1 Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) ShortageTraining Opportunities And Ongoing Initiatives ToIncrease And Maintain The JTAC Population

5 Foreign Professional Military EducationA Human Capital Investment To Develop 3-DOperators

9 SOF And The Asymmetric Warfare GroupEnhancing The Combat Effectiveness Of OurOperating Forces

13 Emerald WarriorThe Future of SOF Mission Rehearsal

16 USSOCOM’s Role in Joint Doctrine

19 SOF ExperimentationTNT as a Pathway to Innovation, Collaborationand Transform

21Warfighter Challenges – Engines of Change

24 SOF Baseline Interoperable Standards

26 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

38 3D Modelling

31The Chairman’s Joint Training SystemFocusedResources, Meaningful Metrics, and Command-Wide Integration USSOCOM’s Training Trifecta

HORIZONSHELPING SHAPE THE FUTURE OF SOF

ISSUE 4, SUMMER

VISIONThe recognized expert in SpecialOperations Forces knowledge, in-stitutionalizing irregular warfare,and developing and integratingfuture concepts and capabilities

MISSIONDevelop and prepare fully capableSpecial Operations Forces for the presentand into the future, ready to conductmilitary operations, build partnercapacity and promote security engage-ment, through doctrine, education, andtraining; future concepts, wargaming,and capabilities integration; and institu-tionalizing irregular warfare across thejoint force

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Shortage:

Chapter - JointTerminalAttackController (Jtac) Shortage:

Training Opportunities And OngoingInitiatives To Increase And Maintain TheJTAC Population

Lately there has been considerable attention being focusedon the importance of Joint Terminal Attack Controller(JTAC) qualified personnel. In a memorandum fromGEN David Petraeus, USCENTCOM Commander, tothe Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, he highlightedthe criticality of providing more JTACs for operations inthe USCENTCOM AOR. JTACs provide the expertiseto direct accurate Close Air Support (CAS) to successfullyengage enemy targets while reducing collateral damageand civilian casualties. The dispersed nature of U.S andCoalition forces on the counter-insurgency battlefield callsfor more JTACs to be emplaced with these units. Theshortage of qualified JTACs can be attributed to factorssuch as lack of suitable training ranges, limited aircraftavailability, high operational tempo, and a limited numberof qualified instructors (JTAC-I) and examiners(JTAC-E). It is important for SOF units and personnel tounderstand Terminal Attack Control (TAC) operationsand the training required to increase and/or maintainJTAC qualified personnel. In order to do so, familiaritywith the following publication is essential:

USSOCOM Manual 350-5, Joint Terminal AttackController(JTAC) Training, 5 September 2008. This manualestablishes the minimum standards for training, qualifying,evaluating, and certifying USSOCOM personnel to control CASmissions as a JTAC. It is essentially the SOF JTAC “bible.”

DefinitionsThe process to establish minimum standards for training,qualifying, evaluating, and certifying USSOCOMpersonnel to control close air support missions as a JTACcan be somewhat confusing for those not intimatelyinvolved in the field. To better understand these processes,the following definitions should be understood and canbe found in USSOCOM Manual 350-5:

JTAC A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is aqualified (certified) Service member who from a forwardposition directs the action of combat aircraft engaged inclose air support and other offensive air operations. Acurrent and qualified joint terminal attack controller will

be recognized across the Department of Defense ascapable and authorized to perform terminal attack control.

JTAC-I A Joint Terminal Attack Controller Instructor(JTAC-I) is a highly qualified JTAC who provides therequisite instruction and guidance for certification toJTAC trainees. This individual must be at least an E-5,have at least 2 years continuous JTAC experience as aqualified JTAC, must be appointed in writing by the unitcommander, and must pass a recurring 18-monthevaluation using the criteria outlined in Table 5-1 ofUSSOCOM Manual 350-5.

JTAC-E A Joint Terminal Attack Controller Examiner(JTAC-E) is a highly qualified JTAC who provides therequisite evaluations of JTACs required for initialcertification and the recurring evaluations JTACs undergoto maintain qualification. This individual must have at leastone year experience as a JTAC-I, must be on a letter fromthe unit commander, and must pass an initial evaluationusing criteria outlined in Table 5-1 of USSOCOMManual 350-5.

Terminal Attack Control A control consists of at leastone aircraft (fixed/rotary wing) attacking a surface target.The control begins with a CAS brief, also known as the“9-line briefing,” from a JTAC and ends with either anactual/simulated weapons release or abort on a final attackrun. No more than two controls can be counted per CASbriefing per target.

Type 1 Terminal Attack Control JTACs use a Type 1control when the risk assessment requires them to visuallyacquire the attacking aircraft and target under attack.

Type 2 Terminal Attack Control A Type 2 control isused when the JTAC desires control of individual attacksbut assesses that either visual acquisition of the attackingaircraft or target at weapons release is not possible, orwhen attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire thetarget prior to weapons release.

Type 3 Terminal Attack Control A Type 3 control isused when the JTAC requires the ability to provideclearance for multiple attacks within a single engagementsubject to specific attack restrictions, and any or all of thefollowing conditions exist: 1. JTAC is unable to visually

2

acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons release. 2. JTACis unable to visually acquire the target. 3. The attackingaircraft is unable to acquire the mark/target prior toweapons release.

Proponent The proponent for USSOCOM Manual350-5 is the USSOCOM J33-G (Ground Branch).

Lead Agent In accordance with USSOCOM Directive10-1, Terms of Reference-Roles, Missions, and Functionsof Component Commands, AFSOC Air IntegrationBranch (AFSOC/A3OG) serves as the lead agent for allTerminal Control Operations involving SpecialOperations personnel.

Executive Agent Commander, AFSOC is theUSSOCOM Executive Agent and JTAC ProgramManager for all Terminal Control Operations involvingSpecial Operations personnel.

Accredited CoursesA JTAC is specially trained, qualified and authorized toprovide terminal control of CAS aircraft conductingoperations in support of ground forces. Standardizedtraining for JTACs is essential to providing effective aircontrol and deconfliction of all CAS missions. Thecomplexity of coordinating CAS with ground fire supportand maneuver units requires a detailed understanding ofcombat aviation capabilities and other fire support means.USSOCOM only recognizes the following accreditedJTAC qualification courses:

• Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (EWTG)Atlantic/Pacific (LANT/PAC) Tactical Air ControlParty Course.• Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) JointTerminal Attack Controller Course.• Special Operations Terminal Attack ControllerCourse (SOTACC).• U.S. Air Force Joint Air Ground Operations Group(JAGOG) Joint Terminal Attack ControllerQualification Course.*• U.S. Air Force Europe Joint Fires Center ofExcellence (JFCOE) Joint Terminal AttackController Qualification Course.*• Multinational JTAC courses including AustralianDefense Force (ADF) Forward Air ControllerDevelopmental Unit (FACDU), Canadian ArmedForces Forward Air Controller Course, NorwegianAir Ground Operations School (AGOS), and UK

Joint Forward Air Control Training andStandards Unit.

*Note: Graduates of JFCOE and JAGOG are not fully qualified JTACs untilthey complete their respective Component phased programs at their home units.

Maintaining CurrencyOnce an individual graduates as a JTAC from one of thepreviously mentioned schools, he must maintain currencyand accomplish all recurring evaluation requirements toretain authority to execute terminal attack operations.USSOCOM IMT 43, Certificate of JTAC Evaluation, orthe equivalent service form is used to document JTACcurrency training. This form, along with USSOCOM IMT46 Terminal Attack Control Log, is placed in the JTACTraining Jacket and maintained by the unit JTAC programmanager. Of note, AC-130 aircraft do NOT count asfixed wing controls. MQ-1 and MQ-9 UAVs may becounted for currency (maximum of 2 controls), but willnot replace any of the required fixed wing controls.USSOCOMManual 350-5, page 10 outlines the followingJTAC currency requirements:

• All twelve annual currency CAS controls require theuse of a 9-Line which can be found in JP 3-09.3,Close Air Support, 8 Jul 09, pg. V-40.• A qualified JTAC must conduct six Type 1 or Type 2controls within a 6-month period. Type 3 controlscan be used for proficiency, but do not count towardthis requirement.• A minimum of three of six controls must befixed-wing.• A minimum of one control every six months mustexpend live or inert ordnance.• One contro l ever y s ix months must be anight control.• Recurring evaluation requirements must occur priorto the end of the 17th month after the previousevaluation.• If a JTAC does not accomplish six controls in a six-month period, he is considered non-qualified.

JTACs who do not satisfy the above requirements areconsidered non-qualified until re-qualified in accordancewith paragraph 3-14 of USSOCOM Manual 350-5.Note: Of the six required controls per six-month period, 75% must be fighter-designated aircraft. The other 25% may be bomber aircraft, forward firinghelicopters, or armed UAVs.

Training Opportunities.The lack of aircraft and training venues seem to be majorfactors in the shortage of qualified and current JTACs. In

3

addition to unit-level training events, the following venuesprovide the opportunity for JTACs to execute thenecessary terminal attack controls to maintain currency.While most of these training opportunities exist as partof a scheduled event, others are solely JTAC-focused.Points of contact follow each training venue/event shouldunits desire to gather information concerning possibleparticipation in these events.

Air Wing Fallon (AWF) The Naval Strike and AirWarfare Center (NSAWC) located in Fallon, NV trainseach carrier air wing on the latest TTPs related to airbornecommand and control, offensive counterair (OCA), airinterdiction, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD),electronic warfare (EW), close air support (CAS) andcombat search and rescue (CSAR). Mr. Al Glover,SOCOM J7/9, albert.glover.ctr@socom.mil.

Angel Thunder (AT) HQACC’s premier CSAR trainingevent. The largest personnel recovery (PR) exercise in theworld with joint/coalition/interagency participation atdistributed locations in Arizona and New Mexico. JCASopportunities exist throughout the exercise. Mr. JohnJewell, SOCOM J7/9, john.jewell.ctr@socom.mil.

Atlantic Strike Atlantic Strike is a semi-annual trainingevent, located at the Avon Park Air Ground TrainingComplex, FL. The event prepares joint air and groundforces for maximum battlefield effectiveness throughrealistic urban close air support and intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance training. MAJ BrendanPowell, JFCOM JFIIT / J32 / Atlantic Strike ExerciseDirector, brendan.powell@eglin.af.mil.

Emerald Warrior (EW) EW provides a dedicated venue(Hurlburt Field, FL and off-sites) where AFSOC aircraftcan focus on interoperability tasks with other SOF assets(ground and air) and conventional Air Force assets in atactical and operational level training event. Mr. JeffMason, SOCOM J7/9, jeffrey.mason.ctr@socom.mil.

Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) Unit and individualtraining to prepare USMC, joint, and Allied Forces toconduct relevant live-fire combined arms training, urbanoperations, and joint/coalition level integration trainingthat promotes operational forces’ readiness. Mr. DougCraddock, SOCOM J7/9, douglas.craddock.ctr@socom.mil.

HAVEACE ProgramHAVE ACE East (Hurlburt Field,FL) and West (Cannon AFB, NM) coordinate with SOF

units to conduct realistic tactical level full-mission profiletraining, with an emphasis on JCAS. HA East CW3 GaryOstrander, gary.ostrander@hurlburt.af.mil; HA West CW4Todd Sowerby, todd.sowerby@cannon.af.mil.

Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) JTFEX is ascenario-driven live exercise designed primarily to train theStrike Group Commander and Staff, and assigned shipsconducting expeditionary and other naval missions in aJoint/Coalition environment. Mr. Don Gresham,SOCOM J7/9, donald.gresham.ctr@jfcom.mil.

JTAC Continuation Program The JFCOM JTAC/JFOContinuation Training Program was implemented in FY09to enhance the warfighting capabilities of forces flowinginto the USCENTCOM AOR. The program is designedfor JTAC/JFO continuation training, not initial training,and pays for any combination of travel, per diem, billeting,and rental vehicles. Funds may be requested for any JCAStraining event. For more information contact Mr. CelioCastiblanco, JFCOM J7, celio.castiblanco.ctr@jfcom.mil.

Red Flag– Alaska (RF-A) RF-A is planned and executedby the 353rd Combat Training Squadron (CTS), locatedat Eielson AFB and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. RF-A isPacific Air Forces’ premier joint and coalition air combatemployment exercise. Mr. Al Glover, SOCOM J7/9,albert.glover.ctr@socom.mil.

Red Flag– Nellis (RF-N). RF-N is a tactical level exerciselocated at Nellis AFB, NV, which provides aviatorscombat sorties in a realistic training environment. Mr. AlGlover, SOCOM J7/9, albert.glover.ctr@socom.mil.

Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course (WTI) WTI,located in Yuma, AZ, hones participant’s knowledge aboutweapons and their delivery, platform tactics and integrationamong Marine aviation and other Marine, joint and foreignaviation platforms and command and control systems. Mr.Tony Styer, SOCOM J7/9, anthony.styer.ctr@socom.mil.

“JTACs are critical enablers for safe, effective employment of CAS.Our experience continues to demonstrate that JTACs are essentialto reducing collateral damage and civilian casualties in the successfulengagements of targets.”

GEN David H. PetraeusUSCENTCOM Commander

Ongoing InitiativesSince JTAC production is being outpaced by mission

4

requirements, increasing the JTAC presence on thebattlefield requires additional manning, funding, andincreased access to JTAC assets. Accordingly, AFSOC hasundertaken the following initiatives to meet the highdemand for this critical skill set.

JTAC Training InitiativesIn an effort to increase the number of deployable JTACs,AFSOC hired sixteen contractors to be placed at SpecialTactics (ST) units to conduct in-unit JTAC training. Oncethe contractors complete the transition with the activeduty JTACs, these JTACs will be available for overseasdeployment. In addition, the 720th Operations SupportSquadron (OSS)/OL-B was established at Nellis AFB, NVto improve JTAC training at the U.S. Air Force WeaponsSchool (USAFWS). This school trains approximately 250JTACs per year. In July 2009, the Air Force SpecialOperations Training Center (AFSOTC) assumedmanagement of the Special Operations Terminal AttackController Course (SOTACC), and will assume full controlin 2010. FY2010 will see an addition of three classes(academics only) which will increase the number ofstudents per year from 96 to 144. Finally, AFSOCprovided funding for JTAC simulator (Indirect Fire-Forward Air Control Trainer-IFACT) upgrades tomaximize JTAC sorties during training events.

JTAC Manpower InitiativesAFSOC also approached the JTAC shortages byexamining unit manning documents. 17th Air SupportOperations Squadron (ASOS) converted six existing billetsto TACP billets, and headquarters AFSOC converted 30unfilled billets to TACP billets. In addition to billetconversions, AFSOC is also focusing on improvingSpecial Tactics recruiting and training efforts. Twelvepositions were approved for U.S. Air Force recruitinggroups, and AFSOC is now utilizing experienced but non-deployable personnel to improve the recruiting andpipeline success. Air Education and Training Command(AETC) approved initiatives which included improvedfacilities, increased focus on recruiting and selection, andimproved instructor cadre.

USSOCOM headquarters and the Components areundertaking aggressive measures to meet the increaseddemand for JTACs across the force. Minimizing collateraldamage is at the forefront of all military leaders’ prioritiesin Afghanistan and Iraq. Those leaders depend on theteamwork between aircrew and JTACs to ensure innocentcivilians and their property aren't put at unnecessary risk.

As one JTAC stated, “we exist to inflict maximum damageon the enemy while reducing collateral damage to civilianpersonnel and structures, and more importantly to bringthe good guys home alive.”

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Creighton is the Integration and Interoperability (I&I)Branch Chief in the J7/9-Exercises and Interoperability Division. The I&IBranch is responsible for facilitating the integration and interoperability betweenSOF, General Purpose Forces (GPF), Interagency and Partner Nation forces.The Branch also authors USSOCOM Pub 3-33, Conventional Forces/SpecialOperations Forces Integration and Interoperability Handbook.

Foreign Professional Military Education:

Chapter - Foreign Professional Military Education

A Human Capital Investment To Develop3-D Operators

Irregular warfare (IW) requires that the traditional,“kinetic” warrior develop the knowledge and expertise tosuccessfully navigate complex political, multicultural andmultinational environments. In his posture statement tothe House Armed Services Committee USSOCOMCommander Admiral Eric Olson said, “The complexity oftoday’s and tomorrow’s strategic environments requires that ourSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) operators maintain not only thehighest levels of war fighting expertise but also cultural knowledgeand diplomacy skills. We are developing ‘3-D Operators’ – membersof a multi-dimensional force prepared to lay the groundwork in themyriad diplomatic, development, and defense activities that contributeto our Government’s pursuit of our vital national interests.”

The Commander also stated that, “We have a long way to goin recognizing and incentivizing such expertise as an operationalnecessity before we can truly develop and sustain real experts inspecific key regions around the world.”

The Department of Defense (DOD) Defense LanguageTransformation Roadmap and Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR) Execution Roadmap for IW highlight aneed for regional expertise and are supported by the DODInstruction for Management of DOD Language andRegional Proficiency Capabilities (DODI 5160.70) and theDirective for IW (DODD 3000.07).

The Directive for IW specifies that, “In coordination with theUnder Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments, create opportunities for DOD personnel todevelop foreign language proficiency and cultural knowledgecommensurate with the Intelligence Community’s assessment ofcurrent and emerging threats to national security…”

A Path to Regional ExpertiseForeign Professional Military Education (FPME) providestoday’s officers the unique ability to “triple dip” during anormal milestone of their professional development.During either the intermediate service school or seniorservice school stage, FPME participants experience theunique advantage of concurrently obtaining languageimmersion, in-country cultural experience, and anadvanced academic degree.

Reciprocal PME exchanges are authorized by Section 544(Exchange Training) of the Foreign Assistance Act. Thissection authorizes the President to provide for theattendance of foreign military personnel at PMEinstitutions in the U.S. (other than Service Academies)without charge, if such attendance is part of aninternational agreement.

These international agreements provide for the exchangeof students on a one-for-one reciprocal basis each fiscalyear between the U.S. PME institutions and comparableinstitutions of foreign countries and internationalorganizations. USSOCOM J7/9-KE Education Branchmanages the command FPME program.

FPME: World-Wide OpportunitiesAs depicted in Figure 1, U.S. military officers attendFPME schools in over 25 locations around the world.Twenty of those schools, such as the Pakistani NationalDefense College, require foreign language proficiency andtraining prior to attendance. This includes two U.S. schoolslocated at Ft. Benning, GA and Ft. McNair, WashingtonD.C. The U.S. schools, focused on the westernhemisphere, are conducted in Spanish and requireSpanish proficiency.

Other schools, such as the Indian National DefenseCollege, are conducted in English and provide studentswith rich cultural experiences in key countries.

“Linguistic, and even cultural training are, however, just aspects ofthe ultimate goal - warriors better able to react and think in the‘three-block war.” The ultimate objective is multi-skilled leaders –

Figure 1—FPME Locations

6

soldiers who are not just warfighters, but are culturally, linguistically,and mentally adept team builders, diplomats, strategic thinkers, whoare adaptable and culturally savvy.”March 25, 2006 Conference on PME—Sponsored by CongressmenSteve Israel & Ike Skelton

The Challenge of Language ProficiencyDOD language proficiency is graded on a scale of 0 to 5for the language skills of reading, listening, and speaking.Realistically, a “3/3/3” score is the highest proficiencylevel that most non-native speak ers can obtain. A personat that level is able to comprehend and communicateeffectively in that language.

Defense language courses, some as long as 63 weeks,require students to achieve a 2/2/1+ proficiency level forgraduation. At that level, students can be expected tounderstand routine social conversation and limited duty-related communication. The leap from that level to a3/3/3 proficiency requires a tremendous investment inboth time and effort—two resources that are in very shortsupply for most mid– to senior-level officers.

FPME provides officers the opportunity to “multitask”by gaining regional expertise while obtaining languageproficiency; both while accomplishing career appropriatePME. The level of language proficiency the FPMEstudent can attain is very difficult to achieve outside of animmersive environment.

Focus on Regional Expertise and Cultural AwarenessAs the lessons of Operations Iraqi Freedom and EnduringFreedom attest, communication and comprehension areenabled through awareness of foreign cultures, regionalexpertise, and skill in foreign languages. During a paneldiscussion presented during the 2006 Conference on

Professional and Military Education, DeputyUndersecretary of Defense (Plans) Ms. Gail McGinn andthen LTG David Petraeus noted that, “...there is a need toinvest a new concept of what it means to be a thinking soldier. Whatis needed is not soldiers advised by scholars – but rather soldier-scholars, or soldier-linguists, or soldier-social scientists, at appropriatelevels.” FPME, and the associated immersive context,provides a way to regional expertise, with a deepunderstanding of the underlying cultural component andeffective language proficiency.

Strategic Guidance: Defense Language TransformationRoadmap (DLTR)Published In 2005, the DLTR laid out the strategic visionto achieve greater competency in organic language andregional skills based on four assumptions:

• Conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreignlanguage capability will not abate. Robust foreignlanguage and foreign area expertise are critical tosustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, andconducting multi-national missions especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security,humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.• Changes in the international security environmentand in the nature of threats to U.S. national securityhave increased the range of potential conflict zonesand expanded the number of likely coalition partnerswith whom U.S. forces will work.• Establishing a new “global footprint” for DoD, andtransitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bringincreased requirements for language and regionalknowledge to work with new coalition partners in awide variety of activities, often with little or nonotice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21stcentury will require forces that have foreign languagecapabilities beyond those generally available intoday’s force.• Adversaries will attempt to manipulate themedia and leverage sympathetic elements of thepopulation and “opposition” politicians to divideinternational coalitions.

Actions directed by the roadmap include establishinglanguage ability as a criterion for General and Flag Officeradvancement. It also introduces a requirement for juniorofficers to complete language training along withexpanding study abroad programs and experiences inforeign countries.

Figure 2—FPME by Service

7

Limited OpportunityThe opportunities for FPME are very limited among allservices. SOF Officers are nominated by their parentservices and minimum quotas for SOF personnelcurrently do not exist.

Figure 2 shows a breakout of FPME opportunities byservice. Some schools are filled every year, others everyother year, and a few are filled on a four year cycle. Theaverage is approximately 75 seats per year. Currently, thereare 6 SOF officers attending FPME schools.

The statistics for Navy and Marine Corps SOF may notnecessarily indicate a lack of interest. The GAO ReportSpecial Operations Forces: Several Human CapitalChallenges Must Be Addressed To Meet Expanded Rolenoted that, “Data trends show [an] increase indeployments for operations and decrease in training.” Theeffect of OPTEMPO, combined with underfilledoccupational specialties, may influence SOF nominationsfor these 2-year commitments.

Other International EngagementAlthough FPME opportunities may be limited, there areseveral other engagement options that promote regionalexpertise and foreign language/culture exposure. A lesstime-consuming alternative is attendance at a DODRegional Center Program. These programs offer world-wide exposure opportunities at short term conferencesand seminars.

The only seminars conducted in a foreign language are atthe Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, which are inSpanish. The other seminars are either conducted inEnglish or are conducted in multiple languages, whichalways include English. Typical activities include in-resident academic programs, in-region 1-3 week seminars,multi-day conferences, and research studies.

Two more foreign study opportunities are the Wayne A.Downing scholarship and the Olmsted Scholar program.Both are two-year overseas study programs.

Downing Scholars earn two years of advanced education,foreign language training and cultural immersion. Scholarsalso serve as Fellows of the Combating Terrorism Center(CTC) at West Point. The CTC helps the scholars designan individual program that includes exposure to foreigncounterterrorism forces and formal language training.The Downing Scholarship program is only open to Armyofficers.

The Olmsted scholarship program is another highlycompetitive foreign study program. Olmsted scholarsenroll as full-time students, usually study a foreignlanguage, and interact with the residents of the countriesin which they are living. They're expected to live on theeconomies of their host countries, travel widely and beconnected to U.S. embassies or consulates only fornecessary administrative purposes.

USSOCOM J7/9-KE continues to foster a strongrelationship with both programs in an effort to increaseopportunities for SOF officers. Both scholarship programsprovide another way for exemplary officers to gain in-depth exposure to foreign language and culture whileobtaining an advanced degree. One drawback is that thecountry location or region of emphasis is selected by theprogram directors and may not match locations SOFleaders deem as priorities.

USSOCOM FPME Way AheadSOF operators must achieve “strategic appreciation” ofthe operational environment to effectively shape andaffect it. As stated in USSOCOM Strategy 2010, “Byapplying perception, perspective, culture, history, andgeography we try to achieve a higher level ofunderstanding—not simply what and how events occurbut rather why. This appreciation concentrates onrelationships and synthesis of information rather thandata and threats.”

The 3-D SOF warrior, centered at the nexus of defense,diplomacy, and development, is the core of USSOF.FPME, and associated foreign study, is a way to developnecessary critical SOF skills.

USSOCOM is committed to forging coherent careerpolicies among all services in an effort to increase SOFparticipation in these critical mission enhancingopportunities. The command will support 3-D operator

Goal 1. Create Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise*Current Situation

- Language and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfightingskills, and are therefore not incorporated into operational or contingencyplanning- Language and cultural expertise are not valued as Defense core compe-tencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems

Desired Outcomes- Total Force understands and values the tactical, operational and strate-gic asset inherent in regional expertise and language- Regional area education is incorporated into PME and Development

*From the DOD Defense Language Transformation Roadmap

8

development by:

• Increasing SOF cultural and regional knowledgethrough education opportunities to meet nationaland USSOCOM missions requirements.• Increasing individual SOF foreign language capabilityin dialects necessary and relevant to current andfuture requirements through education opportunities.• Assisting in matching gained expertise througheducation to immediate follow-on assignments or tolife-long career models for SOF.

ConclusionFPME is a Human Capital investment to enhance thedevelopment of the 3-D operator. That person is aSpecial Operations Force warrior who has regionalexpertise, understands local language and culture, and canaddress regional and local interests. The 3-D operator isable to deftly integrate activities among broaderInteragency and international efforts.

For More Information on FPME Contact:Your unit or duty station education officeUSSOCOM J7/9-KE Education BranchDSN 299-9463/2943/0558

Mr. Nalepa works at the J7/9 Education Branch and has duties that includemanaging the Memorandums of Agreement between USSOCOM and theDOD Senior Service Schools. He holds an advanced degree in Education andhas deployed numerous times to support lessons learned active collection at theJTF and JSOTF levels.

SOF And The Asymmetric Warfare Group:

Chapter - SOF and the Asymmetric Wargare Group

Enhancing The Combat Effectiveness OfOur Operating Forces

“For USSOCOM, success in the future will be defined by actionsthat develop, support, and enable a Special Operating Force capableof executing global, distributed operations, within an environmentcharacterized by irregular warfare and asymmetric challenges. U.S.Special Operations Forces (USSOF) must be seamlessly integratedand enabled with capabilities from across the Department of Defenseand other agencies of the U.S. Government.”

ADM Eric Olson

The Special Operation Forces (SOF) Warrior, andincreasingly the General Purpose Force (GPF) Warrior,must execute missions across the 3-D Construct ofDefense, Diplomacy, and Development. To address theneed for skilled operators who can effectively employ thediplomatic and developmental capabilities of numerousdepartments and agencies of the U.S. Government,USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF), Joint ForcesCommand Joint Irregular Warfare Center, and theAsymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) teamed with theJohns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory topublish the Interagency Teaming to Counter IrregularThreats Handbook in December 2009. The AWG-fundedhandbook augments the 3-D Warrior’s ability to engage,develop, and sustain partnerships within the interagencycommunity during missions. The purpose of thishandbook is to better equip the 3-D Warrior Leader witha basic understanding of the interagency environment andbest practices when charged with building an interagencyteam to counter irregular threats at the tactical andoperational level.

Although a relatively new military organization with itsofficial formation in 2006, the Asymmetric WarfareGroup, headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, hasalready built a strong relationship with SOF in the field. Inaddition to developing training tools and publications,AWG has teamed with SOF during theater securitycooperation events such as Joint Combined ExchangeTraining (JCET), select training exercises and operations,and with units deployed in support of OPERATIONIRAQI FREEDOM(OIF) andOPERATIONENDURINGFREEDOM (OEF). The Asymmetric Warfare Groupprovides operational advisory assistance in support of

Army and Joint Force Commanders to enhance thecombat effectiveness of the operating force and enablethe defeat of asymmetric threats at the tactical andoperational level. In addition to providing confidentialobservations to unit leadership from experienced warriorsbased on unit requests for support, AWG uses theseobservations to develop material and non-materialsolutions to assist both SOF and GPF.

Evolution of AWGThe Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (IED TF)was formed in 2003 to systematically address the IEDthreat predominantly in Iraq; however, the threat was everchanging and evolving its tactics, techniques, andprocedures to inflict casualties on US and Coalition Forcesand the IED was a single form of asymmetric threat. Tostay ahead of this threat, the IED Task Force expandedand split into two organizations: the Joint ImprovisedExplosive Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and theAsymmetric Warfare Group. JIEDDO remained a jointorganization with primary focus on the ever-changing andcomplex IED threat. The Asymmetric Warfare Groupwas assigned a much different mission. As a fieldoperating agency to the Army G3 Staff, the AWG evolvedand broadened its charter. The AWG missionencompasses observation and collection of informationon enemy asymmetric threats and friendly vulnerabilitiesas well as rapid solution development for capability gapsby exploiting enemy vulnerabilities and mitigating friendlyvulnerabilities. The AWG is designed to improve thecapabilities of the Army and joint units at the operationaland tactical levels throughout the full spectrum ofconflict. AWG enhances the capabilities of US units bymaking them faster and more adept at identifying andattacking enemy vulnerabilities, and by preparing them forfuture threats. As the threat evolved, so did the AWG.

Composition of the Organization.The AWG is a team of professionals with approximately370 active duty military personnel, government civilians, andcontractors divided into a headquarters detachment, twooperational squadrons, a training/recruitment/assessmentsquadron, and a concepts integration squadron. The AWGdoes not rely heavily on active duty Special Forces warriorsdue to the small population and high demand of thesewarriors. At the time of this publication and after a recentselection board, AWGmanning includes twelve active duty

10

Special Forces warriors (three percent of the unit). Ratherthan focus heavily on active duty Special Forces to fill itsranks, AWG recruits from across the active duty Army forindividuals with special skill sets and it relies heavily oncontractors with extensive SOF experience (from allservices) to build its team of operational advisors. LikeSOF units, all AWG unit members are volunteers, mustmeet the strict entrance requirements, and complete acomprehensive assessment, selection, and trainingprogram. They must possess the following baselineskill sets:

• Be seasoned war fighters and functional experts• Be innovative thinkers• Be physically and mentally tough• Be quiet professionals• Be team players• Want to effect change

To support the unique AWG mission and its personnelrequirements, the Department of the Army classified theAWG as a Special Mission Unit (SMU), facilitating theunit’s ability to assess, select and train unit membersthrough a nominative process and modified personnelmanagement procedures to ensure individuals with theproper skill sets enter this new organization.

More than Lesson Learned: Material andNon-Material Solutions.Although AWG collects critical lessons learned based ondirect observations from ongoing operations in Iraq,Afghanistan, and other locations around the world, it isorganized and resourced to accomplish much more.Based on requests from the unit chain of command, AWGOperational Advisors observe and collect information onspecified areas, report possible vulnerabilities and/orcapabilities gaps, and then advise and assist troops

accordingly. Additionally, AWG has the ability to takethese vulnerabilities or capability gaps and focus onsolutions that may be both material and non-material.

The Concepts and Integration Squadron, also known asDog Squadron, is an exceptionally unique organizationwithin AWG and the Army. Their mission is to rapidlyidentify, develop, and integrate non-material and materialsolutions that mitigate or defeat specified asymmetricthreats and transition these solutions to proponents,program managers, or Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC). The squadron is comprised of a diversegroup of specialists and military subject matter experts,to include a former Senior Executive Service (SES)counter threat finance expert, military explosivestechnicians, senior law enforcement professionals, andPhDs in various academic fields. The squadron conductsrequirement analysis and research that lead to solutiondevelopment. In a collaborative effort with interagencypartners, industry, and academia, the squadron assessesand refines possible solutions to known capability gapsbased on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material,Leadership/Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy(DOTMLPFP). The Rapid Equipment Force AsymmetricProduct Office (REF APO) provides direct support as thematerial developer for the AWG. The REF APO Teamprovides direct acquisition support and assists in the roleas combat developer. This close relationship has resultedin the rapid and timely fielding of new capabilities to ourdeployed forces.

Some recent non-material solutions that have beencombat proven involve best practices and techniques usingthe Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and DisseminateMethodology (F3EAD) in support of OIF and OEF,Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), and Afghan KeyLeader Engagement (KLE) to support the diplomaticskills of our 3-D operator. In addition, the Al Qaeda andAssociated Networks (AQAN) Vulnerability AnalysisWorkbook was published to assist planners with asystematic method of identifying, understanding, andmit ig at ing asymmetr ic threats assoc ia ted withth is network.

For material solutions, the Concepts and IntegrationSquadron has assisted in the fielding of rapid solutions toour Warfighters in theater. These include a CulvertClearance system and a Fast Obscurant Grenade (FOG),fielded in less than six months. Other material solutionsinclude the Air Digger and the Iron Scrape. The Air

11

Digger supports our EOD, engineers, and other forces inrender safe procedures for dealing with IEDs. The IronScrape addressed the need for an organic means ofremoving heavy debris from routes during tacticaloperations. This simple yet incredibly effective tool allowsrapid removal of debris that keeps routes open to trafficand prevents future patrols from repeatedly interrogatingthe same item found in their path. All of these productsincrease the effectiveness of our SOF and GPF in theater.Information on material and non-material solutions arereadily available to our joint forces on the NIPRand SIPR websites.

Making the Culture More Innovative and AdaptiveSince 2006, AWG has been researching and developing aninnovative approach to preparing Soldiers, leaders andunits for the uncertain and constantly evolving missionenvironments of Iraq, Afghanistan, or other futurebattlefields. The concept, ideas, methods and techniquesof this approach flow from a simple notion thatpromoting individual mastery of fundamental skills withina problem solving context develops a Soldier in wayslargely unmatched by the Army’s existing training systemand approaches. Further analysis suggests that this kindof development will produce the adaptability, agility,versatility, flexibility and resilience that are called for tosucceed during Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) toinclude the challenges associated with Irregular Warfare.The Outcomes Based Training & Education (OBTE)methodology closely resembles training techniques oftenused to prepare some of our SOF warriors and units.Leaders gain confidence in their units while individualSoldiers gain confidence in themselves through:

• Knowing what they must do and why• Practicing problem solving• Understanding the value and utility of initiative• Awareness of what they must learn• Understanding individual and team accountability

OBTE, linked with the Army Leader DevelopmentStrategy represents the new method of thinking andtraining needed to produce those highly competent andversatile leaders, individuals and teams. AWG has workedclosely with Division and Military Initial Training unitswith significant results. This methodology nests well withthe Army Chief of Staff ’s vision when he stated, “Mostimportantly, the Army is only as versatile as its Soldiers, leaders andcivilians. Every Soldier is a warrior, and each must be trained andready to effectively operate in any environment.”

Leadership remains an essential element of combat powerduring this period of persistent conflict and hybridwarfare. AWG is working multiple initiatives to developinnovative and adaptive leaders through asymmetricleadership development programs. Based on guidancefrom the Army Staff, AWG is developing an AsymmetricWarfare Adaptive Leaders Program to better able theArmy’s leaders to deal with the challenges associated withthese hybrid threats.

Teaming with SOFThe complex threats permeating the operationalenvironment in Afghanistan and Iraq have forced GPFand SOF to work together at all levels. To facilitate thiseffort, AWG has worked closely with both entities to buildand refine Regional Fusion Cells. These cells fuse thecapabilities and functions of GPF, the interagencycommunity, and SOF resulting in a more rapididentification, isolation, and destruction of enemynetworks. A much more detailed report on tactical andoperational observations and best practices is available onthe AWG SIPR website.

The AWG has provided liaison officers or operations cellsat the USSOCOMHeadquarters, Geographic CombatantCommands (GCCs), Combat Training Centers, and FortBragg to facilitate operations, and/or Pre-DeploymentAdvisory Support. In addition to the Interagency TeamingHandbook project at USSOCOMHeadquarters, the AWGelement is coordinating future initiatives with theUSSOCOM J7/9 on lessons learned and interoperabilitytraining issues.

In Khost Province, Afghanistan, AWG recently workedclosely with elements of 4th Brigade Combat Team(Airborne), 25th Infantry Division. Using SOF tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs), AWG Operational

12

Specialists assisted in the training and development of aFocused Targeting Force (FTF) that has enjoyed manyrecent successes. Employing migrated SOF TTPs, thesetailored forces combine well trained GPF combat armsforces, explosive ordnance disposal technicians, doghandlers, and others trained to work closely withdocument, media exploitation, and biometric laboratoriesin theater. During a mission in November of 2009,members of this FTF and Afghan Border Policecaptured an enemy commander in his bed without a shotfired. To date, this FTF has conducted over 70 operationsand detained 25 individuals currently undergoingprosecution within the judicial system with only two directfire engagements.

Although a majority of the AWG missions are within theCentral Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOMAOR), AWG has participated in Joint CombinedExchange Training and other training events with SpecialOperation Forces in Mali, Bangladesh, Thailand, andelsewhere. These missions provide valuable lessonslearned, additional observations for SOF leadership, andselect SOF TTPs that can migrate to the GPF whichincrease our overall capabilities to predict and defeatasymmetric threats.

ConclusionAWG provides a unique combination of experiencedSoldiers, DA civilians, and contracted subject matterexperts, many with extensive SOF experience. Theyembed with deployed US Forces, SOF and GPF, toobserve and collect information on enemy and friendlyoperations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Thisenables AWG to identify exploitable enemy capability gapsand friendly capability gaps to mitigate. AWG assists inmaterial and non-material solutions through itsoperational and acquisition unit members charged with

rapidly identifying, developing, and fielding newcapabilities to counter emerging threats. Teaming withSOF, AWG provides additional observations on trainingand operations from experienced warriors and someadditional expertise in some diverse areas to support theSOF 3-D Warrior. Close liaison with SOF, enables AWGto migrate select SOF tactics, techniques and proceduresto GPF in order to increase the lethality and combateffectiveness of our nation’s joint forces againstfuture threats.

All Asymmetric Warfare products and requests forsupport instructions are available on the unit’s websiteslocated at:SIPR:http://army.daiis.mi.army.smil.mil/org/aawo/awg/default.aspxNIPR: https://portal.awg.army.mil

Sources:ADM Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM Strategy 2010, 18 November 2009.Asymmetric Warfare Group Newsletters, May, August, and December 2009.Operational and Organizational Concept for the Asymmetric Warfare Group,March 2, 2005.Acquisition Management in support of the Asymmetric Warfare Group,27 July 2006.GEN George W. Casey, “The Army of the 21st Century”, Army Magazine,October 2009.Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats, Lesa McComas, JohnsHopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009.Sandra Jontz, “Specialty unit trades bullets for stealth”, Stars and Stripes,November 25, 2009.Asymmetric Warfare Group Welcome Handbook, February 2010.

Jeff Hensley serves as the Asymmetric Warfare Group’s Forward Operations andLiaison Officer in the USSOCOM IATF. He has served multiple assignmentswith the 75th Ranger Regiment and at Fort Bragg with United States ArmySpecial Operation Command.

Emerald Warrior:

Chapter - Emerald Warrior

The Future of SOF Mission Rehearsal

The Military Author of Ancient Rome, Flavius Vegetius,famously wrote: “if you want peace, prepare for war.”“Preparation” for US Special Operations Forces (SOF)translates to “Mission Rehearsal” and within the SOFcommunity the EMERALD WARRIOR (EW) MissionRehearsal Exercise (MRX) is quickly becoming thepremier training venue for SOF warriors. The EW MRXseeks to integrate unique SOF capabilities with those ofthe General Purpose Forces (GPF), the Interagency andNon-Governmental Organizations. The goal of EW is tomaximize our likelihood of success against an “irregular”threat by training the Joint Task Force to orchestrate thedisparate elements of military and national power as one,integrated effort. EMERALD WARRIOR provides themechanism for that integration training.

EMERALD WARRIOR is a USSOCOM sponsored, AirForce Special Operations Command (AFSOC) executed,Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX); its focus is at theoperational/tactical level. This year EWwill bring togethera Joint training audience of nearly 1,400 warriors who willparticipate in a realistic scenario combining both livetraining and a dozen simulations to replicate theenvironment of actual combat. Buttressing the capabilitiesof EW is a Secretary of Defense program known as theJoint National Training Capability (JNTC).

The EW MRX began as a concept in 2007 to design anexercise that would enhance the capabilities of the newlyformed AFSOCWarfighting Headquarters. That conceptfeatured a series of joint operations conducted in acombination of Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC)environments. The success of the first exercise in 2007led to increased interest from USSOCOM and the USJoint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint WarfightingCenter (JWFC). The next significant milestone occurredin 2009 when EW was granted JNTC accreditation andcertification from JFCOM.

JNTC accreditation brings OSD investment to ensureadequate joint facilities, experienced exercise participantsand required funding are available to enable joint context.As a result of SOF innovation and JNTC support theEMERALDWARRIORMRX has grown into a model of

SOF/General Purpose Force/Interagency collaborationand mission execution. JNTC has invested over threemillion dollars in improvements in joint training facilitieson the Eglin Test and Training Range in Florida andinvested roughly 2.3 million dollars in exercise executionfor EW 2009. The EMERALDWARRIOR 2010 budgetfrom JNTC is currently set at 2.7 million dollars.

In concert with the overall direction of JNTC,EMERALD WARRIOR continues to evolve as a Joint /Combined / Interagency training exercise that ensures thereadiness of SOFWarriors by using a combination of live,virtual and constructive environments. The liveenvironment involves the most traditional training venueof real people using real equipment on territory thatclosely approximates the terrain expected on an actualmission. The virtual environment employs individualsusing simulations to closely replicate the missionenvironment and available capabilities. And, theconstructive environment uses simulated entities in asimulated setting to replicate mission requirements. ThisLVC approach requires close collaboration among allparticipants to seamlessly integrate the differentenvironments into a whole picture that creates thechallenges of actual operations. The stated goal of JNTCleadership is that a soldier’s experience during actualcombat operations should be no different than theexperience of his/her last simulation.

In 2010 EW will feature four Special OperationsComponents, conventional Marine Corps and Air Forceunits, Department of State, Department of Justice, DrugEnforcement Administration and Non-GovernmentalOrganization participation. All of these participants willfunction together in an irregular warfare scenario requiring

14

innovation and cultural understanding as much asfirepower and agility. Future exercises will includeCoalition SOF observers and international SOF unitparticipation.

The overall design of the exercise moves participantsthrough a series of phases building up to live participationin realistic combat operations executed under conditionsclosely replicating actual combat operations.

EW kicks off with a five-day “Academic phase” thatbrings together SOF, General Purpose Forces (GPF) andInteragency participants to hone specific skills and shareinformation regarding subjects such as Irregular Warfare,Command and Control, Urban Survival EvasionResistance & Escape (SERE) Training, Forward AreaRefueling Point operations, and Communications. Thisphase will also see the stand-up of the exercise controlorganization and establishment of communications andcollaborative connectivity among the major exerciselocations. The objective of the academic phase is to ensureall participants are working from a common understandingof the mission and a common standard for the specificskills required for MRX execution.

Following the Academic Phase the exercise will transitioninto a second, five-day, phase of integrated missionplanning and rehearsals. Half of this phase will beconducted on a reverse-cycle of nighttime training. Muchof this training will focus on tactical-level operations inpreparation for the larger exercise to come.

After a short mid-exercise After Action Review, EW willtransition into its most dynamic phase of operations. TheMRX will conduct night operations across a series of fivetraining ranges located in Apalachicola, FL, Eglin AFB,FL, Camp Shelby, MS and Anniston, AL

Supporting the collaborative planning, exercise control,simulation integration and exercise execution is a complex“knowledge network” made up of interconnected nodes.The USSOCOM SOF Training and Exercise Network(STEN) will provide the central hub supporting theexercise with connectivity to three additional networks:the USJFCOM Joint Training and ExperimentationNetwork (JTEN), the Hurlburt Training and ExerciseNetwork (H-TEN) and the USAF Distributed MissionOperations Network (DMON). Simulation capabilitiesfrom as far away as Camp Lejeune NC, Eglin AFB FL andCharleston AFB SC will interconnect with a total oftwelve other simulation systems via the combined powerof these joint training networks.

One such simulation is the USMC Virtual Battlespace-2(VBS-2), a computer-based, first-person shootersimulation that is designed to enhance logic and decisionmaking skills. VBS-2 allows for single or multiplayeractivity aimed primarily at the ground force tactical-level.The goal of VBS2 training is to help our warriors enhancetheir cognitive skills and decision making ability understress. Through the use of the VBS-2 our SOF warriorscan operate in the same environment they will face whendeployed. Thus, simulations like VBS2 allow us to train inan environment that would be difficult to duplicate in“live” training.

To meet the requirement for air-ground integration EWwill employ the SOF Air Ground Interface Simulator(SAGIS). SAGIS provides Joint Terminal AttackController (JTAC) and Joint Fires Observer (JFO) trainingto both the air and ground audience. SAGIS, currentlyfielded at Hurlburt Field, provides an interactivemultimedia instructional simulation system designed toreplicate realistic air traffic control (ATC), terminal attackcontrol (TAC) and Fire Support (FS) coordination.

Irregular Warfare-based scenarios will include:Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), night infiltration,live call for fire, Intelligence Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR), AC-130 gunship support, andactive convoy defense. New for 2010 will be training inRealistic Urban Terrain operations, Urban CasualtyAvoidance, Information Operations, Advanced UrbanSERE training and integrated Unmanned AerialSystem support.

Of particular interest this year is the addition of RealisticUrban Terrain (RUT). RUT includes high-intensity, close-

15

quarter battle training that employs both live-fire and non-lethal fires in a very realistic civilian urban site. RUT alsoprovides the setting for the transition from the “non-kinetic” battle (intelligence gathering and Civil MilitaryOperations) to “kinetic” operations. RUT brings ourwarriors closer to the irregular warfare battle that they willexperience on actual deployment.

As the EMERALD WARRIOR exercise moves into thefuture it will afford SOF operators the ability to rehearsetheir skills in the most realistic and interconnectedenvironment possible. Hearkening back to the words ofFlavius Vegetius, the EMERALD WARRIOR MissionRehearsal Exercise will help our nation “preserve thepeace by preparing (our SOF warrior diplomats) for war.”

Contact USSOCOM J7/9 E for information regardingfuture EW participation.

Mr Don Kropp is a ManTech contractor currently supporting the Joint NationalTraining Capability (JNTC) Program at US SOCOM. He is a retired ArmyCOL, with a Masters Degree from the US Naval War College and extensiveSpecial Operations experience.

Mr. Mike Brennan is a contractor and is the Joint National Training Capability(JNTC) Support Element to AFSOC. Mr Brennan's primary duty is to bethe Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) JNTC operations and planningrepresentative at AFSOC and provides the bridge and reach back for JWFCsupport with specific emphasis on the JNTC accredited EMERALDWARRIOR exercise program. Mr. Brennan is a retired USAF Lt Col with22 years of Special Operations aviation experience in the AC-130A/H/U.

USSOCOM’s Role in Joint Doctrine

Chapter - USSOCOM’s Role in Joint Doctrine

Recently, both the Commander, US Special OperationsCommand, and the Director, J7/9 have made the subjectof doctrine a high priority within the organization. TheCommander has a Title 10, US Code responsibility fordeveloping and maintaining special operations (SO)doctrine which includes joint, Service, and multi-Servicedoctrine and multi-Service tactics, techniques, andprocedures. This article focuses on how joint doctrine isdeveloped by the Joint Staff, Service chiefs, and combatantcommanders through a prescribed development system 1

which provides the fundamental principles to guideemployment of US forces in coordinated actions towardcommon objectives. Joint doctrine is contained in jointpublications. It is authoritative but requires judgment inapplication which means it will be followed except in thoseunusual situations where a commander decidescircumstances dictate otherwise.

Joint doctrine is written for those who:

• Provide strategic direction for joint forces, i.e., theChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) andcombatant commanders (CCDRs).• Employ joint forces, such as CCDRs, subordinateand joint task force (JTF) commanders (CDRs).• Either support or are supported by joint forces.• Prepare forces for employment by CCDRs andJTF CDRs.• Train and educate those who will conduct jointoperations.

For SO practitioners, joint doctrine provides guidance forconcepts of employment for commanders responsible for

SO. This includes command and control relationships;employment of JTFs for SO, civil-military operations(CMO) and psychological operations (PSYOP); andplanning procedures. Joint SO doctrine addresses thecapabilities and limitations of SOF; it tells joint force staffswhat they can and cannot expect from SOF; and describeswhat joint staffs must do to receive full value of SOF andtheir task forces as part of a joint force. Doctrine providesSOF units guidance regarding what they can reasonablyexpect for mission taskings, planning, employment,and support.

The foundations of joint doctrine include the following:• It is based on current capabilities…it is the “D” inthe DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training,material, leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities) process and defines the capabilities to befielded by the force.

• Incorporates time-tested and enduring principles andcontemporary lessons.

• Standardizes terminology, training, commandrelationships, responsibilities and processes amongUS forces,

• Frees joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffto focus efforts on the strategic, operational, andtactical problems confronting them.

Joint doctrine maintains responsive relationships with theeight key discipline areas of policy, concepts, lessonslearned, training, joint capabilities areas, military education,operation planning, and strategy (Figure 1). Doctrinereflects these areas as they pertain to the subject matteraddressed within each joint publication. Conversely,doctrine impacts the thinking expressed in each disciplinearea. Of note, there are instances where terminology maybe developed within other disciplines to serve differentpurposes as is sometimes the case in policy documents orjoint capability area (JCA) processes.

For example, a doctrinal definition developed to supportthe employment of forces may not provide the focus orcontext needed within a policy or JCA documentaddressing resources or requirements. Approved doctrinedefinitions are tightly drawn and without qualifying caveatswhile other disciplines’ terminology serve narrowerpurposes and are not as constrained as doctrinal terms. Insuch cases where there may be differing terms, it isFigure 1 - Subject Areas Reflected in and Affected by Joint Doctrine

17

essential they not conflict.

Joint doctrine and Service doctrine are developed tocomplement each other. Joint doctrine is written with afocus on how to think in terms of unified action tosynchronize joint, Service, and multinational operationswith the activities of governmental and nongovernmentalorganizations. Service doctrine and tactics, techniques,and procedures focus on what to think and how to dothings. The development system producing joint doctrineprescribes how its processes will be implementedwithin DOD.

USSOCOM is one of 16 voting members of the JointDoctrine Development Community (JDDC) which iscomprised of the Joint Staff, Services (and their doctrinedevelopment agencies), and combatant commands (Figure2). The JDDC works closely to operate the Joint DoctrineDevelopment System of lead agents (i.e., those commandsdesignated by the CJCS to lead the development ofspecific joint pubs), Joint Staff doctrine sponsors,coordinating review authorities, processes and procedures,and the hierarchical framework designated to initiate,develop, approve, and maintain joint publications. WithinUSSOCOM, the HQ staff, components, and the JointSpecial Operations University actively participate in thejoint working groups established by the J7/9 to developthe joint publications assigned to USSOCOM. 2

The CJCS tasks USSOCOM to develop SO doctrinewhich is found in six joint pubs and integrated throughoutthe remaining 72 pubs of the Chairman’s joint doctrinehierarchy. Normally, joint pubs are developed and revisedover an 18 month process. This period allows common-sense doctrine to be produced that is well-researched,thoroughly vetted, pertinent, and enduring. The six jointSO pubs and their recent revisions are discussed below. 3

Pub TitleJP 3-05 Special OperationsHighlights:Revision resumed in Jan 2010; completion by Dec 2010Addresses recent developments, revisions, and evolutionof SOF doctrine, to include command and control,counterterrorism (CT), PSYOP, foreign internal defense(FID), and CMO/civil affairs operations (CAO)Discusses SO within the context of irregular warfare (IW)Adds discussions of new core tasks-counterinsurgency(COIN) and security force assistance (SFA)

Revises discussion of the original core tasks, with a focuson unconventional warfare (UW) and the HQ-USSOCOM core task of synchronizing the planning forglobal operations against terrorist networks

Pub TitleJP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task

Force OperationsHighlights:Addresses organizing, planning, preparing and executingJSOTF operationsDiscusses SO/JSOTF command and control (C2)relationships, stresses SOF are employed with SOF C2intactProvides initial “in-brief ” of JSOTF Commander to JTFCommanderDiscusses SOF/conventional force (CF) integrationExpands discussion of SO targeting and mission planning

Pub TitleJP 3-13.2 Psychological OperationsHighlights:Refocuses PSYOP within the context of militaryand informational instruments of national power andUS Government strategyExpands discussion of joint PSYOP activities at all levelsof war (i.e., activities at one level can affect other levels)Discusses PSYOP support of combat operations; DODinformation capabilities in peace; civil authorityinformation support of domestic lead federal agencies;and special operationsIntroduces a seven-phase joint PSYOP process into jointoperations

Figure 2 - The Joint Doctrine Development Community

18

Pub TitleJP 3-22 Foreign Internal DefenseHighlights:Introduces “sources of power” (financial, intelligence,and law enforcement) which are applied through theinstruments of national powerIntroduces SFA joint doctrine and defines it as DOD’scontribution to unified action by the USGProposes the definition of “joint proponent” for JP 1-02,DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Pub TitleJP 3-26 CounterterrorismHighlights:Redefines and refocuses CT away from obsolete constructsReflects policy and strategy adjustments to the evolutionof terrorism from a tactic to a transnational threat ofstrategic proportionsDiscusses the relationship of CT with the context of IWand existing doctrine applied to CT operationsIntroduces into doctrine the Strategic CampaignFramework for the direct and indirect approaches forconducting CT operationsDiscusses the enhanced role of CF in long-term CT andCOIN operations

Pub TitleJP 3-57 Civil-Military OperationsHighlights:Addresses CMO as an inherent responsibility ofcommanders assigned terrain with civilians presentExpands discussion of CMO as a primary means tosynchronize military and nonmilitary instruments ofnational power supporting stability operations,COIN, and IWIntroduces discussion of CAO and its relationship toCMO within unified actionJoint doctrine development is a dynamic process with apurpose to enhance the operational effectiveness of USforces. Although it is neither policy nor strategy, jointdoctrine seeks to make policy and strategy effective in theapplication of US military power. The Commander,USSOCOM ensures that joint SOF doctrine does its partto enhance such application.

Source1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5129.02A, Joint DoctrineDevelopment System, 31 March 2007.2. United States Special Operations Command Directive 34-1, Joint DoctrineDevelopment, Coordination, and Review, 8 April 2008.3. For access to joint doctrine publications, visit the Joint Doctrine, Education,and Training Information System (JDEIS) through the SIPRNET, visit theUS Special Operations Command Homepage-SOF Online, and use the “JointDoctrine” link. For access through the NIPRNET, visit“https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp.”

Mr. John Brush is a retired Army Special Forces officer. He is currently Chief,Doctrine Branch, within the Proponency Division, USSOCOM J7/9. Heholds a Master of Public Administration degree from the University ofKentucky."

SOF Experimentation

Chapter - SOF Experimentation

TNT as a Pathway to Innovation, Collaborationand Transform

As we begin the New Year, the Futures Concepts andExperimentation Division will focus on jointexperimentation to design and conduct focusedexperiments and apply results to solutions of current andfuture warfighter challenges. We will also align ourselves tothe Joint Concept Development and Experimentation(JCD&E) process to guide future force and capabilitydevelopment by motivating experimentation in andexploration of new operating methods to solvecompelling, real-world challenges, current or envisioned.These experiments will result in DOTMLPF and Policychanges. In addition, we have formed resourcingpartnerships with Joint Forces Command, Office of theSecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics andthe Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office.

This article will talk to the origins of Tactical NetworkTopologies (TNT) as a part of USSOCOM experimentationand to the processes needed to drive change that helpsshape the future capabilities of SOF.

TNT BackgroundTNT has been a mainstay of the USSOCOMexperimentation landscape since 2002. The program,originally titled Surveillance and Target AcquisitionNetworks (STAN), evolved into a cooperative, quarterlyeffort sponsored by USSOCOM and the NavalPostgraduate School (NPS). In 2005, the current title,TNT, was adopted.

What is TNT?It’s not a rock song or Tri-Nitro-Toluene. It is, however, adynamite program. TNT is the USSOCOM /NPScooperative experimentation program. As the USSOCOMlead for Joint/SOF experimentation, the J7/9 FutureConcepts and Experimentation Division partners withSORDAC-ST and NPS and draws on the uniqueexperience and capabilities of USSOCOM operationaland staff personnel, NPS professors, NPS students, and adiverse group of technology development resources.These bring operational reality checks, technologyexploitation opportunities, and innovative ideas into anorganized and rational approach to experimentation.

The primary objective of the TNT Field ExperimentationCooperative Program is to identify emerging technologythat can impact SOF operational opportunities to bringquicker success on the battlefield and save lives. This, inturn, influences SOF concepts and technologydevelopment toward achievable high-priority capabilities.At the same time the venue provides benefits to specialoperations, it enables enhanced education for NPSstudents. Students have the opportunity to test and assesstheir theses in a field environment with SOF operatorsproviding immediate feedback.

TNT ConceptEngineers who design military equipment typically don’tinteract with those who use it. Information gets filteredthrough layers of bureaucracy, complex requirementdocuments, and specifications that can muddle the trueneed and adversely restrict the solution set. Conversely,operators may not be aware of technology opportunitiesor limitations resulting in requirements that are unrealisticor non-optimal. As one venue to overcome thesedifficulties, TNT encourages participation from a diversegroup of operational and technical resources. It bringsthe troops and the engineers together to provide a unique,collaborative environment, and stimulating interactionbetween participants. This environment often results incombined technology solutions that provide enhanced,well integrated capability solutions. The quarterlyOPTEMPO allows the tactizens (SOF operators andparticipating vendors, academics, federal, state, and localgovernment organizations) to rapidly adapt and assesstheir solutions in a field-like environment on a regular,quick-turn-around basis.

20

TNT Path ForwardHeading USSOCOM’s effort for the past year in jointexperimentation is Mr. Mike Meyers, USSOCOM JointExperimentation Chief and Mr. Dennis Granger, DeputyChief of Future Concepts and Experimentation. “Whatwe do is combine SOCOM with NPS and leverage more than $60million of capability gap research into material and non-materialsolutions designed to help the SOF operator,”Granger said. “Wework closely with SOCOM’s Science and Technology folks to ensureSOCOM stays on the cutting edge of emerging technology. Anincreasingly critical role of TNT is to enhance identification,assessment and employment of technical solutions that can beimmediately applied by the Theater Special Operations Commandsagainst the disparate global threats.”

As valuable as the program is, there are continuing effortsto improve it. Principally, the TNT community is strivingto achieve increased SOF operational communityparticipation, improved integration with relevantUSSOCOM processes, and near-term technologyintegration and employment in TSOC-driven scenarios.TNT has evolved into a cooperative experimentationprogram that is getting away from a strict engineering /technical endeavor towards one that is more orientedtowards experimenting on objectives that addresscapability gaps.

A working level, 0-6 led Experimentation Steering Group(ESG) is a conceivable method to increase operationalparticipation and integration with USSOCOM processes.The ESG will validate the USSOCOM capability gaps orthemes to be addressed by subsequent TNTs.

ESG workshop participants will assemble periodically tosubmit, discuss, and review proposals for experimentation.Participants in the workshop will include representativesfrom the components, USSOCOMHQ staff, TSOCs, and,

on occasion, the Services,Combatant Commands, otherGovernment agencies, andinternational partners. Theworkshops will forwardnominations to the ESG forexperiment themes, scenarios,and execution. In turn, theESG will combine anddeconflict the nominationsas necessary to avoidduplication and waste ofresources. J7/9 intends to

establish and maintain an electronic repository on theUSSOCOM portal to serve as a central hub for theseactivities. This database will provide awareness of relevantexperimentation activities occurring inside andoutside of USSOCOM.

Increased coord ina t ion between USSOCOMExperimentation and the TSOCs is a valuable opportunityto assess maturing technologies and integrate them forspecific TSOC mission application. This process willendorse the operational validity of the experiments andprovide a rapid path to employ material or non-materialsolutions to current Special Operations missions.

Mr. Dennis Granger is the Chief of Future Concepts and ExperimentationDivision for SOCOM J7/9. Mr. Granger is a former Marine Corps InfantryOfficer and Navy SEAL Captain with over 30 years of Service. A qualifiedJoint Specialty Officer, he holds a Master's Degree from the Naval War Collegeand is a Program Management Professional.

Warfighter Challenges – Engines of Change

Chapter - Warfighter Challenges – Engines of Change

“Future concepts are the big engines that drive future warfightingcapabilities and solutions. They are the ground thumpingNASCAR V-8s. arfighter Challenges (WFC), however, are thesmaller, lesser-known engines that drive new capabilities. They are thehigh-revving Indy series V-4s.”Mike Ellis, USSOCOM Warfighter Challenges Branch Chief

There are a number of ways to substantively change thejoint force. Historically, the most well known method ofchange has been through acquisition of new equipment.Accomplished through Planning, Programming, andBudget System and Defense Acquisition System processesin the beltway, this process has a deep constituency basiswith Congressional appropriations. The joint force doesn’tbenefit only from new equipment; however, newcapabilities derived from experimentation and analysisfocused on non-materiel solutions adjusts the face of theforce itself. Unlike material acquisitions, though, non-materiel solutions don’t have a self-made beltwayconstituency, so in order to affect such changes, Servicesand Combatant Commands - including USSOCOM - areusing WFCs to affect these non-materiel changes. Thisarticle describes WFCs, their place in USSOCOM strategy,and the processes to develop solutions and transition thesolutions to the warfighter.

What is a WFC?A Warfighter Challenge is a detailed description of amilitary problem requiring solutions to improve joint forcecapability. A WFC provides a capability definition, alinkage to Joint Capability Areas, and refers to the sourceof strategic guidance and other supporting documentationrequired to facilitate understanding and analysis of theissue. USSOCOM’s WFCs are related to but differ fromthe Integrated Priority List (IPL) and USSOCOM’sScience and Technology IPL (STIPL) because WFCsrequire some form or combination of experimentation toarrive at a solution. Whereas, in general, we know thesolutions to IPL problems, but we don’t have theresources to fulfill the requirement.

The annual Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) is thedata call and impetus for Services and combatantcommands (COCOM) to determine, prioritize, andsubmit WFCs. The October CJA drives each combatantcommander and Service Chief to assess how well hisorganization accomplished their mission, determine future

risks and potential capability gaps, and establish ways tomitigate the risks and gaps. The gaps that requireexperimentation to determine solutions are WFCs.USSOCOM’s prioritized WFCs for Fiscal Year 2010 are:

• Enabler, Support, and Sustainment (ESS)• Capabilities to Special Operations Forces (SOF)• Security Force Assistance Synchronization• Countering Threat Finance• ISR Collection and Analysis – AustereEnvironments

• Special Skills Personnel / Expand Force Enablers• Conduct Protracted Asymmetrical Warfare andIndirect Activities Globally

• Streamlined Acquisition.1

USSOCOMWFCs have touch points and weave throughUSSOCOM strategy. The USSOCOM Strategy 2010 waspublished 1 Nov 09 followed by the attendant StrategicPlan 18 Dec 09. Both strategy pieces, supported byUSSOCOM’s Strategic Appreciation, will provide the basisof and simultaneously leverage future USSOCOMWFCs.The seven FY2010WFCs, especially the ESS, Special SkillsPersonnel, and Asymmetric Warfare and IndirectActivities WFCs, will provide a vehicle to experiment anddevelop capability solutions to the three strategy focusareas: The Operator; Capabilities, Capacities, andAuthorities; and Strategic Credibility and Influence. TheFY2010 WFCs’ network, through the USSOCOM visionand strategy, inextricably centered on a consistent theme:the focus on SOF Operators and efforts to develop, field,and employ a Special Operations Force.

22

How Do We Identify WFCs?The USSOCOM J7/9Warfighter Challenges Branch is theoffice of primary responsibility (OPR) to develop theannual WFC list. The following describes the process theWFC Branch used to develop the FY2010 list, cognizantof the 1 October 2009 suspense for Admiral Olson tosubmit the CJA to the Joint Staff.

• The WFC branch conducted research and datacollection to establish a tentative list ofUSSOCOM challenges that need experimentationto determine solutions. The team researchedstrategic guidance including the NationalDefense Strategy, Global Development of theForce, National Military Strategic Plan for the Waron Terrorism, and the 2006 Quadrennial DefenseReview to discover potential challenges. Anotherand more directive source for potential WFCswere Admiral Olson’s testimonies to Congress.Finally, the team leveraged the work completed bythe USSOCOM 2010 QDR working group andtheir “one through n” list.• The WFC team whittled a list of 22 potential challenges down to a manageable list of seven.

• The team collaborated with the USSOCOM J-code“owner” of each WFC to ensure the descriptionwas accurate and the amplifying information andexperimentation questions would lead topotential solutions.

• USSOCOM J51 staffed the CJA including theWFCs through the headquarters in earlySeptember for Admiral Olson’s approval 1 Oct 09.

How Do You Find Solutions to WFCs?The real work – finding solutions to the FY2010 WFCs –began in late October 2009. USSOCOM J7/9 began

processing WFCs using two methods, both based onexperimentation. The first is a DOD process shown inFigure 1. and described in CJCSI/M 3010.02C, JointConcept Development and Experimentation. The secondmethod enables the USSOCOMWFC Branch to exploreinternal ways to address the WFCs using the J7/9Wargame and Experimentation Branches. This methoddrives focused experiments specifically designed aroundthe USSOCOM WFCs.

For the DODWFC process described in CJCSI 3010.02C,a DOD Enterprise exists to develop an annual CampaignPlan (CPLAN) to address experimentation against WFCsand future concepts. In existence less than five years, theJoint Concept Development and Experimentation(JCD&E) Enterprise is comprised of action officer to 2star level representatives from the Office of the Secretaryof Defense, the Joint Staff, Services, COCOMs, theNational Guard Bureau, the US Coast Guard, and partnersfrom Defense agencies, the interagency, and multinationalorganizations. The group follows a battle rhythm andprocedures established in CJCSI/M 3010.02C.

Joint Staff J7 collected all WFCs and forwarded them toJFCOM J9, the lead proponent to facilitate JCD&EEnterprise WFC processing. Following the processidentified in CJCSI/M 3010.02C, the Enterprise actionofficers racked and stacked all 106 DOD WFCs usingestablished formulae to produce a recommendedprioritized list. (USSOCOM’s #1WFC, Enabler, Support,and Sustainment for SOF rated #11 on the list.) After theO-6 Development Team and the 2-star Executive Councilapproved the prioritized WFC list, the AO and O-6-levelEnterprise members conducted a “gap analysis” todetermine whether or not other activities or existingexperimentation could address all or a portion of 2010WFCs. USSOCOM AOs determined they could leverageseveral Title 10 Service experiments and existing JFCOMprojects to address ESS and ISR WFCs. The results ofWFC processing and associated experimentation iscaptured in the Annual JCD&E Campaign Plan. Asshown in Figure 1, the CPLAN goes through an approvalprocess and directs experimentation for the next two fiscalyears. Accordingly, the WFCs submitted 1 Oct 09 will beincluded in the FY 2011/2012 CPLAN.

USSOCOM J7/9 has some capability and capacity toaddress FY2010 WFCs sooner than the CPLAN.USSOCOM J7/9 is developing experiments against theUSSOCOM FY2010 WFCs that are not sufficientlyFigure 1. JCD&E Warfighting Challenge Process

23

covered by existing Joint experimentation. Theexperimentation will be custom-designed to answerspecific Command gaps. Global Scout 2010 will be theprimary venue to discover and develop WFC solutions tothose uncovered gaps and challenges. The experimentalwargame will consist of three Limited ObjectiveExperiments leading to a capstone event inSeptember 2010.

How Do You Transfer Solutions to the Warfighter?The most important and toughest part of the WFC-to-experimentation-to-solution process is transitioning validsolutions into actionable Doctrine, Organization, Training,Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities,and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) changes. WFC sponsors incollaboration with the USSOCOM J7/9 WFC Branch andCapability Development Branches devise individual plansto shepherd DOTMLPF-P changes to culmination. WFCBranch personnel will guide these changes through theUSSOCOM Special Operations Forces CapabilitiesIntegration Development System (SOFCIDS) process andthe Joint Staff Joint Capabilities Integration DevelopmentSystem (JCIDS).

WFC sponsors and the USSOCOM J7/9 can transitionDOTMLPF-P changes through formal and informalmeans. The informal pathway may provide WFC sponsorsthe most rapid means for delivering solutions to thewarfighter. Examples include: Joint Doctrine changesaffected through the Joint Doctrine Development System(CJCSI 5120.02); changes or updates to Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) through the Air, Land,and Sea Application (ALSA) Center change process;changes to the Keystone, Capstone, and Pinnacle coursesmaintained by the Joint War Fighting Center (JWFC);changes to military education submitted to the MilitaryEducation Coordination Council (MECC) and MilitaryEducation Coordination Council Working Group (MECC

WG); and changes toorganization, personnel,and facilities that haveportfolio impacts submittedto the appropriate CapabilitiesPortfolio Manager.2

The formal or traditionalpathway to transition(resulting in a DOTMLPF-P change recommendation)is well documented in

CJCSI 3170.01 and the JCIDSManual. However, JCD&Eorganizations must scope their project correctly anddocument linkages between their WFCs, customer needs,and other validated requirements to ensure transitionsuccess. It is imperative that DCR recommendations areclear and concise and directed at the correct DOTMLPF-P solution category (doctrine, organization, training, etc.)3

In summary, the WFCs are engines that drive change. TheWFC process provides commanders and Service chiefs avehicle to affect change and provide solutions to theirmilitary problems. In USSOCOM, the J7/9 WarfighterChallenges Branch is the office of primary responsibilityfor developing and shepherding WFCs throughexperimentation and the transition to solutions. Ladiesand gentlemen…start your engines.

Source:1 Full WFC descriptions and supporting information can be found in“Hot Links” on the USSOCOM SIPRNET site:http://sofrel.socom.smil.mil/sites/SOKF/Default.aspx2 CJCSM 3010.02, Manual for Joint Concept Development andExperimentation, 1 Dec 09 (draft)3 Ibid

Mr. Mike Ellis is the Warfighter Challenges (WFC) Branch chief. Thefour-person WFC Branch identifies USSOCOM’s most pressingissues that require experimentation and shepherds the WFCsthrough experimentation into WFC solutions. Mike is a retiredUSAF navigator; commander of the 2nd Special Operations Flight(1994-1996) based at Robins AFB, Georgia and Special ActionsAircraft Manager at USSOCOM from 1996 to 1999.

SOF Baseline Interoperable Standards

Chapter - Special Operations Forces Baseline Interoperable Standards

Is there a movement to standardize U.S. SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures (TTP)? The clear answer is no, but there is anon-going effort in Headquarters U.S. Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) to establish standards for certainSOF skill sets that are applicable across all of thecomponents. In existence for over a year, the TrainingStandards branch (J7/9-TS), within the Knowledge,Training, and Futures Directorate (J7/9) at HQUSSOCOM, is tasked to establish Special OperationsForces Baseline Interoperable Standards (SOFBIS).

The SOFBIS concept originated in February 2006, as aresult of an Integrated Process Team (IPT) establishedunder the direction of then USSOCOM DeputyCommander, Admiral Olson. At that time he “…tasked todevelop the methodology and process to establish and validatestandardization of baseline Special Operations Forces trainingstandards and requirements validation.” Then Brigadier GeneralSteven J. Hashem (the current J7/9) kicked off the IPTmeeting by relaying ADM Olson’s vision and intent:

“The Training Standards and Requirements IPT was born out ofnecessity and specifically formed to address joint SOF advancedtraining requirements, methods, and standards. The IPT’s purposeis to help enable structure and consistency across the joint SOF forcewherever it is appropriate, while recognizing that you are eachprimarily responsible for training to standards that you set withinthe components. This IPT is meant to augment and assist yourimpressive efforts to train, qualify and certify our rapidly growingforce, not to centralize training management at USSOCOM. Theinitial focus will be on combat diving, military freefall, and combatmedicine. Later efforts will address shooting/sniping, driving,climbing, CQB and more –in a sequence largely determined by you.As you begin this process, keep in mind the big-picture end-statetraining requirements of this joint force in the context of SOF-peculiar vs. Service-common training standards and executive agencyand proponency. You must remain open-minded and non-parochialin your approach to developing/enhancing both component and jointSOF solutions to our growing collective training needs.

This IPT is not so much about how to train (you’ll determine thatfor the most part) as about what will we train to do. Its productwill be driven by operational requirements. A big part ofdetermining which advanced skills ought to have a SOF standardand who is responsible for what…. Your mission is to swiftly resolvethis issue—at the strategic level….”

Initial efforts from the SOKF-J7-T (now J7/9-T)addressed Combat Dive and Military Freefall skill sets. InJuly 2007, Major General Hashem approved conditionsand standards for both tasks which were published inmemorandum format for distribution. The process hasmatured over the years and now J7/9-TS efforts are beingpublished under the umbrella of the USSOCOM 350-series Training documents.

Formally established in October 2008, the J7/9-TS istasked to establish SOFBIS. Led by a Special ForcesLieutenant Colonel, and manned by SOF experienced,Government Service and contractor personnel, itfunctions as the institutionalized, enduring effortestablished by the Joint Training Branch IPT. J7/9-TSdeveloped its schedule of work from the SOFBIS TaskPrioritization List (Figure 1). The Task list was compiledfrom multiple sources including: CDRUSSOCOMTraining Guidance FY 08-10/FY 10-11,USSOCOM/DCDR Guidance/Priorities, Joint TrainingBranch IPT results (Feb 06), Component inputs, J7/9goals and objectives, the Unified Command Plan,USSOCOM D10-1 Terms of Reference-Roles, Missions,and Functions of Component Commands, Servicerequirements, and existing USSOCOM 350-seriesmanuals. The branch’s methodology is to optimize effortsby undertaking one or two larger, more complex (andpotentially more contentious or more “service demands”intensive) tasks; while simultaneously accomplishing otherless demanding and time consuming “low-hanging fruit”skills/tasks.The Task list was compiled from multiple sourcesincluding: CDRUSSOCOM Training Guidance FY 08-10/FY 10-11, USSOCOM/DCDR Guidance/Priorities,Joint Training Branch IPT results (Feb 06), Componentinputs, J7/9 goals and objectives, the Unified CommandPlan, USSOCOM D10-1 Terms of Reference-Roles,Missions, and Functions of Component Commands,Service requirements, and existing USSOCOM 350-seriesmanuals. The branch’s methodology is to optimize effortsby undertaking one or two larger, more complex (andpotentially more contentious or more “service demands”intensive) tasks; while simultaneously accomplishing otherless demanding and time consuming “low-hanging fruit”skills/tasks.

25

With Training Standards branch acting as the SOFAdvocate3 , establishing SOFBIS is a collaborative andtime consuming process (Figure 2) of researching,analyzing, coordinating and recommending appropriatestandards for each skill set. As a component-drivenproduct, SOFBIS development is based on the LeadComponent4and coordinating components providinginformation through formal data calls, componentcommand visits, component Subject Matter Expertsproviding current input and an operator’s “reality check”at the J7/9-TS sponsored working groups. EachUSSOCOM component possesses specific capabilities andfulfills particular service and joint requirements, thus theSOFBIS produced will frame a capability that does notinterfere with those component “peaks of excellence. “The SOFBIS serves as the foundation from whichcomponent commanders take full advantage of the JointTraining System as it defines the conditions and standardsfor SOF specific mission essential tasks.

Using the USSOCOM M350-30 Special OperationsForces Baseline Interoperable Sniper Training Standardsas an example, the process took eleven months frominception to publication. The time line included data calls,command visits, working groups, continuous e-mails andphone calls to come to an agreement on a SOF SniperSOFBIS. Initially hesitant, working participants were soonleaning forward when they realized they owned theprocess, the end product would be directly influencingcommunity wide policy, and their commands wouldultimately benefit from their invested efforts.

The SOFBIS Sniper working group had an additionalpositive outcome. Through the relationships establishedamong the participants, a SOF Sniper “Community ofInterest” (COI) has been formed on the USASOC portalensuring that professional knowledge and TTPs willcontinue to be shared across the components. To assist inknowledge sharing, the J7/9-TS maintains SOFBIS relatedfolders on its HQUSSOCOM SIPRNET portal page.

2010 will be a busy year for Training Standards branch.An internal realignment sensibly combined the StandardsBranch and the Assessments Branch tasks to maximizepersonnel talents and align Training managementoversight into a comprehensive process. Thestandardization of the publication format and the lessonslearned in the publishing process will shorten theproduction timeline. The recently updated USSOCCOMD 10-1 and the revised USSOCOM D350-1 USSOCOM

Military Training will provide supporting documentationfor writing Headquarters guidance for component trainingpolicy.

In keeping with ADM Olson’s guidance at the IPT, thefinal version of the M350-30 is only seventeen pages long.It articulates training standards, it does not standardizetraining. It is strategic level training guidance, outliningfor the components “what to do” but not “how to do it!”As a policy document, it provides componentHeadquarters a basis for planning and budgeting resourcesto improve training effectiveness and efficiency.

So to answer the question that began this article, no, theHeadquarters isn’t trying to “Standardize” SOF TTP.Instead, the Training Standards branch within theKnowledge, Training, and Futures Directorate hasdeveloped a process that puts the components in thedriver’s seat for determining Special Operations ForcesBaseline Interoperable Standards. As a result, the 350-series manuals the branch produces from componentinput; will afford the components the ability to optimizetheir capabilities-based peaks of excellence whilemaximizing training efficiencies and ultimately produce amore capable SOF warfighter.

Sources1 Minutes from the Inaugural Meeting and Charter creation of the SOF TrainingStandards and Requirements IPT, Feb 062 Ibid3 SOF Advocate. For an area of interest, the SOF advocate is responsible forapproving SOF Baseline standards within that area as well as adjudication andapproval of the following: concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine,training programs, training support requirements, research, development, test andevaluation (RDT&E) and equipment. USSOCOM has approval, validationand certification authority. Per USSOCOM D 10-1, 12 Dec 094 Lead Component. The Lead Component will recommend standardized SOFbaseline qualifications for all Components in the designated skill, capability, ortask. This includes evaluation of the skill levels produced at all USSOCOMComponent schools and training facilities against SOF baseline qualificationrequirements. Testing, validation, and standardization of equipment are essentialto endure SOF interoperability and safety. Lead Components must also develop,publish, and distribute safety messages, equipment bulletins, and quality deficiencyreports. Authorities will be assigned at time of assignment. The Lead Componentis required to coordinate with all Components for any proposedestablishment/change recommendations. Per USSOCOM D 10-1

Mr. Herrera is the AFSOC Training SME within the Training Division ofUSSOCOM's J7/9 Directorate. He and his fellow SMEs in TrainingStandards Branch are responsible for writing SOFBIS in the USSOCOM 350series directives. He is a retired USAF officer and holds a masters degree inDefense Analysis from Naval Postgraduate School.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Chapter - Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

The recent establishment and initial operating capability(IOC) of the Small Unmanned Aircraft System FormalTraining Unit-East (SUAS FTU-E) at Choctawrepresented a huge paradigm shift and is a significantmove for SOCOM in developing a central point of initialqualification training (IQT) for Unmanned AircraftSystems (UAS). Over the past few years, almost all of theUAS training for SOF [barring mature programs such asPredator] has been provided by vendors/ contractorsand/or mobile training teams (MTTs). This way ofproviding IQT to SOF has not met the current demand,and the standards of training have not been adequatelyupheld and have been extremely difficult to monitor andassess. The real solution has been in establishing a schoolhouse or a center of excellence where prospectivestudents could receive the same standardized training.This benefits not only SOF but the joint force in manyways and has potential to mitigate several problems werepeatedly see.

The past and current UAS training methodology wassimply not sustainable and did not support UAS operatorrequirements over the long term. Additionally, UAStraining conducted at numerous geographically separatesites throughout CONUS by numerous contractors madeassessing the quality of training nearly impossible. Havinga USSOCOM -operated and controlled training venue willfacilitate our qualitative and quantitative control of SUAStraining as well as our ability to ensure adherence toapplicable Joint and SOF standards. The idea was that aSOF UAS training center would provide: the oversightneeded to manage the SUAS training programs; theflexibility to amend the training courses and to incorporateJoint and/or USSOCOM-approved syllabus changesrapidly; a way to maintain an instructor cadre base capableof providing consistent high quality training; a method toprovide qualifications accepted among governmentinstitutions to operate UAS safely while providing thiscapability at a greatly reduced cost.

The original thoughts behind the SOF joint training centerwere that training would be conducted by an instructorcadre composed of active duty personnel, department ofdefense (DoD) civilians, and DoD contractors. The SOFjoint training center would consolidate Basic UASQualification (BUQ), IQT, Mission Qualification (MQT),and instructor upgrade training at a central facility under

common Joint syllabi and would increase schedulingefficiencies, while reducing overall training costs.Adequate student-to-instructor ratios would allow the fullimplementation of the UAS training program with theassociated qualification levels to include incorporation ofancillary training and secondary training benefits. Thecurrent accepted ratio is 5:1; however, there are on-goingdiscussions of a 4:1 ratio to be adopted as the newstandard. Insufficient student to instructor ratios precludeconsistent high quality training as well as the assurancethat all required tasks – as directed by the CJCSI 3255.01and USSOCOM Directive 350-9 – are met.

The SUAS FTU-E (Choctaw) reached IOC in October2009 and represents the collaborative work of severaldifferent J-codes and offices from the SOF components,as well as The U.S. Navy’s Naval Air Station Whiting Field,who owns the land on which the FTU-E is located. Itsmission statement is: To provide Special Operations andAir Force operators and instructors with relevant, tailoredSUAS training; increasing the effectiveness and security ofthe teams they support. Current instructor breakdownincludes MFP-11 and MFP-4 funded positions: 4government civilians, 6 contracted instructors, 3contracted support personnel and 1 Officer In Charge(pending AFSOC/CC decision). SOF student throughputfor FY10 and future years is 420 students, with an AirForce student throughput of 230 students, resulting in anannual cost savings of $1.2 million over vendor-provided training.

The ability to train SOF operators from all of thecomponents under one roof ensures that all SOF will be

27

held to the same training standards. This in turn will allowmore interoperability between the components in theaterdue to the qualification commonality that will result fromall components having been trained to the same standards.Additionally, the cost for the training will be significantlyreduced for the components and the program will bemuch more effective in filling urgent needs. FTU-E willset the new standard as we look to establish an FTU-Weston the West coast with Naval Special Warfare Commandas the lead. Partnership talks with the services havealready begun [and in some cases embraced] as theyunderstand that the overall utility of the school houseswill benefit the Joint force in the long term whilemitigating significant training deficiencies as well.

The J7/9-TU office fully embraces and supports the “endto end” training approach as we look to continue pursuingthe school house approach to training. There is a direneed to continue to develop training programs to facilitatethe development of a UAS operator and equip him/her tobe effective on the battlefield. IQT is not acceptable as astand alone program; there needs to be robust advancedand mission qualification training programs developed bya cadre of subject matter experts to fully equip the SOFUAS operator. The ability of SOF to continue toeffectively exploit the capabilities of current UASprograms and those to evolve from the various CMNS,JUONS, RAF initiatives, etc. will continue to requireorganization and management from the HQ level that isfocused on long term objectives with flexible resourcingtools and the ability to coordinate and keep pace withindustry and technological advances.

Mr. Jordan Binion is the Group 1 UAS subject matter expert in the J7/9-TU,unmanned Systems Branch. He is qualified on multiple UAS platforms and hasoperational SOF experience in multiple AOR’s. Mr. Binion spent 5 years onactive duty in Naval Special Warfare as a Special Warfare Combatant-CraftCrewman (SWCC) where he was assigned to Special Boat Team Twenty-Two.

3D Modelling

Chapter - 3D Modelling

“Leveraging Advanced Technology to Enable SOF MissionPlanning, Preparation, and Rehearsal for Ground, Maritime, andAir Operations in a 3D Virtual Environment.”

Required CapabilityThe United States Special Operations Command(USSOCOM) has long been a leader in the developmentand use of modeling and simulation for aviation trainingand planning. Over the years, however, there has been acritical capability gap with air mission rehearsal and allfacets of ground and maritime modeling and simulation.Several recent lessons learned from combat operationssubs tant i a te a renewed focus on th i s long-s tanding requirement.

United States Army Special Operations Command(USASOC), Air Force Special Operations Command(AFSOC), Marine Special Operations Command(MARSOC), and Naval Special Warfare Command(NSWC) have Master Plans that address the capabilityrequirement to perform mission rehearsal in live, virtual,and constructive (LVC) environments. Resources havebeen previously allocated unevenly across thecomponents, resulting in few or no virtual andconstructive capabilities for ground and maritime trainingand mission rehearsal. Emerging defense and commercialoff-the-shelve virtual technologies should prove toenhance mission preparedness for ground and maritimeSOF. Special Operations Aviation should also capitalizeon these advanced technologies.

Thus, a requirement for a virtual mission rehearsalcapability does exist for all SOF (National and Theaterground, maritime, and air), using geo-specific terrain in a3D virtual environment, providing a first-person shooterexperience supported by multi-echelon command andcontrol (C2). FM 17-95 defines Mission Rehearsal as acapability for organizations and operators to plan,rehearse, and evaluate specific operational missions in aneffort to minimize the probability of detection and reducerisk and combat losses during the actual missionperformed over the same virtual terrain as the actualmission. An enhanced mission rehearsal capability willlikely increase the warfighter’s understanding of complexoperating environments.

VisionWhat if SOF could “see” high value targets,concealed locations for potential threat, and rehearsemulti-unit actions on the objective in geo-specificterrain?

What if SOF could survey maritime topographybefore physically reconnoitering a beach landing?

What if SOF could detect IED indicators along aningress route, causing the bypass of that route,reducing or eliminating the effects of an IEDdetonation?

What if SOF could accomplish these and othermission rehearsal scenarios in a 3D environment withreal/near-time intelligence?

A mission rehearsal capability could change how SOFprepares for and executes unilateral and multilateralmissions. In fact, a 3D immersive environment couldimprove training, planning, preparation, rehearsal, missionexecution, mission summary/after-action reporting, andplanning for branches and sequels. It would potentiallyprovide a capability to significantly improve how theplanner and operator views battlespace, terrain,meteorological, and oceanographic effects, and preparefor situational dynamics influencing the ability toaccomplish strategic goals.

Optimally, a SOF mission rehearsal application will haveto support interoperability and flexibility and link currentSOF TTPs. The Capabilities Development Documentidentifies Key Performance Parameters for net-ready,stand-alone operations, and Special Operations MissionPlanning Environment (SOMPE). Further, the rehearsalapplication will add new technologies to the SOFbattlespace awareness arsenal and leverage existingbaseline applications and capabilities to achieve it. Thevirtual environment is expected to incorporate a soldier’smission load, weapons, munitions, radios, sensors, andmobility equipment.

The vision incorporates an immersive, highly visual, 3Drehearsal environment with the capability to assist insynchronizing forces, improving 3D battlespace, and

29

enhancing situational awareness. This will also be awarfighter and staff decision-making tool, providinginteractive visualization and the ability to integrateunlimited aspects of human terrain, language, and culture.

ChallengesUntil recently, the technologies to provide high qualitymodeling and simulation to the ground and maritimeoperational environments were either not available orunder-developed. On the other hand, the entertainmentindustry continues to produce very immersive, virtualenvironments that can appear to accurately simulate theenvironment. When closely analyzed, however, it becomesapparent there is a wide gap between the goals of theentertainment market and the requirements of themilitary. This gap continues to narrow over time due todemands placed on industry by gamers who want a morerealistic environment for virtual game-play.

While warfighters’ needs will drive the virtual missionrehearsal requirement, consideration should be equallygiven to developing available hardware. A virtual missionrehearsal capability must operate on USSOCOM TacticalLocal Area Network (TACLAN) notebook computers andservers. This extends the rehearsal capability for the usersto the battlefield and permits use in garrison, duringmission planning and preparation, while en route, and atall Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) andtactical unit locations. In other words, this capability mustbe available during course of action development, analysis,wargaming, execution, and post-mission activities.

USSOCOM components can successfully conductmission rehearsal in joint/combined live, virtual, andconstructive (LVC) environments only with the availabilityof appropriate resources and infrastructure. The need tobalance active engagements against a global irregularadversary with the requirement to remain prepared toaddress a traditional adversary underscores the complexityof the joint training challenge. Lack of a robust missionrehearsal capability is a critical operational and trainingshortfall that can be overcome. The combination of thefuture environment and security challenges, combinedwith future joint training realities, make it imperative thatUSSOCOM transform joint training to close these gaps.

Advance Technology and IntegrationSOF warfighters could benefit from a mission rehearsalcapability that leverages and integrates today’s andtomorrow’s technical advances, providing more in-depth,

accurate, timely, usable, and pertinent rehearsals.USSOCOM requires the ability for SOF to conduct joint,full range of military operations, networked, integrated,and interoperable mission rehearsal in a LVC, geo-specificenvironment. It will be fully interoperable with the SOFmission planning systems and SO Mission PlanningEnvironment (SOMPE).

There are several commercial off the shelf (COTS)interactive models that already have the ability to replicatemissions that provide a mastery of tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs). Ultimately, 3D modeling andsimulation supporting the full-spectrum of SOFoperations should provide rehearsal:

• In garrison• En route to target objective• At Forward Operating Base (FOB)• In remote, austere operational locations

These functional capabilities must be available on apersistent basis and for use at home station, en route, anddeployed, as driven by the force’s operational tempo, andwhile providing realistic training and rehearsalopportunities.

“[W]e will continue to press ahead with vigor in our pursuit oftechniques and technologies that mitigate our adversaries’ inherentadvantages.”

Admiral Olson, 2010 Commander’s Guidance

The Way AheadThe desire is for the mission rehearsal application toenable SOF to conduct mission rehearsal in a virtual orconstructive, 3-D geo-specific environment to supporttraining, exercises, planning, rehearsal, and post-missionsummary/after-action reporting. It will be integrated withSOF mission planning, the SOF common database(CDB), and SOF language and cultural software, providinga tool for individuals, teams, or a large joint force toconduct SOF mission rehearsal. Additionally, a fullyintegrated mission rehearsal application will run onUSSOCOM automated equipment and networks withoutthe need for specialty simulators or special facilities. It willbe used by all SOF to support mission planning, rehearsal,and execution from individual to CJSOTF.

SummaryMission rehearsal capability will provide all SOF elements(National and Theater Ground, Maritime, and Air) the

30

ability to train, plan, and rehearse over mission terrain ina 3D virtual environment providing a first-person shooterexperience with multi-echelon C2. It will add to the speedof execution, knowledge empowerment, situationalawareness, and combat decision-making skills for SOF.Further, it will produce the USSOCOM CDB for rapiddelivery of virtual terrain layers for ground, maritime,littoral, and aviation support.

This rehearsal system will include the SOF-uniqueoperational, language and cultural capabilities that areroutinely employed by USSOCOM throughout theoperational continuum. Once developed into the requiredcapability, virtual 3D mission rehearsal will:

• Facilitate SOF synchronization, battlespacedeconfliction, and situational awareness.• Provide decision-making tools for the warfighterand staff through visualization.• Incorporate aspects of human terrain, e.g.,language and culture.

Taking the fight to the terrorist begins by taking away thehome field advantage. USSOCOM and its componentsare vigorously pursuing that effort through a 3D virtualmission rehearsal capability. This endeavor supportsAdmiral Olson 2010 Commander’s Guidance where hestates, “[O]ur priorities must work to the advantage ofthose who will face combat, assume greater personal risk,live by their wits or represent us in far-away places aloneor in small groups.”

This article was a collaborative effort from J7/9 Training Requirements Branch(J7/9-TR). J7/9-TR provides operator focused training guidance; and functionalmanagement and requirements advocacy for SOF training and missionpreparation systems. The article was compiled and edited by Mr. Randy K.Jackson, of Gemini Industries, Inc., a Senior SOF Program Analyst. He wasa career SOF officer, spanning years from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel, andholds a Juris Doctor degree from the Southern Methodist University.

The Chairman’s Joint Training System

Chapter - The Chairman’s Joint Training SystemFigure 1: Integrated JMET Structure

Focused Resources, Meaningful Metrics, andCommand-Wide Integration USSOCOM’sTraining Trifecta

What is the Chairman’s Joint Training System (JTS)?The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)developed the JTS in order to establish a common processusing a common language throughout our combatantforces. The JTS is a requirements-based, structuredanalytical methodology that provides commanders withthe ability to focus critical training resources where theyproduce the timeliest results to the force demographicwith the greatest need. In essence, it gets the right trainingto the right force at the most appropriate time. By using afour-phase process that identifies the mission-derivedtraining requirements, gaps and/or deficiencies and targetsthe specific training audience and the best training methodfor that audience, the commander is better able to allocatehis limited resources to produce the most effectivetraining. In addition, as he proceeds through the phases,he develops and collects pre-defined metrics that recordhis training success or deficiencies.

Historically, the most limited training resource has beenactual training time with the training audience. The JTSprovides the commander with the ability to maximize thatlimited time and gain the greatest results in the process.It also allows greater integration across the Joint TrainingCommunity through the use of this DOD-wide commonprocess. We will talk about the four phases in greaterdetail later in this document.

Why is This Important?Early in the Bush Administration, then Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld began a program calledTraining Transformation or T2 for short. As an integralpart of T2, Secretary Rumsfeld strove to link previouslystove-piped DOD processes into a more fully integratedsystem-of-systems. The thread he used to stitch thesesystems together was the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).The UJTL is a library of tasks that describes military tasksin a common language complete with “conditions” underwhich the task will be performed and “standards” towhich the task will be executed. The goal of this Universallanguage is to promote common understanding andcapability expectations between commanders employing

American forces. When selected UJTL tasks are linked toparticular mission directives, they form the basis of whatwe know as Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs).

The result of the Secretary’s T2 efforts is that today weoperate in a predominately UJTL-centric universe. UJTLtasks are used as the foundation for readiness reporting,joint training, resourcing (JCIDS) and soon will be used incapability-based planning. The very same JMETs and theirassociated supporting tasks are used to definerequirements, tailor training, and determine readinessthroughout every combatant command, Service andcombat support agency (CSA). This common process isunderwriting great strides in integration effortsacross the DOD.

Why Does USSOCOM Use the JTS?USSOCOM’s role is defined in both law and regulation.Title 10 USC, Section 167 spells out the Commander,USSOCOM’s responsibilities in regards to the SOF force.For example, the Service-like responsibilities to organize,train and equip are captured in this section of U.S. law.The JTS provides the Commander with some of themetrics necessary to assist him in accurately reporting onthe combat readiness of SOF forces.

Also, the regulatory requirement for the JTS is provided byChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction3500.01E, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the ArmedForces of the United States clearly states “The JTS shall be usedto manage training throughout the Department of Defense…”Also, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual3500.03B, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces ofthe United States adds “This manual provides guidance to the

32

combatant commanders when implementing the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy for developing joint mission-essential task list (JMETL), planning and conducting joint training,and assessing command readiness with regard to joint training. Thecombatant commands, Services and combat support agencies (CSAs)will use this manual when using the Joint Training System…”

Not unlike USSOCOM’s Strategic Planning Process thatproduces the strategy-to-task model used to allocateresources throughout the command, the JTS provides amission-to-task model that is used to identify and applytraining resources and develop metrics that can be usedfor specific reporting and assessments.

What Does the JTS Do for USSOCOM?The JTS process is the “sausage grinder,” if you will, thatconverts National Military Strategy into measurabletraining down to the unit level. Using the JTS process thatidentifies mission-derived training requirements (JMETs),stratified by their appropriate level-of-war (strategicnational, strategic theater, operational, and tactical), andintegrated with the JMETs of subordinate commands(components, JTFs, etc.), the JTS translates strategicmission taskings (OPLANs, CONPLANs, UCP, etc) intomeasurable specific individual tasks.

As the integrated JMETL structure makes it way down thechain of command, we see the logic in this level-of-warapproach. HQ USSOCOM’s mission is global in nature;therefore, the majority of its tasks are strategic national.As we progress to the JTF and Theater Special OperationsCommand level, their focus becomes more strategictheater oriented. SOCOM’s component commands havea more operational focus and their subordinate units tendtrain mainly at the tactical level. It is at the unit level thatthe joint tasks most directly link to the Service tasks. Sotaken in the aggregate, the JMETL process is able tocapture the entire scope of the SOF mission.

A side benefit of the JTS process is that it contributes togreater interoperability through the linkage of supportingtasks to higher headquarters JMETs and the increasedintegration of Interagency/Multinational Partners. TheInteragency community has embarked on a parallel JTSeffort thru the development of Agency Mission EssentialTask Lists (AMETL) and their integration into the DODJTS construct.

The Four-phased JTSThe JTS consists of the four phases: Requirements, Plans,Execution, and Assessments. The full cycle completesonce every year. The assessments (phase four) from oneyear identify training gaps and deficiencies that are fedback into the requirements development (phase one) forthe next year to be addressed and corrected. Each phaseproduces a product that is used in the following phase.We will briefly address each phase and the productsthey produce.

Phase One - RequirementsThe requirements phase can best be described by thequestion, “What do we need to do?” As such, missionanalysis kicks off the requirements phase. All taskingdocuments (OPLANS, CONPLANS, UCP, JSCP, etc) arereviewed for specified and implied unit mission taskings.Once identified, a concept of operation is crafted toexecute those mission sets. The UJTL is then consultedto build the required task list necessary to conduct theconcept of operations. This list can vary in lengthdepending on the complexity of the mission tasking. TheCommander will then apply his “essentiality criteria” tothis list of tasks. All tasks do not have the same missionimpact. For instance, the majority of tasks could fail andresult in a degree of mission degradation, but overall themission could still succeed. However, there are a handfulof tasks that could conceivably cause total mission failurewere they to fail. It is the commander’s prerogative thatidentifies those few “essential” tasks. These then becomethe JMETs, and when placed in a list they become theJMETL. All other tasks then become supporting tasks.HQ USSOCOM has identified almost 400 tasks but hasonly 17 essential tasks. This total list of tasks is whatdefines the USSOCOM mission and drives the tasks towhich we need to train. A point of interest regardingsystems integration is that all JMETs are developed in theDefense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and arethen automatically migrated to the Joint TrainingInformation Management System (JTIMS) to be used fortraining. This is another example of different processesFigure 2: CJCSI 3500.01E, Figure B-1. JTS Four-Phase Process

using the same mission derived JMETs.

Phase One Output: JMETL

Phase Two – PlansThe plans phase can best be described by the twoquestions “Who needs to do it?” and “How do they doit?” In this phase we build the command’s Joint TrainingPlan (JTP). The JTP resides on JTIMS and is comprisedof a series of eight tabs. To build the JTP we complete afew important steps:

• Revise the Commander’s Training Guidance (CTG)– This is annual guidance to the force where thecommander articulates his prioritized training focusareas. These can be emerging requirements and/orcontinuing requirements where additional effort isrequired.• Refine the Training Audience – What particular partof the force requires what training? This analysis iscrucial to ensure that needed training is targeted onthe specific segment of the force most in need.Significant time and resources are spent providingunnecessary training to those with little or no actualneed.• Develop Training Objectives – Once the commanderidentifies his training priorities in the CTG, theJMETs that support those priorities are selected.Training Objectives (TO) are then developed to helpstructure the training events to train to those JMETs.• Determine Training Methods – This is one of themost overlooked aspects of developing a JTP. Whenwe talk about training, most military membersimmediately think of exercises. While exercises area very effective training method it is not the only oneavailable. There are also classroom academics,distributive learning, workshops, and senior leaderseminars just to name a few. A balanced mixture ofthese training methods spread across selectedelements of the training audience can accomplisheffective training while saving time and money.• Design and schedule Training Events – Based on thework accomplished in the previous steps, specifictraining events are developed using the TO to plantraining of the selected JMETs.• 149 Publish the JTP in JTIMS.

Phase Two Output: JTP

Phase Three – ExecutionPhase three can be characterized by the simple statement“Just do it!” It is in this phase where we execute the JointLife Cycle for the training events developed in Phase two.During the execution, pre-planned observations (TaskPerformance Observations (TPO)) are captured andentered in JTIMS. The TPOs are used to determine ifthe training audience can perform to the level describedin the TO. TPOs can be captured by actualdemonstrations, briefings, etc. Multiple TPOs are thencollected for each TO and analyzed to produce theTraining Proficiency Evaluation (TPE). The TPE answersthe question “Did I meet my TO?” An After ActionReport (AAR) is produced and provides a “first-look” onhow well the training audience achieved their TOs.

Phase Three Output – TPO, TPE, AAR

Phase Four – AssessmentPhase Four can be characterized by the question “HowDid We Do?” The Joint Training Manual describes thisphase as “…how training evaluations from multipletraining events are converted into an assessment oftraining readiness and mission essential task proficiency.”In perhaps what is a gross over simplification, the processworks as follows:

• Analyze TPEs from Phase Three. Review relevantLessons Learned in other military operations.Prepare staff/unit assessments.• Develop Training Proficiency Assessments (TPA) –All TPEs are analyzed to develop the TPA. TheTPA answers the question “Is the training audiencetra ined to execute the JMET (or other

33

Figure 3: JTS Input-Output Process by Phase

34

tasks) to standard?”• Develop Mission Training Assessment (MTA) – Allthe TPAs are analyzed. This shows the commanderthat all the selected JMETs have been trained anddefines the command’s ability to perform thatmission area. The commander approves the MTAand it is entered in JTIMS.• The MTA migrates from JTIMS to DRRS andpopulates the training readiness tab.

Phase Four Output – TPA and MTA

SummaryThe Joint Training System’s four-phased building blockapproach provides the pre-planned analytical frameworkthat takes the command from mission-to-task to metricscollection and assessment. This provides the commanderwith the essential mission- based data that he needs tomake an accurate appraisal of the command’s training tomeet its assigned mission. It also provides a provenmethodology that helps apportion scarce trainingresources to where they are most urgently needed.

As with all complex strategic undertakings, the “devil” inthe JTS lies in the details. It requires actions at all levelsthroughout the command. All staffs must fully grasp theCommander’s guidance and priorities, be able to applystrategic concepts, and work to constantly improveintegration efforts both within the command and acrossDOD. However, this is no “Herculean Task” and theprocess will guide us to success. Successfulimplementation of the JTS’ analytical methodology willallow the commander the ability to ensure that his trainingpriorities are met, measured and integrated throughoutthe command. The perfect Training Trifecta.

Mr. Gearing is Camber Corporations Tampa Director and the Command'sJoint Training System Specialist (JTSS). As the JTSS he is responsible forhelping USSOCOM implement the Chairman's Joint Training System. He isretired SOF with extensive senior staff experience at HQ USSOCOM.