Holstein and the Arnim Affair

Holstein and the Arnim AffairAuthor(s): Norman RichSource: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1956), pp. 35-54Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1875785 .

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HOLSTEIN AND THE ARNIM AFFAIR'

NORMAN RICH

IN DECEMBER, 1874, Count Harry von Arnim, the first ambassador of the new German Empire to France, was

brought to trial before the municipal court of Berlin for unauthorized removal of official documents from the archive of the Paris embassy. Bismarck says in his memoirs that the official proceedings against Arnim were provoked by Arnim's refusal to obey official instructions ;2 but there were more issues involved than bu- reaucratic discipline. The trial was above all the dramatic climax of a struggle between Arnim and Bismarck for the lead- ership of the German Empire.

This personal rivalry had found expression in differences of opinion over policy, particularly with regard to de- feated France after Arnim became ambassador to that country. Bismarck fa- vored the republican regime in the belief that it would keep France sufficiently stable to fulfill its treaty obligations, but sufficiently unattractive to its monarchic neighbors to remain without allies. Arnim on the other hand saw in the republic a permanent source of trouble and unrest, as well as an inspiration to revolu- tionary elements in other countries. He

I Presented to Professor Ernst Kantorowicz on his sixtieth birthday. The article is based on un- published documents from the files of the German foreign ministry and on Holstein's personal papers, now in the process of publication in English trans- lation (The Holstein papers: the memoirs, diaries and correspondene of Friedrich von Holstein, ed. Norman Rrci and M. H. FiSHER [Cambridge, 1955--I). When not otherwise stated, all documentation comes from the German foreign ministry files, in particular from series Generalia I.A.A.a. 52, 58, 58 adhibend I and II, 59, I.A.B.c. 75 and 78 adhibend.

2 Otto von BISMARCK, Die gesammelten Werke (Berlin, 1925-35), XV, 357.

advocated support for a monarchic restoration, a policy which appealed strongly to the royalist prejudices of William I, to whom the ambassador was able to report directly in his capacity as the emperor's personal representative. This right of a government minister or ambassador to report directly to the emperor over the head of the chancellor, and with it the whole question of ministerial responsibility, was a constitutional problem raised by the Arnim affair which was not settled with Arnim's personal defeat. The problem was to play a major part in the destruction of Bismarck's own authority sixteen years later.3

Apart from his political ideas, Arnim as a political figure served as a rallying point for important discontented groups in the new empire: for the large body of conservatives Bismarck had alienated by his constitutional concessions to liberal- ism, for the anti-Bismarck forces at the imperial court led by Empress Augusta, and for opponents of government meas- ures against the Roman Catholic church. The trial and conviction of Arnim removed the only potential leader of these powerful and articulate groups and effec- tively ended all serious challenge to Bis- marck's authority during the lifetime of William I. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that many disappointed opponents of Bismarck and even many of his admirers suspected the Arnim trial was a plot engineered by the chancellor to break a dangerous rival. This sus-

3 The constitutional aspect of the Arnim affair is brilliantly brought out by Fritz HARTUNG, "Bis-- marck und Graf Harry Arnim," Historische Zeit- sclirift, CLXXI (1951), 47-77.

35



36 NORMAN RICH

picion was encouraged by the following incident.

In the morning session of December 11, 1874, the third day of the Arnim trial, Arnim's defense counsel charged Friedrich von Holstein, second.secretary at the German embassy in Paris, with having admitted to. Arnim that he had been assigned by the foreign ministry to keep watch on.Arnim and to report regularly on. his activities to the ministry "and to another authority," meaning Bismarck.4 The accusation was made at a point in the trial when the government had. already, built up a powerful case against. Arnim., If the accusation against Holstein was intended as a diversionary sensation, as seems likely,, it had the desired effect. The story was eagerly taken up by the public and. the press and awoke widespread sympathy for the defendant. The accusation was well calculated in another respect. It was made on. the as- sumption that the hearing of .witnesses would soon be closed. When it was learned that. Holstein had been sum- moned from Paris to answer the charges made against him, Arnim's defense counsel withdrew his statement with the ad- mission that it was based on incorrect information.5 Yet the charge had been made and continued to circulate. The story that Bismarck had actually assigned. a man to spy, on Arnim in Paris was too spicy a bit of gossip to die easily.

The charge was later revived, with strong embellishments, when Holstein's influential position in the foreign minis-

4Darstellung der in der Untersuchungssache wider den wirklichen Geheimen Rath Grafen von Arnim vor, dem koniglichen Stadigericht zu Berlin im Dezember 1874 stattgehabten offentlichen Verhand- lungen (Berlin, 1875), p. 164. See appendix below.

5 Ibid.,p. 230. The statement so often made that Holstein was the principal government witness in the Arnim trial is incorrect. He was not on the original list of witnesses at all.

try had made him powerful enemies in his own right. The spy story became the cornerstone of a theory to explain the dual enigmas of Holstein's character and power. The disgrace he brought upon himself through his part in the Arnim affair was said to have forced him to withdraw from society and to have made him impossible for posts abroad or for promotion to'any position involving social obligations. Overnight he was trans- formed from a debonair young diplomat into a bitter recluse, fit only to work behind the scenes.6 Not content with this obscure and humiliating position, spurred on by inordinate ambition and patholog- ical hatreds, Holstein, began to spin a net of intrigue from his sinister lair in the Wilhelmstrasse. Most sensational of his victims was Bismarck himself, the man who had imposed on him the onerous task of espionage which had ruined his life. With the fall of Bismarck, Holstein became the most influential figure in the foreign ministry. Although he still occupied only a subordinate position, he established his power and exercised control over colleagues and superiors alike by methods similar to those employed so successfully against Harry von Arnim.

Stories of this kind were in circulation during Holstein's lifetime and were in- corporated in many memoirs of the period, sometimes in personal animosity against Holstein, but often merely to add flavor to the narrative.7 Yet none of the

6 This theory is developed in an interesting article by C. William Vogel, who finds Holstein innocent of the spy charge and the victim of malicious slander ("The Holstein. enigma: a reappraisal of its origins," Journal of modern history, XIV [1942], 46-64).

7For instance: Otto HAMMANN, Bilder aus der leisten Kaiserzeit (Berlin, 1922), p. 39; Ludwig RASCHDAU, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi (Ber- lin, 1939), pp. 139-40; Hugo Graf LERCHEN-

FELD-KOEFERING, Erinnerungen und Denkwitr- digheiten (Berlin, 1935), pp. 385-86; Bernhard



HOLSTEIN AND THE ARNIM AFFAIR 37

memoir writers who described the Arnim affair had firsthand knowledge of the events except Joseph Maria von Rado- witz, one of the foreign ministry officials in charge of the case. Radowitz was one of Holstein's bitterest enemies, but his brief account of Holstein's part in the Amim affair agrees essentially with Hol- stein's own.8

The memoirs written by Holstein's friends, like Prince Chlodwig zu Hohen- lohe,9 hardly mention him in connection

von BULOW, Denkwiirdigkeiten (Berlin, 1930-31), I, 498. When Billow was eighty, he told Friedrich Rosen in the couise of a long conversation of Hol- stein's bitter complaint to Princess Biilow that Bismarck had branded him for life by forcing him into his dishonorable role in the Arnim affair. Rosen printed his record of the entire conversation. Billow's recollections, always strongly tinged with fantasy, become almost preposterous as retold by Rosen. To judge from the rest of the conversation, it is highly improbable that any part of Btilow's story about Holstein's confidences to Princess Billow is true (Friedrich ROSEN, Aus einem diplo- matischen Wanderleben [Berlin, 1931-321, I, 92-93). Theodor Wolff tells a similar story in Das Vorspiel ([Munich, 1924], I, 77), which, he says, Holstein confided to a "clever woman." This story, too, must have come from Prince Billow and can be similarly dismissed.

8Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz, ed. Hajo HOLBORN (Stuttgart, 1925), I, 289. See below, n. 28.

Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe, son of Arnim's successor as ambassador to Paris, might be considered another exception, though he was only twelve years old in 1874. His version of the Holstein spy story and withering commentary on Holstein's character (Aus meinem Leben [Frankfort, 19251, pp. 299-326) contrasts strangely with a letter he wrote to Holstein on July 8, 1901, at the time of his father's death: "You have been for so many years such a loyal friend, a worthy collaborator and ad- viser to my father in many difficult hours of his official activity, that to me it is more than a self- evident duty to thank you once again at this sad moment for everything you have done for the deceased." Prince Alexander carried on a warm correspondence with Holstein in his own right until 1908 (Holstein papers, Correspondence).

9Denkwuirdigkeiten des Fufrsten Chlodwig zut Hohenlohe-Schillingsf first (2 vols.; Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1907).

with Arnim's downfall, because, as will subsequently be shown, there was not much to mention. Many historians who used memoir literature to look behind the scenes of the official records of the Arnim case therefore took the only story available-the version circulated by the Ar- nim party, by Holstein's enemies, and by gossips. Not until the 1930's were memoirs published showing Holstein in a more favorable light in connection with the Arnim affair.10 By that time the story was well established in historical literature."

Holstein was already working in Paris when Harry von Arnim presented his credentials as minister extraordinary to Adolphe Thiers, president of the French Republic, on August 29, 1871. During the peace negotiations with France, Hol- stein had been a member of Bismarck's personal staff. He remained in France after the preliminary peace of February 26, 1871, first in Rouen and Soisy on the staff of General von Fabrice, later in Paris with Count von Waldersee, the first German representative to France.

Holstein and Arnim had met in Brus- sels in 1869 when Arnim was charge d'affaires there and Holstein was working on a project to provide a mechanized towing system for river and canal boats.12 They were on friendly terms at the time but must have had some falling out later, for Holstein's solicitous aunt, Minna von Holtzendorff, was disturbed by the news

10 Arthur von BRAUER, Im Dienste Bismarcks, ed. Helmuth ROGGE (Berlin, 1936), pp. 109-10; Bogdan Graf von HUTTEN-CZAPSKI, Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1936), I, 51-52.

" A recent version is furnished by Sir Harold NIcOLSON ("Holstein and Eulenburg," History today, V [1955], 500).

12 Holstein to Ida von Sttilpnagel, Oct. 21, 1869, in Helmuth ROGGE, Friedrich von Holstein (Berlin, 1932), pp. 85-86.



38 NORMAN RICH

of Arnim's appointment to Paris. "I'm afraid Arnim may force Fritz to resign, because they don't like each other," she wrote to her daughter Ida von Sttilpnagel on September 1, 1871.'3 Minna von Holtzendorff was Holstein's closest living relative. To her and to her daughter Ida, his childhood playmate, he confided many of his personal ambitions and political ideas. If Holstein had any fears about Arnim's appointment he soon got over them. On November 8 he wrote to his worried aunt: "My official relationship with Arnim is very good. He is a silent, nervous man, with whom I get on splendidly, however."14 The description of his excellent relationship with Arnim was not written simply to comfort his aunt. Holstein had written much the same thing to his good friend Karl von Eisendecher a few days earlier."5 In both letters he complained about the high cost of living in Paris, and about the hostile attitude of the French people. The Ger- mans in Paris were socially ostracized, so that the members of the diplomatic mission were thrown very much upon their own society.

For Holstein, the work itself made up for every other drawback in Paris. In those decisive months of negotiation with France, he worked directly with the head of the mission on political affairs. Arnim often dictated reports to Holstein in draft, especially in the beginning when there was much to be done. While en- gaged in this work, Arnim informed Hol- stein in confidence of his opinions on the policy Germany should adopt toward Thiers and the republic. In his testimony preceding the Arnim trial, Holstein said that he did not conceal his disagreement

13 Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi, 113. 14 Ibid., pp. 114-15.

16 Letter of Nov. 4, 1871, Holstein papers, Corre- spondence.

but maintained an opposing point of view with all the arguments at his disposal. These differences of opinion were to come out more clearly later.'6

Nonpolitical business was under the direction of the first secretary. In order to continue with political work, Holstein rejected possibilities to become first secretary in another post. The attitude was typical of his whole career. So long as he could have his hand in important work, he cared little about the rank he held. When in December 1871 the temporary German diplomatic mission in Paris was made into a permanent embassy, Hol- stein was much pleased by his appointment as regular second secretary.'7

Despite their early differences of opinion on policy, Holstein's relations with Arnim continued to be good. He con- sulted the ambassador about various minor political schemes, and corresponded with him when he went on leave at the end of February 1872. When Bis- marck became ill in the spring of 1872 and spoke of retirement, Holstein wrote Arnim that he looked upon him as the most suitable successor as chancellor.)8 In the light of later events, this letter has been interpreted as an example of Hol- stein's duplicity.'9 Only the light of later events makes such an interpretation possible, for the letter was written before there was any open breach between Bis- marck and Arnim. The letter is actually quite in keeping with Holstein's habit of

16 Testimony of Nov. 1, 1874. 17 Letter of Minna von Holtzendorff to [Ida von

Stiilpnagel] of Nov. [29], 1871, ROGGE, p. 116. 18 Darstellung, pp. 232-33; Staatsanwalt Tessen-

dorf to Wilke, the justiciar of the foreign ministry, Dec. 12, 1874.

19Maximilian HARDEN, "Herr von Holstein," Die Zukunft, LV (1906), 458; Eduard von WERT- HEIMER, "Der Prozess Arnim," Preussische Jablr- biucher, CCXXII (1930), 287-88.




flattering his correspondents, no-doubt with a certain amount of calculation. But there is no reason to suppose the flattery was insincere. When Holstein disliked someone or disagreed with him, he showed his feelings no less clearly. This was certainly to be the case with Arnim.

Bismarck's opinion of Arnim was not so favorable. The beginning of Bis- marck's fundamental quarrel with Ar- nim cannot be precisely dated. Bismarck made disparaging comments about him even before the Paris appointment, and there is considerable cause to wonder why Bismarck gave him this critical post at all.20 Only three weeks after Arnim's arrival in Paris, Bismarck felt himself obliged to reprimand him severely for reaching an agreement with Thiers without consulting Berlin and. without authority.21 The difference of opinion about Thiers and the French Republic can be documented soon after. On January 6, 1872, Arnim informed Bismarck of the weakness of Thiers' government. In the event of a parliamentary crisis, Arnim thought the Duke of Aumale should seize power to prepare the way for a monarchy and with a few regiments "surprise M. Thiers in his bed."22 A statement like this did not mean that

20 See the diaries of Moritz Busch, entries for Sept. 27, Nov. 12, and Dec. 22, 1870, BISMARCK, Die gesammelten Werke, VII, 359, 403, 455. Bis- marck says in his memoirs that he sent Arnim to Paris in the hope of using his considerable talent in the imperial service (ibid., XV, 356), though in a letter of April 14, 1873, to the emperor he wrote: "Only complete faith in Your Majesty's confidence in me gave me the courage to try to collaborate on political matters with an ambassador of such un- certain and untrustworthy character" (ibid., VIc, 36-37). Hartung thinks Bismarck may simply have wanted to get Arnim away from Berlin (loc. cit., p. 53).

21 Dispatch of Sept. 21, 1871, Die Grosse Politik der europaisclien Kabinette, 1871-1914 (Berlin, 1922- 27), I, 83, n.

22 WERTHEIMER, loc. cit., pp. 122-23.

Arnim's opinions about Thiers were yet fixed, for his attitude, as reflected in his reports to the foreign ministry, fluctu- ated in the course of the year and perhaps justified a comment Bismarck is said to have made about him in 1870: "Today this way, tomorrow that way, often on the same day two basically different points of view-there is nothing you can depend on."23 Hermann von Thile, the head of the foreign ministry, expressed a similar opinion in a letter of

January 20, 1872: "[Arnim's] reports are as usual very ingenious, in fact too ingenious, but his opinions vacillate and are even contradictory, and I still doubt that in the long run he will have enough backbone for the demands of the strenu- ous job there."24 Not until the autumn of 1872 did Arnim's reports settle to a con- sistent anti-Thiers, promonarchy line.

