Triarchic theory of intelligenceFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Human intelligence

Abilities, traits and constructs

Abstract thought

Communication

Creativity

Emotional intelligence

g factor

Intelligence quotient

Knowledge

Learning

Memory

Problem solving

Reaction time

Reasoning

Understanding

Visual processing

Models and theories

Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory

Fluid and crystallized intelligence

Theory of multiple intelligences

Three stratum theory

Triarchic theory of intelligence

PASS theory of intelligence

Fields of study

Cognitive epidemiology

Evolution of human intelligence

Psychometrics

Heritability of IQ

Impact of health on intelligence

Environment and intelligence

Neuroscience and intelligence

Race and intelligence

Religiosity and intelligence

V

T

E

The triarchic theory of intelligence was formulated by Robert J. Sternberg, a prominent figure in the

research of human intelligence. The theory by itself was groundbreaking in that it was among the first to go

against the psychometric approach to intelligence and take a more cognitive approach.

Sternberg’s definition of human intelligence is “(a) mental activity directed toward

purposiveadaptation to, selection and shaping of, real-world environments relevant to one’s life” (Sternberg,

1985, p. 45), which means that intelligence is how well an individual deals with environmental changes

throughout their lifespan. Sternberg’s theory comprises three parts: componential, experiential, and

practical.

Contents

  [hide] 

1   Different components of information processing

o 1.1   Componential / Analytical Subtheory

o 1.2   Experiential / Creative Subtheory

o 1.3   Practical / Contextual Subtheory

2   Challenges

3   See also

4   References

5   Bibliography

Different components of information processing[edit]

Schematic illustrating one trial of each stimulus pool in the Sternberg task: letter, word, object, spatial, grating.

Sternberg associated the workings of the mind with a series of components. These components he labeled

the metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components (Sternberg, 1985).

The metacomponents are executive processes used in problem solving and decision makingthat involve the

majority of managing our mind. They tell the mind how to act. Metacomponents are also sometimes referred

to as a homunculus. A homunculus is a fictitious or metaphorical "person" inside our head that controls our

actions, and which is often seen to invite an infinite regress of homunculi controlling each other (Sternberg,

1985).

Sternberg’s next set of components, performance components, are the processes that actually carry out the

actions the metacomponents dictate. These are the basic processes that allow us to do tasks, such as

perceiving problems in our long-term memory, perceiving relations between objects, and applying relations

to another set of terms (Sternberg, 1997).

The last set of components, knowledge-acquisition components, are used in obtaining new information.

These components complete tasks that involve selectively choosing information from irrelevant information.

These components can also be used to selectively combine the various pieces of information they have

gathered. Gifted individuals are proficient in using these components because they are able to learn new

information at a greater rate (Sternberg, 1997).

Whereas Sternberg explains that the basic information processing components underlying the three parts of

his triarchic theory are the same, different contexts and different tasks require different kind of intelligence

(Sternberg, 2001).

Componential / Analytical Subtheory[edit]

Sternberg associated the componential subtheory with analytical giftedness. This is one of three types of

giftedness that Sternberg recognizes. Analytical giftedness is influential in being able to take apart problems

and being able to see solutions not often seen. Unfortunately, individuals with only this type are not as

adept at creating unique ideas of their own. This form of giftedness is the type that is tested most often

(Sternberg, 1997).

Experiential / Creative Subtheory[edit]

Sternberg’s 2nd stage of his theory is his experiential subtheory. This stage deals mainly with how well a

task is performed with regard to how familiar it is. Sternberg splits the role of experience into two parts:

novelty and automation.

A novel situation is one that you have never experienced before. People that are adept at managing a novel

situation can take the task and find new ways of solving it that the majority of people would not notice

(Sternberg, 1997).

A process that has been automated has been performed multiple times and can now be done with little or

no extra thought. Once a process is automatized, it can be run in parallel with the same or other processes.

The problem with novelty and automation is that being skilled in one component does not ensure that you

are skilled in the other (Sternberg, 1997).

The experiential subtheory also correlates with another one of Sternberg’s proposed types of giftedness.

Synthetic giftedness is seen increativity, intuition, and a study of the arts. People with synthetic giftedness

are not often seen with the highest IQ’s because there are not currently any tests that can sufficiently

measure these attributes, but synthetic giftedness is especially useful in creating new ideas to create and

solve new problems. Sternberg also associated another one of his students, “Barbara”, to the synthetic

giftedness. Barbara did not perform as well as Alice on the tests taken to get into school, but was

recommended to Yale University based on her exceptional creative and intuitive skills. Barbara was later

very valuable in creating new ideas for research (Sternberg, 1997).

Practical / Contextual Subtheory[edit]

Sternberg’s third subtheory of intelligence, called practical or contextual, “deals with the mental activity

involved in attaining fit tocontext” (Sternberg, 1985, p. 45). Through the three processes of adaptation,

shaping, and selection, individuals create an ideal fit between themselves and their environment. This type

of intelligence is often referred to as "street smarts."

Adaptation occurs when one makes a change within oneself in order to better adjust to one’s surroundings

(Sternberg, 1985). For example, when the weather changes and temperatures drop, people adapt by

wearing extra layers of clothing to remain warm.

Shaping occurs when one changes their environment to better suit one’s needs (Sternberg, 1985).

A teacher may invoke the new rule of raising hands to speak to ensure that the lesson is taught with least

possible disruption.

The process of selection is undertaken when a completely new alternate environment is found to replace

the previous, unsatisfying environment to meet the individual’s goals (Sternberg, 1985). For instance,

immigrants leave their lives in their homeland countries where they endure economical and social hardships

and go to other countries in search of a better and less strained life.

The effectiveness with which an individual fits to his or her environment and contends with daily situations

reflects degree of intelligence. Sternberg’s third type of giftedness, called practical giftedness, involves the

ability to apply synthetic and analytic skills to everyday situations. Practically gifted people are superb in

their ability to succeed in any setting (Sternberg, 1997). An example of this type of giftedness is "Celia".

Celia did not have outstanding analytical or synthetic abilities, but she “was highly successful in figuring out

what she needed to do in order to succeed in an academic environment. She knew what kind of research

was valued, how to get articles into journals, how to impress people at job interviews, and the like”

(Sternberg, 1997, p. 44). Celia’s contextual intelligence allowed her to use these skills to her best

advantage.

Sternberg also acknowledges that an individual is not restricted to having excellence in only one of these

three intelligences. Many people may possess an integration of all three and have high levels of all three

intelligences.

Practical Intelligence is also a topic covered by Malcolm Gladwell in his book "Outliers: The story of

success" [1]

Challenges[edit]

Psychologist Linda Gottfredson (Gottfredson, 2003) criticises the unempirical nature of triarchic theory and

argues that it is absurd to assert that traditional Intelligence tests are not measuring practical intelligence

when they show a moderate correlation with income, especially at middle age when individuals have had a

chance to reach their maximum career potential, an even higher correlation with occupational prestige, and

that IQ tests even predict the ability to stay out of jail and stay alive (all of which qualifies as practical

intelligence or "street smarts").[2][3]

Gottfredson claims that what Sternberg calls practical intelligence is not a broad aspect of cognition at all

but simply a specific set of skills people learn to cope with a specific environment (task specific knowledge).

There is evidence to suggest that certain aspects of creativity (i.e. Divergent thinking) are separable from

analytical intelligence, and are better accounted for by the cognitive process of executive functioning.[4] More specifically, task-switching and interference management are suggested to play an important role in

divergent thinking. A more recent meta-Analysis found only small correlations between IQ and creativity

(Kim, 2005).

J. P. GuilfordFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.(June 2007)

Joy Paul Guilford (March 7, 1897, Marquette, Nebraska – November 26, 1987, Los Angeles) was a United

States psychologist, best remembered for his psychometric study of human intelligence, including the

distinction between convergent and divergent production.

Developing the views of L. L. Thurstone, Guilford rejected Charles Spearman's view that intelligence could

be characterized in a single numerical parameter and proposed that three dimensions were necessary for

accurate description: operations, content and products.

Contents

  [hide] 

1   Guilford's career

2   Guilford's Structure of Intellect

o 2.1   Operations dimension

o 2.2   Content dimension

o 2.3   Product dimension

3   Criticism

4   Selected bibliography

5   Notes

6   References

7   See also

8   External links

Guilford's career[edit]

Guilford graduated from the University of Nebraska before studying under Edward Titchener at Cornell. In

1938 Guilford became the 3rd President of the Psychometric Society, following in the footsteps of its

founder Louis Leon Thurstone and of EL Thorndike who held the position in 1937. Guilford held a number of

posts at Nebraska and briefly at the University of Southern California. In 1941 he entered the U.S. Army as

a Lieutenant Colonel and served as Director of Psychological Research Unit No. 3 at Santa Ana Army Air

Base. There he worked on the selection and ranking of aircrew trainees as the Army Air Force investigated

why a sizable proportion of trainees was not graduating.

Promoted to Chief of the Psychological Research Unit at the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Command

Headquarters in Fort Worth, Guilford oversaw the Stanine (Standard Nine) Project in 1943, which identified

nine specific intellectual abilities crucial to flying a plane. (Stanines, now a common term in educational

psychology, was coined during Guilford's project). Over the course of World War II, Guilford's use of these

factors in the development of the 2-day Classification Test Battery was significant in increasing graduation

rates for aircrew trainees.

Discharged as a full colonel after the war, Guilford joined the Education faculty at the University of Southern

California and continued to research the factors of intelligence. He published widely on what he ultimately

named the Structure of Intellect theory, and his post-War research identified a total of 90 discrete

intellectual abilities and 30 behavioral abilities.

Guilford's 20 years of research at Southern California were funded by the National Science Foundation, the

Office of Education of the former Health, Education and Welfare Department, and the Office of Naval

Research. Although Guilford's subjects were recruits at the Air Force Training Command at Randolph Air

Force Base, San Antonio, the Office of Naval Research managed this research.

Guilford's post-war research led to the development of classification testing that, modified in different ways,

entered into the various personnel assessments administered by all branches of the U.S. Armed Services.

Thus, in a generic manner, all U.S. Military qualifying exams of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s may be said to

have descended from Guilford's research.

Guilford's Structure of Intellect[edit]

According to Guilford's Structure of Intellect (SI) theory (1955), an individual's performance on intelligence

tests can be traced back to the underlying mental abilities or factors of intelligence. SI theory comprises up

to 150 different intellectual abilities organized along three dimensions—Operations, Content, and Products.

The Structure of Intellect theory advanced by Guilford was applied by Mary N. Meeker for educational

purposes.

Operations dimension[edit]

SI includes six operations or general intellectual processes:

1. Cognition - The ability to understand, comprehend, discover, and become aware of information.

2. Memory recording - The ability to encode information.

3. Memory retention - The ability to recall information.

4. Divergent production - The ability to generate multiple solutions to a problem; creativity.

5. Convergent production - The ability to deduce a single solution to a problem; rule-following or

problem-solving.

6. Evaluation - The ability to judge whether or not information is accurate, consistent, or valid.

Content dimension[edit]

SI includes four broad areas of information to which the human intellect applies the six operations:

1. Figural - Concrete, real world information, tangible objects -- things in the environment. It includes

visual: information perceived through seeing; auditory: information perceived through hearing; and

kinesthetic: information perceived through one's own physical actions.

2. Symbolic - Information perceived as symbols or signs that stand for something else, e.g., Arabic

numerals, the letters of an alphabet, or musical and scientific notations.

3. Semantic - Concerned with verbal meaning and ideas. Generally considered to be abstract in

nature.

4. Behavioral - Information perceived as acts of people. (This dimension was not fully researched in

Guilford's project, remains theoretical, and is generally not included in the final model that he

proposed for describing human intelligence.)

Product dimension[edit]

As the name suggests, this dimension contains results of applying particular operations to specific contents.

The SI model includes six products, in increasing complexity:

1. Units - Single items of knowledge.

2. Classes - Sets of units sharing common attributes.

3. Relations - Units linked as opposites or in associations, sequences, or analogies.

4. Systems - Multiple relations interrelated to comprise structures or networks.

5. Transformations - Changes, perspectives, conversions, or mutations to knowledge.

6. Implications - Predictions, inferences, consequences, or anticipations of knowledge.

Therefore, according to Guilford there are 5 x 3 x 6 = 90 intellectual abilities or factors (his research only

confirmed about three behavioral abilities, so it is generally not included in the model). Each ability stands

for a particular operation in a particular content area and results in a specific product, such as

Comprehension of Figural Units or Evaluation of Semantic Implications.

Guilford's original model was composed of 120 components (when the behavioral component is included)

because he had not separated Figural Content into separate Auditory and Visual contents, nor had he

separated Memory into Memory Recording and Memory Retention. When he separated Figural into

Auditory and Visual contents, his model increased to 5 x 5 x 6 = 150 categories. When Guilford separated

the Memory functions, his model finally increased to 180 factors.[1]

Criticism[edit]

Various researchers have criticized the statistical techniques used by Guilford. According to Jensen (1998),

Guilford's contention that ag-factor was untenable was influenced by his observation that cognitive tests of

U.S. Air Force personnel did not show correlations significantly different from zero. According to one

reanalysis, this resulted from artifacts and methodological errors. Applying more robust methodologies, the

correlations in Guilford's data sets are positive.[2] In another reanalysis, randomly generated models were

found to be as well supported as Guilford's own theory.[3]

Guilford's Structure of Intellect model of human abilities has few supporters today. Carroll (1993)

summarized the view of later researchers:[4]

"Guilford's SOI model must, therefore, be marked down as a somewhat eccentric aberration in the

history of intelligence models; that so much attention has been paid to it is disturbing, to the extent

that textbooks and other treatments of it have given the impression that the model is valid and

widely accepted, when clearly it is not."

Theory of multiple intelligencesFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Multiple intelligence)

This article is about Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences. For other uses, see Intelligence.Human intelligence

Abilities, traits and constructs

Abstract thought

Communication

Creativity

Emotional intelligence

g   factor

Intelligence quotient

Knowledge

Learning

Memory

Problem solving

Reaction time

Reasoning

Understanding

Visual processing

Models and theories

Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory

Fluid and crystallized intelligence

Theory of multiple intelligences

Three stratum theory

Triarchic theory of intelligence

PASS theory of intelligence

Fields of study

Cognitive epidemiology

Evolution of human intelligence

Psychometrics

Heritability of IQ

Impact of health on intelligence

Environment and intelligence

Neuroscience and intelligence

Race and intelligence

Religiosity and intelligence

V

T

E

The theory of multiple intelligences is a model of intelligence that differentiates it into specific (primarily

sensory) "modalities", rather than seeing intelligence as dominated by a single general ability. This model

was proposed by Howard Gardner in his 1983 book Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences.

Gardner articulated seven criteria for a behavior to be considered an intelligence.[1] These were that the

intelligences showed: potential for brain isolation by brain damage, place in evolutionary history, presence

of core operations, susceptibility to encoding (symbolic expression), a distinct developmental progression,

the existence of savants, prodigies and other exceptional people, and support from experimental

psychology and psychometricfindings.

Gardner chose eight abilities that he held to meet these criteria:[2] musical–rhythmic, visual–spatial, verbal–

linguistic, logical–mathematical, bodily–kinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and naturalistic. He later

suggested that existential and moral intelligence may also be worthy of inclusion.[3] Although the distinction

between intelligences has been set out in great detail, Gardner opposes the idea of labelling learners to a

specific intelligence. Each individual possesses a unique blend of all the intelligences. Gardner firmly

maintains that his theory of multiple intelligences should "empower learners", not restrict them to one

modality of learning.

Gardner argues intelligence is categorized into three primary or overarching categories, those of which are

formulated by the abilities. According to Gardner, intelligence is: 1) The ability to create an effective product

or offer a service that is valued in a culture, 2) a set of skills that make it possible for a person to solve

problems in life, and 3) the potential for finding or creating solutions for problems, which involves gathering

new knowledge.[4]

[5]

Contents

  [hide] 

1   The different abilities

o 1.1   Musical–rhythmic & harmonic

o 1.2   Visual–spatial

o 1.3   Verbal–linguistic

o 1.4   Logical–mathematical

o 1.5   Bodily–kinesthetic

o 1.6   Interpersonal

o 1.7   Intrapersonal

o 1.8   Naturalistic

o 1.9   Existential

2   Critical reception

o 2.1   Definition of intelligence

o 2.2   Neo-Piagetian criticism

o 2.3   IQ tests

o 2.4   Lack of empirical evidence

3   Use in education

4   See also

5   References

6   Further reading

The different abilities[edit]

Musical–rhythmic & harmonic[edit]

Main article: Musicality

This area has to do with sensitivity to sounds, rhythms, tones, and music. People with a high musical

intelligence normally have good pitch and may even have absolute pitch, and are able to sing, play musical

instruments, and compose music. Since there is a strong auditory component to this intelligence, those who

are strongest in it may learn best via lecture. They will sometimes use songs or rhythms to learn. They have

sensitivity to rhythm, pitch, meter, tone, melody or timbre.[6][7]

Visual–spatial[edit]

Main article: Spatial intelligence (psychology)

This area deals with spatial judgment and the ability to visualize with the mind's eye. Spatial ability is one of

the three factors beneath gin the hierarchical model of intelligence.[7]

Verbal–linguistic[edit]

Main article: Linguistic intelligence

People with high verbal-linguistic intelligence display a facility with words and languages. They are typically

good at reading, writing, telling stories and memorizing words along with dates.[7] Verbal ability is one of the

most g-loaded abilities.[8] This type of intelligence is measured with the Verbal IQ in WAIS-III.

Logical–mathematical[edit]

Further information: Reason

This area has to do with logic, abstractions, reasoning, numbers and critical thinking.[7] This also has to do

with having the capacity to understand the underlying principles of some kind of causal system.[6] Logical

reasoning is closely linked to fluid intelligence and togeneral intelligence ( g   factor) .[9]

Bodily–kinesthetic[edit]

Further information: Gross motor skill and Fine motor skill

The core elements of the bodily-kinesthetic intelligence are control of one's bodily motions and the capacity

to handle objects skillfully.[7] Gardner elaborates to say that this also includes a sense of timing, a clear

sense of the goal of a physical action, along with the ability to train responses.

People who have bodily-kinesthetic intelligence should learn better by involving muscular movement (e.g.

getting up and moving around into the learning experience), and be generally good at physical activities

such as sports, dance, acting, and making things.

Gardner believes that careers that suit those with this intelligence

include: athletes, dancers, musicians, actors, builders, police officers, and soldiers. Although these careers

can be duplicated through virtual simulation, they will not produce the actual physical learning that is

needed in this intelligence.[10]

Interpersonal[edit]

Main article: Social skills

This area has to do with interaction with others.[7] In theory, individuals who have high interpersonal

intelligence are characterized by their sensitivity to others' moods, feelings, temperaments and motivations,

and their ability to cooperate in order to work as part of a group. According to Gardner in How Are Kids

Smart: Multiple Intelligences in the Classroom, "Inter- and Intra- personal intelligence is often

misunderstood with being extroverted or liking other people..."[11] Those with this intelligence communicate

effectively and empathize easily with others, and may be either leaders or followers. They typically learn

best by working with others and often enjoy discussion and debate.

Gardner believes that careers that suit those with this intelligence include sales

persons, politicians, managers, teachers, counselorsand social workers.[12]

Intrapersonal[edit]

Further information: Introspection

This area has to do with introspective and self-reflective capacities. This refers to having a deep

understanding of the self; what one's strengths/ weaknesses are, what makes one unique, being able to

predict one's own reactions/emotions.

Naturalistic[edit]

This area has to do with nurturing and relating information to one’s natural surroundings.[7] Examples

include classifying natural forms such as animal and plant species and rocks and mountain types. This

ability was clearly of value in our evolutionary past as hunters, gatherers, and farmers; it continues to be

central in such roles as botanist or chef.[6] This sort of ecological receptiveness is deeply rooted in a

"sensitive, ethical, and holistic understanding" of the world and its complexities–including the role of

humanity within the greater ecosphere.[13]

Existential[edit]

Further information: Spirituality

Some proponents of multiple intelligence theory proposed spiritual or religious intelligence as a possible

additional type. Gardner did not want to commit to a spiritual intelligence, but suggested that an "existential"

intelligence may be a useful construct.[14] The hypothesis of an existential intelligence has been further

explored by educational researchers.[15]

Critical reception[edit]

Gardner argues that there is a wide range of cognitive abilities, but that there are only very weak

correlations among them. For example, the theory postulates that a child who learns to multiply easily is not

necessarily more intelligent than a child who has more difficulty on this task. The child who takes more time

to master multiplication may best learn to multiply through a different approach, may excel in a field outside

mathematics, or may be looking at and understanding the multiplication process at a fundamentally deeper

level. Such a fundamental understanding can result in slowness and can hide a mathematical intelligence

potentially higher than that of a child who quickly memorizes the multiplication table despite possessing a

shallower understanding of the process of multiplication. [citation needed].

Intelligence tests and psychometrics have generally found high correlations between different aspects of

intelligence, rather than the low correlations which Gardner's theory predicts, supporting the prevailing

theory of general intelligence rather than multiple intelligences (MI). The theory has been widely criticized

by mainstream psychology for its lack of empirical evidence, and its dependence on subjective

judgement [citation needed]. Certain models of alternative education employ the approaches suggested by the

theory [citation needed].

Definition of intelligence[edit]

One major criticism of the theory is that it is ad hoc: that Gardner is not expanding the definition of the word

"intelligence", but rather denies the existence of intelligence as traditionally understood, and instead uses

the word "intelligence" where other people have traditionally used words like "ability" and "aptitude". This

practice has been criticized by Robert J. Sternberg,[16][17] Eysenck,[18] and Scarr.[19] White (2006) points out

that Gardner's selection and application of criteria for his "intelligences" is subjective and arbitrary, and that

a different researcher would likely have come up with different criteria.[20]

Defenders of MI theory argue that the traditional definition of intelligence is too narrow, and thus a broader

definition more accurately reflects the differing ways in which humans think and learn. [21] They would state

that the traditional interpretation of intelligence collapses under the weight of its own logic and definition,

noting that intelligence is usually defined as the cognitive or mental capacity of an individual, which by

logical necessity would include all forms of mental qualities, not just the ones most transparent to I.Q. tests.[citation needed]

Some criticisms arise from the fact that Gardner has not provided a test of his multiple intelligences. He

originally defined it as the ability to solve problems that have value in at least one culture, or as something

that a student is interested in. He then added adisclaimer that he has no fixed definition, and his

classification is more of an artistic judgment than fact:

Ultimately, it would certainly be desirable to have an algorithm for the selection of an intelligence, such that

any trained researcher could determine whether a candidate's intelligence met the appropriate criteria. At

present, however, it must be admitted that the selection (or rejection) of a candidate's intelligence is

reminiscent more of an artistic judgment than of a scientific assessment.[22]

Gardner argues that by calling linguistic and logical-mathematical abilities intelligences, but not artistic,

musical, athletic, etc. abilities, the former are needlessly aggrandized. Certain critics balk at this widening of

the definition, saying that it ignores "the connotation of intelligence ... [which] has always connoted the kind

of thinking skills that makes one successful in school."[23]

Gardner writes "I balk at the unwarranted assumption that certain human abilities can be arbitrarily singled

out as intelligence while others cannot."[24] Critics hold that given this statement, any interest or ability can

be redefined as "intelligence". Thus, studying intelligence becomes difficult, because it diffuses into the

broader concept of ability or talent. Gardner's addition of the naturalistic intelligence and conceptions of the

existential and moral intelligences are seen as fruits of this diffusion. Defenders of the MI theory would

argue that this is simply a recognition of the broad scope of inherent mental abilities, and that such an

exhaustive scope by nature defies a one-dimensional classification such as an IQ value.

The theory and definitions have been critiqued by Perry D. Klein as being so unclear as to

be tautologous and thus unfalsifiable. Having a high musical ability means being good at music while at the

same time being good at music is explained by having a high musical ability.[25]

Neo-Piagetian criticism[edit]

Andreas Demetriou suggests that theories which overemphasize the autonomy of the domains are as

simplistic as the theories that overemphasize the role of general intelligence and ignore the domains. He

agrees with Gardner that there are indeed domains of intelligence that are relevantly autonomous of each

other.[26] Some of the domains, such as verbal, spatial, mathematical, and social intelligence are identified

by most lines of research in psychology. In Demetriou's theory, one of the neo-Piagetian theories of

cognitive development, Gardner is criticized for underestimating the effects exerted on the various domains

of intelligences by processes that define general processing efficiency, such as speed of

processing, executive functions, working memory, and meta-cognitive processesunderlying self-

awareness and self-regulation. All of these processes are integral components of general intelligence that

regulate the functioning and development of different domains of intelligence. [27]

The domains are to a large extent expressions of the condition of the general processes, and may vary

because of their constitutional differences but also differences in individual preferences and inclinations.

Their functioning both channels and influences the operation of the general processes. [28][29] Thus, one

cannot satisfactorily specify the intelligence of an individual or design effective intervention programs unless

both the general processes and the domains of interest are evaluated.[30][31]

IQ tests[edit]

Gardner argues that IQ tests only measure linguistic and logical-mathematical abilities. He argues the

importance of assessing in an "intelligence-fair" manner. While traditional paper-and-pen examinations

favour linguistic and logical skills, there is a need for intelligence-fair measures that value the distinct

modalities of thinking and learning that uniquely define each intelligence.[7]

Psychologist Alan S. Kaufman points out that IQ tests have measured spatial abilities for 70 years.[32] Modern IQ tests are greatly influenced by the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory which incorporates a general

intelligence but also many more narrow abilities. While IQ tests do give an overall IQ score, they now also

give scores for many more narrow abilities.[32]

Lack of empirical evidence[edit]

According to a 2006 study many of Gardner's "intelligences" correlate with the g   factor , supporting the idea

of a single dominant type of intelligence. According to the study, each of the domains proposed by Gardner

involved a blend of g, of cognitive abilities other than g, and, in some cases, of non-cognitive abilities or of

personality characteristics.[33]

Linda Gottfredson (2006) has argued that thousands of studies support the importance of intelligence

quotient (IQ) in predicting school and job performance, and numerous other life outcomes. In contrast,

empirical support for non-g intelligences is lacking or very poor. She argued that despite this the ideas of

multiple non-g intelligences are very attractive to many due to the suggestion that everyone can be smart in

some way.[34]

A critical review of MI theory argues that there is little empirical evidence to support it:

To date there have been no published studies that offer evidence of the validity of the multiple intelligences.

