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Victor D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in ClassicalGreece, Biblioteca di Studi Antichi 40 (Pisa: GiardiniEditori 1983). Pp. xii + 168: 1 table, 1 map.

If it were possible to poll the residents of classical Greece,to determine what they considered to be the most importantactivities in which they engaged during the course of anaverage year, war and farming would surely rank very high.The study of warfare has traditionally enjoyed an activefollowing among ancient historians, and the traditionalsubjects of military history - battle strategy and tactics, andbattlefield topography - are well represented in recentscholarly literature. Within the last twenty years or sohistorians interested in ancient warfare have expanded therange of the field of military history by treating other,seemingly more mundane, topics. French scholars,influenced by the seminal studies of Andre Aymard, haveled the way. In 1968 a collection of essays edited by J.-P.Vernant, Problemes de La guerre en Grece ancienne,presented a variety of approaches to the general question ofthe social context of warfare. Subsequently, books by Y.Garlan on poliorcetics (1974), E. Levy on the psychicimpact of the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War(1976), and R. Lonis on religion and war (1979) havedeepened our understanding of Greek warfare. I Notablecontributions by English-speaking scholars include W. K.Pritchett's three volumes on The Greek State at War and D.Engels' insightful analysis of Macedonian logistics. 2

In contrast to war, Greek agriculture has only recentlycome into its own as a subject of scholarly attention.Pioneering work by L.-Gernet (1909) and A. Jarde (1925)was not adequately followed up and consequently K. D.White's books on Roman farming have no Greek parallels. 3

This lacuna is now, h·owever, on its way to being filled. In1973 M. I. Finley edited a volume of essays on Problemes deLa terre en Grece ancienne, which helped to define some ofthe social aspects of Greek agriculture. In the next yearseminal articles by G. Audring and A. Andreyev cleared uplong-standing problems in Athenian agriculture. These

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studies can now be supplemented by detailed analyses ofmodern Greek peasant farming. Archaeologists areemploying the techniques of surface survey to define thechanging patterns of land use. 4

The time is right for studying the interrelationshipsbetween Greek agriculture and warfare. Victor Hanson'sexcellent study, the first book entirely devoted to the subject,demonstrates the great importance of an accurate assessmentof these interrelationships to our' understanding of the socialrealities of ancient Greek life, as well as to the politicalhistory of (for example) the Peloponnesian War.

The book is divided into three main parts. Part One dealswith attacks upon agricultural resources. Chapter 2 looks atthe vocabulary of agricultural devastation, delineating theshades of meaning of various terms which are oftentranslated simply as "to ravage." Hanson emphasizes theimportant distinction between ravaging and plundering, adistinction sometimes blurred by students of Greek war.Next comes a brief, but very sound chapter on militaryorganization, which stresses that the actual ravagers would,in most cases, be neither hoplites nor slaves, but light­armed troops. Part One concludes with a detailedconsideration of the actual means employed by Greek armiesin destroying grain, vines, and fruit (especially olive) trees.The great difficulties involved in permanently destroyingvines and trees are clearly demonstrated.

In Part Two Hanson turns to the means by whichagricultural populations responded to invasion as theyattempted to lessen the impact of ravaging. Chapter 5considers the generally ineffective use of field walls and theestablishment of garrisons and border fortresses. NextHanson studies evacuation of rural populaces, arguing thatevacuation in the face of the advancing enemy was the mostcommon recourse of the invaded state. A short chapter ondefensive sorties, a tactic which could often seriously limitthe effectiveness of ravaging, completes this section.

Part Three is a case study of ravaging In thePeloponnesian War, applying the results of the previouschapters to a particularly well-knovJn and well-documented

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Hanson: Warfare and Agriculture 93

case of agricultural devastation. Hanson concludes that thedetrimental effects of Peloponnesian ravaging, especially inthe long term, have been overstated by scholars whouncritically accepted comments by Thucydides andAristophanes regarding the devastation of Attica. Hanson'sconclusion (Chapter 9) is that the strategy of agriculturalravaging usually failed to severely impair the economicresources of the defenders, but nonetheless strategies basedupon ravaging remained common throughout the classicalperiod and into the Hellenistic era.