While he was ambassador in Paris, Arnim spent several months of each year in Germany, a privilege a powerful noble- man and favorite of the emperor could allow himself. During his absence he was represented by his first secretary, Lud- wig von Wesdehlen, whom Holstein had met as charge d'affaires in Florence on a mission to Italy in 1870. Bismarck held no very high opinion of Wesdehlen's judgment or ability and instructed him to keep in constant touch with Holstein. This instruction was later taken as evidence of Holstein's equivocal purpose at the Paris embassy.25 Actually it was nothing more than a reflection on the unfortunate Wesdehlen. Holstein han- dled his delicate position with skill, made

23 Recorded by Moritz Busch, diary entry for Nov. 12, 1870, BISMARCK, Die gesammelten Werke, VII, 403.

24 Johann SASS, "Hermann v. Thile und Bis- marck," Preussische Jahrbucher, CCXVII (1921), 273.

25 Erinnerungen und Gedanken des Botschafters Anton Graf Monts (Berlin, 1932), pp. 187-88.



40 NORMAN RICH

friends with Wesdehlen, and supported him well during his long periods as head of the embassy. He had every interest in doing so, for with Arnim away a large part of the time, Holstein was in fact in charge of the important Paris mission.

In September 1872 Holstein came to Germany to work with Bismarck in Ber- lin and later at his Varzin estate while Lothar Bucher, the foreign ministry official serving as Bismarck's personal secretary, went on leave. At this time Bis- marck perhaps already suspected Arnim of intriguing against him, for the ambassador had spent a part of the summer near the imperial family at Ems, had seen the emperor several times, and was the frequent guest of the empress, whose animosity to Bismarck was notorious.26 It is therefore possible that Bismarck sounded out Holstein about Arnim's attitude and ambitions, but there is naturally no evidence that such questioning took place. Whatever Holstein told Bis- marck about Arnim cannot have greatly changed the chancellor's opinion of the ambassador, particularly if Holstein's reports were unfavorable. At no time in his life can Bismarck be said to have needed an lago.

Whether or not Bismarck discussed his suspicions of Arnim at Varzin, Hol- stein seems to have been made vividly aware of the differences between Ger- many's official policy toward France and the policy advocated by Germany's ambassador. When he returned to Paris in November, Holstein had several long talks about politics with Arnim in which, according to his own testimony, he presented Bismarck's point of view. "I soon found," Holstein said, "that the point of view of [Arnim] on this matter was fixed

26 Pro nihilol (see Appendix below), pp. 1, 6-7, 17; HARTUNG, loc. cit., p. 55; BISMARCK, Die gesammelten Werke, VIc, 36-37.

and said no more. Only when I was asked did I say anything. I had the impression at the time, even if at first only tem- porarily, that this difference of opinion would result in forcing the question as to which of the two personalities would eventually direct the policy of the Reich." Holstein admitted that to him it made a -big difference whether Bismarck left his post of his own free will or whether he was removed by some political maneuver. "As for my own feelings- I came as an attache to Herr von Bis- marck fourteen years ago and had close relations with him thereafter-my sym- pathies were in the latter eventuality absolutely on the side of Prince Bis- marck."27

In December 1872 Amim asked Hol- stein if he corresponded with officials in the foreign ministry. Holstein admitted that he wrote private letters to friends in the ministry and, when asked, also admitted that in them he expressed opinions about the French political situation differing from those of the ambassador.28

These letters to Berlin expressed more than a difference of political viewpoints. Holstein wrote in his memoirs: "When Arnim began to work in Paris for a Bour- bon restoration, Bismarck decided to transfer him. I myself had recommended his transfer in two or three letters to Bucher, for the sake of peace and quiet. That is my real share in the Arnim affair. Arnim was to be transferred first to

27 Darstellung, pp. 233-34.

28 Pre-trial testimony (see above, n. 16) and trial testimony (Darstellung, pp. 232-34). Radowitz wrote in his memoirs: "In Berlin we heard about the sharp criticism that Arnim expressed in Paris about the instructions he received through confidential letters which Herr von Holstein . .. sent to the foreign ministry; Bismarck also received warnings from other confidential sources that Harry Arnim was working to bring about his downfall and in that event considered himself as the only suitable successor" (Aufzeichnungen, I, 289).




Rome and then to Constantinople."29 Holstein's letters to Bucher have not been found, and his recollections, written in 1907, may have-been vague about their date in relation to proposals for Arnim's transfer. The decisive point remains, and on this Holstein's memory must have been quite clear, that he actively worked for Arnim's transfer. In his diaries he lets fall the significant remark: "If Arnim had merely been an ass, I never would have written."80 Holstein, therefore, considered Arnim a definite danger to Bis- marck, and wrote to Lothar Bucher, who was serving as Bismarck's personal secretary, to tell him so. These letters were written before December 1872, according to Holstein's trial testimony, and probably after Holstein's return from Varzin in October 1872, when differences of opinion with Arnim came out clearly.3

When Arnim challenged him about his private correspondence with officials in Berlin, Holstein expressed his willingness to ask for a transfer from Paris if the ambassador desired it. Arnim replied: "No, don't, because I can't hold that against you." Holstein thought Arnim behaved extremely well in the matter until he later heard that Arnim was accusing him of being in part to blame for his conflict with Bismarck.2

Holstein's partial blame for Arnim's conflict with Bismarck was the only ac- -cusation Arnim upheld in the course of the trial, and it was perfectly true. Whether Holstein behaved dishonorably in reporting Arnim's opinions and sug- gesting his transfer from Paris, and whether he should have resigned his own post in Paris as a result of his personal disagreement with Amim is another

29 Holstein papers, Memoirs, p. 95. 30 Entry of May 6, 188,5, Holstein papers, Diaries. 31 Darstellung, pp. 238-40,. 32Ibid., p. 234.

matter. A far better case might be made out for dishonorable conduct on the part of Arnim and the propriety of his resignation if he disagreed with official policy toward France and was unwilling to carry it out.

Whatever the moral judgment on Hol- stein's behavior, his reports were not at all necessary to intensify the conflict between Arnim and Bismarck, for the chancellor was amply supplied with evidence about Arnim's attitude from other sources. Most important of these was the emperor, who kept Bismarck fully informed of Arnim's efforts in the autumn of 1872 to persuade him to change Ger- man policy toward France.3 But some of the most damaging evidence came from the indiscretions, and even from the official reports, of Arnim himself.

In October 1872 Arnim told Count Saint Vallier, the French representative to the headquarters of General von Manteuffel, commander of the German armies of occupation, that in his opinion the present government in France could not survive, and unless a monarchy were established in France in time, Gambetta, the Commune, and a military dictator- ship would follow Thiers in rapid succes- sion. All this he confided in strictest secrecy and quite outside his official capacity. Saint Vallier, alarmed that this might after all be the official German attitude, immediately informed Manteuf- fel, but not before Arnim had told Man- teuffel much the same thing himself. Manteuffel at once informed Bismarck in a letter of November 1, 1872.

Upon receipt of this information, Bismarck called the ambassador to account.84 Arnim's version of his talk

33 Bismarck to the emperor, Apr. 14, 1873, Die gesammelten Werke, VIc, 36-37; XV, 356-57.

34Dispatch of Nov. 8, 1872. See Darstellung, p. 28.



42 NORMAN RICH

with Saint Vallier differed considerably from the report the chancellor had already received.85 Arnim, however, left no doubt about his attitude toward the Thiers government. In official reports of November 10 and 12, he declared that the continuation of the Thiers dictator- ship ran counter to German interests and was of all possible governments in France the least suitable for Germany to back.36

Arnim now received firm instructions from Berlin to keep his hands out of French affairs, and on December 20 Bis- marck sent him a long lecture on the principles and conduct of foreign policy which was in fact a severe reprimand."7 It was just at this time, in December 1872, that Arnim questioned Holstein about 'his correspondence with Berlin.

