follow polychronic time. Ji*e oil and water the two systems do not

mix, so for performing international business it is essential to *now about the difference.

Cyclic concepts of time are found in various cultures, for instance in the ancient Gree*

culture. !ser 2899B3 describes this view: 5's time proceeds around the circle, one

encounters the past and repeats the transactions and events as the present.5 !ser also

thin*s that this cyclical reality proved 6uite ade6uate for the social, economical, and

political life in anti6uity around the /editerranean and throughout 'frica. illiams 289B@,

p. 3 0udges that the Kolngu 2Northern erritory of 'ustralia3 perceive time as circular, so

that from any particular time, what is past may be future, and what is future may be past.'nd she 6uotes a personal communication by von %turmer: 5'borigines read life

bac*wards and forwards. e read it forward.5 %he also states that for the Kolngu time is

in some contexts both cyclical and circular, though this does not preclude a certain *ind of

lineal causality 2illiams 289B@,p. +B3.

In the Cewish way of thin*ing, as described by %teinsalt4 289B, chapter ;3, time is seen li*e

a spiralor a helix rising up from creation. ime is seen as a process, in which past, present,


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and future are bound to each other as a harmoni4ation of two motions: progress forward

and a countermotion bac*ward, encircling and returning. here is always a certain return

to the past, a constant reversion to basic patterns of the past, although it is never possible to

have a precise counterpart of any moment of the time.

'lso in the &antu culture time is conceived li*e a spiral. $ach season and each new

generation return on the same vertical of the spiral, but at a higher level 2agame [email protected] /ayan concept of time is often described as cyclical, but !ser 2899B3 finds it more

correct to shift the symbolism from a circle to a spiral.

&erndt 289;, p. B3 reports that with the 'boroginal 'ustralians mythological or sacred

time exists alongside secular timebut not identical with it. he 'borigines recogni4e both

*inds of time as e6ually real, as applying in different, although overlapping, sociocultural

situations. &erndt and &erndt 289@;, pp. 8B-8BB3 write that for the 'borigines the beings

said to have been present at the beginning of things still continue to exist. In one sense the

past is still here, in the present, and is part of the future as well. &ut the 'borigines also

recogni4e various time categories in connection with their everyday activities: days and

nights, moons, the se6uence or cycle of seasons. /owal0arlai 2/owal0arlai and /alnic899, pp. @-@B3 explains that when you are in an ancient state of mind, time stands still,

because your mind is in a state where time does not count. 'ncient time is no time.

/ore, comprehensive evidence for experience being regarded as existing in both past and

present has emerged from several studies of the 'ustralian 'boriginal culture. hus $l*in

289@;, p. +83 states:

In those rituals we were 5in the Areaming5. e were not 0ust

commemorating or re-enacting the past. hatever happened in the

mythic past was happening now, and there is no doubt that the men

were 5carried away5 by the experience.

his statement by $l*in is particularly clear and explicit, but it is substantiated by several

other reports about past events reoccurring in the present during rituals and ceremonies in

the 'ustralian culture 2&erndt 89;, pp. +-+B, &erndt and &erndt 89@;, pp. ++@-++,

1ume 8999, pp. 9 -8, Isaacs 899+, p. ;, %trehlow 89@B, pp. +9- and 898, p. @883 .

'lso in other cultures than the 'ustralian ritual time may differ from secular time. hus

%ilverman 28993 writes about the $astern Iatmul, New Guinea:

'lthough $astern Iatmul time can be incremental and linear, the naming

system and totemic identifications seem to merge the present and the past.

o some degree, so does the cyclical temporality of the *inship system. his

form of time is also present in $astern Iatmul rituals such as curing rites

which often enact primordial events as if they were occuring in the present.

'nd Jancaster 2 899, p. +3 writes about the Cewish culture that time for sacred history is

not the everyday passing time of literal history, but that mysterious dimension of time

which is eternally present. 1e thin*s that while literal history may satisfy the rational mind


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there are deeper dimensions to the psyche for which sacred history can provide an e6ually

satisfying picture of the way things really are.

