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debates within the social fabric of each respective country. Through a

comparative policy analysis, our paper does so by contextualizing higher-education policies within a welfare regime framework.

The key for a meaningful comparative analysis is a comprehensive

understanding of the trade-offs with which each country is faced when

endeavouring to expand its higher-education system. It is simply not possible

to achieve all of the following goals at the same time: low taxation, low or no

tuition fees, high non-repayable student aid, and a high participation rate in

adequately funded higher-education institutions. Policy decisions are necessary

to prioritize these goals all of which are advocated by at least some interest

groups. How countries deal with and respond to these trade-offs largely

depend on their welfare regimes and the political traditions within which theyare embedded and upon which they rely. We propose that the concept of the

welfare regime is a useful analytical tool to understand the different national

approaches in higher education funding and development.

Conceptual Perspectives

Considerable variation can be observed in the social policies of advanced

industrial nations. According to Hega and Hokenmaier (2002, 2), the specific

nature of their provisions for healthcare, work injury, unemploymentcompensation, and old age pensions bear important consequences for the

socioeconomic opportunities and outcomes of individuals and groups. A

nations social programs reflect the socioeconomic and political institutions

that shaped them. Categorization and classification of public social policies

according to their content and extent of their provisions has resulted in the

development of national profiles that have been further aggregated into

typologies of welfare state regimes. The latter has been accomplished by

generating categories according to the similarity of their social programs, by

their tendency to produce similar and distinctive public policies (ibid.). In this

paper, we employ the typology of welfare regimes advanced by Esping-

Andersen (1990, 1999). Although other schemas exist, Esping-Andersens

typology is described as a modern classic (Arts and Gelissen, 2002) that has

dominated the field of research on welfare states (Hicks and Kenworthy, 2003).

We prefer this framework as it incorporates a complex set of policy dynamics

embedded within the state, market, and family. As Esping-Andersen (1999, 4)

argues, such an approach allows for the interaction between the composite

parts that, in unison, form contemporary welfare regimes. It is beyond the

scope and page limitations of this paper to provide an extensive review of the

literature. For such reviews, see for example, Arts and Gelissen (2002), Bradleyet al. (2003), Hicks and Kenworthy (2003), and Starke (2006).

Hans Pechar and Lesley AndresHigher-Education Policies and Welfare Regimes

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However, another related body of literature is worth mentioning. Iversen

and Stephens (2008) have compared the welfare regime typology with theproduction regime approach of the varieties of capitalism theory (Hall and

Soskice, 2001). The latter approach specifies differences in liberal market

economies and coordinated market economies by contrasting the extent to

which different regimes focus on general vs specific skill formation and the

extent to which they provide vocational training. The interrelationships among

social insurance, skill formation, and financing public education are central to

the production regime typology. The extent to which each is embraced defines

the location of a given country into one of the three worlds of human capital

formation defined in this approach. Iversen and Stephens explicate how

relationships among institutions, political parties, and electoral systemsinfluence and shape skill formation regimes. Elsewhere, we (Pechar and

Andres, 2010) have employed such a comparative approach to examine

educational and skill formation in secondary and tertiary education. In this

paper, however, we focus on tertiary education and hence our conceptual lens

is directed on general level skill formation.

Welfare Regimes

Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of welfare regimes that are shaped

by political traditions and are characterized by coherent patterns of welfare policy.He describes different welfare regimes as qualitatively different arrangements

between state, market, and the family (p. 26). A key concept of this typology is

de-commodification, which refers to the degree to which individuals, or families,

can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market

participation (p. 37). The main criteria employed in Esping-Andersens typology

is de-commodification of welfare provisions for old-age pensions, healthcare, and

unemployment compensation (p. 50). The three types are as follows:

Liberal welfare regimes(e.g., Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, and UK)

are characterized by a low degree of de-commodification and a strong role for

markets in the production of welfare. In liberal regimes, states provide a

residual function; that is, the state assumes responsibility only when the family

and market fails; it seeks to limit its commitments to marginal and deserving

groups (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 20). Other characteristics include heavy

reliance on minimal means tested benefits for clientele of low income (which

often leads to stigmatization when receiving such benefits) and subsidies to

private welfare schemes.

Conservative welfare regimes (e.g., Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands,Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium) are characterized by a strong corporatist


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legacy and a commitment to preserve social structures and hierarchies, and in

particular the traditional family. They are dominated by status-preservingsocial insurance schemes. Conservative welfare regimes support preservation of

thestatus quoand its inequalities. Social rights are attached to class, status, and

work effort. The primary provider of welfare insurance is the state, with the

market and private insurance playing only marginal roles.

Social-democratic (universal) welfare regimes (e.g., Denmark, Norway,

Sweden, and Finland) are characterized by universal benefits based on

citizenship, equal access to benefits and services of high standards, and a high

degree of de-commodification. Welfare coverage is universal and the state

attempts to treat all citizens equally and at a much higher standard thanminimal need. The goal is to guarantee the individual and families a socially

acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping-

Andersen, 1990, 37) without discouraging individual aspirations or denying the

opportunity for private socio-economic achievement.

