How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

18
How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals Steven L. Grover Marcus C. Hasel Received: 20 April 2013 / Accepted: 9 March 2014 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 Abstract The leader integrity literature has described how professional behavior influences perceptions of integrity, yet behavior in leaders’ personal lives potentially affects those perceptions. The present paper examined how personal life behavior affects leaders. We assessed high profile political sex scandals to explore the research ques- tions of how indiscretions in personal life affect leaders and how leaders recover from public revelations of sexual indiscretions. The results revealed that whether politicians survived the scandal depended on (a) the degree to which the indiscretion deviated from accepted norms, (b) the degree to which the behavior departed from the politician’s expressed values, (c) the leader’s political power (or value), and (d) whether the leader fully engaged in atone- ment under conditions when denying the allegations is not possible. These components were inter-related such that atonement was possible if the behavior was neither too extreme nor out of character and the leader had sufficient political power. The model was then tested with a sample of business executives engaged in sex scandals, finding support for its elements. Keywords Leadership integrity Á Trust recovery Á Reputation Á Sexual indiscretion Á Scandal Sex scandals of various forms have occurred throughout history. For example, Alexander Hamilton tarnished his political career in 1796 with an extra-marital affair and Stephen Grover Cleveland paid child support to Maria Crofts Halpin for a child born out of wedlock when he was a bachelor, and he was elected twice to the U.S. presidency despite this public knowledge (Summers 2000). In 2005, Volkswagen executives engaged in sex parties with pros- titutes in countries from Brazil to Germany, renting apartments to host these parties with corporate funds (‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012;O ¨ zgenc, 4 June 2007). Among those senior managers was Peter Hartz, who acted as Director of Human Resources at Volkswagen and was also strongly connected to powerful politicians, even acting as the name-sake for the Hartz 4 law that substan- tially altered the German working world. Hartz resigned following the scandal, and received a 2-year probation for his involvement (‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012). The present paper explores factors that determine why some leaders successfully continue in their careers and others see their careers whither following sex scandals. Leader Integrity The impact of sex scandals on leaders is an important issue for leader integrity. Leader integrity theorists have long suggested that behavior outside of the formal leadership role affects reputation in the form of leadership integrity perceptions by followers and others (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999; Trevin ˜o et al. 2000, 2003). Leader integrity research, however, has focused on work-related behavior, in-role behavior, and relatively little has investigated how behav- ior outside of work, extra-role behavior, relates to integrity (Brown et al. 2005; Grover and Moorman 2007; Kalshoven et al. 2011; Mayer et al. 2012). Moorman et al. (2012) have shown that people make assessments of leaders as a holistic S. L. Grover (&) University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] M. C. Hasel EMLyon, Lyon, France e-mail: [email protected] 123 J Bus Ethics DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2146-3

Transcript of How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

Steven L. Grover • Marcus C. Hasel

Received: 20 April 2013 / Accepted: 9 March 2014

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The leader integrity literature has described

how professional behavior influences perceptions of

integrity, yet behavior in leaders’ personal lives potentially

affects those perceptions. The present paper examined how

personal life behavior affects leaders. We assessed high

profile political sex scandals to explore the research ques-

tions of how indiscretions in personal life affect leaders and

how leaders recover from public revelations of sexual

indiscretions. The results revealed that whether politicians

survived the scandal depended on (a) the degree to which

the indiscretion deviated from accepted norms, (b) the

degree to which the behavior departed from the politician’s

expressed values, (c) the leader’s political power (or

value), and (d) whether the leader fully engaged in atone-

ment under conditions when denying the allegations is not

possible. These components were inter-related such that

atonement was possible if the behavior was neither too

extreme nor out of character and the leader had sufficient

political power. The model was then tested with a sample

of business executives engaged in sex scandals, finding

support for its elements.

Keywords Leadership integrity � Trust recovery �Reputation � Sexual indiscretion � Scandal

Sex scandals of various forms have occurred throughout

history. For example, Alexander Hamilton tarnished his

political career in 1796 with an extra-marital affair and

Stephen Grover Cleveland paid child support to Maria

Crofts Halpin for a child born out of wedlock when he was

a bachelor, and he was elected twice to the U.S. presidency

despite this public knowledge (Summers 2000). In 2005,

Volkswagen executives engaged in sex parties with pros-

titutes in countries from Brazil to Germany, renting

apartments to host these parties with corporate funds

(‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012; Ozgenc, 4 June

2007). Among those senior managers was Peter Hartz, who

acted as Director of Human Resources at Volkswagen and

was also strongly connected to powerful politicians, even

acting as the name-sake for the Hartz 4 law that substan-

tially altered the German working world. Hartz resigned

following the scandal, and received a 2-year probation for

his involvement (‘‘Zehn Jahre Hartz IV,’’ 15 August 2012).

The present paper explores factors that determine why

some leaders successfully continue in their careers and

others see their careers whither following sex scandals.

Leader Integrity

The impact of sex scandals on leaders is an important issue

for leader integrity. Leader integrity theorists have long

suggested that behavior outside of the formal leadership

role affects reputation in the form of leadership integrity

perceptions by followers and others (Bass and Steidlmeier

1999; Trevino et al. 2000, 2003). Leader integrity research,

however, has focused on work-related behavior, in-role

behavior, and relatively little has investigated how behav-

ior outside of work, extra-role behavior, relates to integrity

(Brown et al. 2005; Grover and Moorman 2007; Kalshoven

et al. 2011; Mayer et al. 2012). Moorman et al. (2012) have

shown that people make assessments of leaders as a holistic

S. L. Grover (&)

University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

e-mail: [email protected]

M. C. Hasel

EMLyon, Lyon, France

e-mail: [email protected]

123

J Bus Ethics

DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2146-3

interpretation and therefore consider how behavior outside

of work affects perceptions of integrity, even if such

behavior has little practical standing in the workplace.

Furthermore, Bauman (2013) theorizes leader integrity as a

fundamentally moral concept represented by leaders’

commitment to moral values. Therefore, leaders may be

viewed as unethical to the extent that their behavior devi-

ates from the moral understanding of observers.

Leadership integrity has garnered a great deal of atten-

tion in the past decade (Bauman 2013; Dineen et al. 2006;

Kalshoven et al. 2012; Moorman et al. 2012, 2013; Pa-

lanski and Yammarino 2007; Simons 2002; Trevino et al.

2003), and is related to positive outcomes, such as

increased follower satisfaction and organizational citizen-

ship behaviors (Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009; Kalsho-

ven et al. 2011; Moorman et al. 2013; Palanski et al., in

press; White and Lean 2007). However, the concept of

leadership integrity is still in its intellectual adolescence,

and Eisenbeiss (2012) notes that the construct is concep-

tually vague. She provides clarity by identifying four ori-

entations of leader integrity: humane, justice, responsibility

and sustainability, and moderation.

The moderation dimension is of particular importance to

sex scandals involving leaders. ‘‘Moderation orientation

refers to temperance and humility and balanced leader

behavior. It may be expressed by leaders’ self-control, their

ability to restrain emotions and personal desires’’ (Eisen-

beiss 2012, p. 797, emphasis in original). The moderation

dimension of leader integrity accounts for why people are

concerned with leader sexual behavior outside of work.

Engaging in extramarital affairs, for example, illustrates an

impulsiveness that is antithetical to restraint or a sense of

balance. The impact becomes particularly fierce when

combined with any conflict of interest invested in the

position, such as misuse of official resources.

Little research has addressed the role of extra-role

behavior in leadership integrity or examined the moral and

moderation components of leader integrity identified in

recent theories (Bauman 2013; Eisenbeiss 2012). The

present paper, therefore, seeks to address this gap in our

understanding of extra-role behavior and leader integrity

by investigating leader sexually oriented behavior. The

present investigation is informed by previous research on

political scandals, ethical perceptions of top leaders, and

responses to wrongdoing such as apologies.

Political Scandals

The role of scandals in political reputation depends on

the type of scandal, particularly pecuniary advantage

versus hedonistic interest. For example, experiments show

that tax evasion, compared to sexual infidelity, has a

more detrimental impact on the likelihood of voting for a

politician and evaluation of how well they are doing

(Funk 1996). Furthermore, both tax evasion and sexual

infidelity are judged much more harshly when they are

associated with an abuse of official power (Doherty et al.

2011). Constituents compartmentalize personal and pro-

fessional integrity factors to some extent, yet personal

matters influence perceptions of leaders, and one of the

reasons for abandonment of political support is a real or

perceived loss of trust in the leader (Maule and Goidel

2003).

Research outcomes of politician integrity indicate mixed

results. Zhu et al. (2012) found that the positive ethical

perceptions of political leaders give constituents greater

confidence in their leaders’ abilities and consequently

make them feel safer, and Maier (2011) found that the

prevalence of political scandals undermines trust and sup-

port in political institutions. However, analyses of over 250

scandals in the U.S. House of Representatives found only a

small impact on the perpetrators’ chance for re-election

(Basinger 2013; Peters and Welch 1980). The small scan-

dal effect could be due to the amount of information

available to constituents: Voters’ opinions are influenced

by scandal when they have a great deal of information

regarding the scandal (Regner and Le Floch 2005), because

scandalous information facilitates processing and recall of

information (Miller 2010).

Ethical Perceptions of Top Leaders

Part of the ambiguity about ethical perceptions of political

leaders is due to followers’ unique perceptual biases of

leaders. People overlook unethical leader behavior when it

is harmful to do otherwise and ignore unethical behavior

whose consequences are ambiguous (Gino et al. 2009).

Moreover, hierarchical distance exacerbates the ambiguity

of ethical perception, and Galperin et al. (2011) suggest

that high status people permit themselves to commit

unethical acts due to their isolation. Chief executives, for

example, are distant in space and experience from most

employees, insulated by chauffeur-driven cars, private

entrances, corporate jets, and leagues of gate-keepers.

However, followers judge high status offenders more

harshly for professionally related malfeasance (Fragale

et al. 2009; Skolnick and Shaw 1994), but they are more

likely to exonerate them of minor personally related vio-

lations (Rosoff 1989) because followers think of their

leaders in very personal terms as opposed to categorical

terms (Fiske 1993). These cognitive biases may be shaped

by extant perceptions of leaders: Negative perceptions of

leaders’ bad acts are mitigated by their inspirational

influence (Shapiro et al. 2011).

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

Leader Response: Apologies and Denials

How leaders respond to allegations of impropriety may

influence their ultimate survival from the scandal (Basford

et al. 2014; Byrne et al. in press). Apologizing is an effective

way to recover from trust violations based on competence—

a mistake, for example—but not for violations based on

integrity, such as doing something one knows to be wrong

(Kim et al. 2004, 2006, 2013). Denying integrity violations is

effective when the issue cannot be verified, because one can

claim innocence of wrongdoing, which will have a positive

effect until one’s guilt can be determined (Kim et al. 2009).

Should guilt be obvious, then providing internal reasons for

the violations helps to restore trust more positively than

external reasons for integrity violations (Kim et al. 2006).

Accordingly, political apologies that focused on moral and

ethical principles effectively changed followers’ perceptions

of politicians, and simply denying wrongdoing was found to

be counterproductive to re-establishing a positive political

image (Chanley et al. 1994).

Fehr and Gelfand (2010) suggest that effective apologies

need to acknowledge rule or norm violations and incor-

porate some type of compensation to re-establish a level of

equilibrium between the parties. This compensation may be

in the form of tangible goods such as money, or it may be

socio-emotional as in showing great levels of gratitude. For

example, Bishop Desmond Tutu argues in the post-Apart-

heid context that if someone has lost something, a simple

apology cannot rectify the situation. Instead, the wrongdoer

needs to return something to recreate the lost equilibrium

(Fehr and Gelfand 2010). The apologies must be sincere,

specific, and involve internal attributions as opposed to

external reasons for the violation (Tomlinson et al. 2004).

Furthermore, statements delivered by third parties may be

key to turning apologies into forgiveness and more effec-

tive than direct apologies from the offending party (Ren

and Gray 2009). The third party, such as a political spon-

sor, provides the illusion of disinterest compared to the

offender whose self-interest is at stake, and therefore can

promote the possibility of promoting the offender as a

positive person.

Atonement goes beyond mere apology. Whereas apol-

ogies restore image, atonement attempts to gain forgive-

ness. Koesten and Rowland’s (2004) theory of atonement

argues that seeking forgiveness requires the following:

1. Acknowledging wrongdoing and willingly and genu-

inely asking for forgiveness;

2. showing that one has thoroughly examined oneself and

the offending act to reveal ‘‘a changed attitude or

policy to prevent future wrongdoing’’ (p. 73);

3. providing evidence that one realizes a need to trans-

form the wrong into a present and future right;

4. publicly showing that he has suffered from his

wrongdoings.

These four phases must be displayed in public confes-

sion characterized by symbolic acts. Koesten and Rowland

(2004) theorize that including these steps projects viewers

toward forgiveness, which in the case of leaders may allow

them to restore reputations and to remain in power.

Scholars have only recently begun to examine the power

of apologies for leader transgression specifically (Basford

et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in press). Basford et al. (2014)

found that sincere apologies positively influenced the fol-

lower relationship and that insincere apologies were worse

than no apology at all. They also discovered that the utility

of the apology depended on the level of extant trust: Fol-

lowers who did not trust the leader in the first place were

not persuaded by the leader apologizing for offenses or

mistakes.

Byrne et al. (in press) found that leader apologies for

transgressions in direct follower relationships resulted in

greater psychological well-being on the part of the fol-

lowers, especially for less severe violations. They were

unable to replicate Kim et al.’s (2004, 2006) finding that

apologies worked better for failures of competence com-

pared to integrity. This may be due to context because Kim

and colleagues follow a recruitment scenario—evaluating a

job applicant—and Byrne and colleagues investigated the

direct leader–follower relationship.

Summary

Prior research provides a springboard to investigate issues

surrounding extra-role leader integrity violations. Leader-

ship integrity research suggests that extra-role behavior

influences global perceptions of leaders, but research has

not investigated this issue and we do not know how extra-

role behaviors affect perceptions of integrity. Prior research

also suggests that leaders are protected in their transgres-

sions due to isolation, but that once found out they can be

judged harshly, and laboratory research suggests that it

may be difficult to recover from the integrity violations.

The factors that affect how extra-role transgressions

affect follower perceptions and recovery from such trans-

gressions have little clarity. Therefore, the mission of this

paper is to explore how leaders respond to and are affected

by their own extra-role ethical transgressions. We examine

sexual transgressions because they are outside the scope of

the job, whereas most leader ethics research examines

issues such as misuse of funds or lying or cheating to gain

business advantage. Because the literature cannot yet guide

us toward the issues that affect leader survival following

sexual misdeeds, we use grounded theory as a complete

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

approach (as opposed to a coding scheme) to guide dis-

covery of key concepts and their inter-relations (Locke

2001; O’Reilly et al. 2012). We explore cases of leaders

involved in sex scandals, working with the information in

an iterative process to identify the key elements of situa-

tional responses and how these key issues are inter-related

in order to develop a theory of leader responses to extra-

role unethical behavior.

We build a framework from nine high profile political

sex scandals and then test the resulting model with six

cases from the business domain. All of these have been

involved in sexual scandals while in powerful offices, yet

some were able to hold on to power through a mixture of

engaging in atonement and using contextual advantages,

while others failed to do so. The central research question,

therefore, asks why and how some leaders succeeded in

remaining in office and continuing as leaders, while others

were forced to step down from their leadership roles.

Method

Recovery following sex scandals among leaders is explored

with a set of cases from politicians involved in scandals.

We identify the politicians, create rich cases from public

information, and then analyze them according to the

characteristics of the situation and the politician’s response.

The details surrounding each case provide a detailed pic-

ture of how politicians respond to sex scandal crises. We

initially focus on politicians because the news media

reports on these issues to a far greater extent than other

sectors, providing a vast amount of data from which to

investigate the details, and there is a wide variety of

examples with different outcomes. Following this theory

creation, we test the theory on a separate sample of busi-

ness leaders.

Grounded Theory

The grounded theory approach is appropriate for our

research problem because little theory or research has yet

examined how ethical violations that lie beyond a leader’s

in-role behaviors, such as sexual activities, relate to

leadership success and tenure (Eisenbeiss 2012; O’Reilly

et al. 2012). The inter-relationships of the various factors

have not been theorized, and it is, therefore, appropriate

to examine episodes in context and to develop theory

about why some leaders successfully navigate non-work

ethical lapses whereas others do not. We followed

Locke’s (2001) grounded theory principles to analyze the

data. The data were initially analyzed to create an

understanding of the underlying dimensions, which turned

out to include characteristics of the politician and how he

was portrayed before the scandal as well as his response

to the scandal. The inter-relationships of these dimensions

were then considered, traveling back and forth between

our ideas and the data, forming the analysis presented

below. The final result conceptualizes the inter-related

factors that influence success and failure following sexual

scandal.

We adopted a contemporary approach to grounded

theory. It is particularly appropriate for this research

question because little is known (a) in general about how

extra-role behavior and leader integrity, (b) specifically

about when that negative extra-role behavior is more or

less impactful, and (c) about the different leader responses.

Our thinking was guided by previous research and theory

on leader integrity, political scandal, and apologies, but

that was inadequate to explain why some leaders failed

whereas others prevailed. Therefore, we approached the

research problem by attending to the four tenets of

grounded theory: the constant comparative method, theo-

retical coding, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation,

and theoretical sensitivity (O’Reilly et al. 2012).

Constant Comparative Method

Using the constant comparative method meant that we

analyzed individual cases thoroughly and discussed the

issues as a team as we completed one case and moved to

the next. This continuous, nonlinear method allowed us to

develop ideas early about why some leaders succeeded

where others failed based on the unique characteristics of

their cases, and, further, this informed how we examined

the cases that followed. We continually revised our ideas

and compared them to the data at hand, both the fresh data

and the data that we had previously analyzed. This method

is the hallmark of grounded theory and allows frameworks

to develop from rich and murky data.

Theoretical coding goes hand in glove with the constant

comparative method. As we developed cases, we coded

events, circumstances and behavior deemed relevant to the

outcomes. We revised these coding schemes as we moved

through the data collection, observing relevant events or

characteristics of the situations that appeared to be

important. We often identified relevant issues in one case

and had to return to previous cases to search for similar

issues in the exploration for patterns.

Theoretical sensitivity refers to not only observing the

data with an open mind, searching for new meanings, but

also considering extant theory and research. Theoretical

sensitivity is a paradoxical issue in grounded theory

because the data are supposed to speak for themselves but

the researchers are informed. One way of resolving this

conundrum is to think of approaching the data with open

minds, not empty minds (Locke 2001).

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

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How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

Theoretical Sampling

Our sampling strategy began by identifying high profile

scandals, the response, and the outcome. We chose highly

publicized cases that collectively had a variety of responses

to the allegations and had various outcomes that captured

the issues of interest: apology versus denial, success versus

failure, legal versus illegal activities. We examined cases

internationally, at least on both sides of the Atlantic, to

consider cultural differences in attitudes toward leadership,

power, sex, and privacy. Leaders at this level of power tend

to be at the later stages of their careers; as such it is not

surprising that the average age at the time of the incident

was 54.4 with the youngest von Boetticher at 42 and the

oldest Berlusconi at 73. All leaders were male and from

Western countries including the USA, UK, Germany,

France, Italy, and Israel. The resulting list of cases and

summary details are shown in Table 1.

Theoretical Saturation

We started with a core sample of five cases and then built

on that sample for greater variation. As this complete

sample was processed and analyzed, we achieved theoret-

ical saturation, gaining no further insight, instead merely

applying ideas that we developed with earlier cases, and

therefore we stopped expanding the sample. Having

developed a model, and then becoming aware of cases of

well-known business leaders in similar situations, we tested

the model against these well-known cases of business

leaders.

Data Collection and Analysis Technique

In-depth news analyses were conducted for each case,

concentrating on respected news outlets such as The New

York Times and The Washington Post for American cases,

the Jerusalem Post for the Israeli case, and Der Spiegel,

The Guardian, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Le

Figaro for the European cases. Key news articles, televised

news conferences, and other visual media where were

assembled for each case.

The researchers took this raw data and produced three

key documents for analysis. First, the key articles were

assembled in chronological order. Second, we wrote

detailed cases that include details about the politician, such

Table 2 Summary of individual stories of politicians analyzed

Bob Livingston was Republican U.S. Congressman who resigned during debate over whether to impeach Bill Clinton over Lewinksy affair. It

had been revealed to him that Hustler magazine was targeting him as a conservative Republican politician and intended to reveal that he had

previously engaged in extramarital affairs. In his resignation, he pleaded for the President to follow suit.

Eliot Spitzer resigned as Governor of the State of New York when it appeared that information had leaked about his use of very high-priced

prostitutes. He had been elected on a platform of ethics with a call to clean up the ethics of the State legislature. He had a reputation as the

‘‘sheriff of Wall Street’’ for his unrelenting attacks on the Financial industry during his reign as the Attorney General of New York.

Anthony Weiner resigned as a U.S. Congressman following the public revelation that he had sent an indecent photo of himself to all his

Twitter followers, intending to send it to only one woman. He received little support from his Democratic Party and vigorously denied the

allegations before finally admitting them and resigning 19 days later.

David Vitter stayed in office as U.S. Senator after it was revealed that he had a history of using prostitutes. When he discovered that a

magazine was going to publish information about his prior use of prostitutes he held a press conference at which he admitted the allegations,

offered a strong apology with all the elements of atonement supported by a statement from his wife.

Christian von Beotticher was a rising star in Germany’s ruling party, slated to run for state governor in Schleswig–Holstein. He resigned

under party pressure when it was discovered that he had an affair with a 16-year old girl.

Silvio Berlusconi was Italy’s Premier and became mired in a controversy over inviting underage prostitutes to sex parties labeled ‘‘Bunga-

bunga’’ parties. It particularly came to light when he offered legal intervention for a girl commonly known as ‘‘Ruby’’ who was arrested and

called him for help. She had been one of the participants at the parties. He was able to stay in office despite these allegations and later

resigned from office as part of a European Union financial rescue of Italy. He was later charged and convicted of paying for sex with a minor

and using his official position to cover it up. These convictions are under appeal at the time of writing.

Dominic Strauss-Kahn (DSK) was the Director of the International Monetary fund and was likely to run for the Presidency of France when

he was arrested and charged with the rape by a chambermaid in New York City. He was forced to resign from the IMF. The charges were

later dropped due to the victim’s credibility, and as he returned to France multiple women made accusations of sexual harassment.

Bill Clinton was the president of the United States of America when he was accused of having an affair with White House intern Monica

Lewinsky. He at first vigorously denied the charges, only to admit that they were true and apologize to the Nation several months later. His

first apology was widely called a non-apology and he subsequently gave a thorough atonement speech in which he took responsibility for his

actions, admitted weakness, and demonstrated that he was attempting to improve himself.

Moshe Katsav was the President of Israel when he was accused of sexual harassment and rape. He completed his term as president, in which

he could not be prosecuted, and then following that was convicted of rape and sentenced to seven years in prison. He maintains his

innocence and charges that the allegations were politically motivated; he even rejected a plea bargain at one point that would have had

nearly no penalty. He is in prison at the time of this writing.

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

as background and political history, the nature of the

allegation, the manner in which it became public, the

politician’s initial response and its timeliness, and sub-

sequent iterations. These cases summarize the news articles

without the repetition to provide a detached view of how

the case unfolded and how the politician behaved at various

points. Researchers worked on just one case at a time and

were fully immersed in not only the news data collected,

but also the extraneous information that they may have

come upon in the pursuit of those articles, such as blogs

and opinions in local newspapers (to the politician). Lastly,

a timeline was created for each case that shows the key

points of the case.

Nine cases were analyzed and their stories are summa-

rized in Table 2. Three politicians continued in office fol-

lowing the scandal: Bill Clinton, David Vitter, and Silvio

Berlusconi.1 Five of the politicians resigned almost

immediately upon public disclosure of allegations of sexual

wrongdoing, and the final politician, Moshe Katsav, was

tried and convicted of rape following the natural expiration

of his term as Israel’s president.

Results

Analyses produced a model of outcomes following sexual

transgressions illustrated in Fig. 1. Four hierarchical layers

of factors determined continuation in office following

sexual integrity violations: deviation from norms, leader

values, political power, and atonement. The model is

hierarchical in the sense that failure at lower levels pre-

cludes an effect of higher levels. For example, if deviation

from norms is too large (first level), then the other three

factors are irrelevant. Alternatively, if the deviation from

norms is not too large, the deviation from the leader’s

values is not too large, and the leader has sufficient polit-

ical power, then atonement is a possibility that could result

in redemption. The following sections provide detailed

descriptions of the four layers.

Deviation from Norms

Some wrongdoing can be dismissed or forgiven as normal

lapses of human conscience, whereas other wrongdoing is

so severe that it deserves punishment because it is entirely

unacceptable. The ethicality of sexual wrongdoing could be

conceptualized as the degree of harm it causes in a con-

sequentialist approach or its divergence from accepted

norms in a deontological approach. At the most, illegal and

socially reprehensible are allegations of rape made against

Katsav and Strauss-Kahn. There is no possible recovery

from such serious offenses, which have stiff criminal

penalties, because they are socially repugnant as exempli-

fied by prison sentences ranging from 3 years in lenient

jurisdictions to life in parts of the USA. Conversely,

Western societies conceptualize prostitution as signifi-

cantly less severe than rape as demonstrated by its legality

in some places, and misdemeanor status in others, and the

infrequency with which prostitutes’ customers are

prosecuted.2

Boetticher, Clinton, and Weiner did nothing illegal, yet

only Clinton was able to survive politically. The various

acts that they committed were perceived as a lack of good

judgment because they failed to see how people might

perceive them as losing moral direction. These legal acts

are unacceptable for people in those positions in society.

Both Weiner and Boetticher used relatively new technol-

ogies such as Twitter, and Weiner masqueraded as a single

man when he was in fact married, and Boetticher devel-

oped a relationship with a 16-year old girl, factors that push

the behavior outside the normal boundaries of acceptable

behavior.

Fig. 1 Hierarchical model of leader responses to extra-role sexual

behavior

1 Silvio Berlusconi resigned as Premiere as part of European Union

bailout of Italy in 2011 and then was found guilty of charges

concerning the case in question in 2013.

2 Strafgesetzbuch §§ 80–358, Statutory State Law Alabama §§ 13A-

6-61.

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

Boetticher was forced to resign within a month of his

political superiors’ discovering his affair because it

appeared immature and impulsive. Even though the rela-

tionship constituted legal consent in Germany, observer

perceptions differed: ‘‘If he truly assumed that this rela-

tionship could survive his political ascent, he was too naive

for any post’’ (Weigand 2011, August 16). The deviation of

the act was, therefore, viewed in the context of cultural

expectations for a person in a leadership position. In cases

where the deviation from norms is not too extreme, the

personal values of the leader come into play as described in

the following section.

Leaders’ Personal Values

Congruence with espoused values affected outcomes. In

some instances, the behavior is consistent with a public

persona, whereas other times it screams hypocrisy. Politi-

cians such as Clinton, Berlusconi, and Strauss-Kahn had

public reputations as larger than life, charismatic, and

sometimes outrageous characters. For example, Clinton

was called the rock star president when first elected due to

his youthful, contemporary image and his engaging, char-

ismatic presence. Likewise, Berlusconi was the super-lea-

der media mogul turned prime minister, known for

elaborate parties and a hedonistic lifestyle. Polls suggested

that the general public was not concerned with Clinton’s

relationship with Monica Lewinsky, and the Italian public

tolerated Berlusconi’s lifestyle because

Berlusconi captures in one person, and in a peculiarly

Italian way, the excesses and the hopes of the era. To

many Italians, he is undoubtedly ‘‘one of us’’ in his

conviviality, Alpha-male swagger, apparent devotion

to his children (if not to his former wife), capacity to

ingratiate himself with whomever he is currently

seducing (politically and otherwise), reckless hedo-

nism, and (for some men, at least) ability to live out

an erotic ‘‘dream life’’ that they can only envy

(Agnew 2011, p. 2).

Hence, the unusual lifestyle and his womanizing were

largely ignored because they were consistent with his

image.

Spitzer and Livingston stand in stark contrast to Clinton

and Berlusconi in their public portrayal of their values. As

state Attorney General for New York, Spitzer broke up

exactly the same type of sex brokerage rings that he later

patronized, and as Governor of New York, one of his first

successes was to promote and sign into law one of the most

progressive sex trafficking laws in the nation that raised the

penalties for men who used the services of prostitutes.

More generally, he was known as the ‘‘Sheriff of Wall

Street’’ for his uncompromising attacks as the Attorney

General on conflicts of interest in the finance industry. In

addition, Spitzer became elected to Governor on a cam-

paign of lifting the ethics of state government based on his

reputation for fighting unethical business behavior in the

financial sector. These contrasting ideologies of using

prostitutes on the one hand while slashing at their legality

on the other may have influenced the reaction to revelations

of his personal prostitute usage.

Livingston was the Speaker-elect of the U.S. House of

Representatives when he resigned in a call for Clinton’s

resignation over Lewinsky. His resignation came as a

surprise, but he knew his history of extra-marital affairs

was going to be publicized by Hustler magazine, which had

targeted, and offered money for information leading to,

conservative Republican politicians who espoused so-

called family values. As the next speaker of the house,

Livingston was a high profile Republican and evidence that

he had not been faithful to his wife was inconsistent with

the political rhetoric of family values, which emphasize the

nuclear family, marriage, and fidelity. Part of how people

react to leaders’ sexual misconduct, therefore, has to do

with how that leader has portrayed values in the past and

the match between those espoused values and the mis-

conduct that has been alleged.

Political Power

If the leader’s transgression is not too dire a deviation from

norms and his values do not conflict too much, then the

next issue in our model concerns the degree of political

power the person has. Some politicians held more power

than others due to their expendability. For example, Vitter

continued as U.S. Senator after he revealed that he had

frequented prostitutes. Under U.S. law, had Senator Vitter

resigned his post, then the Democratic Governor of Loui-

siana would have likely appointed a Democrat to take

Vitter’s Republican senatorial seat until a special election

took place, increasing the slim margin (49/51) of Demo-

crats in Senate. Accordingly, resignation was not in the

Republican Party’s interest because other seats were in

play and the Republicans may have been able to enjoy a

majority vote in Senate.

The pressure for impeachment of President Clinton

emerged from the partisan politics. Republicans pushed

strenuously for the special investigation of the Whitewater

scandal, an investigation that grew to include the Monica

Lewinsky affair. Therefore, Republicans would have

politically benefitted from ousting Clinton—that is argu-

ably why the investigation went on for as long as it did,

since impeachments are handled by the then Republican-

controlled House of Representatives—but there was little

or no political benefit to the Democratic Party for Clinton

to resign. On the contrary, more harm to the party would be

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

attracted by deposing a sitting president than the press

coverage of the allegations and subsequent revelations

regarding Monica Lewinsky. In direct contrast, Boetticher

was a young rising star, whose personal life made him a

political liability to the Christian Democrat party, and there

was little cost to dismissing him. Similarly, Democratic

Party leaders abandoned Anthony Weiner from the outset

of scandal allegations and called for this resignation. For

example, in response to the question of what he would do if

Weiner were to come to him for advice, party leader

Senator Harry M. Reid responded that he would tell him

‘‘to call someone else.’’

The issue of political power and the ability to remain in

power becomes particularly visible in the case of Berlus-

coni who, as media tycoon, was able to control the news

coverage and influence public perception of his endeavors.

He also succeeded in changing various laws allowing him

to avoid prosecution and increase the size and influence of

his media empire (‘‘Berlusconi tightens grip on media,’’ 3

December 2003; ‘‘Berlusconi Says,’’ 26 October 2010).

Different from, for instance, Boetticher or Weiner, Ber-

lusconi created an environment that enabled him to act

very much as he desired.

Strauss-Kahn, who was also very well connected and

powerful, succeeded in surviving previous affairs until the

incident with the chambermaid at the New York hotel. At

least one Strauss-Kahn subordinate claimed he abused his

power to engage in a sexual affair with him, providing the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) with details about

‘‘how he summoned me on several occasions and came to

make inappropriate suggestions to me.’’ Even the same

subordinate, however, admitted that he is ‘‘a brilliant leader

with a vision for addressing the ongoing global financial

crisis.’’ The IMF brushed off the affair as ‘‘poor judgment’’

on the part of Strauss-Kahn, because he was simply too

valuable to lose and his wide appeal made him the most

promising candidate for French presidency (‘‘DSK leader

prefere,’’ 9 September 2008).

Apology Versus Denial

Leaders only had the opportunity to respond in the form of

apology or denial if the transgression did not deviate too

much from either norms or the leader’s values and the

leader had sufficient political power.

Denial

Denials attempt to distance leaders from reputational harm,

and it successfully accomplishes this in some cases, while

being counterproductive in other instances. When innocent

of fabricated allegations, it is reasonable to uncover the

fallacious allegations for what they are, and a strong denial

more effectively radiates the image of innocence, and even

hurt, caused by allegations (Kim et al. 2009). This pro-

jection of innocence explains why many politicians used

this strategy even though they were guilty. In contemporary

media-driven politics, however, resources exist to discover

and report truth of allegations, which makes vigorous

denial of truthful allegations (when one is guilty) a risky

strategy.

Two politicians initially denied the allegations and then

later admitted that they were true and asked for forgive-

ness. Anthony Weiner denied having sent a photograph of

his underwear-laden crotch on his Twitter account: ‘‘We’re

trying to find out where that photograph came from, and

whether it was manipulated, whether part of it might be

from something that was in my account,’’ and in response

to probes, ‘‘I’m reluctant to tell you anything definitive’’

(Karl, 6 June 2011). Similarly, U.S. President Bill Clinton

rather famously stated that ‘‘I did not have sex with (pause)

that woman (pause) Monica Lewinsky’’ (Associated Press,

26 January 1998). With media pressure and investigations

suggesting the veracity of the allegations despite their

denials, both these politicians relented and later admitted

that the allegations were indeed true.

In the amorphous world of sex, specific allegations are

sometimes denied when there is a seed of truth to them.

Strauss-Kahn employed this type of denial by claiming that

charges were not legitimate, but that ‘‘something may have

happened.’’ He denied the alleged rape of a chambermaid

in a New York hotel that led to rape charges being laid

against him, his resignation as head of the International

Monetary Fund, and abandonment of his anticipated run for

the French Presidency. When the legal charges in New

York were dropped due to victim credibility, he returned to

France to make a public apology for his behavior, which he

maintains did not constitute rape. Silvio Berlusconi also

adamantly denied wrong-doing in connection with the so-

called ‘‘Bunga–Bunga’’ parties, having sex with underage

girls, prostitution, and abuse of power.

Denials are claims of innocence to maintain reputation

and positions of power. They attempt to recast the narra-

tive, enlisting the scope of political enemies or conspiracy,

as illustrated by Katsav: ‘‘The legal onslaught on me was

an hysterical eruption of hatred and malice and it included

witness tampering, coaching, and coercing, all to frame the

President of Israel.’’ Denials attempt to put the narrative of

allegations to rest and to shift the view toward substantive

political matters. For example, Clinton vigorously denied

sexual relations with Lewinsky in a series of interviews

over the course of a few days, and typically ended with

statements such as, ‘‘These allegations are false. I need to

go back to work for the American people’’ (Associated

Press, 26 January 1998). Weiner said in a news conference

at the beginning of his scandal, ‘‘I am not going to permit

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

myself to be distracted by this issue any longer.’’ Early in

the Katsav investigation, when the press was pestering the

Israeli President, he said, ‘‘I don’t think it’s proper that I

have to answer this question every 2 h. I intend to fulfill

my obligations as president.’’

Denial usually backfired because it was deceptive.

When the veracity of the allegation is certain, proven, or

persistent, the denial strategy may distance the politician

temporarily, but the unsuccessful denial can further sully

reputation and end political careers.

Apologies and Atonement

In contrast to denials, apologies open doors, admit guilt,

and move forward (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in

press; Fehr and Gelfand 2010). Various types of apologies

were forthcoming in our sample. The most direct apology

comes from U.S. Senator David Vitter (Republican-Loui-

siana), who called a press conference to admit that he had

frequented prostitutes in the past. His name and telephone

number were on a list of high profile individuals who had

used a prostitution service, information which was revealed

to the Senator’s office when someone from Hustler mag-

azine contacted the office to investigate. At the press

conference Vitter confirmed reports that he had used

prostitutes several years earlier, that his wife knew, and

that he had asked forgiveness from his wife.

I want to again offer my deep sincere apologies to all

those I have let down and disappointed with these

actions from my past. I am completely responsible

and I am so very very sorry. No matter how long ago

it was, I know this has hurt the relationship of trust I

have enjoyed with so many of you, and I have a lot of

work to do to rebuild that. I will work every day to

rebuild that trust. Wendy and I dealt with this per-

sonally several years ago. I confronted it in confes-

sion and marriage counseling. I believe I received

forgiveness from God; I know I did from Wendy.

And we put it behind us.

Vitter is the most successful political case among our

examples, because allegations were made, confirmed, and

then he went on to continue in his role as a U.S. senator

with relatively little media attention about the issue and

won a second term as U.S. senator in 2010 (U.S. senators

serve 6-year terms). Vitter’s strategy was similar to that of

Clinton, discussed below, in that it covered all steps of

atonement (Koesten and Rowland 2004): He publicly

admitted wrongdoing (implicitly), took responsibility,

acknowledged and offered sincere condolence to those

affected, and suggested penance has already been paid,

particularly to his wife, who then reinforced his statement.

The involvement of his wife fulfilled the function of an

apology delivered by a third party, which may be the key to

turning an apology into forgiveness and to career contin-

uation (Ren and Gray 2009). Although Vitter’s wife did not

directly apologize for the allegation, she stated ‘‘like all

marriages, ours is not perfect’’ followed by the display of

her support: ‘‘I stand before you to tell you very proudly, I

am proud to be Wendy Vitter.’’

Bill Clinton demonstrated one of the most famous

turnarounds in response strategy. After vigorously denying

the Lewinsky affair, President Bill Clinton admitted to it

several months later in a 4 min statement to the nation on

this one single issue. In that speech he admitted that,

‘‘Indeed, I did have a relationship with Miss Lewinsky that

was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong. It constituted a

critical lapse in judgment and a personal failure on my part

for which I am solely and completely responsible.’’ He

excused his behavior by saying the matter was private and

that it arose due to a ‘‘politically inspired lawsuit’’ and that

he was ‘‘protecting his family.’’ His intended apology

speech, therefore, took the first steps toward atonement but

also added the distancing elements of denial by way of

excuses or justification.

The speech was widely criticized as a non-apology

(‘‘Testing of a president,’’ 19 August 1998), leading Clin-

ton to make an additional apology speech on September 11,

1998 at a White House Prayer meeting. Clinton’s final

apology speech had all the hallmarks of atonement (Koe-

sten and Rowland 2004): ‘‘I agree with those who have said

that in my first statement after I testified I was not contrite

enough. I don’t think there is a fancy way to say that I have

sinned.’’ He proceeded to apologize to those affected,

saying ‘‘I have asked all for their forgiveness.’’ He then

suggested that he was concerned with ‘‘genuine repentance,

a determination to change and to repair breaches of my

own making. ‘‘I have repented,’’ and ‘‘I must have God’s

help to be the person that I want to be.’’ Most strikingly,

Clinton shrouded the 10 min speech in the tenets of

atonement, ending with a famous prayer used on Yom

Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. As for Vitter,

Clinton also received third-party support (Jerome 2008;

Ren and Gray 2009) through his wife who announced

before the important impeachment trial that she was

‘‘committed to her marriage’’ and ‘‘believes in this Presi-

dent and loves him very much.’’

Both Vitter and Clinton successfully moved on with

their careers and the matters of their extra-marital activities

quieted. Going through the ritual of atonement, which

includes public mortification, served them well. By

exposing themselves and acknowledging weaknesses,

albeit ‘‘no matter how long ago’’ for Vitter and raised by

political enemies for Clinton, these politicians engaged

with their followers and removed the veneer of pride that

separates them from the public. Their constituents, for

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

example, could see them as human, with human frailties,

with which people identify using language such as ‘‘no

marriage is perfect’’ and the deep regret that is expressed

verbally and nonverbally. Baring weaknesses in atonement

draws people in by way of empathy served with similarity:

Presented authentically, guilty parties seeking atonement

project their shame and embarrassment in ways that allow

people to empathize with them. Because empathy is both

taking the perspective of another party and actually expe-

riencing their emotion, the request for forgiveness gener-

ates goodwill and a need for the other party to reduce those

negative feelings in themselves by doing something such as

granting forgiveness. In the video recording of Vitter’s

speech, for example, his facial expression reveals his

embarrassment and chagrin, echoed by his wife’s distress

that contrasts with her usual professional composure

(CNN, 16 July 2007). This human frailty is underscored by

Clinton saying at the beginning of his atonement speech

that he needed to put on his glasses to read something that

he had written the night before, suggesting that he is

human, his aging eyesight is not good for reading small

print, and he wrote the statement himself as opposed to a

team of speechwriters developing the prose.

The successful leaders in our sample pointed to their

importance for future achievements, and their commitment

to the collective goal: ‘‘We all have a lot of important work

to do for Louisiana’’ (Vitter); ‘‘I would never walk away

from the people of this country and the trust they’ve placed

in me’’ (Clinton). In addition, Clinton and Vitter fulfilled

every step in atonement and clearly focused on the issue at

hand rather than being vague as their counterparts Spitzer

or Strauss-Kahn. Berlusconi, the third politician who con-

tinued in power, never apologized or entered the process of

atonement. His power to control the media and change the

legal system enabled him to survive the numerous scandals

by denying any wrongdoing. As we are writing this paper,

however, Berlusconi was convicted of paying for sex with

a minor and abusing his office in trying to cover it up.

Perhaps, we might suggest, had he engaged in atonement

the story might end differently.

Test with Business Executive Sample

This paper has developed theory for how leaders respond to

and then are affected by sexual affairs. The personal and

professional consequences and outcomes of sexually pro-

vocative scandals have little to do with their formal roles

yet influence a leader’s future success and ability to remain

in power. While we used political leaders for our inductive

theorizing, we are interested in how this theory applies to

business leaders. Therefore, we conducted an analysis of

publicized business leaders’ reactions to allegations of sexTa

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How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

scandals as partial test of the theory that we developed. We,

therefore, attempted to replicate the method used for pol-

iticians with six recent high profile cases of business

executives embroiled in sexual controversy on either side

of the Atlantic (Table 3).

Mark Hurd, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP),

resigned following allegations of sexual harassment by an

HP contractor who had a personal relationship with him.

The ensuing investigations cleared Hurd of sexual harass-

ment and stated that no sexual relations occurred, but the

board found that he exercised poor judgment in having

dinners with, and making payments to, this contractor from

his expense account. While he was cleared of the sexual

allegations, the board viewed his lack of judgment in

expense reporting as too severe to stay on as CEO at HP.

The case of Mark Hurd fits and supports our theory. His

actions deviated significantly neither from norms nor his

official persona, yet it was politically expedient for the

board to sack him. Some claimed, in fact, that is was a

brave move on the part of the board (Worthen and Lublin,

8 August 2010), and others claimed that the board did not

trust him due to his role in ousting of the chairwoman of

the board in an infamous spying scandal. Therefore, Hurd

never had the chance to apologize or make amends.

Instead, his public statement was: ‘‘As the investigation

progressed, I realized there were instances in which I did

not live up to the standards and principles of trust, respect

and integrity that I have espoused at H.P.’’

Harry Stonecipher was ousted as CEO of Boeing for

having an affair with another Boeing executive only

15 months after being brought back from retirement to

bring ethics to the company in the aftermath of serious

ethical violations that had earned it a ban from the U.S. Air

Force, which was a major Boeing client. The board forced

his resignation on the grounds that a relationship with a

staff member violated the recently introduced code of

conduct that was meant to restore a higher level of ethics to

Boeing. The policy does not specifically prohibit intra-

company romance, but does prohibit activities that could

embarrass the company or raise questions about its hon-

esty, impartiality, and reputation. Applying our theory,

then, Stonecipher’s actions did not represent a gross devi-

ation from norms, but were inconsistent with his persona as

an ethical savior of Boeing. Stonecipher either chose not to,

or was not given the opportunity to step forward and

engage in the process of atonement.

For the very top echelon of business executives, the

appearance of ethical behavior, even as it pertains to one’s

romantic life, seems to be paramount. Another example is

Christopher Kubasik, who was to become Lockheed’s chief

executive on the first day of 2013. Kubasik, who was

married, had a long-standing affair with an employee who

had left the company before the scandal surfaced. The

stated basis of Kaubasik’s forced resignation was a

departure from ethical codes. Although Lockheed’s code of

ethics has no clear guidelines on romantic relationships, it

does prohibit conflicts of interest, such as ‘‘having a close,

personal relationship with a subordinate employee’’ (2011,

p. 25). Like the rest of the aerospace industry, Lockheed’s

ethics were being scrutinized, prodding the board chairman

to make the official statement that ‘‘While I am deeply

disappointed and saddened by Chris’s actions, which have

been inconsistent with our values and standards, our swift

response to his improper conduct demonstrates our

unyielding commitment to holding every employee

accountable for their actions’’ (Drew, 9 November 2012).

In a statement regarding his resignation Kubasik said, ‘‘I

regret that my conduct in this matter did not meet the

standards to which I have always held myself.’’ This case

illustrates the importance to the company of appearing to

be ethical due to the pressure on the industry from past

ethical failings. Those previous failings, however, were

over the issues such as industrial espionage and inappro-

priate treatment of government officials responsible for

issuing contracts, whereas Kubasik’s case seems to be

colored by personal ethics from the individual’s personal

life.

A similar case that involves links to personal value

systems is the forced resignation of Brian Dunn, the CEO

of Best Buy. Dunn was axed for ‘‘engaging in an extremely

close personal relationship with a female employee that

negatively impacted the work environment’’ (Audit Com-

mittee 2012, p. 1). No romantic or sexual interest was

admitted by either party or even alleged in the final report.

Instead, the close personal relationship evidenced by

attending dinners, drinks, and sporting events together was

enough for the audit committee to declare that ‘‘The fre-

quency and level of interaction between the CEO and the

female employee became sufficiently well known at

Company headquarters that it generated speculation about

the nature of the relationship, especially due to the dis-

parity in position, power, and age between the CEO and the

female employee.’’ They go on to say ‘‘Company policy

prohibits any ‘behavior not consistent with our Company

values.’’’

Brian Dunn’s behavior that led to his downfall was

clearly a departure from the accepted norms, which the

audit committee report explicitly stated. Moreover, the

investigation was initially prompted by Best Buy’s strong

founder and chairman when he was given information

about the relationship. The company found no improper

use of company resources, but ample evidence of a close

relationship that fit uncomfortably with the values

espoused by the board. The legal justification for enforcing

such fierce standards of conduct among the highest ranking

officers of corporations centers on reputational risk to the

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

corporation, which in turn affects its valuation in the

marketplace (Peregrine 2012).

Corporate cases of this nature are not confined to the

USA. For example, Wolfgang Buchele was slated to

become the CEO of BASF Chemical Corporation in Jan-

uary 2008, but was forced to leave the company shortly

before taking stewardship. Just a few days before reaching

the zenith of his career, BASF announced in a press release

that Buchele resigned for personal reasons. In reality,

Buchele was forced to step down because he had a liaison

with a coworker in breach of company guidelines (von

Top-Managern 2011). The abrupt end to his successful

corporate career supports the notion of that situational

characteristics play a decisive role for leaders’ ability to

defend against, and recover from, sexual scandals. He did

not claim to undermine his own personal ethical code, as

Kubasik did, but was simply a threat to corporate reputa-

tion for breaching corporate policies.

In contrast to all the cases above, in which married men

had some sort of improper relationship with women, Brit-

ish Petroleum (BP) CEO John Browne was forced to resign

when he fell victim to a former boyfriend selling their love

story to a British tabloid. While he was cleared of any

professional wrongdoing by BP, he lied about how he had

met his former boyfriend to avoid being ‘‘outed’’ as a

homosexual. Although he declared later that being outed

was the best thing that had ever happened to him because it

lifted a weight from his shoulders (Browne, 15 July 2010),

the allegations forced him to resign without the £3.5 mil-

lion bonus and the £12 million golden parachute he was

contractually entitled to if he had given a year’s notice

(Wearden, 1 May 2007). Browne’s downfall was lying

under oath when trying unsuccessfully to win an injunction

against the Daily Mail to prevent their publication of an

article on how he had met his boyfriend, Canadian Jeff

Chevalier, 34 years his junior (Rice, 6 May 2007). He

claimed to have met Chevalier while jogging, instead of

admitting that they met through a male escort agency.

Analysis of Browne’s case with our model proves

interesting. His ensuing resignation seems to be prompted

by his lover’s publicly outing him as a homosexual, which,

more precisely, led Browne to perjure himself in court.

This ‘‘outing,’’ however, was only the media publication of

their relationship. Chevalier had been living with Browne

for four years, nearly always accompanying Browne on

trips and socializing in their home and at outside events.

Chevalier claimed to have met some of Britain’s most

powerful people in business and politics, and as such

Browne’s sexuality was of no surprise (Rice, 6 May 2007).

In terms of our model there seems to be little evidence that

there was too much deviation from norms given Browne’s

stature as long-time CEO of one of the world’s largest

companies. Second, Browne’s espoused values do not seem

to deviate significantly from this relationship in the sense

that he was not married and had no platform of ethics from

which lead, in comparison to the aerospace executives

noted above. Browne’s downfall, then, may have had to do

with his political power at the time. Clearly, he was a

politically powerful man, connected to boards throughout

Europe and the United States and regularly entertaining

powerful political figures such as the British Prime Min-

ister. Indeed, Browne is now serving as ‘‘super-director,’’

the most senior business advisor to British government to

instill a greater business ethos (Harvey, 12 March 2013).

However, Browne had already announced his retirement,

named his successor, and ultimately resigned just

19 months early, suggesting that it may have been politi-

cally expedient to the board to see his early departure in the

face of reputation damage. Additionally, BP was under

some pressure, particularly from the United States, which

had witnessed a string of major industrial accidents at BP

facilities and had fined the company and provided scathing

criticism of its safety practices. The political realities,

therefore, superseded the other elements of the model to

make a forced resignation the most expedient thing to do.

Summary

The model illustrated in Fig. 1 explains the outcomes for

the business executives in our sample. There are a number

of limitations to this test of the model, however. The

sample is biased. By examining only high ranking execu-

tives from the news media, the sample is biased toward

forced resignations that make their way into the news. In

contrast, other boards face sensitive issues with their top

managers (e.g., CEO) and treat them confidentially. Only

when the CEO resigns does the board need to put a public

face on the decision. Therefore, there could be cases in

which leaders engage in out-role sex scandals that result in

their staying in place. Such cases, therefore, are much more

likely to provide the opportunity for apology or atonement.

In fact, our model suggests that for issues that appear not to

stray too far from either acceptable norms or the leaders

espoused values, that business leaders and others may have

the opportunity to provide full and complete apology that

has the elements of atonement. Before a board or an

investigating committee (e.g., audit committee), a CEO

may be able to recognize that his or her actions have vio-

lated trust and confidence, appear to have true remorse,

appear to be attempting to improve on a felt character flaw,

and make amends going forward.

Another bias of the sample in our test of the theory is the

fact that they are all CEOs, which makes them newswor-

thy. Leaders at lower levels of the corporation are much

more likely to be able to follow the model. An affair, for

example, is not outrageous behavior in some contexts or

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

exhibited by certain people, and some leaders are valuable

assets to their companies, which may allow for atonement.

We developed the model with political leaders and then

tested it with widely publicized CEO affairs because that

information is publicly available and some theory needs to

be created to understand how extra-role, character-related

events influence the success and failure of leaders.

Discussion

We have developed a grounded theory of how leaders

successfully or unsuccessfully deal with their own sexual

improprieties and the effects on their careers. We devel-

oped a theory based on politicians who have become

embroiled in sexual controversy and then tested that theory

on a sample of business executives who have found

themselves in similar circumstances. The nature of that

theory is that the leaders’ success or failure was determined

in a hierarchical fashion by four sequential elements. First,

if the nature of the sexual impropriety propriety is too

severe a deviation from accepted norms (e.g., of the

institution), then the leader will not be able to successfully

recover from the situation regardless of what he does.

Should it not be too severe, the second issue, the deviation

from the leader’s values or persona comes into play. If the

behavior is vastly inconsistent with the leader’s espoused

values, then the leader will not be able to successfully

recover from the episode, yielding to the third level. Should

the first two levels of the model be satisfied, then the third

question is whether the leader has sufficient political power

to prevail, or whether the leader is politically expendable.

Lastly, in the cases where the first three questions have

been satisfied, the leader may be able to apologize using

the elements of atonement in order to successfully gain the

forgiveness of followers and other constituents. This last

step of atonement, however, can only occur if the first three

levels (deviation from norms and the leader’s values and

political power) allow the leader to engage in atonement

actions.

Theoretical Implications

Little leader integrity research has differentiated between

professional and private life and how they influence per-

ceptions, with the exception of Trevino and colleagues’

(Trevino et al. 2000) notion of personal morality, which

suggests that leaders ‘‘have a greater standard, a greater

responsibility than the average person would have to live

up to’’ (Trevino et al. 2000, p. 132). Most of the subsequent

research, however, focuses on the moral person at work

(Brown et al. 2005; Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009;

Kalshoven et al. 2011). The present study provides a

unique angle on how private lives potentially influence

leader integrity. Most of the characters in both of our

samples neither did anything illegal nor abused their

power, yet most had negative personal outcomes, demon-

strating that behavior in personal lives influences how

leaders could be perceived in their professional roles.

We have introduced a number of potential moderators of

the impact of personal life behavior to the leader integrity

field, including deviation from norms, fit with one’s leader

persona, and political power. The leadership integrity lit-

erature has found an association between perceptions of

leader integrity and a number of positive follower out-

comes (Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009; Kalshoven et al.

2011; Moorman et al. 2013; Palanski et al., in press; White

and Lean 2007). The present findings highlight the notion

that the same leader behaviors might not result in the same

outcomes for all leaders, that they are moderated by those

issues found in our model. As the field of leader integrity

enters its adolescence, we need to sift through these

potential moderators to improve our understanding leader

behavior and integrity.

Current work in leader integrity and related subfields has

begun to look at how leaders violate trust or offend fol-

lowers, finding severity influences how followers respond

and importantly how they react to apologies for the offense

(Byrne et al., in press; Grover et al., in press; Tomlinson

2011). The present findings add to this work by providing a

nuanced view of offense severity and linking that perceived

severity to the characteristics of the leader. The main

implications, therefore, are that the characteristics of the

leader in terms of their past behavior, overall impression or

image, and political power moderate the impact of extra-

role ethical violations.

The present study also supports Eisenbeiss’ (2012)

reconceptualization of leader integrity as including a

moderation orientation. Most leader integrity research has

taken either a consistency or a justice-based approach and

ignored the essentially moral nature of leader integrity that

Bauman (2013) recently identified. This study supports

these new notions, extending our understanding toward not

only the fact that behavior based in moral values affects

leaders but the nuanced manner in which they affect

leaders. The nuance lies in how the behavior fits with

constituent values as well as how it fits with the leader’s

persona.

Previous research has predominantly found that apolo-

gies are ineffective for recovering trust following integrity

violations (Dirks et al. 2011; Ferrin et al. 2007; Kim et al.

2004, 2006). However, the present findings coupled with

other recent leader apology results suggest that this may

not be true for leaders. Byrne et al. (in press) found no

difference in the effectiveness for apologies based on

whether violations were competence- or integrity-based,

S. L. Grover, M. C. Hasel

123

and the present findings show that apologies could be

effective for sexually-oriented integrity violations. Fur-

thermore, Grover et al. (in press) similarly found that the

competence-integrity distinction was not meaningful for

differentiating recoverable from irrecoverable trust viola-

tions in the direct leader–follower relationship. These more

recent findings are in the realm of leadership and previous

trust recover studies have looked at hiring decisions and

trust. Due to structure, people are more dependent on their

leaders, and if they meet certain thresholds, then followers

and others might prefer to overlook forgive violations

(Gino et al. 2009).

The present findings also augment Byrne et al.’s (in press)

finding that severity was more important than the type of

violation for predicting the impact of apologies. The present

findings add to their findings by identifying components of

severity. Deviation from both norms and the leaders’ values

are elements of severity that could be examined further in

future research. Additionally, the second level of our

model—leader values—is a striking addition the literature,

suggesting that the impact of transgressions is a function of

leader characteristics, or that it varies according to who the

leader is and how he has behaved in the past.

Recent theory suggests that people who violate trust need

to engage in sincere apologies and provide restitution steps to

move forward (Andiappan and Trevino 2010; Goodstein

et al. 2011). Our findings, coupled with the literature on

political apologia, suggest that genuine atonement involves

more than apology and moving forward (King 1985; Koesten

and Rowland 2004). This literature, illustrated by Vitter and

Clinton’s apologies, says that in addition to asking forgive-

ness and taking steps toward the future, the statements must

be public and demonstrate mortification, which includes

publicly sharing the sense of shame and admitting that one

was wrong. In fact, research supports the notion that shame

from moral failings promotes either image restoration or

hiding from others (Gausel and Brown 2012; Gausel and

Leach 2011). These elements of atonement are particular to

leaders and extend the experimental research that has found

that substantive action, such as suffering, is more effective

for recovering trust than mere apologies or promises (Bottom

et al. 2002; Schweitzer et al. 2006).

The recent leader-based work on apologies combines

with the present research to start a coherent picture of

leader apologies (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in

press). These findings suggest a set of circumstances under

which leaders can effectively apologize for their actions.

The extension and contribution of the present findings,

however, is in the elements of atonement. The difference

between apology and atonement is that atonement seeks the

possibility of forgiveness for actions; the leader takes

responsibility for actions and notes that they were wrong.

Atonement clearly had positive effects in our political

sample, and certainly at least some of the apologizing in

previous research would include unmeasured components

of atonement (Basford et al. 2014; Byrne et al., in press).

Future work will benefit from differentiating the types of

apologies to create more refined models of how leaders

recover from their mistakes.

Practical Implications

The important lesson for leaders is that they are held in the

public eye, even if that public eye is primarily their own

organization. The type of inappropriate behavior needs to

be carefully measured against the normative culture of the

organization or community in which one finds oneself.

When behavior runs outside these limits, corrective action

in the form of atonement may be necessary. However, our

analysis suggests that leaders need to weigh various aspects

before engaging in atonement. Denial may be the best

option to stay in office (Ferrin et al. 2007). Combined with

the use of language that shows their human side, denial of

wrongdoing, or justification that explains their behavior in

terms that everyone can associate with, are key to surviving

scandals. However, should denial not be an option, then

leader should adhere to the steps of atonement. Moreover,

they should be coupled with third-party support by the

stakeholder who is most affected, such as the wife. Support

from peers is essential and needs to be clearly expressed,

and third-party support must be explicit public announce-

ments of ‘‘full faith and confidence in the person.’’

Limitations

The main limitation of the present work is that we have

analyzed high profile cases and our selection may have

influenced the results. We purposely chose cases that col-

lectively faced a range of accusations and outcomes. Other

scandals of the sort are easy to come by with a quick search

on the internet; there are web pages, for example, that list

America’s top 50 political scandals. While we do not report

it here, we have compared our findings with these scandals

and our findings seem to hold. Those offenses that are too

out of sync with the time or place or inconsistent with the

individual politician have very negative results for the

politician, their disgrace or loss of perceived integrity.

Additionally, we conducted a post hoc test of the theory

with business leaders after the theory was developed.

Another limitation is that we have studied leaders in

vastly different contexts, including the United States,

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Israel. To

some degree, we expect constituents to respond differently

in these situations. The sexual mores in the different cul-

tures presumably influence how leaders are perceived in

these types of situations. In fact, part of the initial sampling

How Leaders Recover (or Not) from Publicized Sex Scandals

123

methodology was to access these different contexts in the

expectation of cultural differences. What we found, how-

ever, was not a direct cultural difference, but a more

nuanced consideration of politicians’ deviation from

expected norms. Stronger than national culture, therefore,

were expectations about how leaders expressing certain

values should behave. In fact, our sample of politicians

from different countries robustly stands up to scrutiny and

is not biased by the ideals within any single culture.

We have focused on the leader in this study, but it should

be recognized that leadership issues are largely interactive

between leaders and followers (Klaussner, 2014; Uhl-Bien

2006). Followers vary in their moral orientation, which

affects how they perceive the acceptability of moral behavior

(Grover and Coppins 2012). The purpose of the present

research was to focus on whether leaders succeed or fail, and

future research may benefit from considering how individual

followers react to leader indiscretions (Grover 2014).

Conclusion and Future Directions

The effect of personal life behavior on leader integrity and

how to recover from acceptable lapses of ethical personal

behavior has not been previously examined in the orga-

nizational sciences. Using the available cases of political

sex scandals, we were able to determine that the accept-

ability in terms of integrity of sex scandals depends on the

variation of the act from (a) cultural norms, and (b) the

leader’s persona. Under the conditions in which this

deviation was not too much to entirely crush integrity and

force resignation, the leaders needed to express genuine

remorse and shame over their acts. These findings provide

guidance for how leaders should respond to discoveries of

frailties that we all have. Future research on the interac-

tion of organizational leaders’ private and personal life

should examine these issues in order to more finely tune

our understanding of how life outside of work affects

leaders’ ability to lead.

Acknowledgments The authors express their thanks to Robert

Moorman for inspiring the study and reviewing an early version of the

paper and to Jennifer White and Adele Brun-Ney who assisted in the

data collection. This research was partially funded by a Grant from

Agence Nationale de la Recherche (TDLR-ANR-12-JSH1-0007-01).

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