Secret history: How the Mossadbecame entangled in a politicalassassination

In the 1960s, Israel's external security service found itself in acompromising situation when it was asked to help carry out anassassination by a secret ally, that later sent shockwaves throughthe country's highest echelons and whose effects are still felttoday.

Ronen Bergman, Shlomo Nakdimon

On a dark and rainy day in a forest near Paris, several people were digginga deep pit, throwing in the body of a man who had been strangled to deathnot long before. No one imagined that the ghost of the victim wouldhaunt the Mossad for many years to come.

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Ronen Bergman and Shlomo Nakdimon have re-opened the famouslymysterious "Bava Batra" case to expose the unbelievable story about akidnapping operation planned to take place at the palace of the King ofMorocco, which went south and ended in an assassination in France -threatening to bring down the head of the Mossad and the prime ministerof Israel.

"I would ask you to hold a preliminary examination into the actions of theMossad with regards to 'Bava Batra'- a term I defined for you verbally."

This above note was written by the third prime minister of Israel, LeviEshkol, but it isn't in his handwriting. It was most likely written be hissecretary, to whom he dictated one of the most sensitive letters in hisstormy tenure as prime minister of Israel.

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"You must examine the documents concerning the case and interview thepeople involved, whose names I gave you verbally. If during theexamination you see the need to interview more people - please inform meverbally and I will make sure they are at your disposal. The people involvedhave received instructions from me to make all of the aforementioneddocuments available to you, as well as to provide you with all of the

information you require of them. You are requested to write yourconclusions by hand and make only one copy, which you will deliver to me.

With regards,

Levi Eshkol."

An added sentence appearing in the letter was written in a differenthandwriting: "We've read the aforementioned instructions and have takenit upon ourselves to follow them." Next to this sentence are the signaturesof former IDF chief of staff Yigael Yadin and the late MK Ze'ev Sherf. Thisdocument shows the climax of one of the biggest dramas the Israeliintelligence community has ever known - and, apparently, the mostserious clash between the Intelligence community and the state'sleadership.Despite the fact his name is not specifically mentioned in the document,it's clear who is at the center of the secret team's investigation: Mossadchief Meir Amit.

Letter written by Levi Eshkol.

Levi Eshkol.Photo by: Photo: David Rubinger

On February 23, 1966, the day on which Yadin and Sherf launched theinvestigation they were instructed to conduct - Amit was at the height ofhis power: He had reorganized the Mossad, created a harmonious andcooperative relationship with Military Intelligence, and executed a seriesof daring operations - most notably Operation Diamond, during which anIraqi fighter pilot defected to Israel with his advanced Soviet fighter jet,MiG 21. When American experts received access to the aircraft they hadlonged to get their hands on for so long, Amit and the organization he ledbecame far more valuable to them.

But it was another affair - which those few in the know referred to by thecode name "Bava Batra" – that threatened to bring Amit down and dragprime minister Levi Eshkol into the abyss with him. To save themselves,the two launched a fierce battle, during which they also resurrectedanother highly charged Mossad affair.

The complete story of the internal war that split the state's upper echelonsinto two rival camps has never been told. Using secret documents fromthe Mossad and the Prime Minister's Office, and a series of interviewsconducted by the undersigned over the years, we can now sketch outalmost in full the "Bava Batra" affair.

It is an affair that started in the opulent palace of Hassan II, the King ofMorocco, carried onward to a summit meeting in Casablanca and ended inan assassination in Paris - and then exploded in the halls of the Israelileadership in the form of a dark and determined battle, the likes of whichhave not been seen since.

Chapter 1: The king and I

Israel, the early 1960s

Meir Amit.Photo by: Photo: David Rubinger

The Mossad's main theater of operations was in Europe and its secretheadquarters on the continent located in Paris. This, of course, wasn't acoincidence - France at the time was a great friend of Israel, and the twocountries had strong security ties. The French, who were mired deep inAlgerian mud and fighting Algeria's National Liberation Front - anunderground organization fighting against the French occupation in thecountry - asked for the Mossad's help.

At first, the Mossad provided the French with information on theunderground organization. Later, Mossad agents also provided weapons -sniper rifles, guns and explosives - for a series of assassinations carriedout by French intelligence against the underground's headquarters inCairo.When this activity increased, a need arose to have a permanent route toEgypt - then Israel's biggest enemy.