This typology has been criticized for not including education as part of the

policy packages of welfare regimes. Although Esping-Andersen (1990) clearly

delimited his attention and empirical investigation to income maintenance,

pensions, and health services, he did acknowledge the importance of education

as part of welfare policy:

What, then, constitute salient dimensions of welfare-state stratification?

Apart from its purely income-distributive role, the welfare state shapes

class and status in a variety of ways. The educational system is an obvious

and much studied instance, in which individuals mobility chances not only

are affected, but from which entire class structures evolve.y[Moreover],

the organization of social services, particularly for women, is decisive for a

nations employment structure. (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 58)

Moreover, he points out that except for the examination of the role of

education in mobility studies, job attainment in relation to the welfare state has

been largely unexamined (p. 146). In his more recent writing, he addresses the

importance of education more directly (Esping-Andersen, 2009). Hokenmaier

(1998) and Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) maintain that education policy

should be included both conceptually and empirically in such analyses. After

World War II, higher education was incorporated as an essential part of a

coherent welfare-policy structure (along with healthcare, education, housing,

and employment). However, from the 1950s to the 1970s, as welfare policies

proliferated in most OECD countries, systematic differences prevailed.

According to Hokenmaier (1998), education policy is clearly one component

of a nations total public policy package; and it is not independent of othersocial policies (p. 710). Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) assert that education


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is no less than other public programs, recognized as a core entitlement in most

Western countries (p. 2) in that it allows for upward social mobility, reducesthe extent to which individuals are dependent on wage labour and market

forces, allows for the ability of individuals to improve their socio-economic

status, and hence ameliorates individual overall life chances. As a result, more

highly educated individuals are less likely to place demands on social safety

nets; in turn, decreased demand will lessen the pressure on welfare states to

provide income assistance and other social welfare programs. Castles (1989)

points out that because of the possibility that education marches in step to a

different drummer from other aspects of the peoples welfare (p. 432), it

warrants particular attention as part of the welfare policy rubric. In Esping-

Andersens (1999) later work, somewhat more of the discussion is devoted toeducation and skills in relation to equality. However, he invites educational

experts to design a workable system of skilling entitlements, one that would

befit an ideal postindustrial welfare regime (p. 184).

Because the educational policy arena is vast, in this paper we focus primarily

on higher education.1 Specifically, we seek to determine the nature and extent

to which there is a consistent relationship between higher-education policy

making and the different welfare regimes by examining whether systematic

differences exist in (1) tertiary2 participation and graduation patterns; (2) pre-

tertiary prerequisites for entry into tertiary education; (3) the role of

government with respect to funding higher education; and (4) tuition feesand student financial aid policies and arrangements. However, in order to do

so, we need to introduce the conceptual dimension of trade-off into the

discussion.

The Trade-Off Argument

By adding education to the mix of social welfare policies to which countries

must direct financial attention, we can consider whether and the extent to

which educational policy competes with other welfare policies for public sector

funding support. A small body of literature has demonstrated this relationship

(Heidenheimer, 1981; Castles, 1989; Hokenmaier, 1998; Hega and Hokenmaier,

2002). In an analysis of long term public policy trends in Europe and the USA,

Heidenheimer (1981) concludes that a trade-off occurred in the extent to which

countries have historically invested in either providing public post-primary

educational opportunities or social insurance programs. Castles (1989) explains

that the two sets of policy alternatives have different goals. Whereas social

welfare policies such as unemployment insurance and old age pensions are

intended to ensure equality of condition, the goal of educational policies is toenhance equality of opportunity. This trade-off thesis adds explanatory power


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to the paradox that although liberal regimes exhibit more inequality with

respect to most indicators (e.g., income, Gini co-efficient, and housing patterns),they are socially more inclusive than conservative regimes in regard to

educational participation and completion rates at all levels beyond post-primary.

By directing resources toward education rather than toward policies that

would buttress the development of other forms of social welfare, support for

public education over social protection programs becomes an alternative

welfare state policy strategy (Castles, 1989). The latter is future directed that

is, oriented to improving the life chances of future generations, as opposed to

supporting equality of condition of the current generation. However, historical

funding preference for one set of social programs over the other may lead to

difficulties in switching policy directions in the future (Hega and Hokenmaier,2002). Hega and Hokenmaier add that countries favouring post-primary

educational opportunities are signalling that public safety nets exist only as

temporary assistance and to buffer the effects of extreme socioeconomic change,

not to insulate the individual from every risk of life, societal competition, and

market forces (p. 4). In doing so, greater self-reliance on the part of the

individual is encouraged and expected and education serves to provide the

individual with the necessary human capital to succeed in the market.

Some authors have attempted to link the trade-off thesis to Esping-

Andersens theory of three distinctive welfare regimes by claiming that

particular tendencies in educational policy correspond to Esping-Andersenswelfare regime types. We agree with Hega and Hokenmaier (2002) that it is a

useful exercise to consider this typology in relation to the extent that there is a

trade-off between public funding support for education and other social

programs in welfare states. In this paper, informed by the findings and

following along Hega and Hokenmaiers line of inquiry, we seek to further

explore the relationships among welfare regimes, extent of expansion of higher

education, and related trade-offs.

