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Holistic cybernetics - conceived as the result of a gradually lessened `detachment ofthe observer´

Löfgren, Lars

Published in:Cybernetics and Systems 2008

2008

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Citation for published version (APA):Löfgren, L. (2008). Holistic cybernetics - conceived as the result of a gradually lessened `detachment of theobserver´. In R. Trappl (Ed.), Cybernetics and Systems 2008 (pp. 144-149). Austrian Society for CyberneticStudies.

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HOLISTIC CYBERNETICS – CONCIEVED AS THE RESULT OF A GRADUALLY LESSENED ‘DETACHMENT OF THE OBSERVER’

LARS LÖFGREN University of Lund

Printed in: Cybernetics and Systems 2008, edited by Robert Trappl, Austrian Society of Cybernetic Studies, Vienna, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 144-149. ISBN 978-3-85206-175-7

Holistic Cybernetics - conceived as the result of a graduallylessened ‘detachment of the observer’

Lars Lofgren

University of Lund, Box 118, S-22100 Lund, Sweden (email: Lars.Lofgren@eit.lth.se)

[Printed in: Cybernetics and Systems ’08, Vol. 1, pp 144-149 (2008), editor: Robert Trappl.Vienna: Austrian Society for Cybernetic Studies. ISBN 978-3-85206-175-7]

Abstract

For help in explaining our theoretical under-standing of nature, Pauli once suggested toBohr a gradual lessening of the ‘detachmentof the observer’, a notion of Bohr based onhis concept of complementarity. Pauli ex-pected further steps in this direction.We suggest further such steps - in line withan epistemological development towards rev-elation of presuppositions rather than ask-ing for fundamental truths. When takento the basic presuppositions for communica-tion, we reach language in its holistic con-ception and cybernetic realization, namelyholistic cybernetics. That is a system of twoholistic languages, one communication lan-guage and one genetic languge. An essen-tial presupposition is that the communica-tion language is shared among a populationof communicating individuals. The geneticlanguage is responsible for this, and provides(via evolutionary adaptation) linguistic ca-pacities that are shared (beyond completedescription) among the communicating indi-viduals. This explains induction as beyonddeduction in the communication language.We compare holistic cybernetics with wellknown self-referential cybernetics (’cybernet-ics of cybernetics’ and second-order cyber-netics).

1 Introduction

Recall for a moment the early stages of cyberneticthinkings, when Mead suggested to look at cybernet-ics as a language, allowing fruitful interdisciplinarytalk. And, furthermore, proposed to apply cyberneticprinciples to the organization of cybernetical activi-ties - suggesting with von Foerster the expression ’cy-bernetics of cybernetics’. How von Foerster furtheredsuch self-referential aspects into an ordering of cyber-netics with first-order cybernetics as the cybernetics ofobserved systems, and second-order cybernetics as thecybernetics of observing systems. See [Pias C, 2004].

In the expansions to follow, with second-ordercybernetics at center, various conceptions of ‘the

observer’ have occured. Some, appealing to physical-like measuring instruments or automata, some toliving organisms, some allowing ‘the observer’ to bea full-fledged human observer, and this even with astretching of observation all the way to communicablethinking. Compare a proposal of Maturana, in apanel discussion in 1990 on old and new cybernetics(quoted from [Heylighen et al eds, 1990]).

A proposal of Maturana [Heylighen et al eds, 1990,page 42] “What if we were saying that the new cyberneticsis not the cybernetics of contol, or the control of thecontroller, but the cybernetics of understanding”.

In the Second Heinz von Foerster Congress, 2005,we proposed to look at cybernetics more in termsof a holistic understanding than in a self-referentialone (with its noticeable problems of explainingself-reference in terms of unfolding orders, and of howto understand ‘the observer’). With reference to theholistic conception of language [Lofgren L, 2004], wethere suggested ’holistic cybernetics’ as follows.

Holistic Cybernetics [Lofgren L, 2005]. “Holisticcybernetics is a system of (at least) two holistic languages,one communication language, shared (in a nontrivialway) among a population of communicating individuals,and one genetic language accomplishing the sharingpresupposition. The genetic language provides (viaevolutionary adaptation) linguistic capacities that areshared, beyond complete description in the communi-caton language, among the communicating individuals(explaining for example induction as beyond deduction inthe communication language.”

