Hume's Self-Interest Requirement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Hume's Self-Interest RequirementAuthor(s): Robert ShaverSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 1-17Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231850 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 1 Volume 24, Number 1, March 1994, pp. 1 - 18

Hume's Self-interest Requirement

ROBERT SHAVER

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg, MB Canada R3T 2M8

Having explained the moral approbation attending merit or virtue, there remains

nothing but briefly to consider our interested obligation to it, and to inquire whether

every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not best find

his account in the practice of every moral duty. (E 278)1

[W]hat theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest

of each individual? (E 280)

So writes Hume. He makes it a requirement on any duty that performing the duty be in my expected self-interest. Call this the 'self-interest

requirement/ or SIR. I shall argue that Hume neither takes SIR seriously nor has reason to do so.

Apart from interest in the justification for SIR, I have three motives for examining Hume's treatment of it.

First, there is little discussion of the history of SIR. Standard taxono- mies of the British moralists divide them into 'sentimentalists' and

1 Reference to works by Hume will be cited in the text as follows: T = A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978); E = An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge and

P.H. Nidditch, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975); and NR = Dialogues

Concerning Natural Religion, R.H. Popkin, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1980); and from

the Essays, Eugene F. Miller, ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty 1985), S = The Sceptic'; NC = 'Of National Characters'; IP = 'Of the Independency of Parliament'; PO = 'Of

Passive Obedience'; and OG = 'Of the Origin of Government.'



2 Robert Shaver

'rationalists/ not into those who hold SIR or not. And standard debates over ethical egoism need not show that SIR should be accepted or

rejected. As the example of Hume shows, ethical egoism is not necessary for SIR. One reason for overlooking the debate is that few gave reasons for SIR. SIR was not a serious issue for those involved, since everyone who made SIR thought that it was satisfied. This insouciance sometimes makes it hard to separate those who make the requirement from those who do not make it, but hold that it is satisfied anyway.2 Only if one

thought it was not satisfied would one carefully present reasons for or

against making it. Thus Sidgwick, who argues that it is not satisfied, is

very concerned in his Outlines of the History of Ethics to divide those who make the requirement from those who do not.3

Second, SIR is sometimes taken to be crucial in the debate over the character of Hume's theory. For example, William K. Frankena cites E 280 to attribute an egoistic conception of rationality to Hume ('Action,' 188). Nicholas Capaldi cites E 278 and 280 to claim that for Hume 'any account of morality presupposes the consistency of self-interest and the

public interest.... [T]he lack of conflict is a basic assumption of moral

philosophizing.'4 And taking these passages seriously provides ammu- nition for all those, from James Balfour and Thomas Reid to David Gauthier and Brian Barry, who see Hume as offering a contractarian or 'mutual advantage' account of justice.5

2 For a similar point, see D.H. Munro's Introduction to his A Guide to the British Moralists (London: Fontana 1972), 20.

3 For the argument that morality does not satisfy SIR, see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett 1977) H.5. For two excellent (though brief) recent histories that feature SIR, see William K. Frankena, 'Concepts of Rational Action in the History of Ethics/ Social Theory and Practice 9 (1983) 165-97, and 'Sidgwick and the History of Ethical Dualism' in Bart Schultz, ed., Essays on Henry Sidgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992) 175-98.

4 Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang 1989), 256; 260

5 James Balfour, A Dilineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality, with Reflexions upon Mr. Hume's Book, intitled, An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Edin- burgh, 1753), 46, 49-54, 57, 73; Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, in Philosophical Works vol. 2 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag 1967), 660; David Gauthier, 'David Hume, Contractarian/ Philosophical Review 89 (1979) 3-38; 'Three

Against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd/ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982) 11-29; 'Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave/ Hume Studies 18 (1993) 401-28; Brain Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California 1989), ch. IV. I myself took E 278 and 280 seriously in 'Hume on the Duties of Humanity/ Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992) 545-56.



Hume's Self-interest Requirement 3

Third, E 278 and 280 are puzzling in the context of the Enquiry. In chapter V, Hume argues at length against an egoistic explanation of why utility pleases. In Appendix n, he argues against 'Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of morals' (E 296). Directly before E 278, he argues that we must take up a 'common' a viewpoint, and he explains how the sentiment of humanity can overcome self-love. He then insists that virtue must pay. Why?