Hanson's book is not only timely, it is a definitive studyof the topic he has set himself. The effect of war onagriculture and hence upon the economy of the Greek statehas been briefly and superficially treated in a variety ofcontexts; Hanson's findings will require a thoroughreevaluation of theories on the origin of inter- and intrastateconflict and will necessi tate the reworking of descriptions ofthe social and economic conditions of Greek states(especially Athens) in the aftermath of major wars. Hanson'scare to separate the specific problem of agriculturaldestruction from other, related, problems (e.g. the generalpoverty of rural dwellers, 118) makes his work particularlyvaluable to scholars interested in agricultural devastation asa factor in socioeconomic change.

The book is thoroughly researched and shows both afamiliarity with and sensitivity for major and minor textsalike.. Particularly good is Hanson's discussion of theimportance of considering the chronology of Aristophanes'plays when adducing those plays as evidence for conditionsin Attica (117-20). Hanson notes that all references toagricultural devastation come from plays produced in theperiod after the devastations of the Archidamian war.Hence, Aristophanes' comments are evidence for the natureof Athenian memories of devastation (a topic interesting initself), but not for the reality of widespread and cripplingdes truction.

Hanson tends to take a synchronic view of Greek historyfrom the sixth through third century; this tendency mayobscure important changes in strategy and tactics. Hanson

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is aware of these changes, but the paucity of evidence leadshim to conflate examples from widely divergent periods andfrom various regions of Greece (in some of which the poliswas not the dominant form of political organization) andeven from Persia, which had a very different militarytradition. Occasionally he employs somewhat dubioussources, for example Pausanias on the Messenian wars (7).Although Hanson quite correctly notes that the actualincident described by Pausanias may not have occurred, heuses Pausanias' account as a "reflection of theoretical Greekattitudes toward ravaging." I would prefer to see it as anexample of late second century A.D. idealization of seventhcentury B.C. Spartans, which may have little to do withconditions of the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. Thespurious decree inserted in Demosthenes' On the Crown,describing evacuation of property in outlying districts torural fortresses, is questionable evidence for fourth-centurypractice. (95). Ps-Demades (cited on p. 97) should probablybe a,voided as a source for late fourth-century history andseen rather as an example of Hellenistic rhetoric.

Ha,nson is well read in modern military literature andfrequently uses modern parallels to illuminate ancientpractice. The use of modern parallels is a fine art; it is alltoo easy to fall into the trap of basing an argument onmodern attitudes or on practices derived from radicallydifferent historical circumstances (e.g. the theories, popularearlier in this century, of Greek trade based on eighteenthand nineteenth-century colonial economics). Hanson'scitations of modern parallels are a model of the art: alwayscautious and illustrative, rather than attempting to beprobative.

Hanson has an impressive grasp of the physicalconditions of ancient agriculture. While never sentimental­izing his subject, Hanson obviously empathizes with thefarmer faced with the destruction of his living. Hanson'sdiscussion of the organization of the Greek countryside (37­41) is the best short treatment of the subject I have seen. Hisown experience in working a family farm in Californiaallows Hanson to speak authoritatively on such subjects as

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Hanson: Warfare and Agriculture 95

the effect of burning on vines (57), and has given him anappreciation of various factors that contribute to success andfailure in farming. A case in point is his analysis (147) ofthe importance of intensive labor, as opposed to technology(and hence capital) in most Greek farming. The labor­intensive nature of Greek agriculture tended to renderancient farms less vulnerable to permanent .or long-termeffects of devastation than is the case in the modern world.

Hanson has a fine sense for the practical aspects ofancient military operations, especially on a tactical level.His treatment of the difficulties faced by soldiers attemptingto devastate agriculture is one of the most valuable parts ofthe book. Hanson suggests (34) that a carefully plannedcampaign could capture harvested grain which had beencollected in unprotected villages. Capture of a year's harvestwas obviously more advantageous to attackers than ravagingthe crop or preventing the harvest, since it profited theinvaders as well as harmed the defenders, by allowing theinvading army to stay in the field longer. Hanson's pointmust be taken seriously by those interested in thechronology of campaigns. The tactic would work bestagainst nearby enemies, who could more easily be taken bysurprise and whose agricultural calendar (which would varyfrom year to year according to local weather conditions)would be better known to the attackers.

Although Hanson's major concerns are, on the one hand,the tactics of ravaging, and on the other, the economiceffects of ravaging upon the invaded, the reasons for the

.popularity of an offensive strategy based on agriculturaldevastation might have been examined in greater detail.Hanson demonstrates that ravaging was difficult and thatpermanent economic ruin seldom resulted. It is thereforeinitially difficult to explain why Greek generals continuedto ravage enemy farms. Hanson is, I believe, quite correctto suggest (149) that the end sought by the ravagers was tobring the enemy into the field to fight. But the hypothesisthat panic on the part of farmers, each of whom feared thathis farm would be badly damaged, does not seem to me toexplain adequately the phenomenon of defenders marching

96 HELlOS Josiah Ober

out to stop what they must have known from experiencewould be minimal harm to agricultural regions.

