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HumanFactorsGuidelinesforUnmannedAircraftSystemGroundControlStations.Aworkingdocumentaddressingtheuniquehumanfactors
considerationsassociatedwithbeyond-line-of-sightoperationofunmannedaircraftintheNationalAirspaceSystem.
PreliminaryGuidelines1.0ContractorReportpreparedforNASAUASintheNASProject
September2015
AlanHobbs,Ph.D.SanJoseStateUniversityResearch
Foundation/[email protected]
BethLyall,Ph.D.ResearchIntegrations,Inc.
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Authors’note
ThisworkingdocumenthasbeenpreparedforNASA’sUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)IntegrationintheNationalAirspaceSystem(NAS)Project.ItcontainsapartiallistofpreliminaryhumanfactorsguidelinesforUASGroundControlStations(GCS)arrangedwithinanorganizingstructure.
TheUASindustryisexpandingrapidly,andmanyUSandinternationalagencies(includingRTCA,ICAO,JARUS,andtheFAA)areworkingtodevelopoperationalconceptsandstandards.Weaimtodevelophumanfactorsguidelinesthatwillbeofvaluetotheaforementionedorganizations.
ItisnotourintentiontolistallhumanfactorsguidelinesrelevanttotheGCS,asthiswouldinvolvereplicatingalargenumberofexistingguidelinesforUAS,cockpitdesign,andotherhumansysteminterfaces.Instead,thedraftguidelinescontainedinthisdocumentareintendedtosupplementtheexistinghumanfactorsliteraturebyfocusingontheuniqueaspectsofunmannedaviationandthecapabilitiesandcharacteristicsoftheGCStoenablepilotstooperateUASintheNAS.
Thisearlyversionofourworkingdocumentisbeingmadeavailableforinputandfeedback.Thedocumentwillberevisedandupdatedperiodicallyasinformationbecomesavailablefromresearch,readercomments,andoperationalexperience.Placeholders,denotedby“TBA”,indicatewherefuturematerialwillbeadded.
Thereadershouldnotethattheseguidelinesaddresscivilunmannedaircraftthatarecapableofoperatingbeyondvisualline-of-sightinallairspaceclassesoftheNAS.Wedonotaddressunmannedaircraftthatoperateentirelyatlowlevel,orarecontrolledbyvisualreferenceofthepilot.Furthermore,althoughourfocusisonUASoperationsintheUnitedStates,wehopethatourworkwillalsobeusefulinternationally.
Commentsorquestionscanbesenttousviatheemailaddressesonthetitlepageofthisdocument.
AlanHobbs,Ph.D.SanJoseStateUniversityResearch
Foundation/NASAAmesResearchCenter
BethLyall,Ph.D.ResearchIntegrations,Inc.
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Contents
Summary......................................................................................................................................................2
Listofabbreviations....................................................................................................................................4
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................5
Scopeofthecurrentactivity....................................................................................................................6
FocusingguidelinesonthespecialchallengesofUASoperations...........................................................7
FAAassumptions.................................................................................................................................8
SpecialconsiderationsofUAS...........................................................................................................10
Overviewofexistingrelevantguidelines...............................................................................................16
Typesofguidelines................................................................................................................................17
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedviatheinterface........................................................................18
Informationcontentofdisplays........................................................................................................19
Controlinputs....................................................................................................................................19
Propertiesoftheinterface................................................................................................................19
Generalguidelines.............................................................................................................................20
UASpilotresponsibilities.......................................................................................................................20
Guidelines..................................................................................................................................................23
Characteristicsandcapabilitiesoftheinterface....................................................................................23
Aviate.................................................................................................................................................23
Navigate.............................................................................................................................................33
Communicate....................................................................................................................................41
ManageSystemsandOperations......................................................................................................44
Generalguidelines.................................................................................................................................47
Summarylistofguidelines.....................................................................................................................57
Guidelinesorganizedbytype................................................................................................................69
Task-relatedguidelines......................................................................................................................69
Information-relatedguidelines..........................................................................................................73
Control-relatedguidelines.................................................................................................................76
Guidelinesrelatingtopropertiesoftheinterface.............................................................................77
Generalguidelines.............................................................................................................................80
Definitionsofterms...................................................................................................................................83
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References.................................................................................................................................................84
Appendix-Selectedhumanfactorsregulations,guidance,andpolicy.....................................................88
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Summary
Thispreliminaryreportpresentsastructurethatmaybeusedtoorganizehumanfactors
guidelinesfortheGroundControlStations(GCSs)ofunmannedaircraftthatarecapableof
operatingbeyondline-of-sightinallairspaceclassesoftheUnitedStatesNationalAirspace
System(NAS).Thedocumentcontainsapartiallistofdraftguidelines,aswellasplaceholdersto
indicatewherefutureguidelinesmaybeincluded.
Thousandsofhumanfactorsguidelinesandstandardsfortechnologicalsystemshavebeen
publishedbystandardsorganizations,regulatoryauthorities,theDepartmentofDefense,and
otheragencies.Incompilingthisdocument,theintentwasnottoreproduceorre-stateexisting
humanfactorsmaterial.Instead,thisdocumentfocusesontheuniqueissuesofcivilian
unmannedaviation,andcontainsguidelinesspecifictothissector.Asaresult,itshouldbeseen
asasupplementto,ratherthanareplacementfor,existingaviationhumanfactorsstandards
andguidancematerial.
Twoconstraintshavebeenusedtofocusthescopeofthisdocument.First,theassumptions
containedintheFAA(2013a)UASroadmaphavebeenusedtodefinetheresponsibilitiesthat
willbeassignedtothepilotofaUASoperatingintheNAS.Thisinturn,helpstodefinethetasks
thattheUASpilotmustperformviatheGCS,andtherebytherequiredfeaturesand
characteristicsoftheGCS.Second,thepointsofdifferencebetweenUASandconventional
aviationhavebeenusedtofurtherfocustheguidelinesontheconsiderationsthatmake
pilotingaUASsignificantlydifferenttopilotingaconventionalaircraft.
Fivebroadcategoriesofguidelinesareidentified.Theseare(1)performance-baseddescriptions
ofpilottasksthatmustbeaccomplishedviatheGCS,(2)informationcontentofdisplays,(3)
descriptionsofcontrolinputs,(4)propertiesoftheinterface,and(5)high-leveldesign
considerations.SomeoftheguidelinesinthisdocumenthavebeenadaptedfromexistingUAS
humanfactorsmaterialfromseveralsources,includingRTCApublicationsandStandardization
Agreements(STANAGs)publishedbytheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).Theuseof
quotationmarksindicatesthatthewordingoftheguidelineremainsinitsoriginalform.In
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othercases,guidelineshavebeendevelopedbasedonNASAresearchconductedunderthe
UASintheNASproject.Inafewplaces,existingaviationstandardsorgeneralhumanfactors
guidelineshavebeenquotedwhentheyhaveparticularrelevancetoUAS.
Throughoutthisdocument,guidelineshavebeenwrittenwiththewords“should”or“will”
exceptincaseswhereanexistingguidelineisquotedthatcontaineda“shall”statementinits
originalform.
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Listofabbreviations
ADS-B AutomaticDependentSurveillance–BroadcastANSI AmericanNationalStandardsInstituteASTM ASTMInternational,formerlyAmericanSocietyforTestingandMaterialsATC AirTrafficControlC2 ControlandCommunicationsCCTV ClosedCircuitTelevisionCFR CodeofFederalRegulationsCOA CertificateofWaiverorAuthorizationCOTS CommercialOff-The-ShelfCPDL Controller-PilotDataLinkCTAF CommonTrafficAdvisoryFrequencyDAA DetectandAvoidDTED DigitalTerrainElevationDataFAA FederalAviationAdministrationGCS GroundControlStationHFES HumanFactorsandErgonomicsSocietyHMI Human-MachineInterfaceICAO InternationalCivilAviationOrganizationIFR InstrumentFlightRulesIMC InstrumentMeteorologicalConditionsJARUS JointAuthoritiesforRulemakingofUnmannedSystemsMOPS MinimumOperationalPerformanceStandardsms MillisecondNAS NationalAirspaceSystemNASA NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationPIC PilotinCommandRTCA RTCAInc.formerlyRadioTechnicalCommissionforAeronauticsSTANAG NATOStandardizationAgreementTBA ToBeAddedTCAS TrafficAlertandCollisionAvoidanceSystemUA UnmannedAircraftUAS UnmannedAircraftSystemUAV UnmannedAerialVehicleVHF VeryHighFrequency
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Introduction
UnmannedAircraft(UAs)havegenerallyexperiencedahigheraccidentratethanconventionally
pilotedaircraft(Nullmeyer&Montijo,2009).Manyoftheseaccidentsappeartoreflectthe
uniquehumanchallengesassociatedwithpilotingaUA,incombinationwithGroundControl
Stations(GCS)thathavebeendesignedwithinsufficientregardforhumanfactorsprinciples
(Williams,2004).
Humanfactorsandhumanfactorsengineeringhavebeendefinedasfollows:“HumanFactorsis
abodyofknowledgeabouthumanabilities,humanlimitations,andotherhuman
characteristicsthatarerelevanttodesign.Humanfactorsengineeringistheapplicationof
humanfactorsinformationtothedesignoftools,machines,systems,tasks,jobs,and
environmentsforsafe,comfortable,andeffectivehumanuse”(Chapanis,1991).
TheGCSofunmannedaircraftsystems(UAS)rangefromcommercialoff-the-shelflaptops,to
sophisticatedpurpose-builtinterfaceshousedinsheltertrailersorcontrolfacilities.Although
someGCSpossessaviationinterfaces(suchassidestickcontrollers)mostalsoincludeinterfaces
basedonconsumerelectronicdevicessuchasscreen-baseddisplays,pull-downmenus,and
“point-and-click”inputdevices(Scheff,2012;Waraich,Mazzuchi,Sarkani&Rico,2013).
Widespreadproblemshavebeenidentifiedwithcontrolstationinterfaces.Examplesinclude
error-provokingcontrolplacement,non-intuitiveautomationinterfaces,arelianceontext
displays,andcomplicatedsequencesofmenuselectiontoperformminororroutinetasks
(Cooke,Pringle,Pedersen&Connor,2006).Someoftheseproblemsmayhavebeenprevented
hadanexistingregulationorcockpitdesignprinciplebeenapplied.Inothercases,thedesign
problemreflectedanemergingUASissuethatwasnotcoveredbyexistingregulatoryor
advisorymaterial.
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TheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)recognizesthathumanfactors
guidelinesfortheGCSwillbeakeyrequirementforsafeandreliableoperationofcivilianUAS
intheUnitedStatesNationalAirspaceSystem(NAS).AspartoftheNASAUASintheNAS
Project,theagencyisworkingwithkeystakeholderstodeveloprecommendationsforGCS
humanfactorsguidelineswithafocusonunmannedaircraftoperatingbeyondvisualline-of-
sight.
Thisdocumentcontainspreliminaryhumanfactorsguidelinesthathavebeendevelopedonthe
basisofdatafromsimulations,accidentandincidentanalysis,andtheliteratureonUAShuman
factors.ThedocumentalsodrawstogetherexistingUASguidelinespreviouslydevelopedby
NATO,RTCA,Access5,andotherorganizations.Guidelines,bydefinition,areadvisoryin
nature.Thereforewehaveusedtheterms“should”and“will”,exceptincaseswherewehave
quotedanexistingregulationorstandardwithoutmodification.
Scopeofthecurrentactivity
Thecompilationofhumanfactorsguidelineswasbasedonthefollowingintentions:
a) TheguidelineswillbedevelopedforUAScapableofoperatingbeyondlineofsight
withinallclassesofcivilianairspace.
b) Thefocuswillbetheengineeredsystem,comprisingtheGCS,anditsimmediate
environment.Whereappropriate,issuessuchasmaintenanceorgroundsupportarealso
considered.Personneltraining,crewqualifications,proceduredesignandphysicalsecurityof
theGCSarebeyondthescopeofthisdocument.
c) Thescopewillnotbelimitedtospecificdesigns,orarchitectures,butcoversasbroada
rangeofUASaspracticable.
d) Thecontrolormanagementofpayloadwillbeoutofscope,exceptwherepayload
considerationsmayaffectthesafetyofflight.
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e) Allstagesofflightwillbewithinscope,fromflightplanningtopost-landing,including
contingencies(non-normalsituations)andin-flighthandover,asshowninFigure1.
Figure1.Stages-of-flightconsideredinthedevelopmentofguidelines.
FocusingguidelinesonthespecialchallengesofUASoperations
Alargenumberofhumanfactorsguidelinesandstandardsforhuman-machineinterfaceshave
beenpublishedbystandardsorganizations,NASA,theFAA,militaryagencies,andothers.A
comprehensivesetofguidelinesfortheGCScouldconceivablyincludere-statementsofallof
thispre-existingmaterial.Suchamassivedocumentwouldbeoflimiteduse.Notonlywould
mostofthematerialbeavailableelsewhere,butoriginalguidelineswouldbedifficulttolocate
amongallofthere-statedmaterial.
IncompilingguidelinesfortheGCS,wehavespecificallydecidednottoproducea
comprehensivesetofhumanfactorsguidelines,butinsteadtofocusonthespecialchallenges
thatwillberelevanttotheoperationofUASintheUnitedStatesNationalAirspaceSystem.
Therefore,thissetofguidelinesisintendedtosupplement,ratherthanreplace,existing
materialoncockpitdesign.
MostoftheguidelinesincludedinthisdocumentareUAS-specificanddealwithissuesthatare
notcoveredbyguidelinestypicallyusedintheaviationindustry.Inafewpartsofthisdocument
however,wehavechosentore-stategeneralhumanfactorsprinciplesthathaveparticular
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applicabilitytoUAS,particularlywhenwehavefoundevidencethattheprinciplehasbeen
overlookedbythedesignersofexistingGCS.
Thecurrentefforthasbeenguidedbytwocomplementarydefiningconstraints.First,wehave
usedasetofassumptionspublishedbytheFAAtodefinethetypesofoperationsthatwillbe
permittedbyUASintheNAS.TheseassumptionsdeterminethecapabilitiesthatUASmust
possessandthetasksthatthepilotmustbeabletoperform.Second,wehaveidentifiedthe
specialchallengespresentedbyunmannedaviation,andfocusedoncompilingguidelines
relevanttotheseissues.Thesechallengesaresometimesreferredtoas“deltas”,meaningthe
additionalconsiderationsthatapplytoUASoperationsoverandabovethoseapplyingto
mannedaviation.Asummaryofthespecialchallengescanbefoundinafollowingsection.
Figure2.ControlandcommunicationresponsibilitiesofaUASpilotoperatingintheNAS.
FAAassumptions
TheFAA(2013a)roadmapforintegrationofUASintotheNationalAirspaceSystemincludesa
setofassumptionsthatwillguidehowcivilUASoperatingbeyondline-of-sightoftheflight
crewwillbeintegratedintotheNAS.TheseassumptionsarereproducedverbatiminTable1
below.Severaloftheassumptionsimplyspecificrequirementsthathelptodefinethenatureof
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UASoperationsandtheroleofthepilot.Forexample,fromassumptionthreeitfollowsthatthe
pilotwillcomplywithInstrumentFlightRules(IFR)proceduresandwilloperatetheaircrafton
designatedairroutes.Assumptionsixmakesitclearthattherewillbearoleforapilotin
command,andthatthecontrolofmultipleUAsbyonepilotisnotenvisioned.Assumption
sevenrequiresthatthepilotwillhaveon-the-looporin-the-loopcontrolauthority.Thisinturn,
impliesthattheGCSmustkeepthepilotinformedofthestateoftheaircraftanditssystems.
Fromassumption13,itfollowsthatthepilotwillhavetheabilitytocommunicatewithAir
TrafficControl(ATC),andwillbecapableofcomplyingwithATCinstructionsaseffectivelyasa
pilotofamannedaircraft.Figure2(above)showsasimplifiedrepresentationoftheroleofthe
pilotinaUASoperatingasafullparticipantintheNAS.
Table1.AssumptionsfromFAAUASroadmap
1.UASoperatorscomplywithexisting,adapted,and/ornewoperatingrulesorproceduresasa
prerequisiteforNASintegration.
2.CivilUASoperatingintheNASobtainanappropriateairworthinesscertificatewhilepublic
usersretaintheirresponsibilitytodetermineairworthiness.
3.AllUASmustfileandflyanIFRflightplan.
4.AllUASareequippedwithADS-B(Out)andtransponderwithaltitude-encodingcapability.
ThisrequirementisindependentoftheFAA’srule-makingforADS-B(Out).
5.UASmeetperformanceandequipagerequirementsfortheenvironmentinwhichtheyare
operatingandadheretotherelevantprocedures.
6.EachUAShasaflightcrewappropriatetofulfilltheoperators’responsibilities,andincludesa
pilot-in-command(PIC).EachPICcontrolsonlyoneUA.*
7.Autonomousoperationsarenotpermitted.**ThePIChasfullcontrol,oroverrideauthority
toassumecontrolatalltimesduringnormalUASoperations.
8.CommunicationsspectrumisavailabletosupportUASoperations.
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9.NonewclassesortypesofairspacearedesignatedorcreatedspecificallyforUASoperations.
10.FAApolicy,guidelines,andautomationsupportairtrafficdecision-makersonassigning
priorityforindividualflights(orflightsegments)andprovidingequitableaccesstoairspaceand
airtrafficservices.
11.AirtrafficseparationminimaincontrolledairspaceapplytoUA.
12.ATCisresponsibleforseparationservicesasrequiredbyairspaceclassandtypeofflight
planforbothmannedandunmannedaircraft.
13.TheUASPICcomplieswithallATCinstructionsandusesstandardphraseologyperFAA
Order(JO)7110.65andtheAeronauticalInformationManual(AIM).
14.ATChasnodirectlinktotheUAforflightcontrolpurposes.
*ThisrestrictiondoesnotprecludethepossibilityofaformationofUA(withmultiplepilots)or
a“swarm”(onepilotcontrollingagroupofUA)fromtransitingtheNASto/fromrestricted
airspace,providedtheformationorswarmisoperatingunderaCOA.
**Autonomousoperationsrefertoanysystemdesignthatprecludesanypersonfromaffecting
thenormaloperationsoftheaircraft.
FAA(2013a).IntegrationofCivilUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)intheNationalAirspace
System(NAS)Roadmap(pp33-334)
SpecialconsiderationsofUAS
Unmannedaviationsharesmanyofthesamehumanfactorsconsiderationsthatapplyin
mannedaviation;howeverthepointsofdifferencehaveimplicationsforGCSdesign(Kaliardos
&Lyall,2014).ThesespecialconsiderationsarelistedinTable2belowandaredescribedin
detailinthesectionsthatfollow.Theguidelinesinthisdocumentareintendedtoaddress
humanfactorschallengesthatexistwithintheproblemspacedefinedbytheseeightbroad
considerations.
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Table2.SpecialconsiderationsofUASwithimplicationsforguidelinesdevelopment
A.Lossofnaturalsensing
B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink
C.Physicalcharacteristicsofthecontrolstation
D.In-flighttransferofcontrol
E.Uniqueflightcharacteristicsofunmannedaircraft
F.Flighttermination
G.Relianceonautomation
H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumerproducts
A. Lossofnaturalsensing
Potentialforreducedawarenessofaircraftstate:Therichsensorycuesavailabletothepilotof
aconventionalaircraftincludevisual,auditory,proprioceptiveandolfactorysensations.The
absenceofthesecueswhenoperatingaUAScanmakeitmoredifficultforthepilottomaintain
anawarenessoftheaircraft’sstate.
Implicationsforerror-selfcorrection:Observationsofairlinepilotshaveindicatedthat“pilot
error”isarelativelyfrequentevent,yetmostoftheseerrorsarerapidlyidentifiedand
correctedbythecrewsthemselvesbeforeanyconsequencesoccur(ICAO,2002).TheUASpilot,
nolongerco-locatedwiththeiraircraft,mayhavemoredifficultyidentifyingandself-correcting
errors.
Collisionavoidanceandseparationassurance:Intheabsenceofanout-the-windowview,the
pilotmustrelyonalternativesourcesofinformation,andwillbeunabletocomplywithATC
visualclearancesintheusualway.Inthecruiseflightphase,aUASpilotlackinginformation
fromanout-the-windowviewmaybeinacomparablesituationtothepilotofaconventional
aircraftduringflightininstrumentmeteorologicalconditions(IMC).However,thecomparison
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betweenconventionalinstrumentflyingandUASoperationsmaynotapplywhentheUAison
thegroundorinterminalairspace.Thesituationawarenessprovidedbyanout-the-window
viewmaybeparticularlycriticalduringtaxiingandtakeoff,andduringtheapproachandlanding
phases.IncollaborationwithRTCASpecialCommittee228,NASAisconductingstudiesto
definetherequirementsforUAStrafficdisplaystobeusedforself-separationandcollision
avoidance.
Fovealbottleneck:SomeUASdesignershaveattemptedtocompensateforthelackofrich
sensorycueswithtext-baseddisplaysintheGCS.However,thisrisksoverloadingthevisual
channelofthepilotbyrequiringthepilottoinvestthelimitedresourceoffovealvisionto
obtaininformationthatwouldbeavailabletoaconventionalpilotviaothersensorychannels,
includingperipheralvision.
Potentialforperceptualillusionsordistortionsrelatedtoon-boardcameras:Ifanon-board
cameraisusedtoassistwithpilotingtasks,thereisthepotentialforperceptualillusionsor
distortionsthatdonotoccurinconventionalaviation.Cameraviewscanproducemisleading
depthcues,someofwhichmayberelatedtothelackofbinocularcues.Misleadingcuesmay
beparticularlynoticeableduringtakeofforlanding.Ifamoveablecameralocatedonboarda
UAisnotalignedasexpectedbythepilot,ormovesunexpectedly,theremaybeanillusionof
yaw,orotherundesiredaircraftstate.
B. Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink
Controllatencies:Thetransmissionofradiosignals,andtheassociatedprocessing,may
introduceoperationallysignificantdelaysbetweenpilotcontrolinput,aircraftresponse
execution,anddisplayoftheresponsetothepilot.Theselatencieswillbeparticularly
noticeablewhenthelinkisviaageostationarysatellite,however,terrestrialradiosystemsmay
alsointroducesignificantlatencies.
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Voicelatencies:Incontrolledairspace,mostcommunicationbetweenpilotsandATCoccurover
VHFradio.Allpilotsonthesamefrequencyareabletomonitortransmissionsduetothe“party
line”natureoftheradio.Thisprovidessituationawareness,andalsoenablespilotstotime
theirtransmissionstominimize“step-ons”,inwhichtwopeopleattempttotransmit
simultaneously.Inbusyairspace,itcanbecomechallengingtoidentifythebriefgapsinwhich
transmissionscanbemade.
Thenear-termcommunicationandcontrolarchitecturebeingdevelopedforUASoperationsin
theNASwillinvolveadigitalrelayofUASpilotvoicecommunicationsviaLbandorCband
radiosfromthegroundtotheUA,fromwherethemessagewillbeconvertedtoanalogueform,
andre-broadcastoverVHFradio.Thetransmissionsofotherpilotsandcontrollerswillbe
relayedtotheUASpilotusingthesamesystem.TherelayofUASvoicecommunicationsfrom
theGCSviatheUAwillintroduceadelaybetweenthecommunicationsoftheUASpilotwith
referencetootherpilotsonfrequency.Mostofthislatencywillbeduetoprocessingbefore
andaftersignaltransmission.InordertoseamlesslyintegrateUASintotheNAS,itwillbe
importantthatthelatencybetweenUASandnon-UASvoicecommunicationsdoesnotreacha
levelthatdisruptscommunication.
Linkmanagement:Inadditiontoflyingtheaircraft,thepilotmustmanageandmonitorthe
ControlandCommunications(C2)link.Thisrequiresthepilottobeawareofthecurrentstatus
ofthecontrollink,anticipatepotentialchangesinthequalityofthelinkastheflightprogresses,
anddiagnoseandrespondtoanychangesthatoccur.Thepilotmayberequiredtointeractwith
securityfeaturesdesignedtopreventunauthorizedpersonsfromtakingcontroloftheUAor
interferingwiththecontrollink.Intheeventofalinkinterruption,theUAmustbecapableof
continuedflightinaccordancewiththeexpectationsofthepilotandairtrafficcontrol.
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C.Physicalcharacteristicsofthecontrolstation
Thegroundcontrolstation(GCS),locatedremotetotheaircraft,islikelytoincreasingly
resembleacontrolroomratherthanacockpit.Guidelinesmaycovernotonlythehuman-
machineinterface(HMI),butalsothephysicalenvironmentoftheGCS,includingnoiselevels,
accesscontrols,temperaturecontrol,andlighting.
Potentialtoadddisplays:TherelativespaciousnessoftheGCScomparedtoatraditional
cockpitenablesadditionalscreenstobeaddedeasilyandwithouttheforethoughtthatwould
beneededtoaddthemtoacockpit.Aproliferationofinformationdisplayscanaffectthepilot’s
performanceandinteractionwiththeGCS.Considerationwillneedtobegiventodetermining
whethertheadditionofadisplaytotheGCSshouldbeconsideredasignificantorminor
modificationforGCSdesignandcertificationpurposes.
AbilityofmaintenancepersonneltoaccessGCSduringflight:CurrentUASoperations
sometimesinvolvein-flighttroubleshootingsuchasdiagnosingandcorrectingconsolelock-ups,
softwareproblems,andproblemswithcableconnections.Incontrasttoconventionalaviation,
UASmaintenancepersonnelhavetheopportunitytogainaccesstothepilotstationduring
flightoperations,andmayhavehands-oninteractionswiththeGCSwhileaflightisunderway.
Asaresult,maintenanceerrorsmayhaveanimmediateoperationalimpact(Hobbs&Herwitz,
2008).
D.In-flighttransferofcontrol
ControlofaUAmaybetransferredduringflightoperationsbetweenpilotsatthesamecontrol
stationconsole,betweenconsolesatthesamecontrolstation,orbetweenphysicallyseparated
controlstations(Williams,2006).Thesehandoverscanbeatimeofparticularrisk,associated
withsystemmodeerrorsandcoordinationbreakdowns.Forexample,therehavebeencasesof
inadvertenttransferofcontrolbetweenGCSduetocontrolssetinerror.Thecontrolofalong-
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enduranceaircraftmaybetransferredmultipletimesduringthecourseofasingleflight
(Tvaryanas,2006),witheachhandovercontributingtoacumulativelevelofrisk.
E.UniquecharacteristicsofUASflight
Comparedtomannedaircraft,unmannedaircraftaremorelikelytohaveunconventionalflight
characteristics.Theymayflyatlowerspeeds,climbanddescendmoreslowly,andbemore
likelytoloiteroveralocationthanflypoint-to-point.UASoperationsmayalsostartandend
withlaunchandrecoverysystemsratherthanconventionalrunways.
Extendedperiodsoflowworkload:AchallengeforthedesigneroftheGCSistomaintainpilot
engagementduringextendedperiodsoflowworkload,particularlywhenthepilot’sroleisto
performsupervisorycontrolofautomation(Cummings,Mastracchio,Thornburg,&Mkrtchyan,
2013).Inaddition,thepilotmustbepreparedforrapidincreasesinworkloadduring
emergenciesornon-normalsituations.
F.Flighttermination
Inanemergency,thepilotofaremotelypilotedaircraftmayberequiredtoperformanoff-
airportlanding,orotherwiseterminatetheflightbydestroyingtheaircraftbyacontrolled
impact,ditching,orothermethod.Althoughnolivesareatstakeonboardtheaircraft1,the
pilotisstillresponsibleforthesafetyofotherusersoftheNAS,andtheprotectionoflifeand
propertyontheground.TheGCSmustprovidetheinformationneededforpilotdecision-
makingandenablethepilottoissuethenecessarycommandstotheUA.Theriskof
inadvertentactivationoftheflightterminationsystemmustalsobeconsidered(Hobbs,2010).
1WeassumethatUASwillnotcarrypassengers.
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G.Relianceonautomation
Manyconventionaltransportaircraftdesignsincorporatesophisticatedautomatedsystems,
howeverthepilotofaconventionalcivilianaircraftwillgenerallyhavetheabilitytoturn-offor
minimizetheuseoftheautomatedsystemsandexerthuman-in-the-loopmanualcontrolofthe
aircraft,evenifthisisviafly-by-wiresystems.MostcurrentdesignsofadvancedUAsrely
entirelyonautomatedsystemsforbasicflightcontrol,anddonotprovideoptionsforpilot
manualcontrol.Instead,theUASpilotisresponsibleforthesupervisorycontrolofthe
automation.ThereforemanualflightcontrolbecomeslessofanissuefortheUASpilot,making
automationmanagementissuesofcriticalimportance.
H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumerproducts
Groundcontrolstations(GCS)increasinglyresembleofficeworkstations,withkeyboard,mouse
ortrackballinterfacedevices,anddisplaysbasedoncomputerscreens.Inmanycases,
interfaceshavenotbeendesignedinaccordwithaviationregulationsorstandards.Insome
cases,theinterfacesoperateonconsumercomputersoftware.Observedproblemshave
includedaheavyrelianceontextualinformation,complicatedsequencesofmenuselection
requiredtoperformtime-criticalorfrequenttasks,andscreendisplaysthatcanbeobscured
behindpop-upwindowsordialogboxes.AGCSthatcontainscontrolsanddisplayssourced
fromdiversecommercialoff-the-shelf(COTS)providersislikelytosufferfromalackof
consistencyandotherintegrationissues.Thismayresultinincreasedcrewtraining
requirements,reducedefficiency,andanincreasedpotentialforoperatorerrors.
Overviewofexistingrelevantguidelines
Arangeofexistingsourcesprovideguidanceandrequirementsthatmayberelevanttothe
designoftheGCS.AsshowninAppendix1,theseincludehumanfactorsmaterialfromtheFAA,
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EASA,andDepartmentofDefense,aswellasgeneralstandardswithrelevancetoHMIdesign.
ThecurrentprojectisnotthefirsttoaddresshumanfactorsguidelinesforGCS.Intheearly
2000s,the“Access5”programmadeprogressindevelopinghumansystemintegration
guidanceforGCSfocusingonoperationsaboveFlightLevel430(Berson,Gershzohn,Wolf&
Schultz,2005).TheOfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefense(2012)releasedaGCShuman-
machineinterfacedevelopmentandstandardizationguideformilitaryUAS.Themostrecent
versionofMilitaryStandard1472G(HumanEngineering)includesabriefsectiononUAS
interfacedesign(DepartmentofDefense,2012).Materialtouchingonthehumanfactorsof
militaryGCShasalsobeenproducedbytheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)in
StandardizationAgreements(2007,2009).OrganizationssuchasASTM(2007,2014),RTCA
(2007,2010,2013)andtheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO,2011)arealso
addressingtheissuesofUASintegration.
Muchoftheprecedingworkdealtwithmilitaryapplications,orprovidedgeneral
comprehensivehumanfactorsguidelinesforsystemdesigners.Incontrast,thecurrentproject
hasanarrowerfocus,limitedtothespecialrequirementsofcivilianUASoperations.
Typesofguidelines
Severalareaswhereguidelinesmaybeusefulcanbeidentifiedbyaskingthequestionsshown
inFigure3.Theprocessleadstofivebroadtypesofguidelines,describedinfurtherdetailinthe
followingsections.
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Figure3.Questionsabouthuman-systeminteractionthatleadtofivetypesofguidelines.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedviatheinterface
Certainguidelinesprovidedescriptionsofpilottasksthatthehumanoperatorshouldbeableto
performviatheinterface.Forexample,asaparticipantintheNAS,theUASpilotmaybe
requiredbyATCtodirecttheaircraftontoamagneticheading.ThereforetheGCSmust
providedisplaysandcontrolstosupportthistask.Ingeneral,aguidelinethattakestheformof
ataskstatementisaformofperformance-basedstandardthatdescribestheoutcomewithout
defininghowitwillbeachieved,althoughadesiredlevelofaccuracyorspeedmaybespecified.
Anadvantageoftaskstatementsisthattheytendtobeindependentofspecifictechnologiesor
WhatPICtasksare(1)uniquetoUASor(2)willpresentuniquechallengesforthePIC?
WhatinformationmusttheGCSprovidetothePICtoenabletaskperformance?
WhatinputsmustthePICmakeviatheGCStoperformassignedtasks?
Howshouldcontrolsanddisplayslook,feel&sound?Howshouldtheyoperate?
Whatbroadoradditionalprinciplesapplyacrosstheengineeredsystem?
PICtaskswithspecificsignificanceforUAS
Propertiesoftheinterface
Controlinputs
Informationcontentofdisplays
General-levelguidelines
QUESTION ANSWER
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designsolutions,andarelikelytoremainrelevantand“future-proof,”evenastechnology
evolves.Inthisdocument,wefocusonpilottasksthatareuniquetoUASoperations,ortasks
thatpresentsignificantadditionalchallengesforUASpilotcomparedtothepilotofa
conventionalaircraft.
Informationcontentofdisplays
Theseguidelinesdealwiththeinformationthattheinterfaceisexpectedtoprovidetothepilot
viadisplays.Theseguidelinesdonotspecifytheformthattheinformationshouldtake.For
example,itmaybestatedthatthepilotshouldreceiveanalertifthecontrollinkislost,without
specifyingwhetherthealertshouldbecommunicatedusingauditory,visual,orhapticmeans,
orsomecombinationofthesemodes.Theseguidelineswilltypicallybeexpressedingeneral
terms,leavingtheHMIdesignerfreetocreateaninterfacethatmeetstheintentofthe
guideline.
Controlinputs
TheseareinputsthattheGCSmustbecapableofreceivingfromthepilot.Therequirement
mayspecifykeyattributesoftheinput,suchastimingandprecision,butwillremainagnostic
withrespecttothedeviceusedtomaketheinput.
Propertiesoftheinterface
ThepropertiesoftheHMIincludelayout,shape,physicalaccessibility,visibility,theuseofcolor
andthestructureofspecificcomputerinterfaces.Despiteawidespreaduseofelectronic
displays,menustructuresandpointandclickinputdevices,physicalergonomicsarestill
relevantforthedesignofgroundcontrolstations,asseveralanalysesofUASinterfaceshave
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identifiedissuessuchascontrolsthatareoutofreachofthepilot,orcriticalcontrolsin
locationswheretheycanbeactivatedinadvertently.
Generalguidelines
Generaldesignguidelinesare“overarching”principlesthathavegeneralapplicabilitytothe
GCSandrelevancetomultipledisplaysandcontrols.Inmostcases,theseareagnosticwith
respecttotheformoftheinterface.Examplesaregeneraldesignprinciplesforhuman-machine
interfacesdealingwithissuessuchastheinternalconsistencyoftheinterface,theneedto
managedataoverload,andtheavoidanceofcompetingalarms(Endsley&Jones,2012;
Norman,1988;Shneiderman&Plaisant,2005).Somegeneralguidelinesrelatetotheoverall
functioningoftheGCS,includingcharacteristicsthatemergefromtheoperationofallsub-
systemstogether.Forexample,visualclutter,displaycompetitionforattentionandthe
prioritizationofinformation.
UASpilotresponsibilities
Figure4presentsahigh-levelmodeloftheresponsibilitiesoftheUASpilot,consistentwith
FAAassumptions,adaptedfromMutuel,WargoandDiFelici(2015).Themodelcanactasa
checklisttoensurethatallareasofhuman-systeminteractionareconsideredwhen
developingguidelinesforthehuman-machineinterface.Insomecases,broadareasof
responsibilityarecommontobothconventionalandunmannedaviation,yetmaypresent
specialchallengesfortheUASpilot.Theseincludemonitoringandcontrollingthestatusof
radiolinks,controlhand-offs,andflighttermination.
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Figure4.ResponsibilitiesoftheUASpilot
Manage:The“Manage”categoryincludestheoverallplanning,decision-making,and
managementresponsibilitiesthatmustbeaccomplishedbythepilot,supportedbythehuman-
machineinterface.Foreaseofpresentation,managementresponsibilitiesareshownseparately
inFigure4,althoughtheyoverlapandcut-acrossotherresponsibilities.
Aviate:Theseresponsibilitiesincludetactical,orshort-term,controloftheairvehicleandits
ground-basedequipment,andthecontrollink.Inmostcases,thecontinuouscontrolfunctions
necessaryforthemaintenanceofstableflightareallocatedtoon-boardautomation,however
thepilotisstillrequiredtoprovidesupervisoryoversightandcontroltheconfigurationof
systems.Maneuverstoavoidcollisionswithotheraircraftorobjectsareincludedinthese
responsibilities.
Navigate:Thenavigationresponsibilitiesinvolvestrategic,orlonger-term,controloftheair
vehicleanditsground-basedequipment.Controllingandmonitoringthelocationandflight
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pathoftheaircraftincludesensuringthattheaircraftnavigateswithrespecttoairspace
boundaries,terrainandotherconsiderations.Theself-separationresponsibilitymustbe
accomplishedintheabsenceofanout-the-windowview,necessitatingrelianceonatraffic
situationdisplayintheGCS.Thetwofinalresponsibilitieslistedunder“Navigate”arespecificto
unmannedaviation.Thepilotmustmaintainanawarenessoftheaircraft’spre-programmed
lostlinkmaneuver,andensurethatthemaneuverisupdatedasnecessaryastheflight
progresses.Finally,intheeventofaseriousin-flightanomaly,thepilotmayberequiredto
terminatetheflight,possiblybydirectingtheaircrafttoasuitablelocationforacontrolled
impactorditching,orbydeployingaparachutesystem.Ineithercase,thepilotmustminimize
risktopeopleandproperty.
Communicate:ThepilotincommandmustcommunicatewithATC,otherairspaceusers,other
membersoftheflightcreworsupportteam,andancillaryservicessuchasweatherbriefers.
