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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY r

NUMBER 7

22 JUN 1945

NOTE

The information contained in Combat , Notes is classified as Confidential, principally due to the inclusion of unit and place identifications therein. In general, by omitting unit and place iden­tifications, the classification of the article nay be reduced to Restricted.

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Manila Victory page X

British Tanks in Burma Page 20

£A Artillery in Support of Ground Troops on Luzon page 26

By Land, By Airi By Water Page 31

Vary for Victory - page 40

Employment of Screening Snoke by Ground Units page kk

Save the Bridges " r Page 49

MANILA VICTORY

This acticle» based on reports of the 37th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry. Division — as consolidated by the 2X7 Corps -» is presented to demonstrate the general features of the fight far Manila.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BHEMYi - n O.-O.n

From the ^ Manila was doomed to fail­ure* Orthodox defensive tactics ~ andr^ing^nfeSS^utilization of the available means marked a ferocious defense by.the enemy, but loss of routes for re­inforcement and resupply precluded any hope of withstanding indefinitely the assault by our forces. Despite this early handicap, the tactics of the enemy demonstrated that they had learned well the lessons brought our during the opening stages of the European conflict.

In general the capture of Manila was complicated by the long familiar, fatalistic mental attitude on the part of the Japanese.; an acceptance of total defeat but a determination to make that defeat as costly as possible before final obliteration. Added to this was the desire on our part to spare as much of the city as possible and protect a friendly population. While these latter factors may not be present in future operations against the Japanese, a hostile civilian population will present new problems which will have to be dealt with expediently.

Missions assigned the defending force ware.threefold; first* to effect maximum attrition of American fighting power;, second, to delay as long as possible .American occupation and utilization of the Fort of Manila; third, by destruction, to hinder use of the city as a base for future military operations and as an economic and government center. Enemy strength approx­imated 18,400 troops, including a large proportion of miscellaneous person­nel, hospital patients, and freshly inducted civilians. About three-fourths of this number were of Naval origin and the remainder of Array origin. The commander, Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, organized this heterogeneous force into provisional units of company and battalion size.

To augment the comparatively few infantry weapons available,the enemy removed all serviceable weapons from numerous planes and ships that had been victims of our air strikes. As a result the enemy defenses were manned with a very high proportion of automatic weapons. (For example, one pro­visional battalion with a strength of 1,03? had 18 - 25mm MG's, 17 - 20mm MG's, 32 - 13mm MG's, 29 - 7.7mm MG's, and only 200 rifles.)

Enemy armament included the following weapons:

7.7mm Lewis MG, Model 92 7*92mm light, Brett type MG 13ran MG, Model 93 20mm MG 25mm MG Conventional infantry MG's U.S. heavy and cal, .50 MG's Japanese rifles and pistols U3. Enfield, M19Q3 ^ U /"A (Qfpjl U.S. Ml rifles ' U.S. Ml? 11 pistols Lr/.'

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U.S. Browning automatic rifle;. ,;;:,., 8lrsr. mortars !1 i;|: 9 Gem mortars , '• ;,r,.• ,,\]; 150mm mortars " " ' L -"-•jl '< 320mm spigot mortar 25mm M guns 4 Omm JJ> guns 20mm aircraft machine cannon, -Model 99 25mm automatic cannon, Model 96 47mm AT guns 75™a field guns, Model 38 Naval 3-inch guns Naval 5-inch guns Naval 8cm (3-inch), 10-year type, high angle fire guns Naval 12cm, high angle fire guns, type 10 20cm spin stabilized rockets k5cm spin stabilized rockets 50mm grenade discharger

Extensive use was made of controlled and uncontrolled minefields, usually installed on roads, on bridges, in the,vicinity of barricades, or in open lots, although these fields did not follow a regular pattern and camouflage was poor, they were all well covered by fire. In addition to the frequent use of beach, ceramic, and yardstick,mines the enemy 'indis­criminately employed mines improvised from aerial bombs.,, artillery shells, morter shells, and depth charges«

Roadblocks in depth were encountered everywhere, installed,sometimes to the length, of a, city block. One type encountered commenced, with mined approaches to an antitank ditch barricaded with wired vehicle bodies, and then included a series of steel rail, wooden beam, or factory machinery obstacles embedded in concrete. The entire distance was. strewn with, barbed wire obstacles and sown with mines. Fire from all type weapons, some located in armor - concrete pillboxes, effectively covered the roadblocks.

The enemy plan for the defense of Manila indicated that the Japanese were determined-to live, fight and die in place. Defensive positions, while sometimes mutually supporting, did not provide for routes of withdrawal to rear assembly areas from which coordinated counterattacks could be launched. Supplies and, equipment ?/ere buried near positions in which,a last stand would be made. Suicidal attacks were ordered and the sick and wounded were directed to take their own lives when they could fight no more. Nowhere was there any indication of a plan to withdraw the Manila Naval Defense Force so that it might be preserved as a fighting unit for future action against the .American advance. However, any deficiencies in the plan adopted or tactics,, employed "were not reflected in the combat qualities of individual soldiers and small groups. These fought tenaciously and skillfully to the bitter end, using all available weapons and both^nat^ral-,pnd artificial barriers.

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REPRODUCED BY 670 ENGR. TOP CO., MAY 1945

Our success in Manila followed the! ciated in field manuals and technical joiiMII®^^§TtJ6rai"ing again the necessity 'far employing basic fund anient els to accomplish the task a't hand. Much'credit' is also due to loy&l civilians and.guerrillas.who* by pro­viding vital information of the ene-toy* assisted materially in the libera­tion of their own great city. •• .

TK3 ATTACK:

It is recognized that. proper plans for the capture of a built-up area call for : Careful estimates of the situation based on a detailed study- ~of the cits'" itself, and of the enemy dispositions with in and around it. Kow- • ever, the formulation of Such plans for .-the. capture of Manila was greatly influenced by several factors attributable-n6t-only to;the obscure enemy situation but also to the rapid advance of our troops.

_ Although it was realised that the capture of the'' port of Manila at an early date was vital for future operations,, a major port ion,, .of our initial ..effort was directed'to'liberating American prisoners of, war and allied, internees held by the enemy at Santo Tomas University and at Bilibid Prison in North Manila® Flying columns of armor, infantry -and- cavalry came down from the north to drive rapidly into 'Manila, liberating the . prisoners before the enemy, could harm them. The great speed of this advance by^passed. and isolated pockets of resistance, penetrating the enemy screen­ing-force north of the Pasig River to secure virtually the whole of North Manila. .. ,

Bveh at this advanced stage, of the attack little .was known of the enemy- dispositions within the city, or even if they existed. The fact, learned later, that the enemy defensiye plan was directed .towards,attack from the south could not. be anticipated, advancing units searched the city as they moved forward, yet struck nothing formidable 'until reaching the main

• -line "of. enemy resistance at the Pasig River. • .After solid contact was made, it became apparent that the enemy defense was .centered, around the Intrsmuros, as the inner stronghold, partially surrounded, by an irregular semi-circular ring of formidable strongpoints developed from the modern public buildings.

The rigidity, of the. enemy defenses on the south bank, of the Pasig River tended to force our plan of action into the /elementary expedient of crossing further upstream and attacking the enemy from the easto The 1st Cavalry Division and two regiments of the 37th. 'Infantry Division were moved, eastward to effect a double crossing of the River and attack, to the west with divisions abreast. The remaining regiment of1 the' 37th Division held the river line directly north of the formidabled Walled City. As the action developed, after the river crossing was completed, the 1st OaValry Division, on the left, broke contact with the 37th Infantry Division and executed.a wide flanking move inland to'sweep into Manila from the southeaj maneuver actually worked 'somewhat to the detri

it permitted a very string'pocket of resistance, the Makati Circle area, to . survive for several day£..directly between .the. two divisions.,, a thorn in the

side of each.

Nevertheless, both divisions of the XIV Corps closed in on Central Manila and attacked the Japanese prepared defenses of -which the Intramur os was the hub, The fighting which resulted in the destruction of these- de­fenses and the final elimination;of enemy resistance in Manila followed the normal pattern of an attack of a fortified locality, and for discussion may be divided into three general categories? normal fighting in the city streets, the reduction Of strong earthquake proof buildings, and the assault of the Walled City itself, actually these categories were not chronological phas.es, in some cases being simultaneous .actions,

Limitations on Bombing and artillery Fire

' As it was desired -to capture Manila as nearly intact as possible and since a large fraction of the civil population /was still inside the city, bombing was forbidden and the employment of artillery -against, enemy fortifi­cations was greatly restricted. Initially, sections of the city were attacks ed by infantry, using small arms, artillery fire being restricted to counter-battery and to observed fire on known enemy strongpoints. The casualty rate, under this plan, reached, alarming proportions and the attack was slowed to a point vfhere. more , powerful measures had to be taken® Tanks, tank destroyers, and 4*2" mortals, were moved in to support the infantry, and field artillery restrictions were relaxed..;

Artillery fire was again employed against known enemy positions, but so many enemy riflemen were interspersed within the positions that artillery fire directed immediately in front of the advancing troops became the rule. Although a general overall program of destruction, of sections of the city by artillery fire was never contemplated, the preponderance of enemy artillery.

• mounted within the city buildings resulted in almost total destruction of the defended areas.

Street.Fighting . .

Street fighting in Manila followed the tactics outlined in JM 3i**50 and, in general, the principles applied v/ere orthodox. Streets were used as boundaries and units advanced through the interior of the city blocks by means of alleys or breaches through the walls* Platoon leaders organized assault -teams equipped with bazookas and demolitions, and assigned definite buildings and houses for the squads to search. Heavier assault weapons, such as • flamethrowers, were kept with the platoon headquarters group, available On call. •

The size of assault groups was varied as required by the situation, each unit working from building to building, endeavoring to secure the top ' floors first. When a squad was used to search, a small isolated building* half the squad remained outside covering the grounds and entrances while

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CONCEPCION

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REPRODUCED BY 670 ENGR. TOP" CO., MAY 1945 r

^ o t h e ^ h a l f ̂ t e r e d R e s e a r c h e d t h e b u i l d i n g , A s s a u l t p l a t o o n s w e r e e m « * ployed on larger buildings0 the support squad being used to center the move­ment of the assault squads *> GBCf entrance gftiw&f cm e%uad t attested to gain posaeseioss of tfee top floor white' the other, #fM5«sr*4 th# ftaxaA floor anA stairstep WhfrMtfer a unit «M1A c^innv&d trm th* t&p Ujf one building to another this was donet allowing the new building to be ©lean- -ed out from top to bottom. Explosives*, grenades and flamethrowers were used-free ly in room to, room fighting#

Automatic weapons were employed in the support role to keep openings and entrances under fire while assault units closed in on the buildings* Machine gun sections were split to permit attachments of one light and one heavy machine gun to each assault platoon® Mortars were employed to provide screening smoke and to place fire on enemy in the open#

In all cases, it was found advisable to r einforce assault units irrmediately after effecting entrance into a buildingG By this means small detachments became available to remain in the building and prevent re-occupation by the enemy while the attacking elements moved on*

Reduction of Fortified Buildings

•The modern buildings in Manila were very strongly built9 earthquake proof, of heavily reinforced concreteo Many of them were surrounded by parks and wide streets which precluded anything except direct assault over open ground© These buildings had been laboriously converted into mutually support­ing strongpoints of the most formidable type, with sandbagged gun emplace­ments and barricades in the doors and windows covering all approaches, and emplacements within the buildings covering the corridors and rooms# The reduction of each building was actually a series of engagements in itself,.

Although the main line of Japanese resistance Vvras based on these forti~ fiedlpositions, enemy riflemen were cleverly concealed in every conceivably place of vantage outside of the buildings# It was necessary that these outer defenses be discovered and eliminated before our assault units could turn to the task of attacking the fortified buildings# While the problem required a specialized solution,, most of the principles advanced by EM Part 1, ^Attack on a Fortified Position" proved adaptable to the situation#

The first such building to be encountered was the Paco police Station* Indirect artillery fire, 4»2" mortars and: infantry supporting weapons "were employed and the building was-assaulted.by infantry unsuccessfully# Tanks were then brought in, and although two were put out of action by mines ana enemy fire, they succeeded in providing sufficient; direct fire to permit the final assault# Even then the Japanese did not .withdraw" and the last of them were destroyed in sandbagged emplacements dug deep in the floor of the base­ment# These same methods were'employed against other such buildings, until the large'public buildings south of the Pasig were encountered# Here .it was necessary to bring in 155*ro ho wit zer s for direct f it e at ranges of less than

•1 ^ 7 7-600 yards * r As building after building was captured, techniques improved.

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until the "final assault upon the. 'Finance Building® In that action howitzers9 tank destroyers» and tanks were employed against two. sides of the building. Fire was confined to the lower floors in order to prevent shells

.from passing through upper windows and falling in sections of the city;. already under our control. /»s the lower portions of the outer walls dis­integrated, the walls and roof settled but the building did not collapse. The assault guns were then shifted to fire on the remaining, walls s Tanks and.• M-7*s fired HE and IP into the upper stories just, prior to the infantry assault, thereby driving' the Japanese defenders into the basement® Immediate­ly upon cessation of this fire the assault teams effected an entrance and eliminated the last of the enemy garrisoh. : r

Typical of the tenacious defense of. buildings was the action centering around the Manila Hotel® iifter our troops occupied the upper floors of this structure during eta.all ..night battle5 the enemy re-occupied the lower levels. The.,-.following morning ..the Japanese retired under pressure to an air raid shelter located in the 'basement. iin estimated 200 of the enemy,perished upon t;he. ;Sea.lijig of the shelter entrance. :

itssauIt of the Walled City

, The assault upon Intramuros was .unique in modern warfare in that , the entire area was medieval in structure, and its defense combined the fortress, of the Middle iiges with the fire power of modern weapons» A granite block wall.s averaging twenty feet in thickness, surrounded the area. This wall

.was augmented by trenches, tunnels, extensive gun emplacements,, and pillboxeso Maximum use was made of this apparently impregnable wall to protect the 'enemy defensive installations..

, is all approaches to this ancient, fortress were swept by enemy auto­matic weapons fire, the problem of the assault resolved itself into two possibilities. One, an attempt to scale the'wall under heavy covering fire; two, the employment of heavy artillery weapons ;at extremely short range to blast entrances through, the wall. Each plan had disadvantages,. Scaling the wall, w,puld: be extremely difficult and costly in the face of enemy fire; the emplacement of artillery weapons within effective assault range would leave them exceedingly vulnerable to enemy-small arms and mortar fire. The final decision was to support the. attack with all available artillery and infantry supporting weapons'! employing the maximum direct fire in order to breach the wall itself._s Great difficuly was experienced in placing the heavier guns into-direct support positions due to the intensity of enemy fire;, however, later events justified this procedure. .

Two places were selected for the concentration of direct fire weapons to breach the wall; one on the Pas ig River side and the other, in, the north­east. sector opposite the Botanical Gardens» The:129th Infantry, attacking across .the Fas ig River in assault boats, was -to. enter the city through the northern; breach while the I45"th Infantry advanced overland against the north­east breach. /»s an example of the fire support employed, the 145"th Infantry used ,a ,Diedium tanks ,- a company of tank destroyers, a special nssFiii't-h 'cim-nipt nob J rtwn f lamp, thrower f .p, liks . and the regimental M-71S fl assart gun plat

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the Cannon Company plus an •daitioMl M-? So heavy was this preiparation that breaches were- blaJilect *" J J

with little opposition, :'w -

'Once inside: the Walled City our units carried: cut normal street fight­ing tactics with the exception of the" assault' on Fort Santiago, an inner fort­ress containing many dungeonsV recesses and tunnels. To; prevent'exce-ssive losses to our troops , demolition "teams sealed off many of the deep recesses with explosive charges while others-1 "'accoiin'ted' for by the simple expedient of pouring -in"gasoline and ighiting: wMh ® grenades. ' : :

CCMMS; -

It should be emphasized that the defense of Manila v/as influenced by factors 'Which' may not be present in future operatiOiiis of. this type. Scone- of these circumstances complicated the defense, while others facilitated it In the first category were the follov/ing conditions s (a) : the relative--' •scarcity- -of- individual weapons; (b) the- lack of training and ane-xperience' of the enemy troops;, and (c) the presence of essentially-unfriendly civilians (to the Japanese). On the other hand, factors contributing to the defense were.: (a) the large number of. automatic weapons: available; (b) the prohibit tion against aerial bombing by i^rerican forces; (c) the initial restrictions on our artillery fire;- and Cd) our efforts to protect- the :frlendly-civilian. populace. r;-- \7 ;

It is believed that by-pa as ing too many strong,:r isolated centers of re-sis tance is normally a mistake, as the number of<• troops- necessary to contain the defenders will far exceed the number of enemy contained. rIf the defenders are deplojred in rigid defense, it is considered advisable to destroy all enemy as the attack progresses. When it is necessary to by-pass centers of resis- • tance, available reserves should be employed to reduce them as soon as prac­ticable. - '

iill available support weapons "should be concentrated and fully coordi­nated to obtain maximum effect on selected targets. Such preparatory fires against; fortified buildings must be as intense as possible to disorganize • and shock the enemy. Infantry assault' units: must take full advantage of -this preparatory fire to reach positions frcr. which the assault can be made immed-

) lately on cessation of fire* JV building of more than one floor is often'un-• tenable if the enemy holds the upper floors, even though our troops are in­side. If assault units are to enter'the building, direct-'firei weapons should be employed initially against ;the top f loors -and- then shifted downward one floor at' a time. This tends to force the enemy to the lov/er floors and to place our troops on en equal footing insofar as elevation is concerned. However, if the intention is to demolish the building completely, initial fire should be directed against the ground floors. This procedure will • prevent the debris'and rubble from falling on and forming a large1 pillbox of the lower floors and basement. - The: use: of- artillery at" point blank ranges involves considerable risk from enemy small arms fire and care must

;be: exer cised to clear out'riflemen and sniper s bef ore; the artillery ;is^hrought in to direct fire support positions. '!•:•.')

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^ - have completed their preparatory fires, heavy "ft?e^should be continued, from machine guns and rifles. Smoke must be placed on any adjacent positions capable of firing on friendly assault units. Assault teams must enter the building rapidly to forestall enemy attempts to re-man their guns. In some cases the enemy will withhold fire until our troops enter the corridors or other exposed places. To counteract such tactics., MO into the building firing and force the enemy to disclose his positions as soon as possible.

The fight for a large fortified building may go on for days with troops fighting from corridor to corridor and roan to room* At night' a defensive perimeter. must be thrown around the building and within the building to pre­vent enemy reinfer cement or escape.

\ Night attacks through the rubble and debris"are difficult and hazardous, J Movement is slow but seldom quiet. It is almost impossible to keep frcm

^ making noise. Mines and boobj#iraps add to the danger. Small local night | attacks against known enemy positions are desirable and profitable, but large

scale night actions should be avoided.

. While streets may be used as boundaries between units, it is important that careful coordination exist« Troops on one side of the street must watch and cover movement on the opposite side. In thickly built up areas, it is often desirable to avoid movement along the streets themselves and to move forward through the buildings, blasting holes in the walls. This type of covered approach manufacturers an artificial route of evacuation and supply. As soon as a building has been taken, it is consolidated to prevent re-entry by enemy.units. Roving patrols can be utilized to keep captured buildings under control. Underground passages and sewers must be examined and destroyed, if necessary,, to prevent enemy use as a route of communication.

Units must perfect the training of assault teams especially skilled for house to house fighting as the initiative and independent action of these small units will often decide a major effort. Teamwork and a complete under­standing of the responsibilities of each member of the team must be stressed. The first man to enter an embrasure or room opening should ..immediately place his back against the near wall and, by heavy fire,, cover the entrance of other members of the assault team. Various techniques for entering, search­ing and "mouse-holing" through' buildings should be developed®

j The fire power of armored vehicles must be carefully employed. In street fighting they are seriously exposed to close-range antitank weapons and are, therefore, unsuited for "bulldozer" or "crushing" tasks. Normally armor is kept in reserve far the performance of suitable missions, including meeting hostile counterattacks. Individual'tanks and tank destroyers may be used as accompanying guns to attack by fire strongly fortified buildings and to assist in reducing barricades. Long-range flamethrowing tanks are effective for neutralizing enemy resistance and driving the enemy from cover. It must be remembered that armor is best employed in the support role in city fight­ing and in all cases must be protected by infantry units detailed to cooperate

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jisll) ~ ' with the taxalcs. The-tougher the fighting, the greater our casualties will be if the following principles are not observed: (1) no splitting of forces, (2) thorough and purposeful concentration of fire, (3) immediate infantry exploitation of supporting fire, and (4) the closest mutual support and coordination throughout each action.

The enemy, notwithstanding his deficiencies, proved himself a formidable opponent in the defense of a heavily populated area. Unquestionably he will profit by the experience gained during the fight for Manila; and it may be expected that future actions of this type will combine the lessons he learned in Manila with an even more fanatic and tenacious resistance. Many of our troops already have tasted the experience of fighting in cities and have been taught some of the lessons that must be learnedj but it can be anticipated that as the enemy becomes compressed within Ms own boundaries, he will bitter ly contest every inch of our advance. Furthermore, our future city fighting may be rendered more difficult.than that encountered in the past if con­fronted by the presence of a hostile civilian population.

Modern cities will became natural fortresses, each building a pillbox, each street a final protective line. More than ever before, gains will be measured by highly coordinated small unit actions. It is, therefore, of major importance that our army be thoroughly proficient in this type of war­fare® In this connection, whereas our troops made every reasonable effort to avoid destruction of property in Manila, no such care will be necessary should fighting occur in the enemy's cities, especially in those cities where he attempts an all out defense® We must reap the full advantage of our Manila experiences so that we may be better prepared to cope with similar situations in future operations.

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CITY HALL

LEGISLATURE BUILDING

REPRODUCED BY 670 ENGR. TOP CO., MAY 1945

BRITISH TANKS IN,,BURMA

This article, • extracted from the January issue of "Military Reports", tells of British tank operations in the^iitnplml cai^gf^p^ in Burma, the success -of which was largely attributable to unorTHoHox tactics. Tanks attacked over terrain normally deemed unsuitable for their employment® They also were used to supplement artillery, and especially to liquidate Japanese positions that survived artillery and aerial bombardment,

The ac,count of these operations , covering a period of six months, was written by a British tank brigade commander. With the thought that it may contain mary points of interest, we are including his story.

NARMriT/l;

The success of tanks in this campaign was largely due to the surprise achieved by their somewhat unorthodox use. It cannot be assumed, however, that these methods will continue to be effective in thte future, for Japanese countenaeasures, when his equipment has permitted, have been immediate.

It may be expected that:

1# In defense the Japanese will never occupy positions which do not possess either a natural or easily made artificial tank obstacle.

2o 1 The most easily produced antidote to the tank is the mine# Future use by the Japanese of antitank mines in considerable numbers is therefore a foregone conclusion., Thus far there is no effective solution to the problem in this hilly and wooded terrain,,

3e It must be assumed that the enemy is either producing the 47mm antitank gun in increasing numbers, or a more effective antitank gun. At ranges the Japanese antitank gunner has been trained to fire, the 47mm gun is capable of knocking out both the Lee and the Sherman tank.

Terrain obstacles overcame:

The most outstanding development in Burma has been the operation of tanks over extremely difficult terrain. Tree-covered hills, on which it was considered impossible to employ armor, have now become normal ground for tanks,

/

Early in the campaign the British tank commander found the Japanese were invariably taking position on hills« To give close support to assaulting infantry - the true function of the infantry tank - the tanks had to climb those hills. The tank personnel themselves were astounded at the. slopes .their machines would climb

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The British commander urgedthat trews do a good deal of climbing during training to'build up confidence in and learn-the capabilities of their tasks*; VJithout such training it will noi? bet possible -toe jbanjfc . commanders to produce an accurate result from ground reconnaissance. But he also -/arnedthat becaus& tanks. rsached positions previously; considered

v impossible, there was.^a. tendency for infantry to assume that tanks can get anyvfngre• "• .--.r ;• /-f

' ffire support • by tanks; f - . v v . . .

The role of tanks is limited to fire support where .the terrain mikes it,impossible for them to participate in the actual assault,. In the Imphal areas,/where; the infantry attacked, overbroken ground, through.;trees and. shrubs,.and up hill,; it was, impossible to .estimate accurately i the. time.• it would take to reach the objective* On a timed program there was a grave risk of a considerable pause between the end of artillery concentration and arrival of the infantry on the forward.edge of the objective. yiT'fai& pause would allow the enemy to re-occupy his positions and effect minor

, repairs to bunkers and vision slits. . A timed .artill(^:^og^.aBt'.^s...;tlxei,e-fore impracticable, and artillery support had to be "at call".

Th6 British officer recommended.that a tank forward observer accompany the. assaulting infantry. Experience in Burma: also, led him to..recommend the following methods. The infantry will call for the artillery concentration

• when .re.ady fpr it., .and .will call it off when they have approached it as near' as possible,. There, will* however,; still be a gap between the time, the concentration ends and the arrival of the infantry at the objective. This gap can be bridged by the fire from the tanks, called for by the tank forward_observer, so that to all intents and.purposes the concentration continues, \

. The 75®® tank gun is extremely accurate and infantry can-close to within.:,20'yards of its hi# e?£plosive fire,, if infantry: and tanks are

-. operatang on.the same axis, If the infantry is. advancing on a different • axis to the line, of tank ;fire#. they:: can 'safely, closeto 10,.yards',, if1 the tank gunners substitute armor piercing projectiles for high explosive on . the forward edge of the objective. .At the same time: other-tandfcs can continue to fire HE-on the rear and, when passible, ( fla^s. of: .the ob jec* tive, giving the enemy the impression that he'is: iiill urder SS "firei^ '' '

•. By this method, according,, to the British brigadier, it should be possible • to-support /the ;infant'ry .right onto-the:objective,

.. The major problem confrenting "the. British infantry was the reverse slope position, to which the Japanese withdrew during bembardment, 'From liere they either launched an immediate counterattack, or made the British ,. posit ion on the . ob ject ive. untenable by mortar,.£Hd;. ̂ enade'if ir^,', :lt was

. normally impossible to cover allthsse slopes with fire from British gun , positions, so tanks dealt -rath them. -

An additional use fpr'tanks in the fire support.role was to destroy

I j tCjL. . . . . . , -*vj-' —' bunkers' aird-firepos'itions disclosed either by previous air strikes or

during: the actual artillery concentration.. . These uses'of tank'fire support were more.' economical end .beneficial than superimposing tank fire on the -v

.. artillery concentration,," .: /''•'•. •

Because! of artille^ amHiinition shortage, tank fire was occ&siohsilly -used for artillery taskse Harassing fire ,was Conducted even at extreme

1 ranges, using flash /spotters and: an artillery air 'observation 'post. 1 These . conditions are abnormal., However, several times tank fire was effective:

as counter battery 9' whereJapanese guns. could be seen by the talks from a flank but; could not be hit:by artillery... ' '

O'n other/occasions when, artillery could not be brought to; bear,.' eneiry bunkers . on crests,were engaged with success, and destroyed' at |i:<,000 to 6,500

' . .•yards.". ' . ; / • • V ' ' " / ' A / v

. /' ..Higher British headquarters/made'.the following comment} . .:

*It, is coiisidered'that the employment of tanks in these roles. •; which .are primarily artillery tasks is abnormal and should only -be resorted ,;, . to when it is impossible to use recognized, artillery methods. Tank

armamelxt doe^ .not' include equipment necessary/: to bring down effective fire at these ranges, ;/Moreove.r , the density $n£ weight' of concentratio'n, and therefore the results likely to be achieved, "will by comparison with artillery, fire be disproportionate to the number of rounds fired".

Preparation and planning: . ^ '

' The tank.commander 'reported .a; tendency to rush attacks, which is. •• ..i»feurai,^:i;h troops' who/have been fighting the "Japanese-for two

years with inadequate supporting weapons and no tanks. Ihen thV Japanese seize a poMtion, iniless there'is an immediate attack, they rapidly con;-' solidate are. always difficult to dislodge. Rapid attacks,may or may: not succeed and are-always1 expensive in casualties. t. .

... ..,:0ne. of .the main, functions of tanks .is to.'save infantry casualties, •but tliey will not do this if an operation is rushed because .tanks cannot function efficiently unless thsy: have adequate time for reconnaissance and preparation with the infantry. / ; • ; , ... . ; • " '

' The Japanese are adept at digging in and, putting a. position in vay. state, of defense in an incredibly short time. It is questionable,: therefore, whether the term "attack on a hastily prepared position" is ever applicable against. the Japanese, or whether arhastily mounted attack with.tanks is justified. • • '. 1 , '

' : Village fighting;.' . / -

, The original, and' somevfhat natural,, assumption that -if the' Japanese p} , left the Jiillp, and, came into the plain area, they would be quickly , and /

- 22 -

ft

easily disposed of by the tanks, was soon pro iwiSPC" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. On leaving the hills,;,the'Japanese always took up' positioiis "Th •ViltlWges, These villages cover considerable areas with dimensions up. to 1,200 yards by 1*000 yards and are Surrounded by open paddy fields affording no covered approach*' They consist of a Series;pf iibfepounds each containing two rir three houses bounded by bunds 01s, efliij^itoients up ,t6 7 feet high, surmounted by thick bamboo with very limited visibility# These banks are formidable tank obstacles# Also there are often nullahs (dry watercourses or gullies) running through the villages.

Where a nullah exists, the enemy places his main position behind it. His defenses are built into the bunds, and consist of a multitude of positions, manned by one or two men, with overhead cover, well camouflaged and interconnecting. His antitank guns, and in some cases well camouflaged, y

dug-in tanks, cover the junctions of main arteries ahd lateral lanes. In addition, approaches to the outskirts of the village are covered by antitank guns firing across the front. Mines are used to cover the outside approach and are also laid in the lanes and at obvious nullah crossings. Given a night's occupation, the Japanese will be so firmly established that the capture of the village will require a carefully staged operation.

With limited bombardment facilities,;and tijien tanks were to be employed .to assist infantry in the capture of villages, this tark eommander's 'exper­ience proved the following procedure; the most effective: • •••* •"

1. The axis of attack was decided as a result of patrols and ground reconnaissance.

• 2. After such; softening.as. was-possible the, infantry first established a bridgehead.in the village. This was done at night .'when the ' enemy could only fire on fixed lines, and with his normal scarcity of~ :' artillery was unable to put down heavy defensive fire#

3. Mopping up and. mine-lifting within the bridgehead was^\ completed before, day light.

. . Prior to dawn, tanks moved into the village to a central area within, the. bridgehead... They were called forward at daylight, to deal with any strongpoints, located but-not destroyed, during the night.

5« . %" ..day. i.3ifantry probed forward., to, locate • enemy, guns , and . infantry positions, .atid only when. definite targets were found: were tanks called forward to deal with them. Tank commanders moved forward on foot, so the infantry, could ;point out .the targets.i Engineers under, cover of-smoke cleared mines from. the. routes by which the. tanks moved up to engage targets.

6. ; If progressing satisfactorily,-t'his procedure continued, but if heavy. casualties occurred,., it was sometimes necessaiy to call a halt until dark, when a further portion pf the village was boxed.1 As a result

- 23 -

|| M ft"

of information gained during th<5 day, it was sometimes necessary to establish a fresh bridgehead to effect a change of axis#

, This method was slow, but where only limited bombardment facilities existed, it proved itself both effective and economical.

If possible, tanks avoided moving across open ground into a village during daylight. Even the use of smoke could not guarantee neutralization •of defiladed guns in adjoining villages.' The Jap 47mm antitank gun is capable of knocking out a Les tank at J00 to 800 yards. The Jap 75mm

can bi-eak a track at an even greater range.

Deployment of tanks:

On numerous occasions the Japanese held a series of hill knobs, usually at the end of a narrow spur# These positions, might only be held by a section or two with light machine guns, but were so situated that ^ they could not be reached by artillery fire* They occupied a dominating feature and their destruction was essential. It was impossible to deploy wore thafc two sections of infantry and a troop of tanks (three:infantry tanks)» possibly operating only on a one-tank front.

This has been one of the most common operations in Burma, the British officer said* and often necessitated a difficult climb; but the presence.of one tank has been a deciding factor, resulting in the destruction of the enemy, with few, if any casualties to British infantry.

Use of dmoket

The writer recommended that considerable use be made of smoke to cover the movement of tanks in open country; and to enable them to close the distance to their objective. This applies particularly where a troop 6f tanks is working in close cooperation with the infantry#

r... : The Japanese is fully sensitive to the climbing ability of. British tanks,; since his antitank mines have been found in. the most unexpected places in the hills, and antitank guns can be expected in increasing numbers on hill features. When this occurs, operations which have been reasonably safe for tanks will become expensive, unless smoke is used to cover all likely positions of defiladed guns. Local smoke will be necessary to cover" mine-clearing operations.

Protection of tanks*

Tanks will always require a degree of infantry protection and organ­ization should be adopted to avoid constant changing of infantry escorts# The British tank commander advised the term "close escort" requires clari­fying* It does not mean that the infantry must move close to the tank, but rather in a position to protect the tank by fire against enemy attempting

^trp eidSb i•*:Vile tank will always drs.w fire-and infantrymen bunched.

m y

heir area is

itfisi ;a ©g hi

i

around it •Kill incur hea'vy casualties.

Infantry units, must realize that a dIsaf^UI definitely their: commitment.1 It must be expected that the enemy will attempt to destroy it' by .nigbt.. Ah airibush must belaid to;cover this contingency and if possible a trip wire or booby trap.erected.

•CaiMStSi .

"infantry Commanders usually overestimate the capabilities of tanks -: . and, as -a result,, too often employ them unwisely at great cost# It is true that calculated risks must be taken. It is also true that an occa­sional, 'sacrifice can be profitable,: but it must be remembered that deviation from normal tank 'tactics has always been an expensive-practice. The tank' commander, ' himself,\i&:;trained^to know- the capabilities, and limitations of the. tank and while he may 'be jirone to protect-his.materi,el --perhaps unnecessarily his, advice and recanmendat ions should be'requested before a decision is made. .

' The ,role-of the tank, and tank 'destroyer' as :an-artillery' Support weapon probably deserves -more- credit' than attributed -by the British' - • statement, for they have demonstrated their, capabilities effectively •.when.

• supplied firing-data by. the •Artillery f ire. Direct ion Center, • The--shell is lighter-and the rate"of fire slowerf yet- in situations where - additional firepower is .desired or artillery ammuMtioii is scarce., th$ tank cair perfom the job. -- -.•• '."/yir-

Infantry - tank cooperation for close-in support needs continual emphasis, Wien enemy MS defenses prevent tanks from leading the attack, they can be employed to deliver effective support: fire for the infantry assault actions— effective within'a matter of ..yards' to bridge the gap-when artillery fire is lifted. On the other hand, iihen tanks lead the ; action, infantry troops must maintain protective support.

Close liaison, thorough reconnaissance, and careful planning have proved that armor is effective and accurate for-many1 support'roles

„ \ AOTIAIR CRAFT ARTIIIJERY IN. SUBFCRT OF GROUND TROOPS CK HJZON ' '. ; ' ,' • ' .. •: - • 1 , ' r • ••• ,'*• • • ..

GENERAL; ..'.V • ••..; •

Employment of antiaircraft ar,tiilery in.a ground support role is, ne'ithep. new .nor. -untes ted, but recent, experiences--haye. emphasized• the.. capabilities; and; effectiveness; of antiaircraft artillery in this role. * Antiaircraft guns, because of their, high nuzzle velocity, rapid., rate, of fire, flat trajectory, accuracy* ;t. andability to traverse 3.6o°» a?®, very ef feet,ive • against such targets es caves., gun pos it ions, vehic le s, troop , concentrations, trenches, and targets of opportunity where f.orwajjd/positions can be occupied. Radar has,been.used to. advantage in detecting enemy, barge and vehicular traffic •during the hours of - darkness. SearchlighttS. have proven very effective in providing, battlefield illumination at night.

narratives V " ' ' . . , : . ' . - . u .

.. Sixth Army antiaircraft artillery units-have exploited extensively the capabilities of 'their weapons in the ground, support role. .The extent to , which these units have been, employed on Luzon is summarized as follows : .

Area

Baguio

/ Units

2 * Gun 3trys 2 «. 4 Omm AW Btrys'

Balete Pass --Villa Verde Trail

2 - JQwii Gun Btrya 2 - 4Qiriffi Af Btrys

, Clark.Field

Ipo

. 1 — 90iDffi Gun Btry .

3 - -$0rm Gun Btrys 1 - 4 0mm AW Btry

19 - SL Sections.

Montalban 3 ? Oram Gun Btr js<i > 1 - 40mm..-AW Btry 6 - SL Sections

Laguna de Bay ., 4 - $0ma Btrys 2 SL Sections

Batangas

Legaspi

1 * 4 ton. AW Bn

1 y 40®® aw Btry

As in the tactical employment of other supporting, weapons, terrain plays an important part in determining the degree of success to be gained by the use of antiaircraft, artillery weapons, in the ground support role. The. 9Gom gun is capable ..of delivering ,indirect, fire, on distant targets by.

siu^pa ilifel#

'~v .I;.

normal forward observer methods» but when extremely accurate fire against pin-point locations is desired* direct-fire offers the best results,*: The 40mm Bofors should be employed against* targets of opportunity from readily accessible positions affording cover. Their high silhouette and vulner­ability to enemy fire necessitate the use of tank destroyer tactics, for they must move into position undetected,' deliver a heavy concentration of fire and quickly displace to a covered position. Searchlights emplaced'itt def ilade provide effective "artificial-moonlight1'. '

The following examples and results of ground support missions are included to demonstrate the capabilities- of antiaircraft artillery.

1. i> battery of guns was empladed in the Clark Field area for direct fire on targets at ranges of 2,500 - 10,000 yards. In nurasrcus instances enemy caves with two foot openings were closed with two or three rounds:}; others were closed by fire directed just above the entrances, there­by causing landslides, i moving vehicle at 5000 yards was destroyed with two rounds. In one case a barrage of 35 rounds Of-time fire was placed on a large troop concentration, ^fter the infantry had advanced through the area, it was learned that a; large number of Japs had been killed by shrapnel and concussion. Fire missions as si gneU this batter y and the results of these missions weret : •

52 caves - 42 were closed and 10 were unobserved.

3 vehicles - all destroyed. ' '

28 gun positions - 21 were destroyed and 7 unobserved.

4 pillboxes - 3 were destroyed and 1 unobserved.

37 troop concentr at ions - 30 were unobserved, 5 caused estimated casualties of 282 and 2 others caused casualties estimated as heavy.

7 gun emplacements - 2 were destroyed, 1 heavily damaged and 4 unobserved.

2. In the Laguna de Bay area a battery of $0mm guns was assigned the mission of engaging enemy barge traffic at night. With the use of the SCR-j>84 radar this battery fired on 38 targets, expended a total of 115 rounds of ammunition, and accomplished the following results - 11 barges destroyed, 12 damaged, 5 probably destroyed, and 10 unknown or lost.. 43 all firing was at unseen targets, results were judged from the pictures as seen on the radar scopes* The result of this fire was to deny the enemy the use of Laguna de Bay for night barge traffic.

3. Four 90mm guns in the Balete Fass area were assigned direct fire missions for close support of the infantry* Firing positions were selected on top or a nxgn ridge overlooking the commandingterrainsouth of. the Res-t House in Balete Pass. With the.aid of engineer, equj|3m#^?Ai^i na#i%e^y^f:*A311;

• : •, , •• M MM " • ; '' "27;- v ^ ^ S, t* >

access. roads were constructed ariS th& gtms^ Were, winched into position* The resulting field of £ ire paid -dividends i-;

;I)Hring -fche period i2 - 25 i*prir • these guns destroyed 23 enefny. gun positions, closed over 100 caves, destroyed

' two vehicles, damaged'one tank, and placed harassing fire on'troop con­centrations and pillboxes.

" ' 4* The'incidents listed below are taken from action reports of antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons'batteries assigned the mission of direct, fare support .of the infantry- i|i the,Bicol and Bagui.o-areasi.

a . . I n t h e a d v a n c e c a n . a h i l l : i n t ' h e C a m a l i g a r e a , t h e i n f a n t r y w a s held up by heavy mortar and 'machine gun fire. . The -kOm -guns of this battery moved into position and delivered a heavy, rapid concentration which complete­ly saturated the area. Upon the completion of this firing, the infantry - — advanced and Secured the objective. M a point of particular interest, . Japanese who had held out against other fire left their trenches' and emplace­ments "immediately when 'the rapid Bofors concentration began. The Jap 'does . not lite the tree-top bursts from the super-sensitive fuzed 40mm ammunition.

b. One 40mm gun fired into an enemy position southeast of Camalig on request from an infantry battalion. Range was 2500 yards. Fire was

^adjusted--by forward observer as the"target area was defiladed and observation from gun positions,was impos sible* ;^n enemy pillbox on the. ridge was destroyed

c.; '40mm ©in'was., assigned..the mission.of close-in support, to a company on a 'high ridge in the Cituinan Hill mass. J, bulldozer, toeing the 40mcrgun, pushed to the forward infantry position located.at the edge of a

^cliff dominating the Japanese position. Some 218 rounds of; 40mm'Ht£ and 16 rounds of. .aaraaxitlcii Y*e re fired into a Japanese cave, and- tench

. system'at '400 yard$ range.. Heavy trees .in front of the cave were blasted away* .the cave was sealed, and communications trenches were exposed to HE •'

. :shrap»eii The following morning a patrol discovered six dead Japanese and one destroyed machine gun in the trenches* . . '

. d. While this battery was supporting a regiment in its advance to Baguio,. numerous, opportunities presented themselves far. firing missions.

, The. weapons, were employed against caves,, tunnels, enemy concentrations, and the. flanks of defiles, through which friendly traffic passed. • In :son© cases p r o t ec t i on was f u rn i shed t o . eng inee r s who w e re sub j ec t ed t o en emj t : f i r e : .

. while" working, on.roads.- .. . . Y-;

5. Twenty-four searchlights were employed to assist the Corps offen­sive in the Ipo Bam area. Since the initial employment on 7 May 1945» these lights have provided continuous artificial illumination as requested by front line troops. Extracts from periodic operations,reports reflect the degree of

.: success obtained, in battlefield illumination. '•>

a* "Seven searchlights provided continuous battlefield illumina­tion from 2000 to 0600. Reports of infantry units indicated worthwhile re-

l^isults. &o.units:,Claimed:. detrimental effects. -

It - ' . - 2 8 - 7 • ;

IIIPI1ISII tion.

b. "i.n infantry patrol reported killing their perimeter when the enemy became illuminated

c. "i«n infantry regiment reported excellent results in evacuating casualties from the forward area due to visibility afforded by searchlight, reflection* - , 1 -

d. "Xoa infantry regiment requested illumination of Hill li)!10 and were pleased ..with results which" helped them repulse; an enemy counterattack.

e. "Jrom 2000 to 0_545. a battery illuminated the battlefield area along Metropolitan Road east to vicinity of Ipo with excellent results. (Note, that- in this instance illuMnation by searchlights proved effective during a period of full moon..) • '

cc;:,MT3: ' • r .

The maximum range of the JOram gun is approximately .20,000 yards when using point detonating (FD), concrete piercing (CP), armor piercing (L£), or W .fuzed ammunition,. High explosive (HE) ammunition with W+3 A5 fuze has time fire limits of 0.6 second (approximately;600 yards) to 3® seconds (approximately 12,800. yards). The high muzzle velocity (2700 F/3) results " in a very flat trajectory far the 23 lb: projectile, an example being 100 mils quadrant elevation for a range of 8000 yards. The gun is well suited for . pin-rpoint targets, having a probable error of one yard in deflection and 32 yards in range at 5000 yards. The gun can be emplaced, less revetments, in 15 minutes for direct fire» Due to the high muzzle velocity of this wea­pon the projectile can penetrate any type of Japanese tank or . armored vehicle yet encountered.

The maximum range of the l±Qcm gun is approximately 5200/ yards, limited by the self-destruction feature of the fuze. The ammunition is either HE or iiP; the projectile weighs approximately two pounds. The high, muzzle , ... velocity (2870 F/S) results in a very flat trajectory - an example being 18 • 9 mils, quadrant elevation for a range of 2000 yards. The gun can fire" automatically at a rate of 120 rounds, per minute, and can traverse through 360°. It is highly mobile and can be fired from the travelling position...... in an. emergency, '

..... fiiith favorable clouds each 6c—inch, 800 million candle p6wer searchlight can create a condition .'which approximates 3/4 full moonlight ever a sector 800 to 1000 yards wide and1 approximately 10,000 yards long. Lights are normally emplaced in pairs 3000 to 5000 yards behind the front when illum­inating front line areas.. Searchlights may also be used to advantage ixi~ rear areas to aid in traffic and construction. The lights.are centrally, controlled .and may be turned on or off instantly.

i*ntiaircraft artillery weapons, especially when firing Case X (direct fire), should be dug in and protected by heavy revetments. Adequate revet­ments can be prepared in a r elatively short time when, a bulldozer is avail-..

J , " A L r k

• i . . V i • • : ' • • r - - - - : ; - * ; ' • • " • " : V " • ' • ' . • • .

relatively immobile once it is enlaced. although ' . • its road'-aobility'is equal to that of similar calibervgune, it is more

• susceptible t'o damage "from travel :over extremely .rough terrain. ' , •, . ; . V •

ii It hough; antiaircraft gun .units are prepared to operate their own fire * direction centers 'when-deliver lag indirect fire, it is usually mere expedient ^ t « to have- them operate under the field artillery fire direction center, Indir- * ect fire is normally, ad justed by forward observers and liaison planes. When

• firing direct fire, antiaircraft artillery is normally'placed under the. con- * •. trolof the supported infantry., .

Numerous experiments with antiaircraft materiel are presently being conducted in combat. Mobile provisional batteries of half-tracks armed with multiple fifty caliber machine gun mounts and towing a 4GCHI Bofor.s are being employed with divisions,. . Searchlights are continuing to produce "artificial moonlight.",, for our troops in contact ?<ith, the enemy. 'ftactar scopes are ob-

. , , ' serving enemy'.movement at .night t and may :w@il -prove of value in spotting . ' enemy .mortar positions. . In order, to provide a maximum ojf support to the

.- infantry-artillery team the' capabilities of ©11 types antiaircraft materiel will continue to- be exploited.. . .

* 30 -

> .

BY Xv/JKP,. BY Jim* BYTEI/EBR

' :Vr^

'WIT GENERAL:'

This attic le.- is based on a report submitted by the 11th -Airborne Divisioncovering the liberation of Allied internees from the Japanese stock­ade at Los Bancs => "'

The Los Banos incident was the second instance (The assault on Lae by -combined American and -Australian forces was ""^B.e~f irit) during the war against Japan of a raid involving the coordinated use of paratroops, a ground thrust," and an;amphibious landing. ' t'he..overwhelming 'success of this special operation can ber attributed to thorough preliminary planning and reconnaissance, able assistance by civilians and guerrillas? excellent timing, and the aggressive­ness, coolness,end initiative displayed,by the forces involved. Had the execution of the operation been deficient in any of.the above respects, its success and the lives of most of the-troops and internees would have been forfeited. -

NARRATIVE:

On 4 February 1945 ^hile the 11th Airborne Division was still under control of the Commanding 'General, Eighth- ATE®-, the Commander-in-Chief,-.SWFA, directed the division commander to prepare plans for a flying column to rescue the .2,200 Allied internees at Los Banos Internment Gamp, $0 miles to the south and gome 20 miles inside enS!5y~~terr it cry. Since the Division was committed in the fignting" for soutfi'l&niia', "permission-was requested and granted to delay the actual execution of the mission until a sufficient force could be disengaged«

Preparations,-however, commenced immediately. In this connection the division commander realized he could spare troops from the fighting in Manila for, only a very limited periods • Therefore, in order that orientation and extensive planning by subordinate units 'would be 'reduced to a minimum, , he directed his staff to prepare- far each participating element detailed plans based on the following general directive;

1» To infiltrate selected personnel into the area prior to the attack with the mission of marking a parachute drop, zosie and' the landing beach,. and of selecting routes of approach to permit simultaneous, surprise attack: on all sentries. . • ' • —- .•

2» To destroy the Japanese garrison with paratroops dropped.close to the canp„-

3» To land a .beachhead'force equipped with vehicles f or transporting the internees:,to safety,..

• 4* To . launch. ..at: a. distance from the camp a strong, diversionary ground attack. ; ; ' ^

_ u \ \ 1 , " : : U t ;

steiLMsMil!'

5* To establish :a camp well within friendly territory for the quarter­ing and hospitalization of the rescued internees.

The division coriander pointed out that the following considerations would affect the operation and should be constantly•borne in mind during the prep ai" at ion of the assailed plan,;-' ' "

1. The possibility of a strong enemy reaction from, the south by troops of his mobile roserve located' in the Santo Tomas - San Pablo area.

2® Tha necessity for plana to be quite detailed and. for each indi- • .. Vidua 1 participating in tha operation to be, thoroughly briefed*

3« The vital necessity for perfect taming, close coordination, and coiflplate, surprise . •

4»- The. preservation of secrecy by moving'troops to' the vicinity of • the camp just' before' H-hour under concealment of darkness.

5« -The probable presence of many war correspondents,, reporters, and photographers who would bo interested in the interness and consequently might ignore and hinder the military operations and jeopardize the secrecy of the plan. 'v

6, The tendency of civilians to carry heavy baggage and their re­luctance to part -with their possessions, no matter what the emergency.

• In order to secure detailed information of the area and cf the setup at the internment camp, it was arranged to have members of the division G-2 section infiltrated into .the headquarters of. the~gii3rrilla forces in the vicinity cf the camp-,' With the assistance of escaped internees, local civilians, and guerrilla patrols,, this G-2 personnel prepared a detailed map of the camp... to include the exact location 'of every sentry and a covered approach to his position, tho cDxraandairb's 'headquarters, the guard barracks, and the building containing weapons, and ammunitions

Simultaneously, division engineer .parties were reconnoitering the roads and bridges on Highway ffi.. from «leiang to Galamba with the view of making them passable to tank" destroyers and 105mm howitzers and prime movers. . Engineer personnel, also reconnectored for near and far shore landing sites, an important project since in many places the shores of. . Laguna de Bay were too muddy to permit traverse by any of the available types of vehicles*

Information of . the enemy indicated that the Japanese were disposed as.follows; 80 guards- in the Internment Camp area; approximately' a com- -pany, two 105mm gunsj and four MCf's at the gravel quarry 3^00 yards west of the internment camp; 20 Japanese with a machine gun at Mayondon Point;

^tw.o ^ along, the .wharf at Los Banos.;; and a force of' ! appro^irl'tely, 8^0 ijiei^ folding a road block'at the RJ 200 yards -south of the

P'the San Juan River,.'with possible fire support from _ 3 3 _

1 !

° Muntmlupa

TAUM.1

n T

aUmba Lech«ria Hills

Canlubang

ayondon rt

V* Dampatit Rivet

Scale 1:200,000

Bto.Tomas

(&\ Sf^

as issaaaai

on the forward slopes of the Lecher ia Kills. Further­more it was estimated that the Japanese could reinforce the Los Banos area with one battalion from the ilaminos area in 9° minutes by vehicle cr nine hours by marching.

During these preparations maintenance of secrecy was particularly « difficult, as in procuring information of the area our forces would ii>H evitably indicate our intentions to a number of the guerrillas* Furthermore, it was necessary that the 53 amphtracs move to their point of departure on the west shqre of Laguna de Bay near Mamatid, a movement certain to arouse the curiosity of the Japanese if discovered.

J\ist prior to the operation there were questionable indications that the Japanese and the internees had knowledge of the caning rescue attempt. Jax escaped internee : stated that the internees were holding daily 11th Air­borne Division Rescue Day drills. Jit midnight of the night prior to the operation a P-6l night fighter reported many enemy trucks moving into the area. .About the same time another report from friendly sources , stated that the Japanese had reinforced the garrison at the internment camp. Though these reports were not considered reliable and consequently were not trans­mitted to the participating troops, the division commander was concerned enough to move an advance Division CP to Calamba and to alert the 2d Bn, 511th Farachute Infantry Regiment as a possible reserve.

Civ the beach at Mamatid extensive plans for the reception of the inter­nees were meanwhile being made. Eighteen ambulances and 25 - 2-^-1;on trucks were assembled on the beach. Division MP's were to guide each amphtrac to a truck, load all internees except litter cases into the truck, and then load the litter cases into ambulances. Guarded convoys of trucks and ambulances were then to evacuate the internees to the camp at New Bilibid , Prison. Since the beach was within range of enerqy artillery and of an enemy counterattack, correspondents were not to be allowed to interview the internees on the beach, and Red Cross employees were not to be permitted to distribute refreshments there as they had originally planned.

Missions assigned each unit were as follows:

1. Co B, 5Hth Prcht Inf Regt, reinforced by a IMG platoon from 1st Bn Hq Co (a total of 155 officers and men) would jump at H-hour on the drop zone, and would then move rapidly to the Los Banos Internment Camp where it would destroy enemy troops guardinglthe prisphi-organize the- prisoners into two groups - those capable of marching and those not capable of marching - and then contact the 1st Bn, 511th Prcht Inf, at which time the company would revert to 1st Bn control.

2. The provisional division reconnaissance platoon would move by water during the hours of darkness to a landing point east of. Los Banos, contact the guerrilla force of 300 at San Antonio, organizing them into groups, and then assign personnel (including 60 guerrillas) to mark the landing beach and to mark and secure the drop zone. Thereupon, in conjunction with 40

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(J) CO U3AI& 9NOQNVB

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guerrillas the platoon would move to the •vicinity of the interment camp and at H-hour destroy all sentries, and then prevent the remaining enemy guards from leaving their quarters and reaching their rifle racks*

3. The 1st Bn9 5Hth Prcht Inf Regt (less Co B) (plus Co C9 12?th AB Engr Bn? and two assault guns from 457th Prcht Fii Bn) would move by amphtrac to Calamba;, embark at H~2 hour;. land at Los Banos at H-hour; secure and hold the beachhead;, move inland at once».guided by 200 guerrillas# * and contact Co B; load prisoners unable to march into amphtracs and trans­port them to the Mamatid beach; convoy those prisoners able to march to the landing beach and thence to Mamatid on amphtrac turnaround;; and then return to Muntinlupa and secure the hospital there®

4e The 672d amphibious Tractor Battalion would move by water from Mamatid t© the vicinity of Los Banos, load the internees unable to march and transport them to Muntinlupa, and then return to the vicinity of Los Banos to pick up the remaining interneeso

5, The 472d Fii Bn (105HOT/) and 675th P/G FA Bn would support the attack, prepared to neutralize enemy positions in Dampalit River Quarry and to impede hostile movement on the Canlubang and Santo Tomas Roads,

6* The Los Banos Force (less above units) would attack, seize, and hold a bridgehead across the San Juan Riverexpand the bridgehead to con­tact the 1st Bn, 511th Prcht Inf Regtj: convoy prisoners to Muntinlupa;, and prevent enemy movement from Canlubang and Santo Tomas against the Los Banos Force effort.

7* Elements of the 5'fch Air Force would conduct fighter sweeps over Laguna de Bay for several days prior to the operation and during the opera­tion to destroy Jap launches and motor boats, would provide fighter cover over the amphibious force, and would provide the C~47's to transport Co Bc

511th Prcht Jnf Regt, as well as figjrter cover for the transports®

8» The 127th Airborne Engr Bn would reinforce the Binan bridge to carry 25 ton loads by 1700 on D-2 day, would select a suitable embarkation location for amphtracs north of the San Juan River, and wculd suppert the Los Banos Foree throughout the operation®

The plans having been thus completed, during the night 21-22 February 1945 troops were moved to concealed assembly areas near Muntinlupa, the southernmost terrain occupied by the divisione The troops remained coiv cealed all day the 22d February and that night moved to jumping-off positions at Mamatid and Calamba® The two artillery battalions occupied their posi­tions under concealment of darkness# GO B» 511th Prcht Inf Regt (plus "IMG" Plat, Bn Hq Co) moved to Nichols Field, Manila, captured only four daysv before, and slept near the nine C-4?'s during the night®

At 0515 the amphibious force moved out, the amphtracs in a column of threes« The course was 7»4 miles long and, due to the pitch black dark­ness, had to be steered by compass,, This was a new experience for the

! / ',V3fcK f?is:1 -I Ml 3» -; r :\ \\ rp

Dc.stroyt.al Batnboa

\ r>ST

1GUARO Bamboo

Groves 4 Coy on Grass

6 Ft High TARGET

RANSE

l guard i CHICO I ORCHARD'

Double Barbed Wire Fence

6 GUARDS A- GUARDS TRAIL 2^RT P R X K

PROTESTANT \0'~ ^ CHAPEL.

* Trait- with ft/ice

^ On both sides

«, barfcj w)rt on top

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Double barbed q Wire Fence rj Inner - 4-' Hij/i Outer- 6'H/qh

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5 GUARDS SAW*u WALL

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( DITCH)

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TREE OUTPOST

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FILIPINO

HOR^E trail

(WAR CO A

INTERNMENT CAMP No 2 LOS BANOS, LUZON

REDRAWN FROM SKETCH PREPARED BY

HQ llth A/B DIV. Scale 1:5,000 (Approx.)

B Bachelors

M Married

Sentry Post

REPRODUCED BY 69" ENOR.TOPO. CO., M AY ,19-45

: personnel-of th^mphjbian tractor battalion, but they accomplished it in a ;superiOTyinankeir^''"7»s tiie column came parallel to the, landing beach, nine amphtracs at a time performed a right flank movement and the six waves head­ed towards the beach.

At 0630 the nine C-47's of the 65th Squadron, 433d Troop Carrier Group took off- in formation from Nichols Field with fighter escort,

iit 0658, at gray dam, two colurais of 'white phosphorous smoke ascended oh the landing beach and two similar columns ascended from the drop ..zone. This was the first indication that the Division Reconnaissance Platoon had performed its initial missions and was a welcome sight to the troops in the _ apphtracs and those cn the north bank of the San Juan River.*

it 0700, H-hour, the first amphtrac landed on the beach, the first parachute snapped open over the drop zone, and the first detonation of the artillery rolled across the rice paddies from the San Juan River..

: The signal for the Division Reconnaissance Platoon and the attached guerrillas to initiate the attack-was the opening of the first parachute. When this occurred, they immediately bayonetted, grenaded cap shot the sen­tries around the camp, and a squad of selected men led by the platoon leader of the division reconnaissance platoon destroyed a pillbox containing three " machine guns,

' ' . -V •* / •

oilmen of the paratroop force landed without injury in a perfect pattern .on the Drop Zone, assembled in three minutes, and moved out to-.. . ttards the camp. Enroute the force quickly reduced a pillbox containing , a BIG* IX 071?. the troops reached the carp, mopped up the few remaining Japanese, set up a perimeter defense around the casp and began to organize the internees into the two groups, iit .this point the amphtracs arrived and the evacuation began.

The first waves of amphtracs had split into two groups. Co C, 511th Prcht Inf Regt moved at once to Llayondon point to silence a small Japanese force on this high ground, then proceeded toward Los Benos and set up a roadblock. Kemv/hile, Co A advanced along the road towards Bay and occupied the high ground dominating the approaches from the east. Battery D, 457th 3TA Bn occupied positions in the center of the beachhead and opened fire on enemy MJ-'s firing from Mayondon Point. Preceded by mine detecting engineers the succeeding waves of araphtracs moved directly to the carp.

ii3 soon as 1500 internees had been loaded, the anphtracs started on the return trip to Mamatid.. The troops in the camp area, less amphtrac guards, formed a cordon.around..the remaining internees and.marched .them to the beach, guerrillas carrying the heavy baggage. The battalion commander then ordered Co*3 A and C, who had destroyed the enemy resistance on Mayondon Point, and the road from Los Banos, to withdraw from their road­block positions to the beachhead area where the entire attacking force and

-the guerrillas established a strong defensive perimeter.

41

1 V

The original plan contemplated that after from Mamatid to evacuate the remaining interlines, the 1st Bn, 511"fch Prcht Inf Regt would then force its way through to the ground forces attacking from the west. It was apparent, though, from the number of internees evacuated on the first trip of the amphtracs, that the entire attacking farce could be evacuated with the '-remaining internees on the second trip of the amphtracs, so the division Commander directed that this be done. By 1500- the remaining personnel had been evacuated to the Mamatid beach.

To the west the remainder of" the Los Banos Force begtn the crossing of the San Juan River at H-hour. By 0745 the 1st Bn, 188th F/G Inf Regt had seized Lecheria Hills, dominating the road to Los Banos• By 1200 the Battalion had advanced to the Dampalit River against light resistance. By this time the decision of the division, commander to evacuate the entire amphibious force and. the paratrocp force by amphtrac had been made, so the Battalion was ordered to withdraw and to hold- the San Juan.bridgehead and the Lecheria Hills, The withdrawal was completed by 1700. That night the enemy attacked the bridgehead unsuccessfully. ,

• M

C03VBTT3: ' v v : • V \:

In successfully rescuing the 2147 internees, with- our ; casualties' totalling only 2 ELu and 3 as compared to 243 Japanese killed, the Los Banos Force proved beyond question that American troops can accomplish suc­cessfully and' with pin-point precision an operation involving airborne, amphibious, and ground troop3 when it is preceded^by thorough planning and reconnaissance and is executed aggressively.

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Information gained over an extended period from'captured.documents and prisoners of war confirms "previous indications that' the Japanese make a continuous study of our offensive tactics and attest to devise means ? and methods to counteract them. Apparently this is not confined to indiv­idual enemy unit3 but is general throughout all areas where our troops are in contact with them, As a specific example of the intensity of this enemy activity a most couplets file of the 14th Area Army "Combat lessons" was found in the Camp Four area. It appears that by 7 February 1945 (less than one month after our landing) 31 "Shobu Combat Lesson Reports" had been

, issued} and during the period 7-26 February 1945 nine more such reports had been published,. To illustrate more clearly the'Japanese technique along this line several quotations from captured enemy documents are presented, . • '

1» "Our (Japanese) concept of the independence of infantry and tanks should not be talcen to mean that infantry and tanks act independently

*• of one another, 3nercy (American) infantry invariably moves forward to make contact arid "keeps advancing cautiously while under cover of- a-great'number of other infantry in direct support, Whenever the vanguard of his advance of infantry is challenged by our defenses, his tasks promptly concentrate and fire on us from rear positions. Successful counter-meassures to the above procedure may be taken alcng the following lines:

"A3? weapons should not be drawn into premature fire by advance infantry elements or single shots,

"Use should be made of concealed mortarg outside the effective range of enercy tanks to wipe out his advancing

, ... infantry, '

"Eneny infantry should be destroyed by split-second sniping •.Tith both heavy and light machine guns, positions to be

, changed after each burst,

"A good opportunity is presented for a counterattack when casualties have been inflicted on the eneny by our mortar fire and he has become badly shaken,"

2, "The enemy certainly carries on an expensive war. They invariably fire 100-200 rounds at unnecessary targets. At lunch time they quit shelling right on time. After an interim they commence again. At sun-down they cease their activities methodically. It is certainly

; exasperating. When night comes-their rifles and guns are silent as well '* as their, planes, Only the glitter of flare shells fired recklessly by

the eneaiy is "••noticed,' Compared to the terrific battleground of the daytime, the silence of the night is deceptive,"

3« : The next quotation illustrates the measures taken by the

Japanese to couni.er^t. our use of 'heaviei4 aiMjillery1 dalibeste and bombing attackst '•

, "The group artillery position (Japanese) is situated in a ;• < rock ceve, and although 50 "bbmbs and. 250 rounds of 155am

shells scored direct hits on.the.cave, there was.no damage,"

!].•- The following' information vras, obtained.;by the Japanese.' from one of bur pilots who was 'shot down-over their territory's

• '' . . r- '

•The enemy's (American) objective was to reconnoiter artillery positions and attack; theme, In general'* our positions were

- not known but the; cave entrances could easily-, be discovered because they"appear black* Units must thoroughly camouflage ;

• •their 'cave positions,9 ; ; -

5„ The following are excerpts taken from a captured Japanese document on combat lessons:

"When the .enemy's fierce bombing and'shelling' stops, the enemy plans to'envelop; aad 'bypass'U3e..' On these occasions it is ' especially important to Blake a thorough reconnaissance. In view of the fact that the indications 'of 'enemy attacks are always the seme,' it is important to endeavor "to .

. recognize these indications,, On occasions, when OPs have . been surrounded, oil1 the previous, day what appeared to'be small enezry patrols appeared about 200. meters in front of . the OPs, and from time to time they approached while firing

It is apparent from the above that those commanders who continue stereotyped forms of attack can expect the Japanese to be fully cognizant of their methods, and prepared to counteract theme Under such conditions success, if achieved,, is often purchased at a higher price than otherwise would obtain0 Gommaiiders of echelons from. the- division to the squad should, without infringing on basic tactical principals, modify successful methods of attack now in vogue "and continuously seek and devise new methods of combating the enemy's improved defenses. There are. .many examples of successful attacks executed by resourceful commanders who did the unexpected and caught the" enemy off balance« A few of the most noteworthy are listed herein: .

'. 1. , prom the interrogation of a PW captured on Corregidor further confirmation was obtained that the parachute assault on the island was definitely ; ufli^js^e,d...and.,ac^eyed c'^piet;g^^^^.^"e»r""Xlthough the commander of the Japanese garrison had been warned by higher headquarters to be on the alert against an. .airborne attack, he concluded,L;,,9fter a careful study of the terrain, that such an attack would not be feasible., -The commander's esimate v;as a logical one as the terrain definitely did not meet for normal antiaircraft defenses, he prepared no defenses;'on

• I vk'A il

any of the normal requisites of a drop zone0 Therefore, except 1 antiaircraft defenses, he prepared no defeases; j'on tbs^ d

& ' i W i

against a vertical envelopment* On the other . liaMf the enemy1s preparations against ah amphibious landing at, any point, on the island Were Complete in evely detail.

' ' ' • '• . X

' The A*"w Commai der realized that jumping on the "Topside* . of Ccrregidor would be one of the toughest,,„jump,ing assignments ever, given

parachutists, but he was convinced that in spite of .'.thelarge number of '* casualties to be_- expected..frciii/such a jim^^tbe total'would still be much less than if the"seizure of the;. island

' assault* As a result the p^achutists held the cormnarid^ng terrain on Corregidor before the Japanese had time.to realize what had happened.

2a One of the most interesting examples of deceiving the enemy .occurred on the night.27 * 28 March when one battalion of the 20th Infantry ftegiment and one battalion of the 63d Infantry Regiment (each employing one company in the attacking echelon) launched an attack at 2£j.00 hours.. The battalion of.the 63d Infantry, facing light resistance,, employed' heavy preparatory fires while the battalion of the-20th infantry executed a "sneak" attack against:a stronger defensive position. This deceptive, plan • was successful, in that enemy attention was diverted from the threat of the battalion ..of the 20th Infantry* Both battalions gained their objectives with slight loss*

3* About 1600 24 March 1945« following a ten minute preparation by the battalion's HMJ's, the 2d Battalion (less do E, committed on Sacobia Ridge), 149th infantry Regiment attacked-to-secure the east end of ifullins Ridge* By the time the, assault squads had scrambled up the sixty degree

., slope to within forty yards of the Japanese positions, the enemy had emerged, from their caves and manned their guns* The ensuing deadly fire, of the enemy forced our units to withdraw to their-original positions.

. Since F Co had been reduced to an effective strength of , only 49 flieiv the -Battalion Commander decided to exchange S and F companies,

, .- thus strengthening 'his force attacking Mullins. Ridge, Most of Mai-ch 25th -was. spent in effecting this, exchange..

. . ; .. . ,-

At 1545 25 March 1945 the battalion's began a ten minute preparation,} just as they had- done prior to the attack'on the previous day* This time, however, 110 attack was contemplated. At,1600 ,, having given the Japanese five minutes, to emerge from their caves and man their guns against our expected but. non-existent attacks a 28 round concentration was placed on the Japanese positions by the division. 155mm howitzer battalion.

On March 26th following a rationed artillery preparation,, the 2d Battalion (less Co p).attacked and captured the objective, receiving only one casualty, JJTA, By dark over 200 dead. Japanese had been, counted in this position, almost all. of them killed within, the past 24 hours by artillery fire. The artifice adopted by the battalion commander had feinted the enemy off balance and then destroyed the. effectiveness of his force, thereby enabling the battalion to capture its objective at. minimum

1'''cost,,,. ' ;

4* In two daylight attacks troops of the 13"5$3il'nfa!nt#y>l^|glmii had been unsuccessful in assaulting a key hill "east of Sison, To overcome the ©neiiy, it was, necessary to move a battalion into position on the far side of the hill to execute a flanking movement. Because of the excellent enemy observation, this..movement was not feasible during daylight. Under the concealment of darkness the 'battalion wal moved to a favorable line of departure and attacked at dawn. The movement caught the enemy by surprise and the hill v;as quickly captured, ' '

5. Ingenuity and detailed planning made, possible the successful assault of SI Fraile Island (Fort Drum) on 13 April '.1945* ' This concrete bastion, fashioned in the shape of a ship, rises 4°. -feet above the water line, the only.means of access being a sally-port at the east end. Inves­tigation showed that- any attempt to enter the fort through this port would be extremely costly and almost impossible dui to direct fire' frcan enemy machine guns located inside the fort. Representatives of the Navy and the unit malting the assault finally decided that the most expedient means of reducing' the enesry resistance would, be to pump oil and gasoline- through the air vents and'ignite the fuel with' a large demolition charge. To reach the top of this 40 foot rock, a drawbridge was constructed on the top. of an LSM. This drawbridge could then be lowered onto the fort, thus enabling the assault crew to land. . . ' •

On the morning of 13 April Co 151st Infantry Regiment, and a platoon, of' Co. A, 113th Engineer/Battalion boarded the fort,' * Several hundred gallons of fuel were pumped through the air "vents stad a 600 lb. demolition charge with a 30 minute delay fuse was set. The resultant fire prevented entry for five days, after.which 60 enemy dead were found inside. Due to detailed planning, close, coordination, and. the effective use of the means at hand, this operation was executed with only minor injuries.

As we approach the last ramparts of the Japanese Empire, we can expect still greater ingenuity in the construction of elaborate'defenses, and greater cunning, fanaticism, and self-sacrifice from the -enemy who trill nan them# We must meet this challenge with the same resourcefulness that has carried us to victory after victory in our long northward march.

m0mzi:mz OF SCRWING SMOKE ~Ef GROUND UNITS

GEHm iiiHiiL •: . jj

The employment of screening smoke in support of assaulting infantry lias been general throughout our operations in the Southwest pacific area. < Many feasible opportunities for employment of large scale smoke screens ^ have been afforded in many combat-areas on Luzon, When properly employed»• these smoke screens have contributed much to the success of the attack and in the-reduction of friendly casualties, 5

Future operations will assuredly provide many other opportunities for the employment of smoke' in support of assault units# This article is based on data obtained from records of the 6th Infantry Division and of the Chemical Warfare Sect ion, this headquarters, acd is designed to present certain advantages and shortcomings of supporting smoke screens,

'' - ; §

During the, heavy fighting in the Mt, Mataba area of Central Luzon, the 6th Infantry Division: staged an attack to seize three objectives, Hills "A",'"Bn and "C (See sketch)» This attack began on 28 March and terminated on 10 April 1945» with all objectives secured.

Preceded by heavy artillery and mortar fire, the 20th Infantry launched coordinated attacks on 28 March, 30 March, and 2 April* ill three of these attacks made'little headway because, the approaches; to Hill^. "A", 11B" and "C* were rendered untenable by eneny artillery and mortar f-ire, adjustment of this fire apparently being directed from excellent enemy OP's (See l-OP's, sketch)-. Our casualties for these three attacks totalled 35KIA and 126

• WIA, while,killing 116 enemy and destroying 10 enemy pillboxes.

For the atttack on 2 April the 20th Infantry was aided by a smoke \ screen laid in the draw between Hills "B" and "C by Company-B, 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion, This screen was initiated at 0640 and jtaintained until ,1300# .Atmospheric conditions were-favorable ~ cloudy, with a flanking wind of four to" six miles per hour, A total of 2|,800 rounds of 4.2-inch mortar' "W? ammunition was expended. The screen, 1,000 yards in width, masked only the right 'flank;of Hill "B." and was laid directly ahead of the attacking infantry. As a result, enemy OP's were not masked, and intense, accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire forced our attacking troops to withdraw.

The 63d Infantry relieved the 20th Infantry in its zone of action on 4 ~ 5 April, and on. 6 April attacked with the mission of seizing Hills. "A", nBn-and -BC and establishing outposts 0$Mt, Mat aba,- This attack was preceded by a 20 minute artillery preparationfin which VT fuzes were used. This artillery preparation was followed by a 10 minute preparation of 81mm and'4»2-inch mortars firing HB ammunition. As soon as the attack started, Company B (plus one platoon, Company C), 82d .Chemical Mortar Battalion, initiated a supporting smoke screen. This time an extensive 1 screen of 6^po^3^ar|.^3i|^oafea1ge was laid to mask all enemy Op's in the area from Rocky Hill^t&ro'ufeh|tho,l|a-Igo River Gorge, and from the right flank of Hill *B*' to

i i .4 !|S ' L. I,h • —

Sketch*! PANORAM/C WEW 100K/NG NORTH IN D/RECT/ON OF ATTACK

HILL "A" MT. MATABA HILL*B'

HI LL 4 ,C"

MANGO R. GORGE-a MT, PACAWAGAN ROCKY HILL

E-OP J E-OP

& \ku el && iL:

iK& right flank of Hill "A", .including Mt. Mataba, The wind velc practically nil during the early morning hours; however, at approximately 0900 a flanking wind of four miles per hour velocity started, and gradually increased in velocity to 12 miles per hour by 1100 hours# The rate of mortar smoke fire had to be increased in ordej^to maintain the screen i-hich vas rapidly-being dissipated by the increasing-velocity of the wind; and as a result all available smoke ammunition, 6,000 rounds, was expended by l^OO. The screen lifted just before; our troops reached Hills "A* and "OS whereupon the. forward elements'were immediately subjected" to intense enemy artillery and 15Qmm mortar fire which rendered their newly-gained positions lint enable, -Our casualties of 6 KIA and 12 ?/IA were sustai ned after the smoke screen lifted. Enemy killed during the action totalled 168, approx­ies tely 100 of whom were killed by our artillery and mortar fire,

preceded by a mortar and artillery preparation, the 63d Infantry again attacked at 0630 on 10 April with the sane mission of seizing Hills "A",. "B" and "C", and of establishing outposts on Mt. Mat aba. An extensive •smoke plan was put into effect just prior to the jump-off. One platoon of chemical mortars was given the mission of screening Rocky Hill'and the upper 1/kngo River Gorge, At 0800, 1000, and 1200 this screen on the right flank was supplemented by aerial smoke screens laid by two B~25's, each equipped, with'a 200 gallon FS spray tank. Three platoons of chemical mortars «ere given the mission of screening lit, Pacawagan and lower Mango River Gorge on the right flank, and Hills "B" and and Mt, Mataba on the immediate front, The weather was clear and bright with temperatures varying from cool in the early morning to hot at noon. Humidity was high, Wind was . flanking from right to left in the early morning hours. At 0930 the wind direction changed 180°, and all the Smoke which had drifted dovm the l&riquina River Valley was blown back on the objective area, thereby reducing the amount of ammunition required to sustain the screen. The wind velocity throughout the period was 3 to 5 niles per hour. The rise in smoke was not excessive and was sufficient to mask'the high ground occupied by the enemy. The Screen covered frontages of 4»006 yards' on the immediate front aid 2,000 yards on the right flank, A total of 1,500 pounds of TUP ammunition was expended, with an average range of 3*200 yards freer the chemical mortars to the impact areas. Under the concealment of this excel­lent smok<? screen the assault units seized all three hills, and by 1500 Companies "A™ and "S" had seized the SW slope of Mb, Mataba, Our casual­ties for this attack Avere only 8 KIA and 13 WIA, The enemy being unable to shift his artillery and mortar fires on our infantry, was forced to place prearranged "concent rations' which our troops were able to bypass. The attack­ing troops counted a total of 256 dead Japanese, sealed 27 enery caves and destroyed numerous bunkers. ;

COMMENTS; 1 j

The use of smoke on 2 April demonstrated two common errors: first*: the emplpynejit of insufficient smoke in support of an attack; and second, failure to mask critical eneiiy OP's. *

- 47 -

..V,

W> I "i:$ d W ||' • Througliout the" v/ee^r p V.O 0. t; tl • *b. Crfc 0 Ztt**. • 0& -'O ;

nel of; tlid 6th Infantry Division collected meteorological data-.-which: enabled ''the division chemical officer to anticipate the high..wind velocity (12 milers per hour) incomputing'the 4.2-inch mortar W?aiMunit:ii6h requirements. Hue to shortage ofVS? osr^unition in tile theater, howeverf it was not practicable to esGt. ;"e6njpl'etaly -the- smoke screen of • £ April be%n augmented by smoke laid by airplanesas was done in the successful attack of 10 'April,- it is.' believed that the smoke screen could have beerv maintained and objectives secured. -• v •"••

'VJ;' The 180° reversal in -nand directlbh on 1'p April was not an unusual o c currenc e, ' Lo cal wi hds flow down valleys at ni $it:• and Up valleys in t he daytime/ ,A, chaiig© in 'wind" direction may be expected after a 3„ull in' wind velocity ,- th^' uind shift ;nctoaliy::'decurririg:,:hetween the hours of 0800 1000» ' A' kli^leige'6f ^crto»&ste<5^^o^ ;as!esaehtial' in;'Orderv''tO'predict . the behavior: of SEioke"0n•'•'& ^arget'-^ea^'aiid'deterHine the quantity of ammuni tion • ye quired' for mint aini'ng blanket ing smoke screens.

/--One .B-25 typ^:;airplaiie. equipped with a 200 gallon IS spray tank is . capable of laying a. single-, smoke screen 10,66.0*yards long* Whenever practicable, large smoke, screens -.should be laid by this means since the method gives an; efficient' sraoke'.screeh ahd permits saving of ;?3? ammunition.

NotSi (Official^;dpcuments ' of "the 6th infantry Divisioii desigilate .the--hill as Hill "XV

GENERAL;

Of paramount importance to the progress of our combat troops is the ' ability of the Engineers to construct and repair the roads and bridges over " , « which must pass the men and materiel destined for combat,: One of the most

influencing factors on speed in combat can to some extent be reckoned in advance; that is the tremendous task of building roads, bridging rivers, and the subsequent maintaining of both,- HOY/ever,s what cannot be forecast is the amount of damage which may be done by our forces and by the enemy. Consequently, it is only by providing the engineer materiel for an estimated 10C$ repair and replacement that all eventualities can be meto

It must be fully realized that time required for reconstructing roads and bridges is time lost to our forces and time gained by .the enemy for reorganizing and redeploying his forces, bringing up supplies and reinforce­ments, and preparing new defensive positions. Time thus lost by us inevi­tably results in higher casualty rates in order to seize the next succeeding objective. Conversely, time.saved to our troops is time lost by the enemy, and means a saving of men's lives.. :

The following narrative presents one operation wherein careful/ tactical planning enabled our forces to capture three bridges intact, thereby saving an inestimable amount of time and a large task of recon-

1 struction.. While it is not always practicable from a tactical standpoint to secure bridges in advance of our attacks3 the possibility of such should ever be considered. Surprise attacks very often catch the enemy off balance and prevent his,destruction of key features. Perhaps the outstanding example of this type of action is the now historic capture of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, Germany®. This unexpected move enabled our forces to maintain the impetus of their offensive across the Rhine and added to the confusion of the enemy. -

MRRKTIVE:

On the l6th of March the 130th Infantry Regiment of the 33d Division received orders to seize and defend the two highway bridges and the railroad, bridge across the Bauang River. Each bridge was known to- be heavily mined

' and prepared for demolition at the first sign of our approach, Guerrilla reports indicated that the north end of the northern bridge was mined with two 100 kilogram bombs in the center of the roadway and that the southern bridge was heavily charged, the electric wires running to a cave at the south

jf end of the northern bridge.. Jap defenses consisted of 70 raen manning auto­matic weapons, posted to repulse attacks on the bridges and to touch off the

> demolitions. To carry out the mission of removing the demolitions and mines, one platoon of the lo8th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached.

The plan of action utilized, the concealment of darkness to allow the troops an unseen approach to the bridges. Knowing that the enemy bridge guards normally occupied the toll house (see sketch) at the north end of the northern bridge, it was decided that the engineers would move along

LM I "T

/ \

ENGINEERS \ DEPLOYED \

ENGINEER ROUTE

CONCRETE ARCH

/- TOLL HOUSE BELIEVED TO BE LOCATION • FROM WHICH JAPS MERGED TO FIRE

MACHINE GUN AS ENGINEERS WERE RETIRING FROM NORTH END OF BRIDGE.

2-100 KILOGRAM -BCMB w/BOOSTER W ^ PRIMER CORD I

0610 .STARTED ACROSS BRIDGE O615 DEMOLITIONS DEFUSED ,

1 OFF - 4 EM

FRGf ASSEMBLY A

' FORWARD V- ' ' ASSMBLY ; * AREA '

|«—-100

REPRODUCED BY 670 ENGR. TOR CO., MAY 1945

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idge and take up positions on the high ground V i i/'1! I -i \ \j)tl !/ i -

'•"^bfetween the "bridges, and that one detail would then remove mines and demo­litions on the southern bridge while another detail would move forward, under covering fire, to remove the two 100 kilogram "bombs on the northern bridge. As soon as they had cleared the demolitions, the engineers were to assemble on the knoll between the bridges and, by fire, deny the eneny access to the bridges to place additional charges, .'la the meantime, one infantry'company was to ford the river and attack enemy forces in Bauang from the west*

The action proceeded, as planned. That our troops achieved surprise is evidenced by the fact that "it was not until after the demolitions had b§en reMOved and the engineers on the northern bridge were retiring to the assembly area that the enemy guards emerged from the toll house to open fire. The engineers from positions on the kpoll held off the enemy attempts to blowthe bridges for .half an hour until the infantry entered Bauang from the west and drove the confused Japanese from the town,

.One man of the north mine^removal- party was killed in action as the group retired .to the assembly area on the knoll. All members of this

. forward party were decorated for their heroism,

COMMME'S:

The saving of the Bauang River bridges is a. notable action,, not. only because of the heroism of the personnel involved but because its success demonstrated that important bridges, can be saved* 4 Furthermore, the action contributed substantially to the campaign by saving at least one month of reconstructive effort by an engineer company, which effort thus became available for combat engineer projects.

~ .51 -

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

3J695 00491 1145

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