IA RTE Haiti_phase 2 Final Report

8/2/2019 IA RTE Haiti_phase 2 Final Report

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INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATIONOFTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSETOTHEEARTHQUAKEINHAITI

20MONTHSAFTER

SilviaHidalgo,withsupportfromMariePascaleThodateJanuary

2012


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluators wish to express their profound gratitude to all those who shared their constructivecriticalviewsandhelpedshapetheconclusionsandrecommendationscontained inthepresentreport.

Weare

especially

grateful

to

the

Haitians

we

met

who,

once

again,

generously

and

patiently

found

the

timetocommunicateandtooffertheirconcernsandideas.

Wearegrateful for thesupport received fromConcern,OCHA, IEDARelief, IOM,UNHabitat,UNICEF,UNFPAandUNOPS.

Finally,theauthorswouldespeciallyliketothankTijanaBojanic,withoutwhosesupportthisevaluationcouldnothavebeenundertaken.


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LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS

CAP ConsolidatedAppealProcessCCCM CampCoordinationandCampManagementCDAC CommunicationwithDisasterAffectedCommunitiesCMO CampManagementOperationsCNSA CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaireCNE CentreNationaldesquipementsCO CountryOfficeCSC CoordinationSupportCommitteeCTC CholeraTreatmentCentreCTU CholeraTreatmentUnitDAD DevelopmentAssistanceDatabase(DAD)DINEPA DirectionNationaledelEauPotableetdelAssainissementDPC DirectiondelaProtectionCivileDSRSG DeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneralECHO EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection

ERC

EmergencyRelief

Coordinator

FAO FoodandAgricultureOrganizationFTS FinancialTrackingSystemGACI GroupedAppuidelaCooprationInternationaleGoH GovernmentofHaitiICG InternationalCrisisGroupIHRC InterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionGBV GenderbasedviolenceHC HumanitarianCoordinatorHCT HumanitarianCountryTeamHQ Headquarters

HIC

Humanitarian

Information

Centre

HRF HaitiReconstructionFundIARTE InterAgencyReal TimeEvaluationIASC InterAgencyStandingCommitteeICC InterClusterCoordinationICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossIDB InterAmericanDevelopmentBankIDP InternallydisplacedpersonIHRC InterimHaitirecoveryCommissionIM InformationmanagementIFRC InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossINFP InstitutNationaldeFormationProfessionnelle

IOM

InternationalOrganization

for

Migration

ISF IntegratedStrategicFrameworkJ/PHRO J/PHaitianReliefOrganizationMARNDR MinistredelAgriculture,desRessourcesNaturellesetduDveloppementRuralMAST MinistredesAffairesSocialesetduTravailMENFP MinistredelducationNationaleetdelaFormationProfessionnelleMICT MinistredelIntrieuretdesCollectivitsterritorialesMINUSTAH UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti


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MPCE MinistredelaPlanificationetdelaCoopration ExterneMTPTC MinistredesTravauxPublics,Transports&CommunicationMSPP MinistredelaSantPubliqueetdelaPopulationNGO NongovernmentalorganizationOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairesOHCHR OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsPDNA

Post

Disaster

Needs

Assessment

and

Recovery

Framework

RC ResidentCoordinatorSRSG SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneralTRIAMS TsunamiRecoveryImpactAssessmentandMonitoringSystemUN UnitedNationsUNCT UnitedNationsCountryTeamUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFundUNIFEM UnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomenUNHABITAT UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgrammeUNICEF UnitedNationsChildrensFund

USAID

UnitedStates

Agency

for

International

Development

UNOPS UNOfficeforProjectServicesWASH Water,SanitationandHygieneWatSan WaterandsanitationWFP WorldFoodProgrammeWHO WorldHealthOrganization


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

2LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS 3

EXECUTIVESUMMARY 6INTRODUCTION 6I. INTRODUCTION 17I.1 BACKGROUNDANDAIMOFTHEEVALUATION 17I.2 METHODS,SCOPEANDSTRENGTHSANDWEAKNESSESOFTHEEVALUATION 18I.3 CONTEXT 21II. MAINACHIEVEMENTS,GAPS,LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 24II.1 MAINACHIEVEMENTS 24II.2 THEBIGGAPS:DURABLESOLUTIONS,LIVELIHOODS,ACCOMMODATION,COMMUNICATIONANDCONTINUEDSUPPORT 27II.3 LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 29II.4 PROGRESSONMAINRECOMMENDATIONSEMERGINGFROMFIRSTPHASEOFTHERTE 31III.

COHERENCE,

CONNECTEDNESS

AND

SUSTAINABILITY

OF

THE

RESPONSE

33

III.1 LACKOFCLARITYANDCONSENSUSONWHATCONSTITUTESHUMANITARIANACTIONINHAITI 33III.2 UNCERTAINPLANNING 34III.3 TRYINGINTERRELATIONSHIPS 34III.4 SUSTAINABILITYOFEFFORTS 35III.5 LIMITEDTAKEUPOFHUMANITARIANCONCERNSINLONGERTERMRECOVERYEFFORTS 35III.6 PILOTINGANDLINKINGEFFORTS 36IV. COORDINATIONANDCLUSTERTRANSITION 36IV.1 LIMITEDCONNECTIONBETWEENDIFFERENTCOORDINATIONMECHANISMSANDACTORS 36IV.2 CLUSTERTRANSITION 38V. INFORMATION 38V.1 CLUSTERDRIVENINFORMATIONSYSTEMS 38

V.2

ENGAGINGWITHOTHERACTORSONINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT

39V.3 COMMUNICATIONEFFORTS 39

VI. SUMMARYOFFINDINGSANDLESSONSLEARNED 40VII. CONCLUSION 42VIII. KEYRECOMMENDATIONS 46ANNEX1:TERMSOFREFERENCE 51ANNEX2:REPORTONTHEFOCUSGROUPHELDWITHHAITIANSTAFFINVOLVEDINTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSE 60ANNEX3:REPORTONTHEIARTEWORKSHOPONTRANSITION 66ANNEX4:TRANSITIONSTRATEGIESOFCLUSTERSINHAITIANDOPTIONSFORLINKING/MERGINGTHEMINTOOFFICIALSTRUCTURES 71ANNEX5:TIMELINE 93ANNEX6:RECOMMENDATIONSFROMTHEWORKINGGROUPONCOMMUNICATIONSATTHERTEWORKSHOP 94ANNEX7:OVERVIEWOFCOORDINATIONFRAMEWORKS 95ANNEX8:FOCUSGROUPS,GENERALMEETINGSOBSERVEDANDVISITS 98

ANNEX9:LISTOFPERSONSMET

100

ANNEX11:SELECTEDREFERENCES 105


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EXECUTIVESUMMARYIntroduction

ThisreportsummarisesthesecondphaseoftheInterAgencyStandingCommitteesInterAgencyRealTime Evaluation of the response to the Earthquake, twenty months after the disaster event. Theearthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th 2010 had a drastic effect on the countrys human andinstitutionalpublicandtheprivatesectorcapacity.Anestimated230,000peoplelosttheirlives;300,000morewere injuredandover1millionwere lefthomeless.1Thedevastatinghumanitariansituationwascompounded by Haitis underlying vulnerabilities and high level of chronic poverty. In response, theinternationalcommunitymountedamassivehumanitarianreliefeffortand fiftyfivedonorspledgedatotalof$4.59billioningrantsfor2010and2011towardstherebuildingofthecountry.2

Given the scale of the disaster and subsequent humanitarian response, the InterAgency Standing

Committee (IASC) launched a multiphase exercise to inform decision makers at national andheadquarters levels, to draw lessons and allow corrections to be made where necessary. TheHumanitarian Country Team (HCT) is intended to be the most immediate user of the feedback andrecommendationsoftheevaluation.

The firstphaseof the InterAgency RealTimeEvaluation, completed inMay 2010, covered the initialresponse. The second phase was initially foreseen to take place in October 20103and focus in aforwardlooking manner on interagency coordination problems or operational challenges during thetransitionphase.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelaysinstartingthetransitionphase.

Thissecondphasesoughtto:

Analyse and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordinationbetweendifferentactorsinvolved;

Examineoptions

for

linking

humanitarian

response

structures

with

longer

term

and/or

government

establishedmechanisms;and

Analyse theextent towhich the findingsand recommendations from the firstphaseof the InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluationhaveinformedtheevolvinghumanitarianresponseinHaiti.

MethodologicalApproach

The evaluation team4carried out the evaluation between August and October 2011, starting with aninitialthreeweekcountrymission.ThefieldworkwasfollowedbydebriefingsandmeetingsinHaitiandNew York. A workshop on the preliminary findings of the evaluation was held in PortauPrince inadvanceof theCommon AppealProcess (CAP)2012workshop.Additionaldatawasgathered later in

Haitiuntil

the

end

of

October

2011.

Interviews

were

conducted

with

more

than

250

individuals

from

Haitian institutions and international agencies (facetoface interviews, focus groups andteleconferences)aswellaswithindividualsandgroupsfromtheaffectedcommunitiesindifferentsites

1GoHfigures(estimatesofthenumberofdeadvary).

2PledgedattheMarch2010InternationalDonorsConferenceheldinNewYork.

3TwoscopingmissionsinMarch2011andJuly2011furtherfinetunedtheinitialTermsofReference.

4TheteamofthreeindependentevaluatorswasreducedtotwooneHaitian,oneinternational aftertheinitialfieldphaseof

theevaluation.


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in PortauPrince and Logane and facing different situations5. An additional debriefing for IASCmemberswasheldinGenevainDecember2011.

Section1inthereportexplainsthebackground,methodologyandconstraintsoftheevaluation.Findingsare presented in sections two to five. Summary of findings and lessons learned are in section VI,conclusioninsectionseven,andsummaryofkeyfindingsandrecommendationsarebroughttogetherinsection

eight.

A

note

on

cluster

transition,

prepared

for

managers

in

the

field

in

advance

of

the

finalizationoftheevaluation,ispresentedinfullinAnnex4.

ContextualConstraintsontheHumanitarianResponse

Atthetimeofthisevaluation,twentymonthsaftertheearthquake,thehumanitarianresponsetotheinitial catastrophe has unfolded within a context of multiple crises, including a cholera epidemic,hurricanes,andpoliticalandsecuritychallenges.Peoplewhowerealreadylivinginsituationsofpovertyand vulnerability before the earthquake are now in a situation of severe need.Despite increasingconstraintsonfunding,transitionhasbeenhighontheagendaasaresultofthegrowingdesiretomoveawayfromhumanitarianresponseandreliefandtoofferdurablesolutionstoexistingneeds.

As phasing out of humanitarian aid did not go hand in hand with concrete steps towards recovery,speedinguptherecoveryandreconstructionprocessbecameamajorpriorityin2011.Theabsenceofagovernmentformuchoftheyear2011andthefactthattheworkofInterimHaitiRecoveryCommission(IHRC) was questioned (its mandate was due to expire in October 2011) resulted in prolongeduncertaintyandinstitutionalfragility.Atthesametime,therehavebeen groundsforoptimismlinkedtothe newly elected Presidents leadership and elements of his programme. Vision, leadership anddecisionmakinghavebeenlackinginthepastinHaiti.PresidentMartelly'scommitmentsoneducationandthe16/6Projectpresentbothchallengesandopportunitiesforpositivechange.

Achievements,GapsandChallenges

Bytheendof2011,thekeyachievementsoftheresponsehavebeen:mainstreamingdisasterpreparedness;aneffectiveresponse incamps,withpopulations largelyfreeofcholera;recentprogress on the rate of rubble removal, which had been a key obstacle for recovery;developments on transitional shelter solutions; implementation of integrated neighbourhoodbasedapproaches;andprogressonimprovingwaterandsanitationinthelongerterm.

Therewasconsiderableconsensusamongstrespondentsonthedeficienciesoftheresponseandcurrentexistinggaps,withHaitianactorsfarmorecriticalofthe internationalresponseatthisstage.Themainshortcomings as perceived in AugustOctober 2011 include: durable solutions; livelihoods;accommodation; communication; and provision of continued support to address remaining needs.Internationalactorsunderlined that,despite thehugeeffortsdeployed,manycriticalconstraintshaveaffectedtheoverallresponseandthespeedofrecoveryinthisperiod.

Inadditiontoexistingcontextualconstraints,thehumanitariancommunityinHaitihasbeenfacingthreemainchallenges:

5Suchas campresidents,relocates,evictees,affectedremaininginneighborhoods,beneficiariesandnonbeneficiariesofhousesrepairedandtransitionalshelter,etc


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Acutehumanitarianneedspersistwithonlylimitedresourcestoaddressthem.Operationsarescalingdownwithoutsustainablesolutionsbeinginplace.

Assistance that does not favour durable solutions no longer meets Haitian expectations.Humanitariangoalsarenotalwaysunderstoodandthehumanitariancommunitysmethodsand instruments (i.e. forms of assistance, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as adecisionmaking body, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), methods of needsassessmentandmonitoring)arerepeatedlyquestioned.

Theaidcoordinationanddeliverysystemhasnotbeensufficientlyrationalisedoradaptedtothefastchangingrealityonthegroundandtheneedformoreinteractionwithotheractors(e.g.GovernmentofHaitianddevelopmentdonors).

The evaluation has identified many areas where data collection, needs analysis, consultation andcommunication,interagencyactionandactionwithgovernmentneedtobestrengthenedsothatgainsmadesofararenotlostasagencieswinddown. Themaininformationalchallengeishavinganoverallassessment of needs that can better guide the response, prioritisation and appeals. More preciseinformationontheneedsofearthquakeaffectedpopulationsandtheextentofcoverageisessentialtoplantheresponseasitmovesforward.

The evaluation found that there is a lack of continuing capacity for assessing and crossvalidatinginformation.Intersectoralcoordinationhasbeenregardedasweakbymajorityofintervieweesandhasnot facilitated furthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingormultidimensional issues.Amonitoringsystemrecently established, with clusters quarterly reporting on progress against key indicators, is basedexclusivelyondataemanatingfromtheclusters;aseachclusterhasitsownmethodsofdatacollection,consolidationofindicatorsandcorroborationofdataremainsachallenge.Atpresenttheprevalentviewamong actors is that the process is too timeconsuming and that the capacity for providing theinformationisoftennotsuffcient.Informationmanagementsystemsrequiremorebuyin,andshouldbeexpanded and connected to meet the needs of stakeholders and address progress on transition (i.e.achievingdurablerecoverysolutions).

Transition isontheagendabutneedsavision,astrategy,aplanand leadership.Theevaluationfoundthatthecoordinationandplanningmechanismsarenotfullyadaptedtothecurrentcontext.Anoverallaid coordination framework integrating all phases of assistance has been lacking. In an evolvingenvironmentwherethevastmajorityofagenciesarescalingdown,rolesandresponsibilitiesarefurtherblurredbythemismatchinthelevelofresourcesacrosshumanitarian,developmentandgovernmentalactors.There isaneed fordefiningandunderstandingnew rolesand clarifying responsibilities in themovetowardstransitionanddevelopment.

Amajorissue,consistentlyraisedwithevaluators,waslimitedfundingavailableforhumanitarianaidinthe context of a projectdriven recovery and reconstruction process. While a focus on lifesavingactivities is still required,withvulnerablepopulations facingmultiple threats, the2011 revisedCAP is

only56

per

cent

funded

and

60

percent

of

the

government

budget

depends

on

international

assistance.

InSeptember2011,donorshadonlydisbursed43percentofthe$4.59billionofthetotalpledgedforrecoveryandreconstructioninthe20102011timeframe.

The length of time required to achieve results was identified as a key limitation to planning fortransition. The organisational structures of the main agencies are considered costly and not flexibleenough,yetagenciesstillfeeloverstretchedintheircurrentcapacities.Withstructuresremainingintactandlargelyhavingtofocusonaddressingconstraintsratherthanonachievingresults,delaysinprogress


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haveconsequencesforcosts.TheresponseinHaitihasbeenmoreexpensivethaninotherrecentcrises(e.g. Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and has far exceeded initial estimates, with projects reported as exceedingthemby2.5to3times.

TheresponsehasbeenhinderedbyalackofengagementinagenuinetwowaycommunicationandtheeffectivesupportofHaitians,whofeelsidelinedandareincreasinglycriticalofNGOsandtheoverallaideffort.

The

humanitarian

community

has

been

limited

in

its

communications

by

not

having

asufficiently

clear understanding of Government of Haiti (GoH) recovery plans with respect to, for example, aresettlementstrategy.WhileplanssuchastheActionPlanfortheNationalRecoveryandDevelopmentofHaitiweredrafted inadvanceof theMarch2010donorsconference, theyoften lacked legitimacywithinthecountrybecauseofboththe limitedHaitianparticipation intheirpreparationandthe2011change of government. The commitment of the new GoH and the need to progress from the initialhumanitarian crisis response towards transition and longer term development present valuableopportunitiesforadjustingthecurrentaidarchitectureinHaiti.

Followuptoevaluationrecommendations

Whilethere

was

no

formal

follow

up

or

management

response

to

the

first

phase

of

the

IA

RTE,

progress

hasbeenmadewithrespecttothreeofitsmainrecommendations.First,thehumanitariancommunityhasincorporatedinitsresponsethechallengesofmainstreamingdisasterpreparedness.Second,thereisgreaterawarenessoftheneedforhumanitarianactorstoadapttheirresponsetotheparticularneedsofan urban environment. Humanitarian efforts have continued to focus on neighbourhoods, andcommunitybased integrated approaches are increasingly favoured and implemented. Third, specificrecommended actions were taken to make the response more inclusive. These have not yet provensufficient to effectively address the extent of the problem. Finally, the response did not manage toextenditscoveragefullytotheearthquakeaffectedpopulationsinruralareas.Geographiccoveragehasbeenextendedtosomedegreetomeetsomeurgentneedsinthecountryside(mainlycholera).

The

humanitarian

community

needs

to

improve

utilization

focused

approaches

to

evaluation.

At

this

time inHaititherearenotenoughexamplesofsystematicfollowuptoevaluations(e.g.bydevelopinganoperationalplanbasedonrecommendationsandassessingprogress4to5monthslater).Moreover,systemwide evaluations like InterAgency Real Time Evaluations should be better integrated intooperationalplanningtobeusedeffectively.

KeyRecommendations

The recommendations below are intended to offer insights into how continuing and urgenthumanitarianneedscanbemetasthistransformationtakesplace.

1. Furtherengagewith thenewgovernmentandHaitiansociety toclarifyandunderstandnew

priorities,objectives

and

strategies

and

better

adapt

the

response

and

collective

action.

Thehumanitariancommunity,incoordinationwithdevelopmentactors,needstoreengagewiththenewgovernmentandtheHaitiansocietyandtakeadvantageof institutionalchangessuchastheNewHousingAuthority toadapt itsapproach,bettercommunicateitsconcernsandjointlydefineanactionplanthataddresseshumanitarianprioritiesandprovidesclarityfortransition.Thisincludesreachingouttoand involvingthediasporaandtheprivatesector(e.g. learningfrom initiatives likeSoulofHaiti,and liaisingwithmembersofthePresidentialAdvisoryCouncil).


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Intheimmediateterm, theHCTincoordinationwiththeUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45 of relevant key leaders in the response) to approach the new Haitian government and tocollaborateat thehighest level in theclarificationofconcernsandpriorities.Thegroup should, ifpossible,haveRedCrossparticipationandincludeOCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership.

Either therecently formedadvocacyworkinggrouporanewoneshould informand followuponthe processed described above and provide information to the lead group. By working withdifferentlevelsofgovernmentandotherHaitianactors,thisgroupcouldeventuallydefineaclearerroadmaptoguidetransitionandaddressremainingneeds.Thegroupshould includeparticipationfromprotectionclusterandCampCoordinationandCampManagement(CCCM)/shelter clusters.

TheinternationalcommunityinHaitiHCT,UNCT,G12,OfficeoftheSpecialEnvoy,etc. needstoconveytheneedforacoherentprocessfor formulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplan.Subsequentlytheplanshouldbesupportedandusedtoalignefforts.ThenewHousingAuthorityinHaitishouldbeencouragedtodefinepolicyandstrivetoworkwithinanagreedoverallresettlementstrategy.

The HCT should also oversee a process to redefine an advocacy plan which would conveyhumanitarianconcernsandencouragegenuinetwowaycommunicationwithaffectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs.

To achieve this, additional leadership, decision making and a stronger and more strategic HCT isneeded,andhighlevelGoHpresenceat theHCTshouldalsobeconsidered.OCHAwouldalso requireadditionalsupport.

2. Reformandrationalisecoordinationtofosterintegration,advancehumanitarianconcernsandconnecthumanitarianactionwithotherphasesorcategories(i.e.recovery,reconstructionanddevelopment)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofanoverallresponse.

TheHC/RCofficeshoulddevelopaproposalforestablishinggreaterlinksbetweentheCAPandtheIntegrated Strategic Framework (ISF), includingjoint monitoring of progress against established

indicatorsand

objectives.

TheHCTshouldfurtherreviewitsdecisionmakingcapacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012intermsofhowitcanengagewiththeGoH,developmentactorsandHaitiancivilsociety.

Transition and Recovery as a topic should be a consistent agenda item at the HCT and inhumanitariandonor coordinationmeetings.Similarly,humanitarianconcerns shouldbeapointofdiscussioninG12meetings.

Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, their representation at the HCT should have beenpromoted and a humanitarian aid issues focus area created within the IHRC (i.e. treated in asimilar way to DRR or other areas). OCHAs presence in Ministry of Planning meetings could beencouragedtoensurethathumanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressivelydealtwith inadurableway.

The

HCT

should

encourage

a

new

strategic

multi

stakeholder

exercise

and

planning

process

that

includesrepresentationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takesstockofthecurrentsituationanddevelops a more detailed plan for transition to recovery and development. This should be doneseparatelyand inadvanceoftheCAPMYRexercisewhichfocusesmorenarrowlyonhumanitarianneedsandisnotasinclusiveorHaitispecific.

3. RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti

Theprocessofproactiveplanningforclustertransition,basedonobjectives,shouldbecontinued.This


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processshouldbejointlydrivenbyOCHA,UNDPandUNICEF.AdditionalsupportshouldbesoughtandprovidedbytheIASCatthegloballevel,OCHAHQ,UNDP/BCPRonclustertransitionandcoordinationonresettlement around key dates, outputs and milestones. The assessment for the rationalization andtransitioningofclustersplancanbedonethroughafourfoldprocess:

Abottomupapproachtounderstandthearrayofgeographicallybasedcoordinationneedsatadecentralised

level,

at

all

scales,

from

neighbourhood,

to

communal

section,

communal,

departmentaltonational.UNDPhasaroletoplayinsupportinglocalgovernanceandastrongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture.

Areviewoffuturescenarios,understandingtheplansandprioritiesoftheGoHunderthenewpresidency,suchasnewinstitutionsliketheHousingAuthority.Thisshouldtakeaccountoftheimplicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclusterstodate.

Asectorbysectoranalysis , leadingtoasectorwideapproach insupportofamorecoherent,seamless response,addressing humanitarian issues, recoveryanddevelopment inparallel,aswellasstrengtheningpreparedness,decentralizationandothercrosscuttingissues.

Specificconcertedactionforkeycrosscuttingandmultidimensionalissuesidentified.

4.

Considerfunding,

costs

and

efficiencies

TheHCTandUNCTsupportedbythegroupthatwasdefinedtocoordinateprojectsubmissionstotheIHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess and quantify funding gaps for both humanitarianactionandadequatetransitiontorecovery,anddefineacoordinatedfundraisingstrategy.

TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonorsincludingattheHQleveltoobtainfundingandadditionalstaffcapacityinpriorityunderresourcedareaslikeprotection.

The CAP instrument should be better utilized for fundraising, distinguishing between overallneedsandthehumanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver.

Donorsshouldprovideflexiblefundingalignedwithprioritiesoutlinedinjointhumanitarianand

recoveryplans.

TheGoHanddonorsshouldemphasizetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts. Costandefficiencyconsiderationsshouldbe factoredinacrosstheresponse.Recoveryproject

implementationmechanismsthatinvolvelessoverheads,reduced levelsofsubcontracting,andlesslagtimeforprocurementandimplementationshouldbeconsidered.

Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshouldbepaidtoprioritisingtheuseoftimeandmoreefficientoperationalprocesses(e.g.fasterdraftingandapprovingofpolicypapers,limitingmeetings,etc.)

Humanresourcepoliciesandpractices,specificallyforUNagencies,shouldberevisedtobecomemore flexibleandbetteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnationalstaff,rapidshorttermdeployments,betteruseofexistingrosters,etc.)

5. Supportcapacitystrengtheningandretaincapacityinpriorityareas

OCHAandClustersneedtocontinuetofocusonbuildingthecapacityofnationalactors. Space for focusing on key humanitarian needs should be retained in a transition framework

throughamoreconnectedOCHA(e.g.withincreasedpresenceintherecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)andadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice.

DRReffortsshouldbeprioritisedovertimeandfurtherintegratedintodevelopment.


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More resources and capacity should be dedicated to protection issues through PROCAP withcontinuedsecondmentofcapacitytotheprotectioncluster,andadditionalresourcestoworkatthecommunelevel.

Clusterleadagenciesshouldembedclustercoordinationcapacityintheirprogrammetosupportcounterpartsandbeinapositiontohelpreactivatetheclusterifneeded.

Globallevelguidanceshouldbesoughtonthemultisectorialchallengeofresettlement.

Thetablebelowsummariseskeyfindingsandrelatedrecommendationsoftheevaluation.

Relatedfindingsandconclusions Recommendations

The international community is keen onbacking the new Haitian leadership and itscommitments.(23)

Plans and objectives of the Government ofHaitiarenotalwayswellknown.(54)

Thereisaneed

to

further

align

response

to

objectivesofnewgovernment.(54)

Top positions in the Government of Haitihave found it difficult to engage with thehumanitariancommunity.(55)

Engagement between the humanitariancommunity and government ministries hasproven difficult without a new governmentinplace.(56)

Haitianauthoritieshavefeltmarginalisedbythehumanitarianresponse(55)

The priority for transitioning beyond postearthquake humanitarian response remainsdefining a comprehensive resettlementpolicy.(17)

The goals and objectives of humanitarianresponsearenotalwaysunderstood.(52)

Twowaycommunicationismissing.(77)

R1. Further engage with the new government andHaitiansocietytoclarifyandunderstandnewpriorities,objectivesandstrategiesandbetteradaptresponseandcollectiveaction.

The humanitarian community, in coordination withdevelopment actors, needs to reengage with the newgovernment

and

Haitian

society

and

take

advantage

of

institutional changes such as the New HousingAuthority to adapt its approach, better communicateits concerns and jointly define an action plan thataddresses humanitarian priorities and provides clarityfor transition. This includes reaching out to, andinvolving the diaspora and the private sector (e.g.learning from initiatives like Soul of Haiti, liaising withmembersofthePresidentialadvisorycouncil).

In the immediate term, the HCT in coordinationwiththeUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45)of

relevant

key

leaders

to

approach

the

new

Haitian

government and work with it at the highest level, toclarify priorities and concerns. The group should, ifpossible, have Red Cross participation and includeOCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership.

To achieve this, additional leadership, decisionmaking and a stronger and more strategic HCT isneeded. OCHA would also require additional support.Highlevel Government of Haiti presence at the HCTshouldalsobeconsidered.

The

recently

formed

advocacy

working

group

or

a

new

oneshouldbeformedto followuponand informtheseprocesses,provide information to the leadgroupandwork at other levels with the GoH and other Haitianactors,andeventuallydefineaclearerroadmapthatcanfurther guide transition and address remaining needs.The group should include protection cluster andCCCM/shelter clusterparticipation.


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The international community inHaitiHCT,UNCT,G12,Office of the Special Envoy, etc. needs to coherentlyconveytheneedforandconsequentlysupportaprocessofformulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplanthat canbe supportedover timeandhelpalignefforts.The

new

Housing

Authority

in

Haiti

should

strive

to

work

under an agreed resettlement strategy and help definethispolicy.

The HCT should also oversee a process that involvesredefining an advocacy plan to convey humanitarianconcerns,andencourageatwowaycommunicationwithaffectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs.

Anoverallaidcoordinationsystemhasbeenabsent.(63)

Therehas

been

limited

interaction

between

recovery and humanitarian coordinationframeworks.(64)

New frameworks and approaches areneeded to overcome weaknesses incoordinationacrosssectors.(63)

Themainobjectiveshaveyet tobedefinedfor an overarching transition plan thatincorporates the humanitarian response.

(68)

There is lackof clarityon the thresholdsofhumanitarian response. Emergencyresponse and development needs areintertwined.(59,61)

There is no collective interaction betweenhumanitariandonorsandtheirdevelopmentcounterparts.(63)

There is limited takeup of humanitarian

concerns

in

longerterm

development

efforts.(63)

Thehumanitarianresponsehashelpedpilotapproaches for recovery that can becontinuedandreplicated.(62)

Assistance is being phased out without an

R2. Reform and rationalise coordination to fosterintegrationandadvancehumanitarianconcernsand connecthumanitarianactionwithotherphasesor

categories(i.e.

recovery,

reconstruction

and

development)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofanoverallresponse.

Asastart,theHC/RCofficecoulddevelopaproposalforestablishing greater links between the CAPand the ISF,includingjointmonitoringofprogressagainstestablishedindicatorsandobjectives.

The HCT should further review its decisionmakingcapacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012interms of how it can engage with the Government of

Haiti,development

actors

and

the

Haitian

civil

society.

Transition and Recovery as a topic should besystematically made an agenda item at the HCT andhumanitarian donors coordination meetings. Similarly,humanitarianconcernsshouldbeapointofdiscussioninG12meetings.

Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, theirrepresentation at the HCT should have been promotedandahumanitarianaidissuesfocusareacreatedwithinthe IHRC(i.e. inasimilarwayasDRRorotherareasareconsidered). OCHAs presence could be encouraged inMinistry of Planning meetings to ensure thathumanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressivelydealtwithinadurableway.

The HCT should encourage a new strategic multistakeholderexerciseandplanningprocess that includesrepresentationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takesstock of the current situation and develops a moredetailedplanfortransitiontorecoveryanddevelopment.Thisshouldbeseparatefromanddoneinadvanceofthe


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14

effective handover strategy. Recoveryeffortsarenotpickinguponmajorareasofneed that have been covered by thehumanitarian community. As a result,continuing humanitarian needs are largelyunmet.(59,60)

CAP MYR exercise which more narrowly focuses onhumanitarian needs and is not as inclusive and Haitispecific.

There has been much recent progress onplanning for cluster transition. UNICEF hasplayed a key role in advancing clustertransition(69)

The cluster system and the IHRC facedifficulties in rectifying the initial lack ofinclusivenessandlimitedHaitianownership.(66)

Involvement of Haitian NGOs has been

largelyunsuccessful.

(66)

Focusing on sectoral tables for clustertransitionistoolimitedanapproach.(70)

The current system can be furtherrationalised throughmergingkeyobjectivesoftheresponse.(68)

The system is not yet adapted togeographicallybasedcoordination(70)

Information management has to bereviewed in line with outcomes basedcoordinationandinformationneeds.(73)

An overall needs assessment system isabsent, and the existing system is highlydependentontheclusterframework.(73)

Mayors have played a key role in theresponse.(27,68,25)

Crosssector

and

inter

cluster

coordination

havebeenweak.(28,65)

R3.RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti

Continue proactiveplanning for cluster transitionbasedon objectives. This process should bejointly driven byOCHA ,UNDPandUNICEF.Additionalsupportshouldbesought and provided by the IASC at the global level,OCHA HQ, UNDP/BCPR on cluster transition andcoordinationonresettlementaroundkeydates,outputsand milestones. The assessment for the rationalizationand transitioning of clusters planning can be donethroughafourfoldprocess:

A bottomup approach to understand the array ofgeographically based coordination needs at adecentralisedlevel,atallscales,fromneighbourhood,tocommunalsection,fromdepartmentaltonational.UNDPhasa role toplay in supporting localgovernanceandastrongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture.

A review of future scenarios, understanding plansandprioritiesoftheGovernmentofHaitiunderthenewpresidency, and plans for new institutions like theHousing Authority. Also to understand the implicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclustersto

date.

A sector by sector analysis for a sectorwideapproach in support of a more coherent, seamlessresponse that addresses both humanitarian issues andrecovery and development, as well as strengtheningpreparedness, decentralization and other crosscuttingissues.

Specific concerted action for key crosscutting andmultidimensional issues that tackle importantprioritiesthat are fundamental to address humanitarian needs,phaseout assistance (e.g. resettlement and livelihoods)and make way for a coherent framework forcoordination.


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15

Thereisinsufficientfundingavailableforthehumanitarian response and recovery (i.e.contributions to the CAP and the HRF). (43)

Theresponse iscostlyand itscosthasbeenunderestimated.

(38,

46)

The CAPs effectiveness as a tool forfundraisingisquestionable.(43)

IHRC isnotconsideredtobeacostefficientstructure.(21)

Areas like protection are underresourced.(37)

Lack

of

funding

prospects

acts

as

a

disincentivetoplanningtransition.(59)

R4.Considerfunding,costsandefficiencies

The HCT and UNCTsupported by the group thatwas defined to coordinate project submissions to theIHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess andquantify fundinggaps forbothhumanitarianactionandadequatetransitiontorecoveryanddefineacoordinatedfundraisingstrategy.

TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonorsattheHQleveltoobtainfundingandadditionalcapacitythrough staff secondments in priority underresourcedareaslikeprotection.

Donors should provide flexible fundingcommensurate to priorities outlined in jointhumanitarianandrecoveryandplans.

The Government of Haiti and donors shouldunderlinetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts.

Make better use of the CAP instrument forfundraising. Distinguish between overall needs and thehumanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver.

Factorin cost and efficiency considerations acrossthe response. Reconsider recovery projectimplementationmechanismsinfavouroflessoverheads,reduced levels of subcontracting, and less lagtime forprocurementandimplementation.

Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshouldbepaidtoeffectivelymanagingtheuseofstafftimeandusing more efficient work processes (e.g. ensuring

efficient

processes

for

drafting

and

approving

policy

papers,limitingmeetings,etc.)Human resource policies and practices for UN agenciesshould be revised to become more flexible and betteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnationalstaff,rapidshorttermdeployments,etc.)


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16

Haitifacesmultiplevulnerabilities(16)andnot all elements of DRR have beenconsideredintheresponse.(36)

Theabilitytotackleissueshasdependedoninformation available, whether there is adedicated

cluster,

sub

cluster,

working

grouporhumanresourcecapacity.(35)

Protectionat thiskeyjuncture isviewedasincreasinglycritical.(37)

The absence of a resettlement policy hasbeenamajorgap.(33)

Nationalcapacitiesarestillweak.(42)

Capacitybuilding

takes

time,

goes

hand

in

handwithengagementand isnecessary forthesustainabilityofefforts.(56,59)

R5.Support capacitystrengtheningand retain capacityinpriorityareas

Prioritise DRR efforts over time which should befurther integrated into development. OCHA/Clustersneed to continue to focus on building the capacity ofnationalactors. Ensure thatspace for focusingonkeyhumanitarianneeds is retained in a transition framework through amore connected OCHA (e.g. with increased presence intherecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)andadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice.

Dedicatemoreresourcesandcapacitytoprotectionissues at this key juncture, through continuedsecondment of PROCAP capacity to the protectioncluster,andprovisionofadditionalresourcestoworkatthecommunelevel.

Seek globallevel guidance on the multisectorialchallengeofresettlement.

Cluster lead agencies should embed clustercoordination capacity in their programme to supportcounterpartsandbe inaposition tohelp reactivate theclusterifneeded.UN human resource practices should be reviewed tomakebetteruseofexistingrosters,allow fortemporaryredeployment,consideringthecapacitiesofpartnersandtobebetterabletoplaceHaitianstaffinkeypositions.


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MAINREPORTI. Introduction

I.1 BackgroundandAimoftheEvaluation

1. Onthe12thofJanuary2010,anearthquakeofmagnitude7.0struckHaitisWestprovince,near

Logne,affecting

the

capital

Port

au

Prince

and

surroundings.

The

earthquake

had

devastating

effects

andaccordingtotheHaitiangovernment,resultedinapproximately230,000deaths,300,000wounded,andovertwomilliondisplacedpersons.Amassiveresponsewasmountedtofaceboththe immediatesituation and establish a bridge towards recovery. Constant challenges including issues with landtenure,limitedgovernmentcapacity,psychologicaltrauma,crime,extremepoverty,protectionissues,acompletelyoverburdened infrastructure system,and the arrayofactors involved foreshadowed thelonganddifficultpathaheadforHaiti.

PORT-AU-PRINCE

Cap-Hatien

Gonaves

Hinche

Jacmel

Jrmie

Les Cayes

Miragone

Port-de-Paix

Fort Liberte

LesAnglaisTiburon

Chantal

Arniquet

Camp PerrinManiche

Cavaillon

StLouisdu Sud

Aquin

GrandGoave

PetitGoave

Bainet

Pestel

Roseau

BonbonAbricot

DameMarie

Les Irois

Moron

Ansed'Hainault Beaumont

CorailPetitTroude Nippes

BaraderesAnse-a-Veau

L'Asile

La vallee de Jacmel

CayesJacmel

Marigot

Ernnery

CercaCarvajal

Vallieres

TerrierRougeTrou

du Nord

CercaLaSource

Thomassique

Belladere

Jimani

LascahobasSautD'eau

Thomonde

Maissade

Pignon

LaVictoire Mombin

Crochu

Bahon

Milot

Limonade

Dondon

SaintRaphael

Marmelade

SaintMichelde l'Attatalaye

Dessalines

Petite Rivierede l'Artibonite

Verrettes

LaChapelle

Mirebalais

Grande Saline

DesdunesL'Estere

AnseRouge

Mole StNicolas

Bombardopolis

Baie deHenne

Jean Rabel

BassinBleu

Chansolme

Anse-a-Foleur

Saint Louisdu Nord

LeBorgne

Port MargotLimbe

PilateGros Morne

La Branle

Plaisance

Anse a pitres

Grand Gosier

FondVerrettes

Ganthier

Thomazeau

CabaretArchaie

LeoganeChambellan

Perches

Ferrier

Carice

BasLimbe

Acul duNord

Terre Neuve

Boucancarre

Kenscoff

Carrefour

PetionVille

Gressier

Cornillon

Ile a Vache

Anse-a-Galets

Pointe-a-Raquette

La Tortue

Caracol

Belle Anse

Torbeck

StJeanduSud

Port-Salut

CoteauxPort-a-Piment

Chardonnieres Thiote

Roche ABateau

Ouanaminte

Monte Criste

Dajabn

SaintMarc

C U B A D O M I N I C A N

R E P U B L I C

H A I T I

SUD EST

NO RD ES T

ARTIBONITE

CENTRE

SU D

GRANDEA N S E

NO RD OU ES T

NI PP ES

NO RD

O U E S T

LE DE LA TORTUE

LEDELA GONVE

PRESQU'LEDESBARADRES

LES CAYMITES

LE VACHE

720'W7230'W730'W7330'W740'W7430'W

200'N

1930'N

190'N

1830'N

180'N

0 10 20 30 40 50

km

Legend

Capital city

Firstadmincapital

Towns

International Boundary

Port

Firstadminboundary

Disclaimer:The designations employed and the presentation of materialon this map donot imply the expression of anyopinion whatsoever on the partof the Secretariat ofthe United Nations concerning the legalstatus of any country,territory,city or area orof its authorities, or concerning the delimitation ofits frontiers or boundaries. ReferenceSystem:UTM 18N, WGS84. Map datasource:United Nations Cartographic Section,ESRI,NaturalEarth, SR TM.Population exposure source:USGS

Haiti - Population Esposed and Exposure Level

Visit http://www.reliefweb.int/haiti to access this map and other crisis information.

Light

Moderate

Verystrong

Severe

Violent

Extreme

Preceivedshaking

7,261,000

5,887,000

1,049.000

571,000

314,000

2,246,000

332,000

Populationexposed

Strong

2. In view of the magnitude of the disaster and the subsequent response, the InterAgencyStandingCommittee (IASC) launchedamultiphase InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluation (IARTE) for thecountry,toassessthedisasterresponse,informdecisionmakers,drawlessonsandallowcorrectionstobemade,inrealtimewhennecessary.Thefirstphasetookplacethreemonthsaftertheearthquakeandevaluatedtheinitialresponse.TheIARTEmissioninAugustSeptember2011ispartofthesecondphaseoftheevaluation,withthemainobjectivesto:

Analyse

and

provide

lessons

for

the

ongoing

response,

with

a

particular

focus

oncoordinationbetweenthedifferentactorsinvolved;

Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with longerterm and/orgovernmentestablishedmechanisms;and

AnalysetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsfromthefirstphaseoftheInterAgency RealTime Evaluation have informed the evolving humanitarian response inHaiti.


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3. BasedonthekeyevaluationquestionsforthesecondphaseoftheIARTE6thisreportfocusesonfourmainareasoftheresponse:

Mainachievements,gapsandconstraints Coherence,connectednessandsustainabilityoftheresponse Coordinationandtransition Information

I.2 Methods,ScopeandStrengthsandWeaknessesoftheEvaluation

I.2.1. Background

4. As per the Terms of Reference of the IA RTE of the Humanitarian Response to the HaitiEarthquake,thesecondphaseoftheevaluationwastocommencesixtosevenmonthsafterthe initialmissionandreflectuponrelevance,effectiveness,efficiencyandcoverageduringthetransitionphaseoftheresponse.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelaysinstartingthetransitionphase.ThesecondphaseoftheIARTEintheendoccurredfourteenmonthsafter

theinitial

first

phase

mission,

from

August

to

October

2011,

with

the

terms

of

reference

fine

tuned

over

thecourseoftwofieldvisitsthattookplaceinMarchandJuly2011.7

Inpractice,however, the secondevaluationphasewas timely in that the transitionprocesswasverymuchontheagendaofthehumanitarianactors inHaiti.Themaindifficultyatthis laterstagewastheevaluationslackofcapacitytoinfluencetheprocess,givenfundingchallenges,capacityconstraintsanddownscaling or finalising of humanitarian operations in Haiti.8Evaluators also faced some difficultiesarrangingmeetingswiththeHaitianauthoritiesandotherkeystakeholdersduringthefieldphaseoftheevaluation.

1.2.2. Methods

5. The findings of the evaluation are based on a triangulation process9drawing on six types oflargelyqualitativesourcesofinformation:

semistructured interviewswithover250keystakeholdersonan individualorsmallgroupbasisinHaiti,PanamaandNewYork,10

Stakeholdergroup Numberofpersonsinterviewed

6See

Terms

of

Reference

in

Annex.

7ThefirstmissionincludedrepresentativesfromOCHAandUNICEFonbehalfoftheManagementGroupfortheevaluation;the

secondmissionwasconductedbytheevaluationmanager,accompaniedbytheinternationalconsultantfortheevaluation.8Forthisreason,anumberoffindingsandconclusionswouldnothaverecommendationsatthislaterstage.

9Evaluatorsusedtriangulationanddrewonmultiplesourcestoensurethatthefindingscouldbegeneralisedtotheresponseandwerenottheresultsofbiasortheviewsofasingleagencyortypeofactor.10ThefulllistofpersonsinterviewedisavailableinAnnexnumber9.Evaluatorsdidnotmanagetoobtainadditionalmeetings

withGoHrepresentativesor the IHRC inHaiti throughUNagencycontactsbutmetwithauthoritieswhenobserving theCGIHaiti Action Network meetings in New York and the Inaugural Assembly of the Presidential Investment Advisory Board inSeptember2011.


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Haitianauthorities 12

HaitianNGOs 67

Beneficiaries/affectedpopulationsduringprojectvisits

54

UNagencies 58

IFRC 5

InternationalNGOs 25

Donors 12

WorldBank/HRF 4

OtherInternational 15

Total 252

observationofmeetingsinHaitiandNewYork, sixfocusgroups, fieldvisitsintheareaofPortauPrinceandLeogane, feedbackfromaonedayworkshopheldinPortauPrinceinadvanceoftheCAPworkshop,

where evaluationfindingsandtransitionrelatedissueswerepresented, acomprehensivedocumentanddatareviewprocess.

6. Overone thousanddocumentsmainlyaccessedvia internet, theDRLAHaitiHumanitarianAidEvaluationDatabaseandUNICEFwereconsultedtogatherinformation,compareandcontrastdataand

establish

timelines.11

These

included

strategic

plans,

evaluation

reports,

surveys,

project

documents,

minutesofmeetingsandotherreportsandinformationavailableonHaitiangovernment,clusters,OCHAHaitiresponseandNGOwebsites.Usingtriangulation,evaluatorswereabletocomprehensivelyaddressthemajorityofevaluationquestionsandvalidatefindingsinasystematicmanner.Asoneofsevenfocusareas,theteamsetouttogatherresponsesandviewsonthelevelofinformationavailableforevidencebaseddecisionmakingandinformationmanagement.Itisonthisissuethatevaluatorsfoundthattherewaslessinformationandsourcesforpropercrossvalidation.

I.2.3. Timeline

7. The field phase of the evaluation in Haiti started in August 2011 and initially lasted three

weeks.

12

Additional

meetings

were

undertaken

until

the

end

of

October

2011.

An

initial

IASC

preliminary

debriefingtookplace inNYonSeptemberand later inGeneva inDecember2011.CAPrelatedfindingswere also shared in advance with OCHA and with participants attending the September CAP 2012

11SeeAnnexnumber??onmeetings.Firstphaseprovidedabaselineagainstwhichtoassessprogress.HaitiDecember2009

Clustercasestudygivesanoverviewofthepreearthquakestructureandsimilarissues.12Whiletheevaluationteamwasinitiallycomposedofonenationalconsultantandtwointernationalevaluators,oneofthe

internationalevaluatorshadtodropoutaftertheinitialfieldphase.Therewere,however,onlytwointerviewsthatthisconsultantconductedalone.


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20

workshop. The lead evaluator attended Haitirelated meetings in New York in September 2011 (e.g.ClintonGlobalInitiative,HaitiActionNetworkandMartellysPresidentialInvestmentAdvisoryCouncil).Anote for theCluster transition inHaitiwas submittedon October31st2011, to inform theongoingprocessesinlieuofthedraftevaluationreport.TheinitialdraftofthereportoftheIARTEphase2wassubmitted on November 10th 2011 and comments provided by the Advisory Group on the 7th ofDecember2011.

I.2.4. Strengthsandweaknessesoftheapproach

8. The evaluation relied on mainly qualitative methods. A survey of affected populations

perceptionsoftheoverallinteragencyresponseinHaiti,whichwastoformapartoftheevidencebase

for thesecond IARTE,wasdelayedandultimatelycancelled.Theevaluationconsideredthe resultsof

the intentionssurveyamongearthquakedisplacedpeople living incampsreleasedbyIOM,ACTEDand

CommunicatingwithDisasterAffectedCommunities(CDAC)Haiti.

9. Theevaluationsoughtinformationfromdifferentsettingsandcategoriesofaffectedpopulation

through purposive selection interviews (with population in neighborhoods and transitional shelters,

owners,renters,

people

living

in

camps,

evictees,

yellow

house

repair

beneficiaries,

people

that

were

relocated,beneficiariesindifferentcommunesofPortauPrinceandLeogane,etc.).Affectedpopulation

viewsontheresponseandcurrentconcernswerehighlycorrelatedacrosscategoriesandevaluatorsfeel

confidentthattheyhave,throughinterviewsandfocusgroups,accuratelycapturedHaitianviewsofthe

response.

10. A focus group with Haitian national staff working on the response was held during the field

segmentoftheevaluation,inordertoprioritiseHaitianviews(seeannex).13Forconsistency,thissecond

phase also sought to follow one of the methods of the first phase when using information received

throughconsultationswith theaffectedpopulation.TheRTE identifiedkey issuesat the levelofboth

directlyandindirectlyaffectedpopulation(outcomes)andtracedthembackthroughservicedeliverers.

Atthetimeofthesecondevaluationphase,however,therewasverylittletotraceback,asthebulkoftheaffectedpopulationwasnolongerreceivinganyformofassistanceandmanyagencieshadphased

outtheiraidorwithdrawn. Insomeinstances,theevaluatorswerenotabletoverifyproblemsthrough

servicedeliverersastheywerenolongerinthecountryoraccessible14.

11. TheevaluationfacedotherchallengesrelatedtotheextentandfocusofsomeofthequestionscontainedintheToR.IARTEsaremeanttoplacegreateremphasisonprocessesandimmediatelessonslearningthanonimpactevaluationandaccountability.ThequestionsintheToRfocusedontoagreaterextentonpastachievements,performanceandaccountability, rather thanon learningat thenationallevel.

12. As

the

Humanitarian

Country

Team

(HCT)

is

the

most

immediate

user

of

the

process

and

recommendationsofIARTEs,thelevelofinvolvementandownershipinthefieldisakeytoasuccessfulIA RTE. However, support to the role of the evaluators during the field phase was limited, as theevaluationwasnotcloselytiedtotheongoingstrategicworkoftheHumanitarianCountryTeamandthe

13ThisfocusgroupwassuggestedbySavetheChildrensCountryDirectorinameetingwiththeCCOinJuly2011.Fora

summaryonthecontentsofthemeetingseeAnnex??number.14AmongthosearetwogirlsrapedinCampJeanMarieVincentthatwerereferredbyIOMtoahealthfacilitybutwhocame

backwithoutreceivingtreatment,aswellasseveralcasesofpoortransitionalhousing.


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21

wideraid framework inHaiti.The IARTEAdvisoryBoardandamajorityof theHumanitarianCountryTeammemberswereengagedintheevaluationonan individual levelbutnotsomuchasagroup.TheevaluationwaspresentedattheHCTbuttherewerenoopportunitiestodiscuss it indetail,astheHCandthehumanitariancommunitywereoverstretchedwiththeConsolidatedAppealProcess(CAP).Theperson initially responsible for the evaluation within the office of the HumanitarianCoordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) and tasked with gathering of information onrecommendations

emanating

from

evaluations

and

their

follow

up

left

Haiti.

Actors

involved

in

recovery

and reconstructioneffortswerenot sufficientlyengaged inanevaluationwhich,although focusedontransition,wasstillperceivedasahumanitarianorattimesOCHAdrivenexercise.

13. The IARTEhighlights themainpoints related tokeyevaluationquestions,butalsoprovidesa

snapshotofthesituationatthetimefieldworkwasconducted.Anindepthassessmenttheactivities

undertaken since May 201015could not be undertaken given the weak monitoring and evaluation

systems in place. Certain questions in the IA RTE TORs dealing with accountability were difficult to

addressinthecontextofHaiti,whereinformationavailableonoverallneedsandresponseislimited.The

level of institutionaluncertainty at the timeof theevaluationalsoaffected its ability todefinemore

specificrecommendationsandtobemoreforwardlooking.

14. Recognising that one key characteristic of an IA RTE is that it can affect programming as ithappens, the evaluation sought to be useful and focus on issues of practical implementation. Aworkshop was held in PortauPrince with multistakeholder groups in advance of the ConsolidatedAppealsProcess(CAP)workshop,inwhichkeyevaluationissueswerediscussed.Contentthatemergedfrom both the IA RTE and CAP workshops were used to further crossvalidate findings. Many of theinputsoftheIARTEworkshopworkinggroupsweresubsequentlytakenintoaccountintheevaluation.AspartoftheIARTE,anoteonclustertransitionwaspreparedformanagersinthefieldinadvanceofthisreport,basedonissuesraisedintheworkinggrouponclustertransition.16Theworkshopsupportedlearningbutdidnotresultinprioritizedrecommendationsthatcouldbethebasisofanactionplanwithidentifiedtimeframesandresponsibleorganizations.

15. Asithasbeenconductedoverayearandahalfaftertheearthquake,thisIARTEdiffersinscopeand focus from other similar exercises. It has focused heavily on transition issues and provides asnapshotofasituationshapedbyaresponsethathasbeenevolvingoveralongerperiodoftimeandhasbeeninfluencedbyamultitudeoffactors.

I.3 Context

Remainingacutehumanitarianneeds

16. At the end of 2011, the humanitarian situation in Haiti remainsa challenge and still requires

internationalsupport.

At

the

time

of

the

evaluation,

the

ERC

determined

priority

humanitarian

needs

in

Haitiover thecomingyearasbeing:access to safedrinkingwater,sanitationand food,andguardingagainstgenderbasedviolenceandforcedevictionsfromcamps.17Thesituationremainsfragile,marredbythechronicstructural issuesthataffected itevenbeforetheearthquake(PortauPrincehadnocity

15Referencesinthereporttospecificprojectsorsectorsshouldberegardedasexamplesusedtoillustrateafindingandnotto

specificallysingleoutanorganisationoractivity.16SeeAnnex4.

17InSeptember2011,nearly70,000peoplehadbeenevictedfromcampswithoutalternativedurablesolutions.


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planningandadeficitofhousingfor300,000people).AccordingtoIOMdata,despiteasharpdecreaseinthecamppopulation(ataratethathasbeendecliningsinceMarch2011)over550,000Haitiansliveinapproximately800displacementcampsscatteredmostlyaroundthecapital,PortauPrince(seeFigure1). There are continuing humanitarian needs, including protection concerns. A focus on lifesavingactivities is still required with vulnerable populations facing multiple threats, such as food insecurity,cholera and natural disasters (mainly frequent heavy rains and hurricanes).18At the same time,humanitarian

donors

have

drastically

reduced

their

funding

in

Haiti

and

the

vast

majority

of

organisationshaverunoutofresourcesandarephasingoutorhavealreadyceasedtheiractivities.19TheGovernmentofHaiti lacksthemeans totakeoverkeyservicessuchascholeratreatmentcentresandsanitation. Humanitarian donors would prefer that recovery and development efforts cover theseongoingneeds.

Figure1:Internallydisplacedpersons(IDP)inrecordedsites

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,0001,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000

Number

Households

Individuals

Source:IOMHAITICampCoordinationCampManagementClusterDTMv2.0

UpdateJulySeptember2011DisplacementTrackingMatrixV2.0UpdateSeptember30,2011

Continuinguncertaintyandfragility

17. PoliticalinstabilityanduncertaintycontinuedtoaffectHaitiin2011.Thecountrywaswithoutagovernment until October of that year, and the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission(IHRC)expiredthatsamemonth.ThenewPrimeMinisterreportedlysoughtitsrenewalbutalsowantedto strengthen the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. While the mandate of the United NationsStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been renewed with the support of the President, itspresence is increasinglyquestioned.Since thedisaster, thecountryhashadanegativeannualgrowthrate of minus 8.5 percent in 2010. Sixty percent of the Haitian budget continues to depend oninternationalassistance.Haitispresentscenarioisstillexplainedbyalackofleadership,decisionmakingon key issues, and an effective Government of Haitiled plan for recovery. The main priority andchallengefortransitioningfromthepostearthquakehumanitarianresponseremainsthedefinitionofacomprehensiveresettlementpolicy.

Transitionstrongontheagenda,complicatedinpractice

18. Transitionsareusuallycharacterizedbyashiftingemphasisfromlifesavingactivitiestorestoring

1845%ofthepopulationfacesfoodinsecurity,thecholeraepidemichassofarinfected450,000peopleandclaimedmorethan

6,500lives.19The2011revisedCAPisonly56%funded.KeyagencieslikeOFDAnolongerhavefundingforecastedforHaiti.


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livelihoods, achieving development goals, and an increasing reliance on national ownership throughnational development strategies. There is recognition that the focus on transition should take placeimmediately after a disaster. Transitioning is regarded as essential to avoid creating a situation ofdependency.

19. TheGovernmentof Haitihadofficially set the endof the reliefphase for July 2010 but laterextended

the

distribution

of

food

aid

until

September

of

that

year.

Cholera

and

the

2010

hurricane

seasonmaintainedthefocusonthehumanitarianemergency.Althoughspeedingupthereconstructionand recovery effort has been the priority in Haiti for 2011, the progress has been slow. For some,transitionisontheagendabutnotnecessarilyasaresultofaplannedprocessbutoffatigue(onthepartoftheaffectedpopulation,authorities,implementingagenciesanddonorswhoallwanttoseechange,tangibleresultsanddurable improvements).Forthevastmajorityofthose interviewed(approximately90 percent) reconstruction hasnotvisiblybegun.Themeansandactivitiesof internationalNGOsareincreasinglysingledoutasasignificantproblembythenewgovernment.

20. AttheInternationalDonorsConference:TowardsaNewFutureforHaiti,heldinNewYorkon31March2010,55donors(nationalgovernmentsandmultilateralinstitutions)pledgedatotalof$4.59

billionfor

recovery

and

development

aid

programmes.

For

the

combined

20102011

timeframe,

donors

hadinSeptember2011disbursed43percentofthistotal($1.97billion).Anadditional$2.08billionhasbeencommitted.

21. The InterimHaitiRecoveryCommission (IHRC)was setup inApril2010 tocover the recoveryagendaforlimited18monthperiod(i.e.untilOctober2011).TheCommissionhasbeendescribedasacumbersomestructurewithacomplicateddecisionmakingprocessandhighoperatingcosts,whosefocus on projects has also restricted its ability to operate with strategic planning and oversight.Notwithstandingitsheavyandsluggishprocedures, internationalstakeholdersinterviewedfeltthattheInterim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was at the time of the evaluation at the point where onewouldhavewantedittobeayearago,withacompetentanddedicatedteam.Indeed,inMay2011the

IHRC

was

deemed

as

not

fully

operational

due

to

delays

in

staffing

the

Commission

and

defining

the

role of its Performance and Anticorruption Office and its limited ability to direct funding to Haitianpriorities,inpartbecausethoseprioritieshavenotbeenclear. SeveraldonorsandUNagencieswere,atthetimeoftheevaluation,consideringhowbesttorationaliseresourcesandhesitantoverwhetherthey should support staffing the IHRC at this stage or empower the Government of Haiti and itsministries.ThecurrentteamattheIHRChasbeenfocusingheavilyonbettercommunicatingitsmissionandactivitiesandextendingitsmandate.

22. TheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionsPublicAccountabilityOfficereportedinJune2011that althoughnot allprojects provided financial updates less than$118millionhad been reported asdisbursedoutofthe$3.2billioninprojectsithadclearedforfunding. Amismatchofresourceshasalsoprevailedandbeen consistentlydenouncedby theOfficeof theSpecialEnvoy,as theGovernmentof

Haitihas

not

been

directly

receiving

sufficient

funding.

As

an

example,

at

the

time

of

the

evaluation

PresidentMartellysteamwasstillworkingoutoftents.


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24

Newleadership,roomforoptimismandopportunities

23. President Martellys election and his "Four E's" programme of education, employment,environmentand the ruleof law (Etatdedroit),havebeenmetwithenthusiasm.Theadministrationwouldliketoproactivelyengagetheprivatesectorandthediasporainhumanitarianandreconstructionefforts.

The

international

community

iskeen

on

backing

the

new

President

and

national

leadership.

His

effort to talkwith theaffectedpopulationabout their needs isanencouraging sign.Oneof the newauthorities flagship programmes is the longterm reconstruction of sixteen neighbourhoods andcorresponding closure of six camps in PortauPrince known as the 16/6 project. Despite someconcernswiththe16/6project,itwasswiftlyapprovedattheIHRCandmanyhavewantedtoembraceitas a model of an integrated neighbourhood approach. The project is supported as part of theHumanitarian Coordinators proactive engagement with the new presidential team. Later on, inSeptember2011inNewYork,thePresidentannouncedhisplantocreateanewhousingauthorityunderthe Primature. This move was recommended by ICG among others.20Beyond the challenges andexpectationscreated,theprospectoffreeeducationforallbytheendofthePresidentstermisalsoseenasauniqueopportunitytopushfordevelopmentgoals.Mayorsthroughoutthepastyearhavealso

exercised

leadership

and

assumed

roles

enabling

the

response

in

many

key

areas

within

their

communes.

II. MainAchievements,Gaps,LimitsandConstraints

II.1 MainAchievements

Disasterpreparednessmainstreaming

24. Preparedness was cited as a keyachievement of the response. Whenconsidering the three objectives of the

current

revised

Consolidated

Appeals

Process (CAP), most progress has beenmadeon supporting targeteddisaster riskreduction interventions focused onpreparing for andmitigating the impact ofthe 2011 rain and hurricane season. Inpreparation for the hurricane season,humanitarian actors have implementedactivities in support of the HaitianGovernment,particularlytheDirectiondelaProtectionCivile (DPC).Acontingencyplanwas finalizedandcirculated,stockswereprepositionedbydepartmentandclusterandtwosimulationexercisesweresuccessfullycarriedout,testingcoordination

mechanisms

in

the

case

of

an

emergency.

The

Direction

de

la

Protection

Civile

has

emerged

strengthenedfromthecurrentresponse.21Alargelyeffectiveresponseincamps

20ICG,PostquakeHaiti:SecurityDependsonResettlementandDevelopmentLatinAmerica/CaribbeanBriefingN25,28June201121Interviews,observationofDPCsroleinmeetingsandinthefield,OCHAIMCAPmonitoring.(Clermontetal.)DECstudyUrban

disasterslessonsfromHaitiAStudyofmemberagenciesresponsestotheearthquakeinPortauPrince,Haiti,January2010foundthattheDPChademergedstrengthenedparticularlyatthedepartmentallevel."March2011(27)

Thethreemainobjectivesoftheresponsebasedonthecurrentrevised2011CAPare:

1. "Tofillcriticalgapsandprovidetargeted,catalyticinterventionswhichenablereintegrationorrecoveryofaffectedpopulationsandillustratehowdurablesolutionscanbeproduced."

2. "Toensurehumanitarianinterventionswhichprovideprotectionandsavelivesamonggroupsmadehighlyvulnerablebyexposuretomultiplerisks:earthquakeinduceddisplacement,choleraoutbreaks,cycloneseasonthreatsorextremefoodinsecurity."

3. "Tosupporttargeteddisasterriskreductioninterventionsfocusedonpreparingforandmitigatingtheimpactofthe2011cyclone.


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25. Theevaluationfoundthattheresponseincampsandhadbeenaconsiderableachievementinachallengingcontext.22Amajorsuccessofthehumanitarianresponseisthattherehavebeennocholeraoutbreaks in thecamps.Assistancehasbeenprovidedandcampshavebeenmanagedunderdifficultcircumstances under threat of evictions, stigmatisation of camp population, insecurity, decliningassistance, and lack of durable solutions. The Camp Management Operation (CMO) units have alsoplayed

apositive

role

in

strengthening

leadership

at

decentralised

levels,

both

at

the

level

of

mayors

and

the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC). Although there has been much discussion regarding theinternationalcommunitybeingexcessively focusedon the camps, lessvisibilityhasbeengiven to theworkoutsidecamps.

Progressonrubbleremoval

26. Debris removaland itsmanagementbecameapriority for theGovernmentofHaiti,as itwasaffectingprogressinotherareas.Theearthquakecreatedanestimated10millioncubicmetersofdebris.As inthecaseofcampmanagement,thecolossaltaskofdebrisremoval isanewneedcreatedbytheearthquake.Anestimated2millioncubicmetersofdebriswere removed in2010 (approximately650

000m

3

of

debris

through

initial

Cash

for

Work

efforts)

and

the

target

for

2011

was

to

manage

afurther

4

million cubic meters. UNDP now estimates (October 2011) that almost half of the debris has beenmanaged.23Thishasbeenachieveddespitedecisionmaking, logisticalandfundingchallenges.Strategyhadbeen initially lackingandobstacles includedobtainingpermissions fromMinistryofPublicWorks,accessingneighbourhoods,andenteringheavymachinery.Projectcoordinationamongactors involvedin debris removal and residents refusing to authorise demolition of their houses were also cited asdifficultiesaffectingprogress.

Transitionalshelter:Tshelter4.0

27. Local production and construction capacity on transitional shelter (Tshelter) has been

developed,

both

in

terms

of

agency

capacity

and

through

training.

24

While

there

is

a

preference

for

findingdurablesolutions,appropriateTsheltersarestillanoptioninthemediumtermgiventhecurrentsituationandchallenges inHaiti,providedbeneficiarieshaveaccessto livelihoodsandservices.Clusterleveldiscussionsontransitionalshelterstandardslastedformanymonthsinmid2010,duetohighcostsof all available designs, lack of materials and many logistical challenges. Criteria for Tshelters haveincludedbeingsimultaneouslyresistantenoughtowithstandCategory1hurricanewindsandlastforupto5years,beredeployableandquickenoughtomountrapidly,aswellasbeingreusable,sothattenantscan relocate. Production and construction capacity has now been created and there are many goodexamplesofhowagencieshavemanaged toadapt to theHaitiancontextand themanychallengesofneighbourhoodsinPortauPrince.25Structurescannowtechnicallysupporttheweightoflaterimprovedconstruction.Somenewdesignshaveamezzanineandcanfurtheradapttothelackofavailablespaceinneighbourhoods and the fact that houses before the earthquake could have two stories and

22Interviews,meetings,observation.Haitianssetupimpromtutentcitiesthroughthecapitalaftertheearthquake.Attheend

ofJanuaryPresidentPrevalwasappealingfor300,000tentsandinitialintentionsweretomove400,000peopletolargercamps.23EvaluatorshadtheopportunitytodiscussJ/PRHOsrubbleremovalinBristouandBobinandtheCARMENproject(Centres

dAppuipourleRenforcementdeMaisonsEndommages)24UNOPSforinstancethroughitswarehouseandproductioncentreinTabarrenowhasthecapacitytoproduce30sheltersa

dayandmount20oftheminneighbourhoods.25Averyaccurateaccountofthechallengesandanexampleoftheprogressthatagencieshavebeenabletomakecanbe

viewedonIFRCsiteandthelinkhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsjoADopKKA


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accommodatetwofamilies.Giventhecomplexity,however,therearefewagenciesthathavebeenableto implement shelter projects successfully; costs, the need for technical expertise, procurementknowledge and especially time for community participation and dialogue have been underestimated.Majorconstraintshave included landownership issues, rubble removal in individualplots,and lackofsuitable public land for organized new temporary settlements. Mayors have exercised new roles anddemonstratedleadershiptoovercomesomeofthesebarriers.

IntegratedNeighbourhood,SafeReturnandCommunityBasedApproaches

28. Humanitarian agencies have piloted a strategy encouraging integration of key programmes intargeted urban neighbourhoods, now recognised as the Neighbourhood Approach (NA). The

NeighbourhoodApproach

isacomprehensive

and

rational

approach

to

longer

term

resettlement

and

to

helping households and communities restructure neighbourhoods and rebuild safer houses (i.e.,ultimatelybuildingbackbetterand restartingcityplanning inPortauPrince).For IFRC it ispartof itsstrategy to encourage integration of key programmes in urban neighbourhoods, involving the directimplementation of key services (shelter, water and sanitation, livelihoods support, community healthandriskreduction).26UNHabitathasbeensuccessfullyadvocatingtheSafeReturnapproachthathasbeenimplementedintheBristouandBobinneighbourhoods,amongstothers.27Theapproachalsohelpsovercome problems related to intercluster coordination, although coordination and collaborationamong different agencies remains crucial. 28 The agencies interviewed reported that they hadunderestimated the effort of consultation and participation within this communitybased approach,where processes are allimportant. Humanitarian projects that have shorter implementation periods

tendto

focus

more

on

results

than

processes.

29. The 16/6 project follows a similar rationale but is costlier (78 million USD to resettle 30,000

26IFRCstrategyandOperationsupdaten28EighteenmonthsProgressReport2November201127AcoalitionofactorshavebeenworkingunderthisprojectmainlyimplementedbySolidariteswithECHOfundingwhereUNHabitathasbeensupportingneighbourhoodcommittees,UNOPSrepairingyellowhousesandmountingTsheltersinlieuofRedHouses,J/PRHOremovingrubble,etc.TheFrenchRedCrosshasalsobeenimplementingtheapproachinDelmas.28InterviewsandDECstudy.

OtherEarthquakeresponseprogressindicatorshighlightedin2011CAPMidyearreviewShelter:64000familieshavebeenrelocatedintotransitionalshelter117200tents,1185052tarpsandover2.5millionNFIsweredistributedtorespondtoemergencyshelterneedsIn2011effortsfocusedonsupportingthereturnofaffectedpopulationstotheiroforiginortorelocationsites.Agriculture:Emergencyagricultureprojectsfacilitatingaccesstoinputsbenefitted200,000householdsandneighbourhoodsseedmultiplicationeffortsafurther25,100families.Livelihoodsactivitiestargeted48,200households.Education:371semipermanentsschoolsand139permanentschoolsreceivedassistance.

700,000school

children

received

school

material.

1,500,000

students

received

school

food

rations.

Health:17fieldhospitalswereestablished.345,000medicalkitsweredistributedbetweenJanuaryandMarch2011byPROMESS.900,000dosesofvaccineswereadministered.Surveillanceestablishedandfreeobstetriccareprovidedin63hospitalswithqualifiedpersonnel.Nutrition:NutritionalStabilisationUnits USN wereestablishedin9de artments.


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people)andmoreambitiousinscope(bothintermsoftermsof improvedcityplanningasbulldozerswillbeinvolvedtointroduceservicesandthenumberofneighbourhoodstargeted).AftertheInterimHaiti Recovery Commissions approval of the 16/6 project, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) hasfunded an initial tranche with 30 million USD, and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) issupportingandcoimplementingit.TheexperiencegatheredbyagenciessuchasIOMandUNOPSinthehumanitarianresponsewillprovehelpfulinthisregard.

Sanitation

30. Much progress has been made on water and sanitation (WASH) in terms of supporting localcapacity, and as a result of the response to cholera. Direction Nationale de lEau Potable et delAssainissement (DINEPA) has undertaken the responsibility for sanitation infrastructure, which wasnonexisting before the earthquake. The humanitarian intervention led to the establishment inSeptember 2011 of the first excreta treatment facility in PortauPrince. In 2011 DINEPA has alsorecognisedthatwaterandsanitationforthecamppopulation liesunder itsresponsibility.29TheWater,SanitationandHygiene(WASH)clusterhasbeenabletofurthersupportDINEPAscoordinationcapacityanditsabilitytoadvocateforfundingforacutehumanitarianneedsanditsactivities.30

II.2 TheBigGaps:DurableSolutions,Livelihoods,Accommodation,CommunicationandContinuedSupport

31. In all interviews and focus groups carried out by evaluators, affected populations above allwanted durable solutions to their problems and to understand what was planned and what theirentitlements,ifany,were.Caseswherehumanitarianworkerscanactuallyrespondtodifficultquestionsarerarebecauseplansarenotknownandcommunicationisonesided,withmanyquestionsraisedandlimited answers. 31 Similar findings were reported in the Care/SCF joint evaluation: Haitiansencounteredandotherstakeholdersincludingwithinthehumanitariancommunity,increasinglyfeelthatthe humanitarian community and government are not meeting peoples expectations. They feel thathumanitarian activities and programs are financially unsustainable and are not helping Haitians toachievetheirowngoalssothattheycanmoveforwardfromastateofemergency.InternationalNGOsinthiscontexttendtobelumpedasoneandareincreasinglyquestioned,alsobecausetheyareoftenonthe front line.32 Responses that enable greater involvement of affected populations and greatercapacitiesintherecoveryphasehavebeenlimited,astheyhavebeenimplementedbyafewernumberoforganisationsandbeenmoretargeted.33

32. The focusgroupheldwithHaitianstaff involved inthehumanitarianresponsealsounderlinedthat organisations have not focused enough on livelihoods.34Organisations involved in livelihoodsprojects emphasize that coverage is necessarily limited due to beneficiary/cost considerations andimplementation capacity, with efforts needing multiyear commitments. Durable accommodation

29Interviews,Projectdocumentation.30Asaresultofphasedoutdonorassistanceinsanitation,afundingproposalfordislodgingincampswasputforwardbyDINEPAtotheIHRC.31Focusgroupswereheldinearthquakeaffectedneighborhoodswhererehabilitationhastakenplace,withpersonsevictedfromtheSylvioCatorcamp,withIDPpopulationsincampsandinterviewswithTshelterbeneficiariesinCorailandinneighborhoods.32Pressreviews,interviews,graffiti.

33Interviews,clusterparticipationpresencebygroup/sector,beneficiaryfiguresandprojectlocationsbasedonFTS.

34Forhumanitarianactors, livelihoodsprojectsareextremelycostlyperbeneficiaryandsomeactors interviewedquestioned

whetherhumanitarianfundingshouldbeusedonprovidingsolutionsforafewinacontextlikeHaitis.


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solutionsarealsolackingintheabsenceofavailableoraffordableland,asPortauPrincehadahousingdeficitfor300,000peopleevenbeforetheearthquakeandmostearthquakeaffectedpopulationwererentersasopposedtohousingowners.

33. Inpractice,HaitianpublicopinionbelievesthatInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)incampsarereceiving assistance when those affected in neighbourhoods are not. At the time of the evaluation,camps

visited

were

not

receiving

any

material

assistance

and

this

coincides

with

data

reported

through

the clusters. Organisations face funding constraints and have phasedout their assistance in camps.Populations in camps are often stigmatised.35IOM,ACTEDandCommunicatingwithDisasterAffectedCommunities(CDAC)HaiticarriedoutIntentionsSurveypollingover15,000campdwellerstofindoutwhytheyarestilltheredespitethediscomfortandinsecurityposedbylivingintentsorundertarpaulinsthroughacholeraepidemicandtwoconsecutivehurricaneseasons.TheIntentionsSurveyfoundthat94percentofpeople living in campswould leave if theyhadalternativeaccommodation.Mostof thosesurveyed said if theyhad todepart immediately, theywould not have the means to pay rentor theresources torepairorreplace theirdamagedordestroyedhomes. In interviews,theevaluation foundthatcamp residentsoftenhadnootherviablealternative to remaining incampsand that inanycasetheywerenotremainingincampsbecauseofcurrentconditionsbutbecausetheyhadbeenregistered

and

could

hope

to

benefit

from

a

durable

shelter

solution

in

the

future.

A

major

gap

in

this

area

continues to be the lack of a Government of Haitiled resettlement policy that could guide bothcommunicationandresponse.

34. Based on interviews of humanitarian community representatives, the main gaps and keypriorities at the time of the evaluation were in the water and sanitation and health sectors.Organisations have been scaling down water and sanitation and cholera operations and transferringtheseresponsibilitiestoDINEPAandMinistrede laSantPubliqueetde laPopulation(MSPP).EffortstotransitioncholeratreatmentcentrestoMSPPlackedthecapacityandfunding.

Protection,DRR36andothercrosscuttingissues

35. With capacities overstretched and the present myriad of challenges, less attention has beengiventocrosscuttingissues.37AttheIARTEworkshop itwassuggestedthatdisabilityandageingwerenotreallyontheagendawasbecausetherewasnosubclusterforelderly,forpeoplewithdisabilitiesand other vulnerable groups while there is a cluster for genderbased violence (GBV) and childprotection.Thelackofdisaggregateddatainassessmentswasalsomentionedasanissueaffectingtheabilitytosupportspecificvulnerablegroups.Withtheexceptionofdisasterpreparedness,intersectoralcoordinationhasbeenregardedasweakandhasnotfacilitatedfurthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingormultidimensionalissues.

36. Atthelevelofspecificclusters,inclusionofcrosscuttingissuesislimited.Thiswascaseeveninthe shelter cluster which, when led by IFRC, was considered one of the bestrun and most

comprehensively

resourced

and

coordinated

clusters. 38Disaster

Risk

reduction

(DRR)

and

the

35AworkinggroupintheRTEworkshopunderlinedthatmanyactorshavebeenworkingwheretherewerenocampsandwere

workingincommunitiespriortotheearthquake.EvaluatorsfoundthatmorethatthebulkofeffortsareinfactfocusingonneighborhoodsbutthattheperceptioninHaitiisthattoomuchassistancehasgonetocamps.36TheconceptofDRRhasdifferentmeaningsamongactors.

37Interviews,DARA2011HumanitarianResponseIndexdata.

38The shelter Cluster Review (April 2011)found that; Technical references on the web site include links to guidance on

disability,genderandhumanrightsmanualsbutcrosscutting issuesfeaturerarely ifatall inClusterstrategicdocumentation.


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environmentwerealsoseenasnotmainstreamed intheresponse.Thereareelementsofdisasterriskreduction that have not been considered in certain shelter projects. Only on environmental issues,throughanadviserrecruitedviaWWF,didtheclustermanagetoassembleanumberofkeyresourcesrelevanttoshelter.

37. Protection in Haiti (camp evictions, gender based violence,39child protection) is viewed asincreasingly

critical

on

all

fronts.

The

pressure

in

communes

to

forcibly

close

camps

and

evict

residents

is

mounDirectiondelaProtectionCivileting.Theleadagencyonprotection,OHCHR,isseenasveryactivedespite its limited human resources.40It however faces problems related to being part of a UNintegratedmission,whichcanundermineitsadvocacyefforts.41

II.3 LimitsandConstraints

Acostlyresponse

38. According to the Financial Tracking System (FTS) data, total humanitarian funding for HaitiamountedtooverUSD3.5billionin2010andUSD493millionin2011.42 Theevaluationfoundthatthe

responseto

the

earthquake

has

been

far

more

expensive

than

anticipated.

On

average,

organisations

includingdonorsandkeyUNagencies recognisedthatprojectcostshadbeenbetween2.5to3timesmore than what had been initially estimated.43There are several factors that affect the cost ofoperationsinHaiti,including:

a. thecostoflivinginPortauPrince;b. technicalsolutionsaremorecostly inurbanenvironments (e.g. forwaterandsanitation

(WATSAN);c. the amount of traffic that leads organisations to have to either double or triple their

logisticsandstaffingcapacitybecauseofthetimeittakestogofrompointAtopointB;d. delays in implementationwhich increaseproject running costs as structureshave tobe

maintained;

e. the need for imports because of the limited amount of suppliers in Haiti and localprocurementbeingmoreexpensiveingeneral;

f. bringinginsuppliestoanisland;g. operational dynamics often entail major agencies subcontracting others, which entails

additionaldelaysandoverheadcosts.

Thestrategicframeworktemplate,ResponsePlanandClusterPositionPapernamenoneoftheissues.TheAdvocacyDocumentreferencesparticipatoryassessmentandgender,ageandHIV/AIDSstatusinanannexe.Itrefersbrieflytoenvironmentalissuesin the contextof transitional shelter funding butnowhere to human rights.Performance standards in theShelter TechnicalGuidancepaperrefertoage,genderandHIV/AIDSbutnottoparticipatoryapproaches,environmentorhumanrights.39The

evaluation

observed

that

two

girls

raped

in

acamp

referred

to

the

intended

health

facility

returned

to

the

camp

without

receivingtreatment.40AsanexampletheProtectionclusterthroughtheHousing,LandandPropertyworkinggroupissuedaproposalforredressing

RenterspositionintheHaitianHousingAssistanceasmanypostdisasterresponsesfailtoincorporatetheparticularsituationofrentersinadurablemanner.41Atthetimeoftheevaluation,aPressstatementonforcedevictionswasreleasedjustaftertheallegedabusecommittedby

MINUSTAHUruguayantroopsinSeptember2011.42FTSdata.43SpecificexamplescomparingcostsofshelterinPakistanandSriLankawerementionedbuttherearenostudiesonthisissue

orreferencestostandardunitcoststocomparetheresponseinHaititothatofothers.


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Timelinessandresults:strikingthebalance

39. Agencies found it challenging to strike the right balance between responding to targets andfocusingonbuildingcapacitiesandtransitiontowardsrecovery.Thecholeraepidemicstronglyaffectedthe ongoing operations, with even agencies not directly involved in water and sanitation or healthdedicatingtheirlogisticandawarenessraisingcapacitytothecholeraresponse(foramonthandahalfon

average).

Representatives

of

organisations

interviewed

also

found

that

decision

making

within

the

humanitariancommunitytooktoo longand,specifically,thatpolicydocuments,operating frameworksandapproachestooktoolongtobeapproved.

40. Aminorityofagencies interviewedalsofoundthattheyhadunrealisticallybeenworkingunderassumptionsofgovernmentcapacityanddecisionmakingatthenational leveland that thishadbeendetrimentalfortheresponse.Governmentcapacityhadbeenassessedpreearthquakeatdifferentlevelsandanumberofstudieshavebeencarriedoutorupdatedsincethedisaster.Clustershavealsosinceengaged in government capacity mapping at different levels. UNDP has a database on these withinformationfromdifferentactorsonthisissue.44

Multiplecritical

constraints

41. The context in Haiti has had agencies move in and out of an emergency mode. The choleraoutbreakledorganisationstodiverttheiractivitiesandshiftthefocusoftheresponse.Thevastmajorityofnonspecialisedagenciesprioritisedsensitisationactivities.45Activitiesarealsoaffectedbythethreatofhurricanesandheavyrains.

42. Political turmoil and uncertainty affected the response and placed further uncertainty ondefined national priorities, policies, institutions46 and the capacity for decisionmaking. Structuralproblems,landtenure,landavailability,lackoflegislation,limitedgovernmentcapacityandinstitutionalweaknesses, extreme poverty47, inequity, crime, impunity, an overburdened infrastructure system,

limited

resources,

the

environment,

dependency

and

limited

markets

are

all

cited

as

major

constraints.

43. The limited levelof funding isalsoperci

IA RTE Haiti_phase 2 Final Report

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