How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
Transcript of How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
Steven L. Grover • Marcus C. Hasel
Received: 20 April 2013 / Accepted: 9 March 2014
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract The leader integrity literature has described
how professional behavior influences perceptions of
integrity, yet behavior in leaders’ personal lives potentially
affects those perceptions. The present paper examined how
personal life behavior affects leaders. We assessed high
profile political sex scandals to explore the research ques-
tions of how indiscretions in personal life affect leaders and
how leaders recover from public revelations of sexual
indiscretions. The results revealed that whether politicians
survived the scandal depended on (a) the degree to which
the indiscretion deviated from accepted norms, (b) the
degree to which the behavior departed from the politician’s
expressed values, (c) the leader’s political power (or
value), and (d) whether the leader fully engaged in atone-
ment under conditions when denying the allegations is not
possible. These components were inter-related such that
atonement was possible if the behavior was neither too
extreme nor out of character and the leader had sufficient
political power. The model was then tested with a sample
of business executives engaged in sex scandals, finding
support for its elements.
Keywords Leadership integrity � Trust recovery �Reputation � Sexual indiscretion � Scandal
Sex scandals of various forms have occurred throughout
history. For example, Alexander Hamilton tarnished his
political career in 1796 with an extra-marital affair and
Stephen Grover Cleveland paid child support to Maria
Crofts Halpin for a child born out of wedlock when he was
a bachelor, and he was elected twice to the U.S. presidency
despite this public knowledge (Summers 2000). In 2005,
Volkswagen executives engaged in sex parties with pros-
titutes in countries from Brazil to Germany, renting
apartments to host these parties with corporate funds
(‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012; Ozgenc, 4 June
2007). Among those senior managers was Peter Hartz, who
acted as Director of Human Resources at Volkswagen and
was also strongly connected to powerful politicians, even
acting as the name-sake for the Hartz 4 law that substan-
tially altered the German working world. Hartz resigned
following the scandal, and received a 2-year probation for
his involvement (‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012).
The present paper explores factors that determine why
some leaders successfully continue in their careers and
others see their careers whither following sex scandals.
Leader Integrity
The impact of sex scandals on leaders is an important issue
for leader integrity. Leader integrity theorists have long
suggested that behavior outside of the formal leadership
role affects reputation in the form of leadership integrity
perceptions by followers and others (Bass and Steidlmeier
1999; Trevino et al. 2000, 2003). Leader integrity research,
however, has focused on work-related behavior, in-role
behavior, and relatively little has investigated how behav-
ior outside of work, extra-role behavior, relates to integrity
(Brown et al. 2005; Grover and Moorman 2007; Kalshoven
et al. 2011; Mayer et al. 2012). Moorman et al. (2012) have
shown that people make assessments of leaders as a holistic
S. L. Grover (&)
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
e-mail: [email protected]
M. C. Hasel
EMLyon, Lyon, France
e-mail: [email protected]
123
J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2146-3
interpretation and therefore consider how behavior outside
of work affects perceptions of integrity, even if such
behavior has little practical standing in the workplace.
Furthermore, Bauman (2013) theorizes leader integrity as a
fundamentally moral concept represented by leaders’
commitment to moral values. Therefore, leaders may be
viewed as unethical to the extent that their behavior devi-
ates from the moral understanding of observers.
Leadership integrity has garnered a great deal of atten-
tion in the past decade (Bauman 2013; Dineen et al. 2006;
Kalshoven et al. 2012; Moorman et al. 2012, 2013; Pa-
lanski and Yammarino 2007; Simons 2002; Trevino et al.
2003), and is related to positive outcomes, such as
increased follower satisfaction and organizational citizen-
ship behaviors (Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009; Kalsho-
ven et al. 2011; Moorman et al. 2013; Palanski et al., in
press; White and Lean 2007). However, the concept of
leadership integrity is still in its intellectual adolescence,
and Eisenbeiss (2012) notes that the construct is concep-
tually vague. She provides clarity by identifying four ori-
entations of leader integrity: humane, justice, responsibility
and sustainability, and moderation.
The moderation dimension is of particular importance to
sex scandals involving leaders. ‘‘Moderation orientation
refers to temperance and humility and balanced leader
behavior. It may be expressed by leaders’ self-control, their
ability to restrain emotions and personal desires’’ (Eisen-
beiss 2012, p. 797, emphasis in original). The moderation
dimension of leader integrity accounts for why people are
concerned with leader sexual behavior outside of work.
Engaging in extramarital affairs, for example, illustrates an
impulsiveness that is antithetical to restraint or a sense of
balance. The impact becomes particularly fierce when
combined with any conflict of interest invested in the
position, such as misuse of official resources.
Little research has addressed the role of extra-role
behavior in leadership integrity or examined the moral and
moderation components of leader integrity identified in
recent theories (Bauman 2013; Eisenbeiss 2012). The
present paper, therefore, seeks to address this gap in our
understanding of extra-role behavior and leader integrity
by investigating leader sexually oriented behavior. The
present investigation is informed by previous research on
political scandals, ethical perceptions of top leaders, and
responses to wrongdoing such as apologies.
Political Scandals
The role of scandals in political reputation depends on
the type of scandal, particularly pecuniary advantage
versus hedonistic interest. For example, experiments show
that tax evasion, compared to sexual infidelity, has a
more detrimental impact on the likelihood of voting for a
politician and evaluation of how well they are doing
(Funk 1996). Furthermore, both tax evasion and sexual
infidelity are judged much more harshly when they are
associated with an abuse of official power (Doherty et al.
2011). Constituents compartmentalize personal and pro-
fessional integrity factors to some extent, yet personal
matters influence perceptions of leaders, and one of the
reasons for abandonment of political support is a real or
perceived loss of trust in the leader (Maule and Goidel
2003).
Research outcomes of politician integrity indicate mixed
results. Zhu et al. (2012) found that the positive ethical
perceptions of political leaders give constituents greater
confidence in their leaders’ abilities and consequently
make them feel safer, and Maier (2011) found that the
prevalence of political scandals undermines trust and sup-
port in political institutions. However, analyses of over 250
scandals in the U.S. House of Representatives found only a
small impact on the perpetrators’ chance for re-election
(Basinger 2013; Peters and Welch 1980). The small scan-
dal effect could be due to the amount of information
available to constituents: Voters’ opinions are influenced
by scandal when they have a great deal of information
regarding the scandal (Regner and Le Floch 2005), because
scandalous information facilitates processing and recall of
information (Miller 2010).
Ethical Perceptions of Top Leaders
Part of the ambiguity about ethical perceptions of political
leaders is due to followers’ unique perceptual biases of
leaders. People overlook unethical leader behavior when it
is harmful to do otherwise and ignore unethical behavior
whose consequences are ambiguous (Gino et al. 2009).
Moreover, hierarchical distance exacerbates the ambiguity
of ethical perception, and Galperin et al. (2011) suggest
that high status people permit themselves to commit
unethical acts due to their isolation. Chief executives, for
example, are distant in space and experience from most
employees, insulated by chauffeur-driven cars, private
entrances, corporate jets, and leagues of gate-keepers.
However, followers judge high status offenders more
harshly for professionally related malfeasance (Fragale
et al. 2009; Skolnick and Shaw 1994), but they are more
likely to exonerate them of minor personally related vio-
lations (Rosoff 1989) because followers think of their
leaders in very personal terms as opposed to categorical
terms (Fiske 1993). These cognitive biases may be shaped
by extant perceptions of leaders: Negative perceptions of
leaders’ bad acts are mitigated by their inspirational
influence (Shapiro et al. 2011).
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
Leader Response: Apologies and Denials
How leaders respond to allegations of impropriety may
influence their ultimate survival from the scandal (Basford
et al. 2014; Byrne et al. in press). Apologizing is an effective
way to recover from trust violations based on competence—
a mistake, for example—but not for violations based on
integrity, such as doing something one knows to be wrong
(Kim et al. 2004, 2006, 2013). Denying integrity violations is
effective when the issue cannot be verified, because one can
claim innocence of wrongdoing, which will have a positive
effect until one’s guilt can be determined (Kim et al. 2009).
Should guilt be obvious, then providing internal reasons for
the violations helps to restore trust more positively than
external reasons for integrity violations (Kim et al. 2006).
Accordingly, political apologies that focused on moral and
ethical principles effectively changed followers’ perceptions
of politicians, and simply denying wrongdoing was found to
be counterproductive to re-establishing a positive political
image (Chanley et al. 1994).
Fehr and Gelfand (2010) suggest that effective apologies
need to acknowledge rule or norm violations and incor-
porate some type of compensation to re-establish a level of
equilibrium between the parties. This compensation may be
in the form of tangible goods such as money, or it may be
socio-emotional as in showing great levels of gratitude. For
example, Bishop Desmond Tutu argues in the post-Apart-
heid context that if someone has lost something, a simple
apology cannot rectify the situation. Instead, the wrongdoer
needs to return something to recreate the lost equilibrium
(Fehr and Gelfand 2010). The apologies must be sincere,
specific, and involve internal attributions as opposed to
external reasons for the violation (Tomlinson et al. 2004).
Furthermore, statements delivered by third parties may be
key to turning apologies into forgiveness and more effec-
tive than direct apologies from the offending party (Ren
and Gray 2009). The third party, such as a political spon-
sor, provides the illusion of disinterest compared to the
offender whose self-interest is at stake, and therefore can
promote the possibility of promoting the offender as a
positive person.
Atonement goes beyond mere apology. Whereas apol-
ogies restore image, atonement attempts to gain forgive-
ness. Koesten and Rowland’s (2004) theory of atonement
argues that seeking forgiveness requires the following:
1. Acknowledging wrongdoing and willingly and genu-
inely asking for forgiveness;
2. showing that one has thoroughly examined oneself and
the offending act to reveal ‘‘a changed attitude or
policy to prevent future wrongdoing’’ (p. 73);
3. providing evidence that one realizes a need to trans-
form the wrong into a present and future right;
4. publicly showing that he has suffered from his
wrongdoings.
These four phases must be displayed in public confes-
sion characterized by symbolic acts. Koesten and Rowland
(2004) theorize that including these steps projects viewers
toward forgiveness, which in the case of leaders may allow
them to restore reputations and to remain in power.
