Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge Against Terrorism

STEVE S. SIN

asian affairs nº 29 – 33

Homegrown Terrorism1,2,3: South Korea’s Next Challenge against Terrorism

by Steve S. Sin

* Steve Sung-Kun Sin graduated from the University of Texas (Austin) in 1995 with a BA in Government. He is a Major in the US Army currently assigned as the Chief of Open Source Intelligence Branch, Directorate of Intelligence, US Forces Korea. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Forces Korea, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

With over 22,000 American service members stationed in the ROK, the USFK is known more for its role as a symbol of the US commitment to the defense of the ROK against North Korean aggression than its role as a partner in the ROK’s fight against terrorism. Many who study terrorism even have the attitude, “Does Korea even have an issue with terrorism?” Perspectives as a person who has served recently in the USFK analyzing terrorism and force protection issues is that the possibility of terrorism is a reality in the ROK. This article will put forth an argument that while the ROK to date has not suffered any known incident of “homegrown” Islamic-inspired terrorism, many if not all of the necessary pre-conditions are already well established. With this awareness, the ROK must develop and implement a coherent program with two key elements: increased vigilance, and palliative outreach measures to potential malefactors, their families and, to the extent that a coherent community exists, its leaders. The ROK is neither immune from nor unfamiliar with acts of terrorism. It has dealt with numerous terrorist acts since its inception in 1948, including attacks against its citizens in foreign countries. The most common types of terrorist tactics used against ROK interests have included bombing, shooting, hijacking, and kidnapping. To date, North Korea was responsible for almost all terrorism-related events against the ROK within and outside of its borders (Koerner 2003 and Fischer 2007).

STEVE S. SIN


Traditionally focused on potential terrorism from the North, the ROK government has for the last few years been shifting its attention to possible acts of terror from beyond the Korean Peninsula. Reflecting this shift, the MOFAT appointed the first Director for International Counter-terrorism Cooperation in February 2006 (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2007, Ch 2). The ROK has yet to experience terrorism within its borders where North Korea is not the primary actor. It has not, however, escaped numerous threats and warnings from Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, some known or suspected of association with Al-Qaeda (4) and acts of terrorism carried out against its citizens abroad, such as the kidnapping of 23 Christian missionaries in Afghanistan in 2007 and the beheading of Kim Sun-Il in Iraq in 2004 are the two most recent incidents. In an effort to better address the issues of terrorism, both abroad and domestically, the ROK military, law enforcement, and government agencies have been cooperating closely with the USFK. The USFK has a robust Force Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Counter-terrorism programs to protect both the US service members and families stationed in Korea and the US interests in the region. These programs also assist the ROK partners prepare for the possibilities of terrorism in Korea and to fight and defeat any terrorist activity against the ROK interests on and off the Korean Peninsula. Cooperation between the USFK and the ROK military during the hostage crisis in Afghanistan in 2007 was a prime example. Unremarkable Residents of Community. The concept of homegrown terrorism is not new; however, it does depart from the conventional terrorism models where the terrorists are of foreign origins. In these conventional models, a terrorist organization located in a foreign country would dispatch a team of operatives to conduct an initial assessment of the possible target areas. Once the assessment is completed, and the conditions are set for an attack, a different team of operatives would enter the target area from overseas to carry out the attack (attack may or may

STEVE S. SIN


not be a suicide mission). Assuming the attack was not a suicide mission, the operatives would then ex-filtrate the area. With the homegrown terrorism model, however, terrorists are usually local residents of the target area who are living ordinary lives as members of their community. They don’t have criminal histories, and they do not always exhibit extremist behaviors. Homegrown terrorist cells are generally composed of young, 1.5th-, second- and third-generation immigrants. These cells may or may not have an ideological affiliation with large terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, and generally operate with total autonomy. Madrid train bombing, Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group, London subway and bus bombings, Australia’s Operation Pendennis, and the Toronto 18 cases are all notable homegrown terrorism cases that have occurred throughout the world. The United States has had its share of attempted homegrown terrorism as seen in the Fort Dix case of 2007 and the Sears Tower case of 2006. The threat of homegrown terrorism is real and it is a problem that every nation-state has to face and deal with today and for the foreseeable future. Ideology and Radicalization. Terrorism experts point out that youth, unemployment, feelings of alienation, a longing to feel self-important, and a need to be part of a group are some of the major qualities that individuals who are likely to adopt a terrorist ideology have in common. They also observe that religion can be compelling to such individuals, and they are prone to exploitation by radical religious leaders (Kaplan 2007). Therefore, religious ideology and radicalization play a major role for the would-be terrorists. In the West, and to most extent in Northeast Asia, the phenomenon of radicalization occurs largely because the people are looking for an identity and sense of belonging – unfortunately, identity and sense of belonging are sometimes found in extremist Islam.