CommunicationandcoordinationwithintheUASoperatingteamiscriticalandtheUAShuman-
systeminterfacemustbedesignedtoenableteamsituationawarenesstobeachieved.Ifthe
UAisoperatingfarfromtheGCS,pilot-ATCcommunicationsmayberelayedusingground
infrastructure,satellite,orair-to-airrelays.Relayshavethepotentialtointroducetimedelays,
withdisruptiveimplicationsforverbalcommunication.
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Guidelines
Thissectioncontainstwobroadsetsofpreliminaryhumanfactorsguidelines.Guidelines
containedinthefirstsetrefertospecificcharacteristicsorcapabilitiesoftheinterface,andare
organizedusingthemodelofpilotresponsibilitiesshowninFigure4.Theletteratthe
beginningofeachguidelinecodeindicatesthetypeofguideline.Guidelineswithcodes
beginningwith“T_”specifypilottasksthatmustbefacilitatedbytheGCS.Guidelinesspecifying
theinformationcontentofdisplayshavecodesbeginningwith“I_”.Controlinputguidelines
havecodesbeginningwith“C_”,andguidelinesspecifyingpropertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
have“P_”codes.Thesecondsetofguidelinescomprisesconsiderationsthathavegeneral
applicabilitytotheGCS,possiblyacrossmultiplepilotresponsibilities.Theseguidelinesare
indicatedbya“G_”code.Thissetofguidelinesincludeshumanengineeringactivitiesthatthe
GCSdeveloperisexpectedtoaccomplishinordertoproduceaGCSthatcanbeoperatedsafely
andreliably,consideringhumancapabilitiesandlimitations.Placeholders,denotedby“TBA”
indicatewherefuturematerialistobeadded.
Characteristicsandcapabilitiesoftheinterface
Aviate
Thegoalof“Aviate”activitiesistoensurethatthebasicfunctionsoftheaircraftoperate
effectively.Theseresponsibilitiesincludetactical,orshort-term,controloftheairvehicle,the
controllink,andthecontrolstation.
Responsibility1.1:Monitorandcontrolaircraftsystems,includingautomationInmostcases,thecontinuouscontrolfunctionsnecessaryforthemaintenanceofstable
flightareallocatedtoon-boardautomation,howeverthepilotisstillrequiredtoprovide
supervisoryoversightandcontroltheconfigurationofsystems.Thismayincludemode
selectionsforautomatedsystems.Theinformationnecessarytoperformthesefunctions
willbeprovidedbythetelemetry(ordownlink)elementofthecontrollink
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Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_1.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.(Access5(2006)
T_1.1.2Ifanon-boardcameraisusedforflightcontroltasks,theGCSshouldenablethepilottocenterthefieldofviewofthecamera.
Informationcontentofdisplays
TBA.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_1.1.1TheGCSshouldnotenablethepilottodisengageautomationinflightiftheaircraftwilldepartfromcontrolledflightasaresult.
P_1.1.2TheGCSshouldpreventmultipleoperatorsfromoperatingthesameapplication/proceduresatanyonetime.(NATO,2004)P_1.1.3TheGCSshouldprovidetheabilitytoallowotheroperatorstoviewthestatusofaircraftsystems.(NATO,2004)
Relatedspecialconsiderations
A.Lossofnaturalsensing; B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink
Responsibility1.2:MonitorconsumableresourcesConsumableresourcesontheUAcanbeexpectedtoreduceinquantityoverthecourseof
aflight.Dependinguponthedesignoftheaircraft,theseresourcesmayincludefuel,oil,
andbatterypower.TheGCSmustenablethepilottomonitorthestatusoftheseresources.
Manyaspectsofthisresponsibilitywillbethesameforunmannedandmannedaircraft.The
taskofmonitoringconsumableresourcesmayinvolveaspectsuniquetoUAS,including
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unconventionalpropulsionsystemsandlongdurationflights.Additionally,thepilotmustbe
preparedforthepossibilitythatalostlinkproceduremayplaceadditionaldemandson
consumableresources,andthepilotmaybeunabletointervenewhiletheaircraftis
performingthelostlinkprocedure.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_1.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorthestatusofconsumableresources.Informationcontentofdisplays
I_1.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthestatusofconsumableresources.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
Relatedspecialconsiderations
E.Uniqueflightcharacteristicsofunmannedaircraft
Responsibility1.3:MonitorandconfigurecontrolstationManagementoftheGCSwillrequirethepilotorothercrewmemberstomonitorand
configurethestatusoftheGCS,andidentifyandrespondtoabnormalconditions.Thismay
includemanagingtheperformanceofcomputersystemsandpowersupplies.Unique
considerationscouldincludetheneedtomanageuninterruptablepowersuppliesandair
conditioningrequiredforcomputersystems.IfasecondGCSisplannedtobeusedduring
theflight,orisavailableonstandby,thepilotmayalsoneedtomaintainanawarenessof
thestateofreadinessofthisGCS.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
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T_1.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformgroundstationperformancechecks.
T_1.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformapre-flightcheckonanalternatecontrolstation,orconfirmthatthischeckhasbeenperformed.(RTCA,2007)
T_1.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocheckthecontrolstationfordamageandfunction.
T_1.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitortheperformanceofGCSsupportservices,e.g.airconditioningandelectricalpower.
Informationcontentofdisplays
I_1.3.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithhealthandstatusinformationontheGCS.Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
C.PhysicalcharacteristicsoftheGCS
Responsibility1.4:Maneuvertoavoidimminenthazard–CollisionAvoidanceThisresponsibilityreferstotacticalmaneuverstoavoidcollisionswithproximateaircraftor
objects.Itincludesthetime-criticalCollisionAvoidanceelementofDetectandAvoid
(DAA)*.Inthecaseofcollisionavoidancewithotheraircraft,thehuman/machinesystem
mustdetectthepresenceofproximatetraffic,identifytrafficthatposesacollisionthreat,
determineandcarryoutanappropriateresponse,aswellascommunicatingwithATC.
Giventhespeedwithwhichacollisionavoidancemaneuvermustbemade,itislikelythat
communicationwithATCwillnotoccurpriortothecommencementofthemaneuver.
Giventheabsenceofanout-the-windowview,thedetectionandpresentationtotheUAS
pilotoftrafficorotherthreatsmustbeperformedbytechnology.Howeverthesubsequent
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stepsmaybeassignedtoeitherautomationorthepilot,dependinguponsystemdesign.
Becausealost-linkconditionmaypreventthepilotfromperformingahuman-in-the-loop
roleduringcollisionavoidance,someUAsmaybecapableofexecutingautonomous
collisionavoidancemaneuvers.
CollisionavoidancecanbeseenasthefinalstageofDAAandwillonlybenecessarywhen
self-separationhasnotkepttheUAwell-clearofothertraffic.Self-separationrelatestothe
maintenanceofawell-cleardistancefromtraffic,andmayoccurwhiletheaircraftarestill
somedistancefromeachother.Guidelinesthatapplytotheself-separationelementsof
detectandavoid(andtheearlystepsofcollisionavoidance)canbefoundinsection2.3
“Self-Separation”.Itshouldalsobenotedthatbecausethisdocumentisfocusedonthe
uniquerequirementsofunmannedaviation,standardsformannedaviationthatwillalsobe
relevanttounmannedaviationarenotgenerallyreproducedhere.Formoreinformation
thereadercanrefertoexistingrequirementsforTrafficAlertandCollisionAvoidance
(TCAS)systems(RTCA,2008)andCockpitDisplaysofTrafficInformation(RTCA,2014).
*Theself-separationelementofDAAwillbecoveredunderthe“Navigate”responsibility.
TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoaccomplishthefollowingtasks
ThefollowingtasksmustbeaccomplishedbythepilotinsituationsthatrequiretheUAto
avoidacollision.
T_1.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifythethreatofanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorecognizetheneedforaUAevasivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodetermineanappropriatemaneuvertoavoidacollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.T_1.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoexecuteaUAcollisionavoidancemaneuver.
T_1.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutacollisionavoidance
maneuverandotherdeparturesfromtheassignedflightpath.
T_1.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathafter
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maneuveringtoavoidacollision.
T_1.4.7IftheUAiscapableofmakinganautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCS
shouldenablethepilottomonitorthemaneuver.
T_1.4.8IftheUAexecutesanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCSshouldenable
thepilottosmoothlyregaincontroloftheUAattheconclusionofthemaneuver.
InformationthatGCSmustprovideforthepilottoaccomplishthetasks
I_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilotwhenthereisathreatoftheUAcollidingwithanotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.ThealertmustbeprovidedintimeforthepilottoeffectivelyrespondtomaketheUAavoidthecollision.
I_1.4.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutterrainorground-basedobjectswithinproximityoftheprojectedUAflightpathandmaybecomeathreatforUAcollision.
I_1.4.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectaircraft,obstructionsorpeoplewhiletheUAismovingontheground.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orClosedCircuitTelevision(CCTV)cameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectlaunchortakeoff.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectapproachandlanding.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.6TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotinformationaboutthelikelihoodoftheUAcollidingwiththeupcomingthreatsothatthepilotwillbeabletomakeadecisionabouttheneedtotakeevasiveactiontoavoidacollision.
I_1.4.7TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithapredictionofthetimeavailableuntiltheUAwouldcollidewiththethreataircraft,object,orterrain.
I_1.4.8TheGCSshouldprovideinformationabouttheaircraftsurroundingtheUAandthecollisionthreattohelpinmakingadecisionaboutmaneuversthatwouldnotcauseadditionalrisksforcollision.
I_1.4.9TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthecapabilitiesoftheUAformakingevasivemaneuversinthecurrentUAsituation.Thisinformationshouldincludeatleastthefollowing:
I_1.4.9aPossiblemaneuversthatcanbemadebytheUAinthecurrentsituation–e.g.climb,descend,turnwithinacertainradius.
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I_1.4.9bTimefortheUAtoaccomplishthemaneuvers–e.g.howlonguntiltheUAreachesacertainturnradiusorclimbattitude.
I_1.4.10TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationnecessarytoquicklyidentifythecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofallcontrolsthatareusedtosendflightcommandstotheUA.
I_1.4.11TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationontheflightpaththathadbeenassignedtotheUApriortotheevasivemaneuver.
I_1.4.12TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthenecessaryUAtrajectoryneededtoreturntotheassignedflightpath.ThisshouldincludethenecessaryUAheadingandaltitudechanges.
I_1.4.13Ifanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuveriscarriedout,theGCSshouldalertthepilotthatthemaneuverisunderway,andmustnotifythepilotwhenthemaneuverisconcluded.
Controlinputs
C_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltocancelthecollisionalertifitwillbeongoinganddistractthepilotinaccomplishingothertasks.
C_1.4.2FlightcontrolsshouldbeprovidedtoenablethepilottorapidlycommandtheUAtoexecuteaneffectivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollision.ThecontrolsshouldbereadilyavailableatalltimesandmustbedesignedtoenablethepilottomakethecommandtotheUAinthetimeneededtoperformthecollisionavoidancemaneuver.Theflightcontrolsmustincludemeanstocontrol:
C_1.4.2aUAattitude.
C_1.4.2bUAheading.
C_1.4.2cUAspeedand/orthrust.Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
ThefollowingpropertiesareimportanttoconsiderwhendesigningtheGCSdisplaysand
controlsforthepilottoaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.1Informationandcontrolsshouldbereadilyaccessibleforthepilottorecognizeandaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.2Collisionavoidancealertsmustattractthepilot’sattentioninallexpectedlightingandoperatingconditions.
P_1.4.3Time-consumingorcomplicatedsequencesofactions(e.g.involvingmultiplelevelsofmenustructures)mustnotbenecessarytoaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.4Primaryflightcontrolsshouldbedesignedinamannerforthepilottoquicklyexecutecriticalcollisionavoidancemaneuversinallexpectedoperatingconditions.
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RelatedSpecialUASConsiderations
A.Lossofnaturalsensing.
Responsibility1.5:ManagestatusofcontrollinksThecontrolandcommunications(C2)linkisanintegralpartoftheUAS.Thelinkmayutilize
acombinationoftechnologies,includingterrestrialradio(stand-aloneornetworked),
satelliteradio(geostationaryorlowearthorbit),air-to-airrelays,andground-based
communicationinfrastructure.Aswellasmanagingtheaircraft,theflightcrewofaUAS
operatingintheNASmustmaintainanawarenessofthestatusoftheC2link,andwill
requiretheabilitytomanagethelink.Linkmanagementwillbeparticularlycriticalduring
controlhandovers,lostlinkandlinkresumption,whenoperatingtowardsthelimitsofthe
signal,andduringfrequencychanges.Theuseoftheword“link”inthefollowingguidelines
includesuplinkanddownlink.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmspectrumavailabilitybeforeselectinglink.
T_1.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselecttheappropriatecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency).
T_1.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofselectedcommunicationmode.
T_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmthatcommunicationlinkiseffective,andestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
T_1.5.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyifmorethanonecontrolstationislinkedwiththeUA.
T_1.5.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinkstrength,orlinkabnormalities.
T_1.5.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinklatency,whererelevant.
T_1.5.8TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.
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T_1.5.9TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainanawarenessofthegeographiclimitsofthelinkandpotentialobstructionstosignal.
T_1.5.10TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofcrewactionsorcontrolinputsthatcouldinterruptordegradethelink.
T_1.5.11TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorespondtointerferencewiththesignal,(e.g.otherusersoffrequency,jammingattempts).
T_1.5.12TheGCSshouldenablethepilottochangethelinkduringflightoperationsasnecessary.
T_1.5.13TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoassesslinkstrengthandqualitybeforeswitchinglink.
T_1.5.14TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodefinethedurationofalossoflinkthatmustoccurbeforethelostlinkalertisactivated,ortheUAentersitslostlinkprocedure.
T_1.5.15TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomanageresumptionofthesignalafteralostlink.
Informationcontentofdisplays
I_1.5.1TheGCSshouldbecapableofprovidingthepilotwithpredictiveinformationonthequalityandstrengthofaC2linkbeforethelinkisactivelyusedtocontroltheUA.
I_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoidentifywhichC2linksettingsareactive(e.g.selectedfrequency,satellitevsterrestrial).
I_1.5.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationtoconfirmthateffectivecontrolisestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
I_1.5.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthegeographiclimitsofthelink.
I_1.5.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonspectrumactivityfromaspectrumanalyzer.
I_1.5.6TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAisapproachinganareawherelinkislikelytobelost.
I_1.5.7TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.8TheUAwilltransmitapre-determinedtranspondercodewhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.9TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomonitorthestrengthofthelink.
I_1.5.10TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheC2linkexperiencesinterference,whetherresultingfromnaturalphenomena,payloadorotherequipmentassociatedwiththeUAS,orhumanactivities(suchasjammingorotherusersonfrequency).
I_1.5.11TheGCSshoulddisplaytothepilotthesourceofdownlinktransmissions.
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(Access5,2006)
I_1.5.12Whererelevant,theGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonlinklatency,inmilliseconds.
I_1.5.13TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.Thisinformationmayincludelinkfootprint,includingareasthatmaybeaffectedbyterrainmasking.
I_1.5.14TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomanagelinksecurity.
I_1.5.15TheGCSshouldinformthepilotwhenalostlinkisresumed.
Controlinputs
C_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency,transmissionpower).
C_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltoenablethepilottorequestalinkstatusreport.
C_1.5.3Ifantennaselectionisperformedbythepilot,thentheGCSshouldsupportanexternalcommandtosettheantennausedforcommunication.
C_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottosetthedurationofalinkoutagethatmustoccurbeforealostlinkresponseistriggered.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_1.5.1“TheremustbeanalertfortheUAScrew,viaaclearanddistinctauralandvisualsignal,foranytotallossofthecommandandcontroldatalink”.(NATO,2009)
P_1.5.2Theauralwarningforlostcontrollinkshouldbeauniquesound,notalsousedtosignifyotherconditions.
P_1.5.3ThemaximumrangeoftheC2datalink(datalinkfootprint)forallaltitudesanddirectionsrelativetothesignalsourceshouldbepresentedvisuallytothepilot,overlaidonamapdisplay.
P_1.5.4AreaswheretheC2link(datalinkfootprint)arepredictedtobemaskedbyterrainshouldbedisplayedontheC2datalinkdisplay.
P_1.5.5Ifthedatalinkfootprintcanbesuppressed,itshouldbeautomaticallydisplayedwhentheUAisapproachingalocationwherealossoflinkislikely.
P_1.5.6TheC2datalinkfootprintshouldbeeasilydistinguishablefromotherfootprintsthatmaybepresentontheoperatormapdisplay.(NATO,2004).
P_1.5.7Ifthepayloadutilizesalinkseparatetotheaircraftcontrollink,anydisplayofpayload
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linkqualityshouldbeseparateandclearlydistinguishablefromdisplaysfortheaircraftcontrollink.
P_1.5.8Ifanauralwarningisusedtoindicatelossofpayloadlink,thesoundshouldbedissimilartothatusedtoindicatelossofcontrollink.
P_1.5.9Securityfeaturesdesignedtopreventunapprovedaccess(logonandlogofffunctions)shouldnotresultininadvertentlockoutsofauthorizedpersonnel.
P_1.5.10TheGCS,incombinationwiththeotherelementsoftheUASshouldcomplywithcontrollinklatency(timefrominitiationofamaneuvertoameasurableresponsebytheUA)requirementsthatareestablishedatalevelsimilartomannedaircraft.(FAA,2013b)
Relatedspecialconsiderations
B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink.
Navigate
Thenavigateresponsibilityinvolveslargelystrategic,orlonger-term,controloftheairvehicle
anditsground-basedequipment.
Responsibility2.1:Controlandmonitorlocationandflightpathofaircraft.Controllingandmonitoringthelocationandflightpathoftheaircraftincludesensuringthat
theaircraftkeepstoitsflightplan,takingintoaccountairspaceboundaries,terrainand
otherconsiderations.Thisresponsibilityincludesgroundtaxiingandcomplyingwithall
requirementsfornavigatingairporttaxiwaysandrunways.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_2.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorandcontrolthepositionoftheUAwhenonthegroundandintheair.T_2.1.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.(FAA,2013b)
T_2.1.3“TheUASshallbecapableoftransitioningfromaninstrumentapproachproceduretoasafelanding,eitherbyvisualreferenceofaflightcrewmemberattheairportorbyothermeansacceptabletotheFAA”.(FAA,2013b)
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Informationcontentofdisplays
I_2.1.1UApositioninairspace.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationoftheUAwithintheairspace.Thisinformationshouldprovide:
I_2.1.1aRepresentationofUAwithintheairspace.
I_2.1.1bHeadingofUA.
I_2.1.1cAltitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1dSpeedofUA.
I_2.1.1eAttitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1fPositionofUArelativetootheraircraft,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2ProgrammedflightplanandpredictedflightpathofUA.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationofthepredictedflightpathoftheUAbasedontheflightplanprogrammedintotheflightmanagementsystembasedontheassignedflightclearance.Thisinformationshouldinclude:
I_2.1.2aIndicationofUAcurrentpositionalongprogrammedflightpath.
