Hurtado, Diego-Autonomy, Even Regional Hegemony

Science in Context 18(2), 285–308 (2005). Copyright C© Cambridge University Pressdoi:10.1017/S0269889705000487 Printed in the United Kingdom

Autonomy, even Regional Hegemony: Argentina andthe “Hard Way” toward Its First Research Reactor(1945–1958)

Diego Hurtado de Mendoza

Universidad Nacional de San Martın

Argument

In the mid-1940s, Argentina was partially isolated and ruled by a military regime. The politicalconfrontation between the military and the scientific community as well as internationalpressures played a major role in the failure of the first attempts to cope with nuclear development.Only after the relationship between the military and local scientists was readjusted and controlof atomic energy was placed in the hands of the Navy, and Argentina’s international relationsrestored, did nuclear development begin to take off. This paper examines the traumatic processof creating the political and institutional conditions for the reception of nuclear technology ina peripheral context. The key to shaping future policies was the decision made by Argentina’sAtomic Energy Commission in April 1957 to construct its first research nuclear reactor insteadof buying it as other countries such as Spain and Brazil were doing at the time.

I. Introduction

Promoted in the 1950s as a new panacea by the United States and other powersanxious to make a profit in a potentially huge market, nuclear technology representsa particularly problematic case of transference if we take into consideration that sinceits beginnings it was characterized by a vigorous but not totally controlled expansion(Hewlett and Holl 1989, chap. 7).

In the case of Argentina, postwar international isolation and the ideological andpolitical conflicts between scientists and the military played a critical role in the firstfailed attempts to enter the atomic age.1 In the early 1950s, after the Army hadspent huge amounts on a thoughtless nuclear adventure regardless of the proposalsput forward by the small community of local physicists, the creation of the DireccionNacional de Energıa Atomica (DNEA) and the transfer of nuclear matters to the

1 On nuclear development in Argentina, see Redick 1975; Poneman 1982, idem 1987; Adler 1987; Solingen1994, idem 1996; Barletta 2000; Hymans 2001. However, these works are focussed on the period after 1960,when Argentina decided to acquire the first nuclear power reactor or in connection with the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

286 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza

Navy’s hands enabled Argentina to start developing a nuclear program that can beconsidered successful in comparison with prevailing standards in developing countries.After joining the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program and signingan agreement with the United States, Argentina decided to construct a research reactor,rather than buy one as many other countries did.2 The first time an adapted replica ofan Argonaut type reactor was put into operation on January 1958 was an auspicioussign that showed it was possible to cope with nuclear technology.

This paper tells the story of the difficult steps that led to the reception andassimilation of nuclear technology in Argentina between 1945 and 1958. Its focusis not on the innovation or production of new knowledge, but rather on the process ofcreating the necessary conditions to enable transplanting a cutting-edge technology intoa peripheral context. In the case of Argentina, this meant a wide range of achievements,from overcoming a negative international image and creating an appropriate politicaland institutional environment to training scientists and technicians in several fields thatdid not exist in Argentina in the 1950s, e.g., nuclear metallurgy, electronics, nuclearreactor physics. The ever changing and always fragile relationship between scientiststrained in public universities and military officers was another complex component ofthis process.3

The way these first efforts were faced and the ideology forged during this time,which stressed autonomy in technological development and nuclear hegemony inLatin America, would shape the future of Argentina’s nuclear program.

II. Military sector, industry, and science

In Argentina, the first official response to the atomic explosions in August 1945 camefrom General Manuel Savio, who during the 1930s had promoted within the Armya notion of “mobilization” understood as an articulation process among the military,industrial, and civilian sectors (Savio 1933; Ortiz 1996, 167–70). In August 1945, Saviosupported, through the Ministry of War, a decree to preserve uranium deposits, whichwas sanctioned in September.4 From then on, Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares

2 For example, Brazil (1957), Australia and Spain (1958), Congo and Yugoslavia (1960), Venezuela, Taiwan,Egypt and Portugal (1961), Thailand, South Korea and Turkey (1962). For a list of countries that took part inthe Atoms-for-Peace Program Grants for Research Reactors, see Poneman 1982, 40–41.3 Supported by catholic sectors, the legal frame which allowed the creation of private universities was establishedin 1959. Until then, all universities had been public. However, during the 1940s, there were many fruitlessattempts to create a “scientific” private university, taking as a model Johns Hopkins University (Hurtado deMendoza and Busala 2002, 11–40).4 Decree 22.855. It predicted that “in a period that can be relatively short” the use of uranium will make itpossible to obtain energy to be applied to industry.

Argentina’s First Research Reactor 287

and the University of Cuyo – located in the Cuyo region, close to the Central Andes –took charge of uranium and thorium prospecting.5

Two circumstances contributed significantly to a situation that was far from idealfor designing a reasonable scientific policy. Firstly, Argentina had been ruled by theArmed Forces since the coup d’etat on June 4, 1943. Four months after the takeover,a group of intellectuals and university professors signed a petition asking the militaryauthorities to return the country to constitutional law. The government ordered theexpulsion of all those who signed it from universities and other state positions. Between1943 and 1946, over one thousand university professors were dismissed or resigned insolidarity with those dismissed.6 The resultant crack between the political power andthe academic sector would be restored only after September 1955, when Peron wasdeposed by another coup d’etat (Halperın Donghi 1962, 127–73).

Secondly, at the international level, Argentina adopted a neutral position duringWorld War II. Because of this, at the beginning of the nuclear era Argentina’s situationwith regard to inter-American relations was one of tense isolation, and it was aboutto lose its membership at the recently created United Nations. As an example, theso-called “Blue Book on Argentina” published by the U.S. State Department (U.S.State Department 1946) just before the 1945 presidential election may be considereda kind of retaliation toward the black sheep of Panamericanism. Intended to provethat during the war the group of military officers led by Colonel Peron had activelyworked in favor of the Axis, the “Blue Book” could be conceived as part of a strategyto discredit this group.7 Although during the early 1950s Peron managed to improveArgentine-U.S. relations, the label “fascism” would nevertheless be attached to Peron’swhole 1946–1955 period (MacDonald 1980, 388–91; Rapoport 1980, 277–78). Inthis context, since 1946, the development of the nuclear field was seen by the ArmedForces as a possible solution to the dependence on foreign carbon and oil (Gimbel1990, 452).

5 During the 1940s, Savio undertook a key position as director of the Direccion General de FabricacionesMilitares. Created in 1941 from an integration of small and medium-sized military factories, this organizationwas intended to coordinate mining and industrial efforts in areas of military interest in order to ensure theindustrial mobilization capacity in war times (Potash [1969] 1971, 181).6 This episode and its later development had wide international repercussions. On the pages of Science magazineand the New York Times newspaper (see Science 1943; Shellenberger 1944, idem 1945; Panamerican [pseudonym]1944; Cortesi 1943, idem 1945; Warren 1947) particular attention was given to the case of expulsion ofphysiologist Bernardo Houssay, who would be awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1947 while workingat a private institute created specially for him, after he was forced to resign his position as professor at the Schoolof Medicine in 1946 (see Science 1944; Evans et al. 1945; Nature 1946).7 The international perception of Argentina’s situation is exemplified by a letter from two members of theAmerican Association of Scientific Workers that was published in the New York Times, referring to the newprofessors who took the position of ousted professors in public universities: “The newly selected appointeesappear to be exclusively Nationalists, Nazi and Fascist sympathizers and Falangists.” A long paragraph from the“Blue Book” follows (Hurvich and Dowker 1947).


On the other hand, the physicists’ reaction to the nuclear issue was channeled almostcompletely through the activities of the Argentine Physics Association (APA). Foundedin 1944 and led by the director of the National Observatory of Cordoba, EnriqueGaviola, who had received his doctorate in Berlin in 1926, it was the oldest nationalphysics society in Latin America (Bernaola 2001, 161–81). Given the small number ofphysicists in Argentina in those years, one of APA’s priorities was to create institutionsto promote experimental physics. Gaviola’s work toward the professionalization andinstitutional strengthening of physics in Argentina had begun as early as 1930 (Hurtadode Mendoza 2001). By the 1940s, Gaviola was also interested in attracting top foreignscientists (see Mariscotti 1985, 35–90; Bernaola 2001, 373–458). One of Gaviola’smain achievements in this sense was to obtain the permanent residence in Argentinaof the anti-fascist Austrian physicist Guido Beck, a former assistant to Heisenberg.Beck arrived in Argentina in May 1943, and worked at the National Observatory ofCordoba for eight years (Passos Videira 2001, 160–67). After the news on the firstatomic explosions, Gaviola saw the nuclear issue as an opportunity for reaching thesegoals.

During the seventh APA Meeting in La Plata city (Buenos Aires province) inApril 1946, Gaviola submitted a report that speculated on scientific and technologicalaspects of chain reactions, the “heterogeneous pile,” production of plutonium, andseparation of deuterium. He also proposed a hypothetical experimental design for afission bomb (Gaviola 1946a).8 In June, attempting an approach with the military,Gaviola sent a “memorandum” to the Ministers of War and Navy.9 He claimed thatArgentina was going through a period that was optimal for attracting top scientistswho were experiencing oppression due to social and economic insecurity, secrecy, andcensorship in Europe. He urged the military to take advantage of these circumstances:“Such a favorable situation to convert Argentina into a civilized and educated countrymight not take place again for the next hundred years” (Gaviola 1946b, 216–17).Gaviola’s argument rested on an accurate evaluation of the domestic scientific landscape:“Nowadays, the number of physicists and chemists capable of doing profitable researchin Argentina is less than twenty. None of them has – so far – proved to be a topscientist” (ibid., 217). As an institutional frame for attracting foreign scientists, heproposed the creation of a Comision Nacional de Investigaciones outside the militaryrealm. He sponsored a bill for initiating its creation. In his view, this initiative couldalso be useful to attract some of those scientists who had been separated from Argentineuniversities (ibid., 218–19).

8 Gaviola quotes two communications presented at the third APA Meeting held in August 1944 in La Plata, onthe updating of the investigations on nuclear fission and on the chemical aspects of such phenomenon (MossinKottin 1945; D’Alessio 1945). Gaviola’s final acknowledgment to Beck suggests the collaboration of the Austrianphysicist in the communication.9 The work was published on Revista de la Union Matematica Argentina (Gaviola 1946b).


Also in 1946, Gaviola learnt about a project to create an Instituto Radiotecnicothrough an agreement between the Ministry of Navy and the University of BuenosAires, which was close to completion. Gaviola, together with mathematician AlbertoGonzalez Domınguez, contacted the Chief of Navy Communications, Captain Riverode Olazabal, who in turn mentioned the aspiration to have a Nobel awarded amongthe new institute’s professors. Gaviola and Beck wrote letters to Heisenberg. Gaviolasaid that Beck received the answer in November 1946. Heisenberg would have agreedto come to Buenos Aires for a short time, provided that he was granted permission byoccupation authorities. However, negotiations were thwarted. Heisenberg was advisedby British authorities that permission would be denied. In turn, Argentina’s Navyargued that there had been a change of plans; they had decided that the institute wouldbe a technology laboratory instead of a scientific research center (Gaviola 1947).10

In a letter to the Chief of the Estado Mayor General de la Armada, Gaviolaacknowledged that the failure was due to the interference of the British occupationauthorities, but he also argued that the authorities of the Navy had acted weakly,and accused them of lack of interest and of not honoring the commitments assumedwith both the University of Buenos Aires and APA. “Is it that Argentina is still anEnglish ‘Honorific Dominion’ as in the times of the Ottawa Conference?” (ibid.).11

Disregarding all rules of courtesy, Gaviola accused the military of ignoring what it meansto do science. He explicitly argued against the scientific and technical training receivedby young officers: “The result is a technical quack” (ibid.). This rough attitude, rootedin a strong skepticism on the honesty and efficiency of Argentina’s political sector,had been typical of Gaviola’s approach toward State officials since the 1930s whenpromoting his projects. He had already been sued for disrespect (Gaviola 1945, 14).

During this time, there were already clear signs of active distrust of the U.S.regarding the pretended nuclear intentions of Argentina. As part of a secret “PreliminaryInvestigation Concerning Potentiality of the Development of Atomic Energy inArgentina” and a “Special Investigation of Nazi Economics Activity in Argentina”conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Argentina, the Argentine chemist VenancioDeulofeu answered a questionnaire which was presented to him “by an outside contactof the Embassy” (Tewksbury 1946).12 Asked whether any leading scientist was in

10 A brief mention of this episode can be read in the New York Times: “British officials recently advised him[Heisenberg] not to ask their permission to accept an invitation to lecture at Buenos Aires University, saying itcould not be granted ‘for obvious reasons’” (Associated Press 1947, 7).11 Cabral 1996, 505–06, considers the issue around the invitation of Heisenberg in the framework of the constantpressures and interventions on the development of physics to which Latin America was subjected during theCold War. In the particular case of Argentina, Cabral considers that, at the begining of 1947, Peron’s governmenthad difficulties with the U.S. as a result of its neutral position during the Second World War and of Argentineattempts to take control of the European wheat market.12 In 1946, Deulofeu was professor of organic chemistry at the School of Sciences, University of Buenos Aires,and few years later he would be president of the Asociacion Argentina para el Progreso de las Ciencias.


a position to be helpful in the field of atomic energy, Deulofeu mentioned FelixCernuschi, Gaviola, and Beck (in this order).13

Despite the issue of Heisenberg, Gaviola managed to draw Savio’s attention tohis proposal for the creation of a “Comision Nacional de Investigaciones.” However,Gaviola found out that, opposing his proposal, which stressed the autonomy from themilitary, Savio sponsored a project to create the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Fısicas,an institute to be dependent on the Ministry of War, authored by physicist TeofiloIsnardi (Gaviola n.d.).14 During the six-month negotiating period, other projectsbacked by members of the Congress entered the contest. Finally, in September 1948,the National Parliament approved a project presented by two Senators from San Luisprovince. However, the necessary approval by the Executive Power would never come(ibid.).15

Two events in February 1947 could have influenced the failure of these projects.Firstly, an article entitled “Peron’s Atomic Plans,” which appeared in the New Republic,then under the editorship of the former U.S. Minister of Agriculture and U.S.Vice-president Henry Wallace, erroneously reported that atomic weapons were beingdeveloped by Argentina. The author, William R. Mizelle, a New Republic correspondentin Buenos Aires, claimed in the first paragraph: “With world-famous German atom-splitter Werner Heisenberg invited to come to Argentina by Peron’s Government andwith a major uranium source discovered in Argentina, that Nation is launching amilitary nuclear research program to crack Pandora’s box of atomic energy wide open”(Mizelle 1947). The article also compared the Pampa region of Argentina with theU.S. region of Los Alamos in New Mexico and described an alarming situation whereAPA’s members, and particularly Beck, appear to be playing a central role in a supposedatomic program promoted by the Government.16

The huge repercussion of Mizelle’s article prompted Gaviola to clarify the issuepublicly. In an interview published on March 27 in Crıtica, an important Buenos Airesnewspaper, he argued that, besides Heisenberg, another five scientists had been invited

13 Cernuschi, an engineer with a Ph.D. in Physics from Cambridge, had been relieved of his duties at theUniversity of Tucuman (Tucuman Province) after the coup d’etat in 1943. As a consequence, he had left thecountry. He was among the most exacerbated critics of Peron’s regime. Regarding Gaviola and Beck, the evalua-tion of Deulofeu shows absolute disinformation.14 In 1912, the physicists Jose Collo and Teofilo Isnardi were sent to Germany to do research under WalterNernst. On their way back, the naval school invited them to be part of its staff (Ortiz 1996, 161). In the 1940sGaviola and Isnardi were the most prestigious Argentine physicists.15 Savio died in July 1948. Only in 1958 was an institution created of the kind Gaviola had proposed: theConsejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientıficas y Tecnicas (CONICET).16 Cabral 1990, 12, includes Mizelle in a list of American and Argentine reporters writing about Argentinawho were in the employment of American intelligence agencies. Regarding the U.S. boycott to Argentina’sagricultural exports and its capital goods imports which took place between 1942 and 1949, Barsky and Gelmanremark that Wallace – as a representative of Iowa State – was part of the most radicalized agrarian populism,and authored one of the most drastic boycott messures: the freezing of the Argentine financial assets in the U.S.(Barsky and Gelman 2001, 299–300).


to work in the country by the Instituto Radiotecnico, none of them on atomic energyissues, but on “the technical improvement of our radiotelephone communications,”especially on radar applications (Crıtica 1947).17

The second event, also in February 1947, was the U.S. excessive support forUruguay’s new president, the anti-Peronist Thomas Beretta. Six B-29 strategic bomberslanded in Montevideo airport the day he took office. During this time, the U.S. were ar-guing before the United Nations in favor of Bernard Baruch’s plan that foresaw atomicretaliations against those nations that intended to develop “illegal” atomic programs(Cabral 1988, 657).

As a result of the sequence of setbacks, Gaviola resigned as director of the NationalObservatory of Cordoba, and worked for private industry until Peron was ousted(Bernaola 2001, 406–07). Before leaving, Gaviola had obtained from the DireccionGeneral de Inmigraciones the permanent residence of his old teacher, the Germanphysicist Richard Gans who arrived in Argentina in May 1947.18 However, as a directconsequence of the conflict between Gaviola and the political and military sector,neither Gans nor Beck participated in Argentina’s nuclear development.19

In summary, there were a number of factors that conspired against APA’s objectivesto create an institution devoted to teaching and research in nuclear physics: Gaviola’sstubbornness, the political weakness of the emergent physics community, the lack of aclear national nuclear policy, and pressure from the United States. Now, the militarywould make their attempt.

III. DNEA: a refuge for Argentine nuclear scientists

Heisenberg’s thwarted invitation not only worsened the relationship between Peron’sadministration and the universities, but also led the military to conclude that the hiringof foreign scientists and technicians could not be left in the hands of civilians and thatnegotiations should be conducted secretly.20 The powers’ active involvement in the“brain hunting” of scientists trained in the German tradition, added to the traditional

17 Gaviola sent invitations to the French L. N. Brillouin, who was in the U.S., to Italian engineer Carlos Vallauri,to the Austrian Kurt Sitte, who was in England, and to the German Richard Gans (Gaviola 1947; Crıtica 1947).18 Gans had been in Argentina between 1912 and 1925 as director of the Physics Institute of University of LaPlata. He had encouraged Gaviola to study in Germany (Gaviola 1954; Pyenson 1985, 179–85; Cabral 1994,52–53).19 Taking into account that Beck and Gans were Jews, Klich discusses the scientific cooperation between formerNational Socialists and Jewish scientists in Argentina. He concludes that the Peronist phobia in Argentina againstJews was more marginal than in Fascist Italy (Klich 1995, 133).20 Peron’s administration had intervened in universities on May 1, 1946. By late 1947, academic opposition to thismeasure increased, describing it as a direct attempt to “convert the universities into bureaucratic dependenciesof the Government” (New York Times 1947).


appreciation by Argentina’s elites of German science and technology.21 This may helpto explain the government’s program for importing German engineers and techniciansin order to develop scientific and technological advances, including in the nuclear field(Klich 1995, 127).

Ignoring the proposals made by Argentine physicists and looking for immediateresults, with no previous evaluation, Peron focused his expectations on Ronald Richter,an Austrian graduate of the German University of Prague who had worked in Berlinin the laboratory of Manfred von Ardenne, a scientist who took part in the ThirdReich nuclear project and later in the Soviet efforts in this area (Meding 1999, 278).22

Richter arrived secretly in Argentina in 1948 as part of a group of German engineersand technicians led by aircraft designer Kurt Tank.23 He convinced Peron that he wouldbe able to obtain energy from controlled fusion. The cost of the project, six milliondollars, was a thousandth of the money invested in the U.S.’s nuclear fission project.Peron began to support Richter’s plan blindly. An impressive laboratory in Bariloche(Rıo Negro province, Patagonia) was built with most of its facilities on Huemul Island.He granted the Austrian physicist unrestricted authority on the island (that equaledpresidential rights) and, in 1950, Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) wascreated to provide Richter with administrative support.

In September 1951, at the eighteenth APA Meeting at Cordoba province,Gaviola, working as scientific consultant for private industry, described the increasingdegradation endured by public universities, and bitterly criticized their favoringpersonal and political factors and their predominant prejudice against educative andscientific ones (Gaviola 1951). On this occasion Beck made public his resignation.Regarding his decision, Beck said: “I have been forced to take it due to the lackof minimum guarantees I consider indispensable to accomplish my work succesfully.”Beck referred to the indifference of the authorities and, alluding to Richter’s project, tothe “considerable administrative apparatus” through which announcements on physicsprojects outside universities were made (Beck 1951, 512).24

APA’s reaction and the fact that Richter did not show interest in incorporatingArgentine scientists into his project, forced Peron’s administration to create the DNEA,to be located in Buenos Aires. While CNEA’s director was Argentina’s presidenthimself, Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez, “a personal friend of Peron’s, but a pragmatic

21 During the 1930–1950 period, the traditional high regard of the local elites on the German culture and,specially, the influence of the German army over the Argentine military sector had a decisive influence over theevolution of both the scientific and technological field (see Ortiz 1996, 160–64).22 Much has been written about Richter’s sadly famous adventures in Argentina. See Gaviola 1955; Primera Plana1967; Westerkamp 1975, 44–46; Mariscotti 1985; idem 1990; Meding 1999, 273–88. In this paragraph we willsummarize this topic.23 A list of Tank’s group can be seen at Meding 1999, 317.24 Beck set off to Rıo de Janeiro to work on the recently created Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Fısicas. Facingthe premature death of his disciple Jose Balseiro in March 1962, Beck would return to Argentina in order totake charge of Balseiro’s courses (Passos Videira 2001, 163, 166).


and very effective administrator,” was initially both CNEA’s General Secretary andDNEA’s Director (Falicov 1970, 9). Richter had nothing to do with DNEA, whereGonzalez began to recruit qualified scientists and graduate students. But it was onlyafter the complete failure of Richter’s project made cover news in the internationalpress that the Armed Forces took a look at Argentine scientists and decided to backDNEA.

The explosion of the first hydrogen bomb by the U.S. in November 1952 coincidedwith Richter’s fall (and CNEA’s with him). At that moment the control of atomicenergy passed from the hands of the Army to those of the Navy; Captain PedroIraolagoitıa was appointed Executive Secretary of DNEA. Slowly some kind ofconsensus between scientists and the military began to emerge, which made possiblea modest but steady “take-off” toward nuclear development. During the next threedecades, a naval officer would lead Argentina’s nuclear area.25 This would ensurenuclear development could count on the Navy’s protection and influence in terms ofbudget, in negotiating the strategic position of nuclear energy, and, most importantly,in keeping this field partially protected from the traumatic political and economicruptures that periodically harmed Argentina’s scientific arena.26

Unlike what was happening at the universities, and with a pragmatism meantto compensate partially for Richter’s fraud, DNEA appointed the best physicistsand chemists among those who stayed in Argentina.27 Thus, during politically andeconomically turbulent times, DNEA became a haven for scientists who opposedPeron’s administration. They were able to work free from the political pressures thatmost university professors were enduring. It was the only national institution wherepeople were not asked to join the government’s party (Partido Justicialista). Good salaries,favorable conditions for research, and the possibility of studying abroad made DNEAa privileged institution (Vessuri 1995, 198–99).

One of the first groups formed in DNEA was devoted to research in radiochemistryled by Walter Seelmann-Eggebert, a German chemist who had arrived in Argentina in1949 to work at the University of Tucuman. Beck may have participated in establishingthe contact. Seelmann-Eggebert had integrated Otto Hahn’s group. He began to workfor DNEA in 1951, and when he returned to Germany in 1955, he left a well-trainedgroup of 25 scientists and technicians (Gonzalez 1988). Another important groupduring this early period was devoted to reactors, led by the young chemical engineerOtto Gamba, DNEA’s Deputy Director.

25 CNEA was ruled by the Navy until December 1983.26 Hymans 2001 argues that the link between CNEA and the Navy was merely formal. However, as the irruptionof politics into the realm of science – basically, periodic military upheavals and economic crisis – has been a keyfactor to account for ruptures in the development of science and technology in Argentina, CNEA’s continuity(anomalous in relation to the uneven history of Argentina’s public scientific institutions) can be understood as aresult of the sponsorship received from the Navy along three decades.27 For a list of the scientists who were expelled from university and incorporated into DNEA, see Westerkamp1975, 47. Colonel Gonzalez tried unsuccesfully to bring Gaviola to DNEA.


Regarding equipment, in May 1951 a physicist commissioned by the Dutchgovernment offered Richter a 28 MV Synchrocyclotron for deuterons and a 1 MeVCockroft-Walton accelerator from the Dutch company Philips. Both accelerators werebought without consultation or further analysis and without having prepared physicistsbeforehand to use them. Nevertheless, these machines would play a productive rolein the history of nuclear physics in Argentina (Mariscotti 1990, 23).28 From 1952 on,different projects to use the equipment bought for Richter’s project were developed atDNEA.

After canceling the nuclear fusion project, Gaviola proposed that Iraolagoitıa movethe high-temperature plasma equipment that had been assigned to Richter’s project offHuemul Island, and to organize a research center on the shore of Lake Nahuel Huapi.However, Gaviola and the Scientific Secretary of CNEA, Captain Manuel Beninson,disagreed on the admission requirements for entering the center and this frustrated theproject (Gaviola n.d.). Some authors have said that the decisive reason behind theirdisagreement was the same that had prevented Gaviola from coming to an agreementwith Savio five years earlier: that is, his demand to keep scientific research outside themilitary realm (Lopez Davalos and Badino 2000, 169).

After two decades during which Gaviola had led the main projects and proposalsput forward by the community of physicists, his desertion of the project of creating anInstitute of Physics in Bariloche marks the moment when he began to lose his role asleader and to isolate himself from the development of the nuclear field in Argentina.The young Catholic physicist Jose Balseiro, who was also taking part in negotiations,would replace him. After finishing his Ph.D. at the University of La Plata in 1944,and at Gaviola’s request, Balseiro joined the National Observatory of Cordoba towork with Beck. In 1952 he had to return from Manchester, where he was doing histraining in research, when he was called to participate in one of the committees thatwas investigating Richter’s activities. In mid-1953, while some scientists had been laidoff from universities because of political conflicts, Balseiro joined the teaching staff ofthe higher level courses alongside Gans (ibid., 158–59).

Also in 1953, DNEA organized the first course on reactors for young researchers.This activity continued in 1954, when mathematicians Gonzalez Domınguez andLuis Santalo, together with Balseiro, organized a summer course in Bariloche.29

The following year, a second summer school was organized at the so-called PlantaExperimental de Altas Temperaturas – the site where Huemul Island’s equipment hadbeen moved. Courses on reactors, theoretical physics for advanced students, and apractical course for professors of physics were its main activities (ibid., 173–74).

28 It is interesting to note that in this same year Brazil also bought a 1 MeV Cockroft-Walton accelerator fromPhilips (Ribeiro de Andrade 2001, 229).29 Both Gonzalez Domınguez and Luis Santalo had been trained by the Spanish mathematician Julio Rey Pastor.


Finally, Balseiro took advantage of these activities to drive the creation of the Institutode Fısica Bariloche in early 1955.30 Funded by CNEA and formally dependent on theUniversity of Cuyo, this institute would soon become the most important Argentinetraining center in the nuclear field (Garcıa and Reising 2002). Balseiro attributed hisinitiative of creating an institute to his frustrated attempts to improve the conditions inthe School of Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires.31 In his letter of resignation,Balseiro wrote to Jose Babini, Dean of the School of Sciences after Peron’s fall: “Idecided that nothing useful could be done . . . . So the Instituto de Fısica Bariloche appearsas a voluntary exile of a group of scientists who wish both to work and to form discipleswithout interferences of criteria or strange organizations into academic life” (Balseiro1956). This way, a successful rapprochement to the military enabled Balseiro to achievethe goals that Gaviola had missed.

When the September 1955 coup d’etat put an abrupt end to Peron’s regime, therewas already an institutional environment appropriate for steady development in thenuclear field. At the international level, the growing economic crisis in Argentina hadled Peron to restore partial relations with the United States. As in the case of many otherdeveloping countries, Argentina’s nuclear program received a major stimulus througha bilateral cooperation agreement with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, whichcame into force on July 29, 1955.32 Being part of Eisenhower’s administration program“Atoms for Peace,” it anticipated the time when the United States would provideenriched uranium for future Argentine research reactors.33 From that moment on,DNEA was organized according to a pattern common to other developing countries’agencies. With intensive research and training programs, DNEA’s main goal was theestablishment of research reactors, initially incorporating as much foreign technical andfinancial help as possible (Redick 1972, 12; Sabato 1973, 23).

During this time, DNEA’s activities focused mainly on research on the physicsof reactors and radiochemistry, and on exploring and prospecting for resources ofnuclear raw materials.34 It also began to encourage the use of radioisotopes stressing

30 After the death of Balseiro, this institute would be renamed Instituto Balseiro.31 Between other initiatives, Balseiro had got the support of the CNEA to provide the University of BuenosAires with both teaching staff and equipment.32 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Argentinaconcerning the civil uses of atomic energy, Washington, July 29, 1955. About local repercussions, see La Nacion 1955.33 Between 1955 and 1961, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission signed 25 agreements to cooperate on investigation,one to cooperate on power production, and 13 to cooperate on investigation and in power production with 37countries and West Berlin. Also 11 agreements of mutual defense and three special agreements with IAEA andEUROATOM (see, e.g., Hewlett and Holl 1989, 236, 581). Agreements identical to Argentina’s were signedby Washington with Turkey (June 10), Israel (July 12), China (July 18), Lebanon (July 18), Colombia (July 19),Portugal (July 21), Venezuela (July 21), Denmark (July25), Philippines (July 27), Italy (July 28), Brazil (August 3),Greece (August 4), Chile (August 8) and Pakistan (August 11) (Ordonez and Sanchez-Ron 1996, 197).34 Concerning raw materials, explorations had begun in 1950. By 1955, CNEA had a group of 30 geologistswho began the systematic prospects of the uranium ore resources of the country (Alegrıa et al. 1972, 8). At themid-1960s, Argentina ranked among the first nine nations in the world in uranium reserves (Eklund 1964, 14).


its medical and agricultural applications. At the First International Conference onthe Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which took place in Geneva in August 1955,Argentina presented 37 reports. Seelmann-Eggebert’s disciples presented thirteen newradiosotopes (Martınez Vidal 1995, 178–79).35

IV. Metallurgy for autonomy

After the toppling of Peron, CNEA was closed down and DNEA was renamed CNEA.Discussions within the academic community made public the tensions between thephysicists who had entered CNEA and those who had stayed away from it (Westerkamp1975, 48). Also, the restrictive admission system of the Instituto de Fısica Bariloche – only15 students were admitted annually, in contrast with the traditionally massive admissionsystem of the Argentine public universities – was temporarily criticized as elitist (Falicov1970, 10).36

In spite of criticism, the Instituto de Fısica Bariloche would become one of theprotagonists of the so-called “golden age” (1956–1966) of Argentina’s scientificinstitutional development (Adler 1987, 106). In the following years, the InstitutoNacional de Tecnologıa Agropecuaria (1956), the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologıa Industrial(1957), and the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientıficas y Tecnicas (1958) were alsocreated. Adding CNEA and public universities to this list completed the landscape ofpublic institutions established to promote scientific and technological research (Valeiras1992; Caldelari et al. 1992, 168–73).

In the academic realm, the new dictatorship proposed the reorganization of publicuniversities as a priority. Thus began a period of modernization in universities,characterized by the renewal of curricula, the creation of research centers (both onnatural and social sciences), and the increase in full-time positions for professors andassistants (Sigal 2002, 76–80). As a result, many scientists returned to the academy,and CNEA established new relationships with public universities. It opened its labsto researchers in the School of Sciences of University of Buenos Aires; in return, theSchool of Sciences let CNEA’s groups use its calculation center, where the brand-newcomputer Clementina was located.37 From 1956 on, CNEA would also expand itsparticipation in the Schools of Engineering and Medicine of the University of BuenosAires, and at the School of Agronomy of the University of La Plata (IAEA 962a,

35 At this moment, CNEA’s personnel was about 250 scientists and 300 technicians (Alegrıa et al. 1972, 9).36 Tomas Buch, a chemist member of the first faculty of the institute, said: “Besides, all students had scholarshipsfrom CNEA, so the cost per student was much higher in Bariloche than in Buenos Aires” (personalcommunication, Buenos Aires, June 2003). It is important to note that all public universities in Argentinaare gratuitous. Students of Instituto de Fısica Bariloche also received, and continue to receive, a stipend formaintenance.37 Emma Perez Ferreira (personal communication, Buenos Aires, July 2003). Physicist Perez Ferreira joinedCNEA in 1952 and was appointed CNEA’s president in the 1980s.


15–17). This interaction enabled groups in public universities to focus on research inexperimental physics, and to inaugurate the first courses in nuclear physics (Falicov1970, 41).38

Although Peron’s deposition implied a change of authority, it did not alter CNEA’sinternal policy. Captain (later Admiral) Oscar Quihillalt who had been an activeparticipant in consolidating the Instituto de Fısica Bariloche, was appointed head ofCNEA. With a degree in Radiocommunication Engineering at University of BuenosAires, Quihillalt had been trained at the Bofors institutions in Karlskoga, Sweden. Inthe late 1940s, he worked on applications of calculating machines to balistics, and wasalso the author of the first works on computers written in Argentina (Babini 2003,15–16).39 Except for a brief interruption, Quihillalt would be in charge of CNEA’spresidency from 1955 until the return of Peron in 1973.40

In addition to the Instituto de Fısica Bariloche, another key initiative during 1955 wasthe creation of the Metallurgy and Reactor Divisions. CNEA’s president appointedJorge Sabato, a high-school teacher of physics, to organize the Metallurgy Division.Sabato would play a central role in CNEA’s expectations of boosting technologicaland industrial development at a national level. Characterized as an autodidact, Sabatowas not only a teacher of physics but also an occasional journalist, an activity that hebegan in 1947 in order to earn a living. In 1952, he ran a small research laboratory fora metallurgical company. He quit in 1954 to take part in the creation of one of thefirst private laboratories dedicated to assisting metallurgical and mechanical domesticindustries. Sabato’s company was hired by CNEA to advise on metallurgy and fuelelements (Martınez Vidal 1995, 80–83).

As director of CNEA’s Metallurgy Division, Sabato initially set his sights on solvingproblems related to nuclear fuels. Although there were good metallurgy specialistsworking in private industry, metallurgy was not included in 1955 in universityprograms, apart from some sporadic graduate courses. Metallurgy was neither taughtas a regular subject in any of the Argentine universities, nor was metallurgical researchcarried out by any center or laboratory within the country. “In fact, metallurgy wasa sort of outcast in the academic world, despite the fact that the electro-mechanical-metallurgical industry already comprised 25 per cent of all Argentine industry” (Sabato1973, 26). Thus, the decision to organize a typical nuclear metallurgy laboratory, likethe Metallurgy Division at Argonne National Laboratory in the U.S., Chalk River inCanada, or Harwell in the U.K. “would have been the ‘easy way’; but CNEA chose the‘hard way’,” as Sabato put it. Instead of focusing on the creation of a nuclear metallurgy

38 In 1957, the Nuclear Physics professorship on University of Buenos Aires and Universidad Nacional de LaPlata were created (Westerkamp 1975, 50–51).39 Among other activities, Quihillalt tried to drive the construction of a differential analyzer in Argentina, similarto the one Vannevar Bush had constructed at MIT (see Quihillalt 1949a; idem 1949b; idem 1951).40 During this period Argentina had eight national presidents.


laboratory, he decided to establish a metallurgy research laboratory able to solve moregeneral problems. The equipment was purchased following the same criteria (ibid.).

That way, Sabato’s laboratory had to build its own foundations. Perceived as aquixotic endeavor, the “scientific establishment” labeled la murga, the group that wasin charge of this task: a metallurgy laboratory created without metallurgy experts.41

About the chemical engineer Mazza, who in 1957 led the team which manufacturedthe first Argentine fuel elements, Sabato said that although he had been trained inBirmingham (England) on metal fatigue, “he had never seen a fuel element in hiswhole life” (Sabato 1972, 10).

Sabato’s Division orientation, which stressed the importance of having “varietyand flexibility,” was characterized by him as a “heterodox decision.” Sabato’s requestsbefore military authorities were clear: “We undertook to meet all the needs of nuclearmetallurgy that CNEA could have; in return for that strong commitment, we asked forthe most complete freedom to choose the ways we judged most adequate to honor it, nomatter how heterodox these ways might look to external observers” (ibid.). Quihillaltfully endorsed Sabato’s demands. Soon thereafter an intensive graduate training programon the physics and chemistry of metals was started (Sabato 1962, 10).

In a broad sense, Sabato’s strategy may be viewed as an effort to reconcile the militaryand the civilian scientists’ goals. The pragmatism, strong industrialist stamp, and accenton technological independence – apparent both in CNEA’s rhetoric and decisions –were not only assumed and promoted by his claims and actions, but also revealedthemselves close to the ideology of nationalist sectors, both civilian and military (Sarlo2001, 74).42

V. The first nuclear research reactor

In 1956, Argentina was among the countries that signed the act that established theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accepted its safeguards system.43 InNovember, Quihillalt announced that Argentina would buy an experimental atomic

41 The term murga applies to a group of people in costumes who participate in Carnival parades. In this context ithas obvious derogative connotations. At the beginning, Sabato’s laboratory was integrated by a teacher of physics(Sabato), two electromechanic engineers, one aeronautical engineer, four chemical engineers, one civilianengineer, three licenciates in chemistry, and one student of chemistry.42 Sabato maintained an ambiguous position regarding the role of universities in the technological and industrialdevelopment. In 1972, after saying that during the 1950s his main purpose was to make metallurgy an “academicactivity,” he added: “I feel disgust toward the word ‘academic,’ though I have no choice but to use it to describean organized and continuous scientific activity, performed in laboratories, research centers, university schools,and the like” (Sabato 1972, 9).43 IAEA’s safeguard system can be seen in United Nations 1957, 476–78. Argentina integrated the first groupof co-sponsors of a Western resolution introduced by the U.S. and Britain under which the General Assemblyof United Nations endorsed the creation of an atoms-for-peace agency. The other co-sponsors were: Australia,Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa (New York Times 1955a).


reactor from the U.S. Selected from bids submitted by seven American and one Britishcompany, the reactor would be built by General Electric Company at a cost of between$1 and $2 million (New York Times 1956a). Argentina’s commitment to the U.S. wasillustrated in December, when Argentina’s ambassador was dismissed after his statementto the United Nations’ that Argentina’s government was showing preference for Britishequipment in the development of its atomic energy program instead of using U.S.atomic offers (New York Times 1956b). At this point, considering that from 1956to 1959 the U.S. exported some forty research reactors, Argentina was just anothercountry within the sphere of influence of the aggressive U.S. policy for capturing themajor part of the research reactor sales.44

At the beginning of 1957 Quihillalt flew to New York, where he found out thatthe sale would be delayed for some months because of legal matters related to thecontract. By that time, CNEA’s officers and scientists already knew that Brazil was alsobehind the purchase of a research reactor, and tacitly both countries were beginningto compete on who would be able to start the first reactor in Latin America.45

Quihillalt traveled to Philadelphia to attend a lecture. There he met Carlos Buchler,a former CNEA official who at the time was working for the Argonne NationalLaboratory in Chicago (Domingo 2003, 29). On Buchler’s recommendation, Quihillalttraveled to the Argonne National Laboratory to see a little reactor named Argonautwhich had been unveiled a few weeks before.46 On this occasion, technicians presenteda complete exhibition of the reactor. It was then that Quihillalt conceived the idea ofbuilding an Argonaut-type reactor in Argentina, instead of purchasing it abroad, as wasthe rule in those days. Quihillalt went from Chicago to Washington to meet John Hall,a friend who was in charge of foreign relations at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.It was through Hall that Quihillalt got the Argonaut plans and the permission to sendtwo people for training at the Argonne National Laboratory (Gonzalez 1988, 41–42).On April 9, 1957, CNEA decided to build its first nuclear reactor. This decision alsoconsidered that Sabato’s Metallurgy Division would take care of manufacturing the fuelelements (Quihillalt 1979). From then on, decisions and actions accelerated.

44 As part of the Atoms-for-Peace Program Grants for Research Reactors, the purchasing country was able tobenefit from a U.S. subsidy of $350,000. Differently from reactors exported by Canada or France, U.S. reactorswere small, devoid of any military significance, and easy to safeguard (Goldschmidt 1985, 111). About Atoms forPeace, Medhurst says: “In short, if U.S. industry could be the first to establish a nuclear presence in the variouscountries, those countries would almost inevitably be dependent upon the U.S. for design, construction, initialoperation, educational materials, and every other aspect of the infant industry. Once established, of course, U.S.technology would be difficult, if not impossible, to substitute for” (Medhurst 1997, 588).45 As early as December 9, 1955, General Bernardino Correa de Matos, president of the Brazilian Atomic EnergyCommission, had announced the acquisition of a research reactor, the first one to be installed in South America(New York Times 1955b). I did not find exhaustive articles on research reactors in Brazil.46 Argonaut (Argonne Nuclear Assembly for University Training) was a low-power (10kW of heat), low-costresearch reactor, moderated by light water, designed to be safe enough for students. It had been designed as atraining reactor for the international reactor school. It first became critical on February 9, 1957. The cost of allthe reactor components and the building of the reactor could not exceed $100,000 (Holl 1997, 147).


The reactor would be built on land owned by Direccion General de FabricacionesMilitares, close to Buenos Aires. In April, 12 tons of nuclear-quality graphite werebought from France. At the beginning of May, through the CNEA Civil EngineeringDepartment, work for the construction of the site where the reactor would be locatedwas contracted. Also, through a number of meetings with Argentine industry men,CNEA officers began to explore the possibility of cooperation with this sector. In June,the assembly of the electronic control system began. By mid-August, the first parts ofthe reactor were assembled. In September, work on its concrete armor-plate started(Forlerer and Palacios 1998, 43).

Late in September, Professor Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos, head of the Sao PauloUniversity’s Institute of Atomic Energy, announced that Brazil had achieved the firstnuclear chain reaction in Latin America (New York Times 1957). This piece of newscould have put an end to the tacit race between Brazil and Argentina. However, it isprobable that the CNEA group had not been informed about this news. Some yearslater it would be argued, as we will see, that the fact that Brazil did not settle the officialinauguration would enable Argentina to claim priority.

There is an eloquent story about this period. Sabato mentions a U.S. delegation thatvisited CNEA while he was manufacturing the first prototype of the fuel elements.Precisely when they entered his laboratory, Sabato was pumping into the press andMazza was holding the mould of extrusion with a pair of pincers. Soon after that, theleader of the U.S. delegation told Quihillalt: “You have in a room two guys playingwith a hand-press and who are completely crazy. I suggest you expel them as soon aspossible” (Sabato 1972, 9).

At the end of October, CNEA signed a contract with the U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission to purchase six kilograms of U-238 enriched up to a maximum of 20per cent in U-235, consistent with the cooperation agreement signed in 1955. Theuranium oxide arrived in Argentina in mid-December.47 By mid-January 1958, thefuel elements had already been produced, and the reactor assembled (Forlerer andPalacios 1998, 43). On January 17, 1958, the research reactor, called RA-1 (ArgentineReactor 1), first became critical.48

Three days later, on January 20, the official inauguration was carried out. Thepolitical importance of this event is apparent from the list of people who attended it: theprovisional president and vice-president, ministers of internal affairs, of education andjustice, of communications, of transports, of economy, of public works, of aeronautics,of navy, of foreign affairs, of labor and social security, and of trade and industry. Theminister of war sent a delegate and also attending were U.S. Ambassador Williard L.

47 Quihillalt emphasized that this was the first time that U.S. exported raw material for another country toelaborate their own fuel elements for a research reactor (La Prensa 1958b).48 According to Quihillalt, the cost of the RA-1 was lower than the cost of the reactor made by the ArgonneNational Laboratory (La Prensa 1958a).


Beaullac, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for Latin America delegate NathanWoodruff, and members of the Catholic Church (La Prensa 1958b).

In his opening speech, Quihillalt stressed that the RA-1 was more than a meredemonstration of technological capability, or the acquisition of an instrument todevelop basic science: “The fact of having made this modest reactor does not meanthat we have neglected the industrial aspect of power reactors” (La Prensa 1958b). Headded that one of the reasons that the RA-1 was necessary for producing radioisotopeswas that they could not be imported, due to their very short lives. He also noted: “weneed it [the RA-1] to be able to study the metallic uranium that is produced in ourfactory from Argentine mineral, for its use as fuel in power reactors” (ibid.). In fact,this goal would be achieved by Metallurgy Division in early 1972, when the first fuelelement for power reactors manufactured by CNEA would eventually be irradiatedon the German reactor MZFR of the Center of Atomic Investigations of Karlsruhe(Sabato 1972, 7). Quihillalt was still president of CNEA at that time.

The day after the inauguration of the RA-1, a nine-line piece of news in the NewYork Times announced: “President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu turned on the first atomicreactor in Latin America today” (New York Times 1958), contradicting what the samenewspaper had published in September 1957 about the first Brazilian atomic reaction.

On January 24, convinced that Argentina had reached the first nuclear reaction inLatin America, and maybe in the southern hemisphere, Quihillalt came to Brazil toattend the official inauguration of the first Brazilian research reactor, which wouldtake place the following day (La Prensa 1958c).49 A Buenos Aires newspaper clarified,however, that Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek actually turned on the reactorfor the second time. “Last year, in September, it had been tested for some days anddeclared to be in perfect working order” (La Prensa 1958d).50

This race for priority may be interpreted as an early expression of both countries’plans for gaining regional hegemony in the nuclear field. In the long run, the racebetween Brazil and Argentina to go nuclear, contrary to what was expected, had noserious consequences in the field of nuclear proliferation, with the exception of someambiguous statements made by the military governments of both countries during the1970s (Courtney 1980, 241).51 Today both countries maintain that they had producedthe first nuclear reaction in Latin America.

49 It can be mentioned that HIFAR (High Flux Australian Reactor), the first Australian research reactor designedand built in Lucas Heights for U.K. Atomic Energy Agency, went critical on January 26, 1958 (MacLeod 1994,306).50 Schwartzman 1978, 565, says that the Instituto de Pesquisas Radioativas, organized in 1953 in Minas Gerais,“since 1956 has operated an experimental reactor of the Triga type.” This statement is erroneous. The Trigareactor was inaugurated in 1960. See, e.g., the web page of the Centro de Desenvolvimento da TecnologiaNuclear (the former Instituto de Pesquisas Radioativas): <http://www.cdtn.br/institucional/historico.asp>.51 A moment of tension between Brazil and Argentina took place as a result of a massive nuclear agreementbetween Brazil and Germany in 1975, which aroused the bitter opposition of the U.S. However it did nothave any further relevant impact in Argentina apart from some wariness in the military sector (see, e.g., Gall1976). About this agreement, Sabato proposed a different interpretation: “But in order to obtain and sustain this


VI. The first power reactor on the horizon

In a developing country like Argentina, where in the mid-1940s the scientificcommunity was just beginning to get organized, nuclear energy was seen by the smallcommunity of physicists as an opportunity for promoting the creation of institutionsfor teaching and doing research on physics. On the other hand, the Argentine militarysaw nuclear energy as a promise for diversifying sources of energy and for advancingits technological modernization. Despite the complementary interests of both sectors,Argentina’s initial failures in the nuclear field can be explained as a result of the politicalweakness of the physics community, Gaviola’s inflexibility regarding the civilian natureof research, and the military’s lack of understanding of the role played by universitiesand local scientists in scientific and technological development.

The creation of DNEA (later CNEA), its subsequent transfer from the Army’s tothe Navy’s hands, and the replacement of Gaviola by young physicist Balseiro in thenegotiations – all these factors would contribute to a shift in the positions of scientistsand Navy officers toward a confluence of objectives. The creation of the Instituto deFısica Bariloche was one of the crucial achievements in this process.

Since 1955, the center of the scene would be occupied by Sabato, a pragmaticscientist with a remarkable ability to negotiate and promote his ideas,52 and Quihillalt,an atypical member of the military in his passion for science. The construction ofRA-1 represents the first expression of a work style that Sabato and Quihillalt began toforge. This work style would characterize CNEA’s performance during the following15 years: intense training of scientists and technicians, and bold and risky decisionsaimed at achieving autonomous technological development. During the 1960s, aneffort was made to integrate scientific, technological, and industrial sectors. In thatsense, RA-1, evaluated by Quihillalt as a “modest” achievement from the perspectiveof the nuclear mainstream, meant the projection on the horizon of a reality that upto that moment only existed in CNEA’s rhetoric. These expectations would soonbe backed by the sale of the know-how developed in the process of manufacturingRA-1’s fuel elements to the German company Degussa-Leybold. This was the firsttime Argentina exported nuclear technology (Martınez Vidal 1995, 180).

Brazil, Argentina’s main competitor in the region, presents an interesting case forcomparison with Argentina’s initial stage of nuclear development. After 1955, a primaryaspect of Brazilian economic policy was emphasis on rapid industrialization. Facing

technological nuclear autonomy – that the central countries are not ready to accept willingly – , Argentina needsthat many other countries, and particularly those from Latin America, be able to reach their own autonomy.”And he added below: “The key to the independence of Latin America is the Argentine-Brazilian understanding”(Sabato 1977, 17).52 Sabato’s protagonism reached its peak in the mid-1960s, when he became one of the main ideological leadingfigures – along with Amılcar Herrera and Oscar Varsavsky in Argentina, Jose Leite Lopez in Brazil, MiguelWionczek in Mexico and Marcel Roche in Venezuela, among others – of what some authors call “LatinAmerican thought on Science, Technology and Society” (see, e.g., Dagnino et al. 1996).


the options of relying on its own scientific community for the development of nucleartechnology or acquiring foreign technology, the Brazilian government chose to acquireforeign technology (Schwartzman 1978, 565). Foreign capital and know-how wereconsidered the main components of the industrialization process, and Brazilian nuclearpolicy was oriented in that direction. As Botelho argues, “As early as 1953, as ifforeshadowing later developments, an editorial in Ciencia e Cultura pointed out that thepattern of industrialization negatively affected the professionalization of researchers,because it pulled capable people away from practice of research” (Botelho 1990, 488).As another diverging point from Argentina’s case – where CNEA monopolized nuclearinitiatives – it can be mentioned that, by mid-1950s, no central institution existed inBrazil capable of ensuring a single and autonomy-oriented nuclear policy. On this Adlercomments, “Brazil’s nuclear program became an arena for domestic and internationalpolitical pressure” (Adler 1988, 77).

Spain also presents an enlightening comparison to Argentina.53 Like Argentina,Spain was, in the 1940s, isolated from the international environment, and was ruled bythe Armed Forces. In both Spain and Argentina, the most important scientists foundthemselves separated from the officially promoted science sector. However, a distinctivefeature of Spain’s case during the 1950s was the industry’s early interest in integratingnuclear energy to produce electricity. The Junta de Energıa Nuclear, which was thecentral nuclear institution in Spain from 1951, was attached to the Ministry of Industry(Ordonez and Sanchez-Ron 1996, 193). As a result, the necessity of shortening thetime for transferring nuclear technology to the industrial sector would force Spain tobe strongly dependent on the U.S., and to become “a mere consumer.”54

Paradoxically, unlike Brazil and Spain, Argentina’s industrial sector was not interestedin nuclear development. This fact made it possible to attempt local developmentwithout pressure from the industry, which although more uncertain in the short term,would be potentially more autonomous in the long run. In Argentina, CNEA wasthe institution that encouraged the industrial sector to develop nuclear technology. Inorder to establish a relationship between industry and the Metallurgy Division, CNEAand the Asociacion de Industriales Metalurgicos created the Servicio de Asistencia Tecnica a laIndustria (SATI) in January 1961. A Sabato’s initiative, SATI was created to do researchand development on all kinds of problems that had to do with metallurgy, on demandby domestic companies (Wortman 1995, 29–31).

By 1960, around 20 graduate students had already spent two years in laboratoriessuch as the Physical Metallurgy Department of the University of Birmingham, theMax Planck Institut fur Metallforschung in Stuttgart, or the Ecoles des Mines in Paris or theMetallurgy Division of the Argonne National Laboratory. The metallurgy division had

53 For a “parallel” analysis of the initial nuclear development in Spain, see Ordonez and Sanchez-Ron 1996.54 “In the long term, all dependency is negative, and Spain never became more than a mere consumer in thisfield” (ibid., 200).


25 scientists, 50 technicians, 1500-square-meter facilities and had invested more than$10 million in equipment (Sabato 1962, 10).

In the 1960s, CNEA developed three more research reactors; all their fuel elementswere manufactured in Argentina. As expected in an agro-exporting country, whichalso had an important biomedical tradition, the use of radioisotopes in agriculture andbiomedical sciences helped integrate CNEA’s activities to the programs of institutionssuch as the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologıa Agropecuaria (the national research institutefor agriculture and stock breeding), the Hospital de Clınicas (a general universityhospital) and the Instituto Angel Roffo (a university hospital for cancer research andtreatment) (IAEA Bulletin 1962a, 15–17). For example, CNEA’s Departments ofRadioisotopes and of Biology and Medicine used, besides its own laboratories, thoseof 27 university and hospital research centers (IAEA Bulletin 1962b, 9). ConfirmingArgentina’s dreams of regional hegemony in the nuclear area, through IAEA’s programs,Argentina provided experts for assistance activities, primarily for other Latin Americancountries.55 A new stage in Argentina’s nuclear history would begin in early 1964,when the possibility of constructing the first nuclear power plant was conceived forthe first time.

Acknowledgments

I benefited from many discussions with Ana Marıa Vara, Eduardo Ortiz, and HectorRubinstein and am grateful for the sources they offered. I also wish to thank tworeferees, Regis Cabral and an anonymous one, for their detailed comments andthoughtful suggestions.

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