Holstein's relations with Arnim remained polite but distant. Early in 1873 Arnim opened negotiations with Thiers for the payment of the last- milliard of French war reparations in which he and Holstein were necessarily obliged to co- operate closely. Bismarck suddenly intervened, shifted the negotiations to Ber- lin, and on March 15, 1873, signed the convention with the French ambassador' providing for the withdrawal of the last German occupation troops. Bismarck hinted to Gontaut-Biron and later stated quite openly that he took this drastic step because he suspected Arnim of pur- posely dragging out the negotiations in order to speculate on the stock exchange.38 In a letter to the emperor of

35 Bismarck to Manteuffel, Nov. 17, 1872. 36 Grosse Politik, I, 155, n.

37Ibid., I, 155-56, 157-62.

38 Gontaut-Biron to Thiers, Mar. 11, 1873. FRANCE, MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGERES,

Documents diplomatiques franqais, 1871-1914 (Paris, 1929 ), 1st ser., I, 216-17; E. de GONTAUT-BIRON,

Mon Ambassade en Allemagne (Paris, 1906), p. 280. On this incident, see VOGEL, IOC. cit., pp. 56-59.

April 14, 1873, he wrote: "I suspect, and not I alone, that [Arnim] occasionally subordinates his official activity to personal interests."39 Bismarck may have received information on this subject from his banker, Gerson Bleichr6der, who was in close touch with Parisian financial circles. Rumors of Arnim's speculations were in any case rife in Paris.40

Surprisingly enough, Arnim swallowed Bismarck's insult without resigning. Even more surprising is Holstein's failure to request a transfer at this time. After the debacle of the negotiations with Thiers, Amim no longer employed Hol- stein on political work, and conditions at the Paris embassy can hardly have been agreeable. "Arnim and Bismarck have been snarling at each other," he wrote to his cousin Ida on March 29. "That will go on. Naturally the fight of the big people can have nothing in it for me but unpleasant consequences." He nevertheless assured his cousin that he had no wish to leave Paris. Perhaps he saw reason to hope that Arnim himself would be transferred. In his letter of March 29 he predicted "many changes in the diplomatic corps in the near future.' 1 Bis-

3' Die gesammelten Werke, VIc, 36-37. Bismarck was quite definite about Arninis speculations in later discussions (Robert Freiherr von Lucius VON BALLEAUSEN, Bismarck-Erinnerungen [Stuttgart and Berlin, 19201, pp. 62-63, 111; HOHENLOHE, Denkwirdigkeiten, II, 140, 196). Thiers also accused Arnim of mixing banking interests with official duties. For Arnim's arguments see Pro nihilo!, p. 42 ff., especially p. 57.

40According to Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, Bismarck intended to use his knowledge about Arnim's speculations to get rid of a "rising rival" and had specially appointed Rudolf Lindau to the Paris embassy to observe his activities. "Let me add in confidence," Lyons wrote, "that he corre- sponds privately and secretly with Bismarck behind Arnim's back" (Lord NEWTON, Lord Lyons [London, 19131, II, 45-46).

41 ROGGE, pp. 118-19.




marck did in fact make efforts to shift Amim to London at this time, but, according to his letter of April 14 to the emperor, the English refused to accept Arnim because they would not be able to believe a single word he said.

At the end of April 1873 Holstein came to Berlin specifically to urge Bismarck to leave him in Paris, for which the pros- pects seemed doubtful. He spent his birthday (April 24) with his aunt, who afterward wrote to her daughter Ida: "Fritz wants-confidentially-either to remain in Paris or to come to Berlin and has quietly taken steps in this direction. He thinks he has noticed that the officials in the ministry don't want him here because they fear his close connec- tions with the Bismarck household and that Arnim fears him in Paris for the same reason.... At any rate, the Bis- marck boys are very anxious to get him here-maybe that will help."42 At the beginning of July, the foreign ministry proposed to send Holstein to Brussels. Wesdehlen, substituting for Arnim who was on leave from June 15 to September 26, wrote to Berlin: "Holstein's transfer would be undesirable to me at the moment in the interests of the service. He himself would be very reluctant to leave here, but especially to go to Brus- sels. . . 43

While Arnim was in Berlin on leave, Holstein also came to Berlin and found that the conflict between Bismarck and Arnim was now the central topic of conversation in all circles. To make his own position perfectly clear, Holstein failed to pay his respects to his chief, as would have been customary. When Holstein returned to Paris in mid-October 1873, Ar- nim's behavior toward him was frigid.

42 Ibid., pp. 119-20. 43 Ibid., p. 120.

Thereafter he and Arnim did not exchange a single word. Holstein admitted that at this time he would have welcomed a transfer, but to have taken the initiative would have been an unusual procedure, and his acquaintances told him it would look as though he were simply trying to get out of a disagreeable situation. The severance of all relations with Arnim and his family would, Holstein hoped, give the ambassador ample reason to request his transfer. Arnim, however, did not do so.44

Instead, it was Arnimn himself who was transferred. In February 1874 Bismarck at last persuaded the emperor to shift Arnim, and the legation in Constantino- ple was specially raised to an embassy to receive him.45 For Bismarck, the fight with Arnim was won, for it required no insider to official gossip to see that Ar- nim's removal to Constantinople was not a promotion. Arnim never went to Con- stantinople. He remained in Paris until April 29.

Arnim now carried the fight to the press. On April 2 an article called "Diplo- matic revelations" appeared in the Vien- na newspaper Presse. This article, based on secret German foreign ministry documents, tried to illustrate the superior wisdom of Arnim's far-sighted policy toward the Roman Catholic church as compared with Bismarck's. Amim could not have struck a more tender spot, for the Kulturkampf was being widely criti- cized in Germany, and Bismarck himself may have been questioning the wisdom

44 Darstellung, pp. 235-36. 45 How Bismarck at last persuaded the emperor

to transfer Arnim is nowhere clearly stated. His dissatisfaction with Arnim's official activity continued through 1873, and he may have presented the emperor with a documented report of Arnim's lapses, backed by his own unique powers of per- suasion. See HOHENLOHE, Denkwiirdigkeiten, II, 118; Lucius, p. 64; WERTHEIMER, loc. cit., pp. 126-27.



44 NORMAN RICH

of his tactics toward the Catholic church. Bismarck countered on April 13 with a publication of official correspondence on ecclesiastical affairs with Arnim in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, "for a better appreciation of [Arnim's] far- sighted policy." He suspected at once that Arnim himself had inspired or written the Vienna article and instructed State Secretary Billow to make inquiries. Arnim replied evasively but at last assured Bulow on May 14 that he had had nothing whatever to do with the Vienna revelations. Bismarck's suspicions were later confirmed when correspondence about the article was found at Arnim's Nassenheide estate. This was not until October 1874.46

Meanwhile the foreign ministry was making inquiries about another article inserted in a Belgian newspaper, the Echo du Parlement, almost two years before, on September 21, 1872. This article had stated that Arnim had handed in his resignation as ambassador to Paris because the Paris post was not sufficient re- ward to make up for the unpleasantness suffered by Germans in Parisian society; if the resignation was accepted, Prince Bismarck was inclined to leave only a consul in Paris to take care of German interests. The article, interpreted as a threat to France, created unusual excitement and was widely reprinted.

Holstein, at that time with Bismarck in Varzin, had sent instructions to State Secretary Thile in Berlin that the chancellor wished the article to be treated ironically in the press, unless Arnim wished otherwise.47 Arnim informed the foreign ministry that he had been un- pleasantly surprised by the Belgian article and had already given orders for the

46 The relevant documents are published in the Darstellung, pp. 38-40.

47 Telegram of Sept. 25, 1872.

ironic treatment.48 On October 1, 1872 he wrote the foreign ministry that a Paris newspaper was blaming a, certain Herr von Kahlden for the article. "Be that as it may," Arnim said, "the few lines which probably by some error found their way from some mailbox or other to Brussels have given rise to unusual excitement."

