IB Historical Investigation TO WHAT EXTENT DID GEORGE KENNAN’S LONG TELEGRAM INFLUENCE TRUMAN’S...

“TO WHAT EXTENT DID GEORGE KENNAN’S LONG TELEGRAM INFLUENCE TRUMAN’S POLICY OF CONTAINMENT?”

CANDIDATE NAME: LI CHUN HO

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 001408-032

SESSION: MAY 2012

SUBJECT: IB HISTORY HIGHER LEVEL

WORD COUNT: 2000

0

Word Count: 2000 Candidate Name: Li Chun HoIB History Higher Level Candidate Number: 001408-032

Session: May 2012

“To what extent did George Kennan’s Long Telegram influence Truman’s policy on containment?”

Contents

Criterion A: Plan of the investigation.................................................................................................2

Criterion B: Summary of Evidence.....................................................................................................3

Criterion C: Evaluation of sources......................................................................................................7

Criterion D: Analysis..........................................................................................................................9

Criterion E: Conclusion....................................................................................................................13

Criterion F: Sources and word limit.................................................................................................14

Appendixes: Appendix 1: Scanned copy of the original Long Telegram read by President Truman........................................................................................................................................18

Appendix 2:..................................................................................................................................37

Truman learns of the Manhattan Project (24th of April, 1945).....................................................37

Appendix 3:..................................................................................................................................39

Summary of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences:.......................................................................39

Appendix 4: Outline of the Clifford-Elsey Report, (Sent to Department of State on 24th of September, 1946)........................................................................................................................42

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Criterion A: Plan of the investigation

Many history texts on President Truman’s containment policies1have lacked discussion as to how far

George Kennan’s Long Telegram2 affected Truman’s decision-making. Hence, this investigation

explores: “To what extent did George Kennan’s Long Telegram influence Truman’s policy of

containment?” Was containment inevitable? Did this “splendid analysis”3 of Russian behavior guide

Truman’s decision-making?

The key primary sources are “Sources of Soviet Conduct”4 and Truman’s private papers

5.Secondary

sources come from John Gaddis’s “Strategies of Containment” and Robert Ferrell’s “Harry S. Truman

and the Cold War revisionists”.

US-Soviet relations from 1945-1953 will be assessed alongside the analysis of methods used by

American participation against incidents undermining capitalism after Kennan’s telegram, such as the

Berlin Blockade. The personal thoughts of Truman and his aides will also be considered.

The investigation will exclude actions taken by America’s allies against Communism and the

interactions these leaders had with the President.

Word count: 145

1Truman’s Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are assumed to be Truman’s key policies on containment.

2 An American embassy official in Moscow, Kennan’s telegram replied to US’s concerns of Soviet western

hostility.3

As claimed by Secretary of State, James F Byrnes in 1947. 4

Kennan’s Long Telegram, also known as, “Article X”. Please see Appendix 15

This includes diaries and both unsent and sent letters to aides.

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Criterion B: Summary of Evidence

Summary of sources related to America’s Cold War policies and Russian actions before Kennan’s

Telegram:

Historian John Lewis Gaddis noted President Roosevelt’s war aims were to, “make the Grand

Alliance [UK, US and USSR] survive Hitler’s defeat,”6 and to make Russia dependent on America.

7

Congress approved Roosevelt’s lend-lease program. It enabled Roosevelt to provide any countries

with “defensive articles” 8

whose defense was important to America. Roosevelt planned to use quid

pro quo approaches9 to satisfy his intentions after the war. In January 1945, Molotov asked Roosevelt

for a $6 billion post-war loan. Roosevelt replied he would first contact Stalin, which did not occur.

Upon Roosevelt’s death, Harry Truman became President. Roosevelt had rarely discussed foreign

policy with Truman, making him ignorant of the Manhattan Project10

and the President’s agendas11

.

Truman was more anti-Soviet than Roosevelt and adopted a black-and-white approach towards

Russia. When the agreement of free Polish elections was broken, Truman strongly criticized Molotov,

the Soviet Foreign Minister. Truman also wanted to limit economic assistance to Russia.

American-Russian relations swiftly deteriorated further. Without informing Russia, Truman dropped

two atomic bombs on Japan, hoping to force her surrender. The bombings further inflamed US-USSR

6 Gaddis, J. (2005) Strategies of Containment. United States of America: Oxford University Press. Page 11

7 See Appendix 3 for a summary of the Potsdam and Yalta conferences.

8 Defensive articles can be defined as any resource useful during times of war which also included payments.

PBS (2009) Primary Source Lend-Lease Act of 1941 [online]. Community Television of Southern California (KCET). Available from < http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/LendLeaseAct.pdf>9

“This for that” in Latin. It does not suggest equality.10

US scientists in 1941 began the project, aiming to create the atomic bomb, exploding on 16th July 1945. See Appendix 2 on when Truman was informed of the Manhattan project. 11

Truman mentioned, “I was not familiar with any of these things [Roosevelt's meetings with Churchill and Stalin].” Truman, H. (1945) [Diary- April 12th, 1945]. Washington: Truman.

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relations, as Stalin perceived it as a demonstration of American military superiority and an attempt to

prevent Russian intervention in Japan. It worsened when America unexpectedly ended lend-lease in

May 1945.

Having the only atomic bomb, Truman felt superior to Russia. Unknowingly, Moscow had infiltrated

their atomic operations12

. This dismantled Truman’s atomic diplomacy aiming to exchange atomic

secrets for East-European concessions.

Failing to limit Russian expansion into East-Europe, Truman was “tired babying the Soviets” 13

.

Summary of sources related to George Kennan’s Long Telegram and reception:

Kennan was an American Embassy official in Moscow and a Soviet specialist. His telegram, “Sources

of Soviet Conduct” dated the 22nd of February, 1946, was sent to the Secretary of State, James Byrnes.

It answered the Department of State’s concerns of Russia’s growing hostility towards the West. This

included Russian refusal to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

According to Kennan, America adopted the wrong policy towards Russia during WWII. She partnered

with Russia as a key ally against the Axis powers, notably Germany. Kennan discouraged such

relations, outlining the inevitable hostility from mutually antagonistic values14

. Kennan explained the

complex logic Moscow followed, by comparing Soviet officials as “unamenable to argument or

reason…Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the “master’s voice.””15

12 The Truman administration became weary of Stalin’s unfazed reaction. Secretary of State James Byrnes

recalled that, “He [Stalin] was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it.” This worsened distrust between both states. Byrnes, J. (1947) Speaking Frankly. 1st ed., New York: Harper & Brothers. Page 263 13

Truman, H. (1946) [To James F. Byrnes dated January 5th, 1946] (Unsent). Washington: Truman.14

“The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism… It must inevitably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime,” Kennan, G. (1947) The Sources of Soviet Conduct.15

Kennan referred to the famous RCA logo of a dog listening to a phonograph being played.

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Kennan believed, instead of making Moscow see logic16

, America should use a policy, “of long-term,

patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”17

This linked with the

“particularized” approach, where foreign relations between countries should be built, “upon real

community of interest and outlook,” considering the distrust between America and Russia as allies.

The telegram was a “splendid analysis”18

of Soviet behavior and commended by Naval Secretary

James Forrestal. To Gaddis, “Kennan did more than anyone else… to articulate containment as a

strategy.”19

Summary of sources related to Truman’s actions after Kennan’s Long Telegram:

16 “Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental

approaches.” Kennan, G. (1947) The Sources of Soviet Conduct.17

Kennan, G. (1947) The Sources of Soviet Conduct.18

As complimented by Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. 19 Gaddis, J.L., (2005) Strategies of Containment. 2nd ed., United States of America, Oxford University Press.

Page 54

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The Truman Doctrine was established to, “support free peoples who are resisting attempted

subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”20

It permitted America to intervene in

democratic countries whose democracy was threatened by authoritarian forces through providing

political, economic and military assistance. The Truman Doctrine speech convinced Congress to

allow America to financially and militarily assist Greece and Turkey in battling Communism.

Marshall Plan aimed to defeat, “hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.”21

By funding war-torn

European nations, it helped prevent them from turning to communism. Initially open to all European

countries, ultimately, only West-European countries received the aid; Russia forbade its East

European satellites-especially Czechoslovakia and Poland-to partake of it.

