How Wide an Impact Has Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Had
Transcript of How Wide an Impact Has Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Had
ONE YEAR AND COUNTING: HOW WIDE AN IMPACT HAS GROSS v. FBLFINANCIAL SEVICES INC. HAD ON THE APPELLATE COURTS?
By Michael C. Subit
It has been just over a year since a bitterly divided United States Supreme Court
handed dovm Gross v. PBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). While the
explicit holding of that case is narrow, the Court's conservative majority sent a broader
message about how it views the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases.
Since June 18, 2009, the appellate courts have been trying to predict just how far they
should go in overturning previously settled legal questions in light of Gross. The results
so far have been anything but uniform.
The Gross Decision
The question on which the Court had granted certiorari in Gross was whether
direct evidence is needed in an ADEA case for the plaintiff to request a so-called "mixed
motives" instruction. The Court, however, held 5-4 that a "mixed motives" instruction is
never proper in an ADEA case.
The district court had instructed the jury that it should find for the plaintiff if he
proved age had been "a motivating factor" in the employer's action and the employer
failed to prove it would have taken the same action based in any event. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $47,000. The employer appealed. The 8th Circuit
reversed holding that Justice O'Connor's controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), required a plaintiff in an ADEA case to proffer "direct
evidence" before the mixed-motives framework could be invoked. The plaintiff sought
1
certiorari on whether the Eighth Circuit's holding was correct. In its brief on the merits,
the employer argued that the Court should overrule Price Waterhouse.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that the burden of persuasion never
shifts to the party defending an alleged mixed-motives discrimination claim under the
ADEA. 129 S. Ct. at 2348. Justice Thomas noted that six Justices in Price Waterhouse
had held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case may prove a violation by showing that an
unlawful reason was a motivating factor in the employment action. Congress had then
amended Title VII by codifying the holding of Price Waterhouse as 42 U.S.c. § 2000e
2(rn). 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
The Gross majority declined to apply the reasoning of the Price Waterhouse
majority to the ADEA on the basis that "[u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA does not provide
that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating
factor." Jd. The majority also relied on Congress' decision to amend Title VII but not
the ADEA in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court reasoned that this gave rise to the
negative implication that Congress did not intend an ADEA plaintiff to be able to prove
discrimination by showing age was a motivating factor. Jd. The majority held that the
words 'because of' as used in the ADEA mean "by reason of' or "on account of." The
majority held that "[t]o establish a disparate treatment claim under the plain language of
the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the
employer's adverse action." !d. at 2350.
The majority stated that "it is far from clear" the Court would reach the same
result if Price Waterhouse came before it now. Id. at 2351-52. The majority noted that
"its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply." ld. at 2352. The Court reasoned
2
that "even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its
application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA
claims. Id. The fact that the Court had originally endorsed the framework in both NLRA
and First Amendment contexts had "no bearing" in the majority's view to the correct
interpretation of ADEA claims. ld. at 2352 n. 6.
Writing for four dissenters, Justice Stevens asserted that the majority had
substituted the Price Waterhouse dissent for the holding of the majority. ld. at 2353. He
reasoned that both the Court and Congress had previously rejected "but-for" causation as
the standard for liability under Title VII, and that "the because of' language of the ADEA
was identical. He accused the majority of engaging in "unnecessary lawmaking." He
noted that the Government had not been give the opportunity to brief anything other than
the question presented in the writ of certiorari. The dissent would have resolved the case
by holding that direct evidence was not necessary to obtain a "mixed-motives"
instruction. ld at 2353.
Justice Stevens reasoned that in Price Waterhouse six Justices had concluded that
the term "because of' meant less than "but-for" causation. ld. at 2354. The dissent
responded to the majority's invocation of the dictionary by reasoning although "because
of' means "by reason of," that does not imply that it means "solely by reason of" Jd. at
2354 nA. The dissent stated that there was no substantive difference between the Price
Waterhouse plurality's "a motivating factor" standard and the concurrences' "a
substantial factor" standard. ld. at 2354 n.3. (The Court had held in Mf. Healthy City
Board. Of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), that the tests were identical). The
Court's recognition of the employer's affirmative same action defense did not alter the
3
meaning of "because of." The ADEA used exactly the same "because of' language that
the Court had held meant less than "but-for" causation in the Title VII context. The
dissent could find no reason to interpret the words any differently in the ADEA context.
It noted that the Price Waterhouse dissent had assumed the majority's holding did apply
to the ADEA and that in the 20 intervening years no court of appeals had held to the
contrary. ld. at 2354-55.
The dissent agreed that the 1991 amendments to Title VII that changed the
employers' proof of the same action defense as a defense to damages rather than liability
did not apply to the ADEA. Id. at 2355. But the lesson the dissent took from that was
that Congress intended the unmodified holding of Price Waterhouse to apply to ADEA
cases. The fact that Congress endorsed in the 1991 amendments the very burden-shifting
framework the Gross majority now claimed is unworkable seriously undermined the
majority's argument, in the view of Justice Stevens. ld. at 2356-57. Given that plaintiffs
often bring Title VII and ADEA claims together, the dissent reasoned that majority's
holding would do nothing to eliminate juror confusion. ld. at 2357.
Turning to the question on which the Court granted certiorari, the dissent would
have ruled that direct evidence is not required for the plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motives
instruction. ld. The dissent concluded that Justice White's opinion, rather than Justice
O'Connor's, provided the controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse. The dissent further
relied on the Court's rejection of a direct evidence requirement in Desert Palace, holding
that the reasoning of that case applied with equal force to the ADEA. ld. at 2358.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent that Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined.
The thrust of his opinion was the difficulty of determining "but-for" causation when the
4
issue is human motivation. All a plaintiff can know for certain is that a forbidden motive
played some role in the employer's decision. The employer is in a far better position to
know the exact role that lawful and unlawful motivations played in its decision. Id. at
2358-59.
Did Gross Raise the Standard of Proof in "But-for" Cases?
Prior to Gross all circuits but the Eighth had held that in non-mixed motives cases
the plaintiff had to prove an illegal motive was "a determinative factor" in or "a but-for
cause" of the employer's action. Justice Thomas' opinion in Gross used the term "the
but-for cause." It is unclear whether the Court was intended to create a new standard for
"but-for" cases. If it did, Gross has done even greater damage to the law. The Supreme
Court had previously held that "a detenninative influence" was sufficient to establish
causation lmder the ADEA. See Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
General tort law does not require a plaintiff to prove the defendant's conduct was "the
but-for cause" or "the proximate cause" of her injuries. Juries are routinely instructed
that there may be more than one proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. (Sometimes
they are instructed that the plaintiff need show only the defendant's conduct was a
"substantial factor"). Most events have multiple "but-for causes." Asking a jury to find
"the but-for cause" of a plaintiff's injuries is nonsensical.
For example, assume the plaintiff is 80 years old and brings a claim of disability
discrimination and a claim of age discrimination. Suppose the jury concludes that the
employer discriminated against her because of both protected characteristics and each
was "a but~for cause" of the employer's actions. If the jury is asked if was disability was
5
"the detennining factor" or "the but-for cause" of the plaintiffs injuries, the correct
answer will be "no." Likewise, if the jury is asked whether age was "the but-for cause,"
the correct answer will still be still no. Asking whether "disability or age" or "disability
and age" were "the but-for cause" or "the determining factor" doesn't help. The problem
is also not solved by asking on the verdict fonn whether "disability and age" were "the
determining factors" because that rules out the possibility that one was and one wasn't.
The only way to ask the question is whether age or disability was "a but-for cause" or "a
determining factor." The same is true where the plaintiff has alleged only one tmlawful
motive. It doesn't matter how many motives, legal or illegal, the employer ha..<;. As long
as an illegal one was "a but-tor cause" or "a determining factor" in the employer's
actions, the employee has met her burden.
In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010), the
Seventh Circuit simply ignored Justice Thomas's use of the term "the but-for cause" in
Gross and held that "a butwfor cause" was the applicable standard.
The District of Columbia Circuit has recognized that there is potential difference
between the prior "a determining factor" standard and Gross's "the but-for cause" test.
See Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But
the court did not resolve the issue as the plaintiff's evidence failed to meet either
standard.
Is there an ADEA Disparate Treatment Same Action Defense After Gross?
Prior to Gross, courts had llliformly held that if the plaintiff proves only that age
was a "substantial factor" in the employer's decision, the employer can raise as an
6
affirmative defense the claim it would have made the same decision absent the unlawful
motivation and thereby defeat "but-for" causation. Does the same action defense remain
viable post-Gross in ADEA cases? The Eleventh Circuit correctly said "no" in Mora v.
Jackson Memorial Foundation, Inc., 597 FJd 1201, 1204 (11 th Cir. 2010).
Gross's Impact on ADEA Pattern and Practice Claims
Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co. 582 FJd 1125 (loth Cir. 2009)
The plaintiffs brought a pattern and practice case under the ADEA. The employer
unsuccessfully argued before the district court that pattern and practice cases are not
cognizable under the ADEA. On interlocutory appeal, the company asserted that Gross
provides additional support for the argument against pattern and practice ADEA cases
because the Supreme Court held that the burden of persuasion never shifts in an ADEA
case. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument on the basis that there were no relevant
textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA with respect to pattern and practice
cases. Both were creatures ofjudicial construction.
Gross's Impact upon McDonnell Douglas-Burdine Framework.
The Gross majority noted that it had not definitively decided whether the
McDonnell Douglas Burdine framework applied to ADEA claims. Prior to Gross, every
circuit had that the framework did apply to ADEA claims. In the wake of Gross, every
circuit faced with the question had continued to do so:
Velez v. Thermo King De Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441 (l st Cir. 2009)
Smith v. City ofAllentown, 589 F.3d 684 (3 rd Cir. 2009)
7
Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2009)
Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgt. Co., 581 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2009)
Of these, only Smith gives the question any substantive analysis. The Third Circuit held
that application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is not inconsistent with Gross
because that framework does not shift the burden of persuasion to the employer. 589
F.3d at 691.
The Impact of Gross on Courts' Construction of State FEP Laws
Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgt. Co., 581 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2009)
The plaintiff brought claims for age discrimination under the ADEA and the
Missouri Human Rights Act. Like the ADEA, state law prohibited discrimination
"because of' age. The Eighth Circuit held that Gross does not undermine prior holding
of the Missouri Supreme Court that "because of' means "a contributing factor," which is
less than "but-for causation."
Gurzynski v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff brought age discrimination claims under both the ADEA and the
New York Human Right Law. The court assumed "without deciding, that the Supreme
Court's Gross decision affects the scope of the NYHRL as well as the ADEA." Id. at
106 n.6.
In Hadad v. Waf-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 914 N.E.2d 59 (2009), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts indicated a willingness to reconsider in some
future decision "whether we will retain a mixed motive analysis under Massachusetts
law." ld. at 113 n.27.
8
The Application of Gross to Other Federal Employment Discrimination Claims
ADA
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (ih Cir. 2010)
This case arose under the pre-2009 version of the ADA. The jury found that the
plaintiff's disability was "a motivating factor" in the employer's action. The jury also
found that the employer would have taken the same action in any event. The district
court awarded the plaintiff 20% of her attorneys' fees and costs. 591 F.3d at 960. The
employer appealed. The Seventh Circuit held that Gross controlled and that in an ADA
case a plaintiff cannot establish liability by proving disability was a 'motivating factor."
The panel recognized that for years courts had assumed that the "mixed-motives" frame
work applied to ADA claims. The court further noted that the ADA contains the
following provision:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [42 U.S.C.] sections 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8 and 2000e-9 shall be the powers, remedies and
procedures this subchapter provides....
42 U.S.C. § 12117. Among the Title VII provisions that the section cross-references is
the provision allovving partial relief to the plaintiff based on a mixed-motives finding. ld.
Despite this language, the majority found that the language of the ADA did not
permit mixed-motives claims because it did not have defmitional language comparable to
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m). Instead, the pre~ADAAA text of the ADA merely prohibits
discrimination "because of' disability. The court held that the incorporation of Title's
remedies for a mixed-motives case did not mean that Congress intended there to be
liability under the ADA in such cases. Id. at 962. Thus, an ADA plaintiff must show that
9
the "employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived of disability." ld.
The panel held that the plaintiff had not proven disability was "a but-for cause of her
discharge. ld. at 963. The court noted that the ADA now uses the "on the basis of"
rather than "because of' as the operative causal standard. The court did not opine
whether this would change the analysis. ld. at 962. n.1.
First Amendment
Waters v. City afChicago, 580 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009)
The plaintiff in this case brought a Section 1983 claim for retaliation in violation
of the First Amendment. The plaintiff prevailed at trial and obtained a $225,000
compensatory damages verdict. The district court denied the employer's Rule 50 motion
and awarded back pay, front pay, and lost pension benefits in excess of $1 million. The
appellate court reversed, holding that there was no evidence that a final po1icymaker had
caused the plaintiffs alleged constitutional deprivation. As an alternative ground, the
court held that there was no evidence that he was tenninated in retaliation for the exercise
of his First Amendment rights. Without mentioning Mt. Healthy City Bd. Of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), the court ruled that under Gross a plaintiff in a First
Amendment claim must establish that his speech "was 'the reason' that the employer
decided to act." 580 F.3d at 584.
Smith v. City ofAllentown, 589 FJd 684 (3rd Cir. 2009)
The plaintiff brought claims under both the ADEA and the First Amendment for
discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. The employer apparently did not argue
10
that Gross changed the burden of persuasion in First Amendment cases. The Third
Circuit reaffrrmed that under Mt. Healthy City Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977), a plaintiff need prove only that political affiliation was "a motivating factor" in
the employer's adverse action.
Section 1981
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3 d Cir. 2009)
The plaintiff in this case brought a Section 1981 racial claim. The court asked for
supplemental briefing of the impact of Gross on Section 1981. Both parties asserted that
Gross had no impact. The majority agreed. It held that Price Waterhouse governed and
that Justice 0'Connor's opinion was controlling under prior circuit precedent. 581 F.3d
at 182. The panel reasoned that Section 1981 does not contain the tcrm "because of."
Instead that statute guarantees all persons the same rights as white citizens. The majority
reasoned that if race plays any role in the defendant's actions, the plaintiff has not
enjoyed the "same right" as other persons. But if the defendant proves it would have
taken the same action in any event, then the plaintiff has "in effect" enjoyed the same
right as white persons. 581 F.3d at 182 n.5. One judge disagrecd. He asserted that
because Congress did not amend Section 1981 to contain the same "motivating factor"
language as Title VII, there was no reason to assume that Section 1981 required the
plaintiff to prove anything less than "but~for" causation. He suggested that "given the
broad language chosen by the Supreme Court in Gross, a critical reexamination of our
precedents may be in order". 581 FJd at 187.
11
FMLA
Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools, 579 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2009)
The court held that Gross required it to examine whether Title VII precedent
applied to retaliation claims under the FMLA. The FJ\.1LA makes it unlawful for an
employer to interfere, restrain, or deny the exercise of any FMLA rights or to
discriminate against any employer for opposing any practice made unlawful by the
FMLA. DOL Regulations interpret this standard to forbid the use of FMLA leave as "a
negative factor" in an employment decision. The court held the phrase "a negative
factor" envisions that the challenged employment decision might also rest on other
permissible factors. 579 F.3d at 692. Therefore, the court held that the FMLA, like Title
VII, authorizes claims in which an employer bases an employment decision on both
permissible and impermissible factors. ld. The tribunal stated that if the plaintiff
presents evidence to establish that the employer discriminated against her "because of'
her leave, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove it would have taken
the same decision absent the impressible motive. Jd.
Title VII Retaliation
Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010)
In this case the court divided 2-1 whether Gross undermined prior Fifth Circuit
precedent that Title VII retaliation cases could be analyzed under a mixedMmotives
framework. The plaintiff had prevailed before the jury under a mixed-motives
instruction. The majority held that since Gross was an ADEA case, and not a Title VII
case, Gross did not affect existing circuit precedent regarding Title VII retaliation. The
12
majority held it would continue to apply Price Waterhouse to such claims and that a
plaintiff need not have direct evidence to invoke that framework. Id. at 330-33. Judge
Jolly's dissent called the majority's distinction between Title VII retaliation claims and
the ADEA "lame." Id. at 337. He is probably right about that. But it was exactly this
same type of "lame" distinction that the Gross majority used to distinguish Price
Waterhouse in the first place.
Z:\S-TISubil\ABA CLESISF 2009\Gr05s.doc
13