The Israeli intelligence community decided to launch a particularlycreative mission: Deputy Military Intelligence Chief Yuval Ne'emanrecruited two American Jewish pilots and provided them with substantialcapital. The two headed to Kuwait, where they proposed the governmentto launch an airline that would fly from Kuwait across the Arab world.

The idea was welcomed with open arms, and since then the Israeliintelligence began "operating" three weekly flights to Cairo. A decade later,when this route was no longer needed, the full ownership of the airlinewas sold to the Kuwaiti government. The airline is still in operation andtoday it is known as Kuwait Airways, Kuwait's national airline.

Despite the fact the French had to give up on Algeria in 1962, they greatlyappreciated the Israeli aid. Paris became a safe and convenient meetingpoint for the Mossad, even with sources who had no official ties withIsrael.

"I was in favor of personal ties with the heads of the intelligence there,"former Mossad chief Meir Amit told us before his passing. "I, the head ofthe Mossad, would go there in person to meet with them and create analliance based on common interests."

The best pathway into Africa and Asia was at the time perceived to bethrough Paris, and the Mossad had become one of the most activeintelligence services in these areas. The tradeoffs usually included Israelimilitary aid and training for local intelligence services (and sometimesground-up construction). In return, the Mossad got approval to operatealmost entirely freely in those countries, and gather information on theArab countries and the activities of the Soviet bloc (information that wasshared with the United States). What was vital was the complete alliancebetween the Mossad and its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia,which became a stage for intelligence coordination between the fourregional powers.

But the Mossad had marked a more desirable intelligence target – one thatwas far harder to achieve: Morocco.The reason is obvious: Morocco is an Arab country, which was in closecontact with Israel's main enemies. But Morocco was moderate and didnot share a threatening border with Israel, it was headed by a relativelypro-Western king, Hassan II.

The intelligence relationship with Morocco began in 1960, when Hassanwas still crown prince. A year later, after he was crowned, Israel askedHassan to allow Morocco's Jews to emigrate. Muhammad Oufkir, who wasin charge of the secret services in Morocco, finalized the deal with Mossadagents: $250 for every Jew who would emigrate. Funds for 80,000 Jewswere transferred in bags of a quarter of a million dollars to a secretaccount.

Next, the Moroccans asked the Mossad to set up a VIP protection unit forthem. Mossad men David Shomron and Yoske Shiner, David Ben-Gurion'sbody guards, were sent to complete the task. "The king was afraid he wouldbe killed," Shomron told us in the past. "He had enough enemies ... he wasnot safe in his life. Oufkir told me, 'We need to secure the king.' During

the course, Shiner was talking to me in Hebrew with an English accent andI translated into French."

During these contacts it became clear that Oufkir and his faithfullieutenant Ahmad Dalimi were concerned not only for the king's life - butalso for his rule. In particular, they were concerned about various attemptsby Egypt and Algeria to undermine Hassan II. The Egyptians and Algerianshad helped elements in the opposition, and the Moroccan embassies inthese countries suffered repeated burglaries.

Israel restructured the Moroccan intelligence service, equipped Moroccanships with electronic equipment to detect infiltrations by sea and providedtraining to prevent the break-ins at the embassies. In return, Israelreceived the right to establish a permanent station in the capital - Rabat.This was the most important achievement.

Morocco's King Hassan IIPhoto by: center

When a border dispute between Morocco and Algeria broke out, Amit flew- with a fake passport - to meet the king. The late journalist Samuel Segevwrote in his book, "The Moroccan Connection", that the meeting tookplace after midnight, in a tent near the royal residence in Marrakech.

"We can help and we want to help," Amit told the king.

The proposal was accepted. Israel gave Morocco intelligence information,trained pilots and supplied numerous weapons to the local army. Inexchange, Israel received access to Egyptian prisoners who had beenhelping the Algerians and had been captured, and the option of trainingagainst Soviet aircraft and tanks, which were also used by Israel's hostileneighbors.The height of the cooperation came in September 1965.

At that time, an Arab summit was convened in Casablanca, whichdiscussed the establishment of joint common Arab command in futurewars with Israel. King Hassan, who had very limited trust in his guests,the leaders of the Arab world, allowed the Mossad to closely monitor theconference.

Members of the "Tziporim" (birds) unit - led by Zvi Malkin and Rafi Eitan– went to Casablanca, and Moroccans sealed off for them, under heavyguard, the mezzanine level of the hotel. On the day before the conference,King Hassan ordered the Mossad to abandon the site, for fear ofencountering Arab guests. "But immediately after the conference theygave us all the necessary information and did not keep anything from us,"Rafi Eitan said.

This information was of great importance: It offered a glimpse into themindset of Israel's biggest enemies. At the same meeting, it later emerged,commanders of the Arab armies reported that their forces were notprepared for a new war against Israel. This information was one of theelements that led to the surprise attack in June 1967 - and theoverwhelming Israeli victory in the Six-Day War.

One of the accounts relaying the "Bava Batra" affair states that "thissensational material was one of the highlights of the achievements ofIsraeli intelligence since its foundation."But in the intelligence world there are no free gifts, and soon after itbecame clear that the Moroccans wanted the debt for the informationrepaid as soon as possible. The target was none other than the king'ssworn enemy: opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka.

In Israeli intelligence codes, he is usually denoted by the letters "BB".Hence the nickname given by Levi Eshkol, who liked to quote religioussources: "Bava Batra" - the Talmudic tractate on legal responsibilities.

Given the damage that this affair was about to cause - it was the perfectname.

Chapter 2: Kill Mehdi

Mehdi Ben Barka was an influential leader in Morocco and the Arab world.As a leftist, he backed the revolution and the fight against colonialism, andwas one of the fiercest opponents of King Hassan II. At the beginning ofthe 60s, he was exiled from Morocco, and later sentenced to death inabsentia. After his exile, Oufkir and Dalimi tried to locate him, but BenBarka was careful to conceal his location, moving from place to place usingpseudonyms. Oufkir and Dalimi decided to contact Morocco's new friend,

Israel, and ask it to help locate the king's enemy.

"The request to help them get rid of the object, for them, sounded natural,"then-Mossad chief Meir Amit later recalled in an interview with us. "Youhave to remember their value system is completely different from ours. Wefaced a dilemma: either help and get drawn in - or refuse and endanger thenational achievements of the highest order. The decision was clear andunequivocal: to be true to our principles and not get involved in helpingdirectly, but to incorporate it into our joint activities with them ... And sowe acted responsibly and did not cross the line we had set for ourselves.Everything was smooth and untainted."

The first task for the Mossad was to search for the man the Moroccans hadhad trouble finding. From information that reached the Mossad it wasdiscovered that Ben Barka had a subscription to foreign magazines,including the British Jewish weekly, "The Jewish Observer".

As he moved around the world, Ben Barka used a kiosk in Geneva as hispostal address, and occasionally used to visit the place to pick up the mailthat had accumulated there for him. The Mossad gave the kiosk address toDalimi. All that was remained for the Moroccan agents was to observe thekiosk 24 hours a day, for two weeks, until their target appeared.

But for the Moroccans, Israel's debt had not yet been paid. On October 1,1965, they requested Mossad agents in Paris to rent them a hiding placeand provide them with camouflage, makeup and fake passports. Inaddition, they wanted Israel to follow their target for them and advisethem on how best to send Ben Barka to meet his maker.

According to the protocol of the meetings between Amit and Eshkol, onlyon October 4 did Amit report to the prime minister about the Mossad'sinvolvement. To sweeten the pill of what he was about to tell Eshkol, Amitbegan with good news, describing the valuable intelligence gathered by theMossad at the summit in Casablanca. "I want to show you the informationabout the debates," Amit told Eshkol, and said that intelligence indicatedthat at that time, the armies of the Arab countries were not ready for waragainst Israel.

Then came the less good tidings: "What do they want?" Eshkol asked. Amitcontinued: "A very simple thing: Deliver Mehdi Ben Barka. We found himin Paris and King Hassan gave an order to kill him. They came to us and

said: 'We do not want you to do it, but help us.'

"Ultimately, we agreed not to give direct assistance to the killers, but tohelp as far as is customary in the context of cooperation betweenintelligence services."

Meir Amit, in a conversation with us, said: "The whole process was broughtto the prime minister. The prime minister was reticent - as someoneinvolved in the dealings of the Mossad he did not jump for joy - but hedefinitely gave consent and did not reject the plan of action."

At this early stage, the Mossad chief considered the possibility of Israel"ducking" on the issue, in other words, buying time in the hopes that theproblem might dissipate on its own. "It could have meant calling 'BavaBatra' to tell him to run away."

In an interview with Amit, we asked: When you told Eshkol that you were"ducking", what did you mean? "To dissolve the issue," said the formerMossad chief, "but it was not under our control."

The Mossad provided five foreign passports, which could be used to carryout the operation undetected. The aim was to provide assistance, but keepa certain distance, so that even if the assassination failed – it would beimpossible to locate the origins of the passports.

The prime minister was uneasy. "It does not smell right me," Eshkol said inYiddish.

Amit: "Nor to me."

Eskhol: "We already agreed once that enough is enough."

Amit: "I will not take a single step without notifying you ... The problem ishow I get out of it, not how I got into it. The Moroccans cannot do it, it'snot simple ... I wanted you to know that ... On the other hand, there is nodoubt that we also cannot show that we are evading ..."

At the meeting, Amit repeats the fundamental statement that in hisopinion, if Israel is involved in any type of assassination, it should be doneby the Mossad and not foreign agents. "I told our guys clearly: Don’t do it.But if we do it, it should be Hebrew labor (i.e. perfect craftsmanship). Ahalf-hearted approach will not work. And then the conclusion reached wasnot to do it."

Four days went by. On October 8, Amit told Eshkol: "So far, all is well. Weare able to hold on. We are 'ducking' the issue."

But the Moroccans had no intention of "ducking" the issue. On October12, Dalimi asked Israel for fake car license plates and a poisonous solution.Israel rejected the request for the license plates and suggested the use of

rented cars, for which it would provide fake documentation. Dalmi also

informed Israel that Oufkir had decided to postpone the operation untilthe end of October, but did not specify an exact date.

On October 13, 1965, Dalimi left France to return to Morocco, and Amittook this as a sign that the entire operation had been scrapped. "ThankGod, they gave up on it," he told Eshkol on the same day.

On October 25, Amit went to Rabat for a routine hearing, during which hetried to continue "ducking the issue" and gently suggested that theMoroccans postpone the assassination for a few months, "so theirpreparations would be more perfect." But Dalimi surprised him with theannouncement that the operation "is already ongoing". Amit, facing a faitaccompli, realized that they could no longer dally - and had to enlistMossad aid for the operation.

What was the purpose of the operation for the Moroccans? It dependswho you ask. According to the research of Dr. Yigal Ben-Nun, a historianwho has for many years studied the relationship between Israel andMorocco, the aim was to kidnap Ben Barka and then let him choosebetween two options: Become education minister in the government ofKing Hassan (i.e., recognition of the King's rule) or go on public trial fortreason. Other evidence shows the intent all along was to end his life.

Chapter 3: Body in the woods

Two days later, Dalimi set out on a flight to Paris to oversee the operation.According to Dr. Ben-Nun's research, a Mossad agent was waiting forDalimi at the airport. They left the airport quickly and separately, andagreed to meet later, for reasons of caution, at Fort-de-Saint-Cloud, wherethey walked past cafes and talked for about ten minutes, while an

operational unit from Mossad guarded them.

Incidentally, a member of the squad was a cousin of Meir Amit - Ze'evAmit - who was killed later in the Yom Kippur War and was known as oneof two heroes of the song "We're both from the same village" by NaomiShemer. It was agreed at the meeting that an Israeli representative would,during the time of the operation, wait next to the phone in the Mossad'soperations apartment in the event any problems arose.

The Moroccans, accompanied by mercenaries from French intelligence andlocal police, were waiting for the arrival of Ben Barka in the City of Lights.Indeed, on the morning of October 29, Ben Barka arrived from Geneva,equipped with an Algerian diplomatic passport.

Ben Barka rushed to Brasserie Lipp, a known meeting place on the banksof the Seine, where he was to dine with a French journalist. He did notknow that the journalist was bait set by the Moroccan intelligence to lurehim into a trap. According to Dr. Ben-Nun's research, this was theMossad's idea.

At a bend in the road before the restaurant, two French policeman - boththe mercenaries in the pay of Dalimi – asked him to accompany them. Astunned Ben Barka was quickly led to a rented apartment in a suburbsouth of Paris, where Dalimi began to severely torture him.

On November 1, when Ben-Barka was still alive, Dalimi asked the Mossadin Paris to provide by the end of November 2 a toxin and two more foreignpassports, shovels and "something to disguise the traces."

Previously, there were different versions of what happened then: someargued that the station chief Rafi Eitan cabled Meir Amit a request forinstructions, but before a decision could be made on whether to provide orrefuse the poison, the issue became irrelevant. Others argued that theMossad complied with the request and the poison arrived in Paris, but itwas no longer necessary.

Either way, in an apartment in Paris, Dalimi and some of his aidestortured Ben Barka, competing to see who would be more vicious. Whatbegan with cigarette burns, became electric shocks and ended withrepeatedly forcing the victim into a tub of stagnant water, with Ben-Barkaon his knees.

Dalimi had not intended to kill Ben Barka, at least not at that stage, butonly gather information about the underground and force him to sign aconfession stating that he had intended to overthrow the king.

The late Mossad agent Eliezer Sharon replayed to us before his passingwhat he had heard from the Moroccans after the fact: "They filled abathtub with water. Dalimi grabbed his head and wanted him to revealinformation. Every time Ben-Barka stuck his head out of the water, hespat and cursed the king. They held his head in the water a little too long,until he turned completely blue."

David Shomron, who was at that time the head of the Mossad delegationin Morocco, later heard the details about what happened in thatapartment from Dalimi himself. "He died in the apartment. They weretorturing him in their own way: Dipping his head in a bathtub filled with

Sign outside of Brasserie Lipp where Barka waskidnapped reads "Ben Barka was kidnapped here."

water, and checking his tailbone. When it (the tailbone) began to stiffen,they took his head out. What happened is that they skipped the test, andwhen they did check, it was too late."

When Ben Barka did not wake up after the last submersion, theMoroccans panicked: What would they do with the body of a known Arableader in Paris? "When he died," recalled Eliezer Sharon, "the Moroccanswet their pants."

As mentioned, the Mossad had rented a Paris apartment for itsoperations. According to Ben-Nun, a number of people arrived at the Parisapartment with two cars of bodyguards. The Mossad was not prepared forthe situation created by Ben Barka's death, and had to wait until theymade contact with more agents from other Mossad locations in Europe.

The group climbed the stairs to the apartment, went into the bathroom,wrapped the body and put it in the trunk of the car.Members of the group recalled that there was a forest in the immediatevicinity used for family picnics, and decided to leave the body of Ben Barkathere. They drove towards the Saint-Germain forest. They reached it atnight, accompanied by guards, dug a deep hole in the ground and buriedthe body, after which they scattered chemical powder all over the area,which was designed to consume the body and is particularly active incontact with water. Fortunately for the diggers, heavy rain fell almostimmediately, so there is probably not much left of Ben Barka.

Three years later a road was paved at that spot. Ben Barka, it is argued, isburied under one of the traffic islands there.

The Mossad provided Oufkir, Dalimi and other Moroccan agents forgedpassports to leave the country. They feared that if their official passportsshowed that they left France shortly after the disappearance, they wouldface a storm from the opposition.

They were right.

Chapter 4: Isser's bomb

The French team who participated in the operation very quickly leaked tothose close to then-French president Charles de Gaulle that the Moroccansecurity services had abducted and murdered the political leader in theheart of Paris. The French president reacted furiously: He fired a large partof the leaders of his country's intelligence services, dismantled theexternal intelligence service (the SDECE, the Mossad counterpart) anddemanded that King Hassan hand over Oufkir and Dalimi. When the king

refused, de Gaulle severed diplomatic relations with Morocco.

A French police investigation led to indictments against 13 people,including Oufkir, Dalimi and the journalist who lured Ben Barka to themeeting. Most of the defendants did not appear for trial, finding refuge in

Morocco. The fallout from the operation has lasted to this day, 50 yearslater, when there is still a dark shadow on France-Morocco relations.

And Israel? The few who knew of the Mossad's involvement in the affair atfirst thought that the storm had passed them by. The Mossad had offered"minimal technical assistance", according to a telegram sent to Amit. OnNovember 5, Amit told Eshkol: "The Moroccans killed Ben Barka. Israelhad no physical connection to the act itself".

The report Amit gave Eshkol was accurate, if one only looks at whosehands actually killed Ben Barka. It is a partial description, or at leastevasive, when one considers the entire incident. However, at the sametime, Amit believed the affair was behind them.

In his summary he wrote: "The situation is satisfactory ... If mistakes weremade here and there, (they) were not due to inattention, but because therewas no way to predict what would happen. The people in the field, whoworked under the pressure of time and in the most difficult circumstances,made some mistakes, and I take all the responsibility upon myself. Despitethe errors, we are still within the security boundaries we set ourselves ..."

On November 25, 1965 Amit told Eshkol: "Everything is fine."

Amit had forgotten that troubles did not always come from outside.Sometimes they erupt internally.

This is where Isser Harel came in.

Harel, known as the "father of Israeli intelligence", was convinced by Ben-Gurion to take on the role of intelligence consultant to prime ministerEshkol. Many argue that at this stage Harel was bitter and looking for anopportunity to show that his successor at the Mossad – Meir Amit – wasnot worthy of stepping into his shoes. And what better opportunity couldhe have than the well-publicized case in Europe?

Isser Harel.Photo by: Photo: David Rubinger

When Harel heard of the Mossad involvement in the affair, he turned toprime minister Eshkol. Before his death, Harel described the conversationto us: "I told him (Eshkol): 'God sent me to protect you and you becameterribly entangled. Amit lied to you all along. You told him not to get

involved, and he was involved. Your situation is very grave. You had aconsultant on this issue and you didn’t consult him. And it heightens yourown responsibility, and now you have to resign.'

"Eshkol really begged for his life," Harel recounted. "I told him, in myopinion, you should appoint an inquiry commission and see who isresponsible for this failure, and the findings of the investigation willdecide whether you continue as prime minister. And as for Amit, youshould know that he did not tell you the truth. You had an advisor and didnot use him. Eshkol almost started crying ..."

Meir Amit, in a conversation with us, said: "As soon as he (Harel) tookoffice, he began to undermine and to prove that his replacement wasinexperienced and irresponsible, and actually operated by foul means,taking advantage of his past connection to the Mossad... When hediscovered the affair in question, he leapt on it like a treasure, and decidedthat it was the way to achieve his desired goal: to eliminate his detestedsuccessor."

The late Adi Yaffa, the head of Eshkol's bureau, recounted to us in aninterview: "Harel turned to Eshkol and said: Either you fire the head of theMossad, or you must resign yourself. Eshkol replied that until the crimewas revealed, he would not get fire anyone. An error can be corrected."

Amit: "Blind hatred drove him (Harel), and he knew no boundaries. In facthe was the one who leaked the grave version out, and spoke of itindiscriminately to anyone who crossed his path. And all this in order toavenge even Eshkol, who did not agree to heed his advice."

On the one hand, Isser Harel; on the other, Amit and Eshkol. The firebegan to spread in the corridors of the government, the big secret waswhispered by word of mouth, and soon it developed into a massiveinternal conflict, the likes of which had not been seen since the Lavonaffair.

Harel demanded and received from Eshkol the documents on the "BavaBatra" affair, and sat down to write a serious report about it. In a letterattached to the document, Harel wrote to the prime minister: "As Iinformed you already orally, the Mossad, and through it the state, wereengaged in various actions connected to a political assassination, in whichIsrael not only had no interest, but should not have, I believe, from amoral, public and international perspective, been involved in at all."

Regarding Amit he wrote that, "he has seriously exceeded his powers ... heused bad judgment ... his report was partial, incomplete and misleading; tothis day he has not reported the role of the Mossad. In light of all this, Iexpressed my opinion to you and to the justice minister, that it isnecessary to conduct an urgent and thorough investigation of the affair,and immediately propose the establishment of a commission of inquiry."

The entanglement caused in this case was a very serious issue. In additionto Israel's involvement in the matter, no consideration was given to thedanger of illegally aiding the Moroccans to carry out a criminal act onFrench soil, which harmed the laws and sovereignty of France and causedserious risk to its relations with Israel.

Years later, when we asked Meir Amit about the extreme accusationshurled at him by Harel, he said: "No action was taken that endangered orimplicated Israel. The matter was leaked by Isser Harel, who behaved witha lack of national responsibility out of personal interests of burningjealousy. He was not driven by concern, but by unbridled vengeance."

Chapter 5: The wars of the Jews

The storm around the affair gave rise to a number of committees andsecret forums set up to investigate the chain of events.

One of them, in an unprecedented way, comprised a group of seniorofficials from Mapai (the Israeli Labor party's forerunner), who declaredthemselves a committee and supported Harel. The late MordechaiNessyahu, a senior Mapai MK, recounted to us in the past: "Isser gavethem (the committee members) his conclusions. He concluded that Israelshould never have entered into it (the operation). It was an error ofjudgment by Eshkol. The entanglement was the responsibility of Amit,and, contrary to his promise, there were complications.

"The committee unanimously concluded that Amit had to go. We alsomade the recommendation that Isser go to de Gaulle and tell him, lest theaffair was discovered and caused us trouble, but Israel drew its ownconclusions and those responsible are now gone."

Isser said: "The sooner the conclusions are made about Amit the better –we save Eshkol, as the prime minister is responsible for the field." Theupper echelon was with Isser the entire time, but did not persuade Eshkolto dismiss Amit, as Amit threatened not to go quietly and to take Eshkoldown with him.

Several senior Mapai members turned to Golda Meir. "She kneweverything," recalled Nessyahu. "She agreed with the political and moralseverity of the matter, and that Amit would have to go ... we said Amit didnot interest us. We did not deal with civil servants, but with the politicalresponsibilities of the prime minister. No conclusions were drawn... wetold her, 'we have to draw conclusions with respect to Eshkol'."

Golda: "Who?"

Us: "You"

Her: "I will topple Eshkol, and take his place? I would rather throw myselfinto the sea and will not do it."

But the rumors ran not only among members of Mapai. An externalcommittee was also established to examine the events in Paris. Itsmembers included former chief of staff Yigael Yadin and Ze'ev Scharf, whowould be appointed minister in the future.

The external committee determined that in several instances Eshkol wasnot briefed by Amit or received late updates.

For example, the committee wrote: "The meeting with Albert (Dalimi'snickname) on October 25 (in Morocco). At this meeting Albert announcedthat he had his own process (the operation to abduct and eliminate BenBarka) that should yield results by the end of the month. At this stage, heonly needed technical support. Shah (Rafi Eitan's nickname) also asked forthese measures and was promised them. When we asked the head of theMossad about this promise, that had not received prior approval, heexplained that he acted according to standard procedure. Incidentally,these measures were not used and were returned. There is no record thatthe prime minister received a report about this meeting."

However, the external committee determined that Eshkol had actuallyapproved Mossad's involvement in the affair, and that the actions of thetwo were fundamentally correct, and there was certainly no reason to oustthe head of the Mossad or the prime minister.

Harel did not like these conclusions. "When I read the conclusions of thecommittee," he said during a conversation we had, "I told Eshkol: 'Do younot know that Amit is deceiving you and you have to quit?' However, I alsotold Eshkol: 'You have a way out. Say that you will set up a commission ofinquiry. Without it you will have to resign.'"

From the perspective of Harel - a virtuous person in Israel's history - itwas a serious incident, which must not be ignored. He launched an all-outwar, in which he implied that "the echoes of the affair will come to theattention of the public and the entire party (Mapai) will be tainted withthe shame."

A senior operational agent in Military Intelligence, who was neverinterviewed by the media, recalled that the threat to Eshkol's rule was sogreat at the time, that a very senior IDF officer entered Amit's office at theMossad headquarters, laid a gun on his desk and said that Amit should"end the affair in a manner expected of an officer." Amit, according to thisstory, "did not get the hint" and returned the gun to its owner. A senioroperations officer said that he had heard the story from the officer who

laid the gun on the table and that he believed him, but was not actuallywitness to this terrible moment. We found no additional references to this

particular story.

