Hegels_Critique of Kants Moral World View

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Hegels Critique of Kants Moral World View

Kenneth R. WestphalUniversity of East Anglia

The definitive version of this article appears in:

Philosophical Topics19.2 (1991):13376.

ABSTRACT: Few if any of Kants critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some

objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled

the Moral World View in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets

Hegel ascribes to the moral world view. I concentrate on five of Hegels main objections to Kants

practical metaphysics. First, Kants problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness

to be happy) is contrived. Kant denies that there is any inherent connection between acting rightly

and being happy, but his denial depends on his defining happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations,

rather than in terms of achieving ends in general. Second, Kants view of moral motivation is

contrived; he ultimately admits that we cannot resolve to act without taking inclinations into account.

(We cannot resolve to act apart from the matter of our maxim.) Third, Kants idea about perfecting

our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Kant defines virtue, and evidence of virtue, in terms

of overcoming inclinations. Inclinations die with the body. Therefore there can be neither virtue nor

evidence of virtue after death. Fourth, Kants view of the autonomy of moral agency is inconsistent

with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kants moral principles cannot be put into

practice in concrete circumstances because he supplies inadequate guidance for classifying acts. I

conclude that Hegels objections to Kants practical metaphysics are sound, and I show that the

problems Hegel raised against Kants account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current,since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora ONeill's Constructions of Reason.


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Hegels Critique of Kants Moral World View

Kenneth R. Westphal

[P]hilosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the

essential ends of human reason .., and the philosopher is not an artificer

in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason.

Kant

There is a point in every ph ilosophy when the philosophers convic-

tion appears on stage ...

Nietzsche

I. INTRODUCTION.

The Nineteenth Century, especially on the Continent, was an age of grand metaphysical world views.Few were grander and none more influential than the one that set the philosophical agenda for theentire century, Kants Critical Philosophy. Few if any of Kants critics were more trenchant thanHegel. Here I wish to reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has receivedinsufficient, indeed very little attention, the chapter titled the Moral World View in thePhenomenology of Spirit. Hegels chapter consists of an introduction and three sections. The first sectionexpounds the moral world view, the second criticizes it, under the title dissemblance, and thethird critically analyzes its alleged final form, conscience. I will not consider this chapters role

within the Phenomenology, nor will I consider Hegels exposition of the moral world view, exceptinsofar as it also contains criticisms, and I will not discuss Hegels analysis of conscience. I willrestrict my consideration to Hegels criticisms of Kant, especially in the second section of hischapter, dissemblance.1

Since Kants postulates loom large in Hegels discussion, it may seem that Hegel considers onlythe second Critique. However, Hegel makes many quite specific allusions or references to others ofKants texts. This shows that Hegel here considers the moral world view articulated in the whole2

of Kants Critical philosophy. Properly understanding and evaluating Hegels objections requiresconsidering not only the Critique of Practical Reason, but also the Critique of Pure Reason, the Groundworkof the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Judgment, theMetaphysics of Morals, and the Religion within the

Limits of Reason Alone. Hegel always strove for synopsis! It would be unfair to Kant, and unhelpful

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for assessing Hegel, to take Hegels own exposition of Kants views as a basis for consideringHegels criticisms of Kants over-all world view, especially since Hegel presupposes familiarity withthe breadth of Kants writings and his presentation is intended to bring out alleged features of it thatare not immediately evident. Hence it is appropriate to look at Kants world view in his own termsbefore turning to Hegels objections.4

II. K ANTS MORALWORLDVIEW:ASYNOPSIS.

Kants Critical strategy for addressing the metaphysical issues of God, freedom, and immortality issheer genius. Starting in the Critique of Pure ReasonKant develops and defends his transcendental5

idealism. Transcendental idealism holds a rationalist view of the significance of concepts, but alsoholds that empirical knowledge requires applying concepts to experienced objects. Transcendental


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knowledge is restricted to knowledge of the a priori conditions of the experience of objects.Analyzing those conditions reveals that space and time are forms of intuition and that twelvecategorial concepts structure our experience of objects. These results, together with an analysis ofthose fortunate metaphysical contradictions, the antinomies, justifies a kind of metaphysical6

dualism. Nature is a causally determined spatio-temporal realm of perceptible substances and

events, though viewed transcendentally the entirety of nature is appearance, and nothing in itself.7

This makes for two quite distinct realms, each subject to its own legislation: the sensible realm ofnature is subject to the legislation of the understanding, while the intelligible realm of freedom andnorms is subject to the legislation of reason. One of the key problems for Kants practical8

philosophy and philosophical theology is to determine how these two realms might be coordinated.9

One of the key results of transcendental idealism is that, because nature is merely appearance, it atleast possible that agents in themselves are negatively free from natural causal determinism andpositively free to resolve to act on purely rational grounds.

An independent analysis of the principles of practical reasoning reveals that practical reasonlegislates a priorithe supreme moral principle, the formal principle of the categorical imperative,

and autonomously commands obedience to it. Practical reason generates a non-natural, a priori10

rational feeling of respect for the moral law, which is the sole morally worthy motive. This motive11

suffices for action, independent of any desires, inclinations, purposes or ends we may have or anyconsequences we may bring about.12

The implications of transcendental idealism for traditional metaphysics are profound. Kantargues against rationalism that God, freedom, and immortality cannot be theoretically known a priori.He also argues against empiricism that the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality make senseand that their existence cannot be theoretically disproven either. Indeed, Kant contends that its13

a very good thing that we cannot know theoretically whether God exists. If we did, we would actout of fear of divine reprobation or in hope of divine reward, but almost never out of the solemorally worthy motive of respect for the moral law. In the absence of theoretical proof one way14

or the other, it becomes appropriate to determine whether any practical, that is, moral groundssupport beliefpro or contra.15

Kant of course does think there are such grounds. It is important to see that he is quite stringentabout what those grounds can be. Unlike Kierkegaard, Kant will have no part in Tertullians dictum,credo quia absurdum est, I believe because it is absurd. Kant insists that concepts must be logicallyconsistent, clear, and determinate if they are to have objects. Moreover, to ascribe objective realityto a concept, that is, to suppose that it has an object, requires that there are definite grounds for sucha supposition. Kant recognizes that we construct the concept of God on analogy with our under-16

standing, will, and moral ideas. Hence he must be stringent about the grounds for postulating an17

object for that concept. One main element of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason

in the Critical philosophy lies in Kants analysis of the moral reasons for supposing that there areGod, freedom, and immortality. Indeed, the theoretical critique would not have been worth Kants18

effort if it did not have this practical result.19

Kant argues that freedom and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. This means that a free willsimply is a will whose principle is the categorical imperative, and that the categorical imperativeformulates the rational universality of the maxims adopted by a free will. The moral law is given20

to us as an a priorifact of reason, namely, in our experience of being morally obligated. We21

cannot be obligated to do anything of which we are incapable. Consequently we must be, not only22

negatively, but also positively free to act on the moral law. The moral law is the ratio cognoscendi(thereason or cause of knowledge) of positive freedom, and positive freedom is the ratio essendi(the

reason or cause of existence) of the moral law.23

Kant argues along the following lines that we must believe in immortality in order to understand


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how we could fulfill our duty to perfect our virtue. We are always obligated to act out of respect forthe moral law. Virtue consists in always acting from this sole morally worthy motive, and we are24

obligated to perfect our virtue. Ought implies can; one cannot be obligated to do what one is25

incapable of doing. Thus it must be possible for us to perfect our virtue. However, due to the26

frailty of human nature (and original sin), it is impossible for us to perfect our virtue in this worldly

life. The only way to resolve this apparent contradiction is to believe that there is a future life27

during which we can continue to improve our virtue, ad infinitum, at least to the point where God,28

in an act of grace, accepts our effort for the accomplishment itself, on the basis of the merit heascribes to us.29

One of the prime advantages of Kants moral proof of Gods existence over other proofs is thatit justifies ascribing moral characteristics to God. Kant argues that we must believe in God in order30

to understand how we could possibly fulfill our duty to bring about the highest good. The highestgood consists in a systematic connection of two heterogenous components, happiness and virtue.31

Happiness consists in the satisfaction of the sum of ones inclinations; it is necessarily the end of32

all finite rational agents. Virtue constitutes our worthiness to be happy. The highest good consists33 34

in happiness proportioned to desert, that is, to virtue. We are obligated to achieve the highest35

good. Ought implies can. Therefore the highest good must be achievable. The end of proportion-36

ing happiness to virtue seems quite beyond human capacities, individually or collectively. Thoughwe cannot rule out that it may come about by nature, we cannot understand how that could37

happen; in our experience, happiness and virtue are not connected, certainly not systematically.38

Rationally willing an end commits one to willing that there be sufficient means, or at leastconditions, to achieve that end. (Means are resources that are in our power; Kant wants to be sure39 40

that God is not thought to be under our power. ) Properly proportioning happiness to virtue among41

all humanity would require omniscience and perfect justice, to judge peoples otherwise inscrutable worthiness; omnibenevolence, to care for peoples welfare and happiness; and omnipotence,42

actually to proportion happiness to virtue, since happiness requires that nature cooperate with ourdesires. In short, actually achieving the highest good requires God. Therefore, we are committed43

to believing that God exists.44

Now Kant very much thinks that rational faith in God and immortality must be voluntary; faithcan be neither compelled nor obligatory. Rational faith answers a need of practical reason to45

conceive of the possibility of achieving its ultimate object, the highest good. If we could notconceive of the possibility of this end it would be difficult, if not impossible, to will to obtain it.46

This practical faith allows us to believe in divine grace and to hope for happiness in the afterlife.47

It also allows us to believe that the world is fundamentally moral, and that the highest good, which48

would result if everyone did what he or she is obligated to do, will ultimately come about, as the49

Kingdom of God on earth.50

III. HEGELS CRITIQUE OF KANTS MORALWORLDVIEW:PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.

Kants moral world view is breathtaking in its scope and ambition. What does Hegel make of it?Answering this question will take some effort. The published Phenomenology of Spirit is basicallyHegels first draft. The chapter under consideration, The Moral World View, especially bearsmarks of this fact; it is very compressed, highly allusive, and often enthymematic. Moreover, Hegelbarely attempts to follow the procedures required by his own method. Thus an informative51

interpretation of Hegels objections will require a charitable reconstruction. In fairness to Kant,evaluating Hegels objections will require considering Kants views and texts in some detail. There

has been substantial controversy about just how to understand Kants arguments for the postulates,especially concerning God. Fortunately, these controversies can be circumvented, due to a certain52


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philosophical economy in Hegels analysis. Hegel lets Kant have his arguments and focuses on hisconclusions and the world view they articulate. He argues that Kants conclusions form aninconsistent set, and that some of his conclusions are themselves incoherent. Consequently, be thearguments what they may, they must be faulty.

This approach, focusing on the conclusions and letting Kant have his arguments, leads Hegel

to label several of Kants tenets postulates. Along with God, Hegel includes among thepostulates the highest good and the conformity of inclinations to duty. This may sound odd; the53

postulates are usually regarded as pertaining strictly to God and immortality. However, Kant himselflabels numbers of other ideas postulates. He refers to the supreme principle of all moral lawsas a postulate, as well as the highest good and freedom, along with God and immortality. Given54

Kants definition of postulate, this expanded list is appropriate. Kant defines a postulate of purepractical reason as

a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary

of an a prioriunconditionally valid practical law.55

Practical postulates are factual propositions which cannot be proven theoretically, but nonethelessare implied by moral imperatives as corollaries. Hegels usage is in line with Kants definition. (Theconformity of inclinations to duty concerns certain issues about the highest good, discussed below[IV.6].)

Hegels assessment of Kants moral world view is second in harshness only to Nietzsches. 56

Hegel asserts that Kants description of the cosmological argument as a whole nest of dialecticalcontradictions is most appropriate as a description of Kants own moral postulates. He charges57

that Kants moral world view is rife with dissemblance, verging on hypocrisy, because it isfundamentally syncretic, that Kant cannot really be earnest about any of it, and that ultimately Kants

views are driven by envy. It is important to note that these critical terms, hypocrisy, dissemblance,58

syncretism, and earnestness, are not at all foreign to Kants views; he uses these terms repeatedly.59

Thus Hegel contends that Kant has not avoided the difficulties in other views which he sought toavoid, nor has he maintained the earnestness he values.

I propose to leave Hegels charges of dissemblance, hypocrisy, and lack of earnestness aside.Hegels charges of dissemblance largely rest on his view of the interrelations among Kantspostulates. Addressing this part of Hegels criticism would require a more elaborate reconstructionthan can be undertaken here. I also set aside much of Hegels contention that the root of theproblems in Kants views is his dualism. I will focus on Kants alleged syncretism, that is, oninconsistencies in his views.

Hegels obliquely phrased introduction to the Moral World View extols what amounts to

autonomy. He then identifies the sharp division between sensible nature and intelligible norms and60

freedom both as the basis of the moral world view and as the ultimate root of its problems. Hesuggests that although it appears that the Kantian moral world view has achieved autonomy, it infact capitulates it. One general way to think about Hegels objections is this. Given the sharp61

Kantian gulf between the sensible spatio-temporal realm of nature and the intelligible realm ofreason, freedom, and normative principles, it would take a God to bridge the gulf, but given howKant sets up the details of the problems, not even God can do the trick.

Although some of Hegels objections are tendentious, he makes several interesting ones. I willconcentrate on five of his main objections to Kants practical metaphysics. First, Kants problemof coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is contrived. Second, Kants view

of moral motivation is contrived. Third, Kants idea about perfecting our virtue in an infiniteprogress is incoherent. Fourth, and most important, Kants view of the autonomy of moral agency


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is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kants moral principlescannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances. I will consider each of these objections in thisorder (which differs from Hegels order). In conclusion, I will summarize the deep difficulties Hegelraised against Kants practical metaphysics, and I will show that the problems Hegel raised againstKants account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been

resolved, e.g., by Onora ONeills Constructions of Reason.62

IV. KANTS PROBLEM OF COORDINATING HAPPINESS WITHVIRTUE.

The problem of coordinating happiness with virtue arises, on Kants view, because there is noanalytic connection between these two quite heterogenous components of the highest good. Since63

there is a duty to achieve the highest good, and there is no analytic connection between virtue andhappiness, there must be a synthetic connection between them. Acting virtuously is within ourpower, because we can decide to act out of respect for duty; but becoming happy is not, since thisrequires the cooperation of nature, which we did not create and over which we have at best

contingent control. Nature itself is causally determined and amoral, and so will not coordinate virtuewith happiness. Thus some power other than our own is required to proportion happiness to virtue.Consequently, both the possibility of the highest good, and the power who brings it about, namelyGod, must be postulated.

Hegels first objection to this line of argument is that successful moral action itself produceshappiness. Happiness generally consists in achieving ones ends, and successful moral actioninvolves achieving the end required by ones duty. Thus the problem of coordinating happiness with

virtue shouldnt be nearly so great as Kant describes, and it shouldnt require postulating either itsmerely metaphysical possibility or the supernatural condition (God) for its actualization. Though64

Hegels objection can be easily stated, its significance is not so obvious. Assessing its significancewill require examining what sorts of happiness or pleasure Kant thinks are, can be, or are notinvolved in virtuous action. Following out these issues reveals some crucial features of Kants overallaccount of happiness and moral agency. I treat these issues in the next eight sub-sections.1. It may seem that Kant either does or can admit that success in moral action is a source ofhappiness or pleasure. Kant at one point admits, for example, that one can take pleasure in the morallaw itself, or that one can find pleasure in exercising ones rational ability to make moral judgments.65

More directly to the point, Kant asserts that there can be pleasure in the fulfillment of duty. This66

looks to be just the sort of pleasure Hegel claimed Kant denied. However, a closer look shows thatit is not, for two reasons. First, Kant understands fulfillment of duty to consist, not in successfulaction (which is Hegels concern), but resolving to act on the basis of respect for duty. A close look67

at the passages bearing on this point consistently reveal that Kant considers only the feelings

attendant on the resolution of the will in view of the moral law, and not any feelings resulting fromsuccessfully executing ones action.