One can question whether trade-offs that imply choosing between two

alternatives are unavoidable. The welfare regime typology offers three

perspectives, one of which appears to transcend such a binary trade-off. For

that purpose, the concept of a trilemmaof subsidization, coverage, and public

cost, as specified by Ansell (2008), may be more valid as it includes level of

taxation as one of the dimensions of the public policy process. We revisit this in

the conclusion and in light of our findings.

Research Design

To examine our analytical framework, we advance a few hypotheses. First, weexpect to find systematic differences in participation in tertiary education


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among the different welfare regimes. We expect that conservative regimes

constrain the expansion of higher education. The main reason is the strongpreference embedded in the institutional arrangements of conservative

regimes for preserving the established social order. Hence, educational

opportunities are strongly linked to social estates.3 As a consequence, these

regimes practise a strong kind of sponsored mobility (Turner, 1960). That is,

the potential of the young generation is identified at a very early age and high

potentials are encouraged to stay in the educational track that leads to the

highest educational credentials; at the same time, the ambitions of the rest are

discouraged and they are assigned to more modest opportunities (e.g., different

tracks at lower secondary school and early vocational specialisation for the

majority of the age group).We hypothesize that both liberal and social-democratic welfare regimes

differ from the conservative approach in that they both welcome and

encourage expansion at the tertiary level on the grounds of human capital

enhancement and for equity considerations. Hence, we would expect a

comparatively long period of comprehensive schooling, less (or even no)

emphasis on vocational training at the secondary level, and, as a consequence,

high entry and graduation rates at the tertiary level. However, we would also

expect differences between the two regimes:

Liberal regimes foster unrestricted human capital creation, they emphasizeindividual achievement and responsibility, and advancement to high levels of

study based on meritocratic criteria (Turner, 1960). Education tends to be

socially inclusive, through encouraging high aspirations and expectations

(by, e.g., giving second and third chances) and by fostering social mobility.

Encouragement of social mobility also serves to mitigate conflicts about

social inequalities. There is very little (if any) social engineering and

adjusting individual ambitions and societal needs. However, the strong

emphasis on individual rights goes hand in hand with the requirement of

large financial investments by individuals, unmatched by any other regime.

Social-democratic regimes strive for a delicate balance between individualrights and the collective order. This collective order is not (as with the

conservative regimes) the established hierarchy of social estates, but rather

a notion of public welfare constructed by rational policy making. Hence,

human capital formation is embedded within an overarching welfare

structure and labour market policies (e.g., state economic and social

planning, active labour-market policy, public responsibility for full employ-

ment, and the provision of high-quality jobs in the public sector).

Higher levels of tertiary participation require higher levels of funding.

Hence, we look at different indicators for funding of tertiary education. First,we hypothesize that liberal regimes spend a high percentage of both total public


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adult population aged 2534 years who have attained tertiary level A and B

credentials; adult population aged 2564 years who have attained tertiary level A and B

credentials.4

Second, we employ four pre-tertiary indicators as measures of prerequisites

to tertiary education entry. These indicators are measures of the preconditions

in place that determine the extent to which students can enter the next levels of

education. For example, early tracking, as indicated by age of first selection

into upper levels of education is a powerful instrument of social selection in

that individuals are routed to institutions which, in turn, will largely determine

their future life chances. The proportion of the age group engaged in general orvocational levels of education illustrates the proportion that will potentially

enter university-level education, or conversely, an indicator of those destined

for early vocational specialization. The likelihood of the students in vocational

programs to enrol in tertiary education is smaller than those in general

programs. The expectation to participate in International Standard Classifica-

tion of Education (ISCED) level 5A or 6 is an indicator reflecting the

ambitions of students shaped by the cultural climate and the expectations of

society. The indicators we employ are as follows:

first, age at which selection takes place; the proportion of age group in general programmes of upper secondary

education5;

the proportion of age group in vocational programmes of upper secondary

education;

the proportion of students expecting to complete ISCED level 5A or 6.

Third, we examine the implications of these different welfare (and education)

regimes on funding tertiary education, using the three indicators as specified

separately below:

public tertiary educational expenditures as a percentage of total publicexpenditures.

This indicator signals the extent to which tertiary education policies have

priority within the overall framework of government policies.

public tertiary educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

This indicator is a measure of the extent of public tertiary educational

expenditures in relation to the wealth of a country.

tertiary expenditures from public and private sources on educationalinstitutions as a percentage of GDP.


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These are measures of (a) the extent of spending on tertiary education in

relation to the wealth of a country, and (b) the proportion of public and privatesources of these expenditures.

Finally, we look at the different patterns of tuition and student aid. We use

the following indicators:

estimated average annual tuition fees charged by tertiary-type A public

educational institutions: actual amounts in USD;

proportion of students with loans;

annual gross amount of loan available to each student: actual amount in

USD;

proportion of graduates with debt;

average amount of debt at graduation in USD.

We employ these data to systematically relate the various dimensions of

higher education within a framework of the welfare arrangements of each

country. We have selected 16 of the 18 countries used by Esping-Andersen

(1990)6 and organized our analyses around three different types of welfare

states: conservative welfare states (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands.

Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium), liberal welfare states (Canada, USA,

Australia, New Zealand, and UK), and social-democratic (universal) welfarestates (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland). We use the data described

above to demonstrate the logic of the relationships among participation in

tertiary education, pre-tertiary prerequisites, educational funding, and levels of

tuition and student financial aid.