Ji*e some other people the 'ustralians believe in reincarnation.. It is the soul or spirit

2which would include what is here called consciousness3 of the deceased which is believed to

reappear in a person living in the present. his can of course be seen as an example of thepast appearing in the present and as an extreme example of consciousness shared across

time. 'ustralian conceptions of reincarnation are described by several authors. %trehlow

2898, pp. @8?-@83 relates how an ancestral supernatural being can become reincarnated

into the unborn child of a pregnant woman. his may happen while she 2or, in some areas,

her husband3 is experiencing a dream-vision of the future child brought on by the

supernatural being who is see*ing rebirth. %trehlow also reports that in sacred ritual

totemic ancestors are represented by their human reincarnations 2898, pp. @88 and @89-

@+3. &erndt 289;, p. +B3 states that during the process of initiation, a father could ta*e his

son away to a secret place and sing into him the spirit-double of his own assistant totem. In

this way that totem spirit merges with the youth


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used in the past.

ith the idealist ontology the materialist entities and events in history may be regarded as

heuristic concepts, 0ust li*e the material things in the present. ime itself may also be

regarded as a heuristic concept useful for further ordering of our conscious experiences in

the Now. I suppose that the different conceptions of time in various cultures are and havebeen useful in this way. his goes for the concepts of time in physics too7 thus in modern

physics the idea of static time is sometimes entertained and regarded as useful, in

particular in association with relativity theory and cosmology 2 $instein and Infeld 89@,

chapter , section on space time continuum, 1aw*ing 89BB, chapter B3. 1aw*ing describes

the theory of imaginary time, a spatial and therefore static dimension, and states that li*e

other theories in physics, it is a mathematical model for describing our observations. 1e

finds that it is meaningless to as* whether the usual or the imaginary time is the correct or

real one, the 6uestion is, which description is the most useful 21aw*ing 89BB, chapter B3. It

may be added here that both of these concepts of time express structures in the catalog of

scientific observations useful in different domains. e are aware of this catalog in the Now,

in the focus and in the margin.

1aw*ing


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(n a biological and evolutionary bac*ground %heets-Cohnstone 2899, p.?+-@+3 also

considers re-enactment of past experience. %he uses a method called hermeneutical

phenomenology and thin*s that by this means 5we might accede, and in the closest possible

way, to the actual experiences of the ancestral hominids.5

&y writing about re-enactmentof past thought #ollingwood 2and %heets-Cohnstone3 seem to

regard the thoughts in history as fixed facts that existed in the past. his is in agreement

with the usual estern linear conception of time. &ut it is also possible to assume that the

historian gradually develops thoughts, about the emperor and the edict mentioned above

for example, that fit the historical evidence 2here seen as conscious experiences in the Now3

and therefore may be seen as shared with a historical person such as the emperor 2here

seen as a construct based on historical evidence3. %uch sharing would be parallel to the

development of collective consciousness with contemporaries by communication as

described in the preceding section.

his interpretaton of #ollingwood


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of self that in normal life often intrudes in consciousness ... In flow the self is fully

functioning, but not aware of itself doing it ... 5 2p. 3. 5'n activity that fosters a merging

of action and awareness with a centering of attention on a limited stimulus field will lead

inevitably to a loss of the ego construct, a loss of awareness of the


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of 5cosmic consciousness5 2##3:

't this point I merged with the light and everything, including myself,

became one unified whole. here was no separation between myself and the

rest of the universe. In fact to say that there was a universe, a self, or any

5thing5 would be misleading - it would be an e6ually correct description tosay that there was 5nothing5 as to say that there was 5everything5. o say

that sub0ect merged with ob0ect might be almost ade6uate as a description of

the entrance into ##, but during ## there was neither 5sub0ect5 nor

5ob0ect5...... 0ust a timeless unitary state of being 2%mith and art 899B, p.

83.

hese are direct experiences of the environment or the universe without the ego in the

usual central position. It is, however, also possible to thin. of the world decentered from

the ego or even with another ego as the center. he change from the Ptolemaic to the

#opernican view of the planetary system is an example of such decentering. %ince then,

science has continued the decentering process and developed an 5ob0ective5 world view.

he decentered world of science is, however, as mentioned above, most often considered as

a material world pro0ected 5out there5 and separate from the human mind. his ma*es it

difficult to place consciousness in the scientific picture. In contrast, an egoless experience of

the world 2perceived or conceived3 is still a conscious experience and avoids the dichotomy

between the material and the mental. (n such a monistic bac*ground, worldviews centered

on an ego, centered on a collective, or completely decentered 2egoless3 are not in conflict,

but can be seen as different structures in the same catalog of conscious experiences. It is

*nown that there can be more than one structure in a system of elements, for example, in

ambiguous figures. hese are perceived in two or more alternating gestalts, only one at a

time, but in thought it can be conceived that the two or more structures or gestalts exist

simultaneously in the figure 2&urling 89@;, Gregory 899B, chapter 8, !andrup 899+3. his

point is also illustrated by the following anecdote 6uoted from !andrup, /un*vad and >og

289B+3: ' visitor to >lorida wanted to mail a baby turtle to his son at camp. he cler* in the

Post (ffice read the regulations aloud: 5ell5, he said 5Aogs is dogs and cats is dogs,

s6uirrels in cages is birds - - and baby turtles is insects5 >or postal purposes this

alternative structure was preferred to the usual Jinnean structure in 4oology.

