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Armed Forces & Society
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/35/4/667The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X09332140
2009 35: 667Armed Forces & SocietyDale Herspring
ApproachMilitary Relations in the United States and Russia : An AlternativeCivil
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Armed Forces & Society
Volume 35 Number 4
July 2009 667-687
2009 Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and
Society. All rights reserved.
10.1177/0095327X09332140http://afs.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
CivilMilitary Relations
in the United States and Russia
An Alternative Approach
Dale HerspringKansas State University
The key to understanding civilmilitary relations in polities such as Russia and the
United States is military culture. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics
or norms of behavior. Some such as executive leadership, respect for military expertise,
and a clear chain of command are critical and exist in both the American and Russian
militaries. Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin and George Bush II, and
Putin and George Bush I), this article maintains that in those instances when military
culture was ignored in either country (e.g., a lack of executive leadership, little respect
for military expertise, and lack of a clear chain of command), conflict not only existed
but also was acerbated. Conversely, in cases where the civilians were firmly in charge
but respected military culture, conflict was minimized. Senior military officers felt freeto express their opinions and had the perception that their views were always taken
seriously.
Keywords: U.S. military; Russian military; civilmilitary relations; military culture
If a lion stands at the head of an army of lions, victory is assured. If a lion stands at the
head of an army of asses, the chances are fifty-fifty. But if an ass stands at the head of
an army of lions, you can call it quits.
General Alexandr Lebed, On Leadership (Russian, no date)
Traditionally, there has been an aversion to the idea of conflict when studying
civilmilitary relations in established political systems. To some, its mere existence
suggests that those in uniform are either refusing or threatening to refuse to carry out
the orders of their civilian masters. This, in turn, can lead to an overemphasis on the
idea of control. As James Burk put it, The question raised is whether (or to what
degree) uniformed elites follow the command of civilian political elites.1 While
there is no question that political control is important, this article argues that conflict
is healthy when it is regulatedin a mature, stable political system such as the United
States or Russia.
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As a consequence, it follows that focus should be on nature of interactions
between the military and its civilian masters. The key to healthy civilmilitary
relations is to create and maintain a situation in which the relationship between thetwo sides is constructive and both sides respect the other. That does not mean an
absence of conflict. Rather, I am talking about a situation in which the civilian
leadership makes the final decision, but senior military officers feel free to express
their opinions and have the perception that their views are taken seriously, although
not always adopted. Here, the task is not to eliminate conflict, it is to channel it in a
positive direction. On the other hand, acerbated or unregulated conflict between the
civilian and military leadership can undermine military effectiveness. It can lead to
what Zoltan Barany called institutional decay. As Barany defined the term,
institutional decay in the American or Russian militaries refers to anything thatinhibits the military from carrying out its mission.2
Focus on Conflict
Conflict between civilian officials and the militarys high command is ubiquitous.
Every countrys budget is finite, and the civilian leadership must decide how much
and on what to spend its treasury. That inevitably brings the civilian leadership into
conflict with the military. The navy always believes it needs more ships, the air forcemore planes, and the army more troops, tanks, and other weapons. The same may be
true of the means for achieving national goals. Civilians may prefer more emphasis
on the use of force, only to learn that senior military officers are in favor of greater
use of diplomatic means.
Perhaps the best way to define healthy conflict is to state its primary characteristics.
The first characteristic is that military and civilian elites are definable but not
necessarily homogenous it their views of the policy process. Civilians tend to look
at force and the use of force differently from those in the military. However, some
civilians are more hawkish than the military, while others will do almost anything toavoid the use of forceand the same thing is true of the armed forces. In other
words, it would be overly simplistic to assume that because a group of individuals
all wear the same, or similar, uniforms, they think alike.
The second characteristic is that the military agrees with Clausewitz; it is always
subordinate to civil authorities, even when policy actions appear wrong headed.
After all, every individual who takes the oath of office as an officer in a mature
political system agrees to accept civilian supremacy. It is a given.3 For officers in
political systems where the process has been bureaucratized and routinized, control
is seldom the critical issue.The third characteristic is that civilmilitary relations are interactive; influence is
notthe critical issue.4 While there is no doubt that military influence is important
for example, to what degree a general is able to persuade his or her civilian
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counterpart to purchase this or that weaponif too much emphasis is focused on
military influence (which is another word for control), one runs the risk of
overlooking the interactive nature of the relationship. It is the interaction betweencivil and military leaders that helps define healthy conflict.5
The fourth characteristic is that the policy process need notbe a zero-sum game.
Instead, as Gibson and Snider noted, when it comes to most issues, the two sides will be
involved in what they called an Area of Overlap and Tension.6 To effectively utilize
military power, it is necessary to relate issues such as national resources, demography,
political objectives, and the definition of war, including strategy, to the military tools
available to achieve foreign policy goals. This assumes that while civilians are in charge,
both sides are interested in learning from the other and that when positions are put forth,
they are both prepared to compromise. There are times when both military and civilianofficials will be wrong; they will need someone from the other side to point out a policys
problems. Indeed, if that is absentperhaps the military is forbidden to speak up or is
ignored by political authoritiescivilians run the risk of ordering the military to do
something for which it is not prepared. Deborah Avant emphasized the positive impact
of the military when she observed that a military that uses its expertise to influence
policy may be a good thing if it creates policy more likely to achieve a countrys goals
in the international system.7
So where does this leave us? Short of a military coup, the approach that will
provide the highest extent of military interaction is one in which there is whatSarkesian and Connor called constructive political engagement.8 As the authors
noted, The problem is to develop a relationship that is appropriate and acceptable
to both civilians and the military, while insuring that the military has an appropriate
and realistic role in the political decision-making process. The goal is to ensure that
the interrelationship is symbiotic. In other words, a constructive political engagement
is one in which senior officers feel free to express their opinions while accepting
civilian supremacy in decision making.
Comparing Militaries
In the past, there have been a number of attempts to compare civilmilitary
relations in different countries. One of the first was the book cowritten by Samuel
Huntington and Zbiniew Brzezinski.9 Huntington wrote the section on the U.S.
military, while Brzezinski wrote the chapter on the Soviet military. While it was
useful in its day, the book lacked a common conceptual framework. Then there was
an effort to look at the impact of revolutions on civilmilitary relations as well as a
number of books that looked at geographical regions.10
The latter usually includedan introduction that laid out a common conceptual framework (often the question of
how democratic civilmilitary relations are). Unfortunately, while some contributors
tried to incorporate this conceptual framework, others did not.11
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There also have been efforts to compare civilmilitary relations in different
countries; one of the best known is Michael Deschs much acclaimed Civilian
Control of the Military. While Desch is to be commended for making the effort tocompare this process in four different polities, there are serious problems with the
analysis. For example, without having done in-depth research on the topic, Deschs
look at civilmilitary relations in Russia during the Yeltsin period was superficial.12
The Problem
The real problem, however, is what kind of a conceptual framework to utilize in
comparing civilmilitary relations. How do we ensure that we are looking at thesame political processes in the two countries?
In a recent book he edited on civilmilitary relations in Latin America,13 David
Pion-Berlin suggested in his introduction that the study of civilmilitary relations
could be broken down into three parts: the rationalist, which focuses primarily on the
decision maker; the structuralist, which studies institutions; and the culturalist,
which looks at the subject.14 While rationalist studies, such as the now classic work
by Peter Feaver,15 look at rewards and punishment in an effort to determine how and
why military officers obey their civilian leaders, it seems to me that many officers
obey for neither reason but out of a sense of duty. Furthermore, it is not clear thatone will be able to obtain such data in depth in more than one polity.
Comparing the United States and Russia
There are a number of reasons why a comparison of the U.S. and Russian
experiences is warranted. First, institutionally, the Russian and American militaries
resemble each other in many ways. They are both highly bureaucratized and
institutionalized militaries. Second, with the exception of General DouglasMacArthur, neither has faced a serious problem with political obedience from the
military. Political obedience has been a sine qua non. Third, both militaries are
prepared to (and have) engaged in conflict. I am not suggesting that they are on a
equal plane when it comes to war-fighting capability. They are clearly not. Russia is
far behind the United States when it comes to modern weapons and equipment, for
example. The key question is how to compare these two militaries.
Military Culture
In their study of military culture in the United States, Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs
defined culture as the prevailing values, philosophies, customs, traditions and
structure, that over time, have created shared individual expectations within the
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or her deputies lead; this is something the military expects. Failure to do so not only
undermines morale but also, more important, creates confusion and even chaos
inside the armed forces.
2. Respect for military expertise. While generals and admirals acknowledge the
primacy of civilian leadership and are prepared to follow whatever order they receive
from such authorities, they also expect civilian officials to show respect for the
expertise they have gained in 30 or more years of military service. What that means
is that while the military is prepared to carry out whatever order it receives, it expects
civilian authorities to listen to what they say and take it into consideration as they
make key national security decisions.
It was the late Richard Neustadt who, with the American polity in mind, commentedthat the power of presidential politics, is the power to persuade.21 A president, whether
Russian or American, a minister of defense, or secretary of defense will have a better
chance of getting senior military officers to accept his policies enthusiastically if the
generals and admirals believe they are part of the process. Similarly, key officers who are
left out of the decision-making process can become obstacles to the smooth enactment
of political decisions through bureaucratic obfuscation.
3. Clear chain of command. Nothing upsets military operations more than unclear
orders or a confused chain of command. It creates confusion and even chaos, as thecommanders try to figure out what the senior officers or civilian officials wanted
them to do or whose orders they should obey.
Comparing U.S. and Russian CivilMilitary Relations
First, the data. The data are taken from a wide variety of sources, primary
materials including newspaper articles, official sources, and secondary materials
including a variety of articles and books.Second, given space limitations, this study focuses on two different periods in
Russia and two in the United States. The commonality between them was that in one
case civilmilitary relations were more or less symbiotic (the George H. W. Bush or
Bush I and Putin periods), while in the other instance (the Yeltsin and George W.
Bush or Bush II periods) relations were very difficult, at times chaotic. The question
therefore is, what can military culture tell us about each country individually and,
more important, about comparing civilmilitary relations?
It is also important to emphasize that the methodology used in this article is
qualitative, not quantitative. Each of the characteristics noted above is analyzedduring all four periods. Furthermore, rather than attempting to quantify the degree
of respect or disrespect, each of the three country discussions evaluates the level of
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respect on a national basis; for example, the preponderance of evidence indicates
that the Yeltsin regime showed little respect for military expertise. These conclusions
are charted to see what factors were most associated with the creation of constructivepolitical engagement and which ones undermined it.
The Case Studies22
The key question to be asked is, how similar or different were the four periods?
Based on intuition alone, the George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin administrations
would seem to bear striking similarities, as would the George H. W. Bush and the
Vladimir Putin administrations. Just how similar were these administrations, andhow much does an examination of these four periods tell us about the value of
military culture as a vehicle for comparing diverse political systems?
The Yeltsin Administration
1. Executive leadership. Yeltsin provided almost no political leadership for the
military during his tenure. Take, for example, the case of military reform. If the
generals hoped to be successful, they had to have strong support from the president.