I_2.1.2b.PredictedflightpathrelativetoUAandothertraffic,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2cDistancetowaypointsalongflightpath.
I_2.1.2dIndicationofpositioninflightpathwhennewcommandedaltitudewillbeattained.
I_2.1.2eIndicationofturningradiusandpathwhenmakingturnsalongflightpath.
Controlinputs
C_2.1.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaneuvertheUA.Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_2.1.1ThemapdisplayshouldbeabletosupportavarietyofmaptypesincludingaeronauticalchartsandpresentationsofDigitalTerrainElevationData(DTED).
P_2.1.2Thepresentationscaleofthemapshouldbeselectable.Continuousscalingispreferredtodiscrete.(NATO,2004)
P_2.1.3Thepilotshouldbeabletoderivethescaleofthemapfromthedisplay.(NATO,2004)
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P_2.1.4ThemapdisplayshouldenablethepilottocustomizetheAircraft’sInformationTrail.(NATO,2004)
P_2.1.5Themapdisplayshouldbeconfigurableto“Northup”or“Trackup”.
P_2.1.6Ifcontrolisviaaterrestrialradio,thelocationof(ordirectionto)thegroundtransmitter/receivershouldbeshownonthemap.P_2.1.7PrimaryflightcontrolsforcontrollingtheUA(heading,attitude,speed)shouldbeavailableatalltimesthroughdedicatedphysicalcontrols.Iftheuseofsoftware-basedcontrolscannotbeavoided,thenthecontrolsshouldbeimmediatelyaccessibleatthetoplevelofthecontrolinterface.(NATO,2009).
P_2.1.8Mapdisplaysshouldhavemeanstoselectthescaleofthemaptobepresented.Thescalespresentedonthemapsshouldbeevidenttothepilot.(NATO,2004)
P_2.1.9Thepilotshouldhavethemeanstocustomizetheinformationtrailforanaircraftshownonthetrafficdisplay.(NATO,2004)
Relatedspecialconsiderations
A.Lossofnaturalsensing;C.Controlstationonground;G.Relianceonautomation.
Responsibility2.2:Remainclearofterrain,airspaceboundariesandweatherThisresponsibilitycoverstheactivitiesinvolvedinremainingclearofundesiredlocations
thatcanbeidentifiedduringflightplanningormaybecomeapparentduringthecourseofa
flight.Theselocationsmaybeundesiredduetoterrain,airspaceboundaries,weather,or
otheroperationalrestrictions.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_2.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.(FAA,2013b)
T_2.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilotto“observe”andcomplywithsignageandwarninglightsduringsurfaceoperations.
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(FAA,2013b)
T_2.2.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.(RTCA,2007)
T_2.2.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.
T_2.2.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidicingconditions.Informationcontentofdisplays
DisplayAirspaceCoordinationInformation
I_2.2.1“Theoperatorshouldbeabletodisplayflightcorridors,controlledairspaceandanyotherrelevantairspaceco-ordinationinformation”.(NATO,2004)
I_2.2.2TheGCSshoulddisplayweatherinformationtothepilot.
I_2.2.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthelocationoficingconditions,especiallyiftheUAisnotcertificatedforflightinicingconditions.
I_2.2.4TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAentersicingconditions.
I_2.2.5TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAencounterssignificantairturbulence.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
A.Lossofnaturalsensing;E.UniquecharacteristicsofUASflight.
Responsibility2.3:Self-separatefromotheraircraftThisresponsibilityincludesthestrategicseparationassurancefunctionofDetectandAvoid
(DAA),inwhichtheUAremainswellclearofothertraffic*.TheNASAUASintheNAS
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projectisdevelopingMinimumOperationalPerformanceStandards(MOPS)forthehuman-
machineinterface(HMI)ofDAASystems.ThismaterialwillfocusonUAS-specificissuesthat
arenotcoveredinRTCA(2014)“GuidelinesforCockpitDisplaysofTrafficInformation”,and
willbeincludedinaforthcomingstandardtobepublishedbyRTCAin2016.Thefinal
approvedRTCAguidelines,whenpublicallyreleased,willreplacethepreliminaryself-
separationguidelinesincludedbelow.
Forthepurposesofthisdocument,guidelinesthathavegeneralrelevancetonavigationare
containedinSection2.1“ControlandMonitorLocationandFlightpathofAircraft”.
GuidelinesthatrelatetocommunicationwithATCthatmustoccurtoaccomplishself-
separationarecontainedinSection2.0“Communication”.
*Notethatevasivemaneuversforimmediatecollisionavoidanceareincludedunder“1.4:
Maneuvertoavoidimminenthazard–CollisionAvoidance”.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_2.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitoralltrafficintheairspacearoundtheUAtoidentifypotentialforupcomingwell-clearviolations.
T_2.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoquicklyidentifyanythreatofanaircraftviolatingthewell-clearairspaceoftheUA
T_2.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottotrackthesurroundingtrafficflightpaths,assesstheriskofwell-clearviolations,andrecognizetheneedfortheUAtomaneuvertomaintainself-separationcriteria
T_2.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodeterminetheappropriatemaneuverfortheUAtomaketomaintainself-separation.
T_2.3.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommandtheUAtoexecutetheevasivemaneuver
T_2.3.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutmakingtheseparationmaneuveranddepartingfromtheassignedflightpath
T_2.3.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathaftermaneuveringforself-separation.
Informationcontentofdisplays
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MaterialfromRTCASC-228MinimumOperationalPerformanceStandards(MOPS)forUnmannedAircraftDetectandAvoidtobeaddedhere.ThisMOPSiscurrentlyindraftform.
Controlinputs
MaterialfromRTCASC-228MinimumOperationalPerformanceStandards(MOPS)forUnmannedAircraftDetectandAvoidtobeaddedhere.
Guidelinesforpropertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
MaterialfromRTCASC-228MinimumOperationalPerformanceStandards(MOPS)forUnmannedAircraftDetectandAvoidtobeaddedhere.
RelatedSpecialUASConsiderations
A:Lossofnaturalsensing.
Responsibility2.4:EnsurethatlostlinkprocedureisappropriateThepilotmustmaintainanawarenessoftheaircraft’spre-programmedlostlinkmaneuver,
andensurethatthemaneuverisupdatedasnecessaryastheflightprogresses.Ifthelost
linkprocedurebecomes“stale”,theaircraftmayexecuteanunsafemaneuverintheevent
ofalostlink,suchasflyingtowardsterraininanattempttoreachawaypointprogrammed
earlierintheflight.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_2.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoremainawareoftheaircraft’slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
T_2.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoupdatetheaircraft’slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
Informationcontentofdisplays
I_2.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithadisplayindicatingthefutureflightpathofthe
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aircraftshouldalostlinkoccur.
I_2.4.2TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheexecutionofalostlinkprocedurewouldcreateahazard(suchasdirectingtheaircrafttowardsterrain,orintonon-authorizedairspace).
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_2.4.1Theflightpaththatwouldbetakenbytheaircraftintheeventofalostlinkshouldbeclearlydistinguishablefromtheprogrammednormalflightpathoftheaircraft.
P_2.4.2Informationontheprogrammedlostlinkbehavioroftheaircraftshouldbereadilyavailabletothepilot,withouttheneedforcomplexinteractionswiththehuman-machineinterface.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink
Responsibility2.5:FlightterminationInanemergency,thepilotofanunmannedaircraftmayberequiredtodestroytheaircraft
byacontrolledimpact,ditching,orotherflightterminationmethod.SomeUASdesignswill
makeprovisionforanemergencyrecoverysystem,suchasaparachute.Humanfactors
considerationswillincludetheinformationpilotswillrequiretomakethisdifficultdecision
andexecutetheaction,aswellasmeasurestoprotectagainsttheinadvertentactivationof
theflightterminationsystem.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_2.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodecidewhentoterminatetheflightviacontrolledimpact,ditchingorparachutedescent.
T_2.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyasuitablelocationforflighttermination.
T_2.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoterminatetheflightinapre-designatedarea.(RTCA,2007)
T_2.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottousereal-timeinformationtoconfirmthatflight
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terminationattheselectedlocationwillnotpresentunacceptablerisktopeopleorproperty.Informationcontentofdisplays
I_2.5.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithreal-timeimageryoftheselectedimpact,ditchingorparachutedescentsitetoconfirmthatasafeterminationcanbeaccomplished.
I_2.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilottoindicatethattheflightterminationsystemisabouttobeactivated.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_2.5.1WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem:
P_2.5.1a.Theuseofthesecontrolsshouldbeintuitiveandminimizethepossibilityofconfusionandsubsequentinadvertentoperation.
P_2.5.1b.TwodistinctanddissimilaractionsoftheUAScrewshouldberequiredtoinitiatetheflightterminationcommand.(NATO,2009)
Note:STANAG4671(NATO,2009)specifiesthatflightterminationcontrols“mustbearrangedandidentifiedsuchthattheyarereadilyavailableandaccessible”.Thistexthasbeendeletedfromthisdocumentasitisbelievedthatflightterminationcontrolsshouldnotbereadilyaccessible.STANAG4671didnotcontainrequirementfordissimilarcontrols.ThisrequirementisbasedontheexperiencecontainedinNASAproceduralrequirementsrelatedtotwo-faulttolerance).
P_2.5.2Beforethefinalstepinactivatingtheflightterminationsystemisreached,theGCSshouldprovideanauralandvisualalerttothepilotthatflightterminationisabouttobeactivated.
P_2.5.3Theauralalertwarningofimminentflightterminationshouldinvolveauniquesound.Thisshouldpreferablytaketheformofaverbalmessagesuchas“Flighttermination!”
P_2.5.4WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem,flightterminationcontrolsshouldbesafeguardedfrominterferencethatcouldleadtoinadvertentoperation.(NATO,2009).
Relatedspecialconsiderations
F.Flighttermination
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Communicate
ThePilotincommandmustcommunicatewithATC,otherairspaceusers,othermembersofthe
flightcreworsupportteam,andancillaryservicessuchasweatherbriefers.
Responsibility3.1:CommunicatewithATCandotherairspaceusersCommunicationwithATCistypicallyviaVHFvoicecommunicationstransmittedfromthe
UA,orinsomecases,controllerpilotdatalink(CPDL).IftheUAisoperatingbeyondradio
line-of-sightfromthegroundtransmitter,communicationsmayberelayedusingground
infrastructureorsatellite.Additionally,air-to-airrelaysbetweenUAsmaybeusedinsome
cases.Relayshavethepotentialtointroducetimedelaysintocommunications.Inaddition
tocommunicatingwithATC,thepilotmayberequiredtocommunicatewithotherairspace
users.Thisincludesdirectpilot-to-pilotcommunicationsaswellas“partyline”
communicationsthatthepilottomaintainawarenessofthelocationandintentionsof
otherusersoftheairspace.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_3.1.1Whenoperatingnearanon-toweredairport,thepilotshouldbeabletoexchangeintentinformationwithotherairporttrafficthroughstandardcommunicationsontheairportcommontrafficadvisoryfrequency(CTAF).(FAA,2013b)
T_3.1.2TheUASpilotshouldbeabletoestablishanalternatecommunicationsmethodwithATCifthedurationofthecommunicationslossexceedsrequirementsfortheoperatingenvironment.(FAA,2013b)
Informationcontentofdisplays
I_3.1.1TheGCSshouldincludealternatemeansforthepilottocommunicatewithATCintheeventofalossofC2link.
I_3.1.2Currentsettingsofcommunicationcontrols.TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationaboutthecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofthecontrolsusedforcommunicationwithATC.
Controlinputs
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TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_3.1.1ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldhaveameanlessthanorequalto250ms.(FAA,2012)
P_3.1.2ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbelessthanorequalto300ms.(99thpercentile).(FAA,2012)
P_3.1.3ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbewithinamaximumof350ms.(FAA,2012)
Relatedspecialconsiderations
B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink.
Responsibility3.2:CommunicatewithotherUASflightcrewandgroundsupportpersonnelGroundsupportpersonnel,externalobserversandothersupportpersonnelmaybelocated
remotefromtheGCS.Communicationandcoordinationwithintheoperatingteamwill
requirespecialattention,andthehumansysteminterfacemustbedesignedtoenable
teamsituationawarenesstobeachieved.SomecurrentUASoperatorsuseclosedcircuitTV
camerastoenablethepilottomonitortheaircraftduringpre-andpost-flightground
handling.WherecontroloftheUAwillbetransferredinflight,communicationmustoccur
betweenthegivingandreceivingpilots.Thismayinvolvevoice,ortextbased
communications.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_3.2.1TheGCSshouldenabletheUAScrewmemberstocommunicatewitheachother(co-locatedornot)inordertoperformthenecessaryflighttasks.(FAA,2013b)
T_3.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatcommandssenttotheaircraftonthegrounddonotcreateasafetyhazardforgroundsupportpersonnel.
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Informationcontentofdisplays
I_3.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithimageryoftheaircraftwheneverthepilothascontroloftheaircraftonthegroundandgroundsupportpersonnelareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
I_3.2.2TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithacommunicationlinkwithgroundsupportpersonnelwhiletheyareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA
Relatedspecialconsiderations
A.Lossofnaturalsensing;B.Controlandcommunicationviaradiolink;C.Physical
characteristicsofthecontrolstation
Responsibility3.3:CommunicatewithancillaryservicesAncillaryservicesincludeweatherbriefers,andotherpersonnelprovidingexternalsupport
totheUASoperation.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_3.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithweatherinformationservicesandotherancillaryservices.
Informationcontentofdisplays
TBA
Controlinputs
TBA
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
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TBA
Relatedspecialconsiderations
TBA
ManageSystemsandOperations
Responsibility4.1:MakedecisionsinnormalconditionsPilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
TBA.
Informationcontentofdisplays
TBA.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
TBA.
Responsibility4.2:Recognizeandrespondtonon-normalconditionsPilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
TBA.
Informationcontentofdisplays
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TBA.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
TBA.
Responsibility4.3:Planfornormalandnon-normalconditionsPilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
TBA.
Informationcontentofdisplays
TBA.
Controlinputs
TBA.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
TBA.
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Responsibility4.4:TransfercontrolTheabilitytocompletelytransfercontrolbetweenorwithincontrolstationsisoneofthekeydifferencesbetweenUASoperationsandconventionalaviation.Handovershavebeenidentifiedasanareaofincreasedriskinarangeofindustrialandtransportsettings,includingaircraftmaintenance,medicine,andairtrafficcontrol.Handoversrequirespecialattentiontoensurethatthecrewofthe“receiving”and“giving”GCSpossessasharedunderstandingoftheoperationalsituationandthatcontrolsettingsarealignedbetweenthetwocontrolstations.
Pilottasksthatmustbeperformedusingtheinterface
T_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredbetweenagivingandreceivingGCSinamannerthatisseamlessandtransparenttoATC.(FAA,2013b)
T_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontinuityofpilotfunctiontobemaintainedduringthetransferofcontrolbetweenagivingandreceivingGCS.(FAA,2013b)
T_4.4.3“TheGCSshallenablethepilottoensurethatoperatingparametersareidenticalbeforeandafterhandover”.(NATO,2009)
T_4.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottopassUAcontrol(handover)toanotherGCSandmonitorthestatusofthehandover.(NATO,2004)
T_4.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.(Access5,2006)
T_4.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethegivingandreceivingpilotstoconfirmthatcontrolsettingsareappropriateandconsistentbeforeahandoverisaccomplished.
T_4.4.7TheGCSshouldenablethereceivingpilottomonitorthestatusoftheUAbyreceivingtelemetryfromtheUAbeforeestablishingcontroloftheUA.
T_4.4.8TheGCSshouldfacilitateahandoverbriefingbetweenthegivingandreceivingpilots.
T_4.4.9TheGCSshouldprovidethereceivingpilotwithameansofconfirmingthatcontrolhasbeenestablishedwiththeUA.
Informationcontentofdisplays
I_4.4.1Thepilotshouldbepresentedwithinformationnecessarytoconfirmthatflight-criticalsettingsinthereceivingGCSareconsistentwithsettingsinthegivingGCS.
I_4.4.2TheGCSshouldprovidealevelofinvolvementindicatortothepilottoshowwhethertheGCShasbeensettoonlyreceivetelemetryfromtheUA,ortoreceivetelemetryandtransmitcommandstotheUA.
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Controlinputs
C_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthedesiredlevelofinvolvementwithaUA,rangingfrommonitoringtelemetrywithoutanactiveuplink,totelemetrywithfullcontrolviaanactiveuplink.
C_4.4.2Thereshouldbeameansforthegivingandreceivingpilotstocommunicatebefore,duringandafterthehandover.
Propertiesofdisplaysandcontrols
P_4.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidesuitabledisplaystoenablebriefingstobeconductedbetweenaseatedpilotandastandingpilotduringcontrolhandovers.Thismayincludetheuseoflargescalesynopticdisplays.
P_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredtoanotherGCSwithoutanygapincontroloccurringduringthehandover.
Relatedspecialconsiderations
D.In-flighttransferofcontrol.
Generalguidelines
Theguidelineslistedinthissectionarebroadprinciplesthathavegeneralapplicabilitytothe
GCS.Eventhoughtheymayappearelsewhereinthehumanfactorsliterature,theseguidelines
arelistedherebecausetheyhavespecialrelevancetoUASinlightofthehumanfactors
considerationslistedinTable2.
G_1UASdevelopersshouldfollowrecognizedhuman-centereddesignprocessesincludingthefollowing:
G_1a.DevelopafullsetofpilottasksandintendedoperationsforwhichtheGCSwillbeused.Thesewillhelpdriveensuringathoroughdesignthatprovidesallsystems,information,andcontrolsthatthepilotswillneed.
G_1b.Developanunderstandingofthepotentialsafetycriticalerrorsthatthepilotsmaymakewhenaccomplishingtheirtasks.Thesewillprovidethefoundationformakingtrade-offsindesigndecisionsbyfocusingondesignattributesthatwillmitigatecriticalerrorsasneeded.
G_1c.Developafullsetofinformationrequirementsforthetasksthepilotswillneedtoaccomplish.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthe
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beginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethattheappropriateinformationisprovidedtothepilotsandprovidethefoundationformakingdesigndecisions.
G_1d.Developafullsetofrequirementsforcontrolsthatthepilotwillneedtoaccomplishtheirtasks.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthebeginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethatallthepilotcontrolsareplannedforasdesigndecisionsaremade.
G_1e.Documentalloftheresultsoftheseprocessessothattheycanbecontinuallyupdatedwhendesigndecisionsandtrade-offsaremadeduringthedesignprocess.Gooddocumentationwillalsohelpthehumanfactorsdesignprocessestobeintegratedwiththeothersystemsengineeringdevelopmentanddesignprocesses.