Another way of understanding the involved holismwould be to start out from Pauli’s view of graduallylessening the ‘detachability of the observer’(suggestedin a letter to Bohr in 1955). And, from there on, toextend the understandings of the ‘gradual lesseningof the detachability of the observer’ to a communica-ble limit, in line with a foundational program aimingat revelation of presuppositions rather than searchingfor absolute truths (cf [Lofgren L, 2004]), thereby re-vealing a full holistic concept. That is, not of somegeneralized quantum system, but rather of some com-pletion of first-second- order approaches to cybernet-ics. Namely to a complementaristic conception of cy-

bernetics, on a par with the above explicit view ofholistic cybernetics as a system of two languages. Aconception, that is, with deep appeal to our naturalsharing of holistic language. Simply notice the waywe naturally ’read’ a sentence - always in terms of themeaning (compositional interpretation) it produces inour conscious mind (with linguistic capacities sharedwith other minds) entangled with the, often subcon-scious, reading of its syntactical structure.

Notice that such an epistemological extension ofunderstanding a ’gradual lessening of the detacha-bility of the ’observer’ will also involve a transitionfrom Bohr complementarity to the phenomenon oflanguage. That is to linguistic complemntarity. Thistransition step may be more a matter of revealingdeeper presuppositions, even compared with thoseinvolved in Bohr’s introducing his concept of comple-mentarity; cf [Primas H, 1983]:

[Primas H, 1983, page 349] “A new style in science be-gan with quantum mechanics when Niels Bohr initiateda spiritual renewal by introducing his concept of comple-mentarity. It turned out that complementarity is far moreimportant than quantum mechanics, it has led to develop-ment of science that encourages a holistic vision.”

“Bohr made it very clear that the notion of complemen-tarity is not restricted to quantum physics. He stressedthat the idea of complementarity is related ’to the generaldifficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in thedistinction between subject and object’ (Bohr 1928)”

It is in such a direction of understanding ‘the for-mation of human ideas’ that we have to look deepinto the presuppositional foundations for language asa phenomenon where thoughts are born and communi-cated. This is where we meet linguistic complementar-ity, where it is the weighing possibilities in its tensionaspect that are behind subject-object distinctions asappearing in predicative conceptualizability.

2 Excerpts from Holistic Language

The following excerpts from our holistic understand-ing of the phenomen of language [Lofgren L, 2004]may be helpful for reading the paper.

Language is, in its general holistic conception, a wholeof complementary description-interpretation processes.The meaning of “comlementary” is that of linguisticcomplementarity given below.

In particular Carnap’s semiotic fragmentation the-sis, stipulating individually understandable syntax,semantics, pragmatics parts (cf [Carnap R, 1968]),does not hold for the phenomenon of language in itsgeneral holistic comprehension.

Linguistic Complementarity. In its holistic concep-tion, language is a whole of description-interpretation pro-cesses, a whole which does not allow part-constructionslike pure descriptions or pure interpretations within thelanguage. Instead, within the language, there is a ten-sion between describability and interpretability. For ex-ample, it may be possible to describe more and more

of the interpretations in the language, due to its re-flexive powers. But there will always remain a non-vanishing undescribable interpretation-residue. We thensay that we weigh the tension toward the describability-side, and refer to the description-construct as description-like. In weighing the tension toward the other side,the interpretation-side, with a small but nonvanish-ing noninterpretable description-residue, we refer to theinterpretation-construct as interpretation-like.There are various related ways of viewing linguistic com-plementarity:

(i) as descriptional incompleteness: in no language canits interpretation process be completely described inthe language itself;

(ii) as a tension between describability and interpretabil-ity within a language: weighing towards increaseddescribability implies decreased interpretability, andconversely;

(iii) as degrees of partiality of self–description (introspec-tion) within a language: complete self–descriptionwithin a language is impossible;

(iv) as a principle of “nondetachability of language”.

For illustrations of weighings as in view (ii), see forexample [Lofgren L, 1998].

Languages may change and evolve, and with themtheir capacities for describing and interpreting. Yet,at each time that we want to communicate our actualknowledge, even on the evolution of language, we arein a linguistic predicament, namely to be confined toa language with its inescapable complementarity.

Linguistic Closure. Our thinking abilities are usuallylooked upon as free and unbounded. But when it comesto communicable thought, we are confined to some sharedcommunication language. The systemic wholeness, orthe complementaristic nature, of this language impliesa closure, or circumscription, of our linguistic abilities –be they creation of “pure thoughts” communicable in aformal mathematical language, or constructive directionsfor an experimental interpretation-domain of a physicslanguage. The nature of this closure is not that of aclassical boundary of a capacity, like describability, or in-terpretability. It is a tensioned and hereditary condition onthe systemic capacity of describability-and-interpretabilityadmitting potentialities in two directions:

(a) The closure is tensioned. Within the language thereis a tension between describability and interpretability(view (ii) of the linguistic complementarity), whereby itmay be possible to increase the describability at the cost ofa lowered interpretability, and conversely. In other words,what the closure bounds off is neither describability, norinterpretability, but their interactive whole as a linguisticunit of describability-and-interpretability.

(b) The closure is hereditary. Languages may evolve,and at a later time we can have access to another sharedcommunication language of greater capacity for commu-nication. However, we are then back to the linguisticpredicament: at each time that we try to communicatethoughts – even introspective thoughts about languageand its evolution – we are confined to a shared language,however evolved, and the linguistic complementarity

of that language restricts our communicability in thetensioned way according to (a).

3 Pauli’s view of a gradually lessened‘detachment of the observer’.

In a general perspective, the topic of the ’detachabil-ity of the observer’ is related with ideas of makingconceptual “cuts”, like in separating mind and mat-ter, observer and the observed, measuring apparatusand system measured upon, inside and outside, etc.By way of well known examples, the Cartesian cutseparates the whole reality into mind and body. TheHeisenberg cut, see [Primas H, 1994], which presup-poses the Cartesian cut, divides in addition the purelymaterial universe of discourse into a material objectand material observing tools (with interactions, butno Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, between theobserved object and the observing tools).

The Bohr-Pauli exchange of ideas on the detacha-bility of the obsever ought to be sufficiently well un-derstood by the following quotations from a letter thatPauli wrote to Bohr in 1955.

Pauli’s letter to BohrThe following quotes from Pauli’s letter to Bohr in1953 are taken from the printed version of it occurringin Laurikainen’s book [Laurikainen K, 1988].

“To a certain extent I am therefore glad, that eventually Ifound something [indicating disagreement]: the definitionand the use of the expression ‘detached observer’, whichappears on page 10 above of your lecture and which reap-pears on page 13 in connection with biology. Accordingto my own point of view the degree of this ‘detachment’is gradually lessened in our theoretical explanation ofnature and I am expecting further steps in this direction.... it seems to me quite appropriate to call the conceptualdescription of nature in classical physics, which Einsteinso emphatically wishes to retain, ‘the ideal of the detachedobserver’. To put it drastically the observer has accordingto this ideal to disappear entirely in a discrete manneras hidden spectator, never as actor, nature being leftalone in a predetermined course of events, independentof the way in which the phenomena are observed. ‘Likethe moon has a definite position’ Einstein said to melast winter, ‘whether or not we look at the moon, thesame must also hold for the atomic objects, as there is nosharp distinction possible between these and macroscopicobjects. Observation cannot create an element of realitylike a position, there must be something contained in thecomplete description of physical reality which correspondsto the possibility of observing a position, already beforethe observation has been actually made.’ I hope that Iquoted Einstein correctly; it is always difficult to quotesomebody out of memory with whom one does not agree.It is precisely this kind of postulate which I call the idealof the detached observer. In quantum mechanics, on thecontrary, an observation hic et nunc changes in general the‘state’ of the observed system in a way not contained inthe mathematically formulated laws, which only apply tothe automatical time dependence of the state of a closedsystem. I think here on the passage to a new phenomenonby observation which is technically taken into accountby the so–called ‘reduction of the wave packets’. As it is

allowed to consider the instruments of observation as akind of prolongation of the sense organs of the observer,I consider the impredictable change of the state by asingle observation — in spite of the objective character ofthe result of every observation and notwithstanding thestatistical laws for the frequencies of repeated observationunder equal conditions — to be an abandonment of theidea of the isolation (detachment) of the observer fromthe course of physical events outside himself....Probably you mean by ‘our position as detached ob-servers’ something entirely different than I do, as forme this new relation of the observer to the course ofphysical events is entirely identical with the fact, thatour situation as regards objective description in ‘thisfield of experience’ gave rise to the demand of a renewedrevision of the foundations for ‘the unambiguous useof our elementary concepts’, logically expressed by thenotion of complementarity.”

On Pauli’s goal behind lessening thedetachmentNotice that Pauli here expects ‘further steps’ towardslessening the detachment of the observer - but doesnot ask for a null-detachment or complete inclusion.This is understandable in the light of his quantumtheoretical insights. Compare as well more recentpositions in quantum theory of observation as mea-surement.

Null-detachment difficulties [Busch, Lahti andMittelstaedt, 1996, page 131]. “The quantum theory ofmeasurement is motivated by the idea of the universalvalidity of quantum mechanics, according to whichthis theory should be applicable, in particular, to themeasurement process. Hence one would expect, and mostresearchers in the foundations of quantum mechanicshave done so, that the problem of measurement shouldbe solvable whithin quantum mechanics. The long historyof this problem shows that, in spite of many importantpartial results, there seems to be no satisfactory routetowards its solution. This general impression is confirmedin the present work by means of no-go-theorems.”

Furthermore, in the wider epistemological context weintend for this paper (for the foundational deepen-ing of Pauli’s lessening of the detachment), a null-detachment of the observer would imply completeself-description - which would contradict view (iii) oflinguistic complementarity. Complete self-descriptionwithin a language is impossible - whereas degrees ofself-description may well be developed. Compare alsoviews (i) and (iv) of linguistic complementarity.

4 Holistic advancements of Pauli’sview

In advancing Pauli’s further steps towards revelationof basic presuppositions for observation and commu-nication, we understand linguistic complementarity asan epistemological extension of Bohr’s complementar-ity concept (in revealing more fundamantal presuppo-sitions). At the same time we extend ‘the observer’(an expression which all too easily connotes embod-

iment and classical detachability) into ‘holistic lan-guage’, namely the language the observers share inmaking observations which are intersubjectively ac-ceptable.

From Bohr Complementarity to LinguisticComplementarity.When Bohr first introduced the concept of comple-mentarity in quantum physics, in his Como paper[Bohr N, 1928], he did so in a way which is perhapsmore general than what the subsequent discussionsof it seem to reflect. Compare his view of a possible“complementarity theory”:

Bohr’s primary view of complementarity [Bohr N,1928, page 580] “Indeed, in the description of atomicphenomena, the quantum postulate presents us withthe task of developing a ‘complementarity’ theory theconsistency of which can be judged only by weighing thepossibilities of definition and observation.”

In [Lofgren L, 1994, pages 159-60] we compareBohr complementarity with linguistic complementar-ity. With definability a special case of describabil-ity, and with observability a case of interpretability(see [Margenau H, 1966]), we regard linguistic comple-mentarity (tension between describability and inter-pretability within a language) an extension of Bohr’sprimary view of complementarity (tension between de-finability and observability).

Notice the different natures of the underlying pre-suppositions. For linguistic complementarity we havetwo presuppositions P I and P II (see [Lofgren L, 2004,pages 146-7].P I states the general opposition between descriptionsand interpretations in a language:descriptions (sentences, theories) are always finite(finitely representable) and locally independent oftime; for interpretations (meanings, models) no suchrestrictions are presupposed.P II concerns the necessity for communicating individ-uals to share a communication language. The sharingcondition, reflecting the adaptation of the language toits niche, is in general beyond full description in thecommunication language.

P I and P II obviously also apply to Bohr’s rea-soning behind complementarity, but are not there re-vealed. Rather, they are detached - indicating limita-tions for Pauli’s lessening of the detachment. Never-theless Bohr frequently returns to the importance ofusing natural language (rather than a not fully inter-pretable quantum “language”) to communicate unam-biguously experimental conditions for quantum mea-surements. But such beliefs (ideal, or detached in thepresent context) rather seem to indicate that Bohr isnot fully aware of a linguistic complementarity.

From observers to their shared language.The step from “observer” to the “language shared be-tween the observers” becomes necessary for the ‘less-ening of the detachment’ problem as soon as we startto understand view iv of linguistic complementarity.That is, that the principle of nondetachability of lan-

guage also applies to the language in which observersobserve, experiment, think, communicate, make in-tersubjective conclusions with other observers, etc. Inparticular so, notwithstanding Bohr’s appeal to natu-ral language for reaching experimental objectivity. In[Lofgren L, 1994] we argue this point in some detail.

The sharing presupposition P II is in [Lofgren L,2004] stated as follows:Presupposition II. Communication presupposes that alanguage be shared among participants of the communi-cation. This means that they all have inherited (geneti-cally; i.e., a phenomenon in genetic language) some basicdescription-interpretation processes of the language, andmay have acquired (by learning the language in its ac-quisition phase) certain other commonly held properties,permitting them to further explore, by the description-interpretation processes constituting the language, a lin-guistic domain of common interest (which may containconceptions of the language itself).

5 Holistic cybernetics as closure ofthe advancements of Pauli’s view

The wide aim of Pauli’s epistemological goal for alessened ‘detachment of the observer’, and that ofour further extensions of this observer perspective, re-veals that we are not aiming at some quantum theorybut rather at an understanding of the phenomenonof language. That is, an understanding respectingthe basically revealed presuppositions for communica-tion which allows us complementaristic conceivabilityof language in language. That is, without detachingourselves from the language - which is the usual sit-uation when we try to formulate scientific results intheories in “formal languages” which are but detachedfragments of holistic language.

Thus, with holistic language as of a different cat-egory than that of theory (and that of “formal lan-guage”), and with the possibility here to understandlanguage in language, we rather associate with cyber-netics, for which “self-referential” characterizationsare well known. Cf cybernetics of cybernetics, as wellas formulations of cybernetics using “the observer”concepts - not to speak of the characterization of holis-tic cybernetics given above in the introduction of thispaper.

Our extensions of Pauli’s view have ended in lan-guage, holistic communication language, as categoryfor what in Pauli’s view is ‘the observer’. Also withwide understandings of observers, such as stretchingobserving all the way to communicable thinking, ourextension comes to a natural stop here. Compare:

[Dummett M, 1991, page 166] “Language, it is natural tosay, has two principal functions: that of an instrument ofcommunication, and that of a vehicle of thought. We aretherefore impelled to ask which of the two is primary. Isit because language is an instrument of communicationthat it can alo serve as a vehicle of thought? Or, is itconvesely, because it is a vehicle of thought, and cantherefore express thoughts, that it can be used by oneperson to communicate his thoughts to others?”

With this view of the function of language, we seem

to be at the right fundamental concept. That is, inholistic communication language - where also the twofunctions seem entangled and perceivable as weigh-ings (perspectives) in the language. Whereby our“theories” become understandable as description-likeweighings with nonvanishing but small interpretation-residues.

6 Holistic cybernetics compared withself-referential cybernetics

With “self-referential cybernetics” we refer here tothe early stages of cybernetic development, mentionedin the introduction. Namely to cybernetics of cyber-netics, of Mead considered a language allowing self-applicability (for example possiblities of applicationof cybernetic principles to cybernetic production ofprinciples), and to von Foerster’s furtherings into first-order cybernetics as the cybernetics of observed sys-tems, and second-order cybernetics as the cyberneticsof observing systems.

In these views there seems to be a tacit frag-mentability assumption in that we can in someprincipal way distinguish between language andits meaning, between a sentence and its meaning,between theory and model, between description andinterpretation, etc. By this we do not want to suggestthat there are no interactions between fragmentedparts. On the contrary. What we mean is that suchtacit fragmentability assumptions may show up asillusions, or as being distortive if taken seriously - inthe sense that they appear as fictions if our naturalholistic communication language is not detached.

By contrast, in our holistic perspective we do notfragment our natural communication language into“language and its meaning” (which we do in forexample logics where “language” refers to a “formallanguage” of sentences and their syntax, and meaningto semantics). Instead we conceive holistic languageas a genuine whole of description-interpretationprocesses. Attempts to make such linguistic processesproduce pure descriptions, or pure interpretations,are impossible in the language. But there is a lin-guistic complementarity, allowing weighings towardsa description-like side and an interpretation-likeaccording to section 2.

In our holistic perspective, with language a vehicleof thought and an instrument of communication, wenaturally view cybernetics more in terms of holisticcybernetics than in terms of self-referential.