Not only was money involved, but also the presidents office would be needed toovercome bureaucratic obstacles within the military. As Colonel General Igor
Rodionov put it, If military reform is now at an impasse and the Armed Forces, per
se (i.e., the Army and Navy) have been reduced to a desperate state, this is primarily
the fault of the countrys political leadership, which has completely removed itself
from the management of military reform.23 What is even worse than his lack of
leadership is that Yeltsin provided a military budget that created chaos and made
military reform impossible. Consider the following: instead of providing the money
for military reform and thereby giving the generals the stability and predictability
any senior officer needs to plan, Yeltsin repeatedly cut the military budget. When thegenerals begged him for more money, he ignored them. In 1991 the military budget
stood at $324.5 billion. The next year it was down to $86.93 billion; in 1993 it was
down to $74.1 billion, and in 1994 it was $71.7 billion.24 Indeed, the situation with
the budget would get so bad that soldiers would be sent out to pick mushrooms, and
a bank would supply the militarys hats and boots during the first war in Chechnya.
In 1997, he cut the budget another 20 percent. As General Rokhlin commented,
That amount would not even cover the cost of six months of the salaries and ben-
efits mandated by Russian law.25 By the end of his tenure, the military budget had
fallen from $142 billion dollars in 1992 to $4 billion in 1999, a 98 percent decrease!26
The bottom line was that it was disingenuous for him to expect the Army to remain
combat capable at a time when he was starving it for funds.
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Take another example. In May 1996, Yeltsin called for the formulation of a National
Security Concept. The military was excited. Finally a document that will define the
course of Russian security policy! Unfortunately, while it provided some idea of whereYeltsin was taking the country, most of it was vague. The military was looking for
leadership, specific guidelines; instead, it was given ambiguous and fine-sounding
language. Not the kind of leadership from Yeltsin that the military was seeking.
Yeltsins leadership style was too chaotic, too unpredictable, too focused on
keeping himself in power to effectively deal with the countrys deep-seated problems.
Indeed, when it came to leadership, the generals found Yeltsin seriously lacking.
They may not have liked the direction he would have taken the military, and they
would probably have fought him behind the scenes. However, Russian officers
believed that at least they had a right to expect the president to show leadership.
2. Respect for military expertise. When he came to power, Yeltsin was convinced the
cold war was over and therefore did not need the military as might have been the case in
the past. With that in mind, he asked himself, why worry about the armed forces? They
would not be needed in the immediate future. As a consequence, he made it clear that he
did not respect the high command and made no effort to hide it.
The military resented Yeltsins attitude. This became evident in the aftermath of
his order that Russian Army tanks become involved in the 1993 attack on the state
Duma. The generals wanted no part of being involved in politics and felt Yeltsinwould not listen to them. This was why General Grachev demanded that Yeltsin put
his order in writing. They were not about to have himlike Gorbachevuse
military force and then blame them if anything went wrong.27
The generals were especially upset at Yeltsins refusal to consider their advice when
it came to the First Invasion of Chechnya. They complained about the operationthe
Army was in no condition to carry out such an operation. Yet Yeltsin insisted. The
military was so upset about being ordered to invade when there were insufficient
weapons, equipment, and, most of all, training that approximately 540 officers resigned
rather than serve in the warincluding some of the most senior generals in the army(e.g., Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, the Deputy Commander of Ground Forces, who
was ordered to take command of the operation but refused).28 By April 1995, 557 officers
had been fired, and criminal proceedings had begun against 11 of them.29
As the generals had predicted, the invasion was a military disaster. Troops who had
never trained together were sent to fight together (e.g., reservists, airborne, regulars, naval
infantry, border guards were put in the same unit). By February 24, 1995, 1,146 men had
been killed and another 374 were missing and presumed dead.30 Yeltsin then blamed the
army for the serious losses suffered by Russian troops in Chechnya. The situation
between Yeltsin and the military became so bad that retired General Lev Rokhlinmounted an unsuccessful effort to have him removed.31
Yeltsin further undercut the generals ability to deal directly with their troops in
1994, when he issued a presidential decree that subordinated all force organs to the
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president. As a result, the military lost its ability to be heard by members of the
legislative. They now worked directly for the president.
3. Clear chain of command. The First Chechen War illustrated the chaotic nature of
command relationships in the Russian Army under Yeltsin. Grachev was not only named
commander of a potential invasion but also told to negotiate with the Chechens about the
regions future as well. In fact, Yeltsin and the Security Council tied his hands to such a
degree that he was unable to be effective. Throughout the Chechen operation, Yeltsin
interfered and countermanded the generals orders. To make matters worse, the chain of
command constantly changed. At one point it was under the command of the army, at
another it was the Interior Ministryand then that changed back to the army, then back
to Interior. Between 1994 and 1996, there were over eight changes of senior commandin Russian forces.32 It was organizational chaos.
The Russian General Staff had a variety of functions, but even if they were operational
they were traditionally subordinated to the defense minister. Yeltsin was concerned about
this arrangement; it gave the defense minister too much power. So in 1995 Yeltsin told
his colleagues that he intended to detach the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense
and create two parallel structures. The 1996 Law on Defense did exactly that. Over time
this would result in constant confusion and at times even chaos as the line of authority
became blurred. The Chief of the General Staff and the defense minister sometimes had
differences of opinionand that happened frequently when General Igor Sergeyev wasdefense minister and General Anatoli Kvashnin was Chief of the General Staff. The
consequence was organizational chaos. Who were the soldiers supposed to follow? The
defense minister or the Chief of the General Staff?
When Yeltsin left the scene, he left behind ten years of neglect. The Armed Forces
were in a disastrous condition as a result of Yeltsins refusal to listen to his generals
or provide even the minimal amount of money necessary to keep it going, let alone
modernize and reform it. Military morale was at rock bottom, and rebuilding the
armed forces would be a very long and difficult undertaking.33
The Putin Administration
Compared to Yeltsins, for the military, the Putin administration was a breath of
fresh air, a positive change.
1. Executive leadership. Beginning with his emergence as Prime Minister in
1999, it was clear that Putin was prepared to provide executive leadership. One of
the first things he did was to call a meeting of all of the agencies involved in the war
in Chechnya to try to impose some order on military operations. This was standardprocedure for Putinintervene, but only if absolutely necessary. He also announced
he would accept personal responsibility for Chechnya.
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Once he took over as president, Putins primary goal was to reintroduce stability
and predictability into the military. It is impossible for senior military officers to plan
if they do not know how much money they will receive or what is expected of them.Similarly, most generals tend to be flexible and nonideological. This was also Putins
pragmatic approach to leadership: If this idea worked, then use it. Forget about its
ideological significance.
Putin demonstrated his leadership role in dealing with Chechnya while he was still
Prime Minister by flying down to Grozny in a jet fighter, which, if nothing else,
emphasized his connection to the war.34 Another observer, in discussing his leadership
in dealing with Chechnya, commented, Another factor, perhaps the most important one,
for the success of the invasion was the resolve and direction demonstrated by the political
leadership in Moscow, namely Vladimir Putin as acting Prime Minister.35
There was one area where Putin pushed the generals, and that was the idea of
professionalizing the Russian armed forces. For Putin and many of the generals,
large armies based on the use of mass forces backed up by hundreds if not thousands
of tanks and artillery were a thing of the past. It not only was out of date (look at the
Western militaries) but also cost too much. While some generals (Kvashnin comes
to mind) did everything they could to undermine this experiment, others were in
favor, believing that the future was in high technologynot in the mass of troops.
The important point is that Putin showed leadership, and since that time the Russian
military has gradually moved in that direction (in spite of many problems and stopsand starts). His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic.
Putin also showed that he was a leader when it came to budgeting money for the
military. In 2000, when Putin assumed the presidency, the military budget was (in
billions of rubles) R146; by 2006 it was up to R498.76.36 In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin
also pushed hard for salary increases. The militarys salary was raised several times,
but it remained far below civilian salaries in large part because of inflation.
2. Respect for military expertise. Putins approach in dealing with the high com-
mand was in striking contrast to that of Yeltsin. Putin made it clear to the generalsthat he was interested in their ideas on the use of force. On August 16, 1999, Putin
sent Interior Ministry troops to Dagestan, where they, together with local security
forces and some military units, engaged the Chechens. Fighting lasted three weeks.
It involved Russian heavy aerial bombing, rocket attacks from Russian helicopter
gunships and artillery assaults.37 Most pleasing from the generals standpoint was
Putins response when they asked to use the highly destructive fuel oil explosives.
This was a politically risky action. Putin approved the plan and made it clear to them
that they were the ones fighting the war. Many think that it was this decision to use
fuel oil explosives that did the trick.38
For Putin, the generals ran the military.Similarly, while Putin may have been the major lever pushing the military to
become a professional force, once it appeared that the senior military staff was
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dedicated to the idea, Putin receded in the background and permitted the generals
who understood the military to implement the new program. The same was true of
training exerciseswhich had been almost nonexistent from 1999 to 2001. He foundthe money for them, but it was up to the generals to decide what kind of exercises to
put on. He gave them time to adapt and listened to them.
3. Clear chain of command. Putin understood the importance of a clear chain of
command. Furthermore, it was clear to him that the constant bickering between
Kvashnin and Sergeyev had to stop. Early on in his administration, he ordered both
generals to silence their debate and come up with realistic policy proposals. 39
However, in spite of Putins comments, the battle between the two senior officers
raged on. Finally, on March 28, 2001, the Kremlin announced that the defense min-ister had stepped down to become a presidential advisor.40 He was replaced by Sergei
Ivanov, a former KGB general and a close friend and confident of Putin. That
removed one part of the problem.
Unfortunately, Kvashnin continued to fight with the defense ministerin this
case Ivanov. Consequently, on June 14, the Duma changed Article 13 of the Law on
Defense to mention only the Defense Ministry: Oversight for the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation is carried out by the defense minister via the Defense
Ministry.41 From now on the Chief of the General Staff worked for the defense
minister. Putin then fired Kvashnin. Furthermore, operational matters were takenaway from the General Staff and given to the Ministry of Defense.
The generals and admirals were not overjoyed at some of the ideas Putin forced
on themfor example, a professional militarybut they were appreciative of his
leadership. For the first time since 1999 they were getting back to the world of
stability and predictability. Putin may have argued with this or that general about
what he believed should be done, but from all appearances he appears to have treated
all of them with respect. The senior officers also appreciated the clear chain of
command that he created. No longer would senior officers have to put up with the
confusion and inefficiencies that come from not knowing who to obey.
The Second Bush Administration42
1. Executive leadership. Georg W. Bush is the first president with an MBA, the
first who had been a CEO. He let it be known that he favors a corporate model of
political leadership.43 For practical purposes, this meant, as Bing West put it,
President Bush presided more than decided, acting like the chairman of the board
rather than the chief executive. . . . Once he selected an option, he considered his job
done.44
The primary result of this leadership style was that it placed primary controlof the military in the hands of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Bush was not
about to get involved in how Rumsfeld ran the Pentagon. Bush did meet with senior
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officers on more than one occasion, and he provided general guidance on policy, but
he left it up to Rumsfeld to decide how and what advice the Pentagon would provide
to the president.Unfortunately, from the militarys standpoint, Rumsfeld provided too much leadership.
On issues such as transformation and the war in Iraq, he told the military not only what
he wanted but also what conclusions he expected them to reach. To make matters worse,
the generals were often excluded from meetings with the secretary and the president and
therefore in many cases did not know what had been decided.
2. Respect for military expertise. The most notable characteristic of Rumsfelds
reign was his almost complete distrust of the uniformed military. He believed the
militarys task was simply to carry out his orders. He began his administration byholding secret meetings on the future of the military while excluding the generals
from them. He primary concern was implementing a policy of military transforma-
tion (e.g., greater reliance on high tech weapons that would compensate for large
numbers of troops). It was then up to the military to quietly implement it even if
was undefined and even if doing so made it impossible to carry out the missions
assigned to it. He did his best to exclude the Armys Chief of Staff, General Eric
Shinseki, who had made considerable headway in transforming the army from a
tank-heavy force to a lighter force.45 Meanwhile, he cancelled a key weapons pro-
gram under less than honorable conditions.Rumsfeld was also dismissive of military advice in the lead up to and in the
invasion of Iraq. For example, he openly interfered with the Armys massive
planning document, the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). The
TPFDD for Iraq was an unbelievably complex master plan governing which units
would go where, when, and with what equipment, on which planes or ships, so that
everything would be coordinated and ready at the time of attack.46 As a result, when
the U.S. forces arrived in Iraq, they lacked both numbers and the right kinds of
troops. Why? Because Rumsfeld had pulled them out of the TPFDD.
Furthermore, in planning for the invasion, Rumsfeld was determined to prove thesuperiority of his transformation policy. The United States would invade Iraq with
minimal numbers of troops, thereby showing that his high-tech shock and awe
policy was not only viable but also the best way to fight a war. This is why he refused
to accept Tommy Franks number of 480,000 troops and instead beat him down until
the United States invaded with about 145,000far too few to deal with the
postcombat period. He also convinced Franks notto deploy the 17,500 troops of the
First Cavalry Division in Iraqan action that deprived the military of troops badly
needed to stabilize the country.
To make matters worse, Rumsfeld and his colleagues assured the Army that theissue of posthostilities operations (or Phase IV as the military called it) had been
fully taken care of prior to the invasion. In fact, almost nothing had been done. The
civilians had ignored the militarys concern because they were convinced what an
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Iraqi refugee had told themthat they would be greeted with open arms, that the
new Iraqi government would quickly take over, and that the Americans could leave
shortly after liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.Worst of all, Rumsfeld and his colleaguesin particular Jerry Bremer, who had
been sent to Iraq to set up the Coalition Provisional Authoritytook two steps
opposed by the military that had disastrous resultsthe disestablishment of the
Baath Party and the dismemberment of the Iraqi military. The result, especially from
the latter action, was an influx of thousands of Iraqis into the insurgency.
Rumsfeld continued to ignore those who disagreed with him throughout his time
in office.
3. Clear chain of command. There were problems with the chain of commandunder Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld wanted only officers who agreed with him in key assign-
ments. As a result, he passed on the promotion of all officers at the three-star rank
and above. If he did not like a senior officers political views or approach to trans-
formation or leadership, the officer was doomed to retirement. On many occasions,
Rumsfeld participated in the selection of officers at the two-star level.47 He also
went out of his way to select officers he believed he could controlthe most obvious
being General Richard Myers, a devotee of high tech and an Air Force officer who
believed in showing deference to the civilian leadership.
Another example comes from Iraq. While General Ricardo Sanchez was incommand of American troops and Paul Bremer was in charge of the Provisional
Command Authority, neither was in charge of operations in Iraq, and neither was on
speaking terms with the other. Furthermore, both reported to Rumsfeld. The result
was a constant bureaucratic struggle between the army and the State Department.
One of the worst examples of the confusion of this situation came from the first
attack on the city of Fallujah by the Marines. The Marines reported through a
military chain of command, while Bremer was dealing directly with Rumsfeld or
Condi Rice at the White House.
It is not surprising that the military reacted negatively to Rumsfelds interferenceand attempts to micromanage its actions in Iraq.
The First Bush AdministrationGeorge H. W. Bush
1. Executive leadership. Although he did not try to micromanage security poli-
cies, George H. W. Bush expected to be consulted on policies involving the use or
the threat of the use of military force. Bush permitted the military and the defense
department to work out policy recommendations, but he was closely involved in
making key decisions.This was evident in the invasions of Panama and Kuwait. First, consider the
invasion of Panama. After Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriegas forces
had attacked U.S. forces in the Panama Zone, General Colin Powell met with Bush
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the afternoon of December 16, 1989. He brought Bush up to date on what had
happened. Bushs prime concern was to avoid a repeat of the failed attempt to rescue
American hostages in Iran as well as to preclude the kind of interservice rivalry thathad taken place in Grenada. After hearing Powells explanation of the situation on
the ground, Bush said, Okay, lets do it.48
The situation was similar when it came to the decision to oust the Iraqis from
Kuwait. On August 2, the day after the Iraqis had crossed into Kuwait, the National
Security Council met, with the president in attendance. General Norman Schwarzkopf,
the individual in charge of U.S. forces in the region, briefed the president on the
situation. Bush insisted that the United States respond.
The National Security Council (NSC) met again on October 31. At that meeting,
Powell laid it out for the president. Now, if you, Mr. President, decide to buildupgo for an offensive optionthis is what we need.49 After Powell had discussed
the additional resources required, Bush approved and told Powell to get to work on
the operation. Finally, it is also worth noting that when it came to terminating the
successful effort to oust Saddam, Bush asked for the input of all of his advisors and
commanders, but he himself made the decision to break off hostilities.
2. Respect for military expertise. George H. W. Bush was not a micromanager. He
allowed the military professionals to handle operational matters, justify the military
budget, and work out new force structures and military doctrines.Bush expected the military to come to him with plans. This was evident in both
military actions. In planning the invasion of Panama, Powell argued for a massive
use of force, and Bush approved. When it became obvious that there was a high
probability that military force would be used to get rid of Panamanian dictator
Manuel Antonio Noriega, Powell met privately with Generals Maxwell Thurman
and Carl Stiner. He asked them to come up with an invasion plan that the chiefs
approved, and Powell briefed it to the president. Bush and Powell met from time to
time to polish various aspects of the operation. For his part, Bush asked only to be
kept abreast of what was happening while leaving the fighting to the military.As was the case in the invasion of Panama, planning for the First Gulf War was left
almost entirely in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. True, Bush would frustrate the
military, expanding his charge to the armed forces to not only keep Saddam Hussein
from invading Saudi Arabia but also, by suddenly expanding his order, throw the Iraqis
out of Kuwait. But the important aspect of this military action was that Bush trusted his
commanders. The planning and implementation of military actions was almost entirely
in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. Furthermore, as noted above, Bush was careful
to get inputs from his generals before calling a truce in this military action.
3. Clear chain of command. During this Bush administration, the chain of command
was clear. This is evident from several examples. During the Panamanian invasion, the
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However, as much as Rumsfeld may have been determined to introduce change in the
U.S. military, he simply did not care what the military thought. He knew what he wanted
and was not concerned about the uniformed militarys response. The result was constant
conflict. Evolutionary change is different. Take, for example, Putins approach. He
wanted change but in a direction that appears to have coincided with the views of the
majority of senior officers. He was careful to respect military culture while pushing for
change. For example, when faced with the seemingly never-ending conflict he had
between his two most senior officers, he gradually removed the first, then the second, and
changed the relationship between the General Staff and the defense ministry.This brings us back to the hypothesis presented in the beginning of this article;
namely, that violating the canons of military culture acerbates conflict. This certainly
happened under Yeltsin and Bush II. Similarly, the opposite took place under Putin
and Bush I. This is not to suggest that there was no conflict in the civilmilitary
relationship in either country during those four administrations. There was. Powell
had run-ins with Cheney, and Admiral Crowe was furious when he found out that
General Woerner had been fired without him having been consulted. Similarly, there
were Russian officers who strongly opposed Putins favoritism toward conventional
forces over the Strategic Rocket Forces or his strong push for a smaller, moreprofessional military. This kind of disagreement will always be a part of civil
military relations in every country.
Lest the reader get the wrong impression, despite the foregoing, the level of
conflict or institutional decay has not been the same in both countries. It was far
worse in Russia under Yeltsin than it was in the United States under Rumsfeld. The
U.S. military is continuing to fight two wars despite a plethora of problems. The
difference between the two countries is that Yeltsins lack of leadership and
disrespect went far beyond that of Rumsfeld, and, just as important, it went on not
for six years but for almost ten years. Furthermore, despite Rumsfelds arrogance indealing with the military, Washington continued to buy weapons systems, bring in
new equipment and training techniques, and pay the military well by standards of
Table 1
Comparison of Military Attitudes
Military Attitude toward:
Characteristic Yeltsin Putin Bush I Bush II
Executive leadership - + + +
Respect for military expertise - + + -
Clear chain of command - + + -
Note: = military attitude toward regime behavior is generally negative; += military attitude toward
regime behavior is generally positive.
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the past. Russia, meanwhile, did little. Planes did not fly, ships did not sail, and the
army did not train for more than ten years.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that this story is incomplete. It is based on anin-depth study of civilmilitary relations in two countries during two time periods. But
does it hold for other polities? It would, for example, be very useful to look at the
experiences of another established, bureaucratized military forcethat of Canada. In
1968, Canadian Forces went through a period when senior civil authorities showed open
disrespect for the countrys military leaders as the various services were forced to unify,
an action that led to mass resignations on the part of Canadian officers. Similarly, one of
the characteristics of civilmilitary relations in Germany has been an effort to civilianize
military culture by introducing the concept of Innere Fhrung.51 It would be useful to
compare that period using the three characteristics of military culture presented here andcompare the Canadian and German experiences with the American and Russian. Other
country studies along the same line would also be useful.
Someone once said that the comparative approach is the ultimate test for any model
or paradigm. Whether we want to admit it or not, all polities are culturally bound.
Feavers model mentioned previously represents a major contribution to the field.
However, to validate it, it must be applied elsewhere in other polities to determine its
universal validity. Unfortunately, such a study would demand the same in-depth
knowledge of another polity that Feaver has of the American system. That, in turn,
requires languages and in-depth knowledge of another culturefor example, do rewardsand punishments mean the same to military officers in Brazil or Ghana or China as they
do in the United States? We are scratching the surface when it comes to understanding
the dynamics of civilmilitary relations. But at least it is a beginning.
Notes
1.James Burk, Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,Armed Forces & Society 29, 1(Fall 2002): 7.
2.Zoltan Barany,Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2007), 7.3.One can, of course, point to the actions of Douglas MacArthur in openly defying the orders of his
commander in chiefPresident Harry S. Trumanbut that was a rare exception to the rule in both of the
countries discussed here. See Dale Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from
FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 77-78, 81. Some have seen parallels
between MacArthur and Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov, but as Timothy Colton argued in his major work on
the Soviet Main Political Administration, the clash between these two men was more of personality conflict
that a civilmilitary dispute. See Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The
Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
4. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesman and Cold War Crisis (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991), 5; Richard Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United StatesToday,Naval War College Review 55 (Summer 2002):8-59.
5.For an essay arguing the critical importance of influence, see Kobi Michael, The Dilemmabehind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations, Armed Forces & Society 33, 4 (2007):
518-46.
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6.Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence:A Look at the National Security Decision-making Process,Armed Forces & Society 25, 2 (1999): 195.
A similar argument is contained in Risa A. Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of
Strategic Assessment(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), esp. chap. 1, in which she argues
that when divergence over security and corporate interests are not entrenched and profound, importance
obstacles to strategic assessment are absent. Ibid., 5. Obviously, if the lines between the military and
civilians are entrenched, then a constructive relationship is very unlikely.
7.Deborah Avant, Conflicting Indicators of Crisis in American Civil-Military Relations,ArmedForces & Society 24, 3 (1998): 383.
8. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert J. Connor, Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-firstCentury; War, Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 19.
9. Zbiniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (Westport, CT:Greenwood, 1982).
10.Jonathan R. Adelman,Revolution, Armies and War(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1985).11.E.g., J. Samuel Fitch, ed., The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1998); Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson, eds., The Political Role
of the Military (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996); Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Communist Armies in
Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982); Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., The Military
and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boulder, CO: Westview, 199); Andrew Cottey, Timothy
Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, Democratic Control for the Military in Post-communist Europe;
Guarding the Generals (London: Palgrave, 2002); Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., Civil-Military
Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). There are, of course, hun-
dreds if not thousands of single-country studies. For example, Alfred Stepans Rethinking Military
Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) has had a major
impact on scholars of civilmilitary relations all over the world.12. Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1999), see esp. 39-66 and compare his analysis with this writers The Kremlin and the High Command
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). In the end, the Russian military was far less of a threat to
political control than Desch assumed. In fact, it was in a state bordering on chaos given Yeltsins lack of
leadership and respect for the military.
13.David Pion-Berlin, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 2001), 1-35.
14.Ibid., 1715.Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants; Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
16.Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, and T. O. Jacobs,American Military Culture in the Twenty-firstCentury (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2000), 3. Also see Edgar
Schein, Organizational Culture,American Psychologist45, 2 (1990): 110.
17.Nick Jans with David Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers, and Climate and HowThey Affect Military Capability (Canberra: Australian National Defense University, Strategic and National
Studies Centre, 2002), 39.
18.One may argue that paramilitary forces such as the police also require the individual to put his orher life on the line in carrying out his or her duties. That is true, of course, and that is why some of the
militarys cultural characteristics are shared by police forces. However, the military is more removed from
civilian society and is trained to use more complex forms of violence. For a discussion of civilian military
culture, see Thomas Langston, The Civilian Side of Military Culture, Parameters (Autumn 2000): 21
19.For a more detailed discussion of military culture, see Williamson Murray, Does Military CultureMatter? Orbis (Winter 1999): 27; John Hillen, Must US Military Culture Reform? Orbis (Winter
1999): 43; and Williamson Murray, Military Culture Does Matter, FPRI Wire 7 (January 1999): 2,
http://www.fpri.org.
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20.The following statement of the main characteristics of U.S. military culture is based on a varietyof sources, including many discussions with military officers as well as the authors thirty-three-year
association with the U.S. Navy and a variety of academic studies. See, for example, Jans with
Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed, 42-53; A. J. Bacevich, Tradition Abandoned: Americas Military in a
New Era, National Interest58 (Summer 1997): 3; John Allen Williams, The Military and Modern
Society, The World and I14 (September 1999): 311; Edgar R. Puryear,American Generalship: Character
is Everything: The Art of Command(Novato, CA: Presidio, 2002), 1-43; Peter Maslowski, Army Values
and American Values,Military Review 70, 4 (April 1990): 10-23; Betts, Soldiers, Statesman and Cold
War Crisis, 157-58; Richard H. Kohn, How Democracies Control the Military,Journal of Democracy
4, 8 (1997): 140; Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap between the Military and Society, Atlantic
Monthly 280, 1 (July 1997): 66-77; Cultural Demolition in the Military, Washington Times, November
20, 1998; Peter Feaver, The Gap, Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding, National
Interest61 (Fall 2000): 29-37; Gregory D. Foster, Failed Expectations: The Crisis of Civil-Military
Relations in America, Brookings Review 15 (Fall 1997): 46-48; and Elliot Cohen, Supreme Command:Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002). Also see articles in Peter
Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National
Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
For comments on Russian military culture, the author has relied on his own extensive contact with Russian
military officers as well as a variety of academic studies. See, e.g., Herspring, The Kremlin and the High
Command; Pavel K. Baev, The Challenge of Small Wars for the Russian Military, in Russian Military
Reform, 19922000, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McCermott (New York: Frank Cass, 2003), 189-202;
Alexandr Golts, The Social and Political Condition of the Russian Military, in The Russian Military Power
and Policy, ed. Steven F. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 80; Anatol Lieven,
Chechnya: The Tombstone of Russian Power(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), citing General
Vrobyev, 293; Christopher C. Losksley, Concept, Algorithm, Indecision: Why Military Reform Has Failed inRussia Since 1992, Slavic Military Studies 14, 1 (March 2001): 1-26; Michael Orr,Manpower Problems in
the Russian Armed Forces, 19921993, no. D62 (Camberley, UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict
Studies Research Centre, February 2002), 8; Michael Orr, Reform and the Russian Ground Forces, 1992
2002, inRussian Military Reform, 19922000, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McCermott (New York: Frank
Cass, 2003), 136; Brian Taylor, The Russian Military Outside Politics: A Historical Perspective, PONARS
Policy Memo, 2 (October 1997); Robert Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishing, 1998), 9-12, 57-58.
21. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidency: The Politics of Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990), 11.
22.It is important to note that the Russians, either civilians or military, have had little to say about
military culture or civilmilitary relations. As one Russian writer put it, Russian authors mainly stressthe problem of civilian control of the military. Civilian control is defined not only in the narrow sense, as
a control of the government over the military and this understanding implies an elected civilian head of
the military. So civil-military relations are mainly understood as an interaction between the government
and the military, while in foreign studies this term has a broader meaning, for example, the interaction
between the whole society and the military. Or as she put it elsewhere in her article, Russian authors
tend to view the military as a closed system separated from the rest of society. Olga Filippova, Civil-
Military Relations: The Comparative Analysis of Russian and Foreign Approaches to the Issue, Post-
Soviet Armies Newsletter5, 2 (2006). Nevertheless, a reading of Russian materials or discussions with
Russian officers makes it very clear that they expect civilian authorities to respect their organizational
culture. The critical question is, how similar or different is the process in both countries? Are there certain
commonalities that are critical to creating symbiotic civilmilitary relations? If so, what are they and whatis their impact in more than one polity?
23.Cited in Michael J. Orr,Rodionov and Reform, no. C92 (Camberley, UK: Royal Military AcademySandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1999), 3.
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24.For the Yeltsin period, this writer relied on Russian Military Budget, Global Security.org, ascited in Steven Miller, Moscows Military Power: Russias Search for Security in an Age of Transition,
in The Russian Military Power and Policy, ed. Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2004), 1-42.
25.Robert V. Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, 478.26.Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 308.
27.Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 74.28.Olga Oliker,Russias Chechen Wars, 19942000 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 9-10.29.Moscow Times, April 18, 1996.30.As quoted in Lieven, Chechnya, 111.31.Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 127-29.32.Gregory J. Celestan, Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya (Ft.
Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, August 1996), 11.33.This section covers up to March 2007, when Ivanov was replaced by Anatoliy Serdyukov, whocontinued to serve under newly elected president Dmitri Medvedev.
34.Putin and the Chechen War: Together Forever,Moscow Times, February, 11, 2004.35.C. W. Blandy, Moscows Failure to Comprehend, in The Second Chechen War, ed. Anne Aldis,
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 40 (London: Strategic and Combat Studies
Institute: September 2000), 17. His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic. He
gradually forced the defense minister out, and a short time latter forced the Chief of the General Staff to
retire. He also changed the relationship between the defense minister and the Chief of the General Staff
so that the latter was not only clearly subordinate to the former but also forbidden to interfere in opera-
tional matters.
36.As cited in Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, 174.37.Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 2004), 101.38.C. W. Blandy, The Storm, Part IThe Invasion of Avaristan, no. P30 (Camberley, UK: Royal
Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2000), 41.
39.Hope Glimmers for Reform,Moscow Times, March 29, 2001, via Johnsons Russia List, March29, 2001.
40. Steven J. Main, The Strategic Rocket Forces, 19912002, no. D66 (Camberley, UK: RoyalMilitary Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, July 9, 2003), 26.
41.Federalnyi zakon Ob oborone, April 24, 1996. http//www.mil.ru/articles/articles3863.shtml.42.The primary focus is on Donald Rumsfelds tenure as Secretary of Defense. While Robert Gates
adopted a very different approachmuch as Minister of Defense Dmitri Serdyukov has in Russiaevents
are too current to permit the kind of conclusions needed for a study of this type.43. Fred I. Greenstein, The Changing Leadership of George W. Bush: A Pre and Post 9/11
Comparison, in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, ed., Eugene R. Wittkopf and James
McCormick, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 359.
44. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: RandomHouse, 2008), 362.
45.Shinseki would later testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. When asked by SenatorLevin (D-MI) how many troops were needed for an invasion of Iraq, he responded, Something on the
order of a hundred thousand. Rumsfeld was furious, and Wolfowitz undercut him by stating that his
views were wildly off the mark. Dale R. Herspring, Rumsfelds Wars: The Arrogance of Power
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 124-25. There has been a debate on the appropriateness of
Shinsekis testimony in Armed Forces & Society: see discussions by Damon Coletta, Courage in theService of Virtue: The Case of General Shinsekis Testimony before the Iraq War, Armed Forces &
Society 34, 1 (October 2007): 109-21; and Paul Camacho and William Hauser, Civil-Military
RelationsWho Are the Real Principals? A Response to Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of
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General Shinsekis Testimony before the Iraq War, Armed Forces & Society 34, 1 (October 2007):
122-37.
46.James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad,Atlantic Monthly 293, 1(January-February 2004): 15.47.Herspring,Rumsfelds Wars, 13.48.Colin Powell,My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 425.49.Ibid.50.As has been stressed previously, I am not trying to quantify the relationship, nor to show correla-
tions. Rather, this is a notional charge, based on the preceding material.
51.This term is almost impossible to accurately translate. Technically it means inner leadership, butin practice it is tied to the German effort to civilianize military culture to the maximum degree
possible.
Dale Herspring, a university distinguished professor at Kansas State University and a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of 12 books and more than 80 articles dealing with U.S.,
Russian/Soviet, German, and Polish civilmilitary relations.Address for correspondence: Dale Herspring,
Kansas State University, Department of Political Science, Waters Hall 240, Manhattan, KS 66506; e-mail: