Hume Inductive Sceptic Millican

8/12/2019 Hume Inductive Sceptic Millican

1/5

ISSUEXV - SUMMER2011

9

Is Hume a sceptic about induction?Tis may seem to be a fairly straight-forward question, but its appearanceis misleading, and the proper responseis not to give a direct answer, butinstead to move to a more fundamen-tal question which is suggested by

Hume himself at the beginning of hisdefinitive discussion of scepticism inEnquiry Section 12: What is meantby a sceptic? (E 12.2). His pointhere is that sceptic can mean manythings, and what counts as sceptical

will often depend on the relevant con-trast. Someone who is sceptical about

morality or the existence of God, forexample, need not be sceptical aboutthe external world. And someone whois sceptical about the rational basis ofinductive inference need not be scepti-cal at all in the sense of dismissive orcritical about the practice itself.

Tis crucial point about the varie-

ties of scepticism is often overlookedin discussions of Hume on induction,generating a great deal of misunder-standing. Commonly the debate willbe framed in terms of a simple contestbetween sceptical and non-scepti-cal interpretations. Ten on the oneside, a case is made drawing on Humes

famous negative argument which ap-parently denies induction any basis in

reason.1 Meanwhile, on the otherside, appeal is made to the wealth ofevidence from Humes writings as a

whole (including the Treatise, Essays,Enquiries, Dissertations, History, andDialogues) that evince a clear commit-ment to induction, and even reveal

their author to be a fervent advocateof inductive science. Te evidence oneach side is then judiciously weighed,and an appropriate conclusion drawndepending on which way the balancefalls. But this whole procedure is mis-directed, because once we recognisethe varieties of scepticism, it becomes

clear that these two bodies of evidenceare not in conflict.Humes argument concerning

induction is indeed a sceptical argu-ment in the sense of showing thatinductive extrapolation from observedto unobserved lacks any independentrational warrant but this is entirely

compatible with his wholehearted en-dorsement of such extrapolation as theonly legitimate method for reachingconclusions about any matter of fact,

which lies beyond the testimony ofsense or memory (E12.22). Te twomay initially seem incompatible, butif so, this is because we are taking for

granted that a method of inference is

1 Te argument appears in Treatise1.3.6,Ab-stract8-16, and Enquiry4.

ISHUMEANINDUCTIVESCEPTIC?

By Dr Peter Millican


2/5

VOX | THESTUDENTJOURNALOFPOLITICS, ECONOMICSANDPHILOSOPHY

10

to be relied upon onlyif it can be givenan independent rational warrant. Andone of the central messages of Humesphilosophy is that this assumptionis itself a rationalist prejudice that

we should discard, even though it isshared by both the Cartesian dog-matist and the extreme Pyrrhoniansceptic. In the contest between thosetwo extremes, the Pyrrhonist seems tohave ample matter of triumph while

he justly urges Humes own scepti-cal doubts of Enquiry4 (the famousargument which is then summarisedat E12.22). However the appropriateresponse, as Hume himself explains, isnot to follow the dogmatist in vainlyattempting to challenge the argumentthat yields these doubts, but rather to

ask the Pyrrhonist: What his meaningis? And what he proposes by all these cu-rious researches? What, after all, doeshe really expect us to do in response tothis sceptical argument, even if we ful-ly accept it? Is he seriously proposingthat we should stop drawing inferencesabout the unobserved? Tat would be

obviously absurd:a P must acknowledge,if he will acknowledge any thing, that

all human life must perish, were hisprinciples universally and steadily toprevail. All discourse, all action wouldimmediately cease; and men remain ina total lethargy, till the necessities of

nature, unsatisfied, put an end to theirmiserable existence. (E12.23)

Teoretically the Pyrrhonist mighttry to deny any such disastrous conse-quences, on the ground that if induc-tion is unwarranted, then we have nogood reason for supposing that hu-man life will indeed perish in thesecircumstances. But Hume suggeststhat even the Pyrrhonist whateverhis theoretical commitments will bequite unable to insulate himself fromsuch common-sense beliefs: Nature isalways too strong for principle. thefirst and most trivial event in life willput to flight all his doubts and scru-ples, and leave him the same, in everypoint of action and speculation withthe rest of us.

Hume cannot, of course, provethat putting total scepticism into prac-tice will lead inevitably to disaster,at least not to the satisfaction of thePyrrhonist who consistently refrainsfrom induction. Nor can heprovethatcommon life will always trump scep-tical principle. But if in factHumesinductive conclusions about humanpsychology are correct, then he doesnot need to prove these points to anysuch opponent:

Nature, by an absolute and uncon-troulable necessity has determind us tojudge as well as to breathe and feel; nor


3/5


11

can we any more forbear [making in-ductive inferences], than we can hinderourselves from thinking, as long as weare awake, or seeing the surroundingbodies, when we turn our eyes towards

them in broad sunshine. Whoever hastaken the pains to refute the cavils ofthis totalscepticism, has really disputed

without an antagonist, and endeavourdby arguments to establish a faculty,

which nature has antecedently implant-ed in the mind, and renderd unavoid-able. (T1.4.1.7)

So if in fact the sceptics doubts willbe spontaneously put to flight assoon as common life intrudes, thenHumes point is practically successfuleven if theoretically unproved. Andrecall again that Hume himself need notbe committed to accepting only what istheoretically provable that is the very

prejudice which he is aiming to under-mine.

Humes subtle approach to scepti-cism is made harder to appreciate bythe vigour and rhetoric of some of hisnegative arguments and conclusions(especially in the Treatise, where his ul-timate position on scepticism remains

relatively obscure), but also, I suspect,by the widespread tradition of ap-proaching scepticism initially throughDescartes Meditations. Descartessees the sceptic as an opponent to berefuted outright, through rational ar-gument of such overwhelming force asto be immune to any possible doubt.

He thus takes on the onus of provid-ing an ultimate justification of humanreason, with any ineradicable doubt

telling in favour of his sceptical oppo-nent. Hume succinctly points out thefundamental flaw in this approach im-mediately after having raised the ques-

tion What is meant by a sceptic? atthe beginning of EnquirySection 12:

Tere is a species of scepticism, anteced-entto all study and philosophy, which ismuch inculcated by D C Itrecommends an universal doubt ofour very faculties; of whose veracity

we must assure ourselves, by a chain ofreasoning, deduced from some original

principle, which cannot possibly be fal-lacious or deceitful. But neither is thereany such original principle, which has aprerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or if there

were, could we advance a step beyondit, but by the use of those very faculties,of which we are supposed to be already

diffident. Te C doubt, there-fore, were it ever possible to be attainedby any human creature (as it plainly isnot) would be entirely incurable; andno reasoning could ever bring us to astate of assurance and conviction uponany subject. (E12.3)

Such antecedent scepticismis utterly un-workable, because in refusing to trust


4/5


5/5


13

the conclusion of a coherent line ofthought which can be traced from thebeginning of Enquiry Section 12, hismost clear and explicit and repeat-

edly refined treatment of scepticism.

Bibliography

Hume, David (1739-40),A Treatise of HumanNature: A Critical Edition, vol. 1, eds DavidFate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford,Clarendon Press, 2007) (Treatise, referencesindicated by T)

Hume, David (1740), Abstractof the Treatise,included with both the Treatise and Enquiryeditions listed here (Abstract, references indi-cated by A)Hume, David (1748), An Enquiry concern-

ing Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) (En-quiry, references indicated by E)

____________________________________

Dr Peter Millican is the Gilbert RyleFellow and Tutor in Philosophy atHertford College, University of Oxford.

Te evolution of human societies canbe seen as analogous to biologicalevolution. However, human societies

consist of rational individuals whoinfluence social evolution and evolu-tionary game theory assumes agentsof limited rationality. Tis is the mainproblem with incorporating evolution-ary game theory into a rational choicetheory. Also, the traditional rationalchoice paradigm applies to individuals

and evolutionary game theory studiespopulations. Nevertheless, rational-ity is seen as utility maximisation andindividuals can maximise their utilitythrough interaction within a popula-tion in the following ways: 1) learningthrough a trial and error process andimitating more successful strategies, 2)

reflecting on the outcomes of differentevolutionary processes and selectingthe best based on rational calculations,

and 3) selecting to participate in anevolutionary process should it seemto maximise their long-term utility.

Terefore, it seems possible to use theevolutionary paradigm without abol-ishing rationality. Te rational animalis an individual and a member of apopulation at the same time. A realis-tic account of human behaviour has toexamine both a holistic and an indi-vidualistic perspective to create a more

powerful tool for analysing humanbehaviour. Te rational choice para-digm could be used in an evolutionarycontext to achieve this.

A rational individual is one whohas a consistent order of preferencesover a set of alternatives. In addition,the rational individual will always look

to maximise her utility. We do notknow what [the rational man] wants...but we know his indifference curves

RATIONALITYANDEVOLUTION

By Vangelis Chiotis

Hume Inductive Sceptic Millican

Documents

Transcript of Hume Inductive Sceptic Millican