In 1994 Sternberg reported finding no empirical studies. In 2000 Allix reported finding

no empirical validating studies, and at that time Gardner and Connell conceded that there was "little hard

evidence for MI theory" (2000, p. 292). In 2004 Sternberg and Grigerenko stated that there were no

validating studies for multiple intelligences, and in 2004 Gardner asserted that he would be "delighted were

such evidence to accrue",[35] and admitted that "MI theory has few enthusiasts among psychometricians or

others of a traditional psychological background" because they require "psychometric or experimental

evidence that allows one to prove the existence of the several intelligences."[35][36]

The same review presents evidence to demonstrate that cognitive neuroscience research does not support

the theory of multiple intelligences:

... the human brain is unlikely to function via Gardner’s multiple intelligences. Taken together the evidence

for the intercorrelations of subskills of IQ measures, the evidence for a shared set of genes associated with

mathematics, reading, and g, and the evidence for shared and overlapping "what is it?" and "where is it?"

neural processing pathways, and shared neural pathways for language, music, motor skills, and emotions

suggest that it is unlikely that each of Gardner’s intelligences could operate "via a different set of neural

mechanisms" (1999, p. 99). Equally important, the evidence for the "what is it?" and "where is it?"

processing pathways, for Kahneman’s two decision-making systems, and for adapted cognition modules

suggests that these cognitive brain specializations have evolved to address very specific problems in our

environment. Because Gardner claimed that the intelligences are innate potentialities related to a general

content area, MI theory lacks a rationale for the phylogenetic emergence of the intelligences.[36]

The theory of multiple intelligences has been conflated with learning styles and cited as an example

of pseudoscience because it lacks empirical evidence or falsifiability.[37][38]

Use in education[edit]

Gardner defines an intelligence as "biopsychological potential to process information that can be activated

in a cultural setting to solve problems or create products that are of value in a culture."[39] According to

Gardner, there are more ways to do this than just through logical and linguistic intelligence. Gardner

believes that the purpose of schooling "should be to develop intelligences and to help people reach

vocational and avocational goals that are appropriate to their particular spectrum of intelligences. People

who are helped to do so, [he] believe[s], feel more engaged and competent and therefore more inclined to

serve society in a constructive way."[a]

Gardner contends that IQ tests focus mostly on logical and linguistic intelligence. Upon doing well on these

tests, the chances of attending a prestigious college or university increase, which in turn creates

contributing members of society.[40] While many students function well in this environment, there are those

who do not. According to Helding (2009), "Standard IQ tests measure knowledge gained at a particular

moment in time, they can only provide a freeze-frame view of crystallized knowledge. They cannot assess

or predict a person’s ability to learn, to assimilate new information, or to solve new problems."[41] Gardner's

theory argues that students will be better served by a broader vision of education, wherein teachers use

different methodologies, exercises and activities to reach all students, not just those who excel at linguistic

and logical intelligence. It challenges educators to find "ways that will work for this student learning this

topic".[42]

James Traub's article in The New Republic notes that Gardner's system has not been accepted by most

academics in intelligence or teaching.[43] Gardner states that "while Multiple Intelligences theory is consistent

with much empirical evidence, it has not been subjected to strong experimental tests ... Within the area of

education, the applications of the theory are currently being examined in many projects. Our hunches will

have to be revised many times in light of actual classroom experience."[44]

George Miller, a prominent cognitive psychologist, wrote in The New York Times Book Review that

Gardner's argument consisted of "hunch and opinion". Jerome Bruner called Gardner’s "intelligences" "at

best useful fictions," and Charles Murray and Richard J. Herrnstein in The Bell Curve (1994) called

Gardner's theory "uniquely devoid of psychometric or other quantitative evidence."[45]

Thomas Armstrong argues that Waldorf education engages all of Gardner's original seven intelligences.[b] In

spite of its lack of general acceptance in the psychological community, Gardner's theory has been adopted

by many schools, where it is often used to underpin discussion about learning styles,[46] and hundreds of

books have been written about its applications in education.[47] Gardner himself has said he is "uneasy" with

the way his theory has been used in education.[48] The No Child Left Behind test legislation in the United

States does not encompass the multiple intelligences framework in the exams' design or implementation. [49]

See also[edit]

Neuroscience

Neuroeducation

Learning styles

Life skills

Soft skills

Williams' Taxonomy

References[edit]

Notes

1. Jump up ̂  This information is based on an informal talk given on the 350th anniversary of Harvard University on 5

September 1986. Harvard Education Review, Harvard Education Publishing Group, 1987, 57, 187–93.

2. Jump up ̂  "Waldorf education embodies in a truly organic sense all of Howard Gardner's seven intelligences ...

not simply an amalgam of the seven intelligences. Many schools are currently attempting to construct curricula based on

Gardner's model simply through an additive process (what can we add to what we have already got?). Steiner's approach,

however, was to begin with an inner vision of the child and the child's needs and build a curriculum around that vision."

Thomas Armstrong, cited in Eric Oddleifson, Boston Public Schools As Arts-Integrated Learning Organizations: Developing a

High Standard of Culture for All

Citations

Association of IdeasFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. No cleanup reason has been specified. Please help improve this article if you can. (December 2008)

 This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed.

(1911). Encyclopædia Britannica(11th ed.). Cambridge University Press

Association of Ideas, or Mental association, is a term used in the history of philosophy and

of psychology to refer to explanations about the conditions under which representations arise

in consciousness, and also for a principle put forward by an important historical school of thinkers to

account generally for the succession of mental phenomena. One idea was thought to follow another in

consciousness if it were associated by some principle. The three commonly asserted principles of

association were similarity, contiguity, and contrast, numerous others had been added by the nineteenth

century. By the end of the nineteenth centuryphysiological psychology was so altering the approach to this

subject that much of the older associationist theory was rejected.

Everyday observation of the association of one idea or memory with another gives a face validity to the

notion. In addition, the notion of association between ideas and behavior gave some early impetus

to behaviorist thinking. The core ideas of associationist thinking recur in some recent thought on cognition,

especially consciousness.

Contents

  [hide] 

1   Early theory

2   The Associationist School

o 2.1   David Hartley

o 2.2   Contemporary reception

o 2.3   French and German associationists and Kant

o 2.4   Differences among versions of associationist thought

o 2.5   Inseparable association

3   Criticism in the 19th century

4   Psychophysical researches

5   See also

6   References

7   Bibliography

8   External links

Early theory[edit]

The associationist theory is anticipated in Plato's Phaedo, as part of the doctrine of anamnesis. The idea of

Simmias is recalled by the picture of Simmias (similarity) and that of a friend by the sight of the lyre on

which he played (contiguity). But Aristotle is credited with originating associationist thinking based on this

passage: "When, therefore, we accomplish an act of reminiscence, we pass through a certain series of

precursive movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one we are in quest of is habitually

consequent. Hence, too, it is that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating from the present or some

other, and from similar or contrary or coadjacent. Through this process reminiscence takes place. For the

movements are, in these cases, sometimes at the same time, sometimes parts of the same whole, so that

the subsequent movement is already more than half accomplished."[1] The passage is obscure, but it does

at all events indicate the various principles commonly termed contiguity, similarity, and contrast. Similar

principles are stated by Zeno the Stoic, by Epicurus (see Diogenes Laertius vii. § 52, x. § 32), and by

St Augustine of Hippo (Confessions, x. c. 19). Aristotle's doctrine received a more or less intelligent

expansion and illustration from the ancient commentators and the schoolmen, and in the still later period of

transition from the age of scholasticism to the more modern philosophy, prolonged in the works of some

writers far into the 17th century. William Hamilton adduced not a few philosophical authorities who gave

prominence to the general fact of mental association - the Spanish philosopher Ludovicus Vives (1492-

1540) especially being exhaustive in his account of memory.

In Thomas Hobbes's psychology much importance is assigned to what he called, variously, the succession,

sequence, series, consequence, coherence, train of imaginations or thoughts in mental discourse. But not

before Hume is there express question as to what are the distinct principles of association. John Locke had,

meanwhile, introduced the phrase "Association of Ideas" as the title of a supplementary chapter

incorporated with the fourth edition of his Essay, meaning it, however, only as the name of a principle

accounting for the mental peculiarities of individuals, with little or no suggestion of its general psychological

import. Of this last David Hume had the strongest impression; he reduced the principles of association to

three: Identity, Contiguity in time and place, Cause and (or) Effect. Dugald Stewart put forward

Resemblance, Contrariety, and Vicinity in time and place, though he added, as another obvious principle,

accidental coincidence in the sounds of words, and further noted three other cases of relation, namely,

Cause and Effect, Means and End, Premisses and Conclusion, as holding among the trains of thought

under circumstances of special attention. Thomas Reid, preceding Stewart, was rather disposed to make

light of the subject of association, vaguely remarking that it seems to require no other original quality of

mind but the power of habit to explain the spontaneous recurrence of trains of thinking, when become

familiar by frequent repetition (Intellectual Powers, p. 387).

Hamilton's own theory of mental reproduction, suggestion, or association is a development, greatly

modified, of the doctrine expounded in his Lectures on Metaphysics (vol. ii. p. 223, seq.), which reduced the

principles of association first to two, Simultaneity and Affinity, and these further to one supreme principle

of Redintegration or Totality. In the ultimate scheme he posits no less than four general laws of mental

succession concerned in reproduction:

(1) Associability or possible co-suggestion (all thoughts of the same mental subject are associable

or capable of suggesting each other);

(2) Repetition or direct remembrance (thoughts coidentical in a modification, but differing in time,

tend to suggest each other);

(3) Redintegration, direct remembrance or reminiscence (thoughts once coidentical in time, are,

however, different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which

they originally held);

(4) Preference (thoughts are suggested not merely by force of the general subjective relation

subsisting between themselves, they are also suggested in proportion to the relation of interest, from

whatever source, in which they stand to the individual mind).

Upon these follow, as special laws:

A - Primary - modes of the laws of Repetition and Redintegration:

(1) law of Similars (Analogy, Affinity);

(2) law of Contrast; and

(3) law of Coadjacency (Cause and Effect, etc.).

B - Secondary - modes of the law of Preference, under the law of Possibility:

(1) laws of Immediacy and Homogeneity and

(2) law of Facility.

The Associationist School[edit]

The "Associationist School" includes the English psychologists who aimed at explaining all mental

acquisitions and the more complex mental processes generally under laws under the associations which

their predecessors applied only to simple reproduction. Hamilton, though professing to deal with

reproduction only, formulates a number of still more general laws of mental succession: law of Succession,

law of Variation, law of Dependence, law of Relativity or Integration (involving law of Conditioned), and,

finally, law of Intrinsic or Objective Relativity. These he posits as the highest to which human consciousness

is subject, but it is in a sense quite different that the psychologists of the Associationist School intend their

appropriation of the principle or principles commonly signalized. In this regard, as far as can be judged from

imperfect records, they were anticipated to some extent by the experientialists of ancient times, both Stoic

and Epicurean (cf. Diogenes Laertius, as above).

In the modern period, Hobbes is the first thinker of permanent note to whom this doctrine may be traced.

Although he took a narrow view of the phenomena of mental succession, he (after dealing with trains of

imagination or "mental discourse") sought in the higher departments of intellect to explain reasoning as a

discourse in words, dependent upon an arbitrary system of marks, each associated with or standing for a

variety of imaginations. Except for a general assertion that reasoning is a reckoning (otherwise, a

compounding and resolving), he had no other account of knowledge to give. The whole emotional side of

mind ("the passions") he similarly resolved into an expectation of consequences based on past experience

of pleasures and pains of sense. Thus, though he made no serious attempt to justify his analysis in detail,

he is undoubtedly to be classed with the associationists of the next century. They, however, were wont to

trace their psychological theory no further back than to Locke's Essay. Bishop Berkeley was driven to posit

expressly a principle of suggestion or association in these terms:

"That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to go together,

without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or so much as knowing what it is that

makes them so to coexist." (New Theory of Vision, § 25)

and, to support the obvious application of the principle to the case of the sensations of sight and touch

before him, he constantly urged that association of sound and sense of language which the later school has

always put in the foreground, whether as illustrating the principle in general or in explanation of the supreme

importance of language for knowledge. It was natural, then, that Hume, coming after Berkeley and

assuming Berkeley's results (though he reverted to the larger inquiry of Locke), should be more explicit in

his reference to association. But Hume was original also, when he spoke of it as a "kind of attraction which

in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as

many and as various forms." (Human Nature, i. 1, § 4)

Other inquirers about the same time conceived of association with this breadth of view, and set themselves

to track, as psychologists, its effects in detail.

David Hartley[edit]

David Hartley is the thinker most precisely identified with the Associationist School. In his Observations on

Man, published in 1749 (11 years after Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature and one year after the better

known An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding), opened the path for all the investigations of like

nature that have been so characteristic of English psychology. A physician by profession, he sought to

combine with an elaborate theory of mental association a minutely detailed hypothesis as to the

corresponding action of the nervous system, based upon the suggestion of a vibratory motion within the

nerves thrown out by Isaac Newton in the last paragraph of the Principia. So far, however, from promoting

the acceptance of the psychological theory, this physical hypothesis proved to have rather the opposite

effect, and it began to be dropped by Hartley's followers (as Joseph Priestley, in his abridged edition of

theObservations, 1775) before it was seriously impugned from without. When it is studied in the original,

and not taken upon the report of hostile critics, who would not, or could not understand it, no little

importance must still be accorded to the first attempt, not seldom a curiously felicitous one, to carry through

that parallelism of the physical and psychical, which since then has come to count for more and more in the

science of mind. Nor should it be forgotten that Hartley himself, for all his paternal interest in the doctrine of

vibrations, was careful to keep separate from its fortunes the cause of his other doctrine of mental

association. Of this the point lay in no mere restatement, with new precision, of a principle of coherence

among "ideas" (which were also called by Hartley "vestiges", "types" and "images"), but in its being taken as

a clue by which to follow the progressive development of the mind's powers. Holding that mental states

could be scientifically understood only as they were analysed, Hartley sought for a principle of synthesis to

explain the complexity exhibited not only in trains of representative images, but alike in the most involved

combinations of reasonings and (as Berkeley had seen) in the apparently simple phenomena of objective

perception, as well as in the varied play of the emotions, or, again, in the manifold conscious adjustments of

the motor system. One principle appeared to him sufficient for all, running, as enunciated for the simplest

case, thus:

"Any sensations A, B, C, etc., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a

power over the corresponding ideas a, b, c, etc., that any one of the sensations A, when impressed alone,

shall be able to excite in the mind b, c, etc., the ideas of the rest."

To render the principle applicable in the cases where the associated elements are neither sensations nor

simple ideas of sensations, Hartley's first care was to determine the conditions under which states other

than these simplest ones have their rise in the mind, becoming the matter of ever higher and higher

combinations. The principle itself supplied the key to the difficulty, when coupled with the notion, already

implied in Berkeley's investigations, of a coalescence of simple ideas of sensation into one complex idea,

which may cease to bear any obvious relation to its constituents. So far from being content, like Hobbes, to

make a rough generalization to all mind from the phenomena of developed memory, as if these might be

straightway assumed, Hartley made a point of referring them, in a subordinate place of their own, to his

universal principle of mental synthesis. He expressly put forward the law of association, endued with such

scope, as supplying what was wanting to Locke's doctrine in its more strictly psychological aspect, and thus

marks by his work a distinct advance on the line of development of the experiential philosophy.

Contemporary reception[edit]

The new doctrine received warm support from some, as William Law and Priestley, who both, like Hume

and Hartley himself, took the principle of association as having the like import for the science of mind that

gravitation had acquired for the science of matter. The principle began also, if not always with direct

reference to Hartley, yet, doubtless, owing to his impressive advocacy of it, to be applied systematically in

special directions, as by Abraham Tucker (1768) to morals, and by Archibald Alison (1790)

to aesthetics. Thomas Brown (d. 1820) subjected anew to discussion the question of theory. Hardly less

unjust to Hartley than Reid or Stewart had been, and forward to proclaim all that was different in his own

position, Brown must yet be ranked with the associationists before and after him for the prominence he

assigned to the associative principle in sensory perception (what he called "external affections of mind"),

and for his reference of all other mental states ("internal affections") to the two generic capacities or

susceptibilities of Simple and Relative Suggestion. He preferred the word "suggestion" to "association",

which seemed to him to imply some prior connecting process, for which there was no evidence in many of

the most important cases of suggestion, nor even, strictly speaking, in the case of contiguity in time where

the term seemed least inapplicable. According to him, all that could be assumed was a general

constitutional tendency of the mind to exist successively in states that have certain relations to each other,

of itself only, and without any external cause or any influence previous to that operating at the moment of

the suggestion. Brown's chief contribution to the general doctrine of mental association, besides what he did

for the theory of perception, was, perhaps, his analysis of voluntary reminiscence and

constructiveimagination, faculties that appear at first sight to lie altogether beyond the explanatory range of

the principle. In James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829), the principle, much as

Hartley had conceived it, was carried out, with characteristic consequence, over the psychological field.

With a much enlarged and more varied conception of association, Alexander Bainreexecuted the general

psychological task, while Herbert Spencer revised the doctrine from the new point of view of the evolution

hypothesis. John Stuart Mill made only occasional excursions into the region of psychology proper, but

sought, in his System of Logic(1843), to determine the conditions of objective truth from the point of view of

the associationist theory, and, thus or otherwise being drawn into general philosophical discussion, spread

wider than any one before him its repute.

French and German associationists and Kant[edit]

The Associationist School has been composed chiefly of British thinkers, but in France also it has had

distinguished representatives. Of these it will suffice to mention Condillac, who professed to explain all

knowledge from the single principle of association (liaison) of ideas, operating through a previous

association with signs, verbal or other. In Germany, before the time of Immanuel Kant, mental association

was generally treated in the traditional manner, as by Christian Wolff.

Kant's inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, agreeing in its general purport with Locke's, however it

differed in its critical procedure, brought him face to face with the newer doctrine that had been grafted on

Locke's philosophy. To account for the fact of synthesis in cognition, in express opposition to

associationism, as represented by Hume, was, in truth, his prime object, starting, as he did, from the

assumption that there was in knowledge that which no mere association of experiences could explain.

To the extent, therefore, that his influence prevailed, all inquiries made by the English associationists were

discounted in Germany. Notwithstanding, under the very shadow of his authority a corresponding, if not

related, movement was initiated by Johann Friedrich Herbart. As peculiar and widely different from anything

conceived by the associationists as Herbart's metaphysical opinions were, he was at one with them and at

variance with Kant in assigning fundamental importance to the psychological investigation of the

development of consciousness. Further, his conception of the laws determining the interaction and flow of

mental presentations and representations, when taken in its bare psychological import, was essentially

similar to theirs. In Friedrich Eduard Beneke's psychology also and in more recent inquiries conducted

mainly by physiologists, mental association has been understood in its wider scope, as a general principle

of explanation.

Differences among versions of associationist thought[edit]

The associationists differ among themselves in the statement of their principle and, when they adduce

several principles, in their conception of the relative importance of these.

Hartley took account only of Contiguity, or the repetition of impressions synchronous or

immediately successive.

The same is true of James Mill, though, incidentally, he made an express attempt to resolve the

received principle of Similarity and, through this, the other principle of Contrast, into his fundamental

law (the law of Frequency, as he sometimes called it, because upon frequency, in conjunction with

vividness of impressions, the strength of association, in his view, depended).

In a sense of his own, Brown also, while accepting the common Aristotelian enumeration of

principles, inclined to the opinion that "all suggestion may be found to depend on prior coexistence, or

at least on such proximity as is itself very probably a modification of coexistence", provided account be

taken of

"the influence of emotions and other feelings that are very different from ideas, as when an

analogous object suggests an analogous object by the influence of an emotion which each

separately may have produced before, and which is, therefore, common to both".

To the contrary effect, Spencer maintained that the fundamental law of all mental association is

that presentations aggregate or cohere with their like in past experience, and that, besides this

law, there is in strictness no other, all further phenomena of association being incidental. Thus in

particular, he would have explained association by Contiguity as due to the circumstance of

imperfect assimilation of the present to the past in consciousness.

Alexander Bain regarded Contiguity and Similarity logically, as perfectly distinct principles, though

in actual psychological occurrence blending intimately with each other, contiguous trains being

started by a first (it may be, implicit) representation through Similarity, while the express

assimilation of present to past in consciousness is always, or tends to be, followed by the revival of

what was presented in contiguity with that past.

Inseparable association[edit]

The highest philosophical interest, as distinguished from that which is more strictly psychological,

attaches to the mode of mental association called Inseparable. The coalescence of mental states noted

by Hartley, as it had been assumed by Berkeley, was farther formulated by James Mill in these terms:

"Some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined that they cannot be

separated; if one exists, the other exists along with it in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin

them." (Analysis of the Human Mind, 2nd ed., vol. i, p. 93)

J. S. Mill's statement is more guarded and particular:

"When two phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not, in any single

instance, occurred separately either in experience or in thought, there is produced between them what

has been called inseparable, or, less correctly, indissoluble, association; by which is not meant that the

association must inevitably last to the end of life - that no subsequent experience or process of thought

can possibly avail to dissolve it; but only that as long as no such experience or process of thought has

taken place, the association is irresistible; it is impossible for us to think the one thing disjoined from the

other." (Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 2nd ed., p. 191)

It is chiefly by J. S. Mill that the philosophical application of the principle has been made. The first and

most obvious application is to so-called necessary truths, those that are not merely analytic judgments

but involve a synthesis of distinct notions. Again, the same thinker sought to prove Inseparable

Association the ground of belief in an external objective world. The former application, especially, is

facilitated, when the experience through which the association is supposed to be constituted is

understood as cumulative in the race, and transmissible as original endowment to individuals -

endowment that may be expressed either, subjectively, as latent intelligence or, objectively, as fixed

nervous connexions. Spencer, as suggested before, is the author of this extended view of mental

association.

Criticism in the 19th century[edit]

Of recent years the associationist theory has been subjected to searching criticism, and it has been

maintained by many writers that the laws are both unsatisfactorily expressed and insufficient to explain

the facts. Among the most vigorous and comprehensive of these investigations is that of F. H.

Bradley in his Principles of Logic (1883). Having admitted the psychological fact of mental association,

he attacks the theories of Mill and Bain primarily on the ground that they purport to give an account of

mental life as a whole, a metaphysical doctrine of existence. According to this doctrine, mental activity

is ultimately reducible to particular feelings, impressions, ideas, which are disparate and unconnected,

until chance Association brings them together. On this assumption, the laws of Association naturally

emerge in the following form:

The law of Contiguity

"Actions, sensations and states of feeling, occurring together or in close connexion, tend to grow

together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind,

the others are apt to be brought up in idea." (A. Bain, Senses and Intellect, p. 327)

The law of Similarity

"Present actions, sensation, thoughts or emotions tend to revive their like among previous

impressions or states." (A. Bain, Senses and Intellect, p. 457 - compare J. S. Mill, Logic, 9th ed., ii,

p. 440)

The fundamental objection to the law of Contiguity is that ideas and impressions, once

experienced, do not recur; they are particular existences, and, as such, do not persevere to

recur or be presented. So Mill is wrong in speaking of two impressions being "frequently

experienced." Bradley claims thus to reduce the law to

"When we have experienced (or even thought of) several pairs of impressions (simultaneous or

successive), which pairs are like one another; then whenever an idea occurs which is like all the

impressions on one side of these pairs, it tends to excite an idea which is like all the impressions

on the other side."

This statement is destructive of the title of the law, because it appears that what were

contiguous (the impressions) are not associated, and what are associated (the ideas)

were not contiguous; in other words, the association is not due to contiguity at all.

Proceeding to the law of Similarity (which in Mill's view is at the back of association by

contiguity), and having made a similar criticism of its phrasing, Bradley maintains that it

involves an even greater absurdity; if two ideas are to be recognized as similar, they must

both be present in the mind; if one is to call up the other, one must be absent. To the

obvious reply that the similarity is recognized ex post facto, and not while the former idea

is being called up, Bradley replies simply that such a view reduces the law to the mere

statement of a phenomenon and deprives it of any explanatory value, though he hardly

makes it clear in what sense this necessarily invalidates the law from a psychological

point of view. He further points out with greater force that in point of fact mere similarity is

not the basis of ordinary cases of mental reproduction, inasmuch as in any given instance

there is more difference than similarity between the ideas associated.

Bradley himself bases association on identity plus contiguity:

"Any part of a single state of mind tends, if reproduced, to re-instate the remainder."

or

"Any element tends to reproduce those elements with which it has formed one state of mind."

This law he calls by the name "redintegration", understood, of course, in a sense

different from that in which Hamilton used it. The radical difference between this

law and those of Mill and Bain is that it deals not with particular units of thoughts

but with universals or identity between individuals. In any example of such

reproduction, the universal appears in a particular form which is more or less

different from that in which it originally existed.

Psychophysical researches[edit]

F. H. Bradley's discussion deals with the subject purely from the metaphysical

side, and the total result practically is that association occurs only between

universals. From the point of view of empirical psychologists Bradley's results

are open to the charge which he made against those who impugned his view of

the law of similarity, namely that they are merely a statement - not in any real

sense an explanation. The relation between the mental and the physical

phenomena of association has occupied the attention of all the leading

psychologists (see Psychology). William James holds that association is of

"objects" not of "ideas," is between "things thought of" - so far as the word

stands for an effect. "So far as it stands for a cause it is between processes in

the brain." Dealing with the law of Contiguity he says that the "most natural way

of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result of the laws of habit in the nervous

system; in other words to ascribe it to a physiological cause." Association thus

results because when a nerve current has once passed by a given way, it will

pass more easily by that way in future; and this fact is a physical fact. He further

seeks to maintain the important deduction that the only primary or ultimate law

of association is that of neural habit.

The objections to the associationist theory are summed up by George F.

Stout (Analytic Psychol., vol. ii. pp. 47 seq.) under three heads. Of these the first

is that the theory as stated, e.g., by Alexander Bain, lays far too much stress on

the mere connexion of elements hitherto entirely separate; whereas, in fact,

every new mental state or synthesis consists in the development or modification

of a pre-existing state or psychic whole. Secondly, it is quite false to regard an

association as merely an aggregate of disparate units; in fact, the form of the

new idea is quite as important as the elements which it comprises. Thirdly, the

phraseology used by the associationists seems to assume that the parts that go

to form the whole retain their identity unimpaired; in fact, each part or element is

ipso facto modified by the very fact of its entering into such combination.

The experimental methods in vogue in the early part of the 20th century to a

large extent removed the discussion of the whole subject of association of ideas,

depending in the case of the older writers on introspection, into a new sphere. In

such a work as Edward B. Titchener's Experimental Psychology (1905),

association was treated as a branch of the study of mental reactions, of which

association reactions are one division.

Today the field is studied by neuroscientists and artificial intelligence

researchers as well as philosophers and psychologists.

See also[edit]

Association (psychology)

Associationism

References[edit]

1. Jump up ^ Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, trans. H. Reid

Bibliography[edit]

See Psychology; and the works of Bradley, Stout, and James, above quoted,

and general works on psychology; articles in Mind (passim);

A. Bain, Senses and Intellect (4th ed., 1894), and in

Mind, xii. (1887) pp. 2 372 49

John Watson, An Outline of Philosophy (1898);

H. Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy (Eng. trans., Lond., 1900),

Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung (2nd ed.,

Leipzig, 1893);

James Sully, The Human Mind (1892), and

Outlines of Psychology (Lond., 1892);

E. B. Titchener, Outline of Psychology (New York, 1896), and in his trans.

of

Otto Ktilpe, Outlines of Psychology (New York, 1895,) trans. by E. B.

Titchener;

James Ward in Mind, viii. (1883), xii. (1887), new series ii. (1893), iii.

(1894);

G. T. Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory (London, 1894);

C. L. C. Morgan, Introd. to Comparative Psychology (London, 1894);

W. Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology (Eng. trans., 1904),

Human and Animal Psychology (Eng. trans., 18 94), pp. 282-307;

Outlines of Psychology (Eng. trans., 1897);

E. Claparede, L' Association des idees (1903).

J. I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906), part iii.

§§ 14, 43 seq.

External links[edit]

Wikisource has the text of

the1911 Encyclopædia

Britannicaarticle Association

of ideas.

A Proposition for Associating Thoughts

Article by Andrew Roberts

Hume's Treatise of Human Nature

Catholic Encyclopaedia Article

Word Associations Network - Associations to 'France'