In section I, I give the standard cases for SIR and argue that Hume cannot appeal to them. In section II, I argue that Hume finds SIR supererogatory on any moral theory. In section HI, I defend my interpretation from objections suggested by the practicality of morality. In section IV, I argue that Hume's self-interested account of the original motive to be just does not motivate SIR even for the special case of justice. In section V, I return briefly to the larger historical picture.

I

Before Hume, there were two standard arguments for SIR. The first combines psychological egoism and an instrumental view of rationality. Thus Hobbes writes that an action is 'not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit,' and 'those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to [one's] ends.' To be 'against reason' is to be 'against ... benefit.'6 When Hobbes adds that 'of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe/ it follows that if morality is to be reasonable, it must meet SIR.7

The second argument for SIR combines psychological egoism and the claim that morality must be practical. Locke admits that, '[w]ere there no human law, nor punishment, nor obligation of civil or divine sanctions,' we could still learn what actions to call 'virtues' and which to call 'vices.' However, this knowledge of how 'to speak properly ... teach[es] us nothing of morality' since '[t]he end and use of morality [is] to direct our lives, and by showing us what actions are good, and what bad, prepare us to do the one and avoid the other.' Mastery of language does 'not show the inf erments that may draw us to virtue and deter us from

6 Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968) ch. 15, 203, 204

7 Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 14, 192. For discussions of Hobbes's psychological egoism, see Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 19-24 and Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political

Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986), 44-51.



4 Robert Shaver

vice/ Without sanctions, 'the force of morality is lost, and evaporates only into words/ What we call 'virtues' and 'vices' will be 'indifferent as to any man's practice' and provide 'no obligation to observe them/ What 'are properly and truly the rules of good and evil' are so 'because the conformity or disagreement of our actions with these will bring upon us good or evil; these influence our lives.' To this, Locke adds a particular account of possible influences. '[A]n understanding free agent naturally follows that which causes pleasure to it and flies that which causes pain.... [N]othing can be good or bad to any one but as it ... serves to produce in them pleasure or pain.' As a result, for morality to direct our lives, virtue must bring pleasure and vice must bring pain, 'it being impossible to set any other motive or restraint to the actions of a free understanding agent.'8

Hume agrees with Hobbes on reason. He also agrees with Locke on the practical nature of morality. But since he denies psychological egoism, he cannot use these arguments (E 295-302).

One might object that, although Hume rejects psychological egoism, he does think we are extremely partial to ourselves, our family, and our friends (e.g. T 487, 488, 491-2, 521, 602, E 188). This cannot let Hume borrow Hobbist and Lockean arguments for SIR, however. Since it remains possible to be motivated against one's self-interest - whether to help friends or family, as Hume suggests, or to help strangers - one cannot argue that instrumental rationality or practicality demand SIR. They demand SIR, not in all cases, but only given self-interested desires. And even if I can never act against the interests of myself, my family, and my friends, taken together, SIR still does not follow: the instrumental rationality and practicality arguments would then support only the requirement that any duty must be in the expected interest of this group.

One might also object that, although Hume finds psychological egoism false, he supposes that we should hold it to be true. He writes that it is 'a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact

' (IP 42-3). But this is not a concession

to motivating people in general, who 'are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity/ It is a concession to motivating those who serve a party and so feel unbound by the considerations of

8 John Locke, 'Of Ethick in General/ in Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (New York: Burt Franklin 1972), 309-12. For SIR and psychological egoism deployed relentlessly against Hutcheson and Samuel Clarke, see John Clarke, The Foundation

of Morality in Theory and Practice considered, in Selby-Bigge, ed. British Moralists vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 1897) 239-44 and Frankena, 'Action/ 183.




honour which are usually 'a great check upon mankind' (IP 43). Hume implies that the concession is unnecessary when dealing, as SIR does, with moral constraints on private individuals. It is a maxim restricted to the design of political institutions.9

II

Hobbes and Locke cannot supply Hume with an argument for SIR. A more promising candidate is Butler. Like Hume, Butler rejects psychological egoism yet suggests SIR: 'Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it/10 Butler's rationale is made clear by the context. Making 'all possible concessions' to self-love, Butler writes that

there can no access be had to the understanding, but by convincing men, that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest. It may be

allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of

happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us; that

they will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and

beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence between them.