In some cases egoless experiences are not only without ego but also without other content

such as perceptions, thoughts etc. his is called pure consciousness, contentless

consciousness, experience of nothingness, emptiness or void etc.. here are many

descriptions of this type of experience in the literature from Indian, Cewish and other

sources. he descriptions differ to some extent, the nothingness seems to be more or less

complete, but surely these experiences lac* many details *nown from ordinary, daily

experiences7 see further below.

Jancaster 2+, p. +3 6uoting %ullivan gives a clear example of a contentless experience

which followed a road accident:


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here was something, and the something was not the nothing 2of total

unconsciousness3. he nearest label for the something might possibly be


25/41

cosmic psyche is regarded as the source of all existence, the ultimate reality. It is also seen

as the basis of the individual mind. 't the pinnacle of human development, unity

consciousness, the individual is regarded as a fully integrated expression of the cosmic

psyche. hus the world view and the direct experience is harmoni4ed in Dedic psychology.

$golessness and nothingness are also important elements of Cewish mysticism, both asdirect experience and in the conception of the world.. here is a tradition of gradual

contemplative ascent to higher planes. 't a high plane the mystic no longer differentiates

one thing from another. #onceptual thought, with all its distinctions and connections,

dissolves7 awareness of the self disappears. >ortune 2899?, p. 83 reports that at the one

occasion, when she touched the edge of the highest level, *eter, of the tree of life, it

appeared as a glaring white light in which all thought vanished completely. eter is also

seen as the totality of all existence. %ince God


26/41

ocean - in no manner can the thrilling depth of these feelings be written - with

these I prayed.... 2Cefferies 898, p. @3

he second description is from the partially autobiographic boo* 5here the %pirits !ide

the ind5 by >elicitas Goodman.

Dery soon I discovered all on my own what being an adult apparently meant,

and confided it to my diary: 5he magic time is over5. >or all of a sudden

and without the slightest warning, I reali4ed that I could no longer

effortlessly call up what in my terms was magic: that change in me that was

so deliciously exciting and as if I were opening a door, imparting a special

hue to whatever I chose. I noticed the curious impediment first with the

fresh, crunchy snow which fell right after my birthday. It was nice, but I

could not ma*e it glow 2 Goodman 899, p. 3

Jater in life >elicitas Goodman regained her 5magic5, when she studied shamanism both

by anthropological methods and by own experiences.

I regard these three experiences as examples of nature spirituality, but Pierre /archais

2899, 8999, +, personal communications 899;-89993 while recogni4ing the occurrence

of this *ind of experiences prefers to name them 5exceptional intuitive experiences5. >or

/archais 5authentic spirituality5 is an act of faith, a part of religion, particularly the

Cudeo-#hristian religions. 1e characteri4es the former type of experiences, and also $ast

'sian mysticism and transcendence with the >rench word 5supranaturel5, while the

5authentic spirituality5 is characteri4ed by the word 5surnaturel5. his distinction

between supranaturel and surnaturel is fundamental in his view.

$velyn Fnderhill 289??, p. 8983 distinguishes less sharply between nature experiences and

religious faith:

%uch use of visible nature as the stuff of ontological perceptions the medium whereby the

self reaches out to the 'bsolute, is not rare in the history of

mysticism. he mysterious vitality of trees, the silent magic of the forest,

the strange and steady cycle of its life, possess in a peculiar degree this

power of unleashing the human soul ..... he flowery garment of the world is for some

mystics a medium of ineffable perception, a source of exalted

0oy, the veritable clothing of God.

his view is supported by 6uotations from several $uropean mystics 2pp. 89-89@3.

>or Pierre /archais the meaning of the word 5spirituality5 is therefore more restricted

than it is for me 2and for Fnderhill3. /archais and I have had prolonged exchange on these

issues and have come to agree on much, also that even though the terms may differ

25nature spirituality5 versus 5exceptional intuitive experiences5 for instance3 it is possible

to agree on the phenomena.

&ut /archais and I still differ with respect to the Perennial Philosophy. his philosophy is

based on a broad sense of the word spirituality comprising both nature spirituality, $ast


27/41

'sian mysticism, shamanistic transcendence, and experiences embedded in Cudeo-

#hristian religions. It assumes that there is a similarity or common core to all experiences

of spirituality 2understood in this broad sense3 across cultures and across the ages. It does

not regard the distinction of /archais between the supranaturel and the surnaturel as

important and is therefore not accepted by him. I, on the other hand, tend to agree with the

perennialists, although I admit that since spiritual experiences are often felt as ineffable,transverbal, it is difficult to discuss the idea of the Perennial Philosophy in words. /y

positive attitude to this philosophy therefore rests on intuition more than on reason

2!andrup 899B3.

In the special integration group %pirituality and %ystems within the International %ociety

for the %ystems %ciences the Perennial Philosophy is widely accepted, and on this basis it

seems possible that some intersub0ectivity might be obtained through communication.

%ince 8998 such communication has been performed at annual meetings in this group

2!andrup 899a3. he exchange has lead to better understanding of both differences and

similarities between the participants, and the exchange is still going on. >or me personally

the direct communication with colleagues from other cultures 2Capanese, Indian, 'mericanIndian, 'boriginal 'ustralian etc.3 has been particularly illuminating. In the group we

have abstained from attempts to define spirituality, but rather try to understand it by

means of the examples presented at our meetings.

&ased on all these experiences and exchanges I thin* thatthe immediate spiritual experience

is the foundationof all spiritual beliefsandtheir ontology( his applies to occidental and

oriental religions, 'boriginal 'ustralian belief systems, shamanism etc.

/hamanism

%hamanism is described in various ways, but autischer 289B93 finds that shamanic

experiences are intersub0ectively accessible. hese experiences often involve a certain state

of mind in which a 0ourney to another world or reality may be experienced. 'nthropologist

/ichael 1arner, a pioneer of neo-shamanism has written about the ontology of this other

world:

In shamanic experience, when one is in non-ordinary reality things

will seem 6uite as material as they are here. (ne feels the

coldness or warmth of the air, the hardness or smoothness of a

roc*7 one perceives colors, sounds, odors and so forth. 'll thephenomena that characteri4e the so-called material world will

appear 0ust as real and material there as they do here if it is an

extremely clear shamanic 0ourney 21arner 89B, p. ;3.

1arner goes on stating that the shaman does not regard these non-ordinary phenomena as

a pro0ection of his own mind, but rather as another reality which exists independently of

that mind. 1arner


28/41

expressed later in the same paper 2p. 8?3: 5's a person who has followed the path of

shamanism for a long time, I aminclined to thin.that there is more to the universe than the

human mind5. 2Italics by the present author3.

hese two views, the alternate world as an independent external reality or as a mental

pro0ection are described and discussed in the literature by several authors 2Peters 89B9, p.88B, Peters and Price-illiams 89B, pp. ;?-;@, urner 899+, Daughan 899?, p. , alsh

89B9, pp. -8, autischer 89B9, iebe +3. his problem is completely parallel to the

problem about the ontology of the material world in modern science: does it exist

independentally 5out there5, or is it rather a mental pro0ection or heuristic concept based

on regularities in the occurrence of the immediate experiences " In science the view of an

external material reality has run into contradictions as described above. 'n idealist

ontology based on conscious experiences seems to be a more viable alternative, but this

does not mean that we can control the processes of sense experiences at will 2&erger and

Juc*man 89@@, Introduction, p. 8, Aiettrich Q99?, pp. 9@, 8-8?, !andrup submitted3 and

the same seems to be true for shamanic experiences. he shamanic world view as well as

the scientific can be seen as mental constructs useful for structuring the immediateexperiences in the Now.

&eligion( 0od, &ationality, /pirituality

urning to the religions more familiar in the est we may say, rationally that God can be

seen as a something 2or a nothing3 which brings coherence to both sensory and spiritual

experiences and to the felt urges to behave ethically. $ven fear of God may be seen as fear

of performing something unethical which may harm family, society, nature, and oneself.

'll this is a rational account, but religion is rather experienced or *nown in an intuitive-spiritual mode. %piritual experiences are usually regarded as mainly ineffable, beyond

words, but it may be said that spiritually God is imagined either as li*e a person or in a

more abstract way. It seems to me that my rational account above agrees with the abstract

spiritual imagination of God, as well as rationality can ever agree with spirituality. his

suggests that there is a difference but no principal conflict between science and religion.

hen these things dawned to me, it was felt as a great relief.

ote

he content of this paper is influenced by prolonged exchange in the %pirituality and%ystems group of the International %ociety for the %ystems %ciences 2!andrup 899a3 and

in the #enter for Interdisciplinary !esearch, #I!IP 2/archais and !andrup 899,

!andrup 899; a3, in particular with Pierre /archais, $laine %mith, %Oren &rier, Grethe

%Orensen, and Jin addell.

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Idealist Ontology: what is real?

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