We recognize that extensions to Esping-Andersens original model have been

proposed. For example, Mills and Blossfeld (2003) suggest a fivefold typology

by adding two categories: the family-orientedregime of the Southern European

countries (e.g., Italy and Spain) and the post-socialistic welfare regime to

account for countries of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Similarly, Castles (1993) has asserted that the liberal regime should be further

divided to account for the role of labour movements in policy formation of

some countries. However, Esping-Andersen (1999) has addressed these

concerns and demonstrates that the explanatory benefits obtained by extending

the number of categories is a matter of greater refinement, more nuance, and

more precision (p. 92) but not of additional dimensionality. In this paper, we

delimit our analysis to Esping-Andersens original three-regime framework.

However, because we are focusing on tertiary education and as such are using a

different set of indicators from those previously employed in other analyses,

the results may suggest that an expansion of this framework is warranted. Wewill take up this issue in the discussion.


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Results

The most coherent and reliable database for international comparisons in

education is that which contains the OECD indicators. However, this data set

is far from perfect. Not all countries provided data for all indicators we wanted

to include in this comparison. Also, some indicators are difficult to interpret.

Despite its limitations, this database allows for an initial assessment of the

soundness of our hypotheses. The data are summarized in Tables 1 to 4.

Most of the data have been extracted from the 2008 OECD Education at a

Glance (OECD, 2008a). Occasionally, we supplement missing data from this

report with data available in the 2007 and 2006 reports (OECD, 2006a, 2007).

In addition, when it is reasonable to do so, we supplement missing OECDindicators as specified above with indicators related to tuition and student

financial assistance compiled by Usher (2005) and with data on tuition and

student financial aid reported by Vossensteyn (2004). A more complete data

profile permits a thorough examination of the types of student financial

assistance provided by these countries. Data from sources other than the

OECD 2008 report are identified in the tables.

In Tables 1 to 4, we observe that there is wide variation within each of the

three groups and a significant amount of overlap among the different regimes.

Nonetheless, there is a correspondence between the indicators and welfare

regimes.By examining enrolment and graduation patterns (Table 1), conservative

regimes are clearly at the bottom with respect to expansion of tertiary

education, with the Netherlands being a sort of outlier, whereas liberal regimes

are at the top. Entry rates into tertiary-type A institutions vary between 35 and

58% in conservative regimes, between 59 and 76% in social-democratic

regimes, and between 57 and 84% in liberal regimes. This pattern remains

evident in graduation rates (tertiary-type A), with conservative regimes varying

between 21 and 43%, social-democratic regimes between 41 and 48%, and liberal

regimes between 36 and 59%. Graduation rates from tertiary-type B institutions

range from 7 to 19% in conservative regimes, 0 to 10% in social-democraticregimes, and 10 to 24% in liberal regimes. The range of the adult population aged

2534 years of age holding tertiary-type A credentials extends from 1334%

(conservative), 2940% (social-democratic), to 2935% (liberal). Comparable

figures for tertiary-type B are 122%, 20%, and 526%, respectively.

The long-term impact of educational expansion can be assessed by

examining the proportion of the population aged 2564 years with tertiary-

level credentials. Again, the proportion with tertiary-type A credentials within

the conservative countries is low (1028%) when compared with social-

democratic (1931%) and liberal regimes (2235%). Also, those aged 2564

years holding tertiary-type B level credentials is low in both conservative and


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Table1

IndicatorsofparticipationintertiaryeducationinselectOECDcountriesa

Conservative

Liberal

Socialdemocratic

AU

FR

DE

NL

IT

CH

BE

CA

US

AUS

NZ

UK

SE

DK

NO

FI

Entryratesintotertiaryeducation

Tertiary-typeA

40

39**

35

58

55

38

35

m

64

84

72

57

76

59

67

76

Tertiary-typeB

7

34**

13

n

m

15

36

m

m

m

49

29

10

22

n

a

Grad

uationratesfromtertiaryeducatio

n

Tertiary-typeA

22

27**

21

43

39

30

m

37

36

59

52

39

41

45

43

48

Tertiary-typeB

7

19**

11

n

n

10

m

m

10

m

24

15

5

10

1

0

Populationaged2534yearsthathasa

ttainedtertiarylevelcredentials

Tertiary-typeA

13

24

15

34

17

23

19

29

35

29

30

29

31

32

40

29

Tertiary-typeB

6

18

7

2

1

9

22

26

5

10

14

8

9

9

2

9

Populationaged2564yearswithtertiarylevelcredentials

Tertiary-typeA

10

16

15

28

12

20

14

24

35

24

23

22

22

27

31

19

Tertiary-typeB

7

11

9

2

1

10

18

23

5

9

15

9

9

8

2

16

Changebetween2534and3564yearspopulationwithtertiarylevelcred

entials

Tertiary-typeA

+3

+8

0

+6

+5

+3

+5

+5

0

+5

+7

+7

+9

+5

+9

+10

Tertiary-typeB

1

7

2

0

0

1

+4

+3

0

1

1

1

0

+1

0

7

Total

2

15

2

+6

+5

+2

+9

+8

0

+4

+6

+6

+9

+6

+9

+3

aDatasources:OECD,2008aandsupplementedwithOECD,2005,2006a,2007whennecessary.

n

Magnitudeiseithernegligibleor

zero.

a

Dataarenotapplicablebecausethecategorydoesnotapply.

m

Dataarenotavailable.


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Tab

le3

Educationalexpendituresin

selectOECDcountries

Conservative

Libera

l

Socialdemocratic

AU

FR

DE

NL

IT

CH

BE

CA

US

AUS

NZ

UK

SE

DK

NO

FI

Educationalexpenditures

Publictertiaryeducationalexpendituresasa

percentageoftotalpublicexpenditu

res

3.0

2.2

2.4

3.0

1.6

3.3

2.6

4.2

3.5

3.5**

4.8

2.7

3.5

4.5

5.3*

4.0

Publictertiaryeducationalexpendituresasa

percentageofGDP

1.5

1.2

1.1

1.4

0.8

1.5

1.3

1.7

1.3

1.1

1.5

1.2

1.9

2.4

2.3

2.0

Expenditureoneducationalinstitutions

asa%

ofGDP(publicandprivatesources)

Total

1.3

1.3

1.1

1.3

0.9

1.4

1.24

2.6

2.9

1.6

1.5

1.3

1.6

1.7

1.3

1.7

Public

1.2

1.1

0.9

1.0

0.6

1.4

1.2

1.4

1.0

0.8

0.9

0.9

1.5

1.6

1.3

1.7

Private

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.0

0.1

1.1

1.9

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.1

Tab

le2

Pre-tertiaryindicatorsinselectOECDcountries

Conservative

Liberal

Socialdemocratic

AU

FR

DE

NL

IT

CH

BE

CA

US

AUS

NZ

UK

SE

DK

NO

FI

Pre-

tertiaryindicators

E

arliestageofselection(years)

10

15

10

12

14

15

12

16

16

16

16

14a

16

16

16

16

Proportioninuppersecondary

generaleducation

22

57

41

33

40

36

31

95

100.0

38

100**

58

45

52

40

35

Proportioninuppersecondary

vocationaleducation

72

43

59

68

25

64

69

5

0

62

0**

42

54

48

60

65

Proportionexpectedtocomplete

IS

CEDlevel5Aor6

24

35

19

41

52

18

35

63

64

63

39

32

33

26

26

52

aWe

useage14yearsfortheUKbasedoninformationprovidedinthesesites:inhttp://www.direct.gov.u

k/en/EducationAndLearning/14To19/

Yea

rs10And11/DG_10013567;http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/EducationAndLearning/QualificationsExplained/DG_10039024;

http

://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmchilsch/169/16905.htm.


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Tab

le4

Tuitionandstudentfinancia

laidindicatorsintertiaryeducationinselectOECDcountries

Conservative

Liberal

Socialdemocratic

AU

FR

DE

NL

IT

CH

BE

CA

US

AUS

NZ

UK

SE

DK

NO

FI

Tuitionandstudentfinancialaid

Estimatedaverageannualtuition

fee

schargedbytertiary-typeA

pu

bliceducationalinstitutionsor

government-dependentprivate

ins

titutions(USD)

837

330a

1,210b

1,505b

1,017

1,873c

574

3,464

5,027

3,855

2,6

71

1,859

0

0

0

0

Finan

cialaidtostudentsasa%

oftotalpublicexpenditureontertiaryeducation

Studentloans

m

a

5.1

15.5

n

0.2

N

2.8

8.6

17.7

30

.0

19.1

16.8

5.0

37.1

n

Scholarships/other

grantstohouseholds

16.8

7.9

14.1

12.3

16.8

2.2

15.2

11.5

14.9

14.7

11

.6

6.7

10.3

25.8

10.9

16.6

To

tal

16.8

7.9

19.1

27.7

16.8

2.4

15.2

14.4

23.5

32.3

41

.5

25.8

27.1

30.8

42.6

16.6

Proportionofstudentswithloans%

0

0

0

28

0

0

1

m

38

79

m

m

80

42

100

26

Annualgrossamountofloan

availabletoeachstudent(USD)

0

0

0

5,730

0

0

m

3,970

6,430

3,450

4,3

20

5,480

4,940

2,500

8,960

2,710

Proportionofgraduateswithdebt(%)

0

0

15d

15d

0

0

0d

50d

65

67

57

79

83

49

78b

39

Averagedebtatgraduation(USD)

0

0

6,973d

12,270

0

0

0c

14,170d

19,400

10,838d

15,320

14,220

20,590

10,430

20,290

6,160

aFranceaverageoftheOECDrange160490.

bDa

tafromVossensteyn,2004in2005USD.

cSwitzerlanddiscrepanciesaredueto

roundingerrors.

dDa

tafromUsherandCervenan,200

5in2005USD.


38



15/28

social-democratic regimes. In contrast, there is wide variation in countries

within the liberal regime rubric. When compared with the 2564-years agegroup, only two conservative countries (France and Belgium) have experienced

large increases in the proportion of 2534 year olds participating in tertiary

education. Yet, the proportion of the 2534-years age group with tertiary-type

A credentials in these countries remains relatively low. The US has experienced

zero growth. However, the 2564-years age group of this country is the most

educated when compared with the same age group in all the countries we have

included in the analysis. In other words, post-secondary expansion occurred

much earlier in the US (see OECD, 2008a, Chart A1.3, 32). Goldin and Katz

(2008) have demonstrated that the US was the pioneer of tertiary expansion,

but since the 1980s has lost momentum.These systematic differences observed at the tertiary level could be

anticipated and indeed are evident at earlier stages of educational careers.