Holistic versus second-order cybernetics. In holistic cybernetics, self-reference is always par-tial - cf view (iii) of linguistic complementarity as wellas [Lofgren L, 1990]. Is there some similar understand-ing in self-referential cybernetics?

Not, as far as we have seen, as documented in somesimilar terminology (like partial self-reference, or de-grees of self-reference). But, perhaps it is von Foer-ster’s classification into first- and second- etc orders

of cybernetics that intends to support degrees of self-reference.

An ordering of cybernetics, that is, which may havebeen inspired by a predicative view of cybernetics.Conceiving “observing observing” as a second-levelpredicate. That is, with a predicate/object swithas in: Observing(as predicate) applicable to Observ-ing(as object). Realizable by levelling the predicatesas in second-order predicate calculus where first-orderpredicates are quantified over objects, and second-order predicates are quantified over first-order pred-icates.

But as long as self-referential cybernetics is con-ceived as a theory or science, the predicate-levellingmust go on - unless the self-reference is accepted aspartial. If not, but with second-order cyberneticsconsidered a complete self-referential cybernetics -the null-detachment problem arizes. Cf at this pointthe following observation of Glanville.

[Glanville R, 2004, page 1384] “What happens in second-order cybernetics? The distinction between first- andsecond-order cybernetics depends, as has already beendeveloped, on a change in attitude to the observerwho, in second-order cybernetics, is understood to beboth within the system being described and affected by it.”

This position, and functioning, of the observer isprecisely that which defines null-detachment - animpossible goal of complete self-description; see bothview (iii) of linguistic complementarity and [LofgrenL, 1990].

Conclusion. Second-order cybernetics, as deductivetheory or science, is bound to be incomplete with re-spect to describability of control and communication.The influence of our nondetachable natural communi-cation language is not taken into account.Holistic cybernetics, as holistic language, is a closureof lessened detachments of “the observer” (of thelanguage shared by observers). Conceivability is hereholistic and not assumed fragmentable as in idealisticsearches for pure theories or for pure models (as innon-holistic understandings of for example “formallanguages”). Characteristically we have a linguisticcomplementarity which can be viewed as a tensionbetween describability and interpretability within thelanguage. It can be weighed towards a description-likeside as well as towards an interpretation-like side.Holistic cybernetics allows weighings towardsdescription-like accounts of holistic cybernetics, aswell as of cybernetics of second-order (and of higherpredicative orders), and also of “cybernetics ofcybernetics” (whether interpreted non-holistically orholistically).

Are cybernetics of cybernetics andsecond-order cybernetics synonymous?Very often, cybernetics of cybernetics and second-order cybernetics are considered synonymous. Cf,Glanville’s briefing of this conference session: “I have,at the last two conferences, chaired the session on Cy-

bernetics of Cybernetics etc - also known as SecondOrder Cybernetics.”

However, in [Glanville R, 2004, page 1380] Glanvilletakes on a more critical attitude, and attempts an ar-gument for a possible synonymity. It ends: “Thus,the Cybernetics of Cybernetics is Cybernetics whenthe observer’s presence is admitted rather than dis-guised - or even completely denied.”

We agree with “Cybernetics of Cybernetics” as avery general kind of formulation which can be inter-preted in many ways. Also so, with Mead’s character-ization of it as a language (cf Section 1).

In a non-holistic perspective of Cybernetics of Cy-bernetics, it surely is possible to interpret it as asecond-order cybernetics - of the character of theory,because also language will then be so fragmented.

In a holistic perspective of Cybernetics of Cyber-netics, it is also possible to interpret it as HolisticCybernetics - thus not as theory but as holistic lan-guage. For example in understanding “cybernetics ofcybernetics” as “applying cybernetic principles to thecybernetic production of principles”. Cf from [LofgrenL, 2004] how we explain the phenomenon of inductionas occuring in holistic language (although partly hid-den from complete description in the language). Withcauses in the adaptation of the language (its constitut-ing individul linguistic agents) to niches where it fits.Resulting in genetically propagated linguistic capac-ities - nonconscious capacities to behave inductively(to the surprise of non-holistic deductivists). Noticethe role here of the genetic language in Holistic Cy-bernetics.

By way of conclusion we see the wide applicabilityof Cybernetics of Cybernetics, in contrast to the morespecific form of second-order cybernetics, as reason fornot considering them synonymous.

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