Husserl on memory

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HUSSERL ON MEMORY

Author(s): John B. BroughSource: The Monist, Vol. 59, No. 1, The Philosophy of Husserl (JANUARY, 1975), pp. 40-62Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902403Accessed: 26-06-2015 08:40 UTC

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HUSSERL ON

MEMORY

"Time

is,

time

was,

time

is

past."

Memory

recaptures

time

past.

Edmund

Husserl devoted

some

of

his

most

interesting

and

challenging,

as

well

as

neglected, analyses to the

phenomenon

of memory. Husserl argued that

every

act

of

consciousness is

intentional,

that

is,

directed towards

an

object,

and

memory?the

consciousness of what is

past?is

no

exception

to

this

rule.

Our

main

concern

in

this

essay

will

be

with

Husserl's

understanding

of

memory's

"constitution":

specifically,

with

the

way

in which

memory

intends

its

object

and

with

the

manner

in which

its

object appears.

Husserl

devoted

no

single

work

to

memory.

The

fundamental elements

of

his

theory

are

found

scattered

throughout

Volume

X

in

the Husserliana

series

1

and

to

a

lesser

extent

in

Volume

XI,2

although

brief

references

to

memory

occur

in

most

of

his

writings.

Our

study

will

be

based

mainly

on

the

two

mentioned

texts,

especially

on

Volume

X.3

I.

Memory

and

Its

Object:

Preliminary

Considerations

Although

the

heart

of

Husserl's

theory

of

memory

is

his account of

the

constitution

or

structure

of

memory's

intentionality,

the

understanding

of

that

account

presupposes

some

appreciation

of

the

way

in

which

memory

and

its

object

are

situated with

respect

to

time.

We

therefore

briefly

trace

in

this

section, first,

the

main

outlines

of

Husserl's

description

of

the

temporal

determinations

of

memory

and

memory's

object

and

second,

memory's status as present experienced act.

A.

Memory,

Its

Object,

and

Temporal

Determinations

The

obvious feature

of

the

temporality

of

memory

and

its

object

is

a

difference

in

time-determination.

The

memory

I

am

now

living

through

is

present;

its

object

is

past.

".

.

.

In

memory

we

stand

in

the

Now,

in

the

object

of

memory

we

stand in

the

past

Now.

.

."

4

(202).

The

memory

I

now

have of

an

express

train

thundering

into the

station is

actually

present,

as

much

so

as

the

perception

I

now

enjoy

of

the

paper

in

front

of

me.

But the

train

thundering up

is

not

yet

another

inhabitant of

that

present.It

stands

forth

as

past.

Here

memory

and

perception

differ

fundamentally.

Perception

too

is

a

present

act,

but

its

object

is

present,

not

past:

"Percep






HUSSERL ON MEMORY 41

t?on

gives

the

Now,

memory

the

past.

.

."

(185).

In terms

of

simultaneity,

perception

and

its

object

are

simultaneous while

"memory

and what

is

remembered

appear

as

not

simultaneous.

.

."

(288).

Even in those

passages

in

which

Husserl

may

speak

of

a

"Now"

or

"present"

given

in

memory,

this

present,

as

we

shall

see,

is

an

earlier

Now,

not

an

actual

Now

as

the

present

of

perception

is.

Memory,

then,

is

a

present

act

whose

object appears

as

past.

But

what

according

to

Husserl is

the

sense

of

this

"past"?

Its

most

elementary

in

gredient

is a certain conflictwith theNow. "A is

past

means

evidently,

it

is

not

now,

it

is

not

present"

(403).

Yet

while

present

and

past evidently

exclude

one

another,

they

just

as

clearly

are

bound

together

tightly

in

a

relationship

possessed

of

two

interconnected

aspects.

To

begin

with,

the

object

of

memory

appears

not

simply

as

past

but

as

having

been

present

(59).

Although

what

I

remember?the

past?is

not

an

actual

Now,

it

"was

a

Now"

(367).

Something

cannot

be

past

which

has

not

been

present.

What is

past,

therefore,

carries the

sense

of

what

is "no

longer

present"

(408),

the

sense

of

being

represented

"in

an

earlier Now"

(182).

But

in

relation

to

what is

this remembered Now

an

earlier one? With this

question

we

meet

the

second

aspect

of

the

relativity

of

past

and

present.

The

point

of

reference

is

the

actual

present

and what

is

remembered

appears

as

earlier

or as

shoved

back

in

relation

to

it

(180).

In

my

memory

the

blast

of

the

train's

horn,

once

perceptually

present,

is

given

a

more or

less

definite

position

"with

respect

to

the

actual

Now

and

the

sphere

of the

original

temporal

field,

to

which the

recollection

itself

belongs"

(51).

Another

dimension

of

the

sense

of

the

remembered

past,

then,

is

its

being

situated

or

sunk

back

in

relation

to

the

actual

present.

Husserl observes that the reference of

what

is

remembered

to

the

actual

Now has its analogue in the reference of what is perceived to an actual

here

(105). Just

as

the

external

object

is

always

perceived

from

the

"zero"

point

of

some

"here"

or

another,

so

the

remembered

object

is

viewed

from

the

perspective

of

my

actual

present.

While

Husserl

himself

does

not

ex

plicitly

make the

point,

it would

seem

that

memory

and

perception

as

oriented

forms of

consciousness

differ

in

that

memory's

point

of

orientation

ceaselessly

changes

while

perception's

may

or

may

not

vary.

The

reason

is

that the

actually

present

time "is

continually

in

flux"

and

thus

is

"always

oriented

from

a new

Now"

(108).

What is

Now

becomes

past

in the

next

moment,

and

what is

already past

becomes further

past.

The

re

membered

past,

which

necessarily appears

as

something

sunk

back

in rela

tion

to

the

Now,

also

reveals itself

as

something

which

"

'sinks further

and






42 JOHN . BROUGH

further

into

the

past'

"

(313)

relative

to

the

always

new

Now.

The modes

of

the

past

in

which

the

remembered

object

appears

will therefore

change

continuously,

although

the

object

itself,

apart

from

the

changing

mode of

temporal

orientation,

will remain the

same

(25).

I

may

enjoy

many

memories

at

many

different times

of

the

conductor,

watch

in

hand,

shouting

"All

aboard ,"

and

in

each

of those

memories

the

same

object

will be

given

in

a

different

mode of

the

past

relative

to

the

protean

Now.5

That

past

and

present,

the remembered

object

and the actual

Now,

are related in the

ways

described accounts for one of the

presuppositions

of

memory,

which

may

be

summarized under

the

term

"distance."

The

elapsed

present

which

appears

in

memory,

Husserl

writes,

"has

a

distance

from the

present

of the actual Now"

(58).

If that distance

were

absent,

what

is

remembered

would be

given

as

Now,

and

memory

would

cease

to

be

itself

and

collapse

into

perception

(316).

Put

another

way,

if

relation

between

past

and

present

vanished

for

my

remembering

consciousness,

if

I

gave

myself

to

the

past

with

such abandon

that

I

forgot

the

present

entirely,

then,

Husserl

argues,

"this

would

no

longer

be

memory,

rather

an

(hallucinatory) perception

of what

is

past,

but

not

as

past " (182).

The

past

would

relinquish

its

sense,

and

memory

would become

impossible,

if

the tension between

past

and

present

were

relaxed

or

if their

relational

bonds

were

snapped.

We have discussed

Husserl's

contentions

that

memory

is

present

and

its

object

past,

that

the

object

appears

in

memory

as

having

been

present,

and

that

it is

past

in

relation

to

the

actual Now. None

of these claims

would

make

sense

if

memory

and

its

object

did

not

belong

to

the

same

unity

of time. To

take

one

case,

how

could

what

is

remembered

appear

as

set

in

relation

to

the

actual Now

if

the

two

were

not

equally

citizens of

a

common temporal world? And if Husserl claims thatNow and past ex

clude

one

another,

the

exclusiveness

would

imply

a

single

temporal

frame

work

in

which the

two

could

not

occupy

the

same

position

and still

be

themselves.

Accordingly,

Husserl

writes,

"there

is

no

reproduced

Now

that

could

be

posited

and would

not

have

actuality

in

the

unity

of

time

to

which

theactual

Now

belongs"

(302).

With

the theme

of the

reproduced

and

actual

Nows'

occupation

of

the

same

unity

of

time,

we uncover

still

another

condition of

memory's

possibility.

What is

remembered

was

once

present

in

the

same

unity

of

time

in

which the

memory

is

now

actual.6 To cast

the

matter

in

egological

form,

what is

remembered is

an

elapsed position

of

my

own

life,

recaptured

through

its

actually present

portion.







Much remains

to

be said about

the

way

in

which

memory's

object

appears,

and

how

its

mode

of

givenness

differs

from

that of the

perceived

object.

The

express

train,

after

all,

is

not

given

to

me

in the

same

way

in

memory

and in

perception.

But the further discussion

of

these

matters

is better

postponed

until

more

has

been

said

about

memory's

intentionality

in

later

sections.

B.

Memoras

Status

as

Present

Experienced

Act

Through

memory,

a

present

act,

we are

conscious

of

something

as

past.

But

through

what

are we

conscious

of

the

memory

as

actually

present?

Surely

not

through

another

memory

or

through

external

perception.

The

answer

rests

in

Husserl's contention

that

memory

is

an

immanent

temporal

object,

a

unity

constituted

in immanent

time

through

what he

calls

"the

absolute

time-constituting

flow

of consciousness"

(73).

We will

examine

that

contention

briefly

in

this section.

Every

experience

{Erlebnis)

or

act

of

consciousness,

Husserl

insists,

is

consciousness

of

something,

"but

every

experience

is

itself

experienced

(erlebt), and thus also 'known' (betvusst)" (291). Husserl's point is that

consciousness

is

always

implicitly

self-consciousness:

while

perceiving

an

event

we

are aware

of

our

perceiving

it,

and

while

remembering

we

are

conscious

that

we

are

remembering.

To

be

sure,

in

ordinary

non-reflective

experience,

we

are

not

conscious

of

the act

and of its

object

in

the

same

way.

The

object,

e.g.,

the remembered

dining

car

on

the

train,

is

intended

in

the

"pregnant"

sense

of

the

term

(289),

that

is,

"posited" (gesetzt)

(126),

intended

thematically.

By

comparison,

the

awareness we

enjoy

of

the

act

is

implicit

and

marginal,

but

nonetheless

there.

The

acts

which

we

experience,

including

memory,

are

obviously

not

empirical

objects

inhabiting

the world of

dining

cars and

express

trains.

They

are

rather

immanent

to

consciousness

and

accordingly

Husserl calls

them "immanent"

objects (96)

or

"unities

of

inner

consciousness"

(51)

or

"'immanent'

temporal

unities"

(292).

They

are

legitimately

termed

"temporal"

because

they

possess

the

appropriate

characteristics:

they

have

a

duration

and

position

in

time,

and

run

off

in

a

succession

of

phases.

"Every

experience,"

Husserl

writes,

"is

given

as

something

enduring,

flowing,

changing

in

various

ways"

(127).

Time,

then,

is

the

"irreducible

form" of

both

immanent

and transcendent

realities

(274),

but

the

time in

which the

act

of

memory

is

experienced

as

present

is

inner

or

"immanent

time"

(292),

not

the

time of

transcendant

objects.

While the train

rushing

into the

station

was an

event

in

the

world's

objective

time,

the

memory

of

it is

a

unity

in






44

JOHN

.

BROUGH

the immanent

time

of

consciousness. The

two

times and

their

objects

are

intentionally

related,

however.

Events

in

the

world's

time

are

brought

to

presence

through

the

intentional

experiences

which unfold in

inner time.7

To

complete

the

account

of

memory's

status

as

present

experienced

act

we

must

inquire

into the

consciousness?the

experiencing?through

which

memory

as

immanent

unity

is

constituted. Insofar

as

memory

makes

us

aware

of

the

past,

it

may

be

called

a

time-constituting

consciousness

(51).

But

insofar

as

memory

itself

is

experienced

as

present

in inner

time,

it

toowill be the correlate of a time-constituting consciousness. This conscious

ness?immanent

even

with

respect

to

the

immanent time and

objects

it

constitutes8?is

the

"absolute

time-constituting

flow

of

consciousness"

(73).

Without

exception,

Husserl

writes,

the

events

of conscious

life?sensations,

wishes,

perceptions,

memories,

and

so

on?belong

to

"the

layer

of

imma

nent

'contents',

whose constitution

is

the achievement of the

absolute

flow

of

consciousness"

(83).9

That the

act

of

memory

is

experienced

as

present

we

owe

to

this ultimate

stratum

of

time-consciousness.

Although

a

thorough

discussion

of

the

way

in

which the

absolute

con

sciousness

constitutes immanent unities

cannot

be

undertaken

here,

certain

important

features will be

mentioned,

especially

those which will

be

in

volved

in

the

later

discussion of

memory's

intentionality.

The ultimate

time-constituting

consciousness

may

be

viewed

as

a

flowing

succession

of

interrelated

phases

or

segments,

one

of which

will

be

actual

while others

will

have

elapsed

or

not

yet

arrived. Each

momentary

phase

will

have

a

threefold intentional

structure

through

which

an

extended

por

tion

of the

immanent

object,

in

our

case,

of

the

memory,

will

be

experienced

or

constituted.

The

way

in

which

this

constitution is

accomplished

may

be

illustrated

as

follows.

Assume

an

act

of

memory

has

begun

to

run

off

for

inner consciousness and has already partially elapsed. The memory will be

presented

to

consciousness

in

a

continuum

of

phases

with

the

"fundamental

temporal

distinctions:

Now,

past

(future)"

(211).

Specifically,

one

phase

of

the

memory

will

be

experienced

as

actually

Now,10

others

as

just

past,

still others

as

future

or

as

yet

to

come.

Correlated

with

the

phase

of the

memory

experienced

as

actually

Now

will

be

an

actual

phase

of the

absolute

consciousness.

That

phase

will

possess

an

intentional

moment

ordinarily

termed

by

Husserl

"primal

impression"

or

"primal

sensation,"

through

which

the

actual

Now

of the

memory

is

constituted.

The

same

phase

will

possess

a

second intentional

moment,

"primary

memory"

or

"retention,"

through

which

elapsed

phases

of the act are held in

grasp

and

experienced

as

just

past

with

respect

to

the actual Now.

Finally,

the

actual

phase

of the

ultimate

flow

will

possess

the

moment

of

"protention"

which

is

conscious







in

an

open

way

of future

phases

of

the act. "In

each

primal

phase,

which

originally

constitutes

the

immanent

content,

we

have

retentions

of

preceding

and

protentions

of

coming

phases

of

precisely

this

content

. .

(84).

Finally,

since

memory

runs

of

in immanent

time,

in the

next

moment

the

whole

process

will

repeat

itself

:

through

a

new

actual

phase

of

the

absolute

flow

a new

phase

of

the

memory

will

be

experienced

as

Now

while

the

prior

phase

will

be

experienced

as

just

past,

and

so

on.

The

act

of

memory,

then,

is

a

unity

constituted

in

inner

time

through

the phases of the absolute time-constituting flow with their impressionai,

retentional,

and

protentional

moments.

1.

Retention

and

Secondary

Memory

This

essay

is

focused

on

what Husserl calls

"secondary

memory"

(sekun

d?re

Erinnerung)

or

more

frequently

simply

"memory" (Erinnerung).

In

the

last

section,

however,

we

met

"primary

memory"

(prim?re

Erinnerung)

or

"retention"

(Retention).

According

to

Husserl,

secondary

memory

and

retention

are

absolutely

distinct

modes of

consciousness

(35),

though

also

inseparable.

On

some

occasions,

Husserl

refers

to

secondary

memory

as

"memory

in

the

usual sense"

and

implies

that

it

intends

"something

further

past"

(179)

while

retention

is

conscious

of the

immediate

past,

usually

of

the

just

elapsed

phases

of

an

act

presently

running

off for

consciousness.

Although

this difference

ordinarily

holds,

Husserl

frequently speaks

of

the

possibility

of

actualizing

a

memory

of

what

is still retained

(367),

in which

case

what

is

retained and

what

is

remembered

would coincide

and

enjoy

the

same

distance from

the actual

Now.

Difference

in

temporal

position,

then,

would

not

by

itself

define

the

distinction

between

memory

and

retention.

Instead, the two are essentially distinct because they belong to different

dimensions

of

consciousness.

Retention

is

a

moment

of

the

absolute

time

constituting

flow

of

consciousness,

while

secondary

memory

is

a

unity

constituted

by

the

absolute

flow.

Retention differs

from

memory

as

what

is

constituting

differs

from

what

is constituted.

Furthermore,

memory

is

an

enduring

act in

immanent

time

and

can

therefore

stand

forth

as a

relatively

independent

unit.

Retention,

on

the other

hand,

far

from

having

the

status

of

an

independent

act,

is

not

even

equivalent

to

an

individual

phase

of

the

ultimate

flow,

since

the

latter

also has

impressionai

and

protentional

moments.

Memory

and retention also

give

their

objects

in

fundamentally

different

ways.

Retention

is

"originary

(origin?r)

consciousness

of the

past"

(417),

in

the

sense

that

"only

in

primary

memory

do

we see

what is

past,

only

in






46

JOHN

.

BROUGH

it

does

the

past

constitute

itself,

namely

not

representatively

but

presenta

tively

(pr?sentativ)" (41).

Of

course,

what

has

elapsed

is

no

longer

pre

sented

as

Now

in

retention,

but

it is

"still

present

as

just

past"

(212):

"its

being

past

is

a

Now,

is

something

present

itself

. .

."

(213).

But

memory,

as

we

shall

see

later,

precisely

does

not

present

the

past

but

only

represents

it.

Furthermore,

retention,

as

presentation

of the

past,

is conscious

of

a

past

phase

in

one

way

only:

as

just

past,

as

elapsing.

Memory,

on

the

other

hand,

as

a

form

of

^-presentation,

intends the

whole

elapsed

object

as if itwere running off once again for consciousness, and so represents a

past

phase

as

"Now"

(62),

and then

as

just

past.

What retention

can

only

intend

as

just

past,

memory

can

represent

as

Now

and let

run

off

again

in

the

mode

of

representation.11

Although

the

discussion

to

this

point

has stressed the

differences

between

memory

and

retention,

it

is

obvious

from what

has

been

said

that

retention

is

a

necessary

condition

of

memory

in

several

respects.

To

begin

with,

in

the

absence

of

retention

there would

be

nothing

to

remember

because

nothing

would be

originally

constituted.

In

addition,

without retention

the

act

of

memory

itself

could

not

be

experienced.

Retention is

an

intentional

moment of the absolute flow

through

which all immanent

objects,

including

memory,

are

constituted.

Bluntly

put,

memory

would

not

exist

without

retention,

for "to

be

and

to

be

consciously

constituted coincide

in

the

case

of

immanent

objects."

12

Finally,

retention constitutes

our

original

sense

of

the

past:

"Retention

and

protention

are

the

primitive,

the

first

forms

of the

establishment

of

past

and

future"

(326).

Following

Husserl,

we

must

now

examine

how

secondary

memory

assumes

and

elaborates

the

sense

of

the

past

it

inherits from

retention.

II.

Memory's

Constitution

Memory

shares with

all

other

intentional

experiences

the condition of

being

constituted

in inner

time-consciousness.

There

is

nothing

unique

about

memory

in this

respect.

Turning

from

this

common

ground,

however,

we

quickly

see

that

"memory

as

such

has

its

own

intentionality,

namely

that of

representation"

(96).

The

distinctive

character of

memory's

inten

tionality

is that it

represents

the

past.

If

we

ask

about

the

manner

in

which

the

representation

is

accomplished,

we

raise

the

issue of

memory's

constitu

tion,

which

we

will

explore

in

the

remainder

of

the

essay.

A. Memory as Direct Consciousness ofWhat Is Past

Interpretations

of

memory

in the

philosophical

tradition

have

frequently

represented

some

variation

of

what

might

be called the

"image

theory".






HUSSERL

ON

MEMORY

47

According

to

this

point

of

view,

what is

immediately

and

directly

experienced

in

memory

is

a

present

image

or

replica

of

what

is

past,

not

what

is

past

itself. The

theory

rests

on

the

assumption

that

the

object

of

memory,

pre

cisely

because

it

is

past,

is

not

available

for

direct

apprehension.

Access

to

it

would

have

to

be

indirect?through

an

intermediary

which,

in

and

present

to

consciousness,

could

function

as an

image

of the

past.

Accordingly,

what

is

directly

known

in

memory

would

be

a

present

image.

Memory's

proper object?the

past

object

or

event?would

be

known

always

and

only

by indirection.

We

shall

see

shortly

hat

Husserl

explicitly

ejected

the

image

theory

of

memory.

But

did

he

perhaps

embrace

the

theory

himself

early

in his

career? In

the

following

section

we

review

evidence

that

suggests

he

did.

1. Husserl's

Implicit

Adherence

to

an

Image

Theory

of

Memory's

Con

stitution

.

Evidence

That

Husserl

Held

an

Image Theory

The

language

Husserl

employed

in

early

analyses

of

memory,

especially

those

written

prior

to

1905,

intimates that he

may

have

interpreted

memory

as

a

form

of

pictorial

consciousness.

In

a

sketch

dating

from

about

1901,

for

example,

Husserl

appears

to

understand

memory

in

terms

of

a

series

of

present

"representations"

(Vorstellungen)

which

"depict"

(abbilden)

a

past

event

(152).

In

other

texts

from the

period

the

terms

"image"

(Bild)

and

"memorial

image"

(Erinnerungsbild)

occur

with

considerable

frequency.

Thus

Husserl

will

speak

of

the

"memorial

images"

of

his

living

room

which

emerge,

endure for

awhile,

perhaps

change,

all

in the

present

(162).

In another

early

text,

Husserl

claims

that

in

memory

I

"grasp" (fassen)

an

object given in phantasy "as

an

image of

what

has been. E.g.,

I

have

the

emerging

tonal

image

and

grasp

it

...

as

the

melody

which

my

little

daughter

played

'a

short

time

ago'

on

the

piano"

(165).

There

are

also

a

few

direct

statements which

appear

to

leave

little

doubt

that

at

the

time

Husserl

accepted

some

kind

of

image

theory: "Ordinary

memory

is

pictorial

apperception

bildliche

Apperzeption),

just

like

expectation"

(173).13

Additional

evidence

may

be

derived

from

the

language

Husserl

used

in

comparing

secondary

memory

and

perception

or

primary

memory.

In

mem

ory,

he

writes,

"the

'image'

hovers

before

me

just

as

the

object

hovers

before

me

in

perception"

(164-165),

suggesting

that

what is

directly

ex

perienced

in

memory

is the

image,

not the

past

object. And in a sketch

from

1904,

Husserl

refers

to

primary

memory

as a

"

'direct*

. . .

conscious

ness

of

having

been

present,"

implying

that

by

comparison

"a

memorial






48 JOHN . BROUGH

presentation

...

in

the

usual

sense,

a

pictorial

memory

{Bild-Er

inner

un

g)

.

.

."

is

an

indirect consciousness

(191).

Moreover,

in

some

early

texts

comparing

memory

and

perception, perception

is

spoken

of

as

giving

its

object

as

"there itself"

{selbst

da).

Husserl

probably

introduced such

lan

guage

specifically

in

order

to

convey

a

conviction that

memory,

as

opposed

to

perception,

is

built

on

images

and is

no

more

capable

of

presenting

its

object

as

"there itself" than

a

painting

is

of

presenting

a

living

Napoleon.

The

designation

of

primary

memory

as

"immediate

memory"

(165)

would

seem to

carry

the same

implication:

in

primary

memory

"the

past

object

as

such is

given

itself"

(173)

while

in

ordinary

memory

it is

presumably

given

indirectly,

through

intermediaries.

b.

Textual

Ambiguities

While

the hint

of

an

image

theory

in

certain

early

texts is

undeniably

strong,

ambiguities

remain.

Significantly,

Husserl

never

offers

a

developed

version

of the

theory

and

does

not

argue

for it

explicitly.

Furthermore,

the

term

"image"

and

its

derivatives

are

often

placed

in

quotation

marks when

they occur in discussions of memory.14 But of greater importance are indi

cations

in

a

few

early

texts

that

Husserl

became

aware

of

difficulties

associated

with

the

theory

even

while

he

may

have

remained

its adherent.

Husserl's earlier

and

later

reservations

about the

image

theory

are

grounded

in

part

on

his

rejection

of what

might

be

called

the

thesis of the

"pseudo-past":

i.e.,

that what

we

take

as

past

is

really

present.

Husserl

argues

on

the

contrary

that

"where

we

.

.

.

bestow

the

predicate

past,

or

apprehend

as

past,

there the

past

is

really

past"

(152).

This is another

expression

of

the rule that

memory

and

its

object

have

different

time

determinations.

Yet

the

image theory

may

violate

this

rule.

In

a

text

dating

from around 1901,15 Husserl appears to single out just such a transgression.

His

argument,

which

we

will

examine

briefly,

is of

interest

because

it

very

likely

paved

the

way

for

his

later

rejection

of

the

image theory.

According

to

the

theory,

the

present

memorial

image

represents

the

past

object

or

content.

It

might

be

argued

that if

it is

to

do

this with

absolute

fidelity,

hen the

present image,

which

by

hypothesis

s the

only

thing

immediately

experienced

in

memory,

would

have

to

contain

or

be the

remem

bered

content. Yet if

the remembered

content

were

resident in

or

identical

with

the

present

image,

it

would itself be

present.

Indeed,

the

content

would

be

past

and

present,

and

as

identical

with

the

representing present image

it

would

represent

itself.

But

as

Husserl

observes,

"the

same

content

which

is

now

cannot

at

the

same

time

cease

and

persist,

namely

as

repr?sentant

of







itself

(159).

This view

effectively

reduces

the

past

to

a

pseudo-past

and

cancels the

difference

in

temporal

determination

between

memory

and

remembered

object:

"the

remembered

content

and the

past

Now

would

at

the

same

time

be

present,

specifically

in

the

sense

of

the

actual

Now"

(159,

note

2).

Yet

Husserl

apparently

does

not

surrender the

image theory

at

this

point,

for he

writes

after

outlining

the

objection

we

have

described:

"The

remembered

content

is

'the same'

as

the

perceived,

but

it is

its

image"

( 160).

For a

time,

then,

Husserl

probably

accepted

some version of the

image

theory.

It

was,

after

all,

a

traditional

view and

in

the

atmosphere

at

the

time. But

already

in

the earliest

texts

seeds

of discontent

are

detectable,

and

so

it

is

not

surprising

that

Husserl

comes

to

reject

explicitly

the

image

theory

of

memory's

constitution.

2.

Husserl's

Explicit

Rejection

of

the

Image

Theory

Memory

is

not

pictorial

consciousness

(?ildbew?sstsein)

but

something

totally

different

(316).

We know that the

'past'

in

memory's

case does notmean that in the

present

act

of

remembering

we

make

ourselves

an

image

of what existed earlier

.

.

.

(309).

By

1904

or

1905,16

Husserl

has

clearly

and

explicitly

rejected

the

inter

pretation

of

memory

as

pictorial

consciousness. But what

are

the

ingredients

of

the

theory

he

rejects,

and

what

are the

arguments

he musters?

17

The

following

contentions

appear

to

comprise

the

theory

which Husserl

criticizes.

(1)

Something

must

be

immediately

and

directly

experienced

in

memory,

and

appear

as

present. (2)

What is

directly

experienced

functions

as an image of something else, the past which is never directly

experienced

and which

never

appears

as

present. (3)

What

is

present

in

the

memory

functions

as

an

image

because

it

is similar

to

or

in

some

way

an

analogue

of

what

it

depicts.

(4)

The

person

remembering

is

aware

that what

he

immediately

experiences

functions

as

an

image

of

something

else.

The

image

and

the

imaged

appear

as

different.

Our

discussion

of

Husserl's

critique

of the

image

theory

will

be

developed

against

the

background

of

these

characteristics.

A

possible

subordinate

expression

of

the

theory?a

variant

of which

we

met

in

the

last

section

and

which

Husserl criticizes

implicitly?would

root

itself

chiefly

in the

first

contention.

Grounded

on

the

assumption

that

what is

past,

because

it is

past,

is

absolutely

inaccessible,

the

interpretation






50 JOHN . BROUGH

in

question

would hold that

the

object

of

memory

is

the

present

image.

This

claim,

however,

contravenes

the

very

sense

of

the

remembered

object,

which is

"by

all

means

not

given

as

Now"

(316).

If

it

were

asserted

in

reply

that

although

the

image

as

a

real

component

of

the

memory

is

indeed

actually

Now,

it

is nonetheless

experienced

as

past,

HusserTs

rejoinder

would

be,

as we

have

seen,

that what

we

apprehend

as

past

is

really

past

(152)

and that "the

Now

cannot

stand forth

as

not

Now

.

.

."

(322). Memory's

sense

precludes

the identification

of

remembered

object

and

present image.The defender of the

image

theory

who

yields

to

the

argument

that

the

proper object

of

memory

cannot

be the

present image

will

probably

turn

to

the

more

complicated position

embracing

all

the

contentions

men

tioned

above.

But

while

this

position

may

escape

the

obvious

failings

of

its

predecessor,

it

has

its

own?and

equally

fatal?difficulties.

The

backbone

of

Husserl's

critique

of

the

image

theory

is

that it

cannot

explain

memory

as

a

direct

consciousness of what

is

past.

The

theory

is

constructed

on

themodel

of

the sort

of

pictorial

representation

accomplished

in

photographs

(180),

or

historical

paintings

or

statues

(183).

In

such

cases, something is perceived as present which also serves as an image or

repr?sentant

of

something

which

is

not

present.

The

representative

function

is

realized insofar

as

what

is

perceived

is

similar

or

analogous

to

what

is

depicted

(184).

A

painting

of the

storming

of

the

Bastile,

although

a

different

object

from

the

historical

event

of

1789,

functions

and

is

known

to

function

as an

image

of that

event

through

a

certain

relation of

similarity.

Representation

does indeed

occur

through

pictorial

objects

of

this

sort,

but

?and this

is

the

telling

point?"not

with

the

consciousness

of the

object

itself

(Selbst)99

( 183).

What

is

given

"itself"

in

these

cases

is

the

present

pictorial

object,

the

image,

and

not

what it

depicts.

Now in memory, Husserl insists, "this is not the case"

(184).

And

the

moment

the

image

theory

attempts

to

import

this

model

of

pictorial

representation

into

memory's

domain,

it

runs

afoul

of

what

we

actually

experience

in

memory.

Suppose,

for

example,

instead of

looking

at

a

print

on

the

page

of

a

history

ook,

I

recall the

brightly

lluminated heater

attended

last

night.

The

lighted

theater

which

I

immediately

experience

in the

memory

"does

not

pretend

to

be

a

more or

less

analogous image"

(184);

intended

in the

memory

"is

not

something

similar to

what

appears

there,

intended

is

what

appears

itself,

the

appearing

theater

.

.

(184).

Furthermore,

what thus

appears, because it is the past object itself and not

a

present

image,

is "not

now

present...

it

is

^presented"

(vergegenw?rtigt)

(184).

Excision

of

an

intermediary

between

present

memory

and

past

object







does

not

suppress

the

temporal

distance

between

the

two.

In

memory,

then,

we

do

not

directly

experience

something

as

present

which

is then

taken

as

an

image

of

something

past

on

the basis of

a

supposed

similarity

between

the

two.

If

that

were

the

case,

memory

would

never

be

more

than

an

indirect

consciousness of the

past,

and

what

appears

immediately

in

memory

would

never

be

its

proper

object.

A reflective

scrutiny

of

the

phenomenon

of

memory

discloses

that

"it

is

the theater itself

which

hovers before

me,

not

a

mere

image,

that

is,

at

bottom

a

different

object,

only

similar

to

the

object

itself,

to the theater"

(184).

The

sort

of

consciousness

achieved

in

memory

is therefore

representation

"through

identity"

and

not

"through

mere

pictorial

similarity

(Bildahnlich

keit)"

(184).

The

object

of

memory

and

what

immediately

appears

in

the

act

of

memory

are

identical.

The

lighted

theater,

given immediately

to

the

remembering subject,

is

the

past

object

and

not

an

image

or

replica

of

it.

The

arguments

discussed

to

this

point

have

been

descriptive

in character:

reflection

reveals that the

act

of

memory

is

not

experienced

as

an

instance

of

pictorial

consciousness.

There

are

also certain

logical

difficulties

in which

an

image theory of memory (or of perception, for thatmatter) may find

itself,

and Husserl

was

aware

of these.

The cardinal

objection

from

this

perspective

is

that

the

image

theory,

far

from

explaining

memory's

consciousness

of the

past,

would

preclude

our

having

any

idea

of

the

past

at

all.

The

theory

rests

on

the

assumption

that

we

have

no

direct

access

to

the

past.

It

asserts

that the direct and

immediate

"object"

of

experience

in

memory

is

always

and

only

a.

present

image

in

consciousness.

Only

the

present,

never

the

past,

is

directly

experi

enced. If

this

is

the

case,

then

the

question

Husserl

addresses

to

Brentano's

theory

of

primary

memory

as

an

instance

of

pictorial

consciousness

applies

equally to secondary memory: ". . .How do we know, then, that an A has

been

earlier,

even

before

the

existence

of this

present

A

[i.e.,

an

image]?

Whence

do

we

have

the

idea

of

the

past?"

(18)?[material

in

brackets

added].

The

difficulty

is

not

simply

that

no

sense

of the

past

could

appear

directly?though

that

would

be

true?but

that

no sense

of the

past

could

appear

at

all. In the

moment the

image

theory

forbids

us

to

possess

the

past

directly,

it

destroys

our

access

to

it

altogether.

And

in

so

doing,

it

collapses

of

its

own

illogical

weight.

If,

however,

we

assumed

for

a

moment

the

theory's

general

validity,

we

would

still be

faced

with

difficulties, specifically

those associated

with

relating

the

particular

image

to

a

past

object.

The

theory

implies

that

in

order

to

determine

whether

the

present

memorial

image really

does

recall






52 JOHN . BROUGH

something

past,

or

does

so

accurately,

I

must

compare

it

with what

it

sup

posedly

depicts.

But

by

hypothesis

what is

past

is

no

longer

and

can

be

known

only

through

the

present

image.

It

is

therefore

not

available

for

comparison

or

matching,

and there would be

no

way

to

determine

whether

the

present

image

truly

does

represent

something

past.

Husserl

claims,

while

developing

the

above

objection,

that it would be

"fundamentally

absurd"

to

argue

this

way?not

because

the

argument

is

anemic

or

has

no

force

against

the

image

theory

(it

does)

but

because

the

image theory

is a

misinterpretation

of

memory.

"A

comparing

of what is

no

longer

perceived

and

merely

remembered

with

something

outside

itself

makes

no

sense"

(316).

No

opaque

image

stands

between

the

present

memory

and the

past

object

and

no

impossible

comparison

is

demanded,

for

memory

is

a

direct

consciousness

of

what

is

past

(316).

This,

incident

ally,

makes

possible

the

comparisons

which

do

occur

in

legitimate

cases

of

pictorial representation.

A

present

melody

may

pictorialize

or

lead

me

to

think of

a

past

melody.

"But this

already

presupposes

another

presentation

(Vorstellung)

of

the

past.

The intuition

of the

past

cannot

itself

be

a

pic

torialization" (311). I can compare past and present objects only because

I

have

an

independent

consciousness

of the

past.

Husserl

rejects

the

image theory

because

it

does

not account

for

memory

as we

experience

it and

because

it

effectively

seals

us

off from the

past.

Husserl's

claim

is

rather

that

memory,

properly

understood,

is

a

direct

consciousness

of the

past

in

which

"the

appearing

object

itself is

meant,

just

as

it

appears"

(184).18

3.

The

Remembered

Object's

Mode

of

Givenness

The

image

theory

is

based

on

the

implicit assumption

that

only

what is

present can be directly known. In a sense, it assumes that every form of

consciousness

must

be,

or

be

built

upon,

a

perception,

and that

any

getting

beyond

what

is

given

perceptually

must

be

by

indirection.

Husserl

snaps

the

spine

of the

image

theory

by

denying

the

assumption.

Perception

is

a

direct

consciousness of its

object,

but

so

too

is

memory,

and

its

object

is

past.

Per

ception

does

present

the

object

itself,

but

"in

memory

the

object

also

appears

itself"

(185).19

The

point

is

that

memory,

providing

direct

access

to

the

past,

is

a

mode

of

consciousness

sui

generis

and

is

irreducible

to

any

other

kind

of

experience. "Reproduction,"

Husserl

writes,

"is

not,

as

Hume

and

the

sensualistic

psychologists

since

Hume

think, something

on

the order

of

a

poor

imitation of

perception

or

a

weaker echo

of

it,

but

precisely

a

fundamentally

new

mode of

consciousness.

.

.

."

20







Although

perception

and

memory

both

give

their

objects

directly,

they

do

so

in

essentially

different

ways.

Only

in

perception

is

the

object

given

as

"present

itself"

(Selbst

gegenw?rtig)

(185).

The

remembered

object,

whose

sense

precludes

its

being

given

as

present,

is

instead

"represented"

(vergegen

w?rtigt), though

still

given

itself.

Reproductions,

Husserl

writes,

"have

the

character

of

itself-representation"

(Selbstvergegenw?rtigung)

and

"memory

is

itself-representation

in

the

sense

of

the

past"

(59).

Representation

as

memory's

mode of

givenness literally

means

a re

presentation,

though

not in the sense that a

play

might

be

restaged

or a crime

reenacted. Rather the

same

event,

given

perceptually

in

an

earlier

Now,

runs

off

once

again

for

consciousness,

but

as

past?1

What

is

remembered

is

thus

not

there

to

be

touched

or

smelled

or

actually

seen;

it is

given

in

a

unique

modification

which,

Husserl

implies,

is

ultimately

indefinable.

He

does

attempt,

however,

to

communicate

something

of

the

sense

of this modifica

tion,

and

his endeavors throw

light

on

the

difference

between

the

presenta

tional

and

representational

modes

of

givenness.

For

example,

a

temporal

object

"hovers

before

me"

(vorschwebt)

in

memory

"as

something

that

has been and at the same time is quasi-running off

. .

." (298). The term

"vorschweben"

means

to

"have

a

recollection,"

but

also

to

"float

or

hover

before,"

and

Husserl

seems

to

play

on

both

meanings.

The

object

of

memory,

while

not

exactly

ghostlike

in its

apparition,

lacks

the

"bodily"

presence

characteristic

of the

object

of

perception.22

In

the

same

vein,

Husserl

claims

that

the

represented

object

appears

as

"quasi-running

off"

and

elsewhere

writes

that the

object

stands

forth in

memory

"not

as

present

itself,

rather

as

quasi-present"

(290).

Husserl's

point

is

that

memory

regenerates

a

for

gotten

object

such

that

it stands

before

us

"as

if"

(gleichsam)

it

were

engendering

itself

anew

(360).

It

does

not

actually

run

off,

of

course,

because it is past. Thus in thememory of the lighted theater, "the theater

comes

to

givenness

'as

if now'

(gleichsam

jetzt)'*

(59).

The memorial

modification

should

not

be

confused with

the

retentional

modification

to

which

every

temporal

object,

whether

remembered

or

not,

is

subject.

In

being

constituted

originally,

the

object

undergoes

a

modifica

tion

from

the

full

clarity

f

the

Now

to

the

just

past,

gradually

growing

more

obscure,

contracting,

and

finally

disappearing

(26).

This

universal

alteration

is

present

in

originary (origin?r)

consciousness and

then

given

again

in

memory,

"which

represents

the earlier

originary

appearing

and

therewith

at

the

same

time

the

originary sinking

back

. .

."

(368).

As

a

mel

ody

runs

off for

memory,

therefore,

not

only

the

past

and

passing

Now

phases

are

recalled

but

the

past

"just

past" phases

as

well

(51).

But

the






54 JOHN . BROUGH

modification

which

is

there remembered?the

vivid

Now

slipping

into the

past

and

becoming

obscure?is

not

equivalent

to

the memorial

modification,

which has

its

own

obscurity

to

contribute:

".

. .

still other 'obscurities'

con

front

us

there,

that

is,

what

is 'clear' in

the first

sense

stands

already

as

if

seen

through

a

veil

...

to

be

sure,

more or

less

obscurely"

(48).

The

veil

which

memory

drops

between

present

and

past

is

not

opaque

?the

past

remains visible

through

it?but

it

does

cast

its shadow

unfailingly.

B. Memory as Representation of Earlier Perception

Husserl

stresses

that

memory

is

a

direct consciousness

of the

past

which

gives

its

object

in

a

unique

manner

irreducible

to

pictorial

or

perceptual

modes.

But

he also

argues

that

memory

and

perception

are

intimately

related.

And the relation involves

more

than the truism

that

if

we

perceived

nothing

we

would have

nothing

to

remember,

for Husserl

claims

that

"memory

. .

.

actually

implies

a

reproduction

of

earlier

perception"

(58).

It

will

be

recalled from the first section

of

this

paper

that

what

is

re

membered

appears

as

having

been

present.

Since

perception

is

the

act

which constitutes the present (182), to appear as having been present means

to

appear

as

having

been

perceived.

Accordingly,

"it

belongs

primarily

to

the

nature

of

memory

that

it

is

consciousness of

having-been-perceived

(Wahrgenommen

getv

e

s

n-s

ein)"

(57).

Now

if

memory

intends its

object

as

having

been

perceived,

it

will

carry

an

implicit

reference

to

the

act

of

perception

through

which

the

object

was

originally

presented.

The

present

which

is

given

again

in

memory,

re-presented,

is

therefore "constituted in

. . .

a

'representation

of

earlier

perception'

..."

(58).

If

the

lighted

theater,

for

example,

appears

in

memory

"as

if

Now,"

this

occurs

because

the

elapsed

perceptual

act

through

which

the theater

was

originally

given

as

Now

is

represented in thememory (58).23

Memory,

then,

has

a

double

intentionality.

Unlike

perception,

which

intends

only

the

present

external

object,

memory

intends

both

a

past

act

and

the

object

of

that

act.

Furthermore,

the

two

intentionalities

are

inseparably

united. To remember

an

elapsed

object

is

to

remember

the

act

through

which

it

was

earlier

given;

to

remember

an

elapsed

act

is

to

remember

the

object

originally

correlated

with

it.24

Husserl offers

a

formula

to

express

this

"essential

law"

(128)

:

R

(P0)

=

R0,

where

"R

(P0)"

is

the

reproduction

(R)

of the

perception

(P)

of

an

external

object

(o)

and

"R0"

is

the

representationR)

of the external

object (o).

It

should

be

stressed

that

Husserl

never

claims

that

the

past

object,

the

theater,

e.g.,

and

the

past

perception

are

intended

in

the

same

way.

The







perception,

while

necessarily

recalled,

is

known

only

implicitly:

"the

per

ception

is

not meant

(gemeint)

and

posited

(gesetzt)

in

the

memory,

rather its

object

is

meant

and

posited

..."

(58).

A

reflective

memory

could

be

brought

to

bear

on

the

act,

of

course,

and

then it

would be

thema

tized and

its

object

only

implicitly

ntended.

We

have

already

pointed

to

the

basic

reason

why

memory

is

always

memory

of earlier

perception.

Husserl

develops

his

explanation

of

this

feature

of

memory's

constitution

in

other

interesting

and

significant

ways.

For

example,

a remembered external

process

such as a

performance

occurring

on

the

stage

of

a

theater

"is

given

in

a

determinate mode

of

appearance"

(57).

That

is,

the

stage

I

recall

is

given

to

me as

seen

from

a

certain

per

spective,

perhaps

from

the back

row

of

the second

tier,

and under certain

conditions,

as

bathed

in

pink

light,

for

example.

This

means

that "an

ex

ternal

appearing

must

be

reproduced"

(57)

because

it is

only

through

such

an

"appearing"

(an

act

of

perceiving)

that

something

is

given

in

a

definite

mode

of

appearance.

I

can

recall the

object

clothed

with the

unique

deter

minations

it

possessed

when

I

originally

experienced

it

only by

representing

the original experience itself. This formulation suggests still another ap

proach

to

the

issue,

one

which takes

us

to

the

heart

of what

memory

accomplishes.

The

past

object

is remembered

as

having

been

perceived,

"but

not

just

anywhere

and

at

any

time and

not

by just

anyone

. .

."

(191).

Memory

intends

an

object

which

I

perceived

at

a

certain

place

and time.

The

object

is

remembered

in

terms

of the

way

it

entered

into

my

life,

became involved

with

me

as

the

object

of

my

experience.

To

remember

something

is

essen

tially

to

remember

an

episode

in

my

own

history.

Memory,

then,

as

memory

of

earlier

perception,

recaptures

an

elapsed portion

of

my

own

stream

of

consciousness. In the

"present

representation

of the

past

consciousness, spe

cifically

as

my

consciousness"

I

am aware

that "at that

time

I

had

the

per

ception"

(195).

Husserl

accordingly

describes

memory

as

"a

part

of

present

experience

in which

a

concrete

part

from

the

stream

of

the

past

experience

of the

same

subject

is

represented."

25

It

pertains

to

the

very

nature

of

an

act

of

consciousness

that,

once

past,

it

can

never

again

be

given

originally.

Without

memory

the

elapsed

experience

would

be

irretrievably

lost

and

so

too its

object,

and

I

would

be

trapped

forever in

the

immediate

present.

The

sense

of

the self

and

of

objectivity

would

never

fully

develop.26

But

through my present

memories

I

can

reach

back

to

the

I

which

perceived

the

theater

last

night,

which

enjoyed

the

sights

and

sounds

of

the railroad

station

years ago,

which

cheered

at

a

football

game

last

fall.

And

this

I,






56 JOHN . BROUGH

Husserl

writes,

"is

continuously

identical

throughout

all these

reproductions,

identically

my

I,

and in its

past

reality

known

to

me

in

the

present

memory

with

a

steady

certainty."

27

We

must

now

examine

certain

further

implications

of Husserl*

s

claim

that

memory

is

always

representation

of earlier

perception.

C. Remembered

Horizon

and

Memory's

Fulfillment

Husserl,

on some

occasions,

distinguishes

two

inseparable aspects

of

memory's

intentionality,

both

of

which

are

related

to

memory

as

representa

tion of earlier

perception.

Through

one

of

these

intentional

moments

the

object

is remembered

with

respect

to

its

enduring

content

(53).

Thus

I

recall

the

freight

train

passing

slowly

through

the

station. If the

memory

represents

the

object

unintuitively,

perhaps

merely

verbally

or

symbolically,

the memorial

inten

tion

is

described

as

empty.

The

fulfillment of

the

intention

would consist

in

the intuitive

representation

of

the

object.

If

the

past

event

is in fact

to

stand

before

me

in

intuitive

"full

dress,"

fulfilling

the

empty

intention,

I must explicitly actualize "the reproduction of the consciousness in which

the

past enduring

object

was

given,

that

is,

perceived

or

in

general originally

constituted.

.

."

(54).

When

the

object

was

originally

given

in

a

perception,

it

was

given intuitively;

if the

object

is

to

be

given

intuitively

once

again

in

the

memorial

mode,

that

perception

must

be

recalled.

Memory's

second

intentional

moment,

always

present

with

the

first,

is

directed towards

the

temporal

context

or

location of the

enduring

content

(

302

).

We

indicated

earlier

that

it is

part

of

the

sense

of

the remembered

object

to

be

set

in

relation

to

the

Now,

specifically,

to

be

apprehended

"as

lying

back

in

relation

to

the actual

present

.

.

."

(58).

Reproducing

some

thing

entails

locating

itmore or less

definitely

with

respect

to the

living

Now.

This

aspect

of

memory's

intentionality

also

has

its

own

manner

of

fulfillment,

which

consists

in the

"production

of

fulfilled

interconnections

up

to

the

actual

present"

(54).

Husserl

means

that

the

intention is

fulfilled

insofar

as we

actualize

memories

which

carry

us

"along

the

chain of

time"

(437)

from the

past

event

to

the

living

present:

"The

only

possible

ful

fillment

...

is

in

a

chain

or

continuity

of

actual

representations

up

to

the

Now,

that

is,

right

into the

present

temporal

field"

(437).

By

Husserl's

own

admission,

understanding

the

possibility

of this

mode

of fulfillment is

no

easy task (196). A consideration of what makes it

possible,

however,

will

considerably

deepen

our

comprehension

of what

memory

achieves.







The

assumption

underlying

HusserTs claim is that the

fulfilling

repre

sentations

only

make

explicit

or

thematize

what

was

there all

along.

And

what

was

there

from the

beginning

in

memory

was

a

consciousness,

empty

to

be

sure,

of the

temporal

interval

stretching

between

the

present

memory

and

its

object:

".

. .

The

whole

is

reproduced,

not

only

the then conscious

present

with

its

flow,

rather

*

im

pli

cite* the

whole

stream

of

consciousness

up

to

the

living

present"

(54).

This

contention,

at

first

glance

surprising,

is

quite

in

keeping

with

Husserl's

understanding

of

the

sense

of

the

remem

bered

past.

If we

experience

the

past

object

as no

longer

present,

as more

or

less

distant

from

the

actual

Now,

some

awareness

of

that

distance

itself

is

implied,

awareness

which

simply

would

be the

implicit reproduction

of

the

segment

of

the

stream

of

consciousness

bridging past

and

present.

But this

observation

does

not

by

itself

explain

the

possibility,

in

principle,

of

a

fulfillment

which

"requires

series

of

memories which

empty

into the

actual Now"

(105).

That

explanation

turns

once

again

on

memory's

nature

as

representation

of

earlier

perception.

Husserl claims

that

memory's

intuitive

intention directed

specifically

towards the enduring object is accompanied by other intentions, unintuitive,

which

refer

back

to

what

precedes

the

remembered

event

and

refer forward

to

the

living

Now

(305).

Focusing

on

the

forward-directed intentional

moment,

Husserl

asserts

that recollection

"has

a

horizon

directed

towards

the

future,

specifically

towards the

future of what

is recollected"

(53).

The fulfillment

of

these

expectational

intentions

leads

to

the

present

(52).

Memory

is

endowed with

this

intentional horizon

not

through

some

inexplicable

property

of

memory

itself,

but because

the

elapsed

perception

which

it

represents

was

originally

constituted

with

a

temporal

halo. "Fore

ground,"

Husserl

writes,

"is

nothing

without

background"

(304).

The

perceptual act and its object occupy the

temporal

foreground. In addition

"every

perception

has its

retentional

and

protentional

halo"

(105)

comprised

of intentions

which,

radiating

from the

perception,

implicitly

intend

its

temporal

background:

the

acts

and

objects

which

are

past

and

future

with

respect

to

the intuitive

present.

Since

memory

is

always

modification

or

representation

of earlier

perception,

and since

perception

is

never

without

its

halo,

"the

modification of

perception

must

also?in

modified

fashion?

contain

this

double

halo

. .

."

(105). Memory possesses

intentions directed

towards

the

past

and future of

what it

recalls

only

because these

intentions

are

already

embedded

in the remembered

act.

This,

incidentally,

explains

why

memory

intends

its

object

as

occupying

a

position

relative

to

the

actual

present.

The

reproduced

past already

bears






58 JOHN . BROUGH

"an

indefinite intention

towards

a

certain

temporal

location

with

respect

to

the

Now"

(54).

Memory

does

not

arbitrarily assign

a

location

to

its

object;

rather

the

object,

thanks

to

its

own

intention,

locates

itself. And

although

the location

may

be

fairly

indefinite,

it is

unlikely

that

someone

recalling

his

wedding

reception,

given

its

temporal

horizon,

will

situate

it

further

from

the actual

Now

than the

day

he entered

grammar

school.

We

are now

in

a

position

to

explain

the

possibility

of

the fulfillment

of

the

memorial intention

directed

towards

the

temporal

location.

We

have

established that when the

elapsed

act is

recalled,

its intention directed

towards

the

future

is

also renewed

memorially.

The

object

of

this

intention

is

"the

objective

temporal

series of

events,"

which is

given

emptily

or

un

intuitively

in the

original

memory

and

is therefore

described

by

Husserl

as

"the

dark

surroundings

(Umgebung)

of

what

is

actually

remembered"

(54).

Now

although

we

ordinarily

recall

the

perception's

horizon

in

an

empty

manner,

"the

possibility

exists

of

unfolding

its

temporal

halo"

by

making

each

point

into the

object

of

a

memory

(436).

Let

us

assume

that

we

actualize

an

explicit

memory

of

what

is

implicitly

intended

as

future

in

the remembered perceptual act. If we are successful, we will be intuitively

conscious

of

a

determinate

act

and

its

object,

intentionally

related

to

what

was

originally

recalled

but

closer

to

the

actual

Now.28 The

new

object

of

memory

will

of

course

possess

its

own

halo of

intentions,

including

an

intention directed towards

future

acts

and

objects,

which

may

also

be

ex

plicitly

remembered,

and

so

on.

As the

recollecting

process

advances

along

the

chain of

interlocking

intentions,

the

temporal

horizon

of

what

is

re

membered "is

continually

opened

anew

and

becomes

richer

and

more

vital"

(53).

The

unfolding activity

of

memory

constitutes

a

progressive

fulfilling

of

the

emptily

intended

horizons,

ultimately

culminating

in

the

living

present.

Through the advancing recollection I realize "the objective

possibility

of

establishing

the

succession:

at

that

time that

was,

then

came

that,

up

to

the

Now"

29

(301),

of

following,

for

example,

"what I

have

perceived step

by-step,

up

to

the

Now

.

. .

(

197)

"

30

If

the

process

of fulfillment

advances

harmoniously,

then

the

temporal

location

of

the

object

is confirmed

(437).

The

possibility

lways

remains

open,

of

course,

that what

I have located in the

past

does

not

belong

there,

or

belongs

in

a

different

position.

Memorial renewal

of the

elapsed

course

of

experience

will reveal

whether

this

is

the

case.

It

may

be

discovered,

for

example,

that of

two

conflicting

memories

only

one

will

fit

into the

context

of

the

past

stream of consciousness. Such

a

determination is

always

available

in

principle,

for

"a

person

now

has

a

past,

a

determinate

one"

and

"there







fore

a

context

of

non-conflicting

memory

certainly

exists,

as

possible"

(437).

We

have

only

to

actualize that

context

memorially

to

make

the

determination.

D.

Memory

and

the

Absolute

Flow

of

Consciousness

To

complete

our

sketch

of

memory's

constitution

we

must

raise

one more

question.

We

discussed

earlier Husserl's claim

that

memory

is

an

immanent

unity

constituted

in inner

time-consciousness.

We

have also

traced

Husserl's

argument

that

memory

of an

elapsed

object

implies representation

of the

perception

through

which

the

object

was

originally

intended.

Now

the

elapsed

perception

is also

an

immanent

object originally

constituted

or

experienced

in inner

time-consciousness.

A

reasonable

question

would

then

be:

must

memory,

in

recalling

the

past

perception,

also

reproduce

the

elapsed

portion

of

the

absolute

time-constituting

flow in

which

the

perception

was

originally

experienced?

If

the

answer

is

in

the

affirmative,

then

memory

would

have

a

triple

intentionality,

recalling

at

once

(though

not

in

a

thema

tizing

way

in each

case)

a

past

segment

of

the ultimate

time-consciousness,

the act once experienced asNow in that segment, and the object originally

perceived

in

the act.

Husserl's

texts,

however,

are

not

clear

on

the issue.

For

example,

in

dis

cussing

the

"inner

reproduction

of

external

perception,"

Husserl

speaks

of

"representation

of

the

inner

consciousness"

(128),

suggesting

that

memory

of the ultimate

flow

is indeed

involved in

memory

of earlier

per

ception.

But

in the

same

passage

the

manner

in

which he

symbolizes

the

representation

of the

perception

omits

any

reference

to

the

past

experiencing.

The

act

when

originally

experienced

as

present

may

be

symbolized

as

Ii

(P0)>

where

"

/'

is

the

impressionai

inner

consciousness

of

the

perception

of

an

external object "P0." The reproduction of the

perception

is symbolized as

Ri

(P0),

where

Ri

is

the "inner

reproduction"

of

the

elapsed

perception.

However,

if the

representation

also

intended

the

elapsed

inner

consciousness,

we

would

expect

the

formula:

Ri[Ii(P0)],

which

Husserl

does

not

in

fact

supply.

Other

texts,

however,

intimate

that

past

inner

consciousness

is

reproduced

in

memory.

Thus Husserl

appears

to

distinguish

between

the

representational

consciousness

of

a

past

immanent

object

and

the

"

'reproduction'

...

of

the

earlier

primal

sensation"

(79)

("primal

sensation"

is

a

synonym

for

"primal impression,"

the

moment

of

the

ultimate flow

through

which

a

phase

of the

immanent

object

is

experienced

as

Now).

Elsewhere

he

refers

to

"the

representational

consciousness

of

the

immanent

tone

(which

in

an






60 JOHN . BROUGH

appropriately

modified

sense

is

representational

consciousness

of

the

inner

consciousness

of the

tone)

.

.

."

(96).

But

if

the

textual evidence is

ambiguous,

the

logic

of Husserl's

position

would

seem

to

be decisive.

Just

as

we

cannot

recall

a

past

external

event

without

representing

the

perception

through

which

it

was

originally

given,

so

we

cannot

recall

the

past

perception

without

representing

the

elapsed

inner consciousness

through

which

it

was

originally

experienced.

When

I

remember

a

past

transcendent

object,

I

remember it

as

having

been

perceived.

When

I

recall

a

past

act,

I

recall

it

as

having

been

experienced,

that

is,

as

having

been constituted

in

inner

time.

If

I

am

to return

memorially

to

the

same

act

I

once

experienced

as

Now,

then

I

must

implicitly

represent

that

segment

of the

ultimate time-consciousness in

which

the

act

was

first

con

stituted.

Furthermore,

the

past

act

will

be recalled

as

located

at

a

certain

position

"in

the

elapsing

series of

my

experiences"

(307).

Since

it is

the

absolute

flow

with its retentions

and

protentions

which

originally

orders

the

act

in

inner

time,

recalling

the

act's location would entail

representing

the

inner

consciousness which first located it.

Finally,

I recall

an

elapsed

act as having been experienced byme, specifically, as having been constituted

in the

same

stream

of

consciousness

to

which

my

present

act

of

memory

belongs.

But

to

recall

the

elapsed

act

without

representing

the

flow

through

which

I

first

experienced

it,

would

be

tantamount to

recalling

an

act

which

belonged

to

no

one.

The

claim

that in

remembering

an

elapsed

act

we

also

recall

the

absolute

time-constituting

flow

does

not

mean

that

we ever

represent

the

flow

by

itself. The

ultimate flow

simply

is

the

experiencing

of

immanent

temporal

objects.

The inner

consciousness

of the

act

is

inseparable

(though distinct)

from

what

it

constitutes.

That

relationship

is

not

severed when

the

act

elapses,

and it is renewed when the act is remembered.

Recalling

a

past

act

always

implies

recalling

the

elapsed

portion

of the

ultimate

time-constitut

ing

flow

in

which the

act

was

originally

experienced,

and

remembering

a

past

segment

of

the flow

always

entails

remembering

the

immanent

object

it

constituted.

Our

sketch

of

memory's

constitution

is

now

complete.

Although

we

have

been

able

to

catch

only

the

broad

outlines of

Husserl's

theory,

we

have

at

least

glimpsed

the

fundamental

role

memory

plays

in

conscious

life.

Consciousness

is

steeped

in

time

and

none

of its flowing phases

can

be

arrested

and

kept

in

living actuality.

From

the

perspective

of

the

living

present,

the

main

portion

of

our

experience

has

receded

into the

past






husserl on memory 61

and

into

forgetfulness.

Without

memory

we

would

have

no

access

to

what

has

been

the

length

and

breadth

of

our

lives.

That

time's

flow

does

not

imprison

the

self

in

a

present

without

windows

to

the

past,

we

owe

to

memory.

John

B.

Brough

Georgetown

University

NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, Zur Ph?nomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893

1917),

ed.

Rudolf

Boehm,

Husserliana,

Band

X

(The

Hague:

Martinus

Nijhoff,

1966).

2.

Edmund

Husserl,

Analysen

zur

Passiven

Synthesis,

ed.

Margot

Fleischer,

Hus

serliana,

Band

XI

(The

Hague:

Martinus

Nijhoff,

1966).

3.

Since

most

of

our

references

will

be

to

Husserliana,

Volume

X

(Zeitbewusst

sein),

page

numbers

of

texts

cited

or

directly

quoted

from

this

volume

will be

given

in

parentheses

immediately

following

the

reference

or

quotation.

4. I

capitalize

the term

"Now" whenever

it is

a

translation

for

"das

Jetzt"

because

the

English

lower

case

"now"

may

fail

to

draw the

reader's attention

to

Husserl's

technical

use

of

the

term.

5.

Memory

is

only

one

among

several

forms of

representation

(Vergegenw?rti

gung) which have a relation to the actual Now. Expectation intends its object as

future

with

respect

to

the

Now. There

is

also

a

representation

of

something

con

temporaneous

with

the

Now

but

not

perceived

(60).

And

"mere

phantasy"

is

disting

uished

from

memory

because the

formerhas

no

reference

to

the actual

Now

(105).

6. Husserl

does

distinguish,

as we

will

see,

between

an

immanent

time

of

con

sciousness

and the

transcendent

time

of external

objects.

The

two

are

related,

how

ever,

in

that

the

latter

is

given

through

the

fomer.

The

immanent act

of

perception,

for

example,

is

simultaneous

with the

perceived

transcendent

object.

7.

The

"world's

time" here is

not

"clock

time"

but

simply

the

appearing

time

of

perceived

or

remembered

transcendent

objects.

8.

Husserl

therefore

distinguishes

two

dimensions

of

immanence,

two

dimensions

within

consciousness

itself,

and

claims that

within

one

the

consciousness of the other

is

constituted. Husserl

begins

to

advance

this

distinction

in

about

1907.

See

the

present

writer's

"The

Emergence

of

an

Absolute

Consciousness

in

Husserl's

Early

Writings

on

Time

Consciousness,"

Man and

World,

5,

no.

3

(August

1972):

307fT.

9.

.

.

Representation,

even

the

most

primitive

immanent

representation,

is

already secondary

consciousness

presupposing

primary

consciousness in

which

it

is

know

impressionally"

(90).

10.

"The

representation

is

itself

an

event

of

inner

consciousness:

//

it

ensues,

then

it

has

its

actual

Now,

its

running-off

modes,

etc.

.

.

."

(316).

11.

Husserl

observes

that

there

are

limits

to

what

we

can

retain

(193).

But

even

if

everything

could

be

retained,

memory

would remain

vitally

important.

For

memory

enables

us

to

relive

our

experiences

representationally,

while

retention

passively

"watches" them recede. Further, ifwe could not remember as well as retain we could

not

reflect,

that

is,

attentively

run

through

an

experience

again,

and

phenomenology

itself

would be

impossible.






62

JOHN

.

BROUGH

12.

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

.

292.

13.

Robert

Sokolowski

cites

this

statement

in

support

of his contention that

Husserl

once

held

an

image

theory.

Robert

Sokolowski,

Husserlian

Meditations

(Evans

ton:

Northwestern

University

Press,

1974),

p.

147,

note

12.

Sokolowski

would

appear

to be

correct

in

his

contention.

Textual

ambiguities concerning

the

matter

are

con

siderable,

however,

as

we

will

point

out

in the

next

section.

14.

See,

e.g.,

(62),

(164), (166).

15. Nr.

7,

pp.

158-160.

The

text

is

probably

concerned

with

primary

memory,

but

the

implied

criticism

of

an

image

theory

would

apply

to

the

case

of

secondary

memory

as

well.

16. Explicit critcismfirst appears inNr. 18,which Boehm, the editor of Hus

serliana

X,

dates

around

1901.

But

both

the

language

and

the

content

of

the

sketch

suggest

that it

was

written somewhat

later.

On

Nr.

18,

see

Sokolowski,

Husserlian

Meditations,

p.

147,

note

12

and

p.

149,

note

14.

17. Some of

the

arguments

appear

in

Nr.

18,

others

in

later

texts,

especially

Nr.

47,

which

probably

dates from

1907-1909.

18.

We

relied

chiefly

on

Zeithbewusstsein for

Husserl's

arguments

against

the

image

theory.

A

strong

and

clear

(but

brief)

rejection

is

found

in

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

305.

19.

"Memory,

however,

does

not

contain

in itself

the

perception

of

one

object

in

which

a

second is

consciously

analogized."

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

305.

20.

Ibid., p. 325.

21.

".

.

.

There

are

not

two

kinds

of

houses,

perceived

houses

and

imagined

or

remembered

houses

.

.

(289).

The

same

house is

represented

as was

earlier

perceived.

22.

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

96.

23.

Because

the

remembered

perception

of

an

external

object

is

itself

an

im

manent

object,

Husserl claims

that

"every

memory

is

.

. .

also

memory

of

what

is

immanent"

(96).

24. "...

A

representational

modification of

a

perception

is

at

the

same

time

representation

of

the

perceived object

. .

."

(89).

25.

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

353.

26.

According

to

Husserl,

it

pertains

to

the

sense

of

the

fully

constituted

object

that it can be repeated as the same in diverse acts, and this requiresmemory. See

Passiven

Synthesis,

pp.

326-27.

27.

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

310.

28. When

an

act

is

originally

experienced,

intentions

or

protentions

directed

to

wards

the

future

are

empty

and

open.

But

the

elapsed

protentions

which

we

recall

"have been

fulfilled,

nd

we are

aware

of

this

in

the

recollection"

(52).

In

recalling

the

past

protentions

I

recall

what

originally

fulfilled

them.

29.

We

have stressed

memory's

forward

movement

along

the trail

of

interlocking

intentions

towards

the

Now.

Husserl

suggests

that

one

can

also

move

backwards

from

the

horizon of

what

is

actually

present

towards

what is

remembered

(70).

In

either

case

we

move across

overlapping

temporal

fields

which

are

united into

a

single

field

through

their intentional

horizons

(70).

30.

Husserl

acknowledges

that

there

are

limitations

to what

we

can

remember

and

that

a

completely

fulfilled

memory

is

an

ideal

limit

case.

Husserl,

Passiven

Synthesis,

p.

82.

Husserl on memory

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