On 24th June 1948, access to Western zones of West Berlin was blocked, forbidding the supply of

necessities and goods. America swiftly responded with Britain in airlifting supplies into West Berlin.

Soviet forces ended the blockade in May 1949.

Word count: 619

Criterion C: Evaluation of sources

“Strategies of Containment,” by John Lewis Gaddis:

20 Truman, H. (1947) The Truman Doctrine. Heard before a Joint Session of Congress, 12th March, 1947.

21 Marshall, G. (1947) The Marshall Aid. Heard before Harvard University, 5th June, 1947.

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John Gaddis’s “Strategies of Containment” is, as the subtitle states, a monograph on American

national security policy during the Cold War. It is a critique judging American policies employed to

protect capitalistic and democratic values during the Cold War. As the text focuses on security

policies, the target audience should already adequately understand the Cold War22

.

This secondary source was written by Historian Gaddis, a Yale University professor, considered a

specialist and post-revisionist of the Cold War. Having published books spanning over three decades,

it testifies his devotion to studying this period of tension.

Gaddis appears to reliably interpret Kennan’s Telegram as he interviewed Kennan and is his official

biographer. Additionally, it is advantageous by hindsight; Gaddis updated the book in 2005, long after

the Cold War ended. Therefore, the book is an entire review of American security policies without

excluding important factors, such as the collapse of USSR. It also investigated the argument of the

post-revisionists23

, as Gaddis is a post-revisionist historian.

Although the text is, “impressive… and far-sighted”24

, it is interesting to note the revisionist

argument was excluded, even though post-revisionist values derived from revisionism25

.

Revisionists like Gabriel Kolko and Walter LaFeber and Russian historians were not included in the

bibliography. As the book centers on post-revisionist thinking it neglected the arguments of

22 For example, the excerpt, “He [Roosevelt] had been careful in his handling of Lend-Lease, reparations, a

post-war loan, and the atomic bomb, to hold out both the “sticks” and “carrots” needed to make a quid pro quo strategy work,” contains vocabulary that readers are expected to understand, such as Lend-Lease and quid pro quo.23

Post-revisionism was developed before the Cold War ended that perceived both America and USSR were equally responsible for instigating the Cold War. Gaddis’s post-revisionist views were best expressed in his, “The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.” 24

As complimented by the Journal of American History at the back cover of the book. 25

Revisionism perceives the United States as an empire seeking to influence other countries, established by intense American participation in the Vietnam War that encouraged a misinterpretation of containment. It associates American policies with the Orthodox argument that USSR was the main contributor in starting the Cold War; Soviet expansion into East Europe was believed as the key factor that led to the Cold War.

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revisionists and traditionalists26

. Therefore the sub-title’s “critical appraisal” is from a post-revisionist

viewpoint. This subjectivity suggests evidence against the post-revisionist argument is ignored.

“Off the record: the private papers of Harry S. Truman,” by Harry S Truman, edited by Robert H

Ferrell:

The text illuminates the President’s life, featuring personally written papers: diary entries, letters and

memoranda. As the text brings, “valuable material on major events of the Truman years” to everyone,

it can evaluate the actions taken by the administration. It uncovers how willing was Truman to

agreeing these actions and his behavior towards Russia. Furthermore, the papers can explore changes

in Truman’s language upon reading the telegram, whether his writing lifted words or phrases from

Kennan’s Telegram.

The primary sources were released by Truman’s daughter, Margaret, shortly after Truman’s death

from closed White House cabinets. Subsequently examined by Truman library archivists, they were

collected and edited by Robert Ferrell, a recognized Cold War expert.

As each dated entry was written immediately after events, they are a faithful accounting of Truman’s

attitudes at that particular moment, thusly are accurate snapshots of his opinions. This is enforced

with sent and unsent letters. They explored changes in his attitude towards Russia after reading

Kennan’s telegram. The sources appear to be authentic and accessible, publicly viewable from the

National Archives of the American government. Their mission statement did not indicate any bias.

However, because Ferrell recognized having excluded documents, “too special to be of interest to

present-day readers”27

, without any criteria, one wonders what was omitted. Therefore, publication

bias limits its usefulness. There is potential absence of views Truman might have had that were “too

26 Traditionalism places the responsibility of igniting the Cold War on the USSR and defended American

actions. For example, it supported the use of containment.27

Truman, H. (1997) Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. Ferrell, R. (ed.) United States of America: University of Missouri Press. Page of Acknowledgements

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special” for public interest. Writing is often transcribed into text using optical character recognition

scanning. This may be inaccurate. Moreover, they were personal papers that offer part of the whole

spectrum of events that needs to be supplemented by other data, such as George Elsey’s interviews.

Word count: 521

Criterion D: Analysis

During President Roosevelt’s later years, his foreign policy involved cooperating with the USSR to

build a Grand Alliance to defeat Hitler. By using Lend-Lease to help defend other countries, Stalin

believed he would continue doing so to Russia’s advantage after the war. However, after Molotov

informed Roosevelt of Stalin’s intentions, no further discussion went underway. This may have

misled Russia as Roosevelt initially held a “soft” stance against Russia: throughout 1943 he accepted

shifting the Russian-Polish borders to Russia’s geopolitical advantage and the Percentages

Agreement28

. This may only have been to ensure Soviet military cooperation against Germany.

Although Roosevelt wanted to use quid pro quo as post-war aims, his death did not permit him to do

so himself. Hence, Moscow believed a change of policy occurred when Truman took office.

Once President, Truman tried to use quid pro quo29

. He wanted East-European concessions from

Russia with America’s economic supremacy and atomic monopoly. By ending Lend-Lease and

28 Roosevelt had quietly accepted the border changes out of domestic political considerations in fear that by

publicly proclaiming his support for it, he would lose support of Polish-Americans whose votes he needed for the 1944 Presidential Elections. The issue of Polish-Russian borders was first discussed at the Tehran Conference from 28th of November to 1st of December, 1943. The Percentages Agreement was held during a bilateral meeting in Moscow that agreed Russia may have 90% influence in Romania and 75 % in Bulgaria, and for that Britain receive the benefit of having 90% in Greece. Clare, J. (no date) Personalities at the Conferences: The “Big Three” at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam [online] & Available from < http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war4_personalities.htm>29

Gaddis, J.L., (2005) Strategies of Containment. 2nd ed., United States of America, Oxford University Press. Page 15

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adjusting Russia’s initial $6 billion loan request after Congress approved $2 billion, he intended to

limit the financial power to Russia, especially in times of peace30

. When the atomic bomb was

operational, Truman mentioned it to Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, hoping to yield East-European

concessions. Truman may have used the bomb against Japan by pressuring Russia for concessions in

East-Europe.

This approach prompted Stalin to believe American foreign policy had changed. Because Truman

dropped the bombs on Japan, he broke Roosevelt’s agreement with Stalin. Further complicating

matters, Moscow was startled America abruptly ended Lend-Lease31

. Stalin was confident America

would help economically rebuild Russia. Therefore, Moscow believed America underwent a dramatic

policy change, based on quid pro quo and economic assistance. It also gave Stalin the impression

America was indifferent to their fear of Germany.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan convinced Stalin that American policy under Truman

was different under Roosevelt. Because Moscow held a different definition of democracy32

, the

Truman Doctrine appeared to justify opposing controlled East-Europe. Russia forbade its East-

European satellites to enjoy this plan and created the Molotov Plan.33

Truman’s impression of Stalin also transformed. This emerged when Russia failed to implement free

Polish elections. Russia’s growing East-European blocs concerned America. Truman was frustrated

30 Ferrell, R., (2006) Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists. United States of America, University of

Missouri Press. Page 2631

The main intention of Lend-Lease was to ensure German defeat. It became difficult to continue funding Russia during peacetime especially when the differences in post-war aims and ideologies became clear.32

“…because there are no capitalists in our country, no landlords, no exploitation, and nobody, in fact, to bring pressure to bear on people in order to distort their will. That is why our elections are the only really free and really democratic elections in the whole world.” Excerpt of electoral speech delivered by Stalin in the Bolshoi Theatre, 11th of December, 1937. Available from <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS37.html>33

The Molotov Plan assisted East-European countries under her spheres of influence by rebuilding their economy and reconstruct war-torn countries.