Table 2 demonstrates that selection into different school tracks commences

much earlier in conservative regimes than in liberal and social-democratic

regimes. Also, in conservative regimes, only 1841% of students at age 15 years

expect to complete ISCED level 5A or 6, compared with 2652% in social-

democratic regimes and 3264% in liberal regimes. However, the proportion of

students attending upper secondary general studies varies considerably both

within and among regimes at 2257% (conservative), 3552% (social-

democratic), and 38100%7 (liberal regimes). Similarly, the proportion ofstudents enrolled in upper secondary vocational education varies across

regimes, but is overall considerably lower in liberal regimes.

These systematic differences in indicators that point to different levels of

tertiary expansion and its preconditions are consistent with the differences at

the level of funding. Consistent with enrolment and graduation rates, Table 3

reveals the range of expenditures on tertiary education. The pattern is one of

low contributions in conservative regimes and higher contributions in both

liberal and social-democratic regimes. For example, public tertiary educational

expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure is low in conservative

regimes (1.63.3%), moderate in liberal regimes (2.74.8%) and high in social-

democratic welfare regimes (3.55.3%). Public tertiary educational expendi-

tures as a percentage of GDP mirror these findings at 0.81.5% in conservative

regimes, 1.11.7 in liberal regimes and 1.92.4% in social-democratic welfare

regimes. In terms of total expenditure on educational institutions as a

percentage of GDP at the tertiary level, liberal regimes are highest (1.32.9%),

followed by social-democratic regimes (1.31.7), and conservative regimes

(0.91.4%). If we differentiate between private and public expenditures, it

becomes evident that the exceptionally high level of tertiary spending in some

liberal countries (mainly North America) is possible only through very highprivate contributions. Private expenditures on tertiary education as a


39



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proportion of GDP are moderate in conservative regimes (0.10.3) and even

lower in social-democratic regimes (0.10.2). In contrast, there is widevariation in liberal regime countries (0.41.9). However, it is noteworthy that

UK with the lowest percentage exceeds event the highest percentage from any

other regime. The US is exceptional in that private expenditures exceed public

expenditures.

The most important facet of private tertiary expenditures is tuition fees.

Average annual tuition fees in the liberal regimes vary between 1,859 and 5,027

USD. In conservative regimes they vary between 330 and 1,873 USD. Social-

democratic regimes charge no fees at all (Table 4). Respectively, the relatively

high level of spending in social-democratic regimes is reflected in high public

expenditures on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP (see paragraphabove), whereas in conservative and liberal regimes the range is similar. These

findings support our funding matrix hypothesis; that is, conservative regimes

have low/medium public expenditures in combination with low/no tuition fees.

Social-democratic regimes have high public expenditures and no tuition fees.

Liberal regimes combine low/medium public expenditures with high tuition

fees. Conservative and social-democratic regimes share a strong tendency to

de-commodification, hence no/low tuition fees. Social-democratic and liberal

regimes share a commitment to expansion of tertiary education; hence, they

must raise not only sufficient resources but also the sources for funding tertiary

education differ.The commitment to tertiary expansion requires sufficient means for student

aid. According to the OECD (2008a),

a key question in many OECD countries is whether financial subsidies for

households should primarily be provided in the form of grants or loans.

y Advocates of student loans argue that money spent on loans goes

further: if the amount spent on grants were used to guarantee or subsidise

loans instead, more aid would be available to students and overall access

would increase. Loans also shift some of the cost of education to those

who benefit most from educational investment. Opponents of loans arguethat student loans are less effective than grants in encouraging low-

income students to pursue their education. (p. 275)

OECD data reveal a clear relationship between the availability of student

loans on the one hand and the amount of public financial aid to students on the

other hand. Of all the countries covered in this paper, only those with loan

schemes exceed the OECD average of public student aid as a percentage of total

public expenditures on tertiary education (Table 4). Owing to a few outliers,

variation does exist within all welfare regimes; however, a clear pattern can be

identified. In the conservative regimes public student aid as a percentage of totalpublic expenditures on tertiary education ranges from 2.4 to 27.7%. Only the


40



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Netherlands (substantively) and Germany (marginally) exceed the OECD

average of 17.6%. These are the only countries within the conservative familywith public loan schemes available. In the liberal countries, student aid ranges

between 14.4 and 32.3% of total public expenditures. In all liberal countries

public loan schemes are available; all but Canada spend more than the OECD

average. The social-democratic regimes spend the highest percentage of their

tertiary expenditures on student aid (16.642.6%). Finland, where loans only

play a marginal role, is an outlier; hence, it is slightly below the OECD average.

We can conclude that loans predominate in those countries, which are

committed to tertiary expansion. As no country can afford to support a large

number of students only by non-repayable stipends and scholarships (a pattern

of support that was dominant in an era of elite higher education when thenumber of students who applied for support was small), social-democratic and

liberal regimes have designed a wide range of student loan schemes.

Conversely, in conservative regimes where expansion has remained low, loans

play either a less important or no role at all. As expected, over 50% of students

in liberal regimes graduate with student debt and the average amount of debt at

graduation is high (i.e., greater than 14,000 USD). However, contrary to our

hypotheses, a high proportion of students from social-democratic countries

also have high debt loads and the average amount of student debt is high.

Finland is the exception.

By combining tuition fees and student aid data, the OECD has identifiedfour patterns that strongly align with the welfare regime typology. We can

summarize the OECD findings as follows8: The first pattern defined by no or

low tuition fees but quite generous student support systems (OECD, 2008a,

272) includes the Nordic countries. The second pattern that is defined by high

level of tuition fees and well developed student support systems (p. 273) and

includes the liberal countries and as an outlier the Netherlands.

Compared with the liberal countries, tuition fees in the Netherlands are

moderate. Finally, the other conservative countries constitute a pattern that is

defined as low level of tuition fees and less developed student support systems

(p. 274).

Correspondence Analysis

Thus far, the analyses have demonstrated that there is reason to believe that the

three welfare regimes differ in terms of participation in tertiary education, pre-

tertiary prerequisites, educational funding, and levels of tuition and levels of

borrowing. To further illuminate and confirm these relationships, we employ

the analytic technique of correspondence analysis (CA). CA is a multivariatedescriptive data technique that summarizes information to provide a visual


41



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representation of data distribution in a two-dimensional map (Greenacre,

2007). As Greenacre (1990) explains, CA is an exploratory statistical techniquewhich displays the rows and columns of a rectangular data matrix as points in

a scatterplot (p. 1). It is similar to principal components analysis in that it is a

method for decomposing the overallinertiaalong principal axes, but is applied

to cross tabulations and hence allows for the analysis of categorical data. In

CA, the patterns of association portrayed in larger data sets (and contained in

the rectangular data matrix) are examined through a graphic description of

tabular data, where each row and each column is depicted as a point. For an

introduction to CA, see Greenacre (2007).

Data are organized into columns and related rows. The columns in this

analysis are the 16 countries. Rows are comprised of 17 indicators selected tobest represent the four categories identified in Tables 1 to 4. Our choice of

indicators was also constrained by missing data for some countries. Only

indicators with complete data for each country were employed in the

correspondence analysis. We employ correspondence analysis to determine

the combined role of four tertiary participation indicators, four pre-tertiary

indicators, four funding indicators, and four tuition and student financial aid

in relation to country. These indicators and their corresponding labels are

listed in the legend. In other words, we are interested in measuring the

correspondence between the columns (countries) and rows (educational

indicators).CA is versatile in that through the transformation of continuous data into

ranks,9 we are able to conduct this multivariate analysis using indicators

contained in the OECD reports. Each indicator was recoded into a rank

ranging from 0 (lowest) to 15 (highest) to create a positive pole; this figure is

then subtracted from the maximum value of the positive pole (in all instances, 15)

to create a negative pole. In doing so, we have created a set of complementary

scales which represent the number of scaled points above and below the actual

value (Greenacre, 2007). According to Greenacre, since the ranks are analysed

and not the original values, the analysis [is] robust with respect to outliers

and can be called a nonparametric CA of the data (p. 184). We used XLSTAT

to compute the w2 coordinates of profile points and the statistical tests of

the analysis.

The data are displayed in a symmetric two-dimensional map, which reveal

the relative positions of row and column profiles. The challenge in this analysis

is to interpret the principal axes by identifying the latent (hidden) variables that

explain the amount of the total inertia along each axis. w2 distances separate the

row and column profiles and are used to compute inertia (or variance), which

measures the dispersion of these profiles in a multidimensional space. The CA

map corresponds to a lower-dimensional subspace defined by a pair of


42



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principal axes and displays the location of profile points as close as possible to

the true set of profiles represented in the multi-dimensional space.The correspondence analysis map in Figure 1 positions the points

corresponding to the 16 column profiles assigned to the country categories in

relation to the 17 row profiles. This map displays the projection of points in the

subspace defined by the first two principal axes that account for the largest

amount of the overall inertia (37%).

By examining the horizontal axis, with the exception of Finland, the groups

of countries we have identified as belonging to the conservative regime, are

AU

FR

DE

NL

IT

CH

BE

CA

US

AUS

NZ

UK

SE

DK

NO

FI

P_25_34trtcrdA+

P_25_34trtcrdA-

P_25_34_trtcrdB+

P_25_34_trtcrdB-

P_25_64_trtcrdA+

P_25_64_trtcrdA-

P_25_64_trtcrdB+

P_25_64_trtcrdB-

PT_agesel+

PT_agesel- PT_upscgen+

PT_upscgen-

PT_upsecvoc+

PT_upsecvoc-

PT_ISCED5a6+

PT_ISCED5a6-

F_TPE_tert+

F_TPEtert-

F_EGDPtert+

F_EGDPtert-

F_EGDPtertpublic+

F_EGDPtertpublic-

F_EGDPtertpriv+

F_EGDPtertpriv-

FA_tuition+

FA_tuition-

FA_loans+

FA_loans-

FA_grants+ FA_grants-

FA_propdebt+

FA_propdebt-

FA_averdebt+

FA_averdebt-

-0.6

-0.2

0.2

0.6

0.80.40-4.0-8.0

F2(17.6

3%)

F1 (39.35 %)

Figure 1. Correspondence analysis of countries and tertiary, pre-tertiary, educational expenditure,and tuition and student financial-aid indicators.


