How Do We Close the Hermeneutic Circle

© 2008 The authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Nursing Inquiry 2008; 15(1): 57–66

F e a t u r e

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

How do we close the hermeneutic circle?A Gadamerian approach to justification in

interpretation in qualitative studies

Jonas Debesay, Dagfinn Nåden and Åshild SlettebøOslo University College, Oslo, Norway

Accepted for publication 29 October 2007

DEBESAY J, NÅDEN D, SLETTEBØ Å. Nursing Inquiry 2008; 15: 57–66How do we close the hermeneutic circle?In this article, an attempt is made to analyse important implications of the hermeneutic approach in qualitative studies. Thearticle discusses the hermeneutic circle with regard to reasoning contexts, on which the researcher’s interpretation is based.Problems in connection with achievement of ‘proper’ understanding in an interpretative process are discussed in light ofGadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy. Some features of qualitative studies are addressed. This is concerned with arguments inthe presentation of findings in qualitative studies using the hermeneutic approach. The essence of the article is there aregrounds for reasonable understanding, even though it cannot be absolute in the hermeneutic.

Key words: Gadamer, hermeneutic circle, interpretation, nursing research, qualitative.

Research studies using a phenomenological or hermeneuticapproach are central within nursing research (Draper 1996;Geanellos 1998; Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). Manyof the reasons for this are likely to include researchers’epistemological concerns when viewing the distinctivenature of nursing as a relational science. This is, in ouropinion, also one of the reasons why the work of humanists,1

such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (Vattimo 2000) — in the field ofhermeneutics — are applicable in nursing research.2

This article focuses on the insights that may be derivedfrom the hermeneutic circle, as described in Gadamer’sphilosophical hermeneutic, and discussion will therefore becentred on the contexts we reason within and how we candraw conclusions from these in practical research.

However, first we shall provide a brief explanation ofthe relationship between hermeneutic and qualitativemethodology followed by an explanation of the mostimportant features of the hermeneutic circle. We will thendiscuss important problems connected with how we arrive atthe ‘right’ understanding in an interpretative process, andfinally we will examine some methodological consequencesthis has in respect of presentation of findings in studies usinga hermeneutic approach.

QUALITATIVE METHOD AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

There is a prevailing belief that the various qualitativemethods are epistemologically different and are connectedonly insomuch as studies using qualitative methodologypresent their findings in the form of texts, in contrast toquantitative methodology, whereby explanations can begiven using figures (Guba and Lincoln 1998; Cresswell 2003;Rolfe 2006). The various methods range from positivistand constructivist, to phenomenological and hermeneutic

Correspondence: Jonas Debesay, Oslo University College, Faculty of Nursing,P.O. Box 4, St Olavs plass, 0130 Oslo, NorwayEmail: <[email protected]>

1 In this instance, the term ‘humanist’ is used to designate the humanities.

2 The dissociation from a positivistic tradition is, however, also an implicitreason.

J Debesay, D Nåden and Å Slettebø

58 © 2008 The authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

methodology. There is no consensus, either in respect of useof common criteria or the need for such between theseepistemological approaches (Rolfe 2006).

Many nurses have based their research on ‘techniques’created by phenomenologists such as Colaizzi, Giorgi andvan Manen. These formulae for qualitative research have beencriticized over recent years for their weaknesses in respect ofcongruence between the philosophical theories and use inpractical research (Paley 1997; Fleming, Glaidys and Robb2003; Rolfe 2006). Consequently, greater concordance hasbeen called for between these approaches and theirimplications on practical/empirical research activity (Paley1997, 1998, 2005; Geanellos 2000; Fleming, Glaidys andRobb 2003).

In this article we shall take our starting point in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Guba and Lincoln (1998)classify hermeneutics within the interpretative tradition,under qualitative methods. Gadamer, however, prefers toview hermeneutics as an approach; and not as a methodproviding specific guidelines for the acquisition of newknowledge. His primary intention is to reveal conditions thatfacilitate understanding ; an aim not intended to be subject toscientific examination, but as ‘being-in-the-world’ (Dasein).His hermeneutic approach may also therefore be viewed asan ontological philosophy. Consequently, the process ofunderstanding he describes is not limited to any method inprinciple, be that qualitatively or quantitatively (Gadamer2004).

THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE

Research into human activity requires our being able tointerpret the players’ intentions (Gilje and Grimen 1993).The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor defines thehuman as a self-interpreting animal, and all understandingwith regard to social interactions must of necessity take itsstarting point in the individual’s understanding of himself/herself (Fossland and Grimen 2001); consequently, allunderstanding will also involve self-understanding.Understanding is achieved by our interpreting within acircular process, in which we move from a whole to theindividual parts and from the individual parts to the wholethrough the hermeneutic circle. When we examine a bodyof work, for example the Bible, the Koran or the Torah, wemust interpret the individual parts of the text, as determinedby the whole; whilst the whole is determined by the individualelements of the work.

Our prejudices or preunderstanding are necessary condi-tions for our understanding of the present. This recognitionstems from the fact that we never meet the world without

prejudice, but with preconceived expectations of it based onprior experience. Consequently, understanding takes placewhen a fusion of horizons of past and present occurs (Grondin2003; Gadamer 2004). The dialogue of the text leads tocommon formation of opinion about die Sache which isalways up for ‘discussion’. In this process, implicit prejudices— over which we have no conscious control — appear to havean influence on our interpretations without our being awareof it. This requires that we thematize our prejudices in orderto arrive at a proper understanding based on the actual issue(Gadamer 1977).

This interrelationship between the whole and itsindividual parts must not however, be seen as a circulusvitiosus (vicious cycle), from which one cannot escape. Inthe hermeneutic circle one does not remain in the sameplace but constantly acquires new knowledge. As such, thecircle is a positive opportunity for gaining new knowledge(Gadamer 1977). Hence, it has been argued that thehermeneutic circle should rather be associated with a spiralin order to avoid deterministic assumptions (Ödman 1979;Gilje and Grimen 1993).

The distance in time (temporal distance) enables us toreassess our prejudices in order to arrive at this understand-ing. The temporal distance mediates as such between thetraditions that fuse into a new one. The prejudices may thenbe viewed as being parts or elements of a tradition; while thetradition in turn can be seen as a comprehensive system ofprejudices.

In this way, understanding takes place when the pre-judices that lead to misunderstanding are filtered out throughthe interplay of the whole and the parts in the hermeneutic circle. Itis not, however, the case that we understand better, but ratherthat ‘we understand in a different way, if we understand atall’ (Gadamer 2004, 296). Neither is it the case that we aremoving towards a final ‘objective’ solution (Tate 1998).

Hermeneutics is therefore a process where, according toTaylor, we attempt to render clear something that appearsunclear. Hence, we can understand the hermeneutic circleas the context within which we must interpret and reason(Gilje and Grimen 1993).

HOW DO WE ARRIVE AT THE ‘RIGHT’ INTERPRETATION?

When we interpret we need to know whether our inter-pretation is sound, even though it cannot be final. This iseven more important when we are required to pass thisinformation on to others. A researcher who has interpretedplayers’ actions must also, according to Anthony Giddens,be able to put this within a context and language which is

How do we close the hermeneutic circle?

© 2008 The authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 59

transparent to others; usually a research community (Giljeand Grimen 1993).

To bring together the parts into one whole is a criterionwhich Gadamer (1977) refers to as proper understanding.This whole may be defined as that which is perceived to bean adequate framework within which one interprets. But thisoverall criterion can, according to Gilje and Grimen (1993),be too strictly interpreted. In order to achieve a whole onecan be led to include something which does not actuallybelong under the whole. There is also a risk that theresearchers leave a work one interprets too quickly — withoutseveral thorough examinations — when an apparent wholeis achieved. Consequently, these risks may lead us to think ofthese interpretations as arbitrary.

Interpretations occur within a process whereby a predraftis continually revised as one gains a greater grasp of the text,whereby mutually inconsistent terms or meanings are com-pared and where only those which are relevant to die sacheare selected (Gadamer 1977). Consequently, there is alwaysan interplay, and tension, between the whole and its elementsin interpretation. This is therefore an issue of optimization,where one shall find a whole which is optimal in terms of theprevailing circumstances (Larsson 1993). In connectionwith this we can perhaps refer to the act of judging, whichGadamer himself uses in several analogies. When a judgeinterprets a statutory provision we will not usually saythat the interpretation is random, but that he is searchingfor an accurate understanding/application of the law. Con-sequently, understanding occurs when something absorbs usor interests us (Gadamer 2004). The point here is not thatthere is no interpretation which is more plausible thananother, but in order to make a judgement we, of necessity,have to have a yardstick. Here Gadamer places the traditionwithin which we always find ourselves as such a yardstick.

Tradition influences our attitudes in important areas,and it must be taken as a legacy which does not necessarilyneed to be analysed in advance, but just ‘is’. But never-theless, there is nothing irrational or random about it, andin agreement with Quentin Skinner we can say ‘We acceptsuch beliefs on trust, on the grounds that we know no better,that they look inherently plausible, and that most otherpeople feel the same’ (Skinner 1988b, 93).

The criteria of the whole, therefore presupposes thetradition that we should be able to arrive at an adequateunderstanding, but there are no grounds to believe thetradition to be in stasis. We humans have created thetradition and can — and do — change it on a regular basis. It isnot therefore a question of a fixed internal content in thetradition, but rather a content which changes meaning overgenerations (Grondin 2003; Gadamer 2004).

One should view the hermeneutic circle as a heuristicstate (Tate 1998). It gives us a miniaturized view of theunderstanding process in reality. Consequently, our inter-pretations should be viewed in light of the fact that Gadamerprovides a philosophical description of how we understand,not a method in its narrowest sense. Consequently, thehermeneutical circle can in principle be interpreted toostrictly in practice — despite traditional perceptions ofalternative methods of understanding.

So saying, the holism in Gadamer’s thinking can, aswe see it, profit significantly from a coherent definition, asproposed by the Norwegian philosopher and professor ofmedical ethics Knut Erik Tranøy. Tranøy (1986) suggeststhat in the research process one must be able to differentiatebetween the significant and the insignificant; seek freedomto contradict and to come to logical-deductive conclusionsin order to achieve coherence.

We have now seen that hermeneutics proposes that thesearch for knowledge is process orientated, and that thesearch is not for ‘complete’ knowledge (Ruth 1991). As such,the understanding can be revised constantly, but in practicalresearch, resource-related factors limit our potential to ‘refine’our understanding indefinitely through the hermeneuticcircle (Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). Consequently,practical research must of necessity find a plausible endpoint.

TEXT AND MEANING

In order to establish the meaning in a text we must interpret.Two important questions arising in this context are: Whatmeaning? Meaning for whom?

The philosopher Paul Ricoeur attributes the text with anautonomic status, and the intention of the interpretation is,in his opinion, to understand the meaning of the text on itsown terms. This is interpreted as the text being disconnectedfrom the author and that his/her opinions are not what theinterpreter should look for in a text (Ricoeur 1981; Grimen1995; Geanellos 2000; Shklar 2004). This reminds us ofMartin Luther’s credo of ‘sola scriptura’, but we shall nowsee that this theory is scarcely applicable under all circum-stances where a text is to be interpreted.

The historian of ideas Quentin Skinner has maintainedthe position that the researcher must endeavour to find theauthor’s intentions, in other words, the thoughts the authorwished to impart through his composition or description ofactions, if it is to be correctly understood (Skinner 1988a).

Both standpoints can lead to unreasonable results in aninterpretative process and if we are to attempt to understanda text on the basis of the author’s intention, as Skinnerproposes, we must understand this intention beforehand.



However, this does not seem to be fruitful as a norm for alltext interpretation. Not only must we interpret the author’sintentions, but neither is it always possible to trace sourceswhich can reveal the author’s intentions. Therefore, we willoften only have access to the text, and not the author.Neither is Ricoeur’s proposal unproblematic. It can hardlybe reasonable in practice to always give the text an auto-nomic position vis-à-vis the author. One thing is that it is notalways possible to establish the author’s intentions due topoor/lack of sources; quite a different matter is that texts arealways interpretations, and that consequently the inter-preter need not be concerned with the author’s intention.

Skinner, rightly enough, asserts that the author’s meaningalone is not the most crucial factor in the interpretation ofa work (Skinner 1988a). This does not, however, weigh upagainst the view that Skinner assumes an interpretive per-spective which undervalues the plurality of interpretations,insomuch as these are not viewed as a construction betweenthe text and the interpreter.

Ricoeur’s perspective is closer to interpretations of worksof fiction such as poetry, where the author’s views are oftenless important. This would be reasonable in the sense thatsome people may experience the work as having a meaningfor himself/herself, without the author necessarily havingconsidered this (the work’s independent role). However,even in poetry the author’s intention need not be completelyunimportant, together with the fact that it runs contrary towhat researchers actually do when they interpret in practice(Shklar 2004).

Gadamer’s views in the area may perhaps vary theimage. He proposes that when one wishes to understand,one is not normally engaged in finding the objective truth inwhat the text says as such: the interpretation takes placebased on prior-understanding and expectations of thetext to be interpreted. Moreover, interpretation is alwaysapplication; we interpret and try to understand when wefirst shall render something concrete for use (application)(Gadamer 2004).

However, there is nothing wrong with trying to retrievethe perspectives of others. Gadamer’s analogy of the work ofthe judge or priest is often evident when one attempts to giveexamples of the notion of application. In this case one mayconsider a situation where a judge is presented with a caseand has to pass a judgement. The judge acts in accordancewith a statutory provision and must interpret it in light ofprevious legal practice, in other words, how similar caseswere resolved previously (what is the norm for such cases?).Where the law is unclear the judge must also establish thelegislators’ intentions with the law — in practice this occursby interpretation of the preliminary work of the law. So-

called ‘equitable considerations’ can also be crucial in certaincases. These give an opinion of the reasonableness of anydecision weighed up against concrete individual or societalinterests.

This involves application of the law in a specific situationwhich governs our interpretation in order to arrive at aproper understanding — whether that be the letter of the law(where the law is unequivocal), the legislators’ intention orother equitable considerations (where the law alone is tooequivocal such as it is).

What is crucial in determining whether one shall retrievethe author’s intention or the text’s alone depends thereforeon what the purpose of the study is? It is also this continuedneed for application which gives understanding (Grondin2003).

Interpretation of intentions and actions are, in otherwords, closely interconnected (Gilje and Grimen 1993).Neither is there any principle difference in the historian’sand the poet’s interpretive work, but the application can bedifferent.3 It is also important to note here that in principlewe do not differentiate between texts and actions in ouraccount.4

We have now asserted that Gadamer’s notion of applica-tion can be helpful while determining whether to retrievethe author’s intention or not. Attempting to sort out whichstudies in the field of nursing coincide with one (Ricoeur’s)or the other (Skinner’s) assumption would, though, bemissing the point. It is rather, in our reading of Gadamer, thedifferent phases of the research process that will establishwhat is most significant at each time.

The application term in the hermeneutics inclines us toreflect upon the theoretical and practical implications ofour study. When presented with a clinical phenomenon, inorder to appropriate an understanding of it, we need to takethe context it is appearing within into account (Lindholm2003).

Thus we strive to listen and take informants accountsseriously while in the interviewing phase. This is also the casefor non-verbal language in hermeneutic observation studies(Nåden 2007; Bergbom 2007). Approaching the informants’expressions in this manner, with an openness and curiosity,gives us an opportunity of gaining valuable insight in theirerlebnisse (experiences). However, we ought not to takeall informants or their accounts at face value in all cir-cumstances. Some accounts may be, given the researchers

3 See also Ödman’s (1992) ‘Interpreting the past’, a hermeneutic illustration ininterpretation of historic sources.

4 Hermeneutics have often been associated with the interpretation of textalone, such an interpretation is scarcely reasonable.



preunderstanding and common knowledge, unclear ormisconceived. In this case the researcher should try to putthe retrieved information in a clearer light for her/hisaudience, possibly by engaging in a subsequent dialoguewith the informant. The patients’ expressions of symptomexperiences can thus be put in a wider context using nursingcare and medical terminology.

Clearly this would entail some ethical considerations,especially in dealing with vulnerable informants, whichshould be duly addressed. The framework of this articledoes, however, not permit a further discussion on thistheme.

UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN TRADITIONS

Alasdair Macintyre has proposed an expansion of thehermeneutic circle in order to make it possible to be able toconsider foreign cultures on their own terms. He feels thatit should, so saying, be possible to acquire a new culture’straditions, without ones own culture influencing this under-standing. In this way one should be in a position to assess theother culture in a manner which does not presuppose biasedinfluence of the first. This has been rejected by Gadamer(Tate 1998). Understanding is always coloured by onesearlier culture/tradition and it is naive to think that onecan enter into another culture without drawing on one’sown previous experiences. It is also quite feasible to usehermeneutic terms in order to include understanding ofother cultures. There is a polarized relationship betweenfamiliarity and foreignness in hermeneutics, according toGadamer, but it is precisely this polarization on which thehermeneutics are based — namely, acknowledging thistemporal distance (Gadamer 1977). An analogy for suchunderstanding is that one’s own preunderstanding is the oldhorizon, and that this is the horizon with which one meets anew strange horizon in new cultures. Consequently, thesetwo horizons meet each other in what we call the fusion ofhorizons and result in a new understanding (Gadamer 2004).Such understanding requires that the parties are curiousand have a wish to understand the ‘foreign’ (Spence 2001).These theories are also supported by Charles Taylor(Fossland and Grimen 2001).

The hermeneutic framework of ideas can therefore be auseful approach to studies whose field of research is foreigncultures. Thus far, however, interest has been low, a factwhich Niekerk (2004) is surprised at — given the insightwhich could have been acquired by such an approach.

The Australian nursing researcher Deborah G. Spence(2001) has in this way used hermeneutics in order toconceptualize how two different cultural backgrounds can

exceed their limitations and be able to conduct a dialoguewith each other.

THE RELATIVITY TRAP

In an attempt to distance oneself, not only from a fixed‘objective’ truth, but also from a Kantian idealism, withsetting of criteria for attainment of truth, hermeneuticsinclines undeniably towards relativism (Rose 2002). This cancreate an unacceptable situation when an interpretation isonly required to be true, either for me (subjectivism) asa single individual, or us (relativism) as a particular group,something Rose (2002) has referred to as the twin hornsof irrationality. Such assumptions, however, are usuallyconnected to postmodern or constructivist epistemologies.Since the constructivist perspective is part of the interpretivetradition, it is necessary that we trace the different views thatare at odds with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneuticregarding the relativity discussion. Various constructivistapproaches exist but we can already discard some of thosewith the most doubtful assumptions. The Norwegianprofessor in theory of science, Harald Grimen, describesone of the extreme variations, and demonstrates the fallacyin the assumption that all social phenomena are socialconstructions — much less natural phenomena — in fact thisis not always the case (Grimen 2006). Gadamer’s response tothis is ‘No one doubts that the world can exist withoutman and perhaps will do’ (Gadamer 2004, 444). At the sametime he avoids simultaneous subjectivism by placing theinterpreter into a historic tradition independent of himself(Rose 2002).

The philosopher Paul Boghossian is of the opinionthat postmodern or constructivist approaches are self-undermining. If the assumption ‘anything goes’ is correct, whythen should we not believe the opposite also to be the case;something which of necessity results from the assumption.Boghossian doubts, however, that the constructivist is pre-pared to accept such reasoning — why then should relativismbe recommended ahead of other approaches? (Boghossian2002). Gadamer also sees the unacceptable in the postmodernapproach, and feels almost that it proposes a monopolyon the method of ‘the truth’. In this way, supporters of thisposition are themselves in the claws of the Age of Enlighten-ment’s rhetoric (Grondin 2003).

A more conciliatory form of constructivism is that theconstructivist can feel that social phenomena exist becausethe players themselves acknowledge them. But this need notobligate the constructivist to have the same belief, or equallyto believe that all social phenomena are social constructions(Grimen 2006).



In the opposite situation we would end up running incircles, insomuch as there is no basis for assessment,and all interpretations would be equally random, whichcan be a hopeless position to take in empirical research.All interpretations in fact are rarely equally plausible, eventhough they can be subjective.

HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION

Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are often cited as examples ofhow the hermeneutics of suspicion operate. These haverevealed the agents’ ‘false consciousness’ and urges such as‘the will to power’ and ‘sexual instinct’, as properties theagents themselves have not openly acknowledged(Skjervheim 1992). Skepticism towards the meaningswhich agents themselves attribute to their own actions hastherefore long been considered as a means of arriving at aproper understanding. This, however, conflicts with anotherprinciple termed ‘the infallibility thesis’. This thesis will, inshort, assert that the agents’ interpretations ought not to becorrected, with the consequence that the researcher’sdisclosures must correspond with the agents’ own inter-pretation. Charles Taylor, however, explains that the agents’interpretations require theorizing, which places thephenomenon one focuses on in a clearer light — since theagents’ own accounts are often not comprehensivelyarticulated (Fossland and Grimen 2001). Consequently, thisis not quite the same as saying that the agents may have madean error, as Bourdieu is understood in Grimen (2006).