Scholars have only recently begun to examine the power
of apologies for leader transgression specifically (Basford
et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in press). Basford et al. (2014)
found that sincere apologies positively influenced the fol-
lower relationship and that insincere apologies were worse
than no apology at all. They also discovered that the utility
of the apology depended on the level of extant trust: Fol-
lowers who did not trust the leader in the first place were
not persuaded by the leader apologizing for offenses or
mistakes.
Byrne et al. (in press) found that leader apologies for
transgressions in direct follower relationships resulted in
greater psychological well-being on the part of the fol-
lowers, especially for less severe violations. They were
unable to replicate Kim et al.’s (2004, 2006) finding that
apologies worked better for failures of competence com-
pared to integrity. This may be due to context because Kim
and colleagues follow a recruitment scenario—evaluating a
job applicant—and Byrne and colleagues investigated the
direct leader–follower relationship.
Summary
Prior research provides a springboard to investigate issues
surrounding extra-role leader integrity violations. Leader-
ship integrity research suggests that extra-role behavior
influences global perceptions of leaders, but research has
not investigated this issue and we do not know how extra-
role behaviors affect perceptions of integrity. Prior research
also suggests that leaders are protected in their transgres-
sions due to isolation, but that once found out they can be
judged harshly, and laboratory research suggests that it
may be difficult to recover from the integrity violations.
The factors that affect how extra-role transgressions
affect follower perceptions and recovery from such trans-
gressions have little clarity. Therefore, the mission of this
paper is to explore how leaders respond to and are affected
by their own extra-role ethical transgressions. We examine
sexual transgressions because they are outside the scope of
the job, whereas most leader ethics research examines
issues such as misuse of funds or lying or cheating to gain
business advantage. Because the literature cannot yet guide
us toward the issues that affect leader survival following
sexual misdeeds, we use grounded theory as a complete
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
approach (as opposed to a coding scheme) to guide dis-
covery of key concepts and their inter-relations (Locke
2001; O’Reilly et al. 2012). We explore cases of leaders
involved in sex scandals, working with the information in
an iterative process to identify the key elements of situa-
tional responses and how these key issues are inter-related
in order to develop a theory of leader responses to extra-
role unethical behavior.
We build a framework from nine high profile political
sex scandals and then test the resulting model with six
cases from the business domain. All of these have been
involved in sexual scandals while in powerful offices, yet
some were able to hold on to power through a mixture of
engaging in atonement and using contextual advantages,
while others failed to do so. The central research question,
therefore, asks why and how some leaders succeeded in
remaining in office and continuing as leaders, while others
were forced to step down from their leadership roles.
Method
Recovery following sex scandals among leaders is explored
with a set of cases from politicians involved in scandals.
We identify the politicians, create rich cases from public
information, and then analyze them according to the
characteristics of the situation and the politician’s response.
The details surrounding each case provide a detailed pic-
ture of how politicians respond to sex scandal crises. We
initially focus on politicians because the news media
reports on these issues to a far greater extent than other
sectors, providing a vast amount of data from which to
investigate the details, and there is a wide variety of
examples with different outcomes. Following this theory
creation, we test the theory on a separate sample of busi-
ness leaders.
Grounded Theory
The grounded theory approach is appropriate for our
research problem because little theory or research has yet
examined how ethical violations that lie beyond a leader’s
in-role behaviors, such as sexual activities, relate to
leadership success and tenure (Eisenbeiss 2012; O’Reilly
et al. 2012). The inter-relationships of the various factors
have not been theorized, and it is, therefore, appropriate
to examine episodes in context and to develop theory
about why some leaders successfully navigate non-work
ethical lapses whereas others do not. We followed
Locke’s (2001) grounded theory principles to analyze the
data. The data were initially analyzed to create an
understanding of the underlying dimensions, which turned
out to include characteristics of the politician and how he
was portrayed before the scandal as well as his response
to the scandal. The inter-relationships of these dimensions
were then considered, traveling back and forth between
our ideas and the data, forming the analysis presented
below. The final result conceptualizes the inter-related
factors that influence success and failure following sexual
scandal.
We adopted a contemporary approach to grounded
theory. It is particularly appropriate for this research
question because little is known (a) in general about how
extra-role behavior and leader integrity, (b) specifically
about when that negative extra-role behavior is more or
less impactful, and (c) about the different leader responses.
Our thinking was guided by previous research and theory
on leader integrity, political scandal, and apologies, but
that was inadequate to explain why some leaders failed
whereas others prevailed. Therefore, we approached the
research problem by attending to the four tenets of
grounded theory: the constant comparative method, theo-
retical coding, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation,
and theoretical sensitivity (O’Reilly et al. 2012).
Constant Comparative Method
Using the constant comparative method meant that we
analyzed individual cases thoroughly and discussed the
issues as a team as we completed one case and moved to
the next. This continuous, nonlinear method allowed us to
develop ideas early about why some leaders succeeded
where others failed based on the unique characteristics of
their cases, and, further, this informed how we examined
the cases that followed. We continually revised our ideas
and compared them to the data at hand, both the fresh data
and the data that we had previously analyzed. This method
is the hallmark of grounded theory and allows frameworks
to develop from rich and murky data.
Theoretical coding goes hand in glove with the constant
comparative method. As we developed cases, we coded
events, circumstances and behavior deemed relevant to the
outcomes. We revised these coding schemes as we moved
through the data collection, observing relevant events or
characteristics of the situations that appeared to be
important. We often identified relevant issues in one case
and had to return to previous cases to search for similar
issues in the exploration for patterns.
Theoretical sensitivity refers to not only observing the
data with an open mind, searching for new meanings, but
also considering extant theory and research. Theoretical
sensitivity is a paradoxical issue in grounded theory
because the data are supposed to speak for themselves but
the researchers are informed. One way of resolving this
conundrum is to think of approaching the data with open
minds, not empty minds (Locke 2001).
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
Ta
ble
1C
har
acte
rist
ics
of
po
liti
cian
sam
ple
Nam
eP
osi
tio
nD
ate
Ag
eC
ou
ntr
yA
ctL
egal
Act
?
Res
po
nse
Res
ult
Du
rati
on
of
Cri
sis
Ach
iev
ed
step
of
ato
nem
ent
Bo
b Liv
ing
sto
n
U.S
.C
on
gre
ssm
an1
99
85
5U
.S.A
.P
rev
iou
sE
xtr
amar
ital
affa
irs
No
Res
ign
edL
eft
Offi
ceR
esig
ned
imm
edia
tely
Fir
stst
ep
Eli
ot
Sp
itze
rG
ov
ern
or
of
New
Yo
rkS
tate
20
07
46
U.S
.A.
Use
of
pro
stit
ute
sN
oR
esig
ned
Lef
tO
ffice
10
day
sP
artl
yfi
rst
step
An
tho
ny
Wei
ner
U.S
.C
on
gre
ssm
an2
01
14
6U
.S.A
.S
ent
ind
ecen
tp
ho
tov
ia
Tw
itte
r
Yes
Den
ial,
then
resi
gn
atio
n
Lef
tO
ffice
19
day
sF
irst
step
Dav
idV
itte
rU
.S.
Sen
ato
r2
00
74
6U
.S.A
.P
rev
iou
su
seo
fp
rost
itu
tes
Yes
Ad
mit
ted
,
Ask
ed
forg
iven
ess
Sta
yed
inO
ffice
11
day
sA
llst
eps
of
ato
nem
ent
Ch
rist
ian
vo
n
Beo
ttic
her
Hea
do
fC
hri
stia
n
Dem
ocr
atU
nio
nin
Sch
lesw
ig–
Ho
lste
in
20
12
42
Ger
man
yA
ffai
rw
ith
16
-yea
ro
ld
gir
l
Yes
Res
ign
edu
nd
er
par
typ
ress
ure
Lef
tO
ffice
4M
on
ths
Fir
stst
ep
Sil
vio
Ber
lusc
on
i
Pri
me
Min
iste
r2
00
9–
20
11
73
Ital
yP
rost
itu
tes,
sex
par
ties
,
Leg
alin
terv
enti
on
for
on
eo
fth
ep
arti
cip
ants
Yes an
d
No
Den
ial
of
wro
ng
do
ing
Lef
to
ffice
for
oth
er
reas
on
s
4y
ears
(on
go
ing
app
eals
)
No
step
s
Kat
sav
Pre
sid
ent
20
06
–2
01
06
1Is
rael
Acc
use
do
fse
xu
al
har
assm
ent
and
rap
e
No
Den
ies
the
alle
gat
ion
s
rep
eate
dly
Imp
riso
ned
for
7y
ears
;
mai
nta
ins
his
inn
oce
nce
4y
ears
No
step
s
Do
min
ic
Str
aus-
Kah
n
Dir
ecto
ro
f
Inte
rnat
ion
al
Mo
net
ary
Fu
nd
20
07
,
20
11
,
20
12
58
Fre
nch
Nat
ion
al,
rap
eca
se
inU
.S.
Acc
use
do
fra
pe
No
Den
ial
(‘‘s
om
eth
ing
may
hav
e
hap
pen
ed’’
)
Res
ign
edfr
om
IMF
;
lost
chan
ceto
run
for
Fre
nch
Pre
sid
ency
Sti
llo
ng
oin
g,
bu
tre
sig
ned
as
hea
do
fIM
F
Fir
stst
ep
and
par
tly
seco
nd
step
Bil
lC
lin
ton
U.S
.P
resi
den
t1
99
85
2U
.S.
Aff
air
wit
hM
on
ica
Lew
insk
y
Yes
Den
ial
atfi
rst,
then
pu
bli
c
apo
log
y
Sta
yed
inO
ffice
1y
ear
All
step
so
f
ato
nem
ent
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
Theoretical Sampling
Our sampling strategy began by identifying high profile
scandals, the response, and the outcome. We chose highly
publicized cases that collectively had a variety of responses
to the allegations and had various outcomes that captured
the issues of interest: apology versus denial, success versus
failure, legal versus illegal activities. We examined cases
internationally, at least on both sides of the Atlantic, to
consider cultural differences in attitudes toward leadership,
power, sex, and privacy. Leaders at this level of power tend
to be at the later stages of their careers; as such it is not
surprising that the average age at the time of the incident
was 54.4 with the youngest von Boetticher at 42 and the
oldest Berlusconi at 73. All leaders were male and from
Western countries including the USA, UK, Germany,
France, Italy, and Israel. The resulting list of cases and
summary details are shown in Table 1.
Theoretical Saturation
We started with a core sample of five cases and then built
on that sample for greater variation. As this complete
sample was processed and analyzed, we achieved theoret-
ical saturation, gaining no further insight, instead merely
applying ideas that we developed with earlier cases, and
therefore we stopped expanding the sample. Having
developed a model, and then becoming aware of cases of
well-known business leaders in similar situations, we tested
the model against these well-known cases of business
leaders.
Data Collection and Analysis Technique
In-depth news analyses were conducted for each case,
concentrating on respected news outlets such as The New
York Times and The Washington Post for American cases,
the Jerusalem Post for the Israeli case, and Der Spiegel,
The Guardian, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Le
Figaro for the European cases. Key news articles, televised
news conferences, and other visual media where were
assembled for each case.
The researchers took this raw data and produced three
key documents for analysis. First, the key articles were
assembled in chronological order. Second, we wrote
detailed cases that include details about the politician, such
Table 2 Summary of individual stories of politicians analyzed
Bob Livingston was Republican U.S. Congressman who resigned during debate over whether to impeach Bill Clinton over Lewinksy affair. It
had been revealed to him that Hustler magazine was targeting him as a conservative Republican politician and intended to reveal that he had
previously engaged in extramarital affairs. In his resignation, he pleaded for the President to follow suit.
Eliot Spitzer resigned as Governor of the State of New York when it appeared that information had leaked about his use of very high-priced
prostitutes. He had been elected on a platform of ethics with a call to clean up the ethics of the State legislature. He had a reputation as the
‘‘sheriff of Wall Street’’ for his unrelenting attacks on the Financial industry during his reign as the Attorney General of New York.
Anthony Weiner resigned as a U.S. Congressman following the public revelation that he had sent an indecent photo of himself to all his
Twitter followers, intending to send it to only one woman. He received little support from his Democratic Party and vigorously denied the
allegations before finally admitting them and resigning 19 days later.
David Vitter stayed in office as U.S. Senator after it was revealed that he had a history of using prostitutes. When he discovered that a
magazine was going to publish information about his prior use of prostitutes he held a press conference at which he admitted the allegations,
offered a strong apology with all the elements of atonement supported by a statement from his wife.
Christian von Beotticher was a rising star in Germany’s ruling party, slated to run for state governor in Schleswig–Holstein. He resigned
under party pressure when it was discovered that he had an affair with a 16-year old girl.
Silvio Berlusconi was Italy’s Premier and became mired in a controversy over inviting underage prostitutes to sex parties labeled ‘‘Bunga-
bunga’’ parties. It particularly came to light when he offered legal intervention for a girl commonly known as ‘‘Ruby’’ who was arrested and
called him for help. She had been one of the participants at the parties. He was able to stay in office despite these allegations and later
resigned from office as part of a European Union financial rescue of Italy. He was later charged and convicted of paying for sex with a minor
and using his official position to cover it up. These convictions are under appeal at the time of writing.
Dominic Strauss-Kahn (DSK) was the Director of the International Monetary fund and was likely to run for the Presidency of France when
he was arrested and charged with the rape by a chambermaid in New York City. He was forced to resign from the IMF. The charges were
later dropped due to the victim’s credibility, and as he returned to France multiple women made accusations of sexual harassment.
Bill Clinton was the president of the United States of America when he was accused of having an affair with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky. He at first vigorously denied the charges, only to admit that they were true and apologize to the Nation several months later. His
first apology was widely called a non-apology and he subsequently gave a thorough atonement speech in which he took responsibility for his
actions, admitted weakness, and demonstrated that he was attempting to improve himself.
Moshe Katsav was the President of Israel when he was accused of sexual harassment and rape. He completed his term as president, in which
he could not be prosecuted, and then following that was convicted of rape and sentenced to seven years in prison. He maintains his
innocence and charges that the allegations were politically motivated; he even rejected a plea bargain at one point that would have had
nearly no penalty. He is in prison at the time of this writing.
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
as background and political history, the nature of the
allegation, the manner in which it became public, the
politician’s initial response and its timeliness, and sub-
sequent iterations. These cases summarize the news articles
without the repetition to provide a detached view of how
the case unfolded and how the politician behaved at various
points. Researchers worked on just one case at a time and
were fully immersed in not only the news data collected,
but also the extraneous information that they may have
come upon in the pursuit of those articles, such as blogs
and opinions in local newspapers (to the politician). Lastly,
a timeline was created for each case that shows the key
points of the case.
Nine cases were analyzed and their stories are summa-
rized in Table 2. Three politicians continued in office fol-
lowing the scandal: Bill Clinton, David Vitter, and Silvio
Berlusconi.1 Five of the politicians resigned almost
immediately upon public disclosure of allegations of sexual
wrongdoing, and the final politician, Moshe Katsav, was
tried and convicted of rape following the natural expiration
of his term as Israel’s president.
Results
Analyses produced a model of outcomes following sexual
transgressions illustrated in Fig. 1. Four hierarchical layers
of factors determined continuation in office following
sexual integrity violations: deviation from norms, leader
values, political power, and atonement. The model is
hierarchical in the sense that failure at lower levels pre-
cludes an effect of higher levels. For example, if deviation
from norms is too large (first level), then the other three
factors are irrelevant. Alternatively, if the deviation from
norms is not too large, the deviation from the leader’s
values is not too large, and the leader has sufficient polit-
ical power, then atonement is a possibility that could result
in redemption. The following sections provide detailed
descriptions of the four layers.
Deviation from Norms
Some wrongdoing can be dismissed or forgiven as normal
lapses of human conscience, whereas other wrongdoing is
so severe that it deserves punishment because it is entirely
unacceptable. The ethicality of sexual wrongdoing could be
conceptualized as the degree of harm it causes in a con-
sequentialist approach or its divergence from accepted
norms in a deontological approach. At the most, illegal and
socially reprehensible are allegations of rape made against
Katsav and Strauss-Kahn. There is no possible recovery
from such serious offenses, which have stiff criminal
penalties, because they are socially repugnant as exempli-
fied by prison sentences ranging from 3 years in lenient
jurisdictions to life in parts of the USA. Conversely,
Western societies conceptualize prostitution as signifi-
cantly less severe than rape as demonstrated by its legality
in some places, and misdemeanor status in others, and the
infrequency with which prostitutes’ customers are
prosecuted.2
Boetticher, Clinton, and Weiner did nothing illegal, yet
only Clinton was able to survive politically. The various
acts that they committed were perceived as a lack of good
judgment because they failed to see how people might
perceive them as losing moral direction. These legal acts
are unacceptable for people in those positions in society.
Both Weiner and Boetticher used relatively new technol-
ogies such as Twitter, and Weiner masqueraded as a single
man when he was in fact married, and Boetticher devel-
oped a relationship with a 16-year old girl, factors that push
the behavior outside the normal boundaries of acceptable
behavior.
Fig. 1 Hierarchical model of leader responses to extra-role sexual
behavior
1 Silvio Berlusconi resigned as Premiere as part of European Union
bailout of Italy in 2011 and then was found guilty of charges
concerning the case in question in 2013.
2 Strafgesetzbuch §§ 80–358, Statutory State Law Alabama §§ 13A-
6-61.
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
Boetticher was forced to resign within a month of his
political superiors’ discovering his affair because it
appeared immature and impulsive. Even though the rela-
tionship constituted legal consent in Germany, observer
perceptions differed: ‘‘If he truly assumed that this rela-
tionship could survive his political ascent, he was too naive
for any post’’ (Weigand 2011, August 16). The deviation of
the act was, therefore, viewed in the context of cultural
expectations for a person in a leadership position. In cases
where the deviation from norms is not too extreme, the
personal values of the leader come into play as described in
the following section.
Leaders’ Personal Values
Congruence with espoused values affected outcomes. In
some instances, the behavior is consistent with a public
persona, whereas other times it screams hypocrisy. Politi-
cians such as Clinton, Berlusconi, and Strauss-Kahn had
public reputations as larger than life, charismatic, and
sometimes outrageous characters. For example, Clinton
was called the rock star president when first elected due to
his youthful, contemporary image and his engaging, char-
ismatic presence. Likewise, Berlusconi was the super-lea-
der media mogul turned prime minister, known for
elaborate parties and a hedonistic lifestyle. Polls suggested
that the general public was not concerned with Clinton’s
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, and the Italian public
tolerated Berlusconi’s lifestyle because
Berlusconi captures in one person, and in a peculiarly
Italian way, the excesses and the hopes of the era. To
many Italians, he is undoubtedly ‘‘one of us’’ in his
conviviality, Alpha-male swagger, apparent devotion
to his children (if not to his former wife), capacity to
ingratiate himself with whomever he is currently
seducing (politically and otherwise), reckless hedo-
nism, and (for some men, at least) ability to live out
an erotic ‘‘dream life’’ that they can only envy
(Agnew 2011, p. 2).
Hence, the unusual lifestyle and his womanizing were
largely ignored because they were consistent with his
image.
Spitzer and Livingston stand in stark contrast to Clinton
and Berlusconi in their public portrayal of their values. As
state Attorney General for New York, Spitzer broke up
exactly the same type of sex brokerage rings that he later
patronized, and as Governor of New York, one of his first
successes was to promote and sign into law one of the most
progressive sex trafficking laws in the nation that raised the
penalties for men who used the services of prostitutes.
More generally, he was known as the ‘‘Sheriff of Wall
Street’’ for his uncompromising attacks as the Attorney
General on conflicts of interest in the finance industry. In
addition, Spitzer became elected to Governor on a cam-
paign of lifting the ethics of state government based on his
reputation for fighting unethical business behavior in the
financial sector. These contrasting ideologies of using
prostitutes on the one hand while slashing at their legality
on the other may have influenced the reaction to revelations
of his personal prostitute usage.
Livingston was the Speaker-elect of the U.S. House of
Representatives when he resigned in a call for Clinton’s
resignation over Lewinsky. His resignation came as a
surprise, but he knew his history of extra-marital affairs
was going to be publicized by Hustler magazine, which had
targeted, and offered money for information leading to,
conservative Republican politicians who espoused so-
called family values. As the next speaker of the house,
Livingston was a high profile Republican and evidence that
he had not been faithful to his wife was inconsistent with
the political rhetoric of family values, which emphasize the
nuclear family, marriage, and fidelity. Part of how people
react to leaders’ sexual misconduct, therefore, has to do
with how that leader has portrayed values in the past and
the match between those espoused values and the mis-
conduct that has been alleged.
Political Power
If the leader’s transgression is not too dire a deviation from
norms and his values do not conflict too much, then the
next issue in our model concerns the degree of political
power the person has. Some politicians held more power
than others due to their expendability. For example, Vitter
continued as U.S. Senator after he revealed that he had
frequented prostitutes. Under U.S. law, had Senator Vitter
resigned his post, then the Democratic Governor of Loui-
siana would have likely appointed a Democrat to take
Vitter’s Republican senatorial seat until a special election
took place, increasing the slim margin (49/51) of Demo-
crats in Senate. Accordingly, resignation was not in the
Republican Party’s interest because other seats were in
play and the Republicans may have been able to enjoy a
majority vote in Senate.
The pressure for impeachment of President Clinton
emerged from the partisan politics. Republicans pushed
strenuously for the special investigation of the Whitewater
scandal, an investigation that grew to include the Monica
Lewinsky affair. Therefore, Republicans would have
politically benefitted from ousting Clinton—that is argu-
ably why the investigation went on for as long as it did,
since impeachments are handled by the then Republican-
controlled House of Representatives—but there was little
or no political benefit to the Democratic Party for Clinton
to resign. On the contrary, more harm to the party would be
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
attracted by deposing a sitting president than the press
coverage of the allegations and subsequent revelations
regarding Monica Lewinsky. In direct contrast, Boetticher
was a young rising star, whose personal life made him a
political liability to the Christian Democrat party, and there
was little cost to dismissing him. Similarly, Democratic
Party leaders abandoned Anthony Weiner from the outset
of scandal allegations and called for this resignation. For
example, in response to the question of what he would do if
Weiner were to come to him for advice, party leader
Senator Harry M. Reid responded that he would tell him
‘‘to call someone else.’’
The issue of political power and the ability to remain in
power becomes particularly visible in the case of Berlus-
coni who, as media tycoon, was able to control the news
coverage and influence public perception of his endeavors.
He also succeeded in changing various laws allowing him
to avoid prosecution and increase the size and influence of
his media empire (‘‘Berlusconi tightens grip on media,’’ 3
December 2003; ‘‘Berlusconi Says,’’ 26 October 2010).
Different from, for instance, Boetticher or Weiner, Ber-
lusconi created an environment that enabled him to act
very much as he desired.
Strauss-Kahn, who was also very well connected and
powerful, succeeded in surviving previous affairs until the
incident with the chambermaid at the New York hotel. At
least one Strauss-Kahn subordinate claimed he abused his
power to engage in a sexual affair with him, providing the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) with details about
‘‘how he summoned me on several occasions and came to
make inappropriate suggestions to me.’’ Even the same
subordinate, however, admitted that he is ‘‘a brilliant leader
with a vision for addressing the ongoing global financial
crisis.’’ The IMF brushed off the affair as ‘‘poor judgment’’
on the part of Strauss-Kahn, because he was simply too
valuable to lose and his wide appeal made him the most
promising candidate for French presidency (‘‘DSK leader
prefere,’’ 9 September 2008).
Apology Versus Denial
Leaders only had the opportunity to respond in the form of
apology or denial if the transgression did not deviate too
much from either norms or the leader’s values and the
leader had sufficient political power.
Denial
Denials attempt to distance leaders from reputational harm,
and it successfully accomplishes this in some cases, while
being counterproductive in other instances. When innocent
of fabricated allegations, it is reasonable to uncover the
fallacious allegations for what they are, and a strong denial
more effectively radiates the image of innocence, and even
hurt, caused by allegations (Kim et al. 2009). This pro-
jection of innocence explains why many politicians used
this strategy even though they were guilty. In contemporary
media-driven politics, however, resources exist to discover
and report truth of allegations, which makes vigorous
denial of truthful allegations (when one is guilty) a risky
strategy.
Two politicians initially denied the allegations and then
later admitted that they were true and asked for forgive-
ness. Anthony Weiner denied having sent a photograph of
his underwear-laden crotch on his Twitter account: ‘‘We’re
trying to find out where that photograph came from, and
whether it was manipulated, whether part of it might be
from something that was in my account,’’ and in response
to probes, ‘‘I’m reluctant to tell you anything definitive’’
(Karl, 6 June 2011). Similarly, U.S. President Bill Clinton
rather famously stated that ‘‘I did not have sex with (pause)
that woman (pause) Monica Lewinsky’’ (Associated Press,
26 January 1998). With media pressure and investigations
suggesting the veracity of the allegations despite their
denials, both these politicians relented and later admitted
that the allegations were indeed true.
In the amorphous world of sex, specific allegations are
sometimes denied when there is a seed of truth to them.
Strauss-Kahn employed this type of denial by claiming that
charges were not legitimate, but that ‘‘something may have
happened.’’ He denied the alleged rape of a chambermaid
in a New York hotel that led to rape charges being laid
against him, his resignation as head of the International
Monetary Fund, and abandonment of his anticipated run for
the French Presidency. When the legal charges in New
York were dropped due to victim credibility, he returned to
France to make a public apology for his behavior, which he
maintains did not constitute rape. Silvio Berlusconi also
adamantly denied wrong-doing in connection with the so-
called ‘‘Bunga–Bunga’’ parties, having sex with underage
girls, prostitution, and abuse of power.
Denials are claims of innocence to maintain reputation
and positions of power. They attempt to recast the narra-
tive, enlisting the scope of political enemies or conspiracy,
as illustrated by Katsav: ‘‘The legal onslaught on me was
an hysterical eruption of hatred and malice and it included
witness tampering, coaching, and coercing, all to frame the
President of Israel.’’ Denials attempt to put the narrative of
allegations to rest and to shift the view toward substantive
political matters. For example, Clinton vigorously denied
sexual relations with Lewinsky in a series of interviews
over the course of a few days, and typically ended with
statements such as, ‘‘These allegations are false. I need to
go back to work for the American people’’ (Associated
Press, 26 January 1998). Weiner said in a news conference
at the beginning of his scandal, ‘‘I am not going to permit
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
myself to be distracted by this issue any longer.’’ Early in
the Katsav investigation, when the press was pestering the
Israeli President, he said, ‘‘I don’t think it’s proper that I
have to answer this question every 2 h. I intend to fulfill
my obligations as president.’’
Denial usually backfired because it was deceptive.
When the veracity of the allegation is certain, proven, or
persistent, the denial strategy may distance the politician
temporarily, but the unsuccessful denial can further sully
reputation and end political careers.
Apologies and Atonement
In contrast to denials, apologies open doors, admit guilt,
and move forward (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in
press; Fehr and Gelfand 2010). Various types of apologies
were forthcoming in our sample. The most direct apology
comes from U.S. Senator David Vitter (Republican-Loui-
siana), who called a press conference to admit that he had
frequented prostitutes in the past. His name and telephone
number were on a list of high profile individuals who had
used a prostitution service, information which was revealed
to the Senator’s office when someone from Hustler mag-
azine contacted the office to investigate. At the press
conference Vitter confirmed reports that he had used
prostitutes several years earlier, that his wife knew, and
that he had asked forgiveness from his wife.
I want to again offer my deep sincere apologies to all
those I have let down and disappointed with these
actions from my past. I am completely responsible
and I am so very very sorry. No matter how long ago
it was, I know this has hurt the relationship of trust I
have enjoyed with so many of you, and I have a lot of
work to do to rebuild that. I will work every day to
rebuild that trust. Wendy and I dealt with this per-
sonally several years ago. I confronted it in confes-
sion and marriage counseling. I believe I received
forgiveness from God; I know I did from Wendy.
And we put it behind us.
Vitter is the most successful political case among our
examples, because allegations were made, confirmed, and
then he went on to continue in his role as a U.S. senator
with relatively little media attention about the issue and
won a second term as U.S. senator in 2010 (U.S. senators
serve 6-year terms). Vitter’s strategy was similar to that of
Clinton, discussed below, in that it covered all steps of
atonement (Koesten and Rowland 2004): He publicly
admitted wrongdoing (implicitly), took responsibility,
acknowledged and offered sincere condolence to those
affected, and suggested penance has already been paid,
particularly to his wife, who then reinforced his statement.
The involvement of his wife fulfilled the function of an
apology delivered by a third party, which may be the key to
turning an apology into forgiveness and to career contin-
uation (Ren and Gray 2009). Although Vitter’s wife did not
directly apologize for the allegation, she stated ‘‘like all
marriages, ours is not perfect’’ followed by the display of
her support: ‘‘I stand before you to tell you very proudly, I
am proud to be Wendy Vitter.’’
Bill Clinton demonstrated one of the most famous
turnarounds in response strategy. After vigorously denying
the Lewinsky affair, President Bill Clinton admitted to it
several months later in a 4 min statement to the nation on
this one single issue. In that speech he admitted that,
‘‘Indeed, I did have a relationship with Miss Lewinsky that
was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong. It constituted a
critical lapse in judgment and a personal failure on my part
for which I am solely and completely responsible.’’ He
excused his behavior by saying the matter was private and
that it arose due to a ‘‘politically inspired lawsuit’’ and that
he was ‘‘protecting his family.’’ His intended apology
speech, therefore, took the first steps toward atonement but
also added the distancing elements of denial by way of
excuses or justification.
The speech was widely criticized as a non-apology
(‘‘Testing of a president,’’ 19 August 1998), leading Clin-
ton to make an additional apology speech on September 11,
1998 at a White House Prayer meeting. Clinton’s final
apology speech had all the hallmarks of atonement (Koe-
sten and Rowland 2004): ‘‘I agree with those who have said
that in my first statement after I testified I was not contrite
enough. I don’t think there is a fancy way to say that I have
sinned.’’ He proceeded to apologize to those affected,
saying ‘‘I have asked all for their forgiveness.’’ He then
suggested that he was concerned with ‘‘genuine repentance,
a determination to change and to repair breaches of my
own making. ‘‘I have repented,’’ and ‘‘I must have God’s
help to be the person that I want to be.’’ Most strikingly,
Clinton shrouded the 10 min speech in the tenets of
atonement, ending with a famous prayer used on Yom
Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. As for Vitter,
Clinton also received third-party support (Jerome 2008;
Ren and Gray 2009) through his wife who announced
before the important impeachment trial that she was
‘‘committed to her marriage’’ and ‘‘believes in this Presi-
dent and loves him very much.’’
Both Vitter and Clinton successfully moved on with
their careers and the matters of their extra-marital activities
quieted. Going through the ritual of atonement, which
includes public mortification, served them well. By
exposing themselves and acknowledging weaknesses,
albeit ‘‘no matter how long ago’’ for Vitter and raised by
political enemies for Clinton, these politicians engaged
with their followers and removed the veneer of pride that
separates them from the public. Their constituents, for
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
example, could see them as human, with human frailties,
with which people identify using language such as ‘‘no
marriage is perfect’’ and the deep regret that is expressed
verbally and nonverbally. Baring weaknesses in atonement
draws people in by way of empathy served with similarity:
Presented authentically, guilty parties seeking atonement
project their shame and embarrassment in ways that allow
people to empathize with them. Because empathy is both
taking the perspective of another party and actually expe-
riencing their emotion, the request for forgiveness gener-
ates goodwill and a need for the other party to reduce those
negative feelings in themselves by doing something such as
granting forgiveness. In the video recording of Vitter’s
speech, for example, his facial expression reveals his
embarrassment and chagrin, echoed by his wife’s distress
that contrasts with her usual professional composure
(CNN, 16 July 2007). This human frailty is underscored by
Clinton saying at the beginning of his atonement speech
that he needed to put on his glasses to read something that
he had written the night before, suggesting that he is
human, his aging eyesight is not good for reading small
print, and he wrote the statement himself as opposed to a
team of speechwriters developing the prose.
The successful leaders in our sample pointed to their
importance for future achievements, and their commitment
to the collective goal: ‘‘We all have a lot of important work
to do for Louisiana’’ (Vitter); ‘‘I would never walk away
from the people of this country and the trust they’ve placed
in me’’ (Clinton). In addition, Clinton and Vitter fulfilled
every step in atonement and clearly focused on the issue at
hand rather than being vague as their counterparts Spitzer
or Strauss-Kahn. Berlusconi, the third politician who con-
tinued in power, never apologized or entered the process of
atonement. His power to control the media and change the
legal system enabled him to survive the numerous scandals
by denying any wrongdoing. As we are writing this paper,
however, Berlusconi was convicted of paying for sex with
a minor and abusing his office in trying to cover it up.
Perhaps, we might suggest, had he engaged in atonement
the story might end differently.
Test with Business Executive Sample
This paper has developed theory for how leaders respond to
and then are affected by sexual affairs. The personal and
professional consequences and outcomes of sexually pro-
vocative scandals have little to do with their formal roles
yet influence a leader’s future success and ability to remain
in power. While we used political leaders for our inductive
theorizing, we are interested in how this theory applies to
business leaders. Therefore, we conducted an analysis of
publicized business leaders’ reactions to allegations of sexTa
ble
3B
usi
nes
sex
ecu
tiv
eca
ses
tote
stth
eth
eory
Nam
eP
osi
tion
Co
mpan
yD
ate
Ag
eC
ou
ntr
yA
ctR
esu
ltD
evia
tio
nfr
om
no
rms
Dev
iati
on
from
lead
er’s
per
son
a
Lea
der
’sp
ow
ero
rv
alu
eA
tonem
ent
Mar
kH
urd
CE
OH
P2010
53
U.S
.A.
Rel
atio
nsh
ipw
ith
fem
ale
con
trac
tor
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Mil
dN
oP
oli
tica
lly
exp
edie
nt
for
bo
ard
tosa
ck
No
chan
ce
Har
ry
Sto
nec
iph
er
CE
OB
oei
ng
20
05
69
U.S
.A.
Aff
air
wit
hfe
mal
e
exec
uti
ve
of
sam
e
com
pan
y
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Mil
dIn
consi
sten
tw
ith
‘‘et
hic
al
face
’’to
bri
ng
eth
ics
to
aero
spac
e
No
chan
ce
Ch
ris
Ku
bas
ik
CE
O-
elec
t
Lo
ckhee
d2
01
15
0U
.S.A
.L
on
g-s
tan
din
gaf
fair
wit
h
form
erco
mp
any
emplo
yee
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Mil
dIn
consi
sten
tw
ith
‘‘et
hic
al
face
’’to
bri
ng
eth
ics
to
aero
spac
e
No
chan
ce
Bri
anD
un
nC
EO
Bes
tb
uy
20
12
52
U.S
.A.
Fra
tern
izin
gw
ith
fem
ale
emplo
yee
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Dev
iati
on
key
tob
oar
d’s
dec
isio
n
No
chan
ce
Wo
lfg
ang
Bu
chel
e
CE
OB
AS
F2
00
74
8G
erm
any
Aff
air
wit
hco
wo
rker
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Mil
dN
ot
rele
van
tE
xp
edie
nt
for
bo
ard
tosa
ck
pri
or
tota
kin
gto
pco
mm
and
No
chan
ce
Joh
nB
row
ne
CE
OB
P2
00
75
9U
nit
ed
Kin
gd
om
Lie
du
nd
ero
ath
abo
ut
ho
w
he
met
his
bo
yfr
ien
d
Fo
rced
to resi
gn
Str
on
ger
Co
nsi
sten
tE
xp
edie
nt
for
bo
ard
tosa
ckin
light
of
succ
esso
ral
read
y
nam
ed.
No
chan
ce
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
scandals as partial test of the theory that we developed. We,
therefore, attempted to replicate the method used for pol-
iticians with six recent high profile cases of business
executives embroiled in sexual controversy on either side
of the Atlantic (Table 3).
Mark Hurd, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP),
resigned following allegations of sexual harassment by an
HP contractor who had a personal relationship with him.
The ensuing investigations cleared Hurd of sexual harass-
ment and stated that no sexual relations occurred, but the
board found that he exercised poor judgment in having
dinners with, and making payments to, this contractor from
his expense account. While he was cleared of the sexual
allegations, the board viewed his lack of judgment in
expense reporting as too severe to stay on as CEO at HP.
The case of Mark Hurd fits and supports our theory. His
actions deviated significantly neither from norms nor his
official persona, yet it was politically expedient for the
board to sack him. Some claimed, in fact, that is was a
brave move on the part of the board (Worthen and Lublin,
8 August 2010), and others claimed that the board did not
trust him due to his role in ousting of the chairwoman of
the board in an infamous spying scandal. Therefore, Hurd
never had the chance to apologize or make amends.
Instead, his public statement was: ‘‘As the investigation
progressed, I realized there were instances in which I did
not live up to the standards and principles of trust, respect
and integrity that I have espoused at H.P.’’
Harry Stonecipher was ousted as CEO of Boeing for
having an affair with another Boeing executive only
15 months after being brought back from retirement to
bring ethics to the company in the aftermath of serious
ethical violations that had earned it a ban from the U.S. Air
Force, which was a major Boeing client. The board forced
his resignation on the grounds that a relationship with a
staff member violated the recently introduced code of
conduct that was meant to restore a higher level of ethics to
Boeing. The policy does not specifically prohibit intra-
company romance, but does prohibit activities that could
embarrass the company or raise questions about its hon-
esty, impartiality, and reputation. Applying our theory,
then, Stonecipher’s actions did not represent a gross devi-
ation from norms, but were inconsistent with his persona as
an ethical savior of Boeing. Stonecipher either chose not to,
or was not given the opportunity to step forward and
engage in the process of atonement.
For the very top echelon of business executives, the
appearance of ethical behavior, even as it pertains to one’s
romantic life, seems to be paramount. Another example is
Christopher Kubasik, who was to become Lockheed’s chief
executive on the first day of 2013. Kubasik, who was
married, had a long-standing affair with an employee who
had left the company before the scandal surfaced. The
stated basis of Kaubasik’s forced resignation was a
departure from ethical codes. Although Lockheed’s code of
ethics has no clear guidelines on romantic relationships, it
does prohibit conflicts of interest, such as ‘‘having a close,
personal relationship with a subordinate employee’’ (2011,
p. 25). Like the rest of the aerospace industry, Lockheed’s
ethics were being scrutinized, prodding the board chairman
to make the official statement that ‘‘While I am deeply
disappointed and saddened by Chris’s actions, which have
been inconsistent with our values and standards, our swift
response to his improper conduct demonstrates our
unyielding commitment to holding every employee
accountable for their actions’’ (Drew, 9 November 2012).
In a statement regarding his resignation Kubasik said, ‘‘I
regret that my conduct in this matter did not meet the
standards to which I have always held myself.’’ This case
illustrates the importance to the company of appearing to
be ethical due to the pressure on the industry from past
ethical failings. Those previous failings, however, were
over the issues such as industrial espionage and inappro-
priate treatment of government officials responsible for
issuing contracts, whereas Kubasik’s case seems to be
colored by personal ethics from the individual’s personal
life.
A similar case that involves links to personal value
systems is the forced resignation of Brian Dunn, the CEO
of Best Buy. Dunn was axed for ‘‘engaging in an extremely
close personal relationship with a female employee that
negatively impacted the work environment’’ (Audit Com-
mittee 2012, p. 1). No romantic or sexual interest was
admitted by either party or even alleged in the final report.
Instead, the close personal relationship evidenced by
attending dinners, drinks, and sporting events together was
enough for the audit committee to declare that ‘‘The fre-
quency and level of interaction between the CEO and the
female employee became sufficiently well known at
Company headquarters that it generated speculation about
the nature of the relationship, especially due to the dis-
parity in position, power, and age between the CEO and the
female employee.’’ They go on to say ‘‘Company policy
prohibits any ‘behavior not consistent with our Company
values.’’’
Brian Dunn’s behavior that led to his downfall was
clearly a departure from the accepted norms, which the
audit committee report explicitly stated. Moreover, the
investigation was initially prompted by Best Buy’s strong
founder and chairman when he was given information
about the relationship. The company found no improper
use of company resources, but ample evidence of a close
relationship that fit uncomfortably with the values
espoused by the board. The legal justification for enforcing
such fierce standards of conduct among the highest ranking
officers of corporations centers on reputational risk to the
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
corporation, which in turn affects its valuation in the
marketplace (Peregrine 2012).
Corporate cases of this nature are not confined to the
USA. For example, Wolfgang Buchele was slated to
become the CEO of BASF Chemical Corporation in Jan-
uary 2008, but was forced to leave the company shortly
before taking stewardship. Just a few days before reaching
the zenith of his career, BASF announced in a press release
that Buchele resigned for personal reasons. In reality,
Buchele was forced to step down because he had a liaison
with a coworker in breach of company guidelines (von
Top-Managern 2011). The abrupt end to his successful
corporate career supports the notion of that situational
characteristics play a decisive role for leaders’ ability to
defend against, and recover from, sexual scandals. He did
not claim to undermine his own personal ethical code, as
Kubasik did, but was simply a threat to corporate reputa-
tion for breaching corporate policies.
In contrast to all the cases above, in which married men
had some sort of improper relationship with women, Brit-
ish Petroleum (BP) CEO John Browne was forced to resign
when he fell victim to a former boyfriend selling their love
story to a British tabloid. While he was cleared of any
professional wrongdoing by BP, he lied about how he had
met his former boyfriend to avoid being ‘‘outed’’ as a
homosexual. Although he declared later that being outed
was the best thing that had ever happened to him because it
lifted a weight from his shoulders (Browne, 15 July 2010),
the allegations forced him to resign without the £3.5 mil-
lion bonus and the £12 million golden parachute he was
contractually entitled to if he had given a year’s notice
(Wearden, 1 May 2007). Browne’s downfall was lying
under oath when trying unsuccessfully to win an injunction
against the Daily Mail to prevent their publication of an
article on how he had met his boyfriend, Canadian Jeff
Chevalier, 34 years his junior (Rice, 6 May 2007). He
claimed to have met Chevalier while jogging, instead of
admitting that they met through a male escort agency.
Analysis of Browne’s case with our model proves
interesting. His ensuing resignation seems to be prompted
by his lover’s publicly outing him as a homosexual, which,
more precisely, led Browne to perjure himself in court.
This ‘‘outing,’’ however, was only the media publication of
their relationship. Chevalier had been living with Browne
for four years, nearly always accompanying Browne on
trips and socializing in their home and at outside events.
Chevalier claimed to have met some of Britain’s most
powerful people in business and politics, and as such
Browne’s sexuality was of no surprise (Rice, 6 May 2007).
In terms of our model there seems to be little evidence that
there was too much deviation from norms given Browne’s
stature as long-time CEO of one of the world’s largest
companies. Second, Browne’s espoused values do not seem
to deviate significantly from this relationship in the sense
that he was not married and had no platform of ethics from
which lead, in comparison to the aerospace executives
noted above. Browne’s downfall, then, may have had to do
with his political power at the time. Clearly, he was a
politically powerful man, connected to boards throughout
Europe and the United States and regularly entertaining
powerful political figures such as the British Prime Min-
ister. Indeed, Browne is now serving as ‘‘super-director,’’
the most senior business advisor to British government to
instill a greater business ethos (Harvey, 12 March 2013).
However, Browne had already announced his retirement,
named his successor, and ultimately resigned just
19 months early, suggesting that it may have been politi-
cally expedient to the board to see his early departure in the
face of reputation damage. Additionally, BP was under
some pressure, particularly from the United States, which
had witnessed a string of major industrial accidents at BP
facilities and had fined the company and provided scathing
criticism of its safety practices. The political realities,
therefore, superseded the other elements of the model to
make a forced resignation the most expedient thing to do.
Summary
The model illustrated in Fig. 1 explains the outcomes for
the business executives in our sample. There are a number
of limitations to this test of the model, however. The
sample is biased. By examining only high ranking execu-
tives from the news media, the sample is biased toward
forced resignations that make their way into the news. In
contrast, other boards face sensitive issues with their top
managers (e.g., CEO) and treat them confidentially. Only
when the CEO resigns does the board need to put a public
face on the decision. Therefore, there could be cases in
which leaders engage in out-role sex scandals that result in
their staying in place. Such cases, therefore, are much more
likely to provide the opportunity for apology or atonement.
In fact, our model suggests that for issues that appear not to
stray too far from either acceptable norms or the leaders
espoused values, that business leaders and others may have
the opportunity to provide full and complete apology that
has the elements of atonement. Before a board or an
investigating committee (e.g., audit committee), a CEO
may be able to recognize that his or her actions have vio-
lated trust and confidence, appear to have true remorse,
appear to be attempting to improve on a felt character flaw,
and make amends going forward.
Another bias of the sample in our test of the theory is the
fact that they are all CEOs, which makes them newswor-
thy. Leaders at lower levels of the corporation are much
more likely to be able to follow the model. An affair, for
example, is not outrageous behavior in some contexts or
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
exhibited by certain people, and some leaders are valuable
assets to their companies, which may allow for atonement.
We developed the model with political leaders and then
tested it with widely publicized CEO affairs because that
information is publicly available and some theory needs to
be created to understand how extra-role, character-related
events influence the success and failure of leaders.
Discussion
We have developed a grounded theory of how leaders
successfully or unsuccessfully deal with their own sexual
improprieties and the effects on their careers. We devel-
oped a theory based on politicians who have become
embroiled in sexual controversy and then tested that theory
on a sample of business executives who have found
themselves in similar circumstances. The nature of that
theory is that the leaders’ success or failure was determined
in a hierarchical fashion by four sequential elements. First,
if the nature of the sexual impropriety propriety is too
severe a deviation from accepted norms (e.g., of the
institution), then the leader will not be able to successfully
recover from the situation regardless of what he does.
Should it not be too severe, the second issue, the deviation
from the leader’s values or persona comes into play. If the
behavior is vastly inconsistent with the leader’s espoused
values, then the leader will not be able to successfully
recover from the episode, yielding to the third level. Should
the first two levels of the model be satisfied, then the third
question is whether the leader has sufficient political power
to prevail, or whether the leader is politically expendable.
Lastly, in the cases where the first three questions have
been satisfied, the leader may be able to apologize using
the elements of atonement in order to successfully gain the
forgiveness of followers and other constituents. This last
step of atonement, however, can only occur if the first three
levels (deviation from norms and the leader’s values and
political power) allow the leader to engage in atonement
actions.
Theoretical Implications
Little leader integrity research has differentiated between
professional and private life and how they influence per-
ceptions, with the exception of Trevino and colleagues’
(Trevino et al. 2000) notion of personal morality, which
suggests that leaders ‘‘have a greater standard, a greater
responsibility than the average person would have to live
up to’’ (Trevino et al. 2000, p. 132). Most of the subsequent
research, however, focuses on the moral person at work
(Brown et al. 2005; Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009;
Kalshoven et al. 2011). The present study provides a
unique angle on how private lives potentially influence
leader integrity. Most of the characters in both of our
samples neither did anything illegal nor abused their
power, yet most had negative personal outcomes, demon-
strating that behavior in personal lives influences how
leaders could be perceived in their professional roles.
We have introduced a number of potential moderators of
the impact of personal life behavior to the leader integrity
field, including deviation from norms, fit with one’s leader
persona, and political power. The leadership integrity lit-
erature has found an association between perceptions of
leader integrity and a number of positive follower out-
comes (Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009; Kalshoven et al.
2011; Moorman et al. 2013; Palanski et al., in press; White
and Lean 2007). The present findings highlight the notion
that the same leader behaviors might not result in the same
outcomes for all leaders, that they are moderated by those
issues found in our model. As the field of leader integrity
enters its adolescence, we need to sift through these
potential moderators to improve our understanding leader
behavior and integrity.
Current work in leader integrity and related subfields has
begun to look at how leaders violate trust or offend fol-
lowers, finding severity influences how followers respond
and importantly how they react to apologies for the offense
(Byrne et al., in press; Grover et al., in press; Tomlinson
2011). The present findings add to this work by providing a
nuanced view of offense severity and linking that perceived
severity to the characteristics of the leader. The main
implications, therefore, are that the characteristics of the
leader in terms of their past behavior, overall impression or
image, and political power moderate the impact of extra-
role ethical violations.
The present study also supports Eisenbeiss’ (2012)
reconceptualization of leader integrity as including a
moderation orientation. Most leader integrity research has
taken either a consistency or a justice-based approach and
ignored the essentially moral nature of leader integrity that
Bauman (2013) recently identified. This study supports
these new notions, extending our understanding toward not
only the fact that behavior based in moral values affects
leaders but the nuanced manner in which they affect
leaders. The nuance lies in how the behavior fits with
constituent values as well as how it fits with the leader’s
persona.
Previous research has predominantly found that apolo-
gies are ineffective for recovering trust following integrity
violations (Dirks et al. 2011; Ferrin et al. 2007; Kim et al.
2004, 2006). However, the present findings coupled with
other recent leader apology results suggest that this may
not be true for leaders. Byrne et al. (in press) found no
difference in the effectiveness for apologies based on
whether violations were competence- or integrity-based,
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
and the present findings show that apologies could be
effective for sexually-oriented integrity violations. Fur-
thermore, Grover et al. (in press) similarly found that the
competence-integrity distinction was not meaningful for
differentiating recoverable from irrecoverable trust viola-
tions in the direct leader–follower relationship. These more
recent findings are in the realm of leadership and previous
trust recover studies have looked at hiring decisions and
trust. Due to structure, people are more dependent on their
leaders, and if they meet certain thresholds, then followers
and others might prefer to overlook forgive violations
(Gino et al. 2009).
The present findings also augment Byrne et al.’s (in press)
finding that severity was more important than the type of
violation for predicting the impact of apologies. The present
findings add to their findings by identifying components of
severity. Deviation from both norms and the leaders’ values
are elements of severity that could be examined further in
future research. Additionally, the second level of our
model—leader values—is a striking addition the literature,
suggesting that the impact of transgressions is a function of
leader characteristics, or that it varies according to who the
leader is and how he has behaved in the past.
Recent theory suggests that people who violate trust need
to engage in sincere apologies and provide restitution steps to
move forward (Andiappan and Trevino 2010; Goodstein
et al. 2011). Our findings, coupled with the literature on
political apologia, suggest that genuine atonement involves
more than apology and moving forward (King 1985; Koesten
and Rowland 2004). This literature, illustrated by Vitter and
Clinton’s apologies, says that in addition to asking forgive-
ness and taking steps toward the future, the statements must
be public and demonstrate mortification, which includes
publicly sharing the sense of shame and admitting that one
was wrong. In fact, research supports the notion that shame
from moral failings promotes either image restoration or
hiding from others (Gausel and Brown 2012; Gausel and
Leach 2011). These elements of atonement are particular to
leaders and extend the experimental research that has found
that substantive action, such as suffering, is more effective
for recovering trust than mere apologies or promises (Bottom
et al. 2002; Schweitzer et al. 2006).
The recent leader-based work on apologies combines
with the present research to start a coherent picture of
leader apologies (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in
press). These findings suggest a set of circumstances under
which leaders can effectively apologize for their actions.
The extension and contribution of the present findings,
however, is in the elements of atonement. The difference
between apology and atonement is that atonement seeks the
possibility of forgiveness for actions; the leader takes
responsibility for actions and notes that they were wrong.
Atonement clearly had positive effects in our political
sample, and certainly at least some of the apologizing in
previous research would include unmeasured components
of atonement (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in press).
Future work will benefit from differentiating the types of
apologies to create more refined models of how leaders
recover from their mistakes.
Practical Implications
The important lesson for leaders is that they are held in the
public eye, even if that public eye is primarily their own
organization. The type of inappropriate behavior needs to
be carefully measured against the normative culture of the
organization or community in which one finds oneself.
When behavior runs outside these limits, corrective action
in the form of atonement may be necessary. However, our
analysis suggests that leaders need to weigh various aspects
before engaging in atonement. Denial may be the best
option to stay in office (Ferrin et al. 2007). Combined with
the use of language that shows their human side, denial of
wrongdoing, or justification that explains their behavior in
terms that everyone can associate with, are key to surviving
scandals. However, should denial not be an option, then
leader should adhere to the steps of atonement. Moreover,
they should be coupled with third-party support by the
stakeholder who is most affected, such as the wife. Support
from peers is essential and needs to be clearly expressed,
and third-party support must be explicit public announce-
ments of ‘‘full faith and confidence in the person.’’
Limitations
The main limitation of the present work is that we have
analyzed high profile cases and our selection may have
influenced the results. We purposely chose cases that col-
lectively faced a range of accusations and outcomes. Other
scandals of the sort are easy to come by with a quick search
on the internet; there are web pages, for example, that list
America’s top 50 political scandals. While we do not report
it here, we have compared our findings with these scandals
and our findings seem to hold. Those offenses that are too
out of sync with the time or place or inconsistent with the
individual politician have very negative results for the
politician, their disgrace or loss of perceived integrity.
Additionally, we conducted a post hoc test of the theory
with business leaders after the theory was developed.
Another limitation is that we have studied leaders in
vastly different contexts, including the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Israel. To
some degree, we expect constituents to respond differently
in these situations. The sexual mores in the different cul-
tures presumably influence how leaders are perceived in
these types of situations. In fact, part of the initial sampling
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
methodology was to access these different contexts in the
expectation of cultural differences. What we found, how-
ever, was not a direct cultural difference, but a more
nuanced consideration of politicians’ deviation from
expected norms. Stronger than national culture, therefore,
were expectations about how leaders expressing certain
values should behave. In fact, our sample of politicians
from different countries robustly stands up to scrutiny and
is not biased by the ideals within any single culture.
We have focused on the leader in this study, but it should
be recognized that leadership issues are largely interactive
between leaders and followers (Klaussner, 2014; Uhl-Bien
2006). Followers vary in their moral orientation, which
affects how they perceive the acceptability of moral behavior
(Grover and Coppins 2012). The purpose of the present
research was to focus on whether leaders succeed or fail, and
future research may benefit from considering how individual
followers react to leader indiscretions (Grover 2014).
Conclusion and Future Directions
The effect of personal life behavior on leader integrity and
how to recover from acceptable lapses of ethical personal
behavior has not been previously examined in the orga-
nizational sciences. Using the available cases of political
sex scandals, we were able to determine that the accept-
ability in terms of integrity of sex scandals depends on the
variation of the act from (a) cultural norms, and (b) the
leader’s persona. Under the conditions in which this
deviation was not too much to entirely crush integrity and
force resignation, the leaders needed to express genuine
remorse and shame over their acts. These findings provide
guidance for how leaders should respond to discoveries of
frailties that we all have. Future research on the interac-
tion of organizational leaders’ private and personal life
should examine these issues in order to more finely tune
our understanding of how life outside of work affects
leaders’ ability to lead.
Acknowledgments The authors express their thanks to Robert
Moorman for inspiring the study and reviewing an early version of the
paper and to Jennifer White and Adele Brun-Ney who assisted in the
data collection. This research was partially funded by a Grant from
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (TDLR-ANR-12-JSH1-0007-01).
References
Agnew, J. (2011). The big seducer: Berlusconi’s image at home and
abroad and the future of Italian politics. California Italian
Studies, 2(1). http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bt6w92c.
Andiappan, M., & Trevino, L. K. (2010). Beyond righting the wrong:
Supervisor-subordinate reconciliation after an injustice. Human
Relations, 64(3), 359–386.
Associated Press. (26 January 1998). Video: Clinton denies in far
more forceful terms. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/special/clinton/stories/deny012798.htm.
Audit Committee. (2012). Investigation of alleged misconduct by
former chief executive officer. Board of Directors of Best Buy.
Basford, T. E., Offermann, L. R., & Behrend, T. S. (2014). Please
accept my sincerest apologies: Examining follower reactions to
leader apology. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(1), 99–117.
Basinger, S. J. (2013). Scandals and congressional elections in the
post-Watergate era. Political Research Quaterly, 66(2),
385–398.
Bass, B. M., & Steidlmeier, P. (1999). Ethics, character, and authentic
transformational leadership behavior. Leadership Quarterly,
10(2), 181–217.
Bauman, D. C. (2013). Leadership and the three faces of integrity.
The Leadership Quarterly, 24(3), 414–426.
Berlusconi says immunity law to shield premier is ‘absolutely
essential’. (26 October 2010). Bloomberg. http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2010-10-26/berlusconi-says-immunity-law-to-
shield-premier-is-absolutely-essential-.html.
Berlusconi tightens grip on media. (3 December 2003). BBC. http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3257932.stm.
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002).
When talk is not cheap: Substantive penance and expressions of
intent in rebuilding cooperation. Organization Science, 13(5),
497–513.
Brown, M. E., Trevino, L. K., & Harrison, D. A. (2005). Ethical
leadership: A social learning perspective for construct develop-
ment and testing. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 97(2), 117–134.
Browne, J. (15 July 2010). Being outed is a blessing. The Guardian.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/15/being-
outed-is-a-blessing/print.
Byrne, A., Barling, J., & Dupre, K. E. (in press). Leader apologies and
employee and leader well-being. Journal of Business Ethics.
doi:10.1077/s10551-013-1685-3.
Chanley, V., Sullivan, J. L., Gonzales, M. H., & Kovera, M. B.
(1994). Lust and avarice in politics: Damage control by four
politicians accused of wrongdoing (or, politics as usual).
American Politics Research, 22(3), 297–333.
CNN. (16 July 2007). Senator won’t talk about ‘‘madam’’: Wife
stands by his side. http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/
2011/06/07/bts.vitter.apology.statement.cnn?iref=allsearch. http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3dkbp0Yif0.
Den Hartog, D. N., & De Hoogh, A. H. B. (2009). Empowering
behaviour and leader fairness and integrity: Studying perceptions
of ethical leader behaviour from a levels-of-analysis perspective.
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology,
18(2), 199–230.
Dineen, B. R., Lewicki, R. J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2006). Supervisory
guidance and behavioral integrity: Relationships with employee
citizenship and deviant behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology,
91(3), 622–635.
Dirks, K. T., Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., & Cooper, C. D. (2011).
Understanding the effects of substantive responses on trust
following a transgression. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 114(2), 87–103.
Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Miller, M. G. (2011). Are financial or
moral scandals worse? It depends. PS. Political Science &
Politics, 44(4), 479–757.
Drew, C. (9 November 2012). Lockheed’s incoming chief forced out
over ethics violation. New York Times.
DSK. Leader prefere pour la gauche face a Sarkozy. (9 September
2008). Le Figaro. www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2008/11/08/01002-
20081108ARTFIG00619-dsk-leader-prefere-pour-la-gauche-
face-a-sarkozy-.php.
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123
Eisenbeiss, S. A. (2012). Re-thinking ethical leadership: An interdis-
ciplinary integrative approach. The Leadership Quarterly, 23(5),
791–808.
Fehr, R., & Gelfand, M. J. (2010). When apologies work: How
matching apology components to victims’self-construals facili-
tates forgiveness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 113(1), 37–50.
Ferrin, D. L., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007).
Silence speaks volumes: The effectiveness of reticence in
comparison to apology and denial for responding to integrity-
and competence-based trust violations. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 92(4), 893–908.
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on
stereotyping. American Psychologist, 48(6), 621–628.
Fragale, A. R., Rosen, B., Xu, C., & Merideth, I. (2009). The higher
they are, the harder they fall: The effects of wrongdoer status on
observer punishment recommendations and intentionality attri-
butions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 108(1), 53–65.
Funk, C. L. (1996). The impact of scandal on candidate evaluations:
An experimental test of the role of candidate traits. Political
Behavior, 18(1), 1–24.
Galperin, B. L., Bennett, R. J., & Aquino, K. (2011). Status
differentiation and the protean self: A social-cognitive model
of unethical behavior in organizations. Journal of Business
Ethics, 98(3), 407–424.
Gausel, N., & Brown, R. (2012). Shame and guilt—Do they really
differ in their focus of evaluation? Wanting to change the self
and behavior in response to ingroup immorality. The Journal of
Social Psychology, 152(5), 547–567.
Gausel, N., & Leach, C. W. (2011). Concern for self-image and social
image in the management of moral failure: Rethinking shame.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(4), 468–478.
Gino, F., Moore, D. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (2009). See no evil: Why
we fail to notice unethical behavior. In R. M. Kramer, A.
E. Tenbrunsel, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), Social decision
making: Social dilemmas, social values, and ethical judgments
(pp. 241–263). Pscyhology Press.
Goodstein, J., Aquino, K., & Skarlicki, D. (2011). Opening a new
conversation in organizational justice: A conceptual model of
offender reintegration in organizations. In S. W. Gilliland, D.
D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), Emerging perspectives on
organizational justice and ethics (pp. 75–104). Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing.
Grover, S. L. (2014). Unraveling respect in organization studies.
Human Relations, 67(1), 27–51.
Grover, S. L., & Coppins, A. (2012). The intersection of justice and
leadership: Testing a moderation model of contingent reward
and interpersonal fairness. European Management Journal, 30,
490–498.
Grover, S. L., Hasel, M. C., Manville, C., & Serrano Archimi, C. (in
press). Follower reactions to leader trust violations: A grounded
theory of violation types, likelihood of recovery, and recovery
process. European Management Journal. doi:10.1016/j.emj.
2014.01.002.
Grover, S. L., & Moorman, R. H. (2007). Grasping the meaning and
interpretation of integrity in business leadership. European
Management Journal, 25, 167–170.
Harvey, F. (12 March 2013). Lord Browne promises to invest
‘whatever it takes’ in UK fracking. The Guardian. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/mar/12/lord-browne-uk-shale-
gas/print.
Jerome, A. M. (2008). Toward prescription: Testing the rhetoric of
atonement’s applicability in the athletic arena. Public Relations
Review, 34, 124–134.
Kalshoven, K., den Hartog, D. N., & de Hoogh, A. H. (2011). Ethical
leadership at work questionnaire (ELW): Development and
validation of a multidimensional measure. The Leadership
Quarterly, 22(1), 51–69.
Kalshoven, K., Den Hartog, D. N., & de Hoogh, A. H. B. (2012).
Ethical Leadership and followers’ helping and initiative: The
role of demonstrated responsibility and job autonomy. European
Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 22(2),
165–181.
Karl, J. (6 June 2011). Weiner’s web of lies. ABC News. http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/flashback-weiners-web-lies-1377
6485.
Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., Dirks, K. T., & Ferrin, D. L. (2013).
Repairing trust with individuals vs. groups. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 1–14.
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). The repair of trust:
A dynamic bilateral perspective and multilevel conceptualiza-
tion. Academy of Management Review, 34(2), 401–422.
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When
more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs.
external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs.
integrity- based trust violation. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 34, 401–422.
Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2004).
Removing the shadow of suspicion: The effects of apology
versus denial for repairing competence- versus integrity-based
trust violations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(1), 104–118.
King, R. L. (1985). Transforming scandal into tragedy: A rhetoric of
political apology. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71, 289–301.
Klaussner, S. (2014). Engulfed in the abyss: The emergence of
abusive supervision as an escalating process of supervisor-
subordinate interaction. Human Relations, 67(3), 311–332.
Koesten, J., & Rowland, R. C. (2004). The rhetoric of atonement.
Communication Studies, 55(1), 68–87.
Locke, K. (2001). Grounded theory in management research.
London: Sage.
Lockheed, M. (2011). Setting the standard: Code of ethics and
business conduct. Bethesda, MD: Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Maier, J. (2011). The impact of political scandals on political support:
An experimental test of two theories. International Political
Science Review, 32(3), 283–302.
Maule, L. S., & Goidel, R. K. (2003). Adultery, drugs, and sex: An
experimental investigation of individual reactions to unethical
behavior by public officials. The Social Science Journal, 40(1),
65–78.
Mayer, D. M., Aquino, K., Greenbaum, R. L., & Kuenzi, M. (2012).
Who displays ethical leadership and why does it matter? An
examination of antecedents and consequences of ethical leader-
ship. Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 151–171.
Miller, B. (2010). The effects of scandalous information on recall of
policy-related information. Political Psychology, 31(6), 887–914.
Moorman, R. H., Darnold, T. C., & Priesemuth, M. (2013). Perceived
leader integrity: Supporting the construct validity and utility of a
multi-dimensional measure in two samples. The Leadership
Quarterly, 24(3), 427–444.
Moorman, R. H., Darnold, T. C., Priesemuth, M., & Dunn, C. P.
(2012). Toward the measurement of perceived leader integrity:
Introducing a multidimensional approach. Journal of Change
Management, 12(4), 383–398.
O’Reilly, K., Paper, D., & Marx, S. (2012). Demystifying grounded
theory for business research. Organizational Research Methods,
15(2), 247–262.
Ozgenc, K. (4 June 2007). Prostituierte ins Hotel bestellt. Focus.
http://www.focus.de/finanzen/boerse/aktien/vw-affaere-prosti
tuierte-ins-hotel-bestellt_aid_226591.html.
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals
123
Palanski, M., Avey, J. B., & Jiraporn, N. (in press). The effects of
ethical leadership and abusive supervision on job search
behaviors in the turnover process. Journal of Business Ethics.
doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1690-6.
Palanski, M. E., & Yammarino, F. J. (2007). Integrity and leadership:
Clearing the conceptual confusion. European Management
Journal, 25(3), 171–184.
Peregrine, M. W. (2012). On and off the clock, conduct matters
(editorial). The New York Times.
Peters, J. G., & Welch, S. (1980). The effects of charges of corruption
on voting behavior in congressional elections. The American
Political Science Review, 74(3), 697–708.
Regner, I., & Le Floch, V. (2005). When political expertise moderates
the impact of scandals on young adults’ judgments of politicians.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(2), 255–261.
Ren, H., & Gray, B. (2009). Repairing relationship conflict: How
violation types and culture determine appropriate restoration
rituals. Academy of Management Review, 34(1), 105–127.
Rice, D. (6 May 2007). The TRUE story about Lord Browne—By
ex-rent boy lover. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-452983/The-TRUE-story-Lord-Browne-ex-rent-boy-
lover.html.
Rosoff, S. M. (1989). Physicians as criminal defendants: Specialty,
sanctions, and status liability. Law and Human Behavior, 13(2),
231–236.
Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006). Promises
and lies: Restoring violated trust. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 101, 1–19.
Shapiro, D. L., Boss, A., Salas, S., Tangirala, S., & Von Glinow, M.
A. (2011). When are transgressing leaders punitively judged? An
empirical test. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(2), 412–421.
Simons, T. (2002). Behavioral integrity: The perceived alignment
between managers’ words and deeds as a research focus.
Organization Science, 13(1), 13–35.
Skolnick, P., & Shaw, J. I. (1994). Is defendant status a liability or a
shield? Crime severity and professional relatedness. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 24(20), 827–1836.
Summers, J. H. (2000). What happened to sex scandals? Politics and
peccadilloes, Jefferson to Kennedy. The Journal of American
History, 87(3), 825–854.
Testing of a president: The editorials; excerpts from newspaper
judgments on Clinton. (19 August 1998). The New York Times.
Tomlinson, E. C. (2011). The context of trust repair efforts: Exploring
the role of relationship dependence and outcome severity.
Journal of Trust Research, 1(2), 139–157.
Tomlinson, E. C., Dineen, B. R., & Lewicki, R. J. (2004). The road to
reconciliation: Antecedents of victim willingness to reconcile
following a broken promise. Journal of Management, 30(2),
165–187.
Trevino, L. K., Brown, M., & Hartman, L. P. (2003). A qualitative
investigation of perceived executive ethical leadership: Percep-
tions from inside and outside the executive suite. Human
Relations, 56(1), 5–37.
Trevino, L. K., Hartman, L. P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and
moral manager: How executives develop a reputation for ethical
leadership. California Management Review, 42(4), 128–142.
Uhl-Bien, M. (2006). Relational leadership theory: Exploring the
social processes of leadership and organizing. The Leadership
Quarterly, 17(6), 654–676.
von Top-Managern, V. A. (2011). Wirtschafts Woche. http://www.
wiwo.de/bilder/nachrichten-und-meinung-verhaengnisvolle-affaeren-von-top-managern/4732796.html?slp=false&p=6&a=false#
image.
Wearden, G. (1 May 2007). BP chief resigns as private life made
public. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/
may/01/privacy.oilandpetrol/print.
Weigand, R. (2011 August 16). Ein Naivling, umgeben von
Erpressern. Sueddeutsche Zeitung. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/
politik/boetticher-und-die-cdu-in-schleswig-holstein-auch-er-ein-
opfer-1.1131461.
White, D. W., & Lean, E. (2007). The impact of perceived leader
integrity on subordinates in a work team environment. Journal of
Business Ethics, 81, 765–778.
Worthen, B., & Lublin, J. S. (8 August 2010). Mark Hurd neglected to
follow H-P code. The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704268004575417800832885086.
html.
Zehn Jahre Hartz IV. (2012).c Deutschlands großte Sozialreform als
Dauerbaustelle. (15 August 2012). Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/
zehn-jahre-hartz-iv-deutschlands-groesste-sozialreform-als-dauer
baustelle-11855926.html.
Zhu, W., Norman, S. M., Peng, Z., Riggio, R. E., & Sosik, J. J. (2012).
The impact of ethical political leadership on the public: The
mediating role of confidence in political leaders. Leadership,
8(2), 109–124.
S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel
123