Supportingnotes:Manysafetystudieshaveconcludedthatdesign-relatedissuesthatleadto
accidentsorincidentsweretheresultofinadequateattentiontodevelopinganddocumenting
sounddesignrequirements,notpoordecisionsaboutdesigncharacteristics.Followingthe
processespresentedinthisguidelinewillhelpprovideafoundationtoensurethathuman
factors-relatedrequirementsaredevelopedanddocumentedasabasisforgoodhumanfactors
designdecisions.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:General
G_2Theuseofmulti-modefunctionsonflightcontrolsshouldbeminimized.Ifmodesareused,thesystemshouldclearlyindicatethecurrentmode,andotherpotentialmodesshouldbeindicated.Supportingnotes:Flight-criticalcontrolsthatcanperformdifferentfunctionsbasedonmode
selectionhavethepotentialtoprovokecontrolerrors.InsomeGCSforexample,asidestick
controllerwillcontroleitherpitchorspeed,dependingontheselectedmode.Evidencefrom
conventionalaviationindicatesthatmaintainingmodeawarenesscanbedifficultforpilots
undersomecircumstances,andtheresultingmodeconfusioncanleadtoaccidents.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfaces
basedonconsumerproducts.
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G_3Ifchangingamodeselectionofanautomatedsystemhasasafetyconsequence,theactiontoselectthatmodeshouldbealerted,andadditionalprecautionsshouldbetakentopreventinadvertentselection.Supportingnotes:Flight-criticalcontrolsthatcanperformdifferentfunctionsbasedonmode
selectionhavethepotentialtoprovokecontrolerrors.TherehavebeencaseswheretheUAS
pilothasselectedamodeinflightthatrenderstheaircraftuncontrollable.TheGCSdesign
shouldmakeitdifficulttoperformsuchamodeselectionaction.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfaces
basedonconsumerproducts.
G_4Payloadcontrolsshouldbeseparatefromcontrolswithsafety-of-flightfunctions.Supportingnotes:SomeGCSdesignshaveinvolvedmulti-functioncontrolsthatcanbe
configuredtoeithercontrolasafety-of-flightfunctionoranon-criticalpayloadfunction.A
notableexamplewastheaccidenttoaMQ-9inwhichtheengineoftheaircraftwasshutdown
inadvertently.Althoughtheaccidentwasrelatedtomultiplecausalfactors,oneissuewasthat
asingleleverintheGCScouldbeconfiguredtoeithercontrolanenginesettingorcontrolan
irissettingonacamera(NTSB,2006).
Relatedspecialconsiderations:General
G_5Itshouldnotbepossibletoreconfigureasafety-of-flightcontroltoperformapayloadfunction.Supportingnotes:SomeGCSdesignshaveinvolvedmulti-functioncontrolsthatcanbe
configuredtoeithercontrolasafety-of-flightfunctionoranon-criticalpayloadfunction.The
widespreaduseofconsumersoftwareinterfacesinGCSmakeitpossibletorapidlyre-configure
controlstoperformfunctionsthatwerenotintendedbytheoriginaldesigners.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumerproducts.
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G_6Activationofakeyorbuttonshouldprovidetactileorauditoryfeedbacktothepilot.(ANSI/HFES,2007)Supportingnotes:TBA
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfaces
basedonconsumerproducts.
G_7ThereshouldbeaclearindicationtothepilotwhenacommandhasbeenreceivedbytheUAS.Supportingnotes:ThelocationoftheUASpilot,remotefromtheaircraft,canmakeit
challengingforthepilottomaintainanawarenessofsystemstateandbehavioroftheaircraft.
Intheabsenceofothersensorycues,itisparticularlyimportantthatthepilotreceivefeedback
thatacommandhasbeenreceivedandisbeingactedupon.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:A.Lossofnaturalsensing;B.ControlandCommunicationvia
radiolink;G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumer
products.
G_8AnyunrecognizedentrymadebythepilotattheGCSshouldcauseaninformativeerrormessagetobedisplayedandnotaffectthestatusoroperationofanysystem.(Access5,2006)Supportingnotes:Therichsensorycuesavailabletothepilotofaconventionalaircraftinclude
visual,auditory,proprioceptiveandolfactorysensations.Theabsenceofthesecueswhen
operatingaUAScanmakeitmoredifficultforthepilottomaintainanawarenessofthe
aircraft’sstate.Observationsofairlinepilotshaveindicatedthat“piloterror”isarelatively
frequentevent,yetmostoftheseerrorsarerapidlyidentifiedandcorrectedbythecrews
themselves(ICAO,2002).ThelocationoftheUASpilotremotefromtheaircraftmaymakepilot
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errorself-correctionmoredifficult.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:A.Lossofnaturalsensing;B.ControlandCommunicationvia
radiolink;G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumer
products.
G_9Flightcrewalerting.(QuotedverbatimfromCFR§25.1322)
G_9“(a)Flightcrewalertsmust:(1)Providetheflightcrewwiththeinformationneededto:(i)Identifynon-normaloperationorairplanesystemconditions,and(ii)Determinetheappropriateactions,ifany.(2)Bereadilyandeasilydetectableandintelligiblebytheflightcrewunderallforeseeableoperatingconditions,includingconditionswheremultiplealertsareprovided.(3)Beremovedwhenthealertingconditionnolongerexists.
G_9(b)Alertsmustconformtothefollowingprioritizationhierarchybasedontheurgencyofflightcrewawarenessandresponse.(1)Warning:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandimmediateflightcrewresponse.(2)Caution:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandsubsequentflightcrewresponse.(3)Advisory:Forconditionsthatrequireflightcrewawarenessandmayrequiresubsequentflightcrewresponse.
G_9(c)Warningandcautionalertsmust:(1)Beprioritizedwithineachcategory,whennecessary.(2)Providetimelyattention-gettingcuesthroughatleasttwodifferentsensesbyacombinationofaural,visual,ortactileindications.(3)Permiteachoccurrenceoftheattention-gettingcuesrequiredbyparagraph(c)(2)ofthissectiontobeacknowledgedandsuppressed,unlesstheyarerequiredtobecontinuous.
G_9(d)Thealertfunctionmustbedesignedtominimizetheeffectsoffalseandnuisancealerts.Inparticular,itmustbedesignedto:(1)Preventthepresentationofanalertthatisinappropriateorunnecessary.(2)Provideameanstosuppressanattention-gettingcomponentofanalertcausedbyafailureofthealertingfunctionthatinterfereswiththeflightcrew'sabilitytosafelyoperatetheairplane.Thismeansmustnotbereadilyavailabletotheflightcrewsothatitcouldbeoperatedinadvertentlyorbyhabitualreflexiveaction.Whenanalertissuppressed,theremustbeaclearandunmistakableannunciationtotheflightcrewthatthealerthasbeensuppressed.
G_9(e)Visualalertindicationsmust:(1)Conformtothefollowingcolorconvention:(i)Redforwarningalertindications.(ii)Amberoryellowforcautionalertindications.(iii)Anycolorexceptredorgreenforadvisoryalertindications.(2)Usevisualcodingtechniques,togetherwithotheralertingfunctionelementsontheflightdeck,todistinguishbetweenwarning,caution,andadvisoryalertindications,iftheyarepresentedonmonochromaticdisplaysthatarenotcapableofconformingtothecolorconventioninparagraph(e)(1)ofthissection.G_9(f)Useofthecolorsred,amber,andyellowontheflightdeckforfunctionsotherthanflightcrewalertingmustbelimitedandmustnotadverselyaffectflightcrewalerting”.
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o Supportingnotes:Thepresentationofwarnings,cautionsandadvisoriesisanareawhere
currentGCSdesignshavebeenparticularlydeficient.Designshavetendedtopresent
informationintextualformat,whichrequiresthepilottoreceivetheinformationthroughthe
limitedchanneloffovealvision.Intheabsenceofadirecton-boardexperienceoftheaircraft’s
performance,theUASpilotisentirelyreliantonwarning,cautionandadvisoryalertsforcritical
informationonsystemstatus.
o TheaboverequirementsarequoteddirectlyfromCFRpart25duetotheirparticularrelevance
toGCSdesigns.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:A.Lossofnaturalsensing
G_10Systemsthatalertthepilottoacriticalanomalyshouldnotbesubjecttoasilentfailure.o Supportingnotes:TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation.
G_11TheGCSshouldprovideaworkenvironmentthatmaintainspilotengagement,andminimizesthenegativeimpactofextendedperiodsoflowworkload.Supportingnotes:TheUASpilotmayexperienceextendedperiodsoflowworkload,particularly
whenthepilot’sroleislimitedtothesupervisorycontrolofautomation(Cummings,
Mastracchio,Thornburg,&Mkrtchyan,2013).Itiswell-establishedthathumanshavedifficulty
maintainingvigilanceontasksthatinvolvelongperiodsofmonotonousmonitoring.Thepilot
mayhavetomakearapidtransitionfromanunstimulatingperiodofmonitoringtoaperiodof
highworkloadandquickdecision-making.Controlstationstendtoberelativelyquiet,air
conditionedenvironmentswithlowlevelsofnoise.Theexperienceofsettingssuchasindustrial
controlroomsandlocomotivecabsindicatesthatsuchunstimulatingenvironmentscanmakeit
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moredifficultforpersonneltoremainalert,especiallywhenfatigued.Controlstationsmustbe
designedtomaintainpilotengagementevenduringextendedperiodsofuneventfuloperation.
Thisguidelinedoesnotspecifyhowpilotengagementshouldbemaintained,orhowlossesof
vigilanceshouldbedetected.Itshouldbenotedthatthereisalonghistoryintherailroad
industryof“vigilancecontroldevices”or“deadman’shandles”designedtomaintainoperator
vigilance.Someroadvehiclesnowincludedevicesintendedtodetectsleepepisodesindrivers,
bymonitoringeyeclosuresordetectingreducedcontrolinputs.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:C;Controlstationonground;E.UniquecharacteristicsofUAS
flight
G_12TheGCSshouldprovideconsistencyofoperationforcommonfunctions.o Supportingnotes:TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation.
G_13Thefunctionsneededtosafelycontroltheaircraftunderusualflightsituationsshouldbelocatedinthepilot'sprimaryfield-of-view.Supportingnotes:TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:C.Physicalcharacteristicsofthecontrolstation;G.relianceon
automation.
G_14WarningsandcautionsshouldnotbeobscuredbyotherGCSdisplays.Supportingnotes:TBA.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:C.Physicalcharacteristicsofthecontrolstation;G.Relianceon
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automation.
G_15“Part-timedisplay.Ifitisdesiredtoinhibitsomeparametersfromfull-timedisplay,anequivalentlevelofsafetytofull-timedisplayshouldbedemonstrated.Criteriatobeconsideredincludethefollowing:(a)Continuousdisplayoftheparameterisnotrequiredforsafetyofflightinallnormalflightphases.(b)Theparameterisautomaticallydisplayedinflightphaseswhereitisrequired.(c)Theinhibitedparameterisautomaticallydisplayedwhenitsvalueindicatesanabnormalcondition,orwhentheparameterreachesanabnormalvalue.(d)DisplayoftheinhibitedparametercanbemanuallyselectedbytheUAVcrewwithoutinterferingwiththedisplayofotherrequiredinformation.(e)Iftheparameterfailstobedisplayedwhenrequired,thefailureeffectandcompoundingeffectsmustmeettherequirementsofUSAR.1309.Theanalysisistoclearlydemonstratethatthedisplay(s)ofdataisconsistentwithsafeoperationunderallprobableoperatingconditions.(f)Theautomatic,orrequested,displayoftheinhibitedparametershouldnotcreateunacceptableclutteronthedisplay;simultaneousmultiple"pop-ups"mustbeconsidered.(g)Ifthepresenceofthenewparameterisnotsufficientlyself-evident,suitablealertingmustaccompanytheautomaticpresentation”.STANAG4671AMC.1722
Supportingnotes:ThismaterialistakenverbatimfromNATO(2009).
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfaces
basedonconsumerproducts.
G_16Whereverpossible,textmessages,whetherindialogboxes,warningmessagesorotherscreendisplays,shouldbepresentedinplainlanguage,orusingstandardaviationterminology.Supportingnotes:SomeGCSinterfacesbasedontextualpresentationofinformationhaveused
unnecessarilycomplicatedorcounter-intuitivelanguage.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfaces
basedonconsumerproducts.
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G_17ControlsintendedtobeoperatedbythepilotshouldbereachablefromaseatedpositionSupportingnotes:ThisprinciplehasbeenviolatedinsomecurrentGCSdesigns.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:C:Controlstationonground
G_18TheGCSshouldprovideabookresttoenablethepilottorefertodocumentswithoutriskthatthedocumentwillcomeintocontactwithakeyboardorotherflightcontrols.Supportingnotes:UASincidentshaveoccurredwherekeyboardcommandshavebeen
inadvertentlyactivatedbycontactwithdocumentsandothermaterials.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:C:Controlstationonground
G_19AppropriateprioritycontrolsshouldbeavailableforUASfunctionsthatrequireeitherquickaccessibilityorconstantavailability.Prioritycontroldevicescaninclude,butarenotlimitedto:(a)Touchpanels,(b)Buttons,(c)Switches,(d)Joysticks,(e)Keyboardshortcuts.(NATO,2004)
Supportingnotes:Pilotactionsthatmustbeperformedrapidlyrangefromsafety-critical
actionssuchascollisionavoidancemaneuverstolesscritical,butimportantroutineactions
suchasrespondingtoanATCrequestto“Ident”(Pestana,2008).SomeGCSdesignshave
requiredpilotstoperformcomplicatedsequencesofactionstoperformtime-criticalorroutine
actions.GuidelinescallingforGCStoenablepilotstorapidlyperformsuchactionsappearin
Access5(2006),NATO(2004)andNATO(2009).NATO(2009)states“Wheretheinterfacewith
UAVcrewisbasedona“pulldownmenus”architecture,thecontrolsthatnecessitateaprompt
reactionoftheUAVcrewmustbeaccessibleatthefirstlevelofthepulldownmenus,
otherwise,safetycriticalcontrolsintheUCSmusthavededicatedknobsorlevers”.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:A.Lossofnaturalsensing;B.ControlandCommunicationvia
radiolink;G.Relianceonautomation;H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumer
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products.
G_20Ifadisplayscreenenablesthepilottomoveorrearrangedisplayorcontrolwindows,itshouldnotbepossibletoplaceawindowsoastoobscureprimaryflightcontrolsordisplays.Supportingnotes:Theuseofreconfigurableandmoveablescreenwindowsanddialogboxes
introducesthepossibilitythatcriticaldisplayscouldbeobscuredbehindless-criticalinterfaces.
Relatedspecialconsiderations:H.Widespreaduseofinterfacesbasedonconsumerproducts.
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Summarylistofguidelines
Notethatinthefollowingsummarylist,thetypeofguidelinecanbeascertainedfromthefirstletterinthetitleasfollows:
T_Taskguidelines I_Informationcontent C_Controlinputs P_Propertiesoftheinterface G_GeneralguidelinesT_1.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.
T_1.1.2Ifanon-boardcameraisusedforflightcontroltasks,theGCSshouldenablethepilottocenterthefieldofviewofthecamera.
P_1.1.1TheGCSshouldnotenablethepilottodisengageautomationinflightiftheaircraftwilldepartfromcontrolledflightasaresult.
P_1.1.2TheGCSshouldpreventmultipleoperatorsfromoperatingthesameapplication/proceduresatanyonetime.
P_1.1.3TheGCSshouldprovidetheabilitytoallowotheroperatorstoviewthestatusofaircraftsystems.
T_1.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorthestatusofconsumableresources.
I_1.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthestatusofconsumableresources.
T_1.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformgroundstationperformancechecks.
T_1.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformapre-flightcheckonanalternatecontrolstation,orconfirmthatthischeckhasbeenperformed.
T_1.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocheckthecontrolstationfordamageandfunction.
T_1.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitortheperformanceofGCSsupportservices,e.g.airconditioningandelectricalpower.
I_1.3.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithhealthandstatusinformationontheGCS.
T_1.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifythethreatofanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorecognizetheneedforaUAevasivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodetermineanappropriatemaneuvertoavoidacollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoexecuteaUAcollisionavoidancemaneuver.
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T_1.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutacollisionavoidancemaneuverandotherdeparturesfromtheassignedflightpath.
T_1.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathaftermaneuveringtoavoidacollision.
T_1.4.7IftheUAiscapableofmakinganautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorthemaneuver.
T_1.4.8IftheUAexecutesanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCSshouldenablethepilottosmoothlyregaincontroloftheUAattheconclusionofthemaneuver.
I_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilotwhenthereisathreatoftheUAcollidingwithanotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.ThealertmustbeprovidedintimeforthepilottoeffectivelyrespondtomaketheUAavoidthecollision.
I_1.4.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutterrainorground-basedobjectswithinproximityoftheprojectedUAflightpathandmaybecomeathreatforUAcollision.
I_1.4.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectaircraft,obstructionsorpeoplewhiletheUAismovingontheground.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orClosedCircuitTelevision(CCTV)cameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectlaunchortakeoff.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectapproachandlanding.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.6TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotinformationaboutthelikelihoodoftheUAcollidingwiththeupcomingthreatsothatthepilotwillbeabletomakeadecisionabouttheneedtotakeevasiveactiontoavoidacollision.
I_1.4.7TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithapredictionofthetimeavailableuntiltheUAwouldcollidewiththethreataircraft,object,orterrain.
I_1.4.8.TheGCSshouldprovideinformationabouttheaircraftsurroundingtheUAandthecollisionthreattohelpinmakingadecisionaboutmaneuversthatwouldnotcauseadditionalrisksforcollision.
I_1.4.9.TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthecapabilitiesoftheUAformakingevasivemaneuversinthecurrentUAsituation.Thisinformationshouldincludeatleastthefollowing:
I_1.4.9aPossiblemaneuversthatcanbemadebytheUAinthecurrentsituation–e.g.climb,descend,turnwithinacertainradius.
I_1.4.9bTimefortheUAtoaccomplishthemaneuvers–e.g.howlonguntiltheUAreachesacertainturnradiusorclimbattitude.
I_1.4.10TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationnecessarytoquicklyidentifythecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofallcontrolsthatareusedtosendflightcommandstotheUA.
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I_1.4.11TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationontheflightpaththathadbeenassignedtotheUApriortotheevasivemaneuver.
I_1.4.12TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthenecessaryUAtrajectoryneededtoreturntotheassignedflightpath.ThisshouldincludethenecessaryUAheadingandaltitudechanges.
I_1.4.13Ifanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuveriscarriedout,theGCSshouldalertthepilotthatthemaneuverisunderway,andmustnotifythepilotwhenthemaneuverisconcluded.
C_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltocancelthecollisionalertifitwillbeongoinganddistractthepilotinaccomplishingothertasks.
C_1.4.2FlightcontrolsshouldbeprovidedtoenablethepilottorapidlycommandtheUAtoexecuteaneffectivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollision.ThecontrolsshouldbereadilyavailableatalltimesandmustbedesignedtoenablethepilottomakethecommandtotheUAinthetimeneededtoperformthecollisionavoidancemaneuver.Theflightcontrolsmustincludemeanstocontrol:
C_1.4.2aUAattitude.
C_1.4.2bUAheading.
C_1.4.2cUAspeedand/orthrust.
P_1.4.1Informationandcontrolsshouldbereadilyaccessibleforthepilottorecognizeandaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.2Collisionavoidancealertsmustattractthepilot’sattentioninallexpectedlightingandoperatingconditions.