STEVE S. SIN


The ideology responsible for driving the radicalization and motivates young men and women to carry out self-guided jihad-inspired terrorism against their host countries is the jihadi-Salafism (5). This ideology inspired all or nearly all of the homegrown groups in the West including those mentioned earlier in this paper. Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of the radicalization process (6) and it is composed of four phases: 1) Pre-radicalization; 2) Self-identification; 3) Indoctrination; and 4) Jihadization. Each phase has unique and specific signatures and individuals who undergo the process do not necessarily follow a sequential progression. It is important to note that not all individuals who begin the radicalization process necessarily complete it – most, in fact, abandon the process. If an individual does pass through the entire process, however, it is quite likely he will get involved in terrorism. There is no set timeline for the radicalization process. The homegrown terrorism cases the New York Police Department studied shows each homegrown group underwent the process at different speeds and for different length of time – the shortest being approximately four years and the longest being approximately 13 years (See Chart 1). One of the critical parts of the radicalization process is the effect of the radicalization catalysts. The catalysts can be found in different, seemingly benign, venues such as cafes, restaurants, grocery stores, flophouses, student associations, non-governmental organizations, bookstores, and even mosques. These locations provide meeting places and haunts for like-minded individuals who have chosen to pursue radicalization as they move through the process. One of the radicalization catalysts that cannot be overlooked today is the internet. The internet, with its thousands of extremist websites and chat-rooms, serves as the virtual venue. In fact,many of the would-be extremists begin their process while researching or just surfing on the internet. As individuals progress through the various stages of radicalization, their use of the internet evolves. In the self-identification phase, the internet serves as

STEVE S. SIN


Chart 1. (Source: Mitchell and Bhatt 2007, 81)

STEVE S. SIN


the person’s source of information about Islam and venue to meet others online. With the aggressive proliferation of the jihadi-Salafi ideology online, it is nearly impossible for someone to avoid this extreme interpretation of Islam. During the indoctrination phase, individuals devote their time tapping into the virtual networks of like-minded individuals around the world via extremist sites and chat rooms who reinforce the individual’s beliefs and commitment and further legitimize them. In the Jihadization phase, people challenge and encourage each others for action. It is at this stage, the internet becomes a resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an attack (Mitchell and Bhatt 2007, 82, 16, 19, 81, 20, 37). Emergence of the ROK as a Regional and International Power. The ROK had one of the fastest economic developments in the world since the 1960s and is now one of the four largest economies in Asia and the 13th largest economy in the world. In the late 20th century, many people referred to the ROK as a newly industrialized country and an Asian Tiger due to its rapid economic growth. Today, the ROK ranks among the G20 industrial nations and is a Next Eleven nation with many developing countries referring to its economic success as the Miracle on the Han River, using the ROK’s success story as a role model. The ROK has a "High" HDI of 0.912 and is part of both the CIA and IMF lists of advanced economies, being defined as a High Income Nation by the World Bank (IMF 2007). The ROK is one of the world's most technologically and scientifically advanced countries; it is the only country in the world with nationwide 100Mbit/s broadband internet access, full HDTV broadcasting, DMB, WiBro and 3G HSDPA. It is currently the most wired nation in the world, with more than 90 per cent of all homes connected to high speed broadband internet. The ROK is a global leader in electronics, computers, digital displays, semiconductor devices, mobile phones, and hi-tech gadgets, headed by the two chaebols (i.e., conglomerates), Samsung and LG. South

STEVE S. SIN


Korea also boasts the world's 3rd largest steel producer, POSCO and is the 5th largest automobile manufacturing nation, headed by Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group. South Korea is the world's largest shipbuilder, led by several multinational corporations such as Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries. Other important industries of South Korea include robotics and biotechnology, with the world's second humanoid robot, EveR-1 and the world's first cloned dog, Snuppy. The ROK participates in the international community in every aspect and continues to work to increase its role in regional and global political affairs. The ROK maintains diplomatic relations with approximately 170 countries. It has also been a member of the United Nations since 1991. On January 1, 2007, the ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon assumed the post of UN Secretary-General. It has also developed links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as both a member of "ASEAN Plus three" and the East Asia Summit. To deter and fight against transnational terrorism, the ROK supports the US Global War on Terror (GWOT) and actively participates in numerous international anti-terrorism initiatives. It supported US goals in Afghanistan and maintained the third-largest foreign troop contingent in Iraq through most of 2007. Additionally, it leads a Coalition Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq’s Irbil Province. In November 2006, the ROK joined other APEC member nations in endorsing US security initiatives on aviation security, bioterrorism and food defense, and the protection of commercial and financial sectors from abuse by proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. It also actively participates in regional training and capacity building programs. The Korean government has hosted representatives from the Middle East, Latin America, and elsewhere in Asia for training in crime prevention, criminal justice, counter-terrorism, forensic science, anti-piracy and terrorism management, prevention of money laundering, and narcotics law enforcement (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2007 and 2008, Ch. 2).

STEVE S. SIN


Foreign Population in the ROK. The ROK’s population (approximately 48.85 million) is one of the most ethnically and linguistically homogenous in the world. It does, however, have a small foreign population – about 1.5%. According to the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, foreigners residing in the ROK totaled 722,686 as of August 2007, a 35% increase over 2006 figures (536,627) (See Figure 1). This survey only took into account the foreigners who have visas that allow them to reside in the ROK longer than 90 days. Other surveys (mostly conducted by the NGOs) estimate there are over one million foreigners residing in the ROK, which includes over 200,000 illegal residents. The majority of these illegal residents possess expired visas with shorter than 90-day dwell periods; therefore, they were not a part of the official ROK government survey conducted in August 2007 (ROK Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 2007 and Korea Islamic Foundation).

STEVE S. SIN


Employees of multinational companies, foreign students, and skill laborers accounted for 276,608 (38.27%) (see Figure 2). Unskilled workers accounted for 259,805 (35.9%) (see Figure 3). However one should not associate the term unskilled workers with uneducated. Unskilled workers in the ROK also include industrial trainees, and a large number of them possess undergraduate degrees (quite a large number of these degrees are in sciences and engineering). Of over 700,000 residents, 64.4% live in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul – 28.7%; Gyeong-gi Province – 29.7%; Incheon – 6.0%) (ROK Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 2007 and Korea Islamic Foundation). The 2007 ROK government survey also indicated that the majority of foreigners with an Islamic background were employed as unskilled laborers in the ROK (see Figure 3). Of approximately 150,000 Muslims in the ROK, approximately 110,000 are non-Koreans (0.2% of ROK population and 14.5% of total foreign population in the ROK) – most of whose ages are between mid-20 and late-30’s, and are in the ROK as unskilled workers or industrial interns. Both the ROK government’s and the KIF’s data show steady increases in foreigners with Islamic background residing in the country.

STEVE S. SIN


ROK over the past five years. Also, according to KIF, a majority of the ROK’s Islamic religious leaders tend to have fundamentalist views, and they tend to be middle-class academics with Ph.D. degrees from universities in the Middle East – similar to the composition of Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East (ROK Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 2007 and Korea Islamic Foundation). Muslim leaders responsible for the radicalization of Islam in Southeast Asia have similar characteristics as the Muslim leaders in the ROK, and much of funding for both the ROK and Southeast Asian Islamic religious activities come from the Muslim World League headquartered in Saudi Arabia, which promotes Wahhabism – a strict Salafi form of Islam (Abuza 2003).

STEVE S. SIN


Cultural Divide. The ROK government survey indicates that the foreigners in Korea tend to live in enclaves and not mingle with the Korean population (ROK Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 2007). This implies that many foreigners residing in the ROK tend to live in diaspora communities and do not assimilate into the ROK society at large. This leads these communities to become isolated, and isolation allows them to shun traditional Korean culture and society. For many living in these communities, therefore, the ROK is merely a place of residence and not one of belonging. The attitudes of Korean society toward foreigners do not help reduce this sense of alienation – perceived or real. Despite the steady increase of foreigners in the ROK since the late-80s, and the increased number of Koreans willing to tolerate foreign cultures and foreigners today compared to ten, or even five years ago, a majority of the ROK population remains apathetic, if not averse, toward everything foreign. Korean people are also very sensitive to class and religious differences, and have a tendency to belittle those who are perceived to be of lower class economically, educationally, or socially (with most Koreans perceiving Islam and Islamic countries as being educationally and socially inferior). These tendencies, coupled with Korean people’s cultural propensity to outwardly balk at other cultures and people (especially those from China, Japan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East), are just a few of many factors that could make foreigners working and living in the ROK feel that they are in a hostile and isolated environment. Chosun-Ilbo, ROK’s most circulated newspaper, ran an article on its January 01, 2008 edition titled, “Is Korea Still an Isolated ‘Island Nation’?” The article criticized numerous problems that foreigners residing in the ROK face daily as they lead their lives. The article reported on interviews of 50 foreigners who are in the ROK as company executives, employees of multinational corporations, university professors, teachers, and students.

STEVE S. SIN


The consensus of those interviewed was, “Not only is it difficult to communicate in Korea, simple daily activities such as finding your way around town, using a credit card, buying a cellular phone, and using the internet are very inconvenient; moreover, the Korean society as a whole is not considerate of different needs foreigners may have living in Korea.” (Chosun-Ilbo 2008) Consequently, for those who live within these enclaves, there tends to be an increased desire to bond with others who share the same culture, values, and religion. This is precisely the environment needed for the radical jihadi-Salafis to recruit and radicalize young, susceptible Muslims and turn them into warriors of jihad.

Possible Support to Terrorism. There have not been any reports that indicate terrorist activities, “homegrown” or otherwise, in the ROK. However, the possibility does exist that there may be elements of the ROK society, wittingly or unwittingly, involved in supporting transnational terrorist or terrorist-supporting organizations operating in or outside of the ROK.

The Muslim World League (MWL, or Rabita from Rabita al-Alam al-Islami), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) have permanently established offices, and have active membership in the ROK.

The Muslim World League (MWL). The MWL is an Islamic non-governmental organization founded in 1962 and based in Saudi Arabia. Its objectives are “to disseminate Islamic Dawah and expound the teachings to Islam” and “to defend Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and aspirations of Muslims, solves their problems, refutes false allegations against Islam, and repels inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in our Muslim

STEVE S. SIN


brethren. (The Saudi Arabia Information Resource and Korea Muslim Federation). The MWL promotes Wahhabism, the strict Salafi form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, the MWL’s Pakistan office was run by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. He was a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Khalifa was the co-founder of the Benevolence International Foundation, and he helped to finance Operation Bojinka, a foiled 1995 plot that would have simultaneously detonated bombs aboard 11 US-bound airliners, blowing them up in mid-flight over the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea (DiscoverTheNetworks.org). The MWL at one time oversaw Rabita Trust, a now-defunct charity whose professed purpose was to give aid to Afghani refugees in Pakistan. The trust came under investigation by the US Senate Finance Committee based on evidence that it had knowingly funded terrorist groups. Today, the MWL oversees the WAMY, one of the vehicles suspected of financing Islamic extremism and international terrorism (DiscoverTheNetworks.org). WAMY has been an active Islamic entity in the ROK since 1983. International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). The IIRO is one of eight subsidiary bodies of the MWL. It is a charity based in Saudi Arabia (World Muslim League 2008 and Korea Muslim Federation 2008). The United Nations and others have associated the IIRO with terrorism. At the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the US, Steven Emerson identified IIRO as a major radical Islamic institution, in part, “responsible for fueling Islamic militancy around the world,” and Rohan Gunaratna, Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, stated: “Mohammad Jamal Khalifa is the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. He arrived in the Philippines in 1988 and he became the first director, the founding director, of the International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia. He used the IIRO to funnel Al-Qaeda funds to the Abu Sayyaf group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” (US Congress 2002 and Gunaratna 2003). The Philippine and Indonesian

STEVE S. SIN


branches of IIRO are included on a list of proscribed individuals and entities associated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, maintained by United Nations Security Council Committee 1267, also known as the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (The United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals 2008).