It may, in light of this, be important to have an open viewof thoughtlessness or apparently ‘good’ actions, somethingwhich several nursing researchers have shown examples ofin their research. Cortis (2004) studied nurses who in theirown opinion felt that they gave ‘holistic’ nursing care topatients from a different cultural background. He revealedthat this was not in agreement with his subsequent findingsfrom interviews with the patients in question. The agents’descriptions of their own actions were, in this case, inconflict with the researcher’s description of the situation.The same applies to all criticism of ‘transcultural nursing’,partly because of the categorization created by this approachto patients from ethnic minorities, and how this leads to anunanticipated increase in stigmatization of the group onewishes to help (Molassiotis 2004; Jeffreys 2005; Narayana-samy 2005). In respect of this, Mulholland (1995) assertedthat transcultural nursing’s humanistic credo concealsunderlying power relationships.

Gadamer appears to be certain that individuals do notalways come to the same conclusion over ‘the statement of thefacts’ — disagreement arises! It is not the case that consensus

always exists, but neither is understanding completelydependent on their being subsequent agreement over theexplanation of the case. The core to hermeneutic thinkingis being able to ask questions. Hence, understanding inGadamerian reasoning is not only a question of acceptingeverything said by others uncritically. The fact that oneactually attempts to understand means that one in principlemust believe that he can be wrong. In this way, the differencesare the beginning of the hermeneutic dialogue and not asdeconstructivists such as Derrida might think; that this isthe end of the hermeneutic. Criticism is also a part of thetradition. Traditions survive for as long as they serve theneeds of individuals, and are not immutable (Di Cesare2004; Gadamer 2004). Taylor too is of the opinion that thehermeneutic does not run contrary to the fact that theresearcher need not take the author’s version as given, assome have asserted (Taylor 1988). Much of the insight fromboth Foucault and Derrida has also been raised by Gadamer,and earlier than both authors, according to Niekerk.Nonetheless, neither does Niekerk view this as being moredifficult to incorporate than the ‘critical impulses’ withinhermeneutics (Niekerk 2004).

It is, however, clear that Gadamer does not problematizeasymmetrical power relationships and hidden agendas anyfurther in his discussion of the conditions for understanding.This is also an element of the criticism levelled at him byhis former pupil, the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo(Rose 2002).

THE PRINCIPLE OF MERCY

We cannot always be sure that our understanding is in agree-ment with the persons with whom we converse. There willalways be potential for our interpretation to be flawed, whilstthe text’s author or the agent’s interpretation is sounder(Gilje and Grimen 1993). One important precondition inGadamer’s hermeneutic is therefore to accept that one is inerror (Gadamer 2004). This brings us to another principleunder discussion; the principle of mercy. The principle isbased on getting the words and actions of those beingresearched to appear sound. In order to understand theagent’s opinions at all, this must be taken on its word, as longas the opinions are reliable. Understanding is in fact madepossible by the researcher being in a position to conceptualizethe agent’s own opinions. A researcher who has understoodthe informant’s opinion should therefore, in principle,give a description of these opinions in a manner which isacceptable to the informant. This is the case even where thedescription uses other forms of expression and arrives atconclusions other than those imagined by the informant.



Consequently, there is nothing wrong, in Gadamerianthinking, with the view that informants can make errors, butthis cannot always be the case. This would in fact be a case ofmaking the so-called genetic fallacy, in other words themetaphysical understanding that the respondents largelyhave erroneous beliefs about social phenomena (Grimen2006). Gadamer makes an analogy in this context to theperson who receives a letter. The letter is read with specificexpectations, depending on the extent to which the personknows the letter’s author. In the first instance this is notsimply the letter being read in a skeptical or suspiciousmanner and it is only in the moment that parts of the letterdo not accord with the whole or other expectations of theletter’s content, that there are reasonable grounds forsuspicion (Gadamer 1977).