43



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located to the left and are opposed to all other countries to the right side of the

map. This axis accounts for 39% of the average total inertia. The columnprofiles that contribute the most to this axis correspond to Austria on the left

and the USA on the right; these two extremes define the axis. Also, the profiles

of Belgium and Italy are well aligned along the first axis toward Austria and

New Zealand and Canada are well-aligned on the right with the USA. Sweden,

Denmark, Norway, and Australia are aligned along the first axis, but less

strongly so, toward the USA. Switzerland and France are similarly aligned

toward Austria on the left. Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK contribute

the least to the first axis and hence remain outliers of sorts. The placement of

row profiles reveal that average amount of student debt at graduation, the

proportion of the 2564-years age population with tertiary-type A credentials,the proportion of graduates with debt, and the proportion of the 2534-years

age population with tertiary-type A credentials are well matched along the

horizontal axis. The profile is also associated with the following variables: the

proportion of students in upper secondary general education, age of selection,

total loans to students as percentage of total public tertiary expenditure, and

public educational expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of (a)

total public expenditures and (b) GDP. These variables also contribute most to

the axis. We interpret this axis as an educational expansion dimension with the

less expansion row profiles matching with the country column profiles to the

left and more expansion row profiles matching well with the country columnprofiles to the right. Also included in this expansion dimension are pre-tertiary

indicators, which determine whether young people have the prerequisites to

engage in tertiary study. Finland is oriented closer to the left because of a

relatively low proportion of the age 2534 and 2565 years population with

tertiary-level credentials and low student debt. Conversely, this proportion is

high in the Netherlands. Also, in the Netherlands financial aid to students as a

percentage of total public expenditure on tertiary education does not fit the

profile of a conservative regime country. As such, it is an outlier on this

dimension.

The vertical axis accounts for 18% of the total inertia, and mainly contrasts

the column profile that corresponds to Finland (up) with the profile

corresponding to Italy (down). Three row profiles associated with (a) public

and (b) private expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP,

and annual average tuition fees charged by tertiary-type A institutions

contribute the most to this axis. Hence, the second dimension is a tertiary-

funding dimension.

Finland and Italy represent the two extremes of the vertical axis. In terms of

public expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP, Italy ranks

lowest of all countries (0.6%) and Finland highest (1.7%). Conversely, Italy(0.3%) (along with the Netherlands) ranks highest of all non-liberal countries


44



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in terms of private expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of

GDP, whereas Finland ranks among the lowest at 0.1%. Canada is drawncloser to the upper part of the map on the vertical dimension because of

relatively high public expenditures on tertiary institutions as a percentage of

GDP (at 1.4%), which aligns more closely with the Nordic countries. The

Netherlands is an outlier because of relatively higher private expenditures on

tertiary institutions as a percentage of GDP and higher tuition fees.

In summary, this analysis demonstrates three clear clusters of countries that

align with Esping-Andersens welfare typology. And they are indeed

significantly associated with indicators of tertiary participation and gradua-

tion, pre-tertiary indicators, and funding indicators (w2547.87, d.f.495, and

po0.0001).

Discussion

Our analyses demonstrate a relationship between welfare regimes and patterns

of education policy. In addition, our findings support the trade-off hypothesis

that claims that there is a conflict of goals in either providing tertiary

educational opportunities or investing in social insurance programs. The

results reveal that countries that lean toward the goal of equality of condition

invest less than those countries that strive for either enhancing equality ofopportunity or enhancing both equality of opportunity and condition. We

continue by highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each regime.

Welfare regimes and higher education

Countries that adhere to the liberal welfare approach minimize their efforts to

establish equitable living conditions, but they apply a strong human-capital

philosophy that involves the highest resources spent on higher education and

the highest participation rates among the three welfare regimes. Clearly, this

arrangement is in accordance with the basic requirements of knowledge-based

economies to increase the stock of human capital. One problem of this pattern

relates to those individuals who do not excel academically and, as a

consequence, cannot benefit from the comparatively generous opportunities

in postsecondary education. Individuals who drop out of high school or who

do not continue their education at the tertiary level for other reasons seem to

fall short of the minimal requirements expected for stable, well-paid jobs.

Although the percentage of the age cohort with no tertiary education is smaller

in liberal regimes than in any other regime, it still encompasses a significant

proportion of the population. Because of the relative lack of vocational skillprovision and social safety net policies, the status and the labour market


45



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chances of this group is more precarious than those in comparable groups in

the other welfare regimes. This is re-inforced by the general tendency of theliberal welfare regime to tolerate high levels of inequality of living conditions.

Another issue of concern is the high amount of debt incurred by a large

proportion of graduates. Under a liberal human capital approach with low

levels of de-commodification, individuals are expected to contribute to the

direct cost of their education. In most liberal countries, cost of higher

education grew much faster than median family income during the last two

decades. