I-TRIZ Overview and Fundamentals - Ideation … 2010 Ideation International Inc. Ideation Operating...

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Introduction

2010 Ideation International Inc.

SVETLANA VISNEPOLSCHI Director of Anticipatory Failure Determination

Ideation International Inc.

Education

MS in Electrical Engineering

MS in Patent Law (USSR)

TRIZ courses by H. Altshuller

Background and Experience

R&D Engineer

Patent expert

TRIZ expert and developer since 1983

Contribution to TRIZ

TRIZ resources: classification, structure, and methods of application to Inventive Problem

Solving

Directed Evolution: first practical application to electrical pumps

Anticipatory Failure Determination: method and software development

Author and co-author of books and publications

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Ideation Operating System for Innovation

Based on Ideation TRIZ (I-TRIZ) methodology

Inventive Problem Solving (IPS)

A systematic procedure for

resolving tough technological

problems, enhancing system

parameters, improving quality, reducing cost, etc.

for current generations of products and technologies.

Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD)

Failure Analysis


identifying the root causes of a failure or other undesired phenomenon in a system, and for

making corrections in a timely manner.

Failure Prediction


identifying beforehand, and

then preventing, all dangerous or

harmful events that might be associated

with a system.

Directed Evolution®

(DE)

A systematic procedure for strategically

evolving future generations of technological

systems.

Control of Intellectual Property


increasing IP value and providing

protection from infringement and circumvention.


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Anticipatory Failure Determination

What failures may occur?

Why failures did occur?

System ?

? Failures

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Failure Prediction


Is the situation any better with regard to failure

prediction? Traditional methods:

Risk Assessment

FMEA (Failure Modes

and Effects Analysis)

HAZOP (Hazard and

Operability Analysis)

PHA (Preliminary

Hazards Analysis)

Vulnerability Analysis

Fault Trees

Event Trees

Etc.

Hypotheses

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It is very difficult to predict future failures with traditional methods, because…

?

?

…Lack of information about

future problems

? What can go wrong???


Denial Phenomenon:

Traditional approaches to failure prediction always face

information deficiency

…our product is very safe…

…it never happened before…

…everything will be just fine…

???

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Absence of strong techniques

for predicting tricky, multi-stage failure scenarios

Traditional failure prediction methods cannot predict all truly

hazardous failures

FMEA/HAZOP templates offers one type of question only:

What would happen if parameter X increased/decreased at a certain degree?

Inexhaustible

field of possible

resources

combinations

System


THREE MAJOR STEPS:

1. Invert the Problem: replace “what” and “why” with “how to”

2. Invent Failure Hypotheses

using problem solving tools

3. Test It :

does the system have resources to make

possible failures real?


includes:

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Step 1: Invert the Problem

What can happen???

?

How to make things happen!

!!!


How can we invent Failures ?

Step 2: Invent Failure Hypotheses

1. Pro-active thinking!

2. Use I-TRIZ tools:

• FP Directions

• FP Checklists

• FP Operators

Hypothesis

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What will happen???

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Step 3: Utilize Resources

For a failure hypothesis to occur, all the necessary components of the failure mechanism

must be present within the system or its environment as available resources.

Com

pon

en

t A

Com

pon

en

t B

Com

pon

en

t C

Available Resources:

• Vacant Space

• Free Time

• Required Function

• Similar Substance

• Source of Energy

• Required Information

Likely

Failure Hypothesis

Resource A

Resource C

Resource B


Instead of guessing, AFD recommends a simple three-step procedure:

. . . that saves you time and money

Advantages of AFD

THREE

TW

O

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Chemical Plant

Possible Explosion

Failure Prediction


S1

Scrubber

Small Gas Release

Vent line

Gas

release

Problem/system as stated by customer

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S1

Scrubber

Gas

release

Problem as reformulated by AFD specialist – find a worst case scenario


S1

Scrubber

Gas

release

Worst-case scenario: Explosion of the gasholder containing over 100 tons of pressurized liquid gas.

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S1 S2

Reactor

Real system

Resource for explosion: • Chemical reaction

• Pressure

S1 S2 + =

Inverted problem:

Find a way to bring two gases in contact initiating an explosion capable to destroy one or both gasholders

Extremely flammable


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Direct approach (FMEA, HAZOP. etc.)

What harm can happen?

Inverted approach (Ideation Failure Prediction)

What harm can we make?

Parameters (as resources)

Harm we want

to make

Methods of harm realization based on

available resources

System

Explosion

Fire

Environment pollution

Limited field of possible

resources for harm

System

Variants browsing,

looking for possible harm

Inexhaustible field of possible

resources' combinations

Operations or sub-systems

Comparison of Different Methods

for Failure Prediction

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Idea! …use

burning paper

How we invent failures – FP Operators



Idea! …the smoke

travels inside by itself


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Idea! …use the

ventilation system



We will not miss any valuable hypothesis –

SEOR Principle

Any impact observed in surrounding objects can be regarded as follows:

– Source provides an

– Effect, that is delivered to the

– Object, where a specific

– Result is created - condition or state of the Object.

EFFECT RESULT

SOURCE

OBJECT

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S

E

O

R

The System of 245 FP Operators


S

E

Selected Group of Operators

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O P E R A T O R S

S E O R

Idea… Idea…

Idea… Idea…

Idea… Idea…

Idea…

Idea…

Idea…

Idea…

Idea…

The system of AFD FP Checklists and Operator

One can not miss any valuable Failure Hypothesis



Failure Analysis

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Ideation Operating System for Innovation

Based on Ideation TRIZ (I-TRIZ) methodology

Inventive Problem Solving (IPS)


resolving tough technological

problems, enhancing system

parameters, improving quality, reducing cost, etc.

for current generations of products and technologies.


Failure Analysis


identifying the root causes of a failure or other undesired phenomenon in a system, and for

making corrections in a timely manner.

Failure Prediction


identifying beforehand, and

then preventing, all dangerous or

harmful events that might be associated

with a system.

Directed Evolution®

(DE)

A systematic procedure for strategically

evolving future generations of technological

systems.

Control of Intellectual Property


increasing IP value and providing

protection from infringement and circumvention.


THREE MAJOR STEPS:

1 - Invert the Problem

2 - Provide Failure Hypotheses

3 - Utilize Resources


utilizes a unique and effective method

that includes

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Step 1 - Invert the Problem

When the problem is inverted… … we take a pro-active approach

Let’s invent… failures!

? ?

How did it happen???

How can we make it happen!


Step 2 - Provide Failure Hypotheses

? ? How did it happen???

Area of poor information

How to make it happen:

Method of

production Method...

Method ...

Method...

Method ...

Method...

Method...

Area of rich information

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By inverting the problem, we turn the failure into a “neutral”

physical effect

Penicillin Mold


Invent the way to produce it

Identify all scientifically known natural ways of

providing it

Obtain information about methods of

producing the same phenomenon for

useful purposes

Using the advantages of the inversion, we can try three major approaches to “produce” the phenomenon in question:

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How did it happen???

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Step 3: Utilize Resources

For a failure or drawback to occur, all the necessary components of the failure mechanism must be present within the system or its environment as available resources.

Com

pon

en

t A

Com

pon

en

t B

Com

pon

en

t C

Resources:

•Surrounding fields (energy

resources)

•Realized or potential functions

•Existing relevant information

•Available substances

•Vacant space

•Time gaps (time resources)

Possible

root causes of the failure

Resource A

Resource C

Resource B


Failure Analysis: ‘Black dots’ on the helicopter blade

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A problem of 20 + years…$ 1 to 5 millions per year

Solution - in 1 hour

Implemented in 1 day

Root-cause – in the costumer jewelry:

Black patterns on aluminum surface

Silica

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Contributors to the AFD Development

Alla Zusman

Boris Zlotin

Vladimir Proseanic

Svetlana Visnepolschi

Genrich Altshuller

Voluslav Mitrofanov


1960 G. Altshuller “How Discoveries are Made – Classification of Discoveries

and Methods of their Achievement.”

1978 B. Zlotin invents Subversion Analysis.

1979 Development of the first version of Subversion Analysis for failure

analysis and failure prediction (B. Zlotin).

1985 Methods of Solving Scientific Problems based on the subversion

analysis approach (B. Zlotin, A. Zusman).

1991 Solving Scientific Problems (B. Zlotin, A. Zusman)

First non-technical application of the subversion analysis approach for

increasing the safety of the Moscow Commodity Exchange (B. Zlotin, V.

Proseanic, A. Zusman, S. Visnepolschi)

1993 The name Subversion Analysis is changed to Anticipatory Failure

Determination (AFD).

1995 First AFD software (S. Visnepolschi).

1998 IFA and IFP software

1999 New Tools for Failure and Risk Analysis. (Kaplan, S., Visnepolschi, S.,

Zlotin, B., Zusman, A.)

2009 How to Deal with Failures (The Smart Way) (S. Visnepolschi)

The origins of AFD

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AFD is compatible with HAZOP, Failure Mode Analysis, and Risk Assessment.

In many cases the wise approach – gradual implementation

Stage 1:

Selected checklists

How to incorporate AFD

into existing techniques


• Guided brainstorming, boost of creativity

• Strong support of creativity throughout brainstorming session

• Foresight into future systemic failures that are out of consideration with

conventional methods

• Can be done with limited AFD training or even without when facilitated by a

professional

Advantages of incorporating AFD

Stage 1:

To keep in mind:

• extended but incomplete variety of potential failures can be generated

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Stage 2 – basic approach:

? ? How did it happen???

How can we make it happen!



Stage 2:


• Strong support of creativity throughout brainstorming session



• Overcoming Denial

• Access to application of TRIZ tools

• Only basic AFD training is necessary

To keep in mind:

• no excessive set of potential threats can be obtained

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Stage 3 – Building cause-effect diagrams, applying Directions and Operators





Stage 2:

• Overcoming Denial


• Strong support of creativity with throughout brainstorming session



• Access to application of TRIZ tools

• Effective analysis of the system by using cause-effect diagramming

• Automatically provided representative variety of options to consider

• AFD training is recommended

To keep in mind:

• substantial variety of potential failures can be generated

• still, no excessive set of potential threats is guaranteed

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Stage 4 – Incorporating the entire process



Advantages:

Excessive set of potential threats can be found and prevented in reasonable

time-frame


AFD publications

Electronic books are available at:

- Amazon,

- Apple

- Barnes Noble stores

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Thank you

I-TRIZ Overview and Fundamentals - Ideation … 2010 Ideation International Inc. Ideation Operating...

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