High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract...

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High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with chard S. Hartley, Ph.D., P.E

Transcript of High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract...

Page 1: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

High Reliability OrganizationA Practical Approach

This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with

Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D., P.E.

Page 2: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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U.S. Nuclear Weapon Assembly- Disassembly Plant

Pantex has no choice except to be aHigh Reliability Organization!

Page 3: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

SYSTEM ACCIDENT TIMELINE

1979 - Three Mile Island1984 – Bhopal India1986 – NASA Challenger1986 – Chernobyl1989 – Exxon Valdez

2001 – World Trade Center2005 – BP Texas City2007 – Air Force B-522008 – Stock Market Crash2010 – BP Deepwater Horizon

CommonalitiesHigh tech, no shortage of smart people, lots of tools

A safety management system

Energy flowed from threat to hazard resulting in mega consequence

Lost focus of weak signals, never saw the catastrophe coming, convinced it couldn’t happen to them

10BPGulf

Who is Next?

Page 4: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Why Is Being an HRO So Important?

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Some types of system failures are so punishing that they must be avoided at almost any cost.

These classes of events are seen as so harmful that they disable the organization, radically limiting its capacity to pursue its goal, and could lead to its own destruction.

Laporte and Consolini, 1991

Some types of system failures are so punishing that they must be avoided at almost any cost.

These classes of events are seen as so harmful that they disable the organization, radically limiting its capacity to pursue its goal, and could lead to its own destruction.

Laporte and Consolini, 1991

Some types of system failures are so punishing that they must be avoided at almost any cost.

These classes of events are seen as so harmful that they disable the organization, radically limiting its capacity to pursue its goal, and could lead to its own destruction.

Laporte and Consolini, 1991

Page 6: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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What is a High Reliability Organization?

An organization that repeatedly accomplishes its high hazard mission while avoiding catastrophic events, despite significant hazards, dynamic tasks, time constraints, and complex technologies

A key attribute of being an HRO is to learn from the organization’s mistakes

Aka a learning organization

Page 7: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Feeling Comfortable with a Good Safety Stats?

Many organizations have demonstrated, great safety stats don’t equal real, tangible organizational safety.

The tendency for normal people when confronted with a continuous series of positive “stats” is to become comfortable with good news and not be sensitive to the possibility of failure.

“Normal people” routinely experience failure by believing their own press (or statistics).

Page 8: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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NASA & ColumbiaJan 16, 2003

CAIB: “The unexpected became the expected, which became the accepted.”

When NASA lost 7 astronauts, the organization's TRC rate was 600% better than the DOE complex.

And yet, on launch day

3,233 Criticality 1/1R* hazards had been waived.

* Criticality 1/1R component failures result in loss of the orbiter and crew.

Page 9: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Individual Accident

An accident occurs wherein the worker is not protected from the plant and is injured (e.g. radiation exposure, trips, slips, falls, industrial accident, etc.)

Plant(hazard)

Human Errors(receptor)

Focus:Protect the worker from the plant

10All rights reserved © B&W Pantex 2011

Page 10: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Fundamental HRO Focus Prevent System Accident

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Plant(hazard)

Equipment, tooling, facility malfunctions

(threat)

Natural Disasters

(threat)

Focus:Protect the plant from the threats

Human Errors(threat)

An accident wherein the system fails allowing a threat to release the hazard and as a result many* people are adversely affected

* Workers, Enterprise, Environment, Country

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The emphasis on the system accident in no way degrades the importance of individual safety , it is a pre-requisite of an HRO, but focus on individual accidents is not enough.

Page 11: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Building a Practical High Reliability Organization

Page 12: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

HRO

Where you want to be

Work-as-Imagined

Work-as-Done

Non-HRO

∆Wg “Why”

Where you probably are

“What”

Work-as-ImaginedWork-as-Done

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Ultimate Goal of an HRO

∆Wg = gap in work as done vs. as imagined

HRO Goal: Align, tighten, and sustain spectrum of performance.

Page 13: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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To Become an HRO(Take a System Approach)

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HRO Practice #1

Manage the System,

Not the Parts

HRO Practice #2

Reduce Variability in HRO System

HRO Practice #3

Foster a Strong Culture of Reliability

HRO Practice #4

Learn and Adapt as an

Organization

Work-as-ImaginedWork-as-Done

Where you want to be

Page 14: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Where you want to be

To Implement HRO Practices(Break the Chain Between Threat and Hazard)

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HumanPerformance

Error Precursors

(Between Threats and Hazard)

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Work-as-ImaginedWork-as-Done

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Page 15: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Where you want to be

To Sustain an HRO(Align Each Culture Level)

Work-as-ImaginedWork-as-Done

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Underlying Assumptions

Espoused Beliefs and

Values

Artifacts and Behaviors

Becoming an HRO

Desire to be an HRO

Adapted from Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2004

What You Really Feel

You Should Do

What You Say You’re Going

To Do

What You Do

Page 16: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Work-as-Imagined

Work-as-Done

Non-HRO

∆Wg “Why”

Where you probably are

To Learn as an HRO(Learn from Small Mistakes)

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Tier 4: Learn From Others’ Mistakes

Tier 3:

Causal

Factors Analysis

Tier 2:

Tracking & Trending

Tier 1: Daily

Supervisor-Worker Interactions

Tier 0: Startup

“What”

Page 17: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Contains: Background on High Reliability Bad Signs of Normal Accidents Logical Safety Framework How Organizational Accidents Occur

and How to Investigate Basis for Conducting CFAs

Investigations

Integrated organizational concepts of high reliability with proven science-based safety to produce a practical guide to become an HRO to protect U.S. interests.

HRO Guide

Authors: Hartley, Tolk, SwaimAvailable through GPOhttp://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/hro.jsp

Page 18: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Contains: Investigative Tools Step-by-Step Process Examples and Templates Method to Interpret Results and

Provide Feedback to HRO Outline for Consistency Criteria for Quality

Folded high reliability concepts with systematic root cause investigation techniques to unveil underlying organizational contributors to prevent significant events.

Causal Factors Analysis Handbook

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CAUSAL FACTORS ANALYSISAn Approach for Organizational Learning

Learn from Information Rich Events

Authors: Hartley, Swaim, CorcoranAvailable through GPOhttp://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/hro.jsp

Page 19: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Should Your Organization Be High Reliability ?Simply put, if your organization cannot recover from the consequences of a systems accident in your operations, then consider learning and applying the concepts and practical application of high reliability.

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Page 20: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

HROs Think and Act Differently

Take a science-based system approachMeasure gaps relative to science-based system

Explicitly account for peoplePeople are not the problem, but the solutionPeople provide safety, quality, security, science etc.Disciplining because of a human error won’t improve performance

Sustain behavior – account for organizational culture

Long-term, sustained performance improvement

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Work-as-imagined

Work-as-done

Artwork courtesy of Marshall Clemens of Idiagram. All rights reserved. [email protected]

Page 21: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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What Can You Expect Out of the HRO Journey?

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Focus on the “Important”Decreases the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-doneHelps everyone understand their role in the bigger system

Increased Value to Customers and Regulators

Increased Employee Involvement & Buy-inPositive Atmosphere Where Employees Report Errors

EmpowermentFramework to understand

Ability to challenge

Responsibility to engage

Page 22: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

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Pantex’s HRO Journey2006 – DEVELOPED FOUNDATION

Human Performance Improvement

2007 – EXPLORED HRO & CFA CONCEPTSSenior Managers initiated HRO journeyDeveloped a new Causal Factors Analysis (CFA) Investigation Process

2008 – TESTED HRO & CFA CONCEPTSPublished HRO and CFA TextsDeveloped Training

2009 – BEGAN HRO DEPLOYMENT

2010 – DEVELOPED TOOLS TO EXPLORE HRO2011 – PLANT-WIDE DEPLOYMENT OF HRO TOOLS

HRO Ambassadors System Mapping

Page 23: High Reliability Organization A Practical Approach This presentation was produced under contract number DE-AC04-00AL66620 with Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D.,

Want to learn more?

Richard S. Hartley, Ph.D., P.E.Principal [email protected]&W PantexP.O. Box 30020Amarillo, TX 79120-0020Bld 12-6, Rm 126