Immediately after his statement of SIR, Butler adds that 'so far as the interests of virtue depend upon the theory of it being secured from open scorn, so far its very being in the world depends upon its appearing to have no contrariety to private interest and self-love.'11 SIR 'may be allowed' since it does no harm to do so, and showing that virtue meets SIR does some good, by allowing 'access ... to the understanding' which

might otherwise 'scorn' virtue. Were Butler to admit the conflict between virtue and self-interest that he finds 'impossible,' men would remain 'under the strictest moral obligations, whatever their opinion be con-

cerning the happiness of virtue.... [T]hough a man should doubt of every

9 For a similar discussion of the maxim, see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in

Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981), 105-6.

10 Joseph Butler, Sermons, in Works, W.E. Gladstone, ed. (Clarendon: Oxford 1897) vol.

2,XI.21

11 Butler, Sermons, XI.2, 21-2



6 Robert Shaver

thing else, yet ... he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue; an obligation implied in the very idea of virtue/12 Butler implies that SIR is a supererogatory demand: were it not met, fewer would be virtuous, but the same obligations would remain.13

The same is true of Hume. After first stating SIR at E 278, Hume writes that, if SIR is met, 'we shall have the satisfaction to reflect, that we have advanced principles, which ... may contribute to the amendment of men's lives, and their improvement in morality and social virtue' (E 279). Before stating SIR at E 280, Hume asks 'what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of austerity and rigour?' (E 280) And the statement of SIR on E 280 explains the passage by arguing that SIR must be met for a theory to 'ever serve any useful purpose.' Meeting SIR, then, is desirable because it would motivate many people to adopt the Humean virtues. It is not obligatory. Hume supposes that, if SIR is not met, he would still have 'advanced principles, which ... will stand the test of reasoning and inquiry.... The philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society' (E 279). This is why he considers interested obligation 'briefly,' after confessing that 'I cannot, at present, be more assured of any truth, which I learn from reasoning and argument, than that personal merit consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him' (E 278).

The Treatise shows the same pattern. Before arguing that Humean virtues 'may interest every principle in our nature,' Hume has con- cluded that 'I am hopeful that nothing is wanting to an accurate proof of this system of ethics' (T 620, 618). It is not necessary for 'an accurate

12 Butler, Sermons, pref. 22

13 For more evidence in favour of this interpretation, see Alan R. White, 'Conscience and Self-Love in Butler's Sermons/ Philosophy 27 (1952) 329-44; A.E. Taylor, 'Some Features of Butler's Ethics,' Mind 35 (1926) 294-300; John Kleinig, 'Butler in a Cool Hour' Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (1969) 399-411; and Austin Duncan-Jones, Butler's Moral Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1952), 113-15. 1 write 'fewer' because Butler holds, contrary to the allowance made in the quoted passages, that conscience can motivate. See White, 'Conscience,' 334-5. White also notes that Butler is following Shaftesbury's claim that 'though the habit of selfishness and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to real merit or virtue; yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment' (337). See Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc., John M. Robert- son, ed. (Gloucester: Peter Smith 1963) vol. 1, 274.




proof to show that the possession of Humean virtues pays. Hume does go on to try to show that Humean virtue pays. But this attempt lies in a section which begins as follows: 'Were it proper ... to bribe the readers assent, or employ any thing but solid argument, we are here abundantly supplied with topics to engage the affections' (T 619). The demonstration of interested obligation is a 'bribe' rather than solid argument. And it is a rather half-hearted bribe at that: after noting 'that a mind will never be able to bear its own survey, that has been wanting in its part to mankind and society/ Hume stops: 'I forbear insisting on this subject. Such Reflexions require a work a-part, very different from the genius of the present. The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter' (T 620). Again, it is supererogatory to show that virtue 'interests] every principle of our nature/

It is true that those who 'dig up the pestilence from the pit in which it is buried' show 'a bad grace/ and we will 'sink them, at least, in eternal silence and oblivion' (E 279).14 A theory 'full of austerity and rigour' has no hope of 'engaging mankind' (E 280). This explains why Hume turns to interested obligation soon after his attack on the 'monkish virtues' (E 270). In context, SIR is a rather hopeful overstatement of the vast differ- ence between, on one side, the 'engaging charms' and 'play, frolic, and gaiety' of Humean virtue, and on the other the 'dismal dress' of 'useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial' (E 279). Hume is actu- ally content with less than SIR as sufficient to separate himself from the monks: '[i]t is sufficient, if the whole plan or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the balance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of evil' (E 305).

14 Similarly, after noting that 'when the execution of justice would be attended with

very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to

public utility/ Hume asks whether he 'would not be better employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in displaying the particular exceptions, which we are,

perhaps, but too much inclined, of ourselves, to embrace and extend?' (PO 489, 491) As in the Enquiry, however, Hume does not take this advice, for he goes on to excuse 'that party among us, who have, with so much industry, propagated the maxims of resistance' (PO 491).



8 Robert Shaver

III

One might object that, since Hume holds that morality must be practical, showing that it engages us cannot be merely supererogatory. Although this objection by itself does not motivate SIR, it does question my interpretation, according to which showing that morality engages us is supererogatory. With the added claim that we are often extremely partial to ourselves, our families and our friends, this objection also suggests that at least most of our duties must lie in these interests, and so would put a check on the duties prescribed from the general survey.15

Hume does write that moral speculations must 'set in motion the active powers of men' and have an 'influence on conduct and behaviour' (E 172; also E 274, 294, T 457-8, 462, 465). Yet as some have noted, Hume does not think that morality often motivates more than speech-acts.16 He is usually careful to claim that morality motivates only when other passions are silent (e.g., E 226, 227, 230). And morality is usually practical by influencing our approbations and our resulting speech-acts. The 'general survey' described at T 581-5, 602-3, E 227-9, 272-4 is often a method of correcting not our 'stubborn' sentiments, but our 'language' and 'abstract notions' (T 582, 585; also E 275-6). Sympathy often serves 'only to excite sentiments of complacency or censure' (E 234n; also T 586). Hume is content to conclude that 'the principles of humanity ... have some authority over our sentiments,' that they 'make some distinction' and are 'sufficient, at least, for discourse, serv[ing] all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools' (E 226, 229; also E 271, T 583, 603). The 'accurate proof of this system of ethics,' from which 'nothing is wanting,' shows that sympathy 'has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation' and that sympathy 'is the chief source of moral distinctions' (T 618). This sympathy 'is too weak to countroul our Passions; but has sufficient Force to influence our Taste, and give us the Sentiments of Approbation or Blame' (T 500, var. T 670).

Hume's practicality objection to rationalism, then, is not that the rationalist's reason fails to produce more than speech-acts. The moral sentiment often fails here as well. Rather, his objection is that this reason

15 For a similar argument in Hobbes, see Kavka, Theory, 310-14.

16 Balfour complains that Virtue is represented as a subject of talk and declamation, but of very little force to influence the heart and life' (Delineation, 123). For a similar

point put sympathetically, see Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press 1991), 183-5 and Miller, Thought, 42, 56. Baier even

suggests that practicality is demanded only ad hominem against the rationalist, but this is an unlikely reading of E 171-3.




'is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation/ and so cannot even produce the speech-acts that sustain morality. Practical- ity, then, demands only that moral distinctions influence our approbations. This is the sense in which it must engage us. This is what is obligatory rather than supererogatory. Now Hume argues at length that our approbations cannot be explained on grounds of self-love (T 499, 582-4, E 215-32). Neither SIR nor the weaker requirement that most of our duties be in our self-interest are constraints on moral approbation, and so both remain supererogatory.

IV

Some critics suppose that SIR is motivated, not by appeal to practicality, but by Hume's account of the original motive to be just. Hume argues that 'self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice' (T 499). Annette Baier comments that 'Hume seems to require that, for some- thing to be moral obligation, it must first satisfy the test of self-interest which convention imposes/17 But this cannot be the general motivation for SIR. For Hume applies SIR to all of the duties - those based on self-interested convention, such as justice, and those that are not conven- tional, such as temperance, good manners, wit, decency, genteelness, humanity, generosity, and beneficence (E 280-1).

The critics might then try a weaker claim: SIR must be met in the case of justice, given Hume's account of the origins of justice. This is precisely what David Gauthier, Barry Stroud, Gerald Postema, Stephen Buckle, and Marcia Baron argue.18 But not even this motivates SIR. Hume aims to show that the original motivation to be just stems from post-convention self-interest, rather than from promise, a sense of duty, reason, public benevolence, private benevolence, pre-convention self-interest, or instinct. To do this, he must show that post-convention self-interest explains what the rival explanations do not - 'the manner, in which the rules of justice are established' (T 484). And to do this, he need not show that post-convention self-interest 'explain[s] how someone is motivated to be just on every occasion/ He need not show 'that the path of justice

17 Baier, Progress, 243

18 Gauthier, 'Artificial Virtues'; Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

1977), 205-18; Gerald Postema, 'Hume's Reply to the Sensible Knave/ History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (1988) 23-5; Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property (Oxford: Clarendon 1991), 291-5; Marcia Baron, 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues/ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1982) 539-55.



10 Robert Shaver

all the time is a "wiser" path/19 He need only show that the rival explanations fail and that his explanation would explain the establishment of justice - two claims the critics rarely attack.20

To show that post-convention self-interest does explain the establishment of justice, Hume might argue that, in the small societies in

question, justice always pays (T 499). Cheating would be hard, and

perhaps Hume holds that, before later artifices change us, we would not be interested in cheating anyway. In larger societies, with artifices such as promises, cheating is possible and attractive for some. But here Hume does not rely on self-interest alone. He adds moral education (T 499-501). If this interpretation is correct, one could allow that SIR is demanded for the initial societies, without allowing that it is demanded for any later societies.21 But Hume need not say even this. For even if some always profit from injustice, it does not follow that justice will not be established. Those who do not profit from injustice could establish it, and those who gain from cheating will help, wherever helping is needed to keep the system intact.22 Hume need not show that everyone has a motive to be just to show that justice will be established.23

This defense of Hume would fail if, as Baron supposes, 'the same reasoning which led Hume to deny that there is a natural motive to act justly forces him to reject his account of justice as an artificial virtue.' The reasoning noted proceeds by showing that the motive up for evaluation 'will not always direct us to act justly.'24 But Baron is wrong. For Hume does not show the superiority of his artifice account simply by showing that, for each rival account, there are possible cases in which no motive

19 Stroud, Hume, 210, 215; second italics added. See also 208 and 214.

20 Thus Baron admits that self-interest 'frequently does explain our motivation/ Stroud admits that '[i]t should not be supposed that there are many people' whose

justice is not explained by self-interest, and that self-interest will 'often' recommend

justice ('Lie/ 547n9; Hume, 206, 207).

21 For the effect of later artifices on our interests, see Baier, Progress, 235-6, 246-8; and 'Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Nonknaves: A Response to Gauthier,' in Hume Studies 18 (1993) 429-40. For stress on moral education, see Frederick G. Whelan, Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Uni-

versity Press 1985) 275-92.

22 I return to this point in the last paragraph of this section.

23 For a similar interpretation, see Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise

(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1989), 172, 182; and J.L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980), 87.

24 Baron, 'Lie/ 546, 541




is to be found. This is one of his reasons for rejecting public benevolence (T 481). (It is not the reason emphasized later, where the stress is on the uselessness of justice given public benevolence [T 494-6, 529, E 184-5].) He rejects promises (T 490), instinct (T 527-9, E 201-3), duty (T 477-80), and reason (T 496) without relying on the possible case argument. Pre-convention benevolence (E 306, T 532, 579), private benevolence (T 482-3, 532 E 309n), and pre-convention (T 497, 532 E 306) or unrestrained

(T 480) self-interest are rejected, not because they fail in a few cases, but because they fail 'so often' and in 'most' cases (E 306, 309n, T 483, 579)™ Thus Hume can retain his own account, even given a few cases where

injustice pays, without giving up his criticisms of rival accounts.26

My view has the added advantage of explaining Hume's treatment of a popular objection. The critics see the key text for the evaluation of Hume's account of justice to be the reply to the sensible knave, where Hume explicitly applies SIR to justice. Hume worries that 'honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions' (E 282-3). He goes on to give a much-criticized reply, stressing the

pleasure of watching knaves get caught and, as in the Treatise, the

superiority of 'peaceful reflection on one's own conduct' to 'worthless

toys and gewgaws' (E 283-4).27 At best, this shows it to be false that

25 As Baron notes, this is oversimplified. Hume may need to show that post-convention self-interest must win out, not only over each rival explanation taken alone, but also over all the rival explanations taken together (lie/ 542n7). Perhaps Hume could avoid this burden by an appeal to the maxims that 'nature acts by the simplest methods' or that 'where any principle has been found to have a great force and

energy in one instance ... ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances' (NR 77, E 204; also E 299, T 282, 473).

26 Baron's 'noble lie' interpretation has, by her lights, the additional drawback that even on it, SIR is not always met. She can claim only 'far greater compliance' ('Lie/ 551).

27 For criticisms of the reply to the knave, see, for example, Gauthier, 'Artificial

Virtues/ 'David Hume, Contractarian/ 26, and 'Three/ 22; Postema, 'Reply'; Stroud, Hume, 215-16; Baron, 'Lie/ 552-3; Barry, Justice, 167-8; Donald T. Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press 1990), 181-2; Whelan, Order, 266; and Jean Hampton, 'Two Faces of Contractarian Thought/ in Peter

Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press 1991), 40. One can, of course, follow Postema in drawing material from elsewhere in Hume to improve the reply. Hume's remarks about the costs of secrecy to the clergy are particularly tempting (NC 199n3). But I assume here that no additional material will save the reply.



12 Robert Shaver

everyone 'conducts himself with most wisdom' through knavery, since the honest would not. It shows the honest that they should not convert to knavery, rather than showing the knave that he should convert to honesty.28 The point is to 'fortify that [honest] temper and furnish it with views, by which it may entertain and nourish itself (S 177n).29 And so the critics conclude that the account of the original motive to be just either fails or needs a 'noble lie/ The reply to the knave is part of a cover-up intended to discourage a 'practice dangerous and pernicious' (E 279).

On my view, Hume need not give a convincing answer to the knave. Since SIR is supererogatory, failure is permitted. Massive failure is not permitted. But Hume can argue that, even if there are many knaves, there cannot be many of them practicing at any one time. Each must be careful to avoid the 'considerable breach in the social union and confed- eracy' which would occur were too many 'pushe[d] forward ... by imitation' of successful knavery, or were too many to adopt knavery to avoid being cullies of their integrity (E 282, T 535). Hence most of the time, and for most people, self-interest is served by justice, even if these people are convinced that 'honesty is the best policy' is 'liable to many exceptions' (E 282).

Thus Hume treats the problem of replying to the knave rather lightly. The knave's argument is 'a little difficult' to rebut, 'if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer' (E 283, italics added). In 'The Sceptic,' after presenting another knave, Hume writes that

[f]or my part, I know not how I should address myself to such a one, or by what

arguments I should endeavour to reform him. Should I tell him of the inward satisfaction which results from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleasure of disinterested love and friendship, the lasting enjoyments of a good name and an established character, he might still reply, that these were, perhaps, pleasures to such as were susceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himself of a quite different turn and disposition. I must repeat it; my philosophy affords no remedy insuchacase.fS^-ZO)30

28 Hume's argument to show that humanity pays, given directly before the knave is introduced, has the same limitation. See E 281 and Butler, Sermons XI. 12-20, from which the argument is taken. For a similar view of the reply to the knave, see Baier, 'Artificial Virtues/

29 I assume that here (and below) Hume agrees with the sceptic whose sentiments he intends to deliver. At one point, Hume notes that '[t]he Sceptic, perhaps, carries the matter too far/ suggesting that at other points he has no quarrel with what the Sceptic says (S 177n).

30 Hume's use of 'remedy' may be intended to recall Shaftesbury and Butler. Shaftes-




Hume even admits that '[s]ome extraordinary circumstances may hap- pen, in which a man finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine, than hurt by the breach which his injustice makes in the social union' (OG 38). Where Hume speaks of 'a little difficulty/ his critics see a crushing counter-example and a cover-up. But this hardly fits 'The Sceptic/ with its repeated avowals of failure. A more charitable explanation is that Hume finds SIR supererogatory.

The critics might object that Hume still must convince the knave, in order to preserve his account of the original motive to be just. As Postema puts it, '[i]f the knave's challenge cannot be answered, Hume's project fails on its own criteria of success.'31 But Hume does not present the knave as an objection to his account of the original motive to be just. The knave comes at the end of a review of all the Humean virtues, a review intended to show that each meets SIR. The critics find Hume disingenuous for not noting that the knave undercuts the earlier account of the motive to be just. But if the earlier account is not jeopardized by stray cases in which injustice pays, this would explain why Hume does not make the connection between it and the knave.

Three passages, each found in the account of the original motive to be

just, raise objections to my interpretation. The first passage notes that, when considering the convention of

property, 'even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on

ballancing the account' (T 497).32 This suggests SIR. But the context makes clear that Hume is not issuing a requirement on his account of the motive to be just. Rather, everyone 'must' be a gainer in the sense that everyone will be a gainer. Thus Hume continues, in an explanation of the quoted claim: 'since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be

suppos'd in society' (T 497). As this makes clear, everyone will be a

gainer in that everyone will do better than in the state of nature.33

bury writes that 'as to atheism; though it be plainly deficient and without remedy, in the case of ill judgments on the happiness of virtue, yet it is not, indeed, of

necessity the cause of any such ill judgment' (Characteristics, i, 275) Butler considers 'a sceptic not convinced of [the] happy tendency of virtue, or being of a contrary opinion. [Shaftesbury's] determination is, that it would be without remedy' (Sermons,

pref. 20).

31 Postema, 'Reply/ 23

32 This passage is cited by Stroud, Hume, 208.

33 Similar passages can be handled in a similar way. Thus Hume notes that justice is



14 Robert Shaver

The second passage notes that 'disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules [of property]' (T 499). This has suggested to some critics that Hume believes that one always has a motive to be just because any injustice brings disorder and confusion.34 Such a desperate argument would, perhaps, betray a desire to meet SIR. But PO 489 and E 196, where Hume recommends injustice in the public interest, make it unlikely that 'inflexible' rules are rules which are never broken. And the similar passages where Hume writes of the need for inflexible general rules suggest his point to be that those administering the rules must be inflexible, in that they must be impartial.35 A 'breach of these rules' in not a case of disobedience, but a case of partial or unclear application of the rules. It 'wou'd produce an infinite confusion in human society' if, in my 'judgments' of others, I 'wou'd take into consideration the characters and circumstances of the persons,' by deciding, for example, in favour of a claimant because he is my friend (T 532). The threat to society lies in rules that are '[changeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest' (T 532; also 502). The moral of the story of Cyrus and the coats is not that 'general peace and order in society' depend on each individual obeying 'general, inflexible rules.' Rather it is that judges such as Cyrus must apply rules without considering 'the characters, situations, and connexions of the person concerned' (E 304-5). '[N]othing could be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even in the smallest instance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it is certain, that men, where they imagine that there was no other reason for the preference of their adversary but personal favour, are apt to entertain the strongest ill-will against magistrates and judges' (E 308). Even rules of property based on merit and use 'wou'd destroy

'absolutely requisite ... to the ... well-being of every individual' or 'infinitely advan-

tageous to ... every part' of society (T 497, 498). Justice 'comprehend[s] the interest of each individual' and 'is advantageous ... to every individual' (T 529, 579 var. T 672). Baier cites T 498 to show that Hume is not a utilitarian. Samuel Freeman cites T 497 and 529 to make the same point, prefacing them by saying that 'Hume is quite clear that systems of property must be to the advantage of every individual.' Hume does hold mat justice benefits everyone, particularly when compared to the state of nature. But to suppose that Hume is making SIR is to confuse description and

prescription. See Baier, Progress, 250; and Freeman, 'Property as an Institutional Convention in Hume's Account of Justice,' Archivfiir Geschichte der Philosophie 73 (1991), 31.

34 Postema, 'Reply,' 30-1; Gauthier, 'Artifical Virtues'; Stroud, Hume, 208-9, 214; Whelan, Order, 249, 265-6

35 See Miller, Thought, 63n8.




society' or lead to 'the total dissolution of society' (E 193, T 502, 514). Again, disorder and confusion are the consequence of bad administration rather than occasional disobedience. The benefits of justice arise provided 'the greater part of the society' are just (E 304). Now Hume may still be wrong in thinking that administrative breaches bring disorder and confusion. But he is not arguing that disorder and confusion need follow upon acts of individual injustice, and so he is not arguing that a motive is or must be provided in every individual's case.

The third passage notes that the convention of property 'cou'd never be enter'd into, nor maintain'd,' were this 'contrary to these [interested] passions' (T 489) .^ One might worry that, if there is no reply to the knave, property conventions would not be started or kept. But again, Hume makes it clear that property is not contrary to interest, in the sense that 'it is by that means we maintain society' (T 489). Some would do better with a convention to which they made exceptions. Again, however, it does not follow that others would not establish property conventions. Nor does it follow that knaves would not start these conventions. Indeed, it follows that knaves must not keep these conventions only if one adds the assumption that they maximize the satisfaction of their self-interest. Hume does not believe that we do maximize: 'Men often act knowingly against their interest' (T 418). Hume's argument for government is founded on our rejection of 'great and important, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very frivo- lous temptations' (OG 38; also T 428-9, 499, 535-9, 545, 571, E 205, 239, NR 83). One might object that this descriptive claim does not show that the knave would be justified in settling for less than he might acquire. But as those who argue that Hume is not a utilitarian have stressed, Hume does not think that an outcome is justified only where it maxi- mizes utility.37 A particular system of property, or form of government, or ruler, can be justified while not maximizing public utility. Similarly, justice can be justified to the knave, even though he might do better by occasional defection. (Thus T 620, quoted above, may succeed in showing that the Humean virtues 'interest every principle of our nature,' although cheating a bit would interest some principles of our nature more [T 620].)

36 This passage is cited by Postema in 'Reply/ 25.

37 See Mackie, Theory, 152-4; and Whelan, Order, 213-14.



16 Robert Shaver

V

I close by recalling one of my initial motives, concerning the history of SIR.

After Hobbes, Locke and Pufendorf make self-interest a condition on any duty, but not the grounds of that duty. The grounds lie in divine command, inferred from our sociableness. Butler replaces divine command and sociableness with conscience, and rejects psychological egoism. Locke, Pufendorf, and Butler stand together in making SIR supererogatory. For none of them does SIR constrain one's duties, and for all SIR loses in any conflict with duty. Hume agrees. He differs only in that, by refusing to appeal to an afterlife, he admits the possibility of a conflict between duty and SIR. He cannot say, with Butler, that '[d]uty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole/38

After Hume, conflicts between duty and self-interest continue to get short shrift. In part, this is because God returns. Reid writes

As to the supposition of an opposition between the two governing principles - that is, between a regard to our happiness upon the whole, and a regard to duty - this

supposition is merely imaginary. There can be no such opposition. While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it is impossible that any man should, in the issue, be a loser by doing his duty.... [A]n atheist ... must either sacrifice his

happiness to virtue, or virtue to happiness; and is reduced to this miserable dilemma, whether it be best to be a fool or a knave.39

And in part, this is because some, like Mill, follow Hume in not taking SIR seriously. Mill holds that it is 'a necessary part of moral philosophy' to show the motive to be moral, but he is content to show that increasing equality will give all but those 'few ... whose mind is a moral blank' a motive. Some simply 'do not possess the feelings [morality] appeals to'; it is sufficient to show that for most, there is 'a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality.'40

With Sidgwick, the conflict between duty and self-interest becomes the central problem for moral philosophy. Sidgwick treats these conflicts much more seriously than Hume or Mill. In making SIR, he believes that

38 Butler, Sermons, m.13; also 111.12

39 Reid, Active Powers, 598

40 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett 1979), ch. Ill, 26, 33, 28, 30




he reflects Butler and 'the history of ethical thought in England/41 But Sidgwick has made a break with this history: far from finding SIR supererogatory, he finds it self-evident. He holds, 'with as much clear- ness and certainty as the process of introspective reflection can give/ that 'it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness/42 In a reply to his critics, who doubted the self-evidence of Egoism, Sidgwick writes that 'the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and ... consequently "I" am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals/43 It is because Hume offers no such argument that he makes relatively little of the conflict between duty and self-interest, while Sidgwick finds it sufficient to show 'a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought/44

Received: September 1992 Revised: March 1993

41 Sidgwick, Methods, 7, 119-20, 200, 366, 386; 'Some Fundamental Ethical Controver-

sies/ Mind 14 (1989), 483

42 Sidgwick, 'Controversies/ 483; see also Methods, xx, 120. Sidgwick also, of course,

gave notable arguments against SIR: see Methods, IV.II.

43 Sidgwick, 'Controversies/ 484; Methods, 498

44 Sidgwick, Methods, 508. 1 wish to thank Annette Baier, David Gauthier, Ken Gemes,

Joyce Jenkins, Geoff Sayre-McCord, an audience at the University of Manitoba, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper.



Hume's Self-Interest Requirement

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