Hugo Nutini Ideological bases of Levi-Strauss

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The Ideological Bases of Lvi-Strauss's Structuralism

Author(s): Hugo G. NutiniSource: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jun., 1971), pp. 537-544Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/671753Accessed: 06/08/2009 14:41

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538 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [73, 1971with what the socio-culturaluniverse"reallyis," and we must necessarilyviewit throughthe ideological screen of "what ought tobe." Onlyas individualsmaywe perceive hesocio-culturaluniverseas it is. Theexistenceof socio-culturalsystems must thereforebepredicated on the notion that consensusabout what the world really is can only beachieved by arbitrarilyestablishingwhat itought to be. This notion of our lack of realacquaintancewith the "external world" ofsocial relations,or rather he realization hatwe view that world through "codedscreens," is one of the central ideas ofLevi-Strauss'sstructuralism,and one thatpervadeshis conception of the relationshipbetween nature and culture. In recognizingthe characterization of structuralism as"Kantianism without transcendental sub-ject," Levi-Strauss 1964:19) clearlyassertsthat his endeavor is not in any senseidealistic,though he has often been chargedwith idealism. At the same time, heimplicitlyassumesthat lawsand theories arenot elicited at the phenomenallevel alone.

The second usageof the term ideologyislargelya corollaryof the first.Althoughthisusage is underlain by the "what is-whatought to be" distinction, the concept heremust be interpretedprimarilyas an ethical-moral imperativeto action. The concept ofideology in this sense is not directlyconcerned with the epistemology-ethicsdistinction, but rather with changing acontext, a socio-cultural ystem, or perhapsthe entire fabric of human society on thebasis of a specific "what ought to be"construct. Let us note, however, thatalthough this use of the term is the mostcommon, it is at the same time the mostimprecise. More often than not, what isdenoted by the concept from the epistemo-logical point of view is always consciouslyrelegatedto the background,giventhe factthat the accent is on the practicaland not ondetermining how "what ought to be" isanchored in the relevantcontextual "whatis." But it must also be indicated thatsometimes this use of the termmay indicateconceptually both a clearly laid out

ethical-moral ode, and its practical mplica-tions. This does not mean, of course, thatthe followers of an ideological creed areaware of the "what is-what ought to be"distinction in the pursuit of its practicalimplications. Thus, while the ethical-moralconception of ideology is primarily aphilosophicalquestion concerned with theexigencies of societal living, the practicaldynamic conception is primarily pragmaticquestionconcerned with strategiesof how acontext can be best changed, givena certainend-in-view. That is, theories of culture,insofar as they limit themselves to globalsocieties, are ethical-moral deological con-structs which make possible the primitiveensemble of individuals n orderly systems.Capitalism, communism, humanism, andmany similarideologies,on the other hand,are practical-dynamicdeological constructsat a sub-culturallevel, which purport totransforma partof the societalstructure,orto reorganize some aspects of the totalsocietal structure, according to some ethi-cal-moral construct which may not alwaysbe clearlypostulated.Finally, the third use of the termideology may be characterized s scientific-epistemological.Here again, the conceptualmeaning of ideology is underlain by the"what is-whatought to be" distinction,butwe call it scientific-epistemologicalbecausethe emphasis is entirely upon verification,upon bridging the gap between nature asindividuallyperceivedand nature as sociallyperceived.This is primarilyan epistemologi-cal and not an ethical question, and theconcept of ideology in this sense may beproperlytermed scientific ideology. One ofthe persistentthemes in Westernphilosophythroughoutmore than 2500 years has beenthe unreliability of the senses in experi-encingthe externalworld,a theme that runsdeeply even through so-called empiricistphilosophies. Furthermore, non-Westernphilosophies, and the information that canbe culled from the ethnography of non-literate peoples, both point to the samedirection. This unreliability of sensible ex-perienceis what I mean by saying that we