The principle of mercy describes therefore a listeningapproach, as laid down by hermeneutics. This assumptionappears to be more productive overall than constantskepticism. Naturally, this will also depend on the themewhich is open to discussion in a research process. In such away, it would be more pressing to adopt a skeptical approachin those cases where one believes that the informant has,with a high degree of probability, something to hide. Thiswould, for example, not be a good approach when theresearcher has chosen ‘good’ nurses to describe relevantcare actions towards patients. This does not, however,exclude the possibility of the researcher being alert forpossible inconsistent responses or ulterior motives in theirresponses. In principle a skeptical approach to the sourcesneed not therefore be in conflict with the principle ofmercy. Nonetheless, in cases where inconsistency arises itis not the case that the only benefit is to discard our originalinterpretation, but rather to have a conscious relationshipwith this further along in the process. The discrepancy inthe informants’ answers can of course be due to a factor overwhich the interpreter has no control; for example, one’s ownincomplete understanding or ambiguity and inability toclarify one’s own intentions.

Consequently, the agent’s subjective opinions are neces-sary, but are not sufficient conditions for arguments inrespect of the phenomenon’s validity. The researcher musttherefore constantly weight up when he/she shall undertakea perspective analysis — be able to see the case in a broadercontext, and information analysis — to be a participant in adialogue by behaving in accordance with the agent’s subjectiveopinion (Gilje and Grimen 1993; Grimen 2006).

The hermeneutics of suspicion introduced hidden andunacknowledged meanings as terms in research into humanbehaviour. But these, according to the influential Norwegianphilosopher who has written extensively on the issues of

hermeneutics and positivism Hans Skjervheim, are self-immunizing theories, which cannot be disproved empirically.Skjervheim feels therefore that there is more to gain fromreconstructing the classics’ phronesis notion of practicalwisdom (Skjervheim 1992). There is, of course, no Archime-dean point for correct understanding. But this is hardly anobstacle to decisions being taken on a discretionary basisevery single day. Understanding is, as such, probably easy ineveryday life, if one acts with goodwill. The problem firstarises when we are required to explain how we do thistheoretically (Davidson 2004). For the sake of fairness itshould however, be mentioned that the requirement forimpartiality and lack of bias in everyday life is not oftenrequired to be as strict as that in scientific research.

The principle of mercy demands therefore that onestrive after an intellectual openness which allows thephenomenon to ‘... present itself in all its otherness andthus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings’(Gadamer 2004, 272).

METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

In presenting findings from research studies it is importantto have awareness about the philosophical preconditions inthe method used. Here we shall address some problemsrelevant to how certain measures are applied in the researchprocess in studies inspired by Gadamer’s philosophicalhermeneutic.

Authors of articles in nursing journals frequently recordthe criteria used in the various stages of the research process.The disadvantage is that often no account is given of howthese criteria have been used in the situation in question.Then, one may of course ask how useful this is, when one ispresented with a study which claims to have followed aGadamerian hermeneutic, and where the only feature ofthis is the recorded criteria. This may often be for reasons ofspace in some research journals. This may nonetheless notbe a favourable situation. The reasons are that the readerscannot form an opinion if the method cited is used in anappropriate manner, and in this way, unfortunately, qualitycomments are withheld from the study.

A more passable method may be to give an account ofthe grounds one has chosen for important decisions duringthe research process. This can be achieved by referring toapposite references or examples which can make clear thepremises of the arguments — such that the reader is giventhe opportunity to understand how interpretations mayhave transpired (Geanellos 2000). Such a method is surelymore transparent and insightful.



A hermeneutist will often have to thematize his/herpreunderstanding in order to gain a better understanding ofthe study object. Hence, on presentation of study’s findingsit is necessary to describe preconditions which are con-sidered to be of relevance to one’s interpretations. It will berelevant to include some personal experiences in such adescription. It can often be difficult to determine what theseexperiences are, and in which way they have affected thestudy. Still, one should avoid the temptation to write a bio-graphy (Larsson 1993). It is also important, in our opinion,that the reader be informed of the theoretical framework forinterpretation. In such a way, the reader has the opportunityto put the discussion of the findings into a theoreticalcontext, something which must be particularly useful to thereader who is not familiar with the framework within whichit is interpreted.

There seems furthermore to be an understanding thathermeneutic studies should be satisfied with describingthe experiences of informants, without theorizing inter-pretations. Such an interpretation must, however, build onwhat John Paley (2005) has called ‘phenomenologicalrhetoric’. His assertion is that researchers in the field ofphenomenology uphold the view that one can keep theirbiases outside of the result of the studies by giving a detaileddescription of the informants’ assertions. In this way theywish to bring forth the informants’ ‘unique’ and ‘pure’ voice,such that the reader can judge themselves (Paley 2005).In such a way, some hermeneutists have probably adaptedthis to their studies uncritically. Several interpretationsare thought to occur in hermeneutics; the informant’sinterpretation of their surroundings, the researcher’s inter-pretation of informants’ opinions and subsequent fusion ofhorizons, and the reader’s interpretation of the researcher’sdescriptions. When one presupposes all these links in theinterpretation process it is therefore naive to think that theresult may be ‘contaminated’ if the findings are discussedthrough adequate theory. Consequently it is not a case ofunderstanding that the researcher summarizes a valueneutral description. The researcher presents a co-created, orconstructed, version of the reality which he/she is responsiblefor interpreting in the final instance.

Another problem which often arises is the extent towhich one shall return descriptions collected to informantsfor checking. In our understanding there cannot be anythingautomatic in this. The crucial factor should be the extent towhich the researcher has gained a complete or adequateunderstanding of the phenomenon being studied, basedon interpretation of the data gathered. Where there areambiguities in listening to tape recorded excerpts or ontranscribing, there are reasonable grounds for checking

with the informants, and with this in mind one should returndata collected (Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). However,in many cases ethical consideration will form the basis forthe decision to check with the informants, to the extent thatthey can state whether they have been reported accurately.

When the hermeneutist attempts to understand theagents’ actions, he/she makes a strategic selection whichcan shed light on the issue studied. In this respect it is notrepresentative to make generalizations about what one islooking for, but to have an in-depth understanding of aphenomenon (Fossland and Grimen 2001). This hasimplications in terms of how often one should interviewinformants. In this context, Franklin, Trenestedt and Nor-denfelt (2006), informs us of an informant who was removedfrom the study as the subject was no longer available for secondround interviews. No reasons are given for the decision.As such this reminds us of a report of ‘missing’ values inlongitudinal quantitative studies. The most important factormust be the centrality of the phenomenon: in other words,the extent to which the researcher gains an accurate under-standing of the ‘case’. It can hardly, therefore, be the causethat one has an absolute need for several interviews withinformants. In the case of the study named, the researcherscould perhaps have used what they had already learned fromthe informant in question, provided one is not of the opinionthat the phenomenon cannot be further elucidated. It may,for example, be that this informant was a central supplierof terms, and that it was no longer possible to re-establishthe phenomenon’s relevance.

All practical research is based on understanding andjudgement, and consequently is a reflective process wherethe researcher continually questions their own preunder-standing and the plausibility of the findings, which takesplace en route. It is therefore important to bear in mindthat ‘Neither “qualitative” nor “interpretive” means “impres-sionistic”. Along with procedural systematicity, the workinvolves a philosophical rigor — a rigor of logic and argu-mentation — rather than just a procedural “rigor” ’ (Yanow2003, 243). The findings in a study should, thereby, beconsidered based on the harmony of the parts in the whole,rather than the extent to which specific techniques areslavishly followed up in the study. The reasoning whichsupports the findings should be logically ordered, and at thesame time should convince the reader that the results areadequate and stand up against alternative ways of under-standing (Larsson 1993; Rolfe 2006). We must therefore inthis context, pin our trust in the assertion that ‘... what thetool of method does not achieve must — and really can — beachieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, adiscipline that guarantees truth.’ (Gadamer 2004, 484).



CONCLUSION

We achieve understanding through the hermeneutic circle.This circle symbolizes the context within which we interpret.We have now seen the need and necessity for being able toacquire understanding in research activity, which in terms ofGadamer presupposes a preunderstanding in a historicallyimpregnated tradition. Our grounds for adequate under-standing must therefore be based on the fact that allinterpretation cannot be equally plausible, and that theresearcher can achieve a great deal by listening to theirinformants and showing good judgement. At the same timeone should bear in mind the hermeneutic insight that theunderstanding cannot be final. But this closes the circle ofunderstanding, if only for now.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Professor Ingegerd Bergbom, Institute of Healthand Care Sciences at the Gothenburg University, for helpfuland critical comments during the preparation of this article.

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How Do We Close the Hermeneutic Circle

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