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over the concessions Secretary Byrnes made in December 194534

. Truman furiously vented, “I’m

tired babying the Soviets.”35

Officials commended Kennan’s analysis of Soviet behavior. Although George Elsey, Truman’s

military advisor, “made sure Truman saw it”36

, he stated earlier he saw it as nothing new37

. It seems

Truman supported Kennan’s containment as he recalled all copies of the Clifford-Elsey report38

that

proposed military action against Russia, including, “atomic and biological warfare”39

. The Truman

Doctrine compelled Congress to assist Turkey and Greece fighting against Communism. This

exemplifies language is crucial in conveying political objectives.

The Berlin Airlift exhibited the determination of the Allies on containment. However, it must be noted

the airlift had merely maintained its Western Zones. It is imaginable that America would have reacted

similarly, towards the Berlin Blockade without the introduction of containment.

Word count: 508

34 Byrnes agreed America would recognize the countries of Romania and Bulgaria when non-Communist

ministers were added to the administration. Pillars of Peace (1946) Documents Pertaining To American Interest In Establishing A Lasting World Peace: January 1941-February 1946. United States of America: Book Department, Army Information School, Carlisle Barracks. Page 158-16635

Truman acknowledged, “…It [Ethridge Letter] is full of information on Romania & Bulgaria and confirms our previous information on these two police states. I am not going to agree to the recognition of those governments unless they are radically changed.” Truman, H. (1946) [To James F. Byrnes dated January 5th, 1946] (Unsent). Washington: Truman.36

Elsey, G., (2009) An unplanned life: a memoir. United States of America, The Curators of the University of Missouri. Page 13737

Elsey, G. (1969) Oral History on Containment. Interviewed by: Hess, J., Washington, DC, 7th of July. Available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey7.htm#375> Page 375-37638

See Appendix 4 for a scanned outline of the Clifford-Elsey report. 39

Elsey, G. and Clifford, C. (1946) The Clifford-Elsey Report.

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Criterion E: Conclusion

Many, such as Gaddis and Forrestal, suggest Truman’s containment policies towards Russia were

influenced wholly by Kennan’s Telegram, reflected by the intentions of his policies in limiting Soviet

expansion. This is based on the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These strategies hindered

Soviet expansion and the replacement of free entities to Stalin’s version of “democracy”. Truman’s

recalling of the Clifford-Elsey report, which states otherwise, reaffirms his support for containment.

However, it is doubtful the Telegram was instrumental in directing Truman to seek containment. Both

the quid pro quo and containment aimed at securing East-European political concessions. Only when

Russia refused offers did they became policies America sought to pursue. The Telegram only seemed

to voice what politicians wanted to hear. It was, “simply expressing publicly… in a somewhat blunter

fashion...”40

It justified using financial means to deter Russian interests. Although uncertainties exist

on whether greater American understanding of Russian insecurity and a strings-free loan would have

ended Russia’s search for expanding its spheres of influence, the failure of the atomic diplomacy and

its unwise choice of a post-war loan with political concessions drove the need for newer policies.

Accordingly, it seems substantially although the Telegram was influential towards Truman’s policies,

it was by no means instrumental.

Word count: 207

40 Elsey, G. (1969) Oral History on Containment. Interviewed by: Hess, J., Washington, DC, 7th of July. Available

from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey7.htm#375> Page 376

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Criterion F: Sources and word limit

Books:

Brett, P., (2000) The USA and the WORLD, 1917-1945. 4th ed., Great Britain, Hodder & Stoughton

Educational. [Cited 18th of May, 2011].

Byrnes, J. (1947) Speaking Frankly. 1st ed., New York: Harper & Brothers. [Cited 18th of July, 2011].

Chernyaev, A. (2000) My six years with Gorbachev. United States of America: Pennsylvania State

University Press. [Cited 18th of June, 2011].

Edwards, O., (2004) The USA and the COLD WAR. 4th ed., Great Britain, Hodder & Stoughton

Educational. [Cited 18th of May, 2011].