In April 2004, the ROK government deported five Bangladeshi nationals after intelligence officials uncovered a network initially described as facilitating illegal foreign workers in the ROK to find jobs and conduct activities described as “anti-South Korean.” In October 2004, a representative of the ROK Parliament revealed to the media that the five Bangladeshi men who were deported earlier were the founders and key leaders of a 500-member organization called Dawatul Islamia of Korea, a South Korea branch of the Jama’at-e-Islami-Bangladesh (JEI(B). JEIB is a political party espousing Islamic fundamentalism and it is reportedly having connections with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Bangladesh, a US State Department level-II terrorist organization designee (7). Dawatul Islamia of Korea was said to have headquartered at the Anyang Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islamic Masjid in Anyang, ROK, a small industrial city approximately 20 kilometers south of Seoul, Korea (The Korea Times 2004 and South Asia Terrorism Portal). According to the KIF and Korea Muslim Federation (KMF) websites, the Anyang Mosque is currently operated by Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim workers independent of the KIF and KMF (Korea Islamic Foundation and Korea Muslim Federation). On July 4, 2008, the KNPA arrested two Afghans, three Pakistanis, and four Koreans who had tried to use South Korea as a shipping point for several tons of acetic anhydride destined for southern Afghanistan. The key Afghan suspect admitted to the police that he was acting at the instigation of the Taliban, but he claimed he was not a member of the Taliban. The KNPA stated that the orders did come from the Taliban, and the operation seemed to have been funded through accounts with suspected links through hawala networks (Yonhap News Agency 2008).

STEVE S. SIN


On July 19, 2007, the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) broke up a hawala network and arrested 10 Bangladeshi nationals in Suwon for conducting illicit financial activity. According to the KNPA, this particular hawala network was operational from September 2004 to July 2007. Throughout its operational period, the network had established ghost import-export companies in Seoul and Gyeonggi areas (KNPA found over 100 accounts associated with these companies) servicing over 3,000 clients. It had conducted more than 32,000 transactions between the ROK and Bangladesh, totaling 1.1 billion USD (Yonhap News Agency 2007). Hawala networks are not uncommon in the ROK (8). Most clients of hawala are immigrants for the legitimate purpose of sending money to relatives and friends back home. Some users, however, exploit the system to launder money for illicit activities. Drug dealers in the United States, for example, have relied on hawala to send profits of drug sales to arms dealers abroad. Basically, the hawala system can be used as an end user tool for terrorists to transfer money for operational purposes (Brisard 2002, 9). Conclusions and Policy Recommendations. The ROK to date has not suffered any known incident of Islamic-inspired terrorism, “homegrown” or otherwise, within its borders; however, the Islamic Jihadists have demonstrated intent and motivation to strike at the ROK interests abroad. Today, many if not all of the necessary pre-conditions for “homegrown” terrorism are already well established in the ROK. Though only accounting for a small portion of the ROK population, foreigners in the ROK live in diaspora communities and have little interaction with the Korean people. Many live in substandard housing and have to endure appalling work conditions. Many also face discrimination, exploitation and abuse from their employers and the surrounding Korean community. These conditions have caused migrant workers to desert their employment and become undocumented. As of 2007, an estimated half of all migrant workers in the ROK were undocumented (Liem 2007). For

STEVE S. SIN


jihadi-Salafis looking to recruit, these discontented migrant workers are prime targets of opportunity. It is well known that jihadi-Salafis hide their terroristic intentions behind visible, mostly legitimate, business or charities. They raise money, recruit and train operatives by abusing religious activities and donations, traditional Islamic banking systems (such as hawala), and the global economy (Brisard 2002, 3). Islamic religious and humanitarian organizations have been used to funnel funds to transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Numerous governments and international agencies have identified both MWL and IIRO as terrorist-supporting organizations. The WAMY, a subsidiary of MWL, is also suspected of providing support to international terrorists. The JEI(B), while not on any terrorist or terrorist-supporting organizations list, certainly seems to have strong ties to terrorist organizations. The existence of these organizations alone does not translate into the presence of terrorist or terrorist-supporting individuals and organizations in the ROK. However, given these organizations’ ties to terrorism elsewhere in the world, the fact that the majority of the ROK’s Islamic leaders tend to have fundamentalist views, and the sense of disaffection and discontent experienced by many migrant residents in the ROK, the environment does exist in the ROK where radical religious leaders and Islamic extremists have a relatively large pool of young, susceptible and alienated Muslims to recruit and exploit in the name of religion and ideology.

While there is no evidence of active homegrown extremist activity in the ROK, many if not all of the necessary pre-conditions are already well established, and the emergence of such individuals or organizations in the future is certainly a worrisome possibility. The ROK must develop and implement a coherent program with two key elements to abate the possibility of such emergence: increased vigilance against possible terrorism related activities and outreach measures to the migrant communities and the ROK society at large.

STEVE S. SIN


The ROK currently does not have comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation. The ROK’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) has pushed for a bill since 2001, but the bill has faced strong resistance and criticism due to fears that such legislation could violate human rights and give too much power to the NIS, which most Koreans still distrust due to its past record of human rights abuses. There is little doubt that the ROK needs some form of legislation that addresses the issue of anti- and counter-terrorism so that it can be better prepared to detect, respond to, and deal more effectively with any future terrorist events. The ROK government should continue to refine and move forward to adopt and implement its pending legislation while being ever so cognizant of the necessity that any such legislation must balance the need to increase the NIS’ and law enforcement agencies’ abilities to deter and react to terrorism while protecting the rights of everyone who resides in the ROK (including those who may be suspected or accused of plotting or carrying out terrorist activity). Just as important are the outreach measures to the migrant communities. Although social and labor problems foreigners, especially migrant workers, in the ROK face – such as discrimination, physical and verbal abuses, hazardous work conditions, and unpaid wages – continue, the ROK government should be applauded for its efforts to address them. The ROK is the first country in Asia to protect the rights of migrant workers under law in 2004, and it continues to revise the law to better reflect the changing dynamics and needs of the migrant population. In 2007, the ROK Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE, which changed its name to the Ministry of Knowledge Economy in 2008) embarked on a five-year project to improve the living conditions of migrant workers after it was identified that most foreigners were dissatisfied with Korea’s transportation, medical, education, and housing environments. Recently, some local governments and neighborhoods started sponsoring cultural events to promote cross-cultural understanding and unity. The measures and events noted above, and others like them, serve as an excellent launching point to improve the overall living environment of foreigners and their perception of Korean society; therefore, the ROK government must

STEVE S. SIN


seize the momentum and implement an aggressive and coherent outreach program that will allow the foreigners to feel that they are a part of Korean society, not just as residents or workers but as valuable, contributing members of the society. Admittedly, outreach programs may only be effective upon those who are not already radicalized; nevertheless, they serve as an essential piece in prevention of terrorism. Though the fight against terrorism cannot succeed unless the policy addresses deterrence, response, and outreach, in the long term, “softer” outreach policies, in general, pays higher dividends than the “harder” anti- and counter-terrorism policies. Although a lot of the terrorists have shown to be educated middle-class Muslims who are self-radicalized for ideological reasons, any effort in swaying the population away from elements of radicalization would result in reduced recruitment and support base, which in turn makes it that much more difficult for the terrorists and would-be-terrorists to operate in a given area. Recognizing the threat of terrorism from the Islamists outside of the Korean Peninsula, and the need to prepare for the potential of terrorist attack within Korea, the ROK military, law enforcement, and government agencies have established close working relationships with the USFK to address issues of terrorism within and outside the Korean Peninsula. Cooperation between the USFK and the ROK military during the hostage crisis in Afghanistan in 2007 was a prime example. Today, the USFK remains vigilant, and continues to work closely with the ROK partners, to fight and defeat any terrorist activity against the US and the ROK interests on the Korean Peninsula and globally.

******** Acknowledgement. Thanks to Mr. Chris Nelson of Samuels International, Mr. Evans Revere of the Korea Society and Dr. Horace Jeffery Hodges of Ewha Womans University for wonderful recommendations and sharp critiques that contributed greatly to the improvement of this paper.

STEVE S. SIN


References Cited 1. Abuza, Zachary. 2003. Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages. Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies. March 7. 2. Brisard, Jean-Charles. 2002. Terrorism Financing: Roots and trends of Saudi terrorism financing, New York: JCB Consulting. December 19. 3. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 2007. Country Reports, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State. 4. Chosun-Ilbo, “ Is Korea Still an Isolated ‘Island Nation’?” - 1/1/2008 5. Fischer, Hannah. 2007. North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950 – 2007. Washington, D.C.: Government Press Office. 6. FM 100-20. 1990. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. 7. Gunaratna, Rohan. 2003. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Bangladesh. South Asia Terrorism Portal. http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm (28/5/08). 9. Introduction to Islam in Korea. Korea Islamic Foundation. http://www.islamkorea.com/ (25/3/08). 10. Introduction to Islam in Korea. Korea Muslim Federation. http://www.koreaislam.org/intro/intro01.jsp (25/3/08)). 11. Joint Publication 1-02. 2001 – 2007. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. 12. Kaplan, Eben. 2007. American Muslims and the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11509/.

STEVE S. SIN


13. Klinger, Bruce. Asia Times, 2004. South Korea Braces for Taste of Terror. October 15. 14. Koerner, Brendan I. 2003. What Kind of Terrorism Does North Korea Sponsor?. The Slate Magazine. http://www.slate.com. 15. Liem, Wol-san. The Korea Times, (3/7/07). “Korean Life Challenges Migrant Workers”. 16. Muslim World League. DiscoverTheNetwork.org. http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=7347 (18/4/07) 17. Muslim World League. The Saudi Arabia Information Resource. http://www.saudinf.com/main/k312.htm (25/3/08)). 18. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2007. Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, Chapter 2. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State 19. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2008. Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter 2. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State 20. Silber, Mitchell, and Arvin Bhatt. 2007. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New York: New York City Police Department. 21. SITE Intelligence Group, Inc. 2005. http://www.siteintelgroup.org/. March 30 (12/02/08)) 22. Survey of Foreigners Residing in South Korea. ROK Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (released 2/08/07)). 23. The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. The United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml. (25/08/08)). 24. The Korea Times, (25/10/04). Anti-Korean Group Linked to Bangladesh Islamic Party.

STEVE S. SIN


25. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 2002. Methods and Procedures for International Terrorist Organizations. 107th Cong. 2d Session. 26. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 27. US National Security Council. 2006. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: US National Security Council. 28. World Assembly of Muslim Youth. DiscoverTheNetworks.org. http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6425 (18/04/08) 29. World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx (12/02/08)). 30. Yonhap News Agency, (19/07/07). “110 Billion Won Hawala Organization Arrested”. 31. Yonhap News Agency, (4/07/07). “Korean Police Arrest Drug Smugglers Linked to Taliban”.

❆❆❆❆❆❆

STEVE S. SIN


Steve S. Sin’s endnotes 1 This article only examined possible Islamic extremist threat to the ROK; therefore, when the author refers to homegrown terrorism or extremism, it refers specifically to homegrown Islamic terrorism or extremism. 2 The White House’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states the main terrorist threat today comes from those who “exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends” (US National Security Council 2006, 5). Since September 11, 2001, governments around the world have made numerous advances in the way they combat terrorism, albeit there still is a lot of room for improvement. As with any conflict, the threat, in this case the radical Islamic Jihadists, continues to evolve, and has introduced a new variable to the battlefield – homegrown terrorism. 3 The US Congress defines homegrown terrorism as the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (US Congress 2007). The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Department of the Army 1990 and Department of Defense 2001-2007). For the purposes of this essay, homegrown terrorism will be defined as the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or living primarily within the host country to intimidate or coerce the host country’s government or the civilian population for furtherance of political or social objectives. 4 On March 30, 2005, an online message posted on the internet by Al-Qaeda in Iraq revealed a revitalized Al-Qaeda policy designed to defeat the enemy through heightened attacks against Italy, Spain, Britain, Japan, and the ROK. The message discussed in detail the reasons for stepping up attacks on US allies and asserted that such attacks would erode support and severely drain the enemy’s economic resources. “For now,” the message urged, “take some of the small allies inside Iraq and Afghanistan. Later, go for the big ones: US, Britain, and Australia” (SITE Intelligence Group, Inc. 2005). On October 15, 2004, Seoul increased its domestic and overseas terror alert status after terrorist threats. The ROK’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed that Al-Qaeda and its associated groups’ sphere

STEVE S. SIN


of operations was slowly moving from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, increasing its attention on Northeast Asia, and said there was an increasing possibility of terrorist attacks on US allies – Japan and the ROK. The latest threat came from an unknown group called the Martyr Hammoud Al-Masri Battalion, which identified itself as Al-Qaeda’s network in South and East Asia. It warned on an Arabic-language website that it would “make Korea suffer” both in Iraq and at home if ROK troops were not pulled out of Iraq within 14 days. The group claimed to have already stationed itself inside Seoul and to be “awaiting the zero hour”. On October 1, 2004, al-Jazeera television broadcasted footage from Al-Qaeda calling on all Muslims to attack the ROK, along with the US, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland and Norway. In the broadcast, Al-Qaeda blamed those countries for the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. A ROK military official stated that Iraqi insurgent groups were promising an 8,000 USD bounty for each ROK soldier or citizen taken hostage. A ROK government spokesman warned that the country had become a serious and actual target of an international terrorist attack, with threats increasing steadily. National Assembly lawmakers stated that terrorist threats against ROK airlines had risen dramatically from five in 2003 to twenty during the first nine months of 2004. In October 2004, the ROK Defense Ministry reported to the National Assembly’s defense committee that the ROK had been targeted 67 times for terror attacks in the first seven months of 2004. The report also indicated that the country had implemented 199 intelligence alerts for possible terror attacks since 1999. The ROK raised its alert status in January 2004 after a threat was mailed to its embassy in Thailand. The letter from a group calling itself the “Anti-Korean Interests Agency” threatened terrorist attacks against ROK airlines, companies, and organizations throughout Southeast Asia. The ROK’s NIS revealed in December 2003 that operatives from an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group had recently infiltrated the country to conduct preliminary preparations for attacks on US military installations and ROK airliners and airports. The NIS reported to the National Assembly’s Committee on Intelligence regarding other reported infiltrations and concluded that Al-Qaeda-affiliated infiltrations had become more frequent. The continued revelations of Al-Qaeda infiltrations into the ROK raised the concern that Islamic terrorist groups may be planning, to bring the “war on terror” to the ROK. (Klinger 2004) 5 The use of the word “jihad” in this paper means specifically the lesser jihad (i.e. military) and not the greater (i.e. inner) jihad.

STEVE S. SIN


6 Mitchell Silberand Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department 2007), 16. 7 The US State Department designated Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Bangladesh (HuJI-B) as a level-II terrorist organization in 2003. The Bangladeshi government designated the HuJI-B as a terrorist organization in October 2005. In March 2008, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice upgraded HuJI-B’s terrorist status, under which the organization’s assets in the US and in US controlled territories would be frozen, and anyone associated with it would not be entitled to a US visa. 8 According to the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), the ROK Customs Service has reported over 1,000 hawala cases annually since 2002. According to the latest available ROK Customs Service report, dated October 2006, there were 1,901 cases worth 3.47 billion USD in 2005. (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2007)

❆❆❆❆❆❆

Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge Against Terrorism

Documents

Transcript of Homegrown Terrorism: South Korea’s Next Challenge Against Terrorism