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Nutini] LEVI-STRA USS'S STR UCTURALISM 539cannot become directly acquainted withnatural phenomena. Furthermore, as wemove from the realm of the non-organic tothe organic and on to the superorganic, thescreens through which we view natural phe-nomena become increasingly complicated,and verification more difficult to attain. Inthis meaning of the term, ideology isopposed to science in the sense that sciencerepresents the realm of "what is" (or ofwhat can be verified, verification beingoperationally defined so as to indicate theextent to which it bridges the gaps betweensensible experience and rational experience)and ideology the realm of "what ought tobe." From this viewpoint, then, everytheory, physical or social, is basically anideological construct until it is properly veri-fied. It goes without saying that verificationis impossible at the level of sensible experi-ence, for an operation at such level wouldsimply constitute consensus primarily about"what ought to be." Verification is arational operation that can take place onlyat a postulated supra-empirical level. Other-wise, a true science is not possible, and anyendeavor using that name will remain largelyideology or, perhaps more accurately, an un-realized scientific ideology at the intuitionallevel of concept formation. It should also beobvious that the science-ideology dichotomyobtains only in the meta-language (supra-empirical level); at the level of sensible ex-perience science is just another ideology,developed within the confines of a given cul-ture, namely, that amorphous entity we re-fer to as Western culture.1It is useless to debate whether the level ofsensible experience is more real than thelevel of analysis where consensus is reachedabout what phenomena really are, orvice-versa; they are equally real, and both areequally important in the conduct of anyscientific inquiry (in the meta-language).The "what is-what ought to be" distinctionis, of course, a shorthand expression for allthat the bifurcation of nature involves.Among other things, the bifurcation ofnature requires that science be conducted inits own language (be it mathematical or in

any other symbolic system) as distinct fromeveryday language. The non-scientist maycomplain, especially with regard to thebehavioral sciences, that scientists seldom ifever explain scientific theories in everydaylanguage, but this is clearly impossible;consensus in science is reached in themeta-language. It is in this sense of thebifurcation of nature that science representsa fundamental transformation in the historyof mankind. What I am saying is simply thatwe cannot begin to visualize what thebifurcation of nature has in store for theevolution (in the meta-language) of man.Meanwhile, we anthropologists are doing ourbest to deny it in the socio-cultural realm,thereby depriving ourselves of a powerfultool and reinforcing old patterns of intellec-tual socialization.2Let us note that there may be otherconceptual usages of the term ideology, butthey are always corollaries of either my first(ethical-moral) or third (scientific-epistemo-logical) usages. Furthermore, any well-estab-lished and comprehensive ideological system,or even an ideological viewpoint, may be acompound ideological construct in that itmay entail any two, or sometimes all threeof the analytical usages of the termdescribed above. For example, humanisminvolves a well-thought-out ethical-moralconception of what society should be, and atthe same time it is a practical-dynamicendeavor, or at least it involves pragmaticconsiderations as guides to action. Marxismis a practical-dynamic program for politicaland social reform, and at the same time it isa fairly well-thought-out scientific-epistemo-logical theory of culture and society. Itshould be clear that I am not discussingideology from the actor's viewpoint and thephilosophical implications that its differentusages imply, but rather from the universalviewpoint that, given the nature of man as asuperorganic entity, we cannot at particularlevels of conceptualization escape the "whatis-what ought to be" distinction. In order totranscend ideology, we must raise ourselvesto higher analytical levels, in the samemanner as, in a logical context, it is


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540 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [73, 1971impossible to solve semantic paradoxes (i.e.,"All Cretans are liars; I am a Cretan")without the notion of a meta-language; thatis, any statement about any object languagemust be made in its meta-language. Thetheory of levels of language is a consequenceof Russell's theory of types (Reichenbach1946:39), and I believe that it appliesequally to the epistemological context offinding the appropriate levels of analysis atwhich the "what is-what ought to be"distinction does not obtain. The onlyanalytical level at which this takes place is atthe theoretical level of contemporary sci-ence, which involves both an object language(organization of empirical facts) and ameta-language (theory construction andverification). No "scientific ideology" whichpersists in reaching consensus about "whatis"3 at the strictly empirical level can attainthe status of science. Sensible experience is atrue datum for individuals, but it is notconsensually true at the societal level. Oncemore, then, we must emphasize the useless-ness of thinking in terms of the greaterreality of either of the contrasting elementsof the "what is-what ought to be"distinction.

In the light of the preceding remarks, letus begin by saying that Levi-Strauss employsthe concept of ideology in my first and thirdsenses, for it is my contention thatstructuralism is a curious combination of anethical-moral ideological system and ascientific-epistemological theory of culture.There are two tendencies in Levi-Strauss'sthought which often pull in differentdirections: his scientific conception of socio-cultural phenomena (or the delineation of aspecific method for harnessing humanbehavior under the rubric of sociologicallaws), on the one hand, and his conceptionof what society should be (or the ideologicalstatement of what constitutes a "good"sociological life), on the other. I believe thisdichotomy in his conception of anthropol-ogy to be the result of the opposition in hisconceptual system between anthropology asan ethical-moral study of culture andsociety, and anthropology as a well defined

universal theory of culture. Let us note thatLevi-Strauss's conceptual system still fallslargely within the domain of ideology, andfrom this viewpoint, structuralism is notgreatly different from any of the empiricistapproaches. Thus, the dichotomy in struc-turalism is between two different meaningsof the concept of ideology, and not reallybetween science and ideology. But whatmakes structuralism differ radically fromother empiricist approaches is that itcontains the notion of meta-language orlevels of analysis, and this takes structur-alism one step along the way from"scientific-ideology" to genuine science. Inany event, the ethical-moral aspects of Levi-Strauss's ideological system do constitutecertain impediments to moving structuralismfrom "scientific-ideology" (the scientific-epistemological meaning of the concept) to agenuine science. We need not look into thegenesis of Levi-Strauss's structuralism or intothe intellectual traditions that have influ-enced its development.4 In order todetermine how ideology interferes withscience, we need only look into theprinciples of structuralism as a conception ofanthropology and as a theory of culture andsociety.The dichotomy in Levi-Strauss's struc-turalism may be interpreted as follows:Structuralism as a conceptual system elicitedfrom sensible social experience is an ethical-moral construct (or constructs) which im-plicitly recognizes the "what is-what oughtto be" distinction, but remains to a largeextent a conceptual system in which theoperational variables are largely unverifiable;they are primarily the expression of aes-thetic and traditional but not necessarilyrational-empirical (deductive-inductive) con-siderations. Structuralism in this sense is nodifferent from, say, evolutionism or anybroad social theory in anthropology, and itmay be termed a kind of seemingly scientifichumanism. At the opposite extreme, struc-turalism as a "scientific-epistemological"theory of culture involves the operationaldistinction between "what is" and "whatought to be"; as a genuine scientific en-


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Nutini] LEVI-STRAUSS 'SSTR UCTURALISM 541deavor, structuralism does not expect toconceptualizethe socio-culturaluniverse atthe level of sensiblesocialexperience,but ata meta-linguistictheoretical level which isthe result of inductive-deductive perationsor second-level-induction. Hence the di-chotomy mainly ideology mainlyscience inLevi-Strauss's nthropologicalapproach:al-though structuralism involves the funda-mental notion of scientific meta-linguisticanalysis, its inextricability from largelyideological considerationshampersits suc-cessful passage from "scientific-ideology"(whereonly concepts by intuition are pos-sible) to genuinescience (where he formula-tion of concepts by postulation s the goal).This, then, is what I mean by saying thatLevi-Strauss'sideological biases interferewithhis scientific aims.It should be clear, however, that theinterplay of the ideological and scientificcomponents of structuralism is neitherclear-cutnor associatedwith specificconcep-tual activities. If we wish to extricate thescientific from the ideological in L.vi-Strauss's tructuralism,we cannot view it asjust another approach to the study ofsocio-anthropological henomena;but ratherwe must addressourselvesto its logicalandepistemologicalfunctions, for the value ofstructuralism ies in its basic principles ofinquiryand not in what it has achieved insubstantive results. From this standpoint,structuralisms nothingmorethana methodin need of deductive-inductivemplementa-tion in order to achieve that status of afull-fledgedscientific method in the socio-culturaldomain. As anthropologistswe neednot be concerned that the ideologicalelementsof Levi-Strauss'structuralismmayhave strictly aesthetic and moral value forother areas of endeavor (literature,poetry,philosophy, etc.); our only concern asscientists should be with devisingappropri-ate verification procedures in order toimplementstructuralism or the formulationof scientific theories in anthropology.If thisis not done, then structuralismwill of courseremain just another approach such asfunctionalism or cross-culturalism.Part of

the difficulty is that despite its explicitendorsement of the use of mathematicaltools, and despite the seemingformalizationsometimesemployed by Levi-Strauss1964,1966, 1969), structuralism eems somehowto resist the formulation of calculi in theconstructionof socio-anthropologicalheo-ry.In fact, Levi-Strausswarnshis readersnotto take too seriouslythe uses thathe makesof mathematical symbols and apparentlymathematical equations. I am not surewhetherhe is simply beingcautiousbecausehe does not yet know how to formulatemeaningful calculi, or whether ultimatelythisactivity is not possiblein the conceptu-alization of social phenomena, and he isengaged in such an operation solely forclarityof exposition. In any case, I believethat it is for aesthetic reasons that thescientific aspects of structuralismare pre-vented from being meaningfullyand profit-ably expressed in Levi-Strauss'swritings. Imight give an example in order tounderstand better what the ideologic-scien-tific opposition means in the conduct ofstructuralism.One of the fundamental notions ofLevi-Strauss'structuralisms the oppositionbetween nature and culture which ismediated by the structure of the humanbrain, and which many anthropologists(Leach1965:17) bent on makingan idealistof him interpretas a metaphysicalentity ofthe collective-consciousnesskind. The na-ture-cultureopposition plays a very impor-tantrole in Levi-Strauss'sonceptualsystem,not only as an ontological property ofsensible social experience, but also as anepistemologicaldevice in the analysisof thatexperience. In any event, what does thenature-culture pposition mean in the lightof Levi-Strauss'swo usagesof the conceptof ideology? On the one hand, as anethical-moral conceptual tool the nature-culture opposition implies not only a cleardistinctionbetween"what is" (nature) and"what out to be" (culture),but at the sametime it implies the fundamentalnotion thatat the level of sensibleexperience,we cannotpossibly bridge the gap between these two


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542 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [73, 1971ontological levels. Hence, Levi-Strauss'sinsistence that cultures are coded screenswhich enable us to organize the facts ofnature, as a projector is needed to makesense out of a film strip. This is, of course, asound view of the interplay between manand his natural environment, and anontological view with a long tradition inWestern philosophy, although differentlyexpressed in traditional and contemporaryphilosophy. On the other hand, the nature-culture opposition as a scientific-epistemo-logical conceptual tool goes beyond theontological domain and asserts that in orderto achieve true consensus regarding sensibleexperience (i.e., universal agreement irre-spective of individual social perception), wemust postulate a meta-level of analysis. Itasserts, in short, that epistemological consen-sus can only be arrived at by transcendingboth individual sensible experience (nature)and social sensible experience (culture).5 Wecan see, then, that the ontological (primarilyideological) and the epistemological (primar-ily scientific) implications of the nature-culture opposition in L.vi-Strauss's systemdo not really conflict, and that they are in asense complementary. But what then consti-tutes the dichotomy of structuralism withrespect to ontology and epistemology, thatis, with respect to socio-cultural phenomenaand method? Levi-Strauss knows that agenuine science is primarily method, andthat this basically epistemological activitycannot possibly succeed at the ontologicallevel of sensible social experience. Why,then, does he seem to persist in searching forepistemological constructs (laws or theories)at the level of the social facts, much as hisempiricist opponents do, when he knowsthat this is impossible? Hence the paradox ofstructuralism: L_vi-Strauss is clearly awareof what constitutes good science and yet heseems unable to practice it or at least tocarry its implications to their logical con-clusions.

It is obvious that no contextual situationever involves constructs based strictly on"what is" or on "what ought to be," forthese are limiting parameters, so we are

simply saying that Levi-Strauss has chosen topractice what his ideology dictates to himrather than what he knows science to be. Wecannot easily determine his reasons, but mayventure to say that they are traditional (andwho can entirely escape tradition ) andaesthetic. Levi-Strauss seems unwilling toimplement his basically excellent conceptionof science because he is unwilling to leavethe realm of social relations. He is tooenamored of the study of social life itself(myth, religion, kinship in the traditionalethnographic sense) to be able to addresshimself to the methodological implementa-tion of the science that he has so insightfullydelineated. Thus, his Mythologiques (L.vi-Strauss 1964, 1966, 1969) is a magnificentfailure as a scientific enterprise, or perhaps itcan be more appropriately characterized as ameta-study of myth involving a fundamentalmistake: the search for consensus at theobject language level, or, if you will, theempirical construction of a theory of mythwithout the notion of structure as asupra-empirical entity which Levi-Strausshimself theoretically advocates. When onereads Mythologiques, one gets the strangeimpression that the scientific superstructureof these studies is always pointing in theright direction, and yet that the results areneither scientifically verifiable nor, inLevi-Strauss's context, scientifically ade-quate. The net assessment of these studies isthat Levi-Strauss has not logically come togrips with his own theoretical notions, andthat they remain within the realm ofideology. Any future attempt at structur-alism along similar lines will result either inanother piece of ideological constructionwithout epistemological unity, or in seem-ingly scientific constructs which lack themathematical tools for the construction ofappropriate calculi of verification. In sum-mary, although Levi-Strauss has a trulyGalilean conception of scientific methodol-ogy, his adherence to ancient, ideologicalideas about qualities and contraries preventshim from producing truly scientific results.To use an analogy from the physicalsciences, had physics conceived of heat and


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Nutini ] LEVI-STRAUSS 'S STR UCTURALISM 543cold as if they were two different sorts ofthings rather than as arbitrary categoriesapplied to measures of a single physicalentity, it could not have achieved its presentresults. In the same fashion, as long asstructuralism does not discard its ideologicaltrappings it will remain only a potentiallyadequate scientific framework for theconceptualization of socio-cultural phenom-ena, unable to devise genuine (verifiable)theoretical terms, hence unable to formulateconcepts by postulation.We have a case then, in which theideological aspects of structuralism, as wehave termed them, interfere with itsscientific aspects. The same argument can bemade against binary opposition, distinctivefeatures, the theory of infrastructures, andmany lesser conceptual tools in Levi-Strauss's system. In my opinion, thepotential of structuralism as a method forformulating genuine theoretical terms in thesearch for concepts by postulation are soevident, that the interference offered by itsideological aspects should not seriouslyhamper its use in anthropology. Given theseconsiderations, what does the ideology-sci-ence dichotomy mean substantively? Twothings primarily: (1) Levi-Strauss's structur-alism cannot, from the anthropologicalstandpoint, be viewed profitably as a kind ofphilosophy. As such, it is simply anotherview of man and his relationship to nature,which has no particular attraction over othersuch views in the intellectual marketplace. Ibelieve that empiricist anthropologists,instinctively realizing the differences in thescientific foundations of the empiricistapproach and of structuralism (and indefense of their vested interests for noapparent analytical reason), have viewedstructuralism as just another philosophy indisguise, and for the wrong reasons haverightly concluded that it has no value for theconduct of anthropological inquiry. (2)Structuralism should not be regarded asanother approach to the handling ofempirical social facts in conceptual contextsthat do not involve the bifurcation of thesocio-cultural universe, not in the light of

the other, scientific, side of structuralism. Itwill not do, then, to examine a structuralistconstruction in strictly empirical terms, asempiricist anthropologists are fond of doingwhen they assert that Levi-Strauss's generali-zations cannot stand the test of particularethnographic situations. By all means let ushave tests and verification procedures, butnot of the nominal definitional sort which isall that empiricist anthropology can achieve.We should learn from structuralism only itsscientific aspects, its basically sound analyti-cal principles, for its ideological aspects areno more adequate than any of the empiricistapproaches.I have emphasized throughout this paperthat structuralism teaches us to conceptu-alize socio-cultural phenomena in terms ofmeta-linguistic levels of analysis. This maybe a small point to many anthropologists,but if the theoretical and methodologicalunity of science is accepted, then it becomesof transcendental importance. If we do notthink in terms of meta-languages (i.e., uni-dimensionally), we shall be unable to formu-late genuine laws and theories in anthro-pology. For those who think that the end-in-view of anthropology is not scientific inthe above sense, the point will be totallyirrelevant.

NOTESli think this basic idea is whatLevi-Strauss has in mind when he maintainsthat at the perceptual level there are no fun-damental differences between scientific con-structs and the constructs of primitivepeojples.The science-ideology dichotomy, andespecially the implications of the bifurcationof nature, are discussed at length in myarticle "A Comparison of Levi-Strauss'sStructuralism and Chomsky's Transforma-tional Generative Grammar" (Nutini 1970).By "reaching consensus about what is" Imean the verification of a theoretical con-struct, or that theories can become realitiesonly at a supra-empirical level of naturalphenomena.4One of the best articles on the genesis ofLevi-Strauss's structuralism and the in-fluences to which it has been subjected is


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544 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [73, 1971Leach's (1965) "Claude Levi-Strauss:Anthropologist and Philosopher."5This again is a sound epistemologicalview of what constitutes modern science,and in this respect Levi-Strauss s struc-turalism represents a Galilean view of thesocio-cultural universe.

REFERENCES CITEDLeach, Edmund R.1965 Claude Levi-Strauss: Anthropol-ogist and Philosopher. New LeftReview 34, November-December.Levi-Strauss, Claude1964 Le Cru et le Cuit. Paris: Plon.

1966 Du Miel aux Cendres. Paris: Plon.1969 L'Origine des Manieres de Table.Paris: Plon.Nutini, Hugo G.1970 A Comparison of Levi-Strauss'sStructuralism and Chomsky's Trans-formational Generative Grammar. InEssays in Structural Anthropology: inHonor of Claude Levi-Strauss, Hugo G.Nutini, Ira R. Buchler, and Betty Bell,eds. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. (In press)Reichenbach, Hans1946 Bertrand Russell's Logic. In ThePhilosophy of Bertrand Russell, P. A.Schilpp, ed. The Library of LivingPhilosophers. Evanston, Illinois.

Hugo Nutini Ideological bases of Levi-Strauss

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