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Lectures 19 and 20

Slave to the Passions: David Hume’s Ethics

Dr. Geoffrey Roche

19.1 Resources for these lectures Secondary resources:

A.J Ayer. Hume: A very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

David Hume “Morality as Based on Sentiment” in James Rachels and Stuart Rachels,

eds. The Right Thing to Do Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007:65- 70.

Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan. Phil 433 course: History of Modern Ethics. Available at:

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh1200.txt

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh200.txt

William Edward Morris “David Hume” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/

James Fieser “David Hume” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available at:

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/humelife.htm

Rachel Cohon “Hume’s Moral Philosophy” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/

Primary resources:

David Hume Treatise of Human Nature (1739- 1740).

http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/hume%20treatise%20ToC.htm [accessed Nov 5th 2007].

Or here:

http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/

19.1 Opening Questions a). What character traits (‘virtues’) would make a person pleasing to themselves? (That is, what traits

do you need to have to enjoy your own company?)

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b). What virtues make a person useful for themselves (that is, independent)?

c). What virtues would make a person pleasing, or useful, to others?

d). Is intelligence necessary and sufficient to be a good person?

e). Is the Motive of Duty necessary and sufficient to be a good person?

19.2 David Hume: Biographical sketch

David Hume (1711-1776), philosopher, historian and essayist, is considered the

greatest philosopher ever to write in English. In the words of His three main

philosophical works, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), the Enquiries

concerning Human Nature (1748) and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)

remain very influential, and had a major impact even on those who disagreed with

him (Kant, in particular). His thought inspired Jeremy Bentham to write his Utilitarian

ethics. He was also an influence on non- philosophers, such as his friend the

economist Adam Smith (Hume suggesting that open markets are better for the

economy) and the father of the theory of Evolution, Charles Darwin. Philosophers

now consider Hume to be the father of contemporary cognitive science (the study of

how the mind organizes information and creates experience). Much of what we now

generally accept as logical principle, especially as applied to scientific and logical

analysis, we owe to Hume. (The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Is- Ought Fallacy are

two examples we’ve already seen).

David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was a precocious youth, and was

sent to Edinburgh University at the age of twelve. He was supposed to study law, but

instead secretly studied the Classical authors of ancient Greece and Rome. (He had to

keep this a secret as his parents were very religious and did not approve of such pagan

literature). He left university without taking his degree (you will notice that Kant

always writes of “Mr. Hume” for this reason) and spent three years thinking and

writing about philosophy. He briefly tried to hold a regular job at a sugar import

company- he got fired because he criticized his boss’s writing style. Then he went to

live in La Flèche, France (where his small stipend was enough to get by) to study

French writings. There he wrote the draft for Treatise of Human Nature between 1734

and 1737, arguing with Jesuit priests about religion in his spare time.

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Hume saw this book published in 1739, anonymously, with the more anti-

religious parts removed (“castrated,” in Hume’s words). Hume then tried to find

academic work, but no university would hire him: his thought was too controversial.

He never held an academic post.

Hume found teaching work in 1745 as the private tutor to the Marquess of

Annandale, but the boy was insane. Eventually he found work as a librarian, which

gave him the stability, and the books, needed to write The History of England, which

became a best- seller. This gave him the financial stability (at the age of 43) to write

more philosophy. In 1763 Hume was made secretary to the Ambassador to France,

and spent the next three years in Paris, where he frequently met the French

philosophes Diderot, D’Alembert and d’Holbach (all atheists and free-thinkers). In

1766 Hume returned to England with Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Their friendship

collapsed- Rousseau, totally paranoid, was convinced that Hume was organizing an

international conspiracy against him.

After a year working for the Government, Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1769,

this time for good. One of his young female friends, Nancy Orde, one night wrote “St.

David’s Street” on the wall of Hume’s home in chalk. The street still bears the name.

Hume died of intestinal cancer in 1776, not before preparing his most controversial

works for publication.

David Hume, 1 St. David’s Street, Edinburgh.

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Hume’s philosophical work was very carefully argued, firmly grounded in solid

logical and scientific principles, and profoundly skeptical. Although never explicitly

stating his lack of faith, he was attacked for his atheism and skepticism. He rigorously

argued that we have no way of knowing that external reality exists, that causality is

quite possibly an illusion, and that there is no self or free will. He was also an

influential critic of conventional religious belief, in particular Christian belief (for his

brilliant argument against the Argument from Design, see Ayer: 115).

Hume summarizes his general approach in the final lines of the Enquiries

concerning Human Understanding: philosophy is not about being nice and respecting

everyone’s point of view. It is about destroying falsity. Philosophy before Hume was

about discovering theoretical explanations based on pure reason, or mere speculation.

After Hume, philosophy is a descriptive inquiry based on direct experience of what

can be observed. (This philosophy is called Empiricism, as opposed to Rationalism).

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we

make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for

instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or

number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact

and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but

sophistry and illusion (E:165).

Here we will concern ourselves with Hume’s ethical theory, in which we see this

attitude that philosophy is a confused mess, and someone has to clean it up.

19.3 Hume’s ethics: background

Hume is not so interested in what the rules of morality should be (he just assumes

Utilitarianism, more or less, in particular Rule Utilitarianism, as a theory of morality,

and a variant of Virtue Theory as a theory of how to be moral). Hume’s main concern

in ethics is the psychological foundation of morals. For Kant, morality was grounded

in reason. For Kant, moral decision- making is based on intelligible ideas and

inescapable conclusions. For Hume, by contrast, morality is grounded on an

immediate, innate sense of right and wrong that is conceptually distinct from the

operations of pure reason. I will quote and expand on Ayer (19.4- 19.13) in

summarizing Hume’s eleven moral principles (Ayer: 98- 100).

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19.4 The Limits of Reason.

Reason alone, being concerned only with the discovery and falsehood, “can never be

the motive for any action of the will” (Treatise: 413).1 It is from this principle that

Hume derives his celebrated dictum:

Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to

any other office than to serve and obey them (Treatise: 415).

What does this mean? It means that reason can never be the motive of any action. For

Hume, reason is merely the capacity to draw inferences and appraise statements for

their truth or falsehood.

As such, Hume is presenting an Emotive theory of morality. A simple Emotivist

theory says that moral statements are statements of our feelings about a particular

action, rather than statements actually describing anything objectively real. “Murder

is immoral” in this sense is more akin to the statement “I hate you” or “ouch” than

“There are 28 chairs in room 602.” Ayer thinks that Hume is not offering such a crude

theory, however: moral language expresses our moral sentiments, but not our personal

mental condition (Ayer: 104).

Hume’s Ethics: The Basics Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (2) Morals are not derived from reason (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (4) While some virtues and vices are natural others, including justice, are artificial (that is, created by particular societies for their own long- term benefit). We’ll go over the first three points.

1 David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature ed. L.A. Selby- Bigge; second edition. Revised by P.H.

Nidditch. Oxford University Press, 1978.

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Against Rationalism: Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” Against the moral rationalists – in particular Kant- Hume argues that it is actually impossible to understand their theory of distinguishing between right and wrong (T, 455-470). (Recall that Kant can hardly explain why telling lies is always immoral). Reason, Hume argues, judges either of matters of fact or of relations. Nothing else. Morality never consists in any single matter of fact that could be immediately perceived, intuited, or grasped by reason alone; morality for rationalists must therefore involve the perception of relations. Distinguishing these cases requires more than reason alone can provide.

Hume also rejected the rationalist model of ethics proposed by the Social Contract theorists, in particular Hobbes. Morality cannot be reduced to self- interest, Hume reasons, because an accurate description of the social virtues, benevolence and justice, will show that there is more to these phenomena than mere selfishness. Hume also argues that our benevolent sentiments can't be reduced to self-interest. It is true that, when we desire the happiness of others, and try to make them happy, we may enjoy doing so. But benevolence is necessary for our self-enjoyment, and although we may act from the combined motives of benevolence and enjoyment, our benevolent sentiments aren't identical with our self-enjoyment. What is reason good for then, according to Hume? It can recommend the best means for attaining a given end, but it can't recommend ultimate ends. (It can’t tell us which is better: a life of adventure, or a life of hard work, or a life in front of television). Reason can provide no motive to action, for reason alone is insufficient to produce moral blame or approbation. We need sentiment to give a preference to the useful tendencies of actions. Hume not only argues against Kant. He is arguing against a very old, in fact

traditional belief that reason and the passions are opposed to each other. (A recent

argument against the Jury system in Japan: people will be overwhelmed by emotion if

they have to sit on a very horrific court case, so they will not be able to judge

rationally). Hume rejects this dichotomy [division]. Instead he states that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will,” and that reason alone “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 413). From Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature:

Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the

combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men

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are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational

creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive

or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be

entirely subdu'd, or at last brought to a conformity with that superior principle. (T:

Part III, Section III Book II, paragraph 1).

What is Hume’s argument here, exactly? He reasons as follows. Human

Understanding has two rational functions. It can analyze the relations of ideas (such

as mathematical or logical reasoning). Human understanding can also judge, using

probability, the relations of objects, especially their causal relationships, revealed by

our experience. That’s all it can do.

As such, Human Understanding cannot cause any action by itself. It is our feelings

of pleasure or pain, or our aversion or attraction to them, that really decide which

action we should take. “'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises. ” Hume has a second argument which is the corollary (the logical twin) of the first. Reason alone cannot prevent or stop any passion or impulse. If reason could prevent an impulse, then it would be able to give rise to a contrary impulse. But if it could do that, it would be an original impulse on the will (that is, a capacity to cause volition). So, when we calm ourselves down and hold ourselves back from some passionate but violent or immoral act, it is actually a calming passion, and not reason, that stops us.

A second aspect of this theory: as reason alone cannot guide actions, neither actions

or passions can be contrary to reason. (Recall Ayn Rand’s argument that attacking

people, or driving a hotrod, is against reason). According to Hume's definition of

reason, something can be contrary to reason only if it can be false, or mistakenly

inferred. But, he says, neither actions nor passions can be contrary to reason in this

sense since they aren't even the sort of thing which can be false (or inferred). To say

that “reason shows that doing dangerous things is irrational” is just a category error.

Something can be false only if it has a "representative quality," that is, if it claims to

represent reality in some way, and if it represents incorrectly (For example, we can

say “this argument is invalid” or “that picture of Godzilla attacking Tokyo Tower is

incorrect, because Godzilla does not exist.” “But passions and actions have no such

quality--each is an "original existence" (415) and "compleat in themselves" (458).

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Therefore, they can neither be false, nor mistakenly inferred. Therefore, they cannot

be contrary to reason (Derived from Darwall: Hume I).

Hume expresses these thoughts in some rather shocking ways.

Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the

scratching of my finger.

Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least

uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 2

A more vivid version of the same insight occurs in the work of Donatien Alphonse François, the

Marquis de Sade, in the novel Juliette (1797).

If from immolating three million human victims you stand to gain no livelier pleasure

than that to be had from eating a good dinner, slender though this pleasure may

appear in the light of its price, you ought to treat yourself to it without an instant’s

hesitation; for if you sacrifice the good dinner, the necessary result is a privation for

you, whereas no privation results from the disappearance of the three million

insignificant creatures you must do away with to obtain the dinner, because between

it and you there exists a relationship, however tenuous, whereas none exists between

you and the three million victims (J: 642).3

2 David Hume, in 1739, Adam Smith, in 1759, and Jean –Jacques Rousseau, in 1762, all made

essentially the same point. Adam Smith, in 1752, writes of the typical person’s attitude towards the

extermination of all China: “…if he would lose his finger tomorrow, he would not sleep to-night; but

provided he never saw them, he would snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a

hundred million of his brethren.” Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (Indianapolis: Liberty

Classics, 1976) pp.233-234. Rousseau, in Emile, writes: “private interest, which in case of conflict

necessarily prevails over everything, teaches everyone to adorn vice with the mask of virtue. Let all

other men do what is good for me at their expense; let everything be related to me alone; let all

mankind, if need be, die in suffering and poverty to spare me a moment of pain and hunger. This is the

inner language of every unbeliever who reasons” (E: 314). Finally, Hume wrote that it was rational “to

prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” David Hume, Hume’s Moral

and Political Philosophy ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Press, 1948) p.25. Note that Hume

knew Rousseau and Smith personally. 3 Marquis de Sade [the story of] Juliette [or, Prosperities of Vice]. trans. Austryn

Wainhouse. New York: Grove, 1968.

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(Again, the question is: is Kim Jong- Il irrational?)

19.5 The Passions (Hume’s Moral Psychology).

The passions by which we are motivated, according to Hume, may be direct or

indirect, calm or violent. The direct passions, such as those of joy, grief, hope or fear,

arise either from natural instinct, or from our desire of good, which can here be

equated with pleasure, or aversion from evil, which can here be equated with pain.

The indirect passions, such as those of pride, humility, love, or hatred, arise from a

combination of these primitive motives with other factors. This distinction is

independent of that between calmness and violence. It is because the motivation may

be [so] violent that “men often act knowingly against their interest” and are not

always influenced by “their view of the greatest possible good” (Treatise: 418).

19.6 Hume’s Virtue Ethics

Recall that Kant argued that an action must be done out of a sense of duty to be truly

moral. Hume turns this thinking on its head. For Hume, and action is only moral if it

is done out of some motive other than a sense of its morality. Ayer explains:

understanding the morality of a particular action does not confer any merit on an

action. The moral subject must have a good motive or a good character to truly be

good. They must be habitually good. 4

4 Consider the psychopathic cop played by Harvey Keitel in the film The Bad Lieutenant (directed by

Abel Ferrara, 1992). The lieutenant (unnamed in the film) is deeply immoral and corrupt, yet, while on

a particular case, attempts to find redemption by finding the criminals. That, in itself, may be morally

good, but Hume would say that the person must completely change his character in order to become

truly moral. A similar case: after the Aum sarin gas attacks, members of Aum offered condolences and

promises of compensation to victims and their families. However, given that they never really

explained the logic of the attack, merely understanding the morality of offering condolences and

carrying through with them may not suffice to make these acts fully moral. To undo years of cult

propaganda, and no sign of any moral development, we would need to see signs of real moral

development.

We have this principle in criminal trials: if the crime was one of a string of offences, we are more

likely to give a harsh punishment. If the crime was plausibly viewed as ‘out of character,’ we assume

that the offense was not so immoral. Hume’s moral psychology captures this intuition whereas Kant

does not.

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A man who is of a miserly disposition may grow ashamed of it [his miserliness] and

so force himself to perform acts of generosity. In time his initial reluctance to

perform them may or may not be overcome. It is not, however, necessary that it

should be overcome in order for his actions to be morally good. Their goodness

depends on their conforming to a habitual practice of generosity… (Ayer: 107).

In this sense Hume is reviving the ancient Greek notion of Ethics as an art of self-

cultivation. Ethics, in this Virtue Ethics sense, is not about following rules or

maximizing the good, but of making oneself an ‘excellent person’ through cultivating

good character traits (‘virtues’). Aristotle sums up this principle: “Excellence, […] is

not an act but a habit.” As a theory of ethical motivation it has its advantages, but its

main weakness is that it gives (arguably) little guidance in what to do in any particular

instance. In any case, Hume poses an important challenge to Kant’s moral schema.

For Hume (reasons Ayer) to rely entirely on a sense of duty for one’s morality

suggests that one is “deficient in natural benevolence” (Ayer: 107). 5

19.7 Sympathy

All humans, reasons Hume, have two sentiments: self- love and sympathy. Sympathy

here means ‘sense of humanity.’ Hume holds that it is a natural instinct. It strength is

such that although it is “rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than

himself,” it is equally “rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken

together, do not over- balance all the selfish” (Treatise: 487). This natural instinct or

sympathy or benevolence plays a large part in the formation of our moral and political

attitudes. He also takes it to be Utilitarian in nature. From the Enquiry: Hume charts

all virtues as being either useful or agreeable.

For ourselves (self- love) For others (sympathy)

Agreeable Qualities immediately Qualities immediately

5 Perhaps this is dangerously close to the Naturalistic fallacy?

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Agreeable to ourselves agreeable to others

Useful (= productive of

something agreeable)

Qualities useful to

ourselves

Benevolence

Justice

Below is Hume’s Table of Virtues:

To Ourselves To Others

Agreeable Tranquility

Good Taste

Politeness

Wit

Decency

Useful Discretion

Industry

Frugality

Honesty and Fidelity

Strength of Mind

Benevolence

Gratitude

Generosity

Friendliness

Justice

(Note that a). this idea of an ethics as good for the ethical agent, and yet also good for

other people, is the ‘missing third option’ that Ayn Rand fails to consider in rejecting

all non- egoistic ethics. Note also that Hume can explain why industry and strength of

mind are good to have, whereas Rand merely asserts it).

Here is Hume’s argument for justifying moral rules.

Any being which has feelings of sympathy and self- love will be pleased by anything

useful or pleasant to itself or others (when considered in general without reference to

our particular interest).

Man has the feelings of sympathy and self- love.

It follows that man will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to ourselves or

others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).

Hence, for example, Justice is useful to ourselves and others.

So, justice pleases us (when considered in general without reference to our particular

interest).

Any character [trait] that pleases (when considered in general without reference to

our particular interest] is morally good.

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Therefore, we ought to be just. 6

19.8 On Reason and Morality

“Since morals… have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows that they

cannot be deriv’d from reason” (Treatise: 457). Accordingly, “the rules of morality

are not conclusions of our reason.”

19.9 Moral Judgments are Not Facts, and cannot be Derived from Facts

Moral judgments are not descriptions of matter of fact.

Take any action allow'd to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all

lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call

vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives,

volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely

escapes you, as long as you consider the object. (T:468).

when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but

that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame

from the contemplation of it. (T: 469)

Similarly, when “instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,” one

suddenly meets “with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought

not” (Treatise: 469), one is being tricked. It is not possible that “this new relation can

be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”

19.10 (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action

[This idea is similar to the theory of perception developed by the Empiricists, in

particular John Locke {1632-1704} and George Berkeley {1685-1753}]. “Vice and

virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern

philosophy [that is, Empiricism and Science, which was then called ‘natural 6 This outline is from a file named “Phil 214, July 18, 2007,” found on the Internet, but I have lost the source.

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philosophy,’] are not qualities in the object, but perceptions in the mind” (T: 469).

Accordingly, “when you pronounce any character to be vicious, you mean nothing,

but that from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling of sentiment or blame

from the contemplation of it.”

The following quotes illustrate this idea.

To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind

from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or

admiration. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in

feeling that it pleases after such a

particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our

judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations (T: 471).

Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which

according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the

mind." (T: 469)

19.11 Virtue and Vice are determined by Motives Only

Though one speaks of virtuous or vicious actions, they derive their merit or demerit

only from virtuous or vicious motives, and it is only as signs of such motives, or the

character of the person who acts from them, that actions are subject to moral

evaluation.

19.12 The Utilitarian Thesis

[For Hume, our moral sentiments are essentially Utilitarian]. What arouses our

approbation [approval] or disapprobation is the appraisal of qualities as being

respectively productive of a preponderance of pleasure or pain. These appraisals may

also be characterized as judgments of utility.

19.13 The Sense of Justice is Culturally Inculcated, rather than Innate

The sense of justice, on which both moral and political obligation depend, is derived

not from any natural impressions of reflection but from impressions due to “artifice

and human conventions” (T: 496).

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Criticisms

Reason and Passions

Does reason really have no control over the passions? Ayer gives some

counterarguments.

Anscombe J. Ayer in 1989.

Ayer writes

Reason has control over the passions, in so far as it can be used to discover that a

passion is based on a false judgment, as for example when the object of one’s fear is

proved not to exist, or that the means chosen to procure [get, achieve] some end are

insufficient for the purpose. A third instance, which Hume failed to notice, is that in

which reason shows us that the achievement of a desired end will probably result in

the occurrence of something which we have a greater desire to avoid. (Ayer:108)

As such, The dramatic statement that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions

amounts to only […] the truism that reason enters into the sphere of action only when

we have been motivated to aim at some end (ibid).

Ayer also notes that another supporting argument is invalid. Hume argues that morals

cannot be derived from reason, as they have an influence on our actions and

affections. Ayer, in response, argues that our actions and affections may be influenced

by reason. We may, for example, be influenced by the truth or falsehood of our

judgments or the soundness (or cogency) of our inferences. But Ayer concedes that

the main point stands (Ayer: 109).

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Is the Sense of Justice Really Artificial?

Hume argues that our sense of justice is artificial because there are no natural motives

to supply it. Men do not have, in particular, a natural love of mankind, so their natural

benevolence towards only the people close to them is basically unjust. Hume also

argues that people are more or less selfish, so it is unlikely that a sense of justice

would arise naturally (Ayer:110). Hume suggests something like Hobbes’ Social

Contract, and also tends towards Rule Utilitarianism, but without offering much of an

explanation: tolerating exceptions would lower respect for the general rule (Ayer:

111).

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

Hume’s thought is so subtle, so good, and so complex that merely being able to

explain it clearly will suffice. For the final exam, you should know:

§ Hume’s theory of virtue

§Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate action

§ Hume’s theory of moral sentiments