Moreover, Kant wavers considerably about whether the feeling that results from resolving toact on the basis of duty counts as a positive pleasure, or is instead something else, a satisfaction,contentment (which is a negative satisfaction), or self-approval. Several times he insists that the68

feeling resulting from virtuous resolution cannot be a pleasure at all, in part because it involvesthwarting the inclinations, which causes pain, so that we cant like doing our duty or derivehappiness from it at all. The source of Kants vacillation, and the ultimate reason why he cannot69

regard virtue itself as a source of pleasure or happiness, is not far to seek. It lies in his anti-natural-ism. Pleasure, Kant claims, is the idea of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective

conditions of life. Respect for the moral law, however, involves70


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respect for something entirely different from life, in comparison and contrast to which life and its

enjoyment have absolutely no worth. ... The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment

of life; it has its own law, even its own tribunal ... 71

The heterogeneity of happiness and virtue is thorough, and thus a good will or virtuous motives

must be a source of a kind of satisfaction other than happiness or pleasure. Equally important for72

present purposes is the point that this satisfaction, contentment, or self-approval (be it what it may)is a feeling that results from the resolution or the self-determination of the will to act on the basisof duty. This is a quite distinct source of feeling from the one Hegel emphasizes in his objection,namely, happiness that results from accomplishing what one resolved to do. Thus it does not answerHegels charge.2. It might seem that there is another obvious reason why Kant cant allow that happiness resultsfrom successful moral action. Kant sharply distinguishes acting on the basis of duty and acting onthe basis of inclination. Since Kant defines happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, successfulmoral action cannot result in happiness, since inclinations are strictly to be ignored. However, this

argument is mistaken. To act on the basis of duty is to act on a specific kind of motive, and toresolve to act independently of any consideration of ends or consequences of ones action. Preciselybecause moral motives are independent of ends, it may happen that acting on dutyalso fulfills theend of an inclination. If a morally motivated action also obtains the object of an inclination, thenthat action would in fact produce some happiness.

Notice that this point is the obverse of the one Kant frequently makes that acting on inclinationonlycontingentlyproduces right acts. As he explains, if an inclination happens to be directed towardsomething that is also morally good, then the inclination can motivate a morally right action, thoughex hypothesiit wont produce a morally worthy one. The flip side of this coin is that if a morally73

worthy action happens to be directed toward something that would satisfy one or more of theagents inclinations, then that action would in fact satisfy that (or those) inclination(s), and thus it

would in fact result in some happiness or pleasure.Though this point is significant, it is important to note that this source of pleasure or happiness

is once again quite distinct from the source Hegel stresses in his first objection. Hegels objectionstresses the success in bringing about the very state of affairs required by ones duty, not thecontingent collateral success in bringing about the object of an inclination. Kant never admits thatsuccess in bringing about the state of affairs required by ones duty is itself a source of happiness.74

3. Hegel highlights this point by contrasting the attitudes towards action held by a Kantian moralagent and a (by Kantian standards) amoral agent. Hegel states the contrast in the following way:

The non-moral consciousness ... finds, perhaps by chance, its actualization where the [Kantian]

moral consciousness sees merely an occasionfor acting, but does not see itself even in part obtainingthrough its action the happiness from performance and from the enjoyment of achievement. (PG

p. 325.3134/M p. 366.1317)

Hegel himself believes that successful moral action can itself be a source of happiness, and hebelieves that this idea is not at all far-fetched, indeed, that it is common-sensical. It may seem thatHegel simply begs the question against Kants analysis, or that, at best, he insists that Kants analysisconform to common sense (if it is common sense that successfully executing a morally motivatedact is a source of pleasure). However, Hegel makes a deeper point here. To appreciate this pointrequires understanding an important feature of the kind of internal criticism afforded by Hegelsphenomenological method. The feature in question shows the kinship of Hegels phenomenological

method to Aristotles aim of saving the phenomena.Theories, even philosophical theories, are not simply formal systems; they are devised in order


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to account plausibly and as adequately as possible for an intended domain of phenomena. Animportant feature of Hegels phenomenological method for critically examining a philosophical viewinternally is to examine how well that view accounts for the phenomena within its intendeddomain. This should be borne in mind when interpreting Hegels point about the satisfaction foundin moral action. (I cannot query here the extent to which it is an acknowledged phenomenon, or

even a phenomenon at all, that successful morally motivated action results in pleasure or happiness.)While saving the phenomena is an important philosophical desideratum, neither Aristotle norHegel hold that the phenomena are so sacrosanct as to exclude antecedently any revisionist accountsof them. Since the phenomenon in question, happiness produced by successful moral action, is (atbest) a common-sensical one, and since transcendental idealism is not at all a common sensedoctrine, at least in its analysis of action, it is little surprise to find that it offers a revisionist accountof the kinds of feelings that result from successful morally motivated action.

It is worth tracing out further the reasons why Kants revisionist account of motivation cannotadmit that successful morally motivated action is itself a source of happiness. The fact that Kantcannot admit that happiness can result from successful morally motivated action shows that there

is an inevitable blind-spot in Kants moral world view. As Hegel shows, this Kantian revision of thephenomena is conjoined with several others and serves as a prop for Kants postulates. Clearingaway this blindness reveals that there are some reasons to expect virtue and happiness to coincidein this world.4. It is somewhat surprising that Kant does not admit that successful morally motivated action isitself a source of happiness, for as he says in the third Critique, quite generally, [t]he attainment ofan aim [Absicht] is always connected with the feeling of pleasure ... Kant never applied this general75

point to successful execution of a virtuous act. Why not? Four reasons may be found for this. First,Kant most often defines happiness and pleasure specifically in terms of satisfying inclinations, notin achieving ends (in general). Hence achieving the end of a virtuous act doesnt and cant naturally76

enter his list of sources of pleasure or happiness. Second, Kant repeatedly defines the happiness thatresults from satisfying inclinations in terms of the totalsatisfaction ofallinclinations throughoutones life. As Hegel points out, this wholesale definition of happiness occludes piecemeal sources77

or occurrences of pleasure or happiness. If happiness requires total satisfaction, it is little surprise78

that no single act of whatever sort can produce happiness! Third, according to Kant there is anextremely deep cleft between the requirements of duty and objects of inclination. Reason despisesthe burdensome, despotic, vice-breeding inclinations, and can only wish to be free of those agitatingobstacles to virtue. Indeed, in a passage that must have impressed Schopenhauerand inspired79

Nietzsches response to Schopenhauers pessimismKant states:

If the value that life has for us is assessed merely in terms ofwhat we enjoy(i.e., happiness, the natural

purpose of the sum of all our inclinations), then the answer is easy: that value falls below zero. Forwho indeed would want to start life over under the same conditions, or even under a plan ... that

aimed merely at enjoyment? (KdUp. 434 note)80

On Kants view it is extremely unlikely that a virtuous action would also happen to result insatisfying an inclination. The contingent collateral source of pleasure or happiness from virtuousaction that Kant can admit (above, 2) is extremely unlikely to be much more than a logicalpossibility. Hegel indicates one more reason why Kant cant admit that successful moral actioncauses happiness or pleasure, namely, Kants intentionalism throws success to the wind. This point81

raises several important issues, and so deserves some consideration.5. For several related reasons, Kant quite decidedly comes to value intention over the conse-quences of acts. He distinguishes two senses of act. One sense of act is the adoption of a maxim;the other is the execution of the action enjoined by the maxim. The fulfillment of duty discussed82


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above is an act of the first sort, specifically, the autonomous adoption of a maxim because of itsconformity to duty. Adopting a maxim out of respect for law, is, famously on Kants view, the locusof moral worth. The moral worth of an action is an intrinsic value. Kant insists that this intrinsic83

value is independent of the behavior that results from virtuously adopting a maxim, since thatbehavior is only externally related to the act of adopting the maxim. These considerations lead84

Kant to hold that the fulfillment of duty consists in the form of the earnest will, not in theintermediate causes for success. Kant is quite serious about the moral irrelevance of the conse-85

quences of actions:

All men could have sufficient incentive if (as they should) they adhered solely to the dictation of

pure reason in the law. What need have they to know the outcome of their moral actions and

abstentions, an outcome which the worlds course will bring about? (Rp. 7 note/G&H p. 6 note)

This statement from the Religion recalls the second proposition of morality formulated in theGroundwork:

A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishesbecause of its fitness for

attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alonethat is, good in itself. (Grp. 394)

Kant immediately admits that there is something strange about this idea, but he claims that it accordswith common sense. Hegel disagrees. Moral theory is supposed to be a theory of action, includingquite definitely behavior. Kants intentionalism slights action and the moral responsibility incurredby, and the moral value involved in, behaving outwardly among other people. Hegel follows the86

Greeks in finding freedom of the will in actual conduct. Now this is only to state an issue, not toresolve it, but it is important to note how one revision of the phenomena involves another. Theunderlying issues, freedom of the will and performance of duties, come up again below (V, VIII).

For now it is enough to see that Kants wholesale definition of happiness and his intentionalismsupport his contention that achieving the highest good requires God. If happiness is wholesalesatisfaction of inclinations, and if the consequences of moral action are only externally and quitecontingently related to the fulfillment of duty, then achieving happiness by coordinating nature

with our inclinations is very far out of our hands.6. There is yet another way in which God is necessary to achieve the highest good. This point turnson the causally determined nature of inclinations; it becomes apparent in a shift in Kants definitionof the highest good. Kant initially defines the highest good in terms of proportioning happiness to

virtue. In this vein, Kant remarks, one must be prepared to renounce ones happiness if one lacks87

virtue. The task simply of proportioning happiness to actual merit, in terms of virtue, is certainly88

herculean. However, Kant does not leave the matter there. Happiness, as he defined it, involves totalsatisfaction. As his discussion of the highest good unfolds, Kant makes plain that the highest goodinvolves universal happiness, and that it involves complete (or at least enormously high) happinessfor each person. Now this high degree of distributive happiness requires that individuals have89

morally acceptable inclinations. Otherwise, their happiness, at least in part, would be contrary totheir worthiness to be happy, and thus would be morally prohibited. This is Hegels reason forstating what Kants discussion implies, namely, that Kant must postulate that the inclinations accord

with virtue.90

This goal of utter happiness for each of us is even more herculean than merely proportioninghappiness to moral merit. However, there is a more specific reason why, given Kants analysis,achieving the highest good requires God. Utter happiness morally requires totally permissible

inclinations. Our inclinations are given us by nature. Kant consistently stresses the causaldeterminism of nature, and this includes the causally determined nature of our psychological states,


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such as our inclinations. Since we do not create nature, we do not determine the nature of our91

inclinations. Thus its a matter of pure luck, sheer coincidence, that any of ones inclinations aremorally permissible, and its utterly astounding to think that all or even most of ones inclinations

would be morally permissible. Astounding, that is, unless there is a God who created nature in sucha way that our inclinations are in accord with the requirements of morality. As Hegel notes, this is

one of the reasons Kant must look to God to co-ordinate the supersensible realm of the substrateof nature and the supersensible realm of morality.92

7. Seeing that Kants doctrine of the highest good involves such extremes allows us to understand(if not to endorse) the sense of two corollaries Hegel draws concerning Kants view of happiness,first, that Kant is concerned with happiness regardless of merit, and second, that the developmentof Kants views is motivated by envy. I discuss these two points in turn.

Hegel recalls Kants view that human frailty inevitably results in imperfect virtue, and that Godgrants us happiness, not as a matter of justice based on strict desert, but as a matter of grace, basedon accepting our sincere but defective efforts to be virtuous in place of moral perfection. Since itis not based on merit, Gods decision to grant us grace can only be arbitrarynot a moral decision

at all. Hegel then infers that to hope for happiness in this way, in view of our moral imperfection,that is, our lack of desert, shows that the Kantian agent is interested in happiness itself regardless ofmerit. This conclusion can be reinforced by recalling Hegels point that the Kantian moral agent93

cannot view occasions for acting as opportunities to fulfill or actualize itself. If the Kantian moralagent didfind fulfillment in successful individual moral acts, then s/he wouldnt be looking forfulfillment in utter happiness in the afterlife.

Hegels second charge, that Kants views are motivated by envy, is based on the first, that hesultimately concerned with happiness regardless of merit. Hegel recalls Kants claim, allegedly basedon ample experience, that virtuous people often fare badly, while immoral people prosper. Hegel94

contends that this idea cannot be justified by experience, precisely because Kant claims thateveryones virtue is imperfect. Consequently, there can be no such simple division and comparisonbetween distinct groups of morally virtuous and morally vicious people. Thus the judgment, that theimmoral prosper, can only be an arbitrary opinion, an opinion that must result from envy of those

who are happier.95

Hegels charge may seem harsh in the extreme, but it looks more plausible when viewed in thecontext of Kants blindness to the piecemeal happiness that can result from successful moral action,his vacillating opinion about whether happiness might result from virtuous decisions, his strong,deep, and constantly reiterated cleft between inclinations and duty, and his ultimate contention thatGod grants us happiness as a matter of grace (rather than desert). Taken together, these points givestrong grounds to warrant Hegels suspicion that Kant is envious of those who are happy. Kantadmits, after all, that his desire for happiness is boundless, and that foregoing happiness to be

virtuous can make one morose and surly. From such feelings as these it is but a short step to envy96

those who enjoy themselves, even at the apparent expense of their moral obligations.8. What is to be made of Hegels objections? Hegels ad hominemcorollaries may show that Kanthimselfwas skewed in his assessment of the inclinations and the extent to which they are burdensomeand at odds with virtue. However, one can revise this part of Kants moral theory without alteringeither its principles or its theory of action. At best, Hegel has shown, perhaps, that moral theoryought to approach the doctrine of original sin cautiously, if at all. Hegels point that Kants theory97

systematically occludes, if not excludes, the happiness (or at least the pleasure) that might result fromsuccessful moral action carries more weight. If one took a broader view of happiness as the resultof successfully attaining ones ends, whatever those ends may be, then successful moral action, too,

would itself be a source of happiness. In this case, the problem of proportioning happiness to virtue would not take on such gargantuan proportions as it does in Kants theory. Lessening the


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proportions of this task, of course, weakens Kants grounds for such strong postulates as those ofimmortality and God. In this regard, Hegel is right that Kants metaphysical dualism generates agenuine problem for his account of the rewards of moral agency. Hegel is also right to point out thaton Kants account of moral action, acting virtuously cannot be a matter of actualizing ones nature.

This is an important issue, but Hegel raises it without settling it here.

V. K ANTSVIEW OF MORAL MOTIVATION.

Hegels first objection concerned coordinating moral motives with external nature so as to affordhappiness. Hegels next two objections concern coordinating moral principles with internal nature,our inclinations, in order to allow for action and for virtue, respectively. Hegels second objectionconcerns Kants views on moral motivation. As Hegel notes, Kants official view is that we canresolve to act independently of any inclinations, and that respect for the moral law is sufficient, ofitself, to motivate us to act. Hegel contends that the alleged independence from inclinations of98

moral decision and motivation is belied in action, because all action is motivated by sensuous

impulses and inclinations; they are required for any self-conscious human agent to actualize itselfwhen acting on principle.99

It may seem that Hegel simply begs the question against Kants view of motivation. If we take100

Hegels method into account it is not hard to see that there is a good deal more to be said on Hegelsbehalf. It is worthwhile to reconstruct this objection, for it is fundamental to Hegels charge thatKants categorical imperative is empty. I will proceed in three stages. First, Ill sketch how thisobjection pertains to Hegels charge that the categorical imperative is empty. Then Ill sketch someof the metaphysical disagreements between Kant and Hegel that underlie this issue. Finally, Illdevelop Hegels line of objection in a manner more internal to Kants views by showing that Kantultimately holds that mixed motives are inevitable.1. Hegel believes that motives, as causes of action, and the ends of action cannot be sharplydistinguished in the way Kants analysis requires. He contends that humans act on the basis of theends they seek to achieve, and that there are various ends sought in any action. In addition to anyspecific ends, Hegel believes that there is always a quite general end to any human action, the endof enjoying ones competence. This is a matter of enjoying ones effectiveness as an agent andenjoying having brought about the state of affairs one intended. If Hegel is right about this, then101

Kants contention that we must abstract from all ends and determine our acts solely on the formalrequirements of the conformity of a maxim to moral lawfulness, performing an action solely becauseit is a duty, is impossible. It is impossible because such an abstraction would leave us with no102

reason to act, because reasons for acting always concern ends. If we did nevertheless act, our actioncould not be specified on the basis of pure dutifulness. Since Kants requirement of doing ones duty

solely because it is a duty abstracts from all ends, it cannot have any content at all, since (Hegelcontends) actions are always conceived, intended, motivated, and performed in view of ends.103

2. To say this much is to explain what Hegel is driving at, but it is not to defend his objection. HasHegel simply begged the question, by denying what Kant maintains, namely, that we can abstractfrom all ends when deciding what to do? What can be said to justify Hegels objection? One pointis straightforward. Hegels claim that all motivation must involve our sensibility is a reminder that,antecedently, a uniform account of motivation is strongly to be preferred. Kant offers asystematically revisionist account of human motivation based on his transcendental idealism. Oneof Kants main reasons for defending transcendental idealism is to defend the possibility and theactuality of human freedom and responsibility in the face of the causal determinism of nature,

including our psychology. Kants account of moral motivation is designed to fit the quite narrow104

requirements of his transcendental idealism.


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Is transcendental idealism required to defend freedom and responsibility? Can it defend them?Hegels answers to these questions can only be suggested here. I treat them in turn. Transcendentalidealism defends freedom by purporting to solve the antinomy between freedom and determinism.

While Hegel thought that this antinomy concerns genuine issues, he also thought that those issueshave to do with autonomy, in the sense of rationally giving ourselves our own ends. Hegel105

regarded the metaphysical conflict between freedom and determinism as basically a pseudo-problemgenerated by importing mechanical accounts of causality into the domain of action, where they areinappropriate. Understanding and explaining action requires teleological explanation, of bothfunctional and purposive varieties. If Hegel is right about this, then transcendental idealism is not106

required to defend freedom, and Kants bifurcation between the sole rational motive of respect andall other motives collapses.

Hegel further contends that transcendental idealism cant defend freedom because Kantsarguments to defend transcendental idealism are inadequate. However, Hegels direct criticisms107

of Kants arguments for transcendental idealism are not made in the Phenomenology. Has Hegelanything to offer on this count in this book? Indeed he has. Part of Kants defense of transcendental

idealism rests on his claim that only transcendental idealism can provide a deduction, that is, ajustification, of the applicability of basic categorial concepts to the objects we experience. The108

entire Phenomenology of Spiritprovides Hegels alternative deduction of basic categorial concepts tothe objects we experience. In particular, in the first six chapters Hegel purports to prove that we canbe self-conscious if and only if we are conscious of perceptible spatio-temporal causally interactingsubstances, where our being conscious of such objects requires that we identify and individuatethem by applying concepts of identity, number, substance, and cause and effect to them. Most109

importantly for the present point, Hegel purports to justify these claims while dispensing with theclaims, central to Kants transcendental idealist deduction, that space and time are merely forms ofour sensible intuition. If Hegel has made his case in those earlier parts of the Phenomenology, then hehas strong grounds at this point for objecting to Kants transcendental idealist account of moralmotivation, and the quite severe revisions of the phenomena of motivation it involves.3. To say all this is, however, only to sketch the context of Hegels disagreement with Kant, andnot even to begin to settle those debates. Can anything be said here to justify Hegels objectionagainst Kant? Indeed so. Kant himself doubts whether we can abstract from all ends and inclinationsin the way required by his account of moral motivation. This has some serious implications for hisown analysis.

Kants official view about motivation is that the sole proper determining ground for morallyworthy action is respect for the formal universality of the moral law. This formal universalityrequires that ends are not among the determining grounds of our virtuous resolutions to act. He110

repeatedly warns us about the impermissibility and the dangers of acting on mixed motives; mixed

motives defile and impair the strength and superiority of reason and they can lead to hypocrisy.111

However, Kant also admits that happiness is not only the necessary end of finite rational beings, itis also an inevitable determining ground [unvermeidlicher Bestimmungsgrund ] of their wills.112

Inevitable doesnt simply mean frequent or strong; it means present and effective in everyresolution. A determining ground is not simply a motivating consideration that one might ignore.113

A determining ground is a motivating consideration that enters into ones resolution. Thus Kantsadmission that happiness is always a determining ground (though not the sole determining ground)of the human will is an admission that mixed motives are the best that can ever be expected ofhumans. This concedes, not merely that no one ever doesact solely from the motive of duty, but thatno one can. Consequently, Kant either must rescind his crucial principle that ought implies can (and

conversely), which would completely undo his postulates, or else he must admit that we are notobligated to act exclusively on the motive (determining ground) of respect for law. Perhaps we might


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be obligated to minimize considerations of self-love and to maximize considerations of duty indetermining what to do, but we cannot be obligated utterly to eliminate considerations of self-love.114

Furthermore, Kant holds that legislative reason can check the influence of the inclinations onlyby another end, namely the highest good, which allegedly is an a prioriend. Kant claims that this115

end is given independently of the inclinations. This cannot be right. The highest good may be116

given independently of any particular inclinations, but it is not and cannot be given independentlyof inclinations altogether, since it is formulated on the basis of recognizing that as finite biologicalcreatures, we have and must have inclinations. However the relation between the highest good117

and our inclinations ultimately is reconstructed, Kants admission that only another end can checkthe influence of the inclinations on our decision is crucial because it indicates Kants own doubtsabout, indeed, inconsistency concerning, whether we can completely abstract from all ends whendetermining the will. Therefore, if an end is necessary for determining the will to act (as Kant states),then considerations of the formal universality of law do not suffice to determine the human will.

This conclusion is underscored by Kants gloss on end in this same passage, namely, that ends are

grounds that determine the will to act. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that Kant claims118

that the highest good is an obligatory end. If it is our duty to promote or achieve this end, themorally worthy motive to do so lies in the formal universality of its maxim, not in the material ofthis end. However, Kant admits that the subjective condition under which we can set ourselvesthis end is happiness. This means that without a genuine anticipation of the material end of119

becoming happy, we would not be able to resolve to pursue the morally obligatory end of thehighest good. This admission underscores the insufficiency of formal considerations of duty fordetermining the human wills decision to act. These consequences of Kants view were to beexpected in view of his claim that no mixed will is in fact capable of holiness, of nothing butmorally worthy self-determinations.120

This same conclusion may be reached by another route. In connection with the general duty todevelop ones sympathetic feelings Kant remarks that sympathy is one of the impulses which naturehas implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish.121

Henry Allison contends that Kants remarks to this effect should be taken to mean that sympatheticfeelings ought to be used to counterbalance our tendency to subordinate duty to self-love. In this

way, such feelings are not themselves directly motivating. By counter-acting a countervailing motive,they make it possible for us to determine what to do on the basis of duty alone. Only in this sensedo such feelings enable us to do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish. Allisons122

interpretation is subtle, but inadequate. There are two distinct points at issue: Is the motive of dutythe sole determining ground of the will? Is the motive of duty a sufficient determining ground ofthe will? Allisons interpretation makes it conceivable that in the circumstances in question,

sympathy enables the motive of duty to be decisive for our action. However, his interpretation doesnot make it conceivable that in such cases duty is a sufficient motive. Determining ourselves to dosomething in these circumstances still requires the co-operation of an inclination, sympathy, in orderthat the balance of interest (not of weight) can be shifted by our allegedly pure interest in duty.Such an action may not strictly speaking be from inclination (given the technicalities of Kantsanalysis of decision), but such an action nevertheless is not performed without that inclination either.Duty alone is insufficient in such circumstances to determine the will.123

Kants admissions on these counts are tantamount to conceding Hegels point that Kantsaccount of the virtuous a priorimotive of respect for the formal universality of the moral law isdeeply flawed since no human resolution to act occurs without at least the cooperation of sensuous

inclinations. If this is true, then Kants analysis of autonomy is inapplicable to human beings. Thereis thus all the more reason to hope, as Kant ultimately has to postulate (though he denies it


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empirically), that our inclinations are largely in accord with duty, whether by nature or by grace.124

VI. KANTS IDEAL OF THE INFINITE PERFECTIBILITY OFVIRTUE.

Hegels third objection concerns a different problem of coordinating duty with our internal nature,

our inclinations, in order to be virtuous. Hegel charges that Kants idea of perfecting our virtue adinfinitumis incoherent. Hegels objection charitably leaves immortality itself aside, and focuses onthe premises that purportedly ground this postulate. These premises are that we are obligated toperfect our virtue, and that, due to our sensibility, we as mixed wills inevitably have only imperfect

virtue. Consequently, Hegel argues, we could only perfect our virtue if sensibility dropped out of ournature. However, if sensibility dropped out of our nature, we would no longer be mixed wills and

we would no longer have obligations. Virtue, however, is defined in terms of overcoming the125

obstacles of the inclinations, virtue is exhibited in overcoming those obstacles, and virtue is onlymade evident by overcoming those obstacles. Consequently, if sensibility were to drop out of our126

nature, we could not be virtuous (much less perfect our virtue), either. Hegel charges that Kant

avoids this contradiction between the obligation to perfect our virtue and virtues essential relationtoand its inevitable deficiency due tosensibility by projecting the perfection of virtue infinitelyinto the future, so that its no longer clear what happens. Does sensibility drop out of our nature,127

or does virtue remain inevitably imperfect? Hegel is right that postponing perfection indefinitely128

does not resolve this dilemma.However, this purported dilemma is really a trilemma, since it rests on the duty to perfect (not

simply to improve) our virtue. If there is a contradiction, it is between the alleged duty to perfect ourvirtue and the alleged fact that no finite, sensuously affected will can perfect its virtue. Kantssolution to this difficulty is to weaken our obligation, so that we are obligated indefinitely toimprove, but not to perfect, our virtue. This is Kants reply to Hegels objection. Can Kants129

postulate be saved by this weakening of our obligation? The answer is negative. Hegel may haveignored this move because he realized that this weakening of our alleged duty directly underminesKants grounds for the postulates. Lets see why.

Consider first an alternative obligation simply to improve our virtue. We can fulfill thisobligation during our worldly life. Such an obligation does not require immortality. Consider nextthe Kantian obligation to improve our virtue continually and indefinitely. This stronger obligationdoes require that we continue to exist indefinitely, and that we can be virtuous indefinitely. How-ever, there are no particular grounds to assume that we are obligated to improve our virtueindefinitely, rather than that we are obligated to improve our virtue so long as we are alive. Kantsstrongest ground for supposing that we must improve our virtue indefinitely is that this would bethe maximum any finite, sensuously affected will could do to achieve the supreme condition of the

highest good, which is perfect virtue. However, once Kant admits that the ideal of perfect virtuecannot be fulfilled, so that we are not obligated to achieve it, then he can no longer plausiblymaintain (what was implausible to begin with) that the duty to achieve the highest good is a strictduty and thus requires that we actually achieve it, instead of doing all we can to bring the highestgood into existence (where we might fulfill this duty while falling far short of completely achievingthe highest good). Admitting that the duty to improve our virtue is (in this regard) a broad dutydeflates the mainstay of Kants purported obligation to achieve the highest good. Consequently,

weakening the duty to improve our virtue destroys altogether Kants ground for the postulate ofimmortality.

Furthermore, Kants views entail that after death we are altogether incapable of virtue, and so

cannot either improve or degrade it. A future life is no help to those who aspire to perfect theirvirtue. The reasons why are straightforward. Kant himself indicates that immortality requires dualism


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of mind (or soul) and body. Our sensibility and our animality are functions of our body, and our130

inclinations are a function of our sensibility or animality. Since virtue is defined, exhibited, and131

made evident only in overcoming inclinations, there can be no virtue, no exhibition of virtue, andno evidence of virtue after death. Kant, indeed, comes close to acknowledging this point when headmits that

respect for the law cannot be attributed to a ... being ... free from all sensibility, since to such a being

there could be no obstacle to practical reason. (KdpVp. 76; cf. p. 84.)

Since virtue consists in always acting out of respect for the moral law, any being freed fromsensibility by death cannot be virtuous.

In the Religion, Kant develops the idea first stated in the second Critique, that God determinesthe nature of our moral disposition at an intuitive glance, and adds that we need to represent ourprospect as consisting of a future life in which we improve our moral disposition, because we canonly gather evidence of our moral disposition over time as we see how we react to moral

challenges. This modification wont save Kants position. Kant states ... mans sensuous natureand

132

the natural inclinations arising therefrom ... afford the occasion for what the moral disposition inits power can manifest, namely, virtue ... If this is so, then upon bodily death there would be no133

further occasions for virtue, and certainly no occasions on which we could collect evidence of ourmoral disposition. Therefore nopost mortemexistence can have any bearing on ones over-all virtue,or on our evidence for it. Its worth pointing out the corollary that there can be no happiness in afuture life either. Kant defines happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations. If the inclinations diealong with the body, then they cannot be satisfied after death. Kants philosophy cannot hold outthe hope of happiness in the future life. Indeed, his philosophy cannot hold our the promise evenof a future life, and so also not of an indefinite improvement in our virtue. At the very least, if we134

cannot conceive clearly of what our agency is like after death, then we do not have the definite

grounds required by the Critical philosophy to suppose that we are agents after death, much lesswhether we can either improve our virtue or be happy after death.

VII. AUTONOMY, THE MORAL LAW, AND DIVINE COMMAND.

Hegels fourth and main objection to Kants moral world view is that Kants analysis of moralautonomy is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. This basic objection135

is expressed in the midst of another more specific one concerning Kants view of the relation of thesupreme principle of practical reason and particular duties. After some remarks about this morespecific objection, I will reconstruct Hegels basic objection.

Hegel charges that Kant vacillates between two opposed views concerning the relation betweenthe supreme practical principle and specific duties. (1) The moral agent is responsible for the sanctityof the sole moral law, while God is responsible for the sanctity of specific duties; (2) God isresponsible for the sanctity of the supreme practical principle, while the moral agent is responsiblefor the sanctity of specific duties. There is some language in Kant on which to hang this136

objection. However, Kants remarks about this issue are not systematic, and certainly not137

systematic in the way Hegel alleges. Thus Hegels specific objection is tendentious, though perhapsit is understandable in view of the fact that Kant never, not even once, spells out in any detail thekind of over-all practical syllogism he must have in mind, or at least that he needs, to lead fromthe supreme principle of practical reason to specific duties in specific circumstances. We shall138

return to this problem of applying the categorical imperative in practice in connection with Hegelsfifth objection (VIII).


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Nevertheless Hegel has identified a serious problem. Kant frequently refers to God as a holylaw-giver, to the moral law as a divine command, and to duties as divine commands. Despite Kantsefforts to finesse the point, these claims are ultimately inconsistent with Kants own analysis ofmoral autonomy. Without using the term itself, Kant succinctly states the nature of moral autonomyat the beginning of the Preface to the first edition of the Religion:

So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent who, just because he is free,

binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neither of the idea of

another being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself,

for him to do his duty. (Rp. 3/G&H p. 3)

Precisely because we are free, autonomous moral agents, we can determine by our own reasoningwhat duty requires, and on that basis we can resolve and motivate ourselves to act. We neither neednor can allow any other party or source to tell us what the moral law requires, or that performingour duties is obligatory, or to motivate our performance of duties. Yet Kant also holds that God isthe holy law-giver of the moral law and that the moral law or duty may and should be viewed as adivine command. He expresses this view at least once in the first Critique, once in the Groundwork,five times in the second Critique, six times in the third, four times in the Tugendlehre, and 20 times inthe Religion. What is Kant driving at?139

There are two principles of divine command Kant officially eschews. He rejects the idea ofderiving the content of the moral law from ideas about the divine will, which would be an illicittranscendent enterprise. He also rejects the idea of deriving the binding force of moral obligations140

from divine threats and rewards. These motives are the antithesis of moral autonomy. Kants141

official view of divine legislation is designed to do three things. One is to allow for an expansivemoral feeling, such as the sense of gratitude for our existence that might overtake us at a relaxedmoment amidst the beauties of nature, or the sense of obedience when we put off pressing affairs

in order to fulfill our obligations, or the sense of humility when we realize that we have violated ourduty. Another is to provide support for our possibly wavering commitment to achieve the highest142

good. A third is to provide support for our possibly wavering sense of, and capacity to act from,143

respect for the moral law. Unfortunately for Kants moral world view, each of these is inconsistent144

with his analysis of autonomy, and none of Kants attempts to finesse the point are adequate. I treatthese two points in turn.

Autonomy involves regardingones ownreason as legislating the moral law, regarding both itscontent and its obligation. As he states in the Tugendlehre, the categorical imperative is to beconceived as the law ofyour own willand not of will in general, which could also be the will of an-other. Kant blatantly violates this crucial feature of moral autonomy several times, in both early145

and late Critical writings, by portraying God as wielding promises and threats in order to enjoinacting on the moral law. Dismissing these remarks as unCritical slips of the pen will not save146

Kants moral world view, for even his official critical doctrines violate his analysis of autonomy,though in a more subtle manner.

Commands enjoin actions; they are commands to obey. To view the moral law as a divine147

command is to view obedience as commanded by God (even if God does not formulate the law).To view the moral law as commanded by anyone other than oneself, even if that other being is God,is inconsistent with autonomy. Kants attempt to wed his account of moral autonomy to an accountof divine command makes his moral world view syncretic.

To put this problem into the context of Kants postulates, as Hegel does, the syncreticcontradiction is this: The moral law commands absolutely and sufficiently and we obey itautonomously. The moral law commands that we achieve the highest good. To achieve the highestgood, we must (or, we can) postulate God as the sufficient additional condition to achieve the


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highest good. We regard God as commandingthe moral law (or, we regard the moral law as a divinecommand). This last step is the capitulation of autonomy that agitates Hegel. To be consistent withautonomy, God should be viewed at most as a co-worker for the highest good, nota commander ofthe moral law.

Kant cannot be rescued from this contradiction by appealing to his distinction between the ratio

cognoscendiand the ratio essendiof the moral law. Indeed, this distinction clarifies Hegels objection.The duty to achieve the highest good, together with our obvious insufficiency to achieve this loftyend, are the ratio cognoscendiof Gods existence, from a practical point of view, as Kant qualifiesthis knowledge. Of what, then, is God to be the ratio essendi? If Kant portrayed God simply as theremaining sufficient condition for achieving the highest good, there would be no inconsistency.

There would also be no complete theology, rational or otherwise. Thus it is no surprise that Kantdoes not leave the matter there. He repeatedly portrays God as the commander or the legislator ofthe moral law. This step goes considerably beyond anything Kants argument justifies. At best,Kants moral argument shows that God is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. These qualitiesare allegedly necessary to know who deserves how much happiness, and to bring just that amount

of happiness to them. None of this either requires or allows that God commands the moral law, inthe sense of ordering obedience to it. To portray God as the ratio essendiof the obligation to obeythe moral law (and this is what it must mean on Kants view to view the moral law as a divinecommand) is to capitulate moral autonomy, because it is inconsistent with the archimedean pointof Kants moral argument, and, indeed, his whole moral theory: our alleged self-legislative moralautonomy.

Hegel points out that it is equally misleading to say, as Kant occasionally does, that it ispermissible to postulate the existence of God because it is not contradictory to do so. It would148

be consistent with Kants premises about pure reason and morality to postulate God as anomnicompetentjudge, but notas a legislator or commander, for the reasons just rehearsed. It is not149

even consistent to postulate God as an omnicompetent executioner(following final judgment), for thiswould lead us to act, as Kant himself insists, from fear of divine punishment or hope of reward inthe hereafter but not from respect for law. Though one of the merits of Kants moral argument isthat it justifies ascribing moral perfections to God, Kant is overly optimistic when he claims that hisargument can justify all the transcendental attributes of God. Kant either must give up his150

analysis of autonomy, or else admit that his arguments for God specificallyexcludeGods allegedattributes of commander of the moral law and executor of divine judgment, with its rewards orpunishments, or else violate the highest, if most demanding, obligation of the philosopher:consistency. This is Hegels point in claiming that Kantian moral consciousness cannot be serious151

about the holiness of the absolute being, because this would conflict with its own autonomy. Lets152

look more closely at this conflict.

In the first CritiqueKant states the following:

So far ... as practical reason has the right to serve as our guide, we shall not look upon actions as

obligatory because they are commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because

we have an inward obligation to them. (KdrVA819/B847; cf. Rpp. 99, 122/G&H pp. 901, 112)

This is proper Critical doctrine, and it is syncretic. Kant proposes to avoid heteronomy by notderiving the bindingness of duties from divine command, and to preserve autonomy by regardingthe inherently obligatory nature of duties as the basis for regarding them as if they were divinecommands. This ploy is a failure. To regard moral laws as divine commands is to regard them asenjoined by God. To regard duties as enjoined by God is to regard their bindingness as derivingfrom God. This is inconsistent with autonomy, and the inconsistency is not alleviated if we reachthis portrayal, in the way this passage suggests, by recognizing our inward obligation to the moral


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law and consequently portraying duties as if they were divine commands. This makes plain how153

frequently Kant transcended his own Critical principles by portraying God as a moral law-giver, orportraying the moral law as a divine command, and how much difficulty he had recognizing hismistake.

Finally, it will also not do, as Kant would have it, to claim that in postulating God we arent

making any objective claim about what really exists, but are only basing an idea on subjectivegrounds, as an idea useful for upholding our moral resolve. So long as the idea of God includes154

the ideas of divine command, judgment, reward, or punishment, the idea of God is inconsistent withmoral autonomy and so cannot be used to support our autonomy. Yet these are precisely the divineattributes that are most important to Kant. Indeed, if the idea of God does not include these155

attributes, its hard to regard this alleged being as God. In this connection it is worth noting that itis dishonest of Kant to introduce God as the remaining sufficient condition for achieving the highestgood, that is, that God makes up for what we cannot accomplish in achieving the highest good,156

and then to say that the real point of postulating God is to support our frail ability to act fromrespect for duty and our wavering commitment and efforts to achieve what portion of the highest

good we ourselves can bring about.157

The root of the problem very likely is this: Kant finds it very hard to conceive of respectindependently of the concepts of God as a moral legislator and of the moral law as a divinecommand. This thought surely lies behind Kants repeated descriptions (starting at least in the158

Groundwork) of the moral law and of duty as holy. If it is not possible to conceive of respect159

independently of these concepts, then it is not merely Kants over-all moral world view that isincoherent, but his very concept of autonomy itself. Autonomy is the power of acting out of respectfor the moral law. If respect for duty cannot be conceived apart from God, then the very conceptof respect is incoherent, and if respect is incoherent, so is Kants analysis of autonomy. Hegel is rightthat Kant is mistaken that ethics leads to religion. Certainly the ethics of moral autonomy do notlead to Christian ethics in any traditional sense.

VIII. CONCRETE CASES OFACTION AND MULTIPLE OF GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION .

Hegels fifth objection is that Kants moral theory cannot come to terms with actual cases of action,because any actual case is complex in ways that cannot be handled by the categorical imperative.Hegel argues as follows. Any specific case of moral action occurs in specific, concrete circumstances.Because they are specific, actual circumstances of moral action as such involve a variety of morallyrelevant factors. This multitude of morally relevant factors engenders a manifold moralrelationship on the part of the agent to those circumstances. This multitude of morally relevantfactors and the morally complex relation of the agent to present circumstances engenders a variety

of distinct duties which embarrass the Kantian moral agent in any specific circumstance ofaction.160

Is Kants moral theory embarrassed by concrete cases? Should it be? Why? Kant recognizes thatcases of action may involve a variety of duties, and he expresses nothing but confidence about161

cases of conflicting duties, or, more carefully, about conflicting grounds of obligation. At one pointKant indicates, obviously enough, that absolute duties take precedence over conditional ones,162

just as strict duties take precedence over broad ones. Kants official view in the Tugendlehreis thatthere can be no conflicts ofduties, only conflicts among opposed grounds of obligation. In suchcases, the stronger ground of obligation takes precedence. Now Hegels argument can easily be163

restated in terms of conflicting grounds of obligation, and Kant doesnt explain how we are to

determine the relative strength of grounds of obligation. However, that would seem to be merelyan incompleteness of, and not an embarrassment for, his ethical theory. Has Hegels objection


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misfired? No.It is a fine thing if the categorical imperative can determine that suicide or lying are wrong, but

this information is of limited help if we arent also informed about how to distinguish betweensuicide and political martyrdom, or between morally reprehensible lying and permissible, innocent,socially expedient white lies that deceive no one. Kant raises these and similar kinds of casuistical

questions in several sections of the Tugendlehre, without giving the slightest indication of how toproceed in answering them. Hegels objection poses the problem of relevant descriptions under164

which actions are performed. Even if Kants answer is that the relevant description is contained inthe agents maxim, this does nothing to insure that the agent has taken all the relevant factors intoaccount, nor does it instruct the agent about how to assess these different factors. What can Kantsay about applying his principles to concrete cases?

First, Kant is on solid ground in claiming that applying rules cannot be fully determined by rules,but requires exercising trained judgment. What role does the Critical Philosophy play in guiding165

judgment? Unlike general logic, transcendental logic must include rules of judgment, at least in thenegative sense of rules for avoiding errors. This task is lightened by the fact that transcendental logic

concerns a priorirelations of cognitive judgments to objects. Similarly, the critique of teleological166

judgment needs to determine maxims for guiding judgments of objective purposiveness. Kant167

provides no critique of moral judgment; he simply reiterates that moral judgment requires practice,training, and maturity. The problem is this. Kant stresses repeatedly that moral laws are categorical168

and that acting on them is unconditionally necessary. However, it is very difficult to maintain thatmoral laws are categorical and that acting on them is unconditionally necessary if one cannot sayprecisely what one categorically and unconditionally ought to do. This is because, as Hegel169

stresses, any dutiful act is a specific act in quite specific circumstances, and the nature of thosecircumstances are essential to the moral character of the act. Now broad or meritorious duties allowconsiderable latitude in deciding just how much to do and when to do it. Actions that fulfill dutiesof virtue cannot be specified after the manner of narrow duty. How precisely can Kant specify170

narrow duties? Kant never explains. In his casuistical questions concerning two perfect duties tooneself, suicide and lying, Kant basically throws up his hands in the face of the very questions heposes. Even if he wasnt embarrassed by this, this is an embarrassment for his theory, for it showsthat the specification of duties must be quite sensitive to circumstances; indeed, so sensitive thatKants claims about the categorical nature of duties and the unconditional necessity of acting onthem could only be sustained by packing the antecedents of the statements formulating those duties

with a enormous number of conditions. This threatens to reduce the categorical necessity of Kantianobligations to the following: Respect persons as beings with dignity, however that is best done inyour circumstances. Kants treatment of casuistical questions lends support to Hegels charge,leveled in the Philosophy of Right, that Kants categorical imperative reduces to preaching duty for

dutys sake. At the very least, Hegel is right to point out that Kant overestimates how much is171

accomplished in moral theory by working out only its pure a prioriprinciples. Hegels criticism pointsout that the connection between moral principle, and even the virtuous resolution to act on moralprinciple, may be much more contingently related to right action than Kant ever realized. This pointtakes much of the force out of Kants claim that acting on inclination is only contingently relatedto right action, while acting from duty leaves no doubt about the rightness of the action.172

Kants response to this charge is that his project concerned the metaphysical foundations andprinciples of ethics, and not their application to specific circumstances. Hegels objection makes173

clear, however, that Kant must retract some of his optimistic claims in the Groundwork about howthe Categorical Imperative can function as a compass to guide our action, even in ignorance of the

ways of the world, and it makes clear that Kants claim about the categorical necessity of acting174

from duty is at best tenuous, in view of how conditional that necessity becomes when applied to


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concrete circumstances. Hegels suspicion, in fact, is that once duties are specified concretely enoughto act on them, it will be found that agents can only conceive performing their duty, and can onlymotivate themselves to perform their duty, in terms of the ends enjoined by their duty. If this is thecase, then Kant is wrong to claim that we can act solely out of respect for the formal universalityof a dutiful maxim, in utter abstraction from its end or material. If this is the case, then Kants175

analysis of morally worthy action, and indeed his analyses of freedom and moral responsibility, areseriously compromised. Even if Hegels suspicion on this count ultimately is not borne out, hiscriticisms make plain that the issue of how exactly to apply Kants principles to concrete cases ofaction is notancillary to Kants project, because a rationalist solution to this issue is necessary toshow that reason can, of itself, be practical, that is, can guide our moral decisions about whatspecifically to do.

Kant has another response to Hegels charge that taking specific circumstances into accountmakes duties conditionally rather than categorically necessary: This conditionality is irrelevant to themain issue, because Kants contrast between hypothetical and categorical imperatives fundamentallyconcerns the issue of whether motives or reasons to obey the moral law are internal or intrinsic

to the moral law, or are external to it. Kant rejects externalism by rejecting hypothetical176

imperatives as the basis of the moral law. Consequently, Kant develops his account of respect as amotive intrinsic to the moral law. He infers that there must be such a motive because all willingrequires a motive and his analysis of the formal universality of the categorical imperative abstractsfrom all ends or material of the will. Hegel endorses motivational internalism. However, his177

stress on the circumstantial conditionality of duties shows that Kants dichotomy betweencategorical and hypothetical imperatives is probably not exhaustive. If this dichotomy is notexhaustive, then Kant cannot defend motivational internalism simply by rejecting consequentialismand its hypothetical imperatives. Kant must then find other grounds for defending motivationalinternalism.

IX. CONCLUSIONS.

Hegels critique of Kants moral world view takes up issues in the Critical Philosophys practicalmetaphysics along with issues much more specific to Kants moral theory. Though many of themneed reconstruction, Hegels criticisms of Kants practical faith in the highest good, immortality, andGod, are basically sound. This is a devastating blow to the Critical philosophy, which promisedsuccess in previously fraught metaphysical conundrums. Not only were Kants argumentsunsuccessful, Hegel showed that they couldnt be, since a complete concept of God is inconsistent

with moral autonomy. Kants moral world view is syncretic and therefore untenable. Hegel claimsthat the moral world view collapses internally and is rescinded even by its proponent form of

consciousness. While this claim has a quite particular meaning within Hegels phenomenological178

method, it is worth noting that Kant himself admits that agnosticism [Zweifelglaube] serves as well aspractical faith for supporting ones fundamental moral maxim. Hegels criticisms completely undo179

Kants answer to the third leading question of philosophy, What may I hope? There may well180

be a way to reformulate the Critical philosophy so as to avoid Hegels objections, but that willrequire distinguishing between the spirit and the letter of Kants philosophy, something to which

we know Kant took offense.181

Hegels criticisms of Kants ethical theory considered here are less decisive. However, they setan agenda of problems that still need to be resolved by contemporary proponents of Kantian ethics.Hegels criticisms of Kants accounts of respect and the necessity and specificity of the Categorical

Imperative challenge Kants cleft between reason and sensibility and the extent to which the groundsof obligation are purely a priori and context-independent. A brief look at Onora ONeills


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Constructions of Reasonwill show that, despite her effort to reconstruct Kants views while avoidinghis metaphysical extravagances, she either has ceded many of these points to Hegel, or else still182

remains subject to his criticisms.Professor ONeill probably has done more than any other recent commentator to rebut Mills

charge that the test of Kants Categorical Imperative rests on consequentialist considerations. She

rightly stresses that the universalizability test rests, not on what people desire or on what would bedesirable for people in general, but instead on what it is possible for all to do. However, she shifts183

ground when considering the relevant universality. At one point she claims that the CategoricalImperative requires us to omit those principles that cannot be adopted by all potential agents,regardless of their variable characteristics. Occasionally she describes it as requiring that others beable to share ones maxim. Most specifically, she claims that it requires that others be able to adoptor to share in the very same maxim on which the agent acts. We must respect others possibility ofcollaborating or consenting. These are not equivalent formulations, and their differences must be184

resolved.The most serious shortcoming of her analysis to date is that she has yet to address two closely

related issues that are fundamental to Kants analysis and to both his consequentialist and Hegeliancritics: Why is acting on the test of the Categorical Imperative obligatory? Why is acting on the testof the Categorical Imperative motivating? On Kants view, avoiding heteronomy requires that webe motivated solely by the formal universalizability of our maxim. Though she is quite eloquentabout what is involved in respecting human beings as ends in themselves, she has omitted considera-tion of these fundamental questions. Without a defence of these aspects of autonomy, either185

consequentialists or Hegelians can co-opt her reconstruction of the Categorical Imperative by con-tending that the fundamental obligation and the fundamental motivation to comply with thestrictures of the Categorical Imperative is that one of our fundamental endsor desiresis to be activeagents, and so we desire to have our capacities for agency respected, and we recognize theprima facieimportance of universalizability because there are no morally relevant differences among humanagents that would justify partiality.

Her analysis also raises a fundamental issue regarding the universality and specificity of moralimperatives specified by the Categorical Imperative. Though she recognizes that Kant thought theCategorical Imperative could guide action quite specifically, on her reconstruction Kants test186

focuses on the worth of underlying principles of action and provides no determinate standard ofoutward behavior. On her view, the Categorical Imperative is not a moral algorithm, but it does187

set constraints on permissible courses of action. Rules of whatever sort, including moral rules,188

require judgment to apply them to particular cases. She makes some interesting suggestions in this189

connection for applying Kants maxims for reflective judgment to cases of moral judgment.190

However, these maxims of judgment do not bridge the gap between universalizable maxims and the

quite specific circumstances and manner in which any action must be performed. ONeill recognizesthis insufficiency when she recognizes that particular courses of action and the maxims one mightconsider when deliberating about those courses of action inevitably rely on the agents institutionaland social context. Consequently, a theory of right must be bound to particular social and culturalsettings. In this regard, she admits that Kants view of right action is inadequate. She claims Kant191

contributed some fundamental guidelines and some suggestions about how to introduce theseguidelines into our actual lives.192

If the Categorical Imperative is a test on the intelligibility of plans and is co

Hegels_Critique of Kants Moral World View

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