Bismarck had all along suspected that Arnim had launched the Echo article and again believed the motive to have been speculation on the stock exchange.49 Btilow was now instructed to make fresh inquiries in Paris. On May 6,1874 Biilow asked Wesdehlen to question Albert Beckmann, a journalist who worked for the German embassy in Paris.

The chancellor already suspected at the time that that newspaper report had been ordered by Ambassador Count Arnim (the motives need not concern us) who was on leave in Germany at the time, and that Herr Beckmann launched it in the press at his instructions. A basis for this belief was the fact that Herr Beckmann was well known to be a correspondent for the Echo du Parlement and the Nationalzeitung. After his return to Paris, Count Arnim made this matter the subject for a political report of October 1, 1872, in which he traced the authorship of this article to Baron von Kahlden, who was living in Paris at that time.

The recent deplorable events have reminded the chancellor of that former case and have strengthened His Highness' conviction that Count Arnim was in fact the author of that article.

The Chief [Bismarck] is occupied with col- lecting evidence about the conduct of the latter [Arnim] during his period of office, and he now intends to investigate the matter thoroughly.

Wesdehlen was then instructed to question Beckmann and also to report what he knew of the Echo article.

Wesdehlen already knew the whole story. Arnim had been on leave when he sent the article to Beckmann with instructions to launch it in the press. Beck-

48 Telegram of Sept. 26, 1872. 49 Lucus, p. 63.




mann did as he was told but had then reported the matter to Wesdehlen, the charge d'affaires. Wesdehlen now asked Beckmann for a signed deposition and sent it to Berlin on May 13, together with a statement of his own. With Beck- mann's deposition about Arnim's authorship, and Arnim's dispatch as good as de- nying this authorship, Bismarck had a clear-cut case of Arnim caught out in a lie. Arnim was subsequently presented with the Beckmann evidence and asked to reconcile it with his dispatch of Octo- ber 1, 1872 which blamed the Echo article on Kahlden.Y0 In his reply of June 20, 1874 Arnim admitted that he had ordered the Echo article, but accused Beck- mann of carrying out his instructions incorrectly.

The evidence on the Echo case was sent to the emperor. Scandalized by Ar- nim's behavior, he ordered Arnim's im- mediate dismissal from active service5" and asked for Bismarck's opinion about starting a disciplinary action against him.52 On May 17 Bismarck thanked the emperor for dismissing Arnim. He thought Arnim's answers to the ques- tions the foreign ministry asked him about the Vienna Presse article were hedging and inadequate and intended to pursue the matter. In all other respects, Bismarck wrote, he felt the Arnim case had been settled with Amim's dismissal and hoped that a disciplinary trial could be avoided. This should be done out of consideration for Arnim's family and his former position in the imperial service. If the matter went to court, a criminal

60 Builow to Arnim, May 28, 1874.

This meant that Arnim would be pensioned and placed in a sort of civil service reserve (in German: zur Disposition).

62 Otto von Bulow, foreign ministry representative with the emperor, at that time in Wiesbaden, to Bernhard Ernst von Builow, the state secretary, May 16, 1874.

sentence could hardly be avoided in the event of a conviction.

With Arnim's loss of imperial favor and his dismissal, all serious threat to Bismarck was ended. It was Arnim himself who now forced the matter further.

On May 23, 1874 Prince Hohenlohe took over the duties of German ambassador in Paris. A few days after his arrival he asked for certain documents on ecclesiastical policy in preparation for a talk with Thiers, now a leader in the French assembly. Holstein, who had been asked to get Hohenlohe the documents, was unable to find them in the files.53 On June 8 Hohenlohe telegraphed to Berlin asking for copies of the missing documents. The foreign ministry replied with an instruction for Hohenlohe to check his files against the journal entries to find out whether any other documents were missing.54 In view of the recent documen- tary revelations attacking Bismarck's policy in the press, Bismarck evidently suspected Arnim of helping himself to material for further attacks.

Before a thorough check of the Paris archive had been made, Bulow informed Arnim that certain documents on ecclesiastical policy were missing from the files of the Paris embassy and instructed him to report immediately about where they could- be. Arnim replied that the desired documents were records of his private conversations with Thiers which in his opinion did not belong in the files. Since the foreign ministry held a different opinion, he was returning the documents as soon as he could find a reliable mes-

63Testimony of Scheven, head of the chancellery at the Paris embassy, at the Arnim trial, Dec. 11, 1874,' Darstellung, pp. 160-61.

54.Instruction of June 13, 1874. The foreign ministry files have been checked. for an instruction from Berlin initiating the search for the documents in the Paris archive (that is, before Hohenlohe's request of June 8), but nothing has been found.



46 NORMAN RICH

senger. Bilow now asked Arnim whether, because of his interpretation about official or private documents, he had removed any instructions from the chancellor as "private" correspondence and, if so, to return them to the foreign ministry at once. Arnim answered on June 24 that besides the documents on ecclesiastical policy he had only one instruction from the chancellor on the usefulness of intelligence reports. All this material was being returned. "I have no other official papers which should be returned to the foreign ministry."

Two days later, on June 26, Hohenlohe reported from Paris that the files of the embassy had been checked, according to the foreign ministry instructions of June 13, and he enclosed a long list of missing documents. Billow sent this list to Ar- nim, with a request for information about .the missing papers. In case he had them *in his possession, he was to return them at once. "The responsibility for the whereabouts of these documents is of course primarily that of the former head of the embassy." Again Arnim replied: "So far as I know, I have in my possession no documents besides my own per- -sonal papers."55

This was on July 10, 1874. Meanwhile Arnim must have sought legal advice, for ten days later he wrote to Billow a private letter-private because according to law there was nothing that necessitated further official relations between himself and the foreign ministry. "I am at the disposition56 of His Majesty the Em- peror, not at the disposition of the foreign ministry.... Therefore the foreign ministry is not in a position to demand 'official' statements from me." With these

5 The relevant documents are published in the Darstellung, pp. 4-10. Hohenlohe's list of missing documents is in the foreign ministry files.

I ISee above, n. 51.

reservations in mind, Arnim said, he had not the slightest hesitation in answering the foreign ministry inquiry about the missing documents. Three of the documents had come by mistake into his private papers. These he returned with apologies. About the others he could give no explanation except that his charge d'affaires had also been head of the embassy for extended periods of time. An- other category of documents-Arnim cited them by their official numbers-be- longed in his opinion among his private papers. These in part concerned his transfer to Constantinople, in part his conflict with the chancellor. Some of Bis- marck's dispatches had stated that he was following a policy contrary to the chancellor's, and Bismarck had person- ally accused him of "conspiring" with the empress against him. "These are all serious accusations in which my reputation` is at stake. I need these documents to defend myself and consider them to be my personal property.... I leave it to the foreign ministry to bring to bear any means it thinks it has at its disposal to give its demand [for the return of the documents] legal validity." Bismarck commented on the margin of a report submitted to him on Amrim's letter: "Then there is hardly anything to be done but take legal steps to teach him his error."57 Biulow informed Arnim on August 5 that according to law he was still an official of the foreign ministry even though retired. The question of documents as private property was one for the ministry, not for the individual official, to decide. The documents in question were on official forms bearing official numbers which were part of a consecutive series and were entered in

- 57 Letter of July 20, 1874, Darstellung, pp. 10-14. The report with Bismarck's marginalia is in the foreign ministry files.




official journals. These were official, not personal, documents. This was so clear and simple that the foreign ministry saw no need to discuss Arnim's reasoning on the matter, and intended to take legal steps against him for removing documents from the archives without authority.58

An investigation of the legal situation was begun in the Reich chancellery. On August 29 a report was submitted to Bis- marck saying that Arnim's conduct would justify a formal disciplinary action against him and his dismissal from the imperial service.59 Bismarck underlined the word "dismissal" and commented: "That won't restore the archive."

At Bismarck's instigation the various other possibilities for legal action against Arnim were explored."0 A conference among representative officials in the foreign ministry on September 20 came to the conclusion that only a criminal suit against Arnim would permit a search of his home and the seizure of the missing documents.6' The problem was now to convince the emperor that such action was necessary. After receiving the rec- ommendations of the foreign ministry, Bismarck ordered Otto von Billow to get the opinion of the public prosecutor- orally and confidentially. "The earlier behavior of Count Arnim," Bismarck wrote, "gives reason to fear that he intends to misuse those documents in pub-


59 A dismissal severing every official connection and cutting off his pension. It should be distin- guished from Arnim's earlier dismissal which placed him on the reserve list.

60 Bucher to State Secretary Bulow, Sept. 17, 1874; Wilke, the justiciar of the foreign ministry, in a report of Sept. 20, 1874.

61 The conference included Philipsborn, temporary head of the foreign ministry (Biilow was on leave until the middle of October), Radowitz for the political section, Otto von Biilow for the per- sonnel section, and Wilke.

lications prejudicial to the state, and it is therefore necessary to take the requisite steps to get them back without delay.... On the basis of the opinion of the public prosecutor and my own oral instructions [Billow was with Bismarck in Varzin at this time] you will then report on the situation to His Majesty the Emperor and King."62

Tessendorf, the public prosecutor, agreed with the opinion of the foreign ministry that a criminal action against Arnim would be necessary to recover the documents, and he expressed his willingness to take action as soon as the foreign ministry gave the word. With this decision of the public prosecutor, Otto von Billow set out for Baden on the evening of September 28 to present the case to the emperor.63

On October 2 Otto von Builow telegraphed to State Secretary Billow: "HEis Majesty has agreed to the proposals of the chancellor that Arnim should be de- nounced to the public prosecutor for the removal, or rather the theft, of important official documents and that criminal proceedings against him as well as a search of his house should be initiated. The emperor added that according to the situat-ion as I had presented it to him personal considerations must disappear and the responsibility for the anticipated scandal should be borne by Arnim, not by the govemment...."

As soon as the decision of the emperor was received the foreign ministry requested the public prosecutor for the municipal court at Berlin to institute legal proceedings against Arnim.64 A conference with the public prosecutor was held in the foreign ministry on October

62 lismarck to Otto von Bulow, Sept. 26, 1874. 63 Philipsborn to Bismarck, Sept. 28, 1874. 64 On October 2, 1874.



48 NORMAN RICH

3, and on the next day Arnim was ar- rested at his Nassenheide estate and his house was searched. The missing documents were not found. Arnim told the searchers that they had been sent abroad but declared his willingness to return the-m in three days if he were allowed to go free.65

On October 27 he was released on 100,000 taler bail for reasons of health, despite the objections of Bismarck and the emperor, then rearrested on Novem- ber 11.66

On October 31 Holstein was called from Paris to testify in the official inves- tigations preceding the Arnim trial. Be- fore Holstein arrived in Berlin, State Secretary Biilow issued an order that he was not to be allowed to look through the foreign ministry files. This order removes the suspicion of collusion between Hol- stein and ithe foreign ministry in the preparation of his testimony. Holstein was to be asked about Arnim's relations with the press, the Echo du Parlement article, his alleged speculations on the stock exchange, and his relations with the lower officials of the embassy staff, because, Bulow wrote, "a chief like that corrupts."67 Holstein gave his testimony on- November 1. Besides details of his personal relations with Arnim, he added little to what the foreign ministry knew already. He had no information about Arnim's stock exchange speculations and had nothing but praise for other members of the embassy staff. His testimony given, Holstein returned to Paris.

Holstein wrote in his memoirs in 1907

P65hilipsborn to Bismarck, Oct. 5, 1874; Dar- slellung, pp. 34-35.

66The emperor thought there must be some possibility of keeping such a dangerous person in cus- tody without prejudice to considerations for his health (Otto von Bulow to the foreign ministry, Oct. 11, 1874).

67 Bulow to Wilke, Oct. 31, 1874.

that he was opposed to a trial of Arnim, for it could mean nothing but unpleasantness for members of the Paris embassy staff. Selfish motives apart, he rea- soned that the affair could be most easily settled if the emperor simply called upon Amim to surrender the documents.68 This would certainly have been the easi- est way to handle the matter, but it neg- lects an important constitutional point. Had Bismarck asked the emperor to order Arnim to restore the documents, he would have admitted the foreign ministry's lack of authority over an ambassador. It was precisely this point that Bis- marck was now trying to establish.

Arnim's trial began in Berlin on De- cember 9. On December 11 Scheven, the head of the chancellery in the Paris embassy, told the story on the witness stand of how Holstein discovered that documents were missing from the embassy files.69 Arnim's defense counsel,' Dock- horn, immediately took up this point. According' to Scheven's testimony, he said, it was Holstein who had taken the initiative to search for the missing papers and it was Holstein again who had told the witness that documents were missing. Graf Wesdehlen had previously testified, Dockhorn continued, that Holstein had access to the cabinet where the documents were kept and had a key to that cabinet. It was now his painful'duty, said Dockhorn, to say something of the relationship between Holstein and the accused. Holstein had been instructed by the foreign ministry to keep an eye on Arnim and to report regularly on his activities to the ministry "and to another authority which I will not name." Hol-

68Hotstein papers, Memoirs, p. 96. Holstein's chronology was confused, for he wrote as though the decision for the trial of Arnim had already been made in the spring of 1874.

69Darstellung, pp. 160-61.



HOLSrEIN AND THE ARNIM AFFAIR 49

stein had admitted this to the accused and promised never to do it again, but it was probable that he continued to report behind the ambassador's back despite his assurance. "If therefore Herr von Holstein had the key [to the archives], as he did without any doubt, and initiated the whole matter, then the possibility of a conclusion is fairly easy."70

The conclusion Dockhorn wished the court to draw could only be that Hol- stein, assigned by Bismarck to collect evidence against Arnim, had himself stolen the documents from the files, in- stigated the in-quiry through which their loss was discovered, and in this way created the situation which made the present trial necessary.

Dockhorn's accusation fails to hold together at any point. Arnim had already been dismissed from active service when the loss of the documents was discovered, and Bismarck had written the emperor that he intended to take no further steps against him. Arnim himself actually admitted having some of the missing documents so that it was physically impossible for Holstein to have taken them. Dockhorn had also twisted the testimony of both Scheven and Wesdehlen. Scheven had never said that Holstein initiated the search for the missing documents but only that while looking for certain documents Holstein had mentioned that some of them were missing. Nor had Wesdehlen said that Holstein had the key to the archive. On the afternoon of December 10 Wesdehlen had testified that only he and an official archivist were allowed the use of the key. At this point Arnim inter- posed to say that Holstein too had used the key. Wesdehlen said he did not re- member, but it was possible.7'

70Ibid., p. 164.

71 Ibid., pp. 137-38.

Immediately after Dockhorn's accusation, the court requested the foreign ministry to summon Holstein from Paris to answer the charges made against him. He was at once notified by telegraph. Hohenlohe replied from Paris that Hol- stein, although unwell, would leave for Berlin on the following (Saturday) morning. Before Holstein arrived the foreign ministry sent a deposition to the public prosecutor declaring it to be untrue that Holstein had ever been commissioned to watch Arnim and to report on his activities. At the same time, the foreign ministry maintained it had a perfect right to make such an assignment.72

Before Holstein appeared on the witness stand on Monday morning, Decem- ber 14, Dockhorn asked to make a statement. The accusation that Holstein had been commissioned to report on the activity of the accused was based on incorrect information, he said. The accused maintained only that Holstein had written behind his back to Berlin and in this way had increased the animosity between Bismarck and himself. Holstein had asked the pardon of the accused and promised never to do it again.73

On the witness stand, Holstein declared that he had never sent reports about Arnim to the chancellor or to anyone else. He had never received instructions of any sort to make such reports, either orally or in writing. He had written letters to friends in which he expressed political opinions differing from those of the accused. He had admitted doing so when Arnim had asked him about it, but instead of using the childish expression of promising never to do it again, he had told him he would ask for a transfer from Paris if the ambassador

72 State Secretary Btilow to Tessendorf, Dec. 11, 1874.




50 NORMAN RICH

desired it, but Arnim had declined his offer. Holstein heard later that Arnim was accusing him of being in part to blame for the conflict with Bismarck. Arnim's own reports at that time, Hol- stein said, showed clearly that his opinions ran counter to those of Bismarck, and there was no need for other reports.