Elsey, G., (2009) An unplanned life: a memoir. United States of America, The Curators of the

University of Missouri. [Cited 22nd of May, 2011].

Ferrell, R., (2006) Harry S. Truman and the Cold War Revisionists. United States of America,

University of Missouri Press. [Cited 23th of July, 2011].

Ferrell, R., (1996) Harry S. Truman: A Life. United States of America, University of Missouri Press.

[Cited 23th of July, 2011].

Gaddis, J. (1972) The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. United States of

America, Columbia University Press. [Cited 28th of June, 2011].

Gaddis, J.L., (2005) Strategies of Containment. 2nd ed., United States of America, Oxford University

Press. [Cited 15th of May, 2011].

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Hanhimäki, J. and Westad O. (2004) The Cold War: a history in documents and eyewitness accounts.

United States of America: Oxford University Press. [Cited 28th of June, 2011].

Hixson, W., (1989) George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. United States of America, Columbia

University Press. [Cited 22nd of May, 2011].

Lukacs, J., (2007) George Kennan: a study of character. United States of America, Yale University

Press. [Cited 24th of July, 2011].

McCauley, M. (1995) The Origins of The Cold War 1941-1949. 2nd ed., Malaysia: Longman Group

Limited. [Cited 10th of May, 2011].

Medvedev, Z. and Medvedev, R. (2006) The Unknown Stalin. (Dahrendorf. E, trans). India: Replika

Press Pvt. Ltd. [Cited 28th of June, 2011].

Midgley D. and Lefton P. (2007) Barron’s SAT Subject Test U.S History. United States of America:

Barron’s Educational Series, Inc. [Cited 17th of June, 2011].

Todd, A. (2011) History for the IB Diploma: The Cold War Dubai: Cambridge University Press.

[Cited 14th of May, 2011].

Truman, H. (1997) Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. Ferrell, R. (ed.) United

States of America: University of Missouri Press. [Cited 22nd of May, 2011].

Web pages:

Clare, J. (no date) The Long Telegram [online]. [Cited 13th of May, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war7_Kennan.htm>

Institute for Advanced Study. (no date) The Long Telegram [online]. [Cited 10th of May, 2011].

Available from <http://www.ias.edu/people/kennan/the-long-telegram>

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Koeller, D. (no date) Historical Sources [online]. [Cited 22nd of July, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.thenagain.info/classes/basics/usingsources.html>

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), United States Federal Government (no date)

Vision and Mission [online]. [Cited 27th of June, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.archives.gov/about/info/mission.html>

PBS (2009) Primary Source Lend-Lease Act of 1941 [online]. Community Television of Southern

California (KCET). [Cited 29th of June, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/LendLeaseAct.pdf>

The History Guide: Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe. (no date) George Kennan, “The Sources

of Soviet Conduct” (1946) [online]. [Cited 10th of May, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html>

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (1st of March, 2007) Kennan’s Diplomatic

Doctrine [online]. [Cited 29th of May, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/kennans-diplomatic-doctrine>

Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, the Avalon Project. (no date) Avalon Project-A

Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949-Potsdam Conference. [online]. [Cited 24th of June,

2011]. Available from <http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp>


Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949-The Yalta Conference. [online]. [Cited 24th of June,

2011]. Available from <http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp>

Electronic Journals, articles and contributions:

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Fakiolas, Efstanthios T. (1998) Kennan’s Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Analysis. East

European Quarterly, [online]. 31(4) [Cited 28th of June, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/fakiolas.htm>

Williamson, D. (no year) The Cold War. New Perspective [online]. 6(2) [Cited 29th of June, 2011].

Available from http://www.history-ontheweb.co.uk/concepts/coldwar.htm>

Paterson, T. (1969) The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943-

1946. Journal of American History [online]. 56(1) [Cited 26th of July, 2011].

Available from <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1902064>

Government and other Official Publications:

Russian Foreign Intelligence Declassified archives (October 1945) “Bomb of “HE” (High Explosive)

Type” and “To comrade L.P Beria”. (Anon, trans). [Cited 22nd of May, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/Voprosy2.html>

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project (March

1994) New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports. United States

of America (Ostermann Report). [Cited 25th of June, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf>

US Department of State (22nd of February, 1946) Incoming Telegram (George Kennan to James

Byrnes [Long Telegram]). [Cited 10th of May, 2011]. Available from

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?

documentdate=1946-02-22&documentid=6-6&studycollectionid=&pagenumber=1>

Interviews:

Elsey, G. (1969) Oral History on Containment. Interviewed by: Hess, J., Washington, DC, 7th of July.

[Cited 29th of June, 2011]. Available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey7.htm#375>

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Appendixes: Appendix 1: Scanned copy of the original Long Telegram read by President Truman.

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Appendix 2:

Truman learns of the Manhattan Project (24th of April, 1945)

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Appendix 3:

Summary of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences:Essential points of agreement at the Yalta Conference:

World Organization: United Nations set up, principles with basis of voting and territorial

leadership adopted.

Declaration of Liberated Europe approved: Atlantic Charter is adopted, securing liberated

people from Nazism. They are to also benefit from principles of national self-determination,

free democratic elections, and methods to sustain internal peace be pursued.

Dismemberment of Germany: committee to examine the procedure taken for dismemberment

set up with the likelihood of implementing French opinion.

Zone of occupation for the French and control council for Germany: the previous zones of

British and American control are formed as a zone under French occupation and allocation.

Reparations: to be extracted from Germany with the intention to eliminate war potential, first

given to countries sustaining great damage as of German aggression and those who greatly

contributed to Allied victory. Reparations to be extracted in three forms; national wealth in

Germany or wealth of Germany abroad, annual delivery of goods produced and acquisition of

German labor.

Poland: current provisional government is reorganized with principles of universal suffrage

adapted as soon as possible.

Yugoslavia: On the question of the building of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, Soviet Foreign

Minister Molotov agreed with the proposal of Secretary of State Stettinius to have include the

British and American ambassadors in the discussion with Molotov on whether a country

under armistice may be permitted to be a signatory of a treaty under another country.

Iran: It was agreed that the current situation of Iran be discussed under the diplomatic

channel.

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Three Foreign Secretaries Meeting: The three foreign secretaries will meet at a regular basis

once in a few months. During their next meeting, they should discuss the Montreaux

Convention.

Japan: Land rights and borders were changed along with land originally belonging to

Japanese Sovereignty handed over to Russia.

Essential Points of agreements at the Potsdam Conference:

Council of foreign ministers: A council of foreign ministers should be established between the

United Kingdom, Russia, China, France and the United States with the view to manage post-

war treaties.

Treatment of Germany politically: Germany should be completely disarmed and demilitarized

with the Nazi party, its laws, should be no longer in existence, while the rest of the population

should be treated fairly with equality.

Treatment of Germany economically: Although split into different economic zones, Germany

should be treated as a single economic unit and decentralized, where economic sectors should

be focused on agriculture and domestic industries.

Reparations from Germany: Reparations should be extracted from each zone in Germany.

Russia should receive extra reparations from the Western zones.

Future of German navy and merchant ships: Existing ships and submarines from the German

navy should be equally split among Russia, UK and the United States. Remaining ships

should be sunk.

City of Koenigsberg and immediate areas: the western frontier of Russia opposite the Baltic

Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig north of Braunsberg-

Goldap, to the meeting points including the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and

East Prussia.

Reparations from Austria: Austria should not pay any reparations.

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Peace Treaties to the UN: The irregular positions of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and

Romania should be ended by the peace treaties.

German populations: The transfer of the German population from Poland, Czechoslovakia

and Hungary should be done in a peaceful and orderly manner.

Iran: Allied troops should withdraw from Tehran without delay.

Satellite reparations: Satellites should not sign treaties limiting Allied Nationals to freedom of

the industry and trade. Any prior arrangements that oppose this should be changed.

Adapted and selectively paraphrased from:


Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949-Potsdam Conference. [online Available from

<http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp>


Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949-The Yalta Conference. [online]. Available from

<http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp>

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Appendix 4: Outline of the Clifford-Elsey Report, (Sent to Department of State on 24th of September, 1946)

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