Either way, it is clear that these were hard times for the head of theMossad, who he found himself up to his neck in the assassination andsubsequent efforts to cover it up. When we asked him, Amit, who used toelaborate greatly about his feelings, summed it up thusly: "I felt pressuredand frustrated."

Chapter 6: Returning fire

At a certain point, when Harel's harsh attacks did not subside, Eshkol andAmit decided to fight back in similar fashion – using a secret affair thatcould cast a shadow on Harel. Amit recalled that his close associates toldhim: "He (Harel) will not drop the subject of his own accord ... unless it ishinted to him that in his past there is enough material to undermine hisclaim that he is 'the moral guardian' of the Mossad."

And there was "enough material". They were referring to a case, firstdisclosed by Yedioth Ahronoth in 2006, which can be summed up asfollows: In 1954, a single joint envoy for the Mossad and the Shin Betsecurity service set out to France. The goal was to kidnap an IDF officersuspected of trying to sell secret documents in France and return him toIsrael for a trial. Somehow, the kidnapped man died en route to Israel,and, on Harel's orders, his body was dumped at sea. Harel also gave theorder to bury the documentation of the affair and to never discuss thematter again.

But there was one man who whispered the details of the affair into Amit'sear, when he replaced Harel. When Harel's pressure on Amit to resigngrew, Amit recalled that he too had a card up his sleeve.

Amit demanded the file on the kidnapping and passed it to the personacting on behalf of Eshkol in the affair. That person summoned Harel for ameeting.

"What do you think would happen if the echoes of this affair caught theattention of the public?" the man asked Harel. "Isser, do you not think thatsuch a serious matter certainly requires a thorough examination andintense investigation? Of course we will keep the story quiet, but we arenot the only ones who know it, and it's truly outrageous, the things thatcome to the attention of journalists these days."

Harel angrily told the man, and until his death maintained, that this wasan error he regretted.

"I was the one who demanded a thorough investigation at the time," Hareltold man, and repeated this in a conversation with us, 30 years later. Onthe other hand, Harel understood all too well what would happen to him

and his reputation if he continued to pursue his interest in Ben Barka.Shortly afterwards, he resigned as intelligence advisor to the primeminister.

Isser Harel has a completely different version of the circumstances of hisresignation, and claimed that it was in response to the conclusions of thecommittee of inquiry on the Ben Barka affair.

"They agreed that I was right," he said. "They told me Amit must beremoved, but he will not go without Eshkol. And Eshkol could not be fired,because that would be a victory for Ben-Gurion. I rejected this - and Iquit."

Meir Amit is unconvinced: "Harel did not resign for reasons of conscienceover the incident in question," he told us, "but because it was implied thatif he continued to stir the pot, there was a serious risk for himself, as hehad been involved in questionable incidents, and his 'righteousness' would

be destroyed ... He resigned when we put the file on the murder of Jews onthe table."

Military censorship imposed a media blackout on the Ben Barka affair, andin December 1966, the editor of the pornographic magazine "Bull" wasarrested and imprisoned for trying to publish the little he knew about theaffair. But in France - despite the fact that books have been written,movies made and documents revealed about the affair - it is repeatedlyrevisited every few years; a wound that cannot heal.

In 1973, Oufkir was shot dead with one bullet, either by suicide ormurder, after being exposed as part of a conspiracy against the king.According to one version of events, he died in a gunfight that broke outbetween him and Dalimi. The latter was that he was killed in 1982 in a caraccident, which, according to assessments, had been staged.

French intelligence suspected at the time that Israel was involved in thecase, but had no conclusive evidence and made no great efforts to find itdue to its support for Israel. But when the IDF launched its surprise attackon Israel's neighbors in June 1967, de Gaulle responded sharply andordered an absolute arms embargo.

In an extreme speech he delivered in November of that year to the Frenchparliament, de Gaulle said the Jews were “at all times an elite people, sureof themselves and dominating.” Two days later, he ordered the expulsionof Mossad's representatives in France and the closure of the organization'sheadquarters.

It was the first time that the Mossad had been thrown out because of anassassination from the French capital - and it was not the last.