Holstein admitted that he occasionally had the key to the embassy archive but never took it home as did the ambassador or Wesdehlen when he was charge d'affaires. "Did you ever take anything from the archive?" he was asked. "No."

There was a good deal about Arnim's activity that he might have reported to Berlin, Holstein said. "If anyone had a right to complain about my behavior, it would be Prince Bismarck on account of some of the things I knew and didn't report." At this point Arnim's defense counsel intervened, and the presiding magistrate assured Holstein that he had adequately refuted the charges against him.74

Neither Arnim nor his defense counsel attacked or even replied to Holstein's testimony. On December 16 Arnim was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for crimes against the public order. The verdict satisfied neither side and was appealed. Arnim was then condemned to nine months' imprisonment for removing official documents. He never served his sentence but fled abroad.

The Arnim trial, the sensation of the day, received immense play in the press. From the beginning the anti-Bismarck press, particularly the French papers, had taken the part of Arnim, and the original version of the Holstein spy story

74 Ibid., pp. 231-40. In the unofficial stenographic record of the trial it is Arnim's defense counsel who makes this statement (TJer Arniin'sclte Prozess, p. 264).

was printed even after Dockhorn had admitted it was based on incorrect information.75 The real target of the attack at that time was, of course, Bismarck, not Holstein.

To counteract the anti-Bismarck newspapers, the German government organ- ized a large-scale press campaign of its own. State Secretary Billow instructed Hohenlohe to use embassy influence with French newspapers to rehabilitate Hol- stein's reputation. A similar instruction was sent to Count Miinster in London.76 On December 17 Hohenlohe reported that an article to rehabilitate Holstein had been inserted in the Figaro which left nothing to be desired. Similar articles were introduced in other newspapers in the following days.77 On December 30 the Journal des Debats even printed a correc- tion of its December 15 article which had used the original version of the Holstein spy story. "Between the ambassador and his secretary there was an open and declared fight known to everyone, which rules out all suspicion of spying." Ho- henlohe was able to report that the chief foreign diplomats in Paris had left their cards at Holstein's residence. - On December 20, State Secretary

Builow wrote in a private letter to Ho- henlohe: It will not of course be possible to refute all the attacks and misrepresentations concerning Herr von Holstein or to prevent their recurrence, especially since his grave evidence has stirred up the full anger of the Arnim party so that we can expect more of the same. Meanwhile, society and the press are thoroughly satisfied with Herr von H's statements-I have heard nothing

75 Journal des Debats, issue of Dec. 15, 1874, then reproduced in many other newspapers.

76 Instructions of Dec. 16, 1874. 77 For instance in the Norddeutscl e Allgemeine

Zeitusng, Dec. 22; The Times, Dec. 25; Moniteur Universel, Dec. 27; Paris Journal, Dec. 28; La France, Le Constitutionel, Le Gaulois, Independance Belge, Dec. 29; and others.




against him and Hlis Majesty the Emperor has received him most graciously in special audience -for Berlin always the decisive factor. I will insert this in the press tomorrow, and at the same time a brief remark about the dishonorable procedure of Arnim's defense counsel. The whole business was done with the calculation that the hearing of witnesses would end on Saturday [December 12] and that it would be too late for the victim of the slander to be called to the stand....

The Times of London thought that Holstein made a mistake in accepting the imperial audience and thus giving the impression of hiding behind the emperor, for which there was no need. "The public testimony of all impartial men absolves Baron von Holstein from the charges pre- ferred against him."78

Valfrey, in his introduction to the French edition of the trial documents, believed the accusation that Holstein played an equivocal role in the Arnim case to be "absolutely false." "On the contrary, M. de Holstein showed his opposition to Count Arnim openly and pub- licly." Valfrey's criticism was directed against the German government for having left Holstein in Paris.79

Nothing, however, and certainly no objective appraisals of the case, could stem the anger of Arnim's partisans or Bismarck's opponents. In Berlin the powerful Arnim social set was joined by many embittered conservatives in ap- plying strong social pressure against members of the Bismarck party. In Paris anti-Bismarck feeling ran so high that Albert Beckmann, whose testimony about the Echo du Parlement article had done so much to ruin Arnim, decided to leave the city until the storm blew over. He was even threatened with personal violence.80 Radowitz wrote in his mem-

78 "Baron Holstein and Count Arnim," Dec. 25, 1874.

79 Le proces d'Arnim, pp. xii-xiv.

oirs of the animosity the Arnim family showed toward all members of the foreign ministry who were involved in the affair and their desire for a large-scale social boycott of Bismarck's followers. "Their influence did not go so far, to be sure," Radowitz said, "but for us a great many unpleasant occasions and tense relationships nevertheless developed which lasted for years to come.""81 As late as January 1877, Holstein could write to Karl von Eisendecher: "The [Bismarck] sons don't go out much, because conditions in society are not pleasant for them. The three groups of the chancellor's enemies which count socially-ultramontanes, Arnim set, and court party-are after all quite a substantial body. Foreign diplomats are admittedly very cautious but prefer to associate in those circles. For this reason . . . the boys have become very distrustful and believe that you never know whose hand you may be shaking. My own passion for society you know. I don't go out at all."82

There is no reason to suppose that Holstein suffered socially more than other members of the Bismarck party. Certain stories later told about his social disgrace can be definitely refuted. For instance he was not expelled from his Berlin club on the Pariser Platz. The club register has been checked and shows that he was listed as a member until 1895.83 But he may have found it un-

80 Hohenlohe to Bismarck, Dec. 17, 1874. 81 Aufzeichnungen, I, pp. 291-93. In a distasteful

passage in his memoirs, Holstein suggested that there was more than met the eye in Radowitz' activity during the Arnim affair. He suspected on the flimsiest evidence that Radowitz had tried to divert attention from himself by involving Holstein in the case (Holstein papers, Memoirs, pp. 94-98; RASCHDAU, p. 207).

82 Letter of Jan. 1, 1877, Holstein papers, Corre- spondence.

83 Ludwig HERZ, "Raitsel um Fritz von Holstein," Preussischse Jahrbiicher, CCXXXI (1933), 169.



52 NORMAN RICH

pleasant to go there because the club was dominated by members of the Arnim party.84

Nor was Holstein made impossible for posts abroad. After the Arnim trial he remained in Paris as second secretary and formed a lifelong friendship with Prince Hohenlohe, who recommended his promotion to first secretary in a letter to Bismarck of May 23, 1875. "Your Highness knows him better and will therefore be able to judge better than I as to whether he is suited for the post here. As for me, I must give the best tes- timonial for his abilities and his zeal." But Bismarck refused to promote Count Wesdehlen, so the post of first secretary in Paris did not fall vacant. Holstein rejected proposals to become first secretary in Constantinople and St. Petersburg, but in 1876 he accepted an offer to join the foreign ministry staff in Berlin. He was to remain there for the rest of his career.

That Holstein was never promoted to a rank higher than senior counselor was due not to social ineligibility but to choice. Preoccupation with the actual reading or drafting of official documents may have been his primary motive in later refusing promotion to posts in the foreign ministry which would have obliged him to defend foreign policy before the reichstag and take an active part in court functions. Holstein himself often gave as the reason for declining promotion that he did not wish to be accused of having profited from Bismarck's dismissal. This was a logical argument shortly after March 1890 and throws ad- ditional light on his sensitivity. But when Biilow offered him the state secre- taryship ten years later, other deep-

4 See Siegfried von KARDORFF, WilhelM V.

Kardoriff (Berlin, 1936), p. 112.

seated prejudices must have applied, none of them necessarily connected with the Arnim affair.85

Even Holstein's famous social isola- tion should not be exaggerated. He shunned court life and large social gath- erings, to be sure, but his voluminous private correspondence shows how large was his circle of acquaintances and with how many important political figures he associated. If Holstein's political judgment erred, or if his character sometimes showed serious blemishes, it was not for want of contact with other people or with "reality." The importance of "normal" social relationships may easily be over- emphasized. Bismarck, after all, lived for months on his country estates without marked detriment to his political in- sight. And as the example of many of Holstein's contemporaries clearly dem- onstrates, political wisdom does not necessarily emerge from a vigorous social life.

Holstein's avoidance of society and court life did not begin with the Arnim trial, however, but was an attitude already strongly developed in his youth. His early excursions into society often have the appearance of cool practicality. With Holstein's appointment to the political division of the foreign ministry in 1876 even the practical benefits of society disappeared. He had gained that position at the center of affairs which he seems to have coveted above all else. "Besides what I have now," he wrote his old friend Eisendecher in 1877, "I neither want nor aspire to anything more, not even a wife."86

The subconscious effect of the Arnim affair on Holstein cannot, of course, be

81 See ROSEN, I, 14. 88 Letter of Jan. 1, 1877, Holstein papers, Corre-

spondence.




evaluated from documents or from any other historical records. The trial brought Holstein's name for the first time before the general public. The publicity furnished by the anti-Bismarck press can hardly have tempted him to renew the experience and undoubtedly contributed to his-later preference for obscurity. To judge from his customary reactions to social slights or attacks against him in the press, he must have felt the slanders keenly. In 1884 he described the Amim business to Herbert Bismarck as "the most disagreeable experience of my life."87 His sensitivity is certainly par- tially to blame for the later legends about his importance in the case. Radowitz commented with some disdain: "Hol- stein was considered by the [Bismarck] ladies to be the most faithful and trust- worthy follower of the Prince, especially since the Arnim affair of which he made himself out to be the victim."88

Holstein's responsibility for the ruin of Arnim can be established only on a single point: he wrote letters to friends in the foreign ministry in which he pointed out Arnim's opposition to- Bis- marck's policy, and he recommended Arnim's transfer from Paris. His letters may have added to the chancellor's bit- terness, as Arnim maintained,89 but Ar- nim's own indiscretions and official reports revealed his opposition to official policy clearly enough. About Arnim's rivalry for imperial favor-the crucial point-Bismarck had precise informa-

87 Letter of Sept. 1, 1884, Wolfgang WINDEL-

BAND, Bismarck und die europdischen Grossmdchle, 1879-1885 (Essen, 1940), p. 602.

88Aufzeicknungen, II, 23. On this problem, see the opinion of Helmuth Rogge in his intelligent and sympathetic introduction to Holstein's letters to his cousin (pp. xxx-xxxi) and the conclusion of Helmut Krausnick after a meticulous survey of the evidence (Holsteins Geheimpolitik in der Ara Bismarck, 1886- 1890 [Hamburg, 1942], pp. 170-74).

tion from the crucial source: the emperor himself.

Of the key incidents that brought about Arnim's downfall, the authorship of the Echo article was revealed by the journalist Albert Beckmann, who had launched it in the press at Arnim's orders; the authorship of the Vienna Presse article was revealed by Arnim's own correspondence, found when his house was officially searched in October 1874; the documents from the Paris archive were removed by Arnim, and it was he alone who refused to return them. In each of these situations, Arnim lied about his participation, in some cases very foolishly. He blamed the Echo article on a man called Kahlden, and when later confronted with Beckmann's con- fession he blamed Beckmann for mis- understanding his orders; he denied the authorship of the Presse article; he denied having taken the documents from Paris, then implied that they might have been lost while Wesdehlen was charge d'affaires. In the same pattern is the in- sinuation he allowed his defense counsel to make that Holstein had stolen the documents from the Paris archive and initiated the search for them to establish the foreign ministry's legal case against him.

Arnim's contemporaries make frequent reference to his considerable ability;90 Bismarck himself pays it hand-

89 According to Maximilian Harden, Bismarck said the same thing in 1890, when he was savagely attacking the leaders of the New Course. "I owe the Arnim scandal to Holstein; if he had not poisoned the well from the beginning, I would have gotten along with that talented comedian without an open conflict" (Die Zukunft, LV [1906], 458).

90 RADOWITZ, Aufzeichnungen, I, 289; HOHEN- LOHE, Denkwiirdigkeiten, II, 107; Philipp zu EULEN- BURG, Aus 50 Jahren, ed. Johannes HALLER (Berlin, 1923), p. 36; Denkwiirdigkeiten des General- Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, ed. Heinrich Otto MEISNER (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), I, 154.



54 NORMAN RICH

some tribute.9" Yet Arnim's struggl( against Bismarck is a record of incredibly foolish blunders which his opponent dic not fail to exploit. The man primarily responsible for the fall of Arnim wac without any doubt Arnim himself.92 BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

APPENDIX

The Darstellung is the government versior of the trial and includes a section of documents which appear to be accurately reproduced, though some documents printed there were not found in the foreign ministry files. The trial testimony reproduced in the Dar- stellung, particularly Holstein's testimony, differs considerably from that in the earlier stenographic report of the trial (Der Arnim'sche Prozess. Stenographische Berichte iiber die vor dem konigl. Stadtgericht in Berlin in der Unter- suchungen wider den Grafen Harry von Arnim gefiihrten Verhandlungen [Berlin, 1874]). Ac- cording to the stenographic report (p. 260), Holstein delivered his testimony so softly and indistinctly that the exact wording could not be understood. As a result, the stenographic report is full of gaps and incomprehensible sentences. For the official record (the Dar- stellung) State Secretary Biilow sent Holstein

91 Die gesammelten Werke, XV, 356. 92 It is at present difficult to understand Arnim's

high reputation as a diplomat. Fortunately a study of Arnim's diplomatic activity is being made from the files of the German foreign ministry by George 0. Kent, member of the board of editors of Docu- ments on Germanforeign policy.

a copy of the stenographic report with the request that he make necessary corrections and fill in the gaps wherever necessary (December 30, 1874). The testimony was returned by Holstein on January 5, 1874, corrected. In the present study the Darstellung version has been used, because the testimony in the stenographic report often makes no sense whatever. It should be borne in mind that some of the most important points of Holstein's testimony could not be understood in the courtroom, at least by the court stenographer, and could therefore pre- sumably not be contradicted by the defense. It is astonishing that Arnim's defense counsel did not demand that Holstein speak louder and more distinctly.

The publications for the defense include: Stenographischer Bericht itber den Process Arnim unter Mitwirkung der Vertheidiger (Berlin, 1875); Franz von HOLTZENDORFF and others, Rechtsgutachten erstattet zum Process des Grafen H. v. Arnim (Munich, 1875); August DOCKHORN and others, Vertheidigungsreden in der Unter- suchung wider den Grafen H. von Arnim (Berlin, 1875); Franz von HOLTZENDORFF, Fiur den Grafen H. v. Arnim. Vertheidigungsrede, gehalten am 14 Dezember 1874 (Berlin, 1875).

A French edition of the trial documents, with a summary of the trial, includes a useful introduction: Le proces d'Arnim. Recueil com- plet des documents politiques et a-utres pikces produites a I'audience publique, edited by E. FIGUREY and D. CORBIER, introduction by M. J. VALFREY (Paris, 1875).

Arnim, or someone working closely with him, published anonymously a book in his defense, including many documents not always accurately reproduced: Pro - nihilo!, Vol. I (Zurich, 1876). Only one volume was ever published.



Holstein and the Arnim Affair

Documents

Transcript of Holstein and the Arnim Affair