For the Benefit of All Musicians:The British Musicians’ Union and the recording industry

John WilliamsonIASPM Canada25 May 2013

Introduction

HISTORY: the relationship between the MU and the recording industry mainly in the form of Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL)

CONTEXT: the role of government, musicians, and the Union itself in the breakdown of previously established relations.

History

4 main points of interest: Copyright Act (1911)- the early

recording and copyright industries The formation of PPL in 1934 and

immediate aftermath The MU and PPL agreement of 1946 The 1988 report of the Monopolies and

Mergers Commission

1911 and thereabouts

1907-9: first downturn within British recording industry

1909 – Copyright Committee 1911 – Copyright Act 1914 – formation of Performing Right

Society (PRS) by music publishers 1920s/ 30s – boom and bust in recording

industry; decline in employment for musicians

PPL forms in 1934

Decca and EMI were the two major record companies

The Gramophone Company vs. Carwardine (1933) – established right for manufacturer’s fee for public performance.

PPL established to pursue and collect income in 1934.

Immediately sought deals with publishers and musicians

Ex-gratia payment to performers – 20% of nett income

PPL and the MU - 1946

Economic pressures on MU – growth in recording industry – seen as threat to ‘conventional’ musical employment (influence of AFM)

PPL to pay Union: 10% (first 2 years) and 12.5% (thereafter) of net income to compensate session players

PPL and BBC agreement on “needletime” in 1947 -

What to do with the money?

First PPL payment to MU in 1951 – prompts debate over how to use it.

EC decide to use it “for benefit of all musicians” and not distribute to those who played on them: minority of members were recording; majority would suffer from unrestricted use.

Fear of being seen as “yellow” union Loans and grants to orchestras, etc. – emphasis

on live music Music Promotion Committee – cf. AFM’s Music

Performance Trust Fund Internal and External impact of PPL funds / MMC

1989 – beginning of the end?

MMC report on Collective Licensing (1988) – implemented by UK government in 1989.

Scard: “The Union’s controls over needletime, employment quotas and the policy of not allowing records to accompany live performance all disappeared overnight.” (1991)

PPL payments had become substantial: £1.3 million in 1987.

MU also had £5.1m reserve in Special Account

1989 – beginning of the end?

Post-1989 dispute with PPL over distribution of funds from point of MMC report.

In 1994, Union received £8.5m to distribute to musicians who played on sessions and whose work had been broadcast post 1989.

Formation of PAMRA in 1996 to distribute funds

Destabilizing period: loss of control over membership? (Challenges to leadership from Freddie Staff / session musicians culminating in election/ Scard’s defeat)

Context / Government

Range of employment and anti-Union legislation beginning in 1980s – secret ballots, limits on strikes and weakening / end of the closed shop

“media unions were seen as the last bastions of Union power” (Scard, 1991)

Government policy: “reinjection of marketisation in to State owned enterprise and the rooting out of restrictive practices” (McIlroy, 2009: 32)

MU had benefited from both in MU/PPL/BBC agreements

Union members

McIlroy on neoliberalism: “marked a return to human nature, individualism and entrepreneurialism, rather than collectivism and dependency culture” (1995: 76)

Individual gain embraced by some union members – encouraged by press and “ambulance chasing” lawyers.

Union leadership

Since 1946, Union involved in pursuit of performance and performing rights with PPL – outcome to benefit of record companies and individual musicians. . .

These rights were not accepted by all countries and until 1996 were not fully enshrined in UK law.

Rosen: use of collective bodies to protect the “creativeness of individuals” (2012: xiii)

Conclusions

Impact of 1988 MMC report: “for the benefit of all musicians” no longer an acceptable ethos for government, members or Union leaders.

Emphasis now “less on the collective context for Union activity and more on services that can be provided to individual members” (Ackers et al,1996: 56)

McIlroy: “industrial relations and trade unions were no longer adversarial” (2009:50)