Works such as Lonis' Guerre et religion (cited above),which deal with the ritualistic nature of Greek warfare,might have been fruitfully consulted. If we assume that inearlier Greek warfare (before the Peloponnesian War) thedestruction of agriculture was intended as a ritual challengeto battle, an insult that threatened the honor of the invadedstate, rather than the grain of a few farmers, we mayconclude that the efficiency or inefficiency of ravaging as amode of economic disruption was immaterial. So long asboth sides played the game by the rules, and ritualchallenges were met by the appropriate response, there neednot have been a rational strategy involved at all.

The situation was rather different after the first years ofthe Peloponnesian War. When the Athenians refused tofight in the field, the Spartans were forced to develop agenuine strategy to defeat them. Offensive fortification(epiteichismos) was one strategic response to the problem ofan enemy who refused to "fight fair." Hence, it does notseem completely accurate to say (28) that epiteichismos "didnot involve" the traditional strategy of agriculturaldevastation, rather it was an attempt to make the "ritual"threat of the traditional strategy into an actual threat, a wayto make the traditional strategy work. Hanson is no doubtcorrect to assume that the garrison at Decelea could notravage all of Attica, but Thucydides (7.27) makes it quiteclear that most Athenians no longer had use of their farms,and loss of access was certainly as serious in the short termas ravaged land. And the short run is what the Spartanswere interested in; after all they aimed at winning a war,not at permanently ruining an economy.

Hanson's exclusive emphasis on agricultural destruction,while useful in may ways, may lead one to underestimatethe originality of fourth-century generals who used ravagingalong with plundering in order to exert economic pressureon the enemy. The combined effect of ravaging andplundering is noted (16 and 31, note 23), but as anaccidental concurrence, rather than as part of a concerted

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strategy of' economic coercion. My assessment of Agesilaus'campaign in Asia Minor differs from Hanson's (150), in thatI would argue that Agesilaus used ravaging and plunderingto pressure the satraps into joining his side against theGreat King. This strategy worked quite well until theCorinthian War forced Agesilaus' recall by the Spartans.Agesilaus may have overlooked the Great King's diplomaticand economic clout, but his failure in Asia was not due tostrategic backwardness. 5

Turning from attack to defense, I am in substantialagreement with Hanson's discussion of the use offortifications for the defense of agricultural areas. Hansondiscusses at some length (75-78) the fifth-century defensive"system" of Attica; however, I do not believe that a coherentsystem of frontier defense existed in the fifth century. Hence,I would replace Hanson's comment (77) that the forts were"not able" to stop the enemy in the Peloponnesian Warwith "never intended" to stop the enemy. It was not untilthe fourth century that a genuine preclusive frontier defensesystem was established. 6

Hanson's discussion of the role of forts during theDecelean War (135) is rather speculative. The existence oflate fifth-century forts at Rhamnous and Anaphlystos isconjectural, although I agree there probably was one atRhamnous, at least. But other forts had been lost. Panaktonprobably was not refortified. Oinoe and Oropos were lost by410. After that year, the only documented garrisons were atSounion, Thorikos and Eleusis. The two former garrisonswere in demes which were primarily industrial, rather thanagricultural (although farms certainly existed in both areas).Eleusis lay on the route taken by the Peloponnesianreinforcements on their way to and from Decelea; theEleusinian plain was probably the most ravaged part ofAttica as a consequence. It seems to me unwise toextrapolate too much about the role of Decelean War fortsin protecting agriculture from these three garrisons.

A few minor points. From Hanson's list of fourth-centuryborder fortifications of Attica (83) delete Leipsydrion andPalaiochora. These sites are not datable and are unlikely to

98 HELlOS Josiah Ober

have been part of the fourth-century defensive system.Hanson's range of suggested dates for the Dema wall (70)might be extended back considerably. S. Dow suggested thelate sixth century and L. Chandler the period of Atheniansynoecism. Hanson is correct in stating that the Dema wallwas not a border defense; I would suggest that it was builtafter Philip of Macedon's improvements in siegecraft hadrendered Athens' relatively small border garrisons vulnerableto attack. 7 The figure 10-14 ll1eters (p. 61) for the originalheight of farm towers seems too high for buildings withrubble socles and mud-brick superstructures. The 10-14meter figure is based on a false analogy with well-preservedfreestanding towers constructed of massive ashlar masonry(e.g. towers "C" and "F" in the Megarian Vathychoria andthe great Mazi tower in northern Attica). I would argue,incidentally, that these massively built towers servedmilitary purposes; the current tendency to consider allfreestanding towers agricultural is as counterproductive asthe previous tendency to see all towers as military. In anyevent, the original height of rubble towers cannot beprojected by analogy to ashlar towers. 8

Perhaps Hanson's most controversial arguments concernthe degree of damage done to Athenian resources during thePeloponnesian War. This is an important problem, sincethe condition of Attica after the war, and the rate ofrecovery (assuming recovery occurred) must be taken intoconsideration in assessing the problems faced by theAthenians in the fourth century. Clearly, the long-termeffects of the damage wrought during the war have oftenbeen overestimated. In recent years many scholars haverejected the old argument that in the fourth century mostAttic land was concentrated in the hands of capitalisticspeculators who bought out ruined farmers and replacedgrain with cash crops.9 Hanson's discussion of the limiteddamage done during the war helps to explain why thereneed not have been any major postwar change in theorganization of the countryside.

Hanson's eagerness to demonstrate lack of long-termdamage may have led him on occasion to minimize the

Hanson: Warfare and Agriculture 99

short-term damage done by the war, however. Hanson'sargument (135) that, since the Boeotians took wood fromAttic farms (Hell. Oxy. 12.5), ren10vable farmhouse wood­work must have been replaced after 425 and notsubsequently reevacuated, and hence that the farmers didnot fear the Decelea garrison, is an example. During theDecelean War the Boeotians sent rooftiles taken fromAthenian farms back to Boeotia. As Hanson points out (92)this was an exceptional activity, since rooftiles were cheapand heavy. This being the case, there is no need to assumethat the wood taken in the Decelean War consisted of theeasily removed parts (e.g. doors) that had been evacuated inthe face of the first invasion. Rather, we may guess that theBoeotians took the heavy structural timbers: framingmembers, doorposts, and columns. Although Hanson hasquite rightly shown that Thucydides' comments on "totaldevastation" during the Archidamian War are overdrawn,one need not dismiss Thucydides' and the OxyrhynchusHistorian's statements on the comparatively large amount ofdamage done during the Decelean War, as long as one keepsin mind that the damage to agricultural areas was notpermanent.

The map on page 138 must be used with care. It indicatesgeneral areas for which there is Ii terary evidence of someagricultural activity during or shortly after the DeceleanWar. Thus it simultaneously represents lack of effectiveprevention of farming and lack of long-term damage toagriculture. The map gives an impressionistic idea of thelimits of damage done by agricultural devastation, andshould be consulted accordingly.lo

In sum, this book should become a standard in the fieldand will be consulted by all serious students of classicalGreek warfare. It makes a major contribution to ourunderstanding of Greek agriculture. The main thesis isimportant to anyone concerned with postwar Greekeconomies. Furthermore, Hanson's vigorous, engaging andstraightforward style makes his book a pleasure to read.

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NOTES

I. Problemes de la guerre en Grece ancienne, ed. J-P. Vernant, EcolePractique des Hautes Etudes - Sorbonne, Sixieme Section: SciencesEconomiques et Sociales. Centre de Recherches Historique. Civilisations etSocietes II (Paris and l~he Hague: 1968). Aymard's articles on ancient warmay be conveniently consulted in his collected essays: Etudes d Jhistoireancienne, Publications de la Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines deParis-Sorbonne, Serie "Etudes et Methodes," 16 (Paris: 1967). Y. Garlan,Recherches de polioroetique grecque, BEFAR, 223 (Paris: 1974); E. Levy,Athenes devant la defaite de 404, BEFAR, 225, (Paris: 1976); R. Lonis,Guerre et religion en Grece a l'epoque classique, Recherches sur les rites,les dieux, l'ideologie de la victoire, Centre de Recherches d'HistoireAncienne, 33 = Annales Litteraires de l'Universite de Besanc;on, 238 (Paris:1979).

2. W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, 3 vols. (Berkeley and LosAngeles: University of California Press, 1974-79); D. W. Engels, Alexanderthe Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley and LosAngeles: lJniversity of California Press, 1978).

3. L. Gernet, LJapprovisionnement dJAthenes en ble au V et au IVsiecle, Universite de Paris, Bibliotheque de la Faculte des Lettres 25.3(Paris: 1909); A. Jarde, Les cereales dans l'antiquite grecque, BEFAR, 52(Paris: 1925); K. D. White, Roman Farming (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 1970).

4. Problemes de la terre en Grece ancienne, ed. M. I. Finley, EcolePractique des Hautes Etudes - Sorbonne, Sixieme Section: SciencesEconomiques et Sociales. Centre de Recherches Historique. Civilisations etSocietes, 33 (Paris and The Hague: 1973); A. Andreyev, "Some Aspects ofAgrarian Conditions in Attica in the Fifth to Third Centuries B.C. ,"Eirene, 12 (1974), 5-46 (a summary of articles written in Russian); G.Audring, "Uber Grundeigentum und Landwirtschaft in der athenischenPolis," in Hellenische Poleis, ed. E. C. Welkopf, 4 vols. (Berlin: 1974), I,pp. 108-31. Major studies of peasant farming include L. G.Allbaugh,Crete: A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area (Princeton, N.J: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1953), 242-86; H. A. Forbes, Strategies and Soils:Technology, Production, and Environment in the Peninsula of Methana,Greece, Diss. University of Pennsylvania, 1982. Archaeological surveys: H.J Van Wersch, "The Agricultural Economy," in The Minnesota MesseniaExpedition: Reconstructing a Bronze Age Regional Environment, eds. W.A. McDonald and G. R. Rapp (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1972), 177-87; M. H. Munn, "A Late Classical Rural SettlementPhenomenon in the Southern Argolid, Greece," Archaeological Institute ofAmerica Conference, Toronto, 29 December 1984.

5. For a survey of the literature on this campaign, see C. D. Hamilton,"The Generalship of King Agesilaus of Sparta," Ancient World, 8 (1983),119-27.

6. See J Ober, Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier,404-322 B.C., Mnemosyne Supplement, 84 (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1985), 192­95.

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7. S. Dow, "The Aigaleos-Parnes Wall," Hesperia, II (1942), 193-211; L.Chandler, "The North-West Frontier of Attica," ] ournal of HellenicStudies, 46 (1926),19,21; Ober, ibid., 150.

8. The "demilitarization" of freestanding towers was initiated by ]. H.Young, "Studies in South Attica: Country Estates at Sounion," Hesperia,25 (1956), 122-46; cf. M. H. Munn's paper, "Watchtowers, Blockhouses, andFarmsteads: A Preliminary Typology of Isolated Structures in the GreekCountryside," abstracted in A]A, 86 (1982), 278. I argued against this trendin a paper on "Fenestrated Catapult Towers in Attica and the Megarid,"abstracted in A]A, 88 (1984), 254. A similar overestimate of tower heightsis made by ]. E. Jones et aI., "To Dema: A Survey of the Aigaleos-ParnesWall," BSA, 52 (1957), 174 with note 52, who suggest that the originalheights of two relatively crudely constructed towers near the Dema wallcould have been as high as 15-20 meters.

9. See, for example, G. Audring, "Grenzen der Konzentration vonGrundeigentum und Landwirtschaft in Attika wahrend des 4. Jh. v. u.Z.,"Klio, 56 (1974),445-56.

10. The map scale, printed as 1:50,000, is incorrect. The scale is actuallyabout 1:500,000.

OHIO CLASSICAL CONFERENCECALL FOR PAPERS

The annual meeting of the Ohio Classical Conference willbe held in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 30-November 1,1986. Proposals for papers are invited from teachers ofClassics at the college, university, secondary and elementaryschool level. Proposals may be submitted on all aspects andauthors of Classical Antiquity. Specific sessions of theConference will be devoted to the following areas ofinquiry: (1) Cicero and Caesar (2) Latin Pedagogy at alllevels (3) The Classical Influence of the AmericanConstitution (4) Classical Art and Archaeology (5) ClassicalLiterature and Myth. Suggestions for panels, colloquia orsymposia are warmly encouraged. Abstracts of 300-400 wordsshould be sent to:

Robert Kelsch, PresidentThe Ohio Classical Conference1004 Crescentville Rd.,Cincinnati, Ohio 45246

Please submit abstracts (or proposals for panels on specialtopics) as soon as possible, but no later than May 15th,1986.