Hypothetical Military CONOPs for Wireless Sensor Networks · for Wireless Sensor Networks Sensor...
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Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work David A. Stuart, Raytheon IDS, Portsmouth, Rhode Island Portsmouth, RI - (401) 842-3956 - [email protected] Presentation to the NDIA 9th Annual Systems Engineering Conference, San Diego, CA, October 26, 2006 Hypothetical Hypothetical Military Military CONOPs CONOPs for Wireless for Wireless Sensor Sensor Networks Networks Sensor Embedded in the Round 84 mm
Transcript of Hypothetical Military CONOPs for Wireless Sensor Networks · for Wireless Sensor Networks Sensor...
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
David A. Stuart, Raytheon IDS, Portsmouth, Rhode IslandPortsmouth, RI - (401) 842-3956 - [email protected]
Presentation to the NDIA 9th Annual Systems Engineering Conference,
San Diego, CA, October 26, 2006
Hypothetical Hypothetical Military Military CONOPsCONOPs
for Wireless for Wireless Sensor Sensor
NetworksNetworks
Sensor Embedded in the Round
84 mm
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
What are “Ubiquitous Wireless Sensor Nets?”
A Network of hundreds, thousands, or millions of micro-scale or nano-scale devices used to instrument some physical space…– Machinery Instrumentation– Habitat Monitoring– Inventory and Asset Tracking– Battlefield– Perimeter Surveillance
Features of Sensor Nets– Power Plant (Generation, Scavenging and Storage) – Detectors (CBRN, Acoustic, SIGINT, EO/IR, etc.)– Computational Layer– At least one communications medium– Camouflage– Efficient software functions primarily concerned with
communications and resource management
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Whose doing what?
Berkeley
Berkeley
(Pister, H
ollar, Culler
et al)
(Pister, H
ollar, Culler
et al)
MITMIT
(Teller e
t al)
(Teller e
t al) UCLA
UCLA (Estrin, et al)
(Estrin, et al)Cornell
Cornell
(Zhou, Haas, Yao et al
(Zhou, Haas, Yao et al))
USC, Harvard, Rutgers, UVA, URI,USC, Harvard, Rutgers, UVA, URI,dozens or hundreds of Universitiesdozens or hundreds of Universities
Device DesignDevice Design
Routing ProtocolsRouting Protocols
Energy Management & ScavengingEnergy Management & Scavenging
Query ProcessingQuery Processing
Security & EncryptionSecurity & Encryption
Pattern RecognitionPattern Recognition
QoSQoS
2D & 3D Self Localization2D & 3D Self Localization
What are they doing?
Signal DisambiguationSignal Disambiguation
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
What’s the problem with the market?
No Standard for judging/measuring the suitability of a particular solution– Mission Life– Sense Modalities– Intranet and Internet Communications– Efficiencies– Latencies between detection and comms– Security/Encryption– Method of deployment– Form factor– Disposability
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Sound Familiar?
In the 1980s, this was the case with Database Software Offerings…– Which was best?– What kinds of tasks were “typical?”– Were Updates, Deletes, Inserts or Queries the activity that
drove acquisition decisions?Transaction Processing Council Benchmarks– Designed to provide standard, typical transactions designed
to assist in evaluating software and system performance– TPC-A (OLTP Update Intensive DB Transactions)– TPC-B (non-OLTP, DB Performance Stress Testing)– TPC-C (OLTP, complex, concurrent DB transactions)– Others
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Proposal
Create an “Industry Standard”
portfolio of military and commercial“Missions”
that isolate the problem spaces solvableby UWSNs!
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
A Typical UWSN Ground Deployment – Al Qa Qaa LONG TERM CONOP
Credit: GlobalSecurity.org / DigitalGlobeCopyright ©, DigitalGlobe, All Rights Reserved, Image used with the permission for this presentation only.
Weeks/Months, not Weeks/Months, not years!years!Not Mission CriticalNot Mission CriticalDeploy and ForgetDeploy and ForgetLow MortalityLow MortalityLow Sample RateLow Sample RateCourseCourse--grained grained InterrogationInterrogationModerate DensityModerate DensityLarge AreaLarge AreaSimple SensorsSimple Sensors
AcousticAcousticEOEOMeteorologicalMeteorological
Larger Form Factor Larger Form Factor is OKAY!is OKAY!Solar Power is Solar Power is OKAY!OKAY!Routing is easierRouting is easierISM Band is OKAY!ISM Band is OKAY!Video/Photo is Video/Photo is ReasonableReasonableCOTS is OKAY!COTS is OKAY!Base stations Base stations –– No No Problem!Problem!
Deploy in surveyed zones…
Deploy in debris fields…
Deploy enroute…
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
RadRadRadRad
PiezoPiezoIntranet Comms
Intranet Comms
BioBio
Fixed Base StationFixed Base Station
Notional System Block Diagram
Intranet Comms
Intranet Comms
EO /IREO /IR
ChemChemPiezoPiezo
BioBio
EO /IREO /IR
ChemChem
Mote Mote
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
A Typical UWSN Ground Deployment – Fallujah MEDIUM TERM CONOP
Credit: GlobalSecurity.org / DigitalGlobe, Copyright © DigitalGlobeAll Rights Reserved, Image used with the permission for this presentation only.
Days/Weeks, not Days/Weeks, not months!months!Mission EssentialMission EssentialModerate MortalityModerate MortalityDeploy and InteractDeploy and InteractMedium to High Medium to High Sample RatesSample RatesMediumMedium--grain grain InterrogationInterrogationModerate DensityModerate DensitySmaller AreaSmaller AreaVariety of SensorsVariety of Sensors
Some Some QoSQoSSome EncryptionSome EncryptionSmaller Form FactorSmaller Form FactorSmaller batteriesSmaller batteriesControlled Controlled RechargingRecharging
HPM?HPM?Laser?Laser?
Base stations Base stations problematic but problematic but selectively okay!selectively okay!
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
~ 828 meters
~ 54
0 m
eter
sDefense of the Haj Musheen Abdul Aziz Az-Kubaysi Mosque - Fallujah
Battlefield
Major Artery Enemy Retreat Path
Indirect Approaches
Direct Approaches
Rooftop Sniper& Ambush Positions
Front Lines
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Sigint Motes
CBRN
EO
Legend
Acoustic
~27,000 Infrastructure Motes Mobile C2
Mobile Base Station
(Humvee)
Mobile C2
~ 828 meters
~ 54
0 m
eter
s ~ 3,000 Sigint Motes
Mobile Base Station
(Soldier)
~ 9,000 Acoustic Motes
~ 4,000 EO Motes
~ 5,000 Chem/Bio Motes
Avg Mote Density = 6 per 100 m2
Click to Advance
Defense of the Haj Musheen Abdul Aziz Az-Kubaysi Mosque - Fallujah
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
PiezoPiezo InfrastructureMotes
InfrastructureMotes
BioBio
RadRad
Mobile Base StationMobile Base Station
Notional System Block Diagram
InfrastructureMotes
InfrastructureMotes
EO /IREO /IR ChemChem
PiezoPiezo
BioBio
RadRad
EO /IREO /IR
ChemChem
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
A Typical UWSN Ground Deployment – Mosque SHORT TERM CONOP
Image used with the permission of GlobalSecurity.org / DigitalGlobe, for this presentation only.
Minutes/Hours, not Minutes/Hours, not Days!Days!Mission CriticalMission CriticalDeploy and InteractDeploy and InteractHigh Sample RatesHigh Sample RatesHigh MortalityHigh MortalityDifficult Difficult CommsCommsHigh DensityHigh DensitySmall AreaSmall AreaComplex SensorsComplex SensorsQoSQoS & Redundancy& RedundancyPossible EncryptionPossible EncryptionIndividual Individual SitAwareSitAwareInclusive NetworkingInclusive Networking
No rechargingNo rechargingSufficient, not optimalSufficient, not optimalBrute force routing okBrute force routing okShort battery lifeShort battery lifeNo encryptionNo encryptionNo antiNo anti--jammingjammingQoSQoS EssentialEssentialAd Hoc redeploymentAd Hoc redeploymentNetworking optionalNetworking optionalNo autonomous base No autonomous base stationstation
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
14
3
9 410
7
68
13
115 12
13
2 1614
17
15
Danger!
Danger!
Infrastructure Mote
Crosshair Mote
Dismounted Mobile Basew/HUD
750 m2 blast zone destroys ~ 45 motes
30 meters
65 meters
Infrastructure Motes orWarfighters
50 Crosshair Motes
New routing plan
Defense of the Haj Musheen Abdul Aziz Az-Kubaysi Mosque - Fallujah
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
PiezoPiezo
BioBio
RadRadMobile Base Station
(War Fighter)
Mobile Base Station
(War Fighter)
Notional System Block Diagram
EO /IREO /IR ChemChem
PiezoPiezo
BioBio
RadRad
EO /IREO /IR
ChemChem
Mobile Base Station
(Warfighter)
Mobile Base Station
(Warfighter)
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Sensor Embedded in the Round
84 mm
Myriad Form Factors!
Aerial Deployment
DeceptionPlenty of Configurations
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Summary and RecommendationConclusions– 3 Different Missions require 3 different approaches to UWSNs.– Missions for surface, subsurface, space, mountainous terrain, caves
and other possible battlefields are required– Scientists and Engineers always produce better product when they
understand the problem they’re trying to solve!Recommendations to Academia, Industry & Government– Mission profiles should NOT specify the solution
Just the mission objectiveThe Nuances of the battlefieldThe requirements for Situational Awareness/Understanding by warfighters & commanders
– Mission profiles should be modeled (simulated), published, and continuously improved or refined in order to present…
The most realistic set of requirementsThe probability spaces of mission variablesMissions that change dramatically before completionPost mortem mission activities (cleanup)
Copyright 2006 -- Raytheon Company, An Unpublished Work
Thanks!