P_1.4.3Time-consumingorcomplicatedsequencesofactions(e.g.involvingmultiplelevelsofmenustructures)mustnotbenecessarytoaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.4Primaryflightcontrolsshouldbedesignedinamannerforthepilottoquicklyexecutecriticalcollisionavoidancemaneuversinallexpectedoperatingconditions.
T_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmspectrumavailabilitybeforeselectinglink.
T_1.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselecttheappropriatecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency).
T_1.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofselectedcommunicationmode.
T_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmthatcommunicationlinkiseffective,andestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
T_1.5.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyifmorethanonecontrolstationislinkedwiththeUA.
T_1.5.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinkstrength,orlinkabnormalities.
T_1.5.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinklatency,whererelevant.
T_1.5.8TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.
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T_1.5.9TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainanawarenessofthegeographiclimitsofthelinkandpotentialobstructionstosignal.
T_1.5.10TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofcrewactionsorcontrolinputsthatcouldinterruptordegradethelink.
T_1.5.11TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorespondtointerferencewiththesignal,(e.g.otherusersoffrequency,jammingattempts).
T_1.5.12TheGCSshouldenablethepilottochangethelinkduringflightoperationsasnecessary.
T_1.5.13TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoassesslinkstrengthandqualitybeforeswitchinglink.
T_1.5.14TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodefinethedurationofalossoflinkthatmustoccurbeforethelostlinkalertisactivated,ortheUAentersitslostlinkprocedure.
T_1.5.15TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomanageresumptionofthesignalafteralostlink.
I_1.5.1TheGCSshouldbecapableofprovidingthepilotwithpredictiveinformationonthequalityandstrengthofaC2linkbeforethelinkisactivelyusedtocontroltheUA.
I_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoidentifywhichC2linksettingsareactive(e.g.selectedfrequency,satellitevsterrestrial).
I_1.5.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationtoconfirmthateffectivecontrolisestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
I_1.5.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthegeographiclimitsofthelink.
I_1.5.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonspectrumactivityfromaspectrumanalyzer.
I_1.5.6TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAisapproachinganareawherelinkislikelytobelost.
I_1.5.7TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.8TheUAwilltransmitapre-determinedtranspondercodewhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.9TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomonitorthestrengthofthelink.
I_1.5.10TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheC2linkexperiencesinterference,whetherresultingfromnaturalphenomena,payloadorotherequipmentassociatedwiththeUAS,orhumanactivities(suchasjammingorotherusersonfrequency).
I_1.5.11TheGCSshoulddisplaytothepilotthesourceofdownlinktransmissions.
I_1.5.12Whererelevant,theGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonlinklatency,inmilliseconds.
I_1.5.13TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.Thisinformationmayincludelinkfootprint,includingareasthatmaybeaffectedbyterrainmasking.
I_1.5.14TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomanagelinksecurity.
I_1.5.15TheGCSshouldinformthepilotwhenalostlinkisresumed.
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C_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency,transmissionpower).
C_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltoenablethepilottorequestalinkstatusreport.
C_1.5.3Ifantennaselectionisperformedbythepilot,thentheGCSshouldsupportanexternalcommandtosettheantennausedforcommunication.
C_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottosetthedurationofalinkoutagethatmustoccurbeforealostlinkresponseistriggered.
P_1.5.1“TheremustbeanalertfortheUAScrew,viaaclearanddistinctauralandvisualsignal,foranytotallossofthecommandandcontroldatalink”.
P_1.5.2Theauralwarningforlostcontrollinkshouldbeauniquesound,notalsousedtosignifyotherconditions.
P_1.5.3ThemaximumrangeoftheC2datalink(datalinkfootprint)forallaltitudesanddirectionsrelativetothesignalsourceshouldbepresentedvisuallytothepilot,overlaidonamapdisplay.
P_1.5.4AreaswheretheC2link(datalinkfootprint)arepredictedtobemaskedbyterrainshouldbedisplayedontheC2datalinkdisplay.
P_1.5.5Ifthedatalinkfootprintcanbesuppressed,itshouldbeautomaticallydisplayedwhentheUAisapproachingalocationwherealossoflinkislikely.
P_1.5.6TheC2datalinkfootprintshouldbeeasilydistinguishablefromotherfootprintsthatmaybepresentontheoperatormapdisplay.
P_1.5.7Ifthepayloadutilizesalinkseparatetotheaircraftcontrollink,anydisplayofpayloadlinkqualityshouldbeseparateandclearlydistinguishablefromdisplaysfortheaircraftcontrollink.
P_1.5.8Ifanauralwarningisusedtoindicatelossofpayloadlink,thesoundshouldbedissimilartothatusedtoindicatelossofcontrollink.
P_1.5.9Securityfeaturesdesignedtopreventunapprovedaccess(logonandlogofffunctions)shouldnotresultininadvertentlockoutsofauthorizedpersonnel.
P_1.5.10TheGCS,incombinationwiththeotherelementsoftheUASshouldcomplywithcontrollinklatency(timefrominitiationofamaneuvertoameasurableresponsebytheUA)requirementsthatareestablishedatalevelsimilartomannedaircraft.
T_2.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorandcontrolthepositionoftheUAwhenonthegroundandintheair.
T_2.1.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.
T_2.1.3“TheUASshallbecapableoftransitioningfromaninstrumentapproachproceduretoasafelanding,eitherbyvisualreferenceofaflightcrewmemberattheairportorbyothermeansacceptabletotheFAA”.
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I_2.1.1UApositioninairspace.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationoftheUAwithintheairspace.Thisinformationshouldprovide:
I_2.1.1aRepresentationofUAwithintheairspace.
I_2.1.1bHeadingofUA.
I_2.1.1cAltitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1dSpeedofUA.
I_2.1.1eAttitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1fPositionofUArelativetootheraircraft,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2ProgrammedflightplanandpredictedflightpathofUA.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationofthepredictedflightpathoftheUAbasedontheflightplanprogrammedintotheflightmanagementsystembasedontheassignedflightclearance.Thisinformationshouldinclude:
I_2.1.2aIndicationofUAcurrentpositionalongprogrammedflightpath.
I_2.1.2bPredictedflightpathrelativetoUAandothertraffic,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2cDistancetowaypointsalongflightpath.
I_2.1.2dIndicationofpositioninflightpathwhennewcommandedaltitudewillbeattained.
I_2.1.2eIndicationofturningradiusandpathwhenmakingturnsalongflightpath.
C_2.1.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaneuvertheUA.
P_2.1.1ThemapdisplayshouldbeabletosupportavarietyofmaptypesincludingaeronauticalchartsandpresentationsofDigitalTerrainElevationData(DTED).
P_2.1.2Thepresentationscaleofthemapshouldbeselectable.Continuousscalingispreferredtodiscrete.
P_2.1.3Thepilotshouldbeabletoderivethescaleofthemapfromthedisplay.
P_2.1.4ThemapdisplayshouldenablethepilottocustomizetheAircraft’sInformationTrail.
P_2.1.5Themapdisplayshouldbeconfigurableto“Northup”or“Trackup”.
P_2.1.6Ifcontrolisviaaterrestrialradio,thelocationof(ordirectionto)thegroundtransmitter/receivershouldbeshownonthemap.
P_2.1.7PrimaryflightcontrolsforcontrollingtheUA(heading,attitude,speed)shouldbeavailableatalltimesthroughdedicatedphysicalcontrols.Iftheuseofsoftware-basedcontrolscannotbeavoided,thenthecontrolsshouldbeimmediatelyaccessibleatthetoplevelofthecontrolinterface.
P_2.1.8Mapdisplaysshouldhavemeanstoselectthescaleofthemaptobepresented.Thescalespresentedonthemapsshouldbeevidenttothepilot.
P_2.1.9Thepilotshouldhavethemeanstocustomizetheinformationtrailforanaircraftshownonthetrafficdisplay.
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T_2.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.
T_2.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilotto“observe”andcomplywithsignageandwarninglightsduringsurfaceoperations.
T_2.2.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.
T_2.2.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.
T_2.2.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidicingconditions.
I_2.2.1“Theoperatorshouldbeabletodisplayflightcorridors,controlledairspaceandanyotherrelevantairspaceco-ordinationinformation”.
I_2.2.2TheGCSshoulddisplayweatherinformationtothepilot.
I_2.2.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthelocationoficingconditions,especiallyiftheUAisnotcertificatedforflightinicingconditions.
I_2.2.4TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAentersicingconditions.
I_2.2.5TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAencounterssignificantairturbulence.
T_2.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitoralltrafficintheairspacearoundtheUAtoidentifypotentialforupcomingwell-clearviolations.
T_2.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoquicklyidentifyanythreatofanaircraftviolatingthewell-clearairspaceoftheUA
T_2.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottotrackthesurroundingtrafficflightpaths,assesstheriskofwell-clearviolations,andrecognizetheneedfortheUAtomaneuvertomaintainself-separationcriteria
T_2.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodeterminetheappropriatemaneuverfortheUAtomaketomaintainself-separation.
T_2.3.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommandtheUAtoexecutetheevasivemaneuver
T_2.3.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutmakingtheseparationmaneuveranddepartingfromtheassignedflightpath
T_2.3.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathaftermaneuveringforself-separation.
T_2.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoremainawareoftheaircraft’slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
T_2.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoupdatetheaircraft’slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
I_2.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithadisplayindicatingthefutureflightpathoftheaircraftshouldalostlinkoccur.
I_2.4.2TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheexecutionofalostlinkprocedurewouldcreateahazard(suchasdirectingtheaircrafttowardsterrain,orintonon-authorizedairspace).
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P_2.4.1Theflightpaththatwouldbetakenbytheaircraftintheeventofalostlinkshouldbeclearlydistinguishablefromtheprogrammednormalflightpathoftheaircraft.
P_2.4.2Informationontheprogrammedlostlinkbehavioroftheaircraftshouldbereadilyavailabletothepilot,withouttheneedforcomplexinteractionswiththehuman-machineinterface.
T_2.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodecidewhentoterminatetheflightviacontrolledimpact,ditchingorparachutedescent.
T_2.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyasuitablelocationforflighttermination.
T_2.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoterminatetheflightinapre-designatedarea.
T_2.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottousereal-timeinformationtoconfirmthatflightterminationattheselectedlocationwillnotpresentunacceptablerisktopeopleorproperty.
I_2.5.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithreal-timeimageryoftheselectedimpact,ditchingorparachutedescentsitetoconfirmthatasafeterminationcanbeaccomplished.
I_2.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilottoindicatethattheflightterminationsystemisabouttobeactivated.
P_2.5.1WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem:
P_2.5.1aTheuseofthesecontrolsshouldbeintuitiveandminimizethepossibilityofconfusionandsubsequentinadvertentoperation.
P_2.5.1bTwodistinctanddissimilaractionsoftheUAScrewshouldberequiredtoinitiatetheflightterminationcommand.
P_2.5.2Beforethefinalstepinactivatingtheflightterminationsystemisreached,theGCSshouldprovideanauralandvisualalerttothepilotthatflightterminationisabouttobeactivated.
P_2.5.3Theauralalertwarningofimminentflightterminationshouldinvolveauniquesound.Thisshouldpreferablytaketheformofaverbalmessagesuchas“Flighttermination!”
P_2.5.4WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem,flightterminationcontrolsshouldbesafeguardedfrominterferencethatcouldleadtoinadvertentoperation.
T_3.1.1Whenoperatingnearanon-toweredairport,thepilotshouldbeabletoexchangeintentinformationwithotherairporttrafficthroughstandardcommunicationsontheairportcommontrafficadvisoryfrequency(CTAF).
T_3.1.2TheUASpilotshouldbeabletoestablishanalternatecommunicationsmethodwithATCifthedurationofthecommunicationslossexceedsrequirementsfortheoperatingenvironment.
I_3.1.1TheGCSshouldincludealternatemeansforthepilottocommunicatewithATCintheeventofalossofC2link.
I_3.1.2Currentsettingsofcommunicationcontrols.TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationaboutthecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofthecontrolsusedforcommunicationwithATC.
P_3.1.1ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldhaveameanlessthanorequalto250ms.
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P_3.1.2ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbelessthanorequalto300ms.(99thpercentile).
P_3.1.3ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbewithinamaximumof350ms.
T_3.2.1TheGCSshouldenabletheUAScrewmemberstocommunicatewitheachother(co-locatedornot)inordertoperformthenecessaryflighttasks.
T_3.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatcommandssenttotheaircraftonthegrounddonotcreateasafetyhazardforgroundsupportpersonnel.
I_3.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithimageryoftheaircraftwheneverthepilothascontroloftheaircraftonthegroundandgroundsupportpersonnelareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
I_3.2.2TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithacommunicationlinkwithgroundsupportpersonnelwhiletheyareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
T_3.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithweatherinformationservicesandotherancillaryservices.
T_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredbetweenagivingandreceivingGCSinamannerthatisseamlessandtransparenttoATC.
T_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontinuityofpilotfunctiontobemaintainedduringthetransferofcontrolbetweenagivingandreceivingGCS.
T_4.4.3“TheGCSshallenablethepilottoensurethatoperatingparametersareidenticalbeforeandafterhandover”.
T_4.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottopassUAcontrol(handover)toanotherGCSandmonitorthestatusofthehandover.
T_4.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.
T_4.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethegivingandreceivingpilotstoconfirmthatcontrolsettingsareappropriateandconsistentbeforeahandoverisaccomplished.
T_4.4.7TheGCSshouldenablethereceivingpilottomonitorthestatusoftheUAbyreceivingtelemetryfromtheUAbeforeestablishingcontroloftheUA.
T_4.4.8TheGCSshouldfacilitateahandoverbriefingbetweenthegivingandreceivingpilots.
T_4.4.9TheGCSshouldprovidethereceivingpilotwithameansofconfirmingthatcontrolhasbeenestablishedwiththeUA.
I_4.4.1Thepilotshouldbepresentedwithinformationnecessarytoconfirmthatflight-criticalsettingsinthereceivingGCSareconsistentwithsettingsinthegivingGCS.
I_4.4.2TheGCSshouldprovidealevelofinvolvementindicatortothepilottoshowwhethertheGCShasbeensettoonlyreceivetelemetryfromtheUA,ortoreceivetelemetryandtransmitcommandstotheUA.
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C_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthedesiredlevelofinvolvementwithaUA,rangingfrommonitoringtelemetrywithoutanactiveuplink,totelemetrywithfullcontrolviaanactiveuplink.
C_4.4.2Thereshouldbeameansforthegivingandreceivingpilotstocommunicatebefore,duringandafterthehandover.
P_4.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidesuitabledisplaystoenablebriefingstobeconductedbetweenaseatedpilotandastandingpilotduringcontrolhandovers.Thismayincludetheuseoflargescalesynopticdisplays.
P_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredtoanotherGCSwithoutanygapincontroloccurringduringthehandover.
G_1UASdevelopersshouldfollowrecognizedhuman-centereddesignprocessesincludingthefollowing:
G_1a.DevelopafullsetofpilottasksandintendedoperationsforwhichtheGCSwillbeused.Thesewillhelpdriveensuringathoroughdesignthatprovidesallsystems,information,andcontrolsthatthepilotswillneed.
G_1b.Developanunderstandingofthepotentialsafetycriticalerrorsthatthepilotsmaymakewhenaccomplishingtheirtasks.Thesewillprovidethefoundationformakingtrade-offsindesigndecisionsbyfocusingondesignattributesthatwillmitigatecriticalerrorsasneeded.
G_1c.Developafullsetofinformationrequirementsforthetasksthepilotswillneedtoaccomplish.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthebeginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethattheappropriateinformationisprovidedtothepilotsandprovidethefoundationformakingdesigndecisions.
G_1d.Developafullsetofrequirementsforcontrolsthatthepilotwillneedtoaccomplishtheirtasks.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthebeginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethatallthepilotcontrolsareplannedforasdesigndecisionsaremade.
G_1e.Documentalloftheresultsoftheseprocessessothattheycanbecontinuallyupdatedwhendesigndecisionsandtrade-offsaremadeduringthedesignprocess.Gooddocumentationwillalsohelpthehumanfactorsdesignprocessestobeintegratedwiththeothersystemsengineeringdevelopmentanddesignprocesses.
G_2Theuseofmulti-modefunctionsonflightcontrolsshouldbeminimized.Ifmodesareused,thesystemshouldclearlyindicatethecurrentmode,andotherpotentialmodesshouldbeindicated.
G_3Ifchangingamodeselectionofanautomatedsystemhasasafetyconsequence,theactiontoselectthatmodeshouldbealerted,andadditionalprecautionsshouldbetakentopreventinadvertentselection.
G_4Payloadcontrolsshouldbeseparatefromcontrolswithsafety-of-flightfunctions.
G_5Itshouldnotbepossibletoreconfigureasafety-of-flightcontroltoperformapayloadfunction.
G_6Activationofakeyorbuttonshouldprovidetactileorauditoryfeedbacktothepilot.
G_7ThereshouldbeaclearindicationtothepilotwhenacommandhasbeenreceivedbytheUAS.
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G_8AnyunrecognizedentrymadebythepilotattheGCSshouldcauseaninformativeerrormessagetobedisplayedandnotaffectthestatusoroperationofanysystem.
G_9Flightcrewalerting.(QuotedverbatimfromCFR§25.1322)
G_9(a)Flightcrewalertsmust:(1)Providetheflightcrewwiththeinformationneededto:(i)Identifynon-normaloperationorairplanesystemconditions,and(ii)Determinetheappropriateactions,ifany.(2)Bereadilyandeasilydetectableandintelligiblebytheflightcrewunderallforeseeableoperatingconditions,includingconditionswheremultiplealertsareprovided.(3)Beremovedwhenthealertingconditionnolongerexists.
G_9(b)Alertsmustconformtothefollowingprioritizationhierarchybasedontheurgencyofflightcrewawarenessandresponse.(1)Warning:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandimmediateflightcrewresponse.(2)Caution:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandsubsequentflightcrewresponse.(3)Advisory:Forconditionsthatrequireflightcrewawarenessandmayrequiresubsequentflightcrewresponse.
G_9(c)Warningandcautionalertsmust:(1)Beprioritizedwithineachcategory,whennecessary.(2)Providetimelyattention-gettingcuesthroughatleasttwodifferentsensesbyacombinationofaural,visual,ortactileindications.(3)Permiteachoccurrenceoftheattention-gettingcuesrequiredbyparagraph(c)(2)ofthissectiontobeacknowledgedandsuppressed,unlesstheyarerequiredtobecontinuous.
G_9(d)Thealertfunctionmustbedesignedtominimizetheeffectsoffalseandnuisancealerts.Inparticular,itmustbedesignedto:(1)Preventthepresentationofanalertthatisinappropriateorunnecessary.(2)Provideameanstosuppressanattention-gettingcomponentofanalertcausedbyafailureofthealertingfunctionthatinterfereswiththeflightcrew'sabilitytosafelyoperatetheairplane.Thismeansmustnotbereadilyavailabletotheflightcrewsothatitcouldbeoperatedinadvertentlyorbyhabitualreflexiveaction.Whenanalertissuppressed,theremustbeaclearandunmistakableannunciationtotheflightcrewthatthealerthasbeensuppressed.
G_9(e)Visualalertindicationsmust:(1)Conformtothefollowingcolorconvention:(i)Redforwarningalertindications.(ii)Amberoryellowforcautionalertindications.(iii)Anycolorexceptredorgreenforadvisoryalertindications.(2)Usevisualcodingtechniques,togetherwithotheralertingfunctionelementsontheflightdeck,todistinguishbetweenwarning,caution,andadvisoryalertindications,iftheyarepresentedonmonochromaticdisplaysthatarenotcapableofconformingtothecolorconventioninparagraph(e)(1)ofthissection.
G_9(f)Useofthecolorsred,amber,andyellowontheflightdeckforfunctionsotherthanflightcrewalertingmustbelimitedandmustnotadverselyaffectflightcrewalerting.
G_10Systemsthatalertthepilottoacriticalanomalyshouldnotbesubjecttoasilentfailure.
G_11TheGCSshouldprovideaworkenvironmentthatmaintainspilotengagement,andminimizesthenegativeimpactofextendedperiodsoflowworkload.
G_12TheGCSshouldprovideconsistencyofoperationforcommonfunctions.
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G_13Thefunctionsneededtosafelycontroltheaircraftunderusualflightsituationsshouldbelocatedinthepilot'sprimaryfield-of-view.
G_14WarningsandcautionsshouldnotbeobscuredbyotherGCSdisplays.
G_15“Part-timedisplay.Ifitisdesiredtoinhibitsomeparametersfromfull-timedisplay,anequivalentlevelofsafetytofull-timedisplayshouldbedemonstrated.Criteriatobeconsideredincludethefollowing:(a)Continuousdisplayoftheparameterisnotrequiredforsafetyofflightinallnormalflightphases.(b)Theparameterisautomaticallydisplayedinflightphaseswhereitisrequired.(c)Theinhibitedparameterisautomaticallydisplayedwhenitsvalueindicatesanabnormalcondition,orwhentheparameterreachesanabnormalvalue.(d)DisplayoftheinhibitedparametercanbemanuallyselectedbytheUAVcrewwithoutinterferingwiththedisplayofotherrequiredinformation.(e)Iftheparameterfailstobedisplayedwhenrequired,thefailureeffectandcompoundingeffectsmustmeettherequirementsofUSAR.1309.Theanalysisistoclearlydemonstratethatthedisplay(s)ofdataisconsistentwithsafeoperationunderallprobableoperatingconditions.(f)Theautomatic,orrequested,displayoftheinhibitedparametershouldnotcreateunacceptableclutteronthedisplay;simultaneousmultiple"pop-ups"mustbeconsidered.(g)Ifthepresenceofthenewparameterisnotsufficientlyself-evident,suitablealertingmustaccompanytheautomaticpresentation”.
G_16Whereverpossible,textmessages,whetherindialogboxes,warningmessagesorotherscreendisplays,shouldbepresentedinplainlanguage,orusingstandardaviationterminology.
G_17Controlsintendedtobeoperatedbythepilotshouldbereachablefromaseatedposition
G_18TheGCSshouldprovideabookresttoenablethepilottorefertodocumentswithoutriskthatthedocumentwillcomeintocontactwithakeyboardorotherflightcontrols.
G_19AppropriateprioritycontrolsshouldbeavailableforUASfunctionsthatrequireeitherquickaccessibilityorconstantavailability.Prioritycontroldevicescaninclude,butarenotlimitedto:(a)Touchpanels,(b)Buttons,(c)Switches,(d)Joysticks,(e)Keyboardshortcuts.
G_20Ifadisplayscreenenablesthepilottomoveorrearrangedisplayorcontrolwindows,itshouldnotbepossibletoplaceawindowsoastoobscureprimaryflightcontrolsordisplays.
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Guidelinesorganizedbytype
Task-relatedguidelines
T_1.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.
T_1.1.2Ifanon-boardcameraisusedforflightcontroltasks,theGCSshouldenablethepilottocenterthefieldofviewofthecamera.
T_1.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorthestatusofconsumableresources.
T_1.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformgroundstationperformancechecks.
T_1.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoperformapre-flightcheckonanalternatecontrolstation,orconfirmthatthischeckhasbeenperformed.
T_1.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocheckthecontrolstationfordamageandfunction.
T_1.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitortheperformanceofGCSsupportservices,e.g.airconditioningandelectricalpower.
T_1.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifythethreatofanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorecognizetheneedforaUAevasivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodetermineanappropriatemaneuvertoavoidacollisionoftheUAwithotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.
T_1.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoexecuteaUAcollisionavoidancemaneuver.
T_1.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutacollisionavoidancemaneuverandotherdeparturesfromtheassignedflightpath.
T_1.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathaftermaneuveringtoavoidacollision.
T_1.4.7IftheUAiscapableofmakinganautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorthemaneuver.
T_1.4.8IftheUAexecutesanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuver,theGCSshouldenablethepilottosmoothlyregaincontroloftheUAattheconclusionofthemaneuver.
T_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmspectrumavailabilitybeforeselectinglink.
T_1.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselecttheappropriatecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency).
T_1.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofselectedcommunicationmode.
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T_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoconfirmthatcommunicationlinkiseffective,andestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
T_1.5.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyifmorethanonecontrolstationislinkedwiththeUA.
T_1.5.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinkstrength,orlinkabnormalities.
T_1.5.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessoflinklatency,whererelevant.
T_1.5.8TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.
T_1.5.9TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainanawarenessofthegeographiclimitsofthelinkandpotentialobstructionstosignal.
T_1.5.10TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaintainawarenessofcrewactionsorcontrolinputsthatcouldinterruptordegradethelink.
T_1.5.11TheGCSshouldenablethepilottorespondtointerferencewiththesignal,(e.g.otherusersoffrequency,jammingattempts).
T_1.5.12TheGCSshouldenablethepilottochangethelinkduringflightoperationsasnecessary.
T_1.5.13TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoassesslinkstrengthandqualitybeforeswitchinglink.
T_1.5.14TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodefinethedurationofalossoflinkthatmustoccurbeforethelostlinkalertisactivated,ortheUAentersitslostlinkprocedure.
T_1.5.15TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomanageresumptionofthesignalafteralostlink.
T_2.1.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorandcontrolthepositionoftheUAwhenonthegroundandintheair.
T_2.1.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.
T_2.1.3"TheUASshallbecapableoftransitioningfromaninstrumentapproachproceduretoasafelanding,eitherbyvisualreferenceofaflightcrewmemberattheairportorbyothermeansacceptabletotheFAA".
T_2.2.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatboththerunwayandapproachpathareclearoftrafficbeforetaxiingontotheactiverunway.
T_2.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilotto"observe"andcomplywithsignageandwarninglightsduringsurfaceoperations.
T_2.2.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.
T_2.2.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidweatherthathasthepotentialtoaffecttheflight.
T_2.2.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoavoidicingconditions.
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T_2.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitoralltrafficintheairspacearoundtheUAtoidentifypotentialforupcomingwell-clearviolations.
T_2.3.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoquicklyidentifyanythreatofanaircraftviolatingthewell-clearairspaceoftheUA
T_2.3.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottotrackthesurroundingtrafficflightpaths,assesstheriskofwell-clearviolations,andrecognizetheneedfortheUAtomaneuvertomaintainself-separationcriteria
T_2.3.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodeterminetheappropriatemaneuverfortheUAtomaketomaintainself-separation.
T_2.3.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommandtheUAtoexecutetheevasivemaneuver
T_2.3.6TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithATCaboutmakingtheseparationmaneuveranddepartingfromtheassignedflightpath
T_2.3.7TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoreturntheUAtotheassignedflightpathaftermaneuveringforself-separation.
T_2.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoremainawareoftheaircraft'slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
T_2.4.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoupdatetheaircraft'slostlinkprocedureastheflightprogresses.
T_2.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottodecidewhentoterminatetheflightviacontrolledimpact,ditchingorparachutedescent.
T_2.5.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoidentifyasuitablelocationforflighttermination.
T_2.5.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoterminatetheflightinapre-designatedarea.
T_2.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottousereal-timeinformationtoconfirmthatflightterminationattheselectedlocationwillnotpresentunacceptablerisktopeopleorproperty.
T_3.1.1Whenoperatingnearanon-toweredairport,thepilotshouldbeabletoexchangeintentinformationwithotherairporttrafficthroughstandardcommunicationsontheairportcommontrafficadvisoryfrequency(CTAF).
T_3.1.2TheUASpilotshouldbeabletoestablishanalternatecommunicationsmethodwithATCifthedurationofthecommunicationslossexceedsrequirementsfortheoperatingenvironment.
T_3.2.1TheGCSshouldenabletheUAScrewmemberstocommunicatewitheachother(co-locatedornot)inordertoperformthenecessaryflighttasks.
T_3.2.2TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoensurethatcommandssenttotheaircraftonthegrounddonotcreateasafetyhazardforgroundsupportpersonnel.
T_3.3.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottocommunicatewithweatherinformationservicesandotherancillaryservices.
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T_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredbetweenagivingandreceivingGCSinamannerthatisseamlessandtransparenttoATC.
T_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontinuityofpilotfunctiontobemaintainedduringthetransferofcontrolbetweenagivingandreceivingGCS.
T_4.4.3"TheGCSshallenablethepilottoensurethatoperatingparametersareidenticalbeforeandafterhandover".
T_4.4.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottopassUAcontrol(handover)toanotherGCSandmonitorthestatusofthehandover.
T_4.4.5TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomonitorwhichentityhascontroloftheaircraftandtowhatextenttheentityhascontrol.
T_4.4.6TheGCSshouldenablethegivingandreceivingpilotstoconfirmthatcontrolsettingsareappropriateandconsistentbeforeahandoverisaccomplished.
T_4.4.7TheGCSshouldenablethereceivingpilottomonitorthestatusoftheUAbyreceivingtelemetryfromtheUAbeforeestablishingcontroloftheUA.
T_4.4.8TheGCSshouldfacilitateahandoverbriefingbetweenthegivingandreceivingpilots.
T_4.4.9TheGCSshouldprovidethereceivingpilotwithameansofconfirmingthatcontrolhasbeenestablishedwiththeUA.
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Information-relatedguidelinesI_1.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthestatusofconsumableresources.
I_1.3.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithhealthandstatusinformationontheGCS.
I_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilotwhenthereisathreatoftheUAcollidingwithanotheraircraft,terrain,orobjects.ThealertmustbeprovidedintimeforthepilottoeffectivelyrespondtomaketheUAavoidthecollision.
I_1.4.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutterrainorground-basedobjectswithinproximityoftheprojectedUAflightpathandmaybecomeathreatforUAcollision.
I_1.4.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectaircraft,obstructionsorpeoplewhiletheUAismovingontheground.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orClosedCircuitTelevision(CCTV)cameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectlaunchortakeoff.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwiththeinformationnecessarytodetectobstructionsthatmayaffectapproachandlanding.Thisinformationmaybeprovidedthroughacameralocatedontheaircraft,orCCTVcameraslocatedontheground.
I_1.4.6TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotinformationaboutthelikelihoodoftheUAcollidingwiththeupcomingthreatsothatthepilotwillbeabletomakeadecisionabouttheneedtotakeevasiveactiontoavoidacollision.
I_1.4.7TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithapredictionofthetimeavailableuntiltheUAwouldcollidewiththethreataircraft,object,orterrain.
I_1.4.8.TheGCSshouldprovideinformationabouttheaircraftsurroundingtheUAandthecollisionthreattohelpinmakingadecisionaboutmaneuversthatwouldnotcauseadditionalrisksforcollision.
I_1.4.9.TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthecapabilitiesoftheUAformakingevasivemaneuversinthecurrentUAsituation.Thisinformationshouldincludeatleastthefollowing:
I_1.4.9a.PossiblemaneuversthatcanbemadebytheUAinthecurrentsituation-e.g.climb,descend,turnwithinacertainradius.
I_1.4.9b.TimefortheUAtoaccomplishthemaneuvers-e.g.howlonguntiltheUAreachesacertainturnradiusorclimbattitude.
I_1.4.10TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationnecessarytoquicklyidentifythecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofallcontrolsthatareusedtosendflightcommandstotheUA.
I_1.4.11TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationontheflightpaththathadbeenassignedtotheUApriortotheevasivemaneuver.
I_1.4.12TheGCSshouldprovideinformationaboutthenecessaryUAtrajectoryneededtoreturntotheassignedflightpath.ThisshouldincludethenecessaryUAheadingandaltitudechanges.
I_1.4.13Ifanautonomouscollisionavoidancemaneuveriscarriedout,theGCSshouldalertthepilotthatthemaneuverisunderway,andmustnotifythepilotwhenthemaneuverisconcluded.
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I_1.5.1TheGCSshouldbecapableofprovidingthepilotwithpredictiveinformationonthequalityandstrengthofaC2linkbeforethelinkisactivelyusedtocontroltheUA.
I_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoidentifywhichC2linksettingsareactive(e.g.selectedfrequency,satellitevsterrestrial).
I_1.5.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationtoconfirmthateffectivecontrolisestablishedwiththecorrectUA.
I_1.5.4TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthegeographiclimitsofthelink.
I_1.5.5TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonspectrumactivityfromaspectrumanalyzer.
I_1.5.6TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAisapproachinganareawherelinkislikelytobelost.
I_1.5.7TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.8TheUAwilltransmitapre-determinedtranspondercodewhenthelinkislost.
I_1.5.9TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomonitorthestrengthofthelink.
I_1.5.10TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheC2linkexperiencesinterference,whetherresultingfromnaturalphenomena,payloadorotherequipmentassociatedwiththeUAS,orhumanactivities(suchasjammingorotherusersonfrequency).
I_1.5.11TheGCSshoulddisplaytothepilotthesourceofdownlinktransmissions.
I_1.5.12Whererelevant,theGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonlinklatency,inmilliseconds.
I_1.5.13TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottoanticipatelinkdegradationsordiminishedlinkstrength.Thisinformationmayincludelinkfootprint,includingareasthatmaybeaffectedbyterrainmasking.
I_1.5.14TheGCSshouldprovideinformationtoenablethepilottomanagelinksecurity.
I_1.5.15TheGCSshouldinformthepilotwhenalostlinkisresumed.
I_2.1.1UApositioninairspace.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationoftheUAwithintheairspace.Thisinformationshouldprovide:
I_2.1.1aRepresentationofUAwithintheairspace.
I_2.1.1bHeadingofUA.
I_2.1.1cAltitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1dSpeedofUA.
I_2.1.1eAttitudeofUA.
I_2.1.1fPositionofUArelativetootheraircraft,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2ProgrammedflightplanandpredictedflightpathofUA.TheGCSshouldprovidearepresentationofthepredictedflightpathoftheUAbasedontheflightplanprogrammedintotheflightmanagementsystembasedontheassignedflightclearance.Thisinformationshouldinclude:
I_2.1.2aIndicationofUAcurrentpositionalongprogrammedflightpath.
I_2.1.2bPredictedflightpathrelativetoUAandothertraffic,terrain,andobstacles.
I_2.1.2cDistancetowaypointsalongflightpath.
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I_2.1.2dIndicationofpositioninflightpathwhennewcommandedaltitudewillbeattained.
I_2.1.2eIndicationofturningradiusandpathwhenmakingturnsalongflightpath.
I_2.2.1"Theoperatorshouldbeabletodisplayflightcorridors,controlledairspaceandanyotherrelevantairspaceco-ordinationinformation".
I_2.2.2TheGCSshoulddisplayweatherinformationtothepilot.
I_2.2.3TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationonthelocationoficingconditions,especiallyiftheUAisnotcertificatedforflightinicingconditions.
I_2.2.4TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAentersicingconditions.
I_2.2.5TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhentheUAencounterssignificantairturbulence.
I_2.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithadisplayindicatingthefutureflightpathoftheaircraftshouldalostlinkoccur.
I_2.4.2TheGCSshouldalertthepilotwhenevertheexecutionofalostlinkprocedurewouldcreateahazard(suchasdirectingtheaircrafttowardsterrain,orintonon-authorizedairspace).
I_2.5.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithreal-timeimageryoftheselectedimpact,ditchingorparachutedescentsitetoconfirmthatasafeterminationcanbeaccomplished.
I_2.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideanalerttothepilottoindicatethattheflightterminationsystemisabouttobeactivated.
I_3.1.1TheGCSshouldincludealternatemeansforthepilottocommunicatewithATCintheeventofalossofC2link.
I_3.1.2Currentsettingsofcommunicationcontrols.TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithinformationaboutthecurrentstate,mode,orsettingofthecontrolsusedforcommunicationwithATC.
I_3.2.1TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithimageryoftheaircraftwheneverthepilothascontroloftheaircraftonthegroundandgroundsupportpersonnelareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
I_3.2.2TheGCSshouldprovidethepilotwithacommunicationlinkwithgroundsupportpersonnelwhiletheyareinteractingwiththeaircraft.
I_4.4.1Thepilotshouldbepresentedwithinformationnecessarytoconfirmthatflight-criticalsettingsinthereceivingGCSareconsistentwithsettingsinthegivingGCS.
I_4.4.2TheGCSshouldprovidealevelofinvolvementindicatortothepilottoshowwhethertheGCShasbeensettoonlyreceivetelemetryfromtheUA,ortoreceivetelemetryandtransmitcommandstotheUA.
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Control-relatedguidelinesC_1.4.1TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltocancelthecollisionalertifitwillbeongoinganddistractthepilotinaccomplishingothertasks.
C_1.4.2FlightcontrolsshouldbeprovidedtoenablethepilottorapidlycommandtheUAtoexecuteaneffectivemaneuvertoavoidanimpendingcollision.ThecontrolsshouldbereadilyavailableatalltimesandmustbedesignedtoenablethepilottomakethecommandtotheUAinthetimeneededtoperformthecollisionavoidancemaneuver.Theflightcontrolsmustincludemeanstocontrol:
C_1.4.2aUAattitude.
C_1.4.2bUAheading.
C_1.4.2cUAspeedand/orthrust.
C_1.5.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthecommunicationmode(e.g.terrestrial/satellite,frequency,transmissionpower).
C_1.5.2TheGCSshouldprovideacontroltoenablethepilottorequestalinkstatusreport.
C_1.5.3Ifantennaselectionisperformedbythepilot,thentheGCSshouldsupportanexternalcommandtosettheantennausedforcommunication.
C_1.5.4TheGCSshouldenablethepilottosetthedurationofalinkoutagethatmustoccurbeforealostlinkresponseistriggered.
C_2.1.3TheGCSshouldenablethepilottomaneuvertheUA.
C_4.4.1TheGCSshouldenablethepilottoselectthedesiredlevelofinvolvementwithaUA,rangingfrommonitoringtelemetrywithoutanactiveuplink,totelemetrywithfullcontrolviaanactiveuplink.
C_4.4.2Thereshouldbeameansforthegivingandreceivingpilotstocommunicatebefore,duringandafterthehandover.
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Guidelinesrelatingtopropertiesoftheinterface
P_1.1.1TheGCSshouldnotenablethepilottodisengageautomationinflightiftheaircraftwilldepartfromcontrolledflightasaresult.
P_1.1.2TheGCSshouldpreventmultipleoperatorsfromoperatingthesameapplication/proceduresatanyonetime.
P_1.1.3TheGCSshouldprovidetheabilitytoallowotheroperatorstoviewthestatusofaircraftsystems.
P_1.4.1Informationandcontrolsshouldbereadilyaccessibleforthepilottorecognizeandaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.2Collisionavoidancealertsmustattractthepilot'sattentioninallexpectedlightingandoperatingconditions.
P_1.4.3Time-consumingorcomplicatedsequencesofactions(e.g.involvingmultiplelevelsofmenustructures)mustnotbenecessarytoaccomplishcollisionavoidancemaneuvers.
P_1.4.4Primaryflightcontrolsshouldbedesignedinamannerforthepilottoquicklyexecutecriticalcollisionavoidancemaneuversinallexpectedoperatingconditions.
P_1.5.1"TheremustbeanalertfortheUAScrew,viaaclearanddistinctauralandvisualsignal,foranytotallossofthecommandandcontroldatalink".
P_1.5.2Theauralwarningforlostcontrollinkshouldbeauniquesound,notalsousedtosignifyotherconditions.
P_1.5.3ThemaximumrangeoftheC2datalink(datalinkfootprint)forallaltitudesanddirectionsrelativetothesignalsourceshouldbepresentedvisuallytothepilot,overlaidonamapdisplay.
P_1.5.4AreaswheretheC2link(datalinkfootprint)arepredictedtobemaskedbyterrainshouldbedisplayedontheC2datalinkdisplay.
P_1.5.5Ifthedatalinkfootprintcanbesuppressed,itshouldbeautomaticallydisplayedwhentheUAisapproachingalocationwherealossoflinkislikely.
P_1.5.6TheC2datalinkfootprintshouldbeeasilydistinguishablefromotherfootprintsthatmaybepresentontheoperatormapdisplay.
P_1.5.7Ifthepayloadutilizesalinkseparatetotheaircraftcontrollink,anydisplayofpayloadlinkqualityshouldbeseparateandclearlydistinguishablefromdisplaysfortheaircraftcontrollink.
P_1.5.8Ifanauralwarningisusedtoindicatelossofpayloadlink,thesoundshouldbedissimilarto
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thatusedtoindicatelossofcontrollink.
P_1.5.9Securityfeaturesdesignedtopreventunapprovedaccess(logonandlogofffunctions)shouldnotresultininadvertentlockoutsofauthorizedpersonnel.
P_1.5.10TheGCS,incombinationwiththeotherelementsoftheUASshouldcomplywithcontrollinklatency(timefrominitiationofamaneuvertoameasurableresponsebytheUA)requirementsthatareestablishedatalevelsimilartomannedaircraft.
P_2.1.1ThemapdisplayshouldbeabletosupportavarietyofmaptypesincludingaeronauticalchartsandpresentationsofDigitalTerrainElevationData(DTED).
P_2.1.2Thepresentationscaleofthemapshouldbeselectable.Continuousscalingispreferredtodiscrete.
P_2.1.3Thepilotshouldbeabletoderivethescaleofthemapfromthedisplay.
P_2.1.4ThemapdisplayshouldenablethepilottocustomizetheAircraft'sInformationTrail.
P_2.1.5Themapdisplayshouldbeconfigurableto"Northup"or"Trackup".
P_2.1.6Ifcontrolisviaaterrestrialradio,thelocationof(ordirectionto)thegroundtransmitter/receivershouldbeshownonthemap.
P_2.1.7PrimaryflightcontrolsforcontrollingtheUA(heading,attitude,speed)shouldbeavailableatalltimesthroughdedicatedphysicalcontrols.Iftheuseofsoftware-basedcontrolscannotbeavoided,thenthecontrolsshouldbeimmediatelyaccessibleatthetoplevelofthecontrolinterface.
P_2.1.8Mapdisplaysshouldhavemeanstoselectthescaleofthemaptobepresented.Thescalespresentedonthemapsshouldbeevidenttothepilot.
P_2.1.9Thepilotshouldhavethemeanstocustomizetheinformationtrailforanaircraftshownonthetrafficdisplay.
P_2.4.1Theflightpaththatwouldbetakenbytheaircraftintheeventofalostlinkshouldbeclearlydistinguishablefromtheprogrammednormalflightpathoftheaircraft.
P_2.4.2Informationontheprogrammedlostlinkbehavioroftheaircraftshouldbereadilyavailabletothepilot,withouttheneedforcomplexinteractionswiththehuman-machineinterface.
P_2.5.1WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem:
P_2.5.1aTheuseofthesecontrolsshouldbeintuitiveandminimizethepossibilityofconfusionandsubsequentinadvertentoperation.
P_2.5.1bTwodistinctanddissimilaractionsoftheUAScrewshouldberequiredtoinitiatethe
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flightterminationcommand.
P_2.5.2Beforethefinalstepinactivatingtheflightterminationsystemisreached,theGCSshouldprovideanauralandvisualalerttothepilotthatflightterminationisabouttobeactivated.
P_2.5.3Theauralalertwarningofimminentflightterminationshouldinvolveauniquesound.Thisshouldpreferablytaketheformofaverbalmessagesuchas"Flighttermination!"
P_2.5.4WhentheUAisequippedwithaflightterminationsystem,flightterminationcontrolsshouldbesafeguardedfrominterferencethatcouldleadtoinadvertentoperation.
P_3.1.1ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldhaveameanlessthanorequalto250ms.
P_3.1.2ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbelessthanorequalto300ms.(99thpercentile).
P_3.1.3ThevoicecommunicationdelaybetweenthepilotandATCshouldbewithinamaximumof350ms.
P_4.4.1TheGCSshouldprovidesuitabledisplaystoenablebriefingstobeconductedbetweenaseatedpilotandastandingpilotduringcontrolhandovers.Thismayincludetheuseoflargescalesynopticdisplays.
P_4.4.2TheGCSshouldenablecontroltobetransferredtoanotherGCSwithoutanygapincontroloccurringduringthehandover.
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Generalguidelines
G_1UASdevelopersshouldfollowrecognizedhuman-centereddesignprocessesincludingthefollowing:
G_1a.DevelopafullsetofpilottasksandintendedoperationsforwhichtheGCSwillbeused.Thesewillhelpdriveensuringathoroughdesignthatprovidesallsystems,information,andcontrolsthatthepilotswillneed.
G_1b.Developanunderstandingofthepotentialsafetycriticalerrorsthatthepilotsmaymakewhenaccomplishingtheirtasks.Thesewillprovidethefoundationformakingtrade-offsindesigndecisionsbyfocusingondesignattributesthatwillmitigatecriticalerrorsasneeded.
G_1c.Developafullsetofinformationrequirementsforthetasksthepilotswillneedtoaccomplish.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthebeginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethattheappropriateinformationisprovidedtothepilotsandprovidethefoundationformakingdesigndecisions.
G_1d.Developafullsetofrequirementsforcontrolsthatthepilotwillneedtoaccomplishtheirtasks.Theserequirementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherdesignrequirementsatthebeginningofthesystemsengineeringprocess.Theywillhelpensurethatallthepilotcontrolsareplannedforasdesigndecisionsaremade.
G_1e.Documentalloftheresultsoftheseprocessessothattheycanbecontinuallyupdatedwhendesigndecisionsandtrade-offsaremadeduringthedesignprocess.Gooddocumentationwillalsohelpthehumanfactorsdesignprocessestobeintegratedwiththeothersystemsengineeringdevelopmentanddesignprocesses.
G_2Theuseofmulti-modefunctionsonflightcontrolsshouldbeminimized.Ifmodesareused,thesystemshouldclearlyindicatethecurrentmode,andotherpotentialmodesshouldbeindicated.
G_3Ifchangingamodeselectionofanautomatedsystemhasasafetyconsequence,theactiontoselectthatmodeshouldbealerted,andadditionalprecautionsshouldbetakentopreventinadvertentselection.
G_4Payloadcontrolsshouldbeseparatefromcontrolswithsafety-of-flightfunctions.
G_5Itshouldnotbepossibletoreconfigureasafety-of-flightcontroltoperformapayloadfunction.
G_6Activationofakeyorbuttonshouldprovidetactileorauditoryfeedbacktothepilot.
G_7ThereshouldbeaclearindicationtothepilotwhenacommandhasbeenreceivedbytheUAS.
G_8AnyunrecognizedentrymadebythepilotattheGCSshouldcauseaninformativeerrormessagetobedisplayedandnotaffectthestatusoroperationofanysystem.
G_9Flightcrewalerting.(QuotedverbatimfromCFR§25.1322)
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G_9“(a)Flightcrewalertsmust:(1)Providetheflightcrewwiththeinformationneededto:(i)Identifynon-normaloperationorairplanesystemconditions,and(ii)Determinetheappropriateactions,ifany.(2)Bereadilyandeasilydetectableandintelligiblebytheflightcrewunderallforeseeableoperatingconditions,includingconditionswheremultiplealertsareprovided.(3)Beremovedwhenthealertingconditionnolongerexists.
G_9(b)Alertsmustconformtothefollowingprioritizationhierarchybasedontheurgencyofflightcrewawarenessandresponse.(1)Warning:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandimmediateflightcrewresponse.(2)Caution:Forconditionsthatrequireimmediateflightcrewawarenessandsubsequentflightcrewresponse.(3)Advisory:Forconditionsthatrequireflightcrewawarenessandmayrequiresubsequentflightcrewresponse.
G_9(c)Warningandcautionalertsmust:(1)Beprioritizedwithineachcategory,whennecessary.(2)Providetimelyattention-gettingcuesthroughatleasttwodifferentsensesbyacombinationofaural,visual,ortactileindications.(3)Permiteachoccurrenceoftheattention-gettingcuesrequiredbyparagraph(c)(2)ofthissectiontobeacknowledgedandsuppressed,unlesstheyarerequiredtobecontinuous.
G_9(d)Thealertfunctionmustbedesignedtominimizetheeffectsoffalseandnuisancealerts.Inparticular,itmustbedesignedto:(1)Preventthepresentationofanalertthatisinappropriateorunnecessary.(2)Provideameanstosuppressanattention-gettingcomponentofanalertcausedbyafailureofthealertingfunctionthatinterfereswiththeflightcrew'sabilitytosafelyoperatetheairplane.Thismeansmustnotbereadilyavailabletotheflightcrewsothatitcouldbeoperatedinadvertentlyorbyhabitualreflexiveaction.Whenanalertissuppressed,theremustbeaclearandunmistakableannunciationtotheflightcrewthatthealerthasbeensuppressed.
G_9(e)Visualalertindicationsmust:(1)Conformtothefollowingcolorconvention:(i)Redforwarningalertindications.(ii)Amberoryellowforcautionalertindications.(iii)Anycolorexceptredorgreenforadvisoryalertindications.(2)Usevisualcodingtechniques,togetherwithotheralertingfunctionelementsontheflightdeck,todistinguishbetweenwarning,caution,andadvisoryalertindications,iftheyarepresentedonmonochromaticdisplaysthatarenotcapableofconformingtothecolorconventioninparagraph(e)(1)ofthissection.
G_9(f)Useofthecolorsred,amber,andyellowontheflightdeckforfunctionsotherthanflightcrewalertingmustbelimitedandmustnotadverselyaffectflightcrewalerting”.
G_10Systemsthatalertthepilottoacriticalanomalyshouldnotbesubjecttoasilentfailure.
G_11TheGCSshouldprovideaworkenvironmentthatmaintainspilotengagement,andminimizesthenegativeimpactofextendedperiodsoflowworkload.
G_12TheGCSshouldprovideconsistencyofoperationforcommonfunctions.
G_13Thefunctionsneededtosafelycontroltheaircraftunderusualflightsituationsshouldbelocatedinthepilot'sprimaryfield-of-view.
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G_14WarningsandcautionsshouldnotbeobscuredbyotherGCSdisplays.
G_15"Part-timedisplay.Ifitisdesiredtoinhibitsomeparametersfromfull-timedisplay,anequivalentlevelofsafetytofull-timedisplayshouldbedemonstrated.Criteriatobeconsideredincludethefollowing:(a)Continuousdisplayoftheparameterisnotrequiredforsafetyofflightinallnormalflightphases.(b)Theparameterisautomaticallydisplayedinflightphaseswhereitisrequired.(c)Theinhibitedparameterisautomaticallydisplayedwhenitsvalueindicatesanabnormalcondition,orwhentheparameterreachesanabnormalvalue.(d)DisplayoftheinhibitedparametercanbemanuallyselectedbytheUAVcrewwithoutinterferingwiththedisplayofotherrequiredinformation.(e)Iftheparameterfailstobedisplayedwhenrequired,thefailureeffectandcompoundingeffectsmustmeettherequirementsofUSAR.1309.Theanalysisistoclearlydemonstratethatthedisplay(s)ofdataisconsistentwithsafeoperationunderallprobableoperatingconditions.(f)Theautomatic,orrequested,displayoftheinhibitedparametershouldnotcreateunacceptableclutteronthedisplay;simultaneousmultiple"pop-ups"mustbeconsidered.(g)Ifthepresenceofthenewparameterisnotsufficientlyself-evident,suitablealertingmustaccompanytheautomaticpresentation".
G_16Whereverpossible,textmessages,whetherindialogboxes,warningmessagesorotherscreendisplays,shouldbepresentedinplainlanguage,orusingstandardaviationterminology.
G_17Controlsintendedtobeoperatedbythepilotshouldbereachablefromaseatedposition
G_18TheGCSshouldprovideabookresttoenablethepilottorefertodocumentswithoutriskthatthedocumentwillcomeintocontactwithakeyboardorotherflightcontrols.
G_19AppropriateprioritycontrolsshouldbeavailableforUASfunctionsthatrequireeitherquickaccessibilityorconstantavailability.Prioritycontroldevicescaninclude,butarenotlimitedto:(a)Touchpanels,(b)Buttons,(c)Switches,(d)Joysticks,(e)Keyboardshortcuts.
G_20Ifadisplayscreenenablesthepilottomoveorrearrangedisplayorcontrolwindows,itshouldnotbepossibletoplaceawindowsoastoobscureprimaryflightcontrolsordisplays.
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Definitionsofterms
System:Anintegratedcollectionoffacilities,parts,equipment,tools,materials,software,personnel,and/ortechniqueswhichmakeanorganizedwholecapableofperformingorsupportingafunction(Stramler,1993).Engineeredsystem:Thenon-humancomponentsofthesystem,comprisingfacilities,parts,equipment,tools,materials&software.Humanfactors:Abodyofknowledgeabouthumanabilities,humanlimitations,andotherhumancharacteristicsthatarerelevanttodesign(Chapanis,1991).Humanfactorsengineering:Theapplicationofhumanfactorsinformationtothedesignoftools,machines,systems,tasks,jobs,andenvironmentsforsafe,comfortable,andeffectivehumanuseChapanis(1991).Humanfactorsguideline:Astatementdescribingacharacteristicoftheengineeredsystemwiththeintentionofpromotingsafeandeffectivehumanuse(AdaptedfromChapanis,1991).Humantask:Ataskdescriptioniscomposedofanactor,averbandanobject.Qualifyingphrasesmaybeincludedifneededforclarification.Informationcontentofdisplays:Informationthatmustbeprovidedbytheengineeredsystemtothehumantoenableatasktobeperformed.Therequirementmayspecifykeyattributesoftheinformation,suchasaccuracy,timing,andusability,butwillremainagnosticwithrespecttothemediumusedtotransmittheinformation.Controlinput:Inputsthattheengineeredsystemmustbecapableofreceivingfromthehuman.Therequirementmayspecifykeyattributesoftheinput,suchastimingandprecision,butwillremainagnosticwithrespecttothedeviceusedtomaketheinput.Propertyoftheinterface:Specificationsofdesiredphysicalorfunctionalpropertiesofcontrolsordisplays.Physicalpropertiesarecharacteristicsthataredirectlyobservable,suchasshapeandcolor.Functionalpropertiesrefertooperationalcharacteristicsoftheinterfacesuchastheorderinwhichinputsmustbemade,ortheabilitytoundoaninput.Generalguideline:Ahumanfactorsprinciplethatrelatestowhole-of-systemfunctioning,orthathasbroadapplicabilityacrosstheengineeredsystem.Human-centereddesignprocess:Anactivityperformedduringthedesignanddevelopmentphasetoensurethatthesystemwilloperatesafelyandeffectively,andwillbeconsistentwiththecapabilitiesandlimitationsofthehumanoperator.
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Appendix-Selectedhumanfactorsregulations,guidance,andpolicyRegulationsandguidancematerialwithrelevancetocockpitdesign
Title14CodeofFederalRegulations(14CFR)
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human_factors/hf-air/cfr/
FAAGuidanceandPolicy
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human_factors/hf-air/policy/
EuropeanAviationSafetyAgency.CS25.1302&AMC25.1302.Certificationspecifications
forlargeaeroplanes.Installedsystemsandequipmentforusebytheflightcrew.
DepartmentofDefense.MIL-STD-1787B:Aircraftdisplaysymbology.
DepartmentofDefense.MIL-STD-411F:Aircrewstationalertingsystems.
HumanFactorsConsiderationsintheDesignandEvaluationofFlightDeckDisplaysand
Controls.Yeh,M.,Jo,Y,Donovan,C.&Gabree,S.(2013)
GAMAPublicationNo.10(2004).RecommendedpracticesandguidelinesforPart23
cockpit/flightdeckdesign.
DocumentsspecificallycoveringtheUASpilotinterface
NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization.(2007).STANAG4586Edition2:Standardinterfacesof
UAVcontrolsystems(UCS)forNATOUAVInteroperability.
DepartmentofDefense.MIL-STD-1472G:Humanengineering.
Access5(2006).HSI003Revision2(Draft):HSIguidelinesoutlinefortheairvehiclecontrol
station.
NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization.(2009).STANAG4671Edition1:Unmannedaerial
vehiclessystemsairworthinessrequirements.
OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefense.(2012).Unmannedaircraftsystemsground
controlstationhuman-machineinterfacedevelopmentandstandardizationguide.
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ExamplesofdocumentswithgeneralrelevancetoHMIdesign
FAA.(2012).HumanFactorsDesignStandard(HFDS).HF-STD-001.Availableat:
http://hf.tc.faa.gov/hfds/
DepartmentofDefense.MIL-HDBK-759C:Humanengineeringdesignguidelines.
ResearchIntegrations,Inc.(2012)HFYIDesignCoPilot[onlineapplicationanddatabase].
Availableathttp://www.designcopilot.com.
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration.(2010).Humanintegrationdesign
handbook(HIDH).
ANSI/HFESStandard100-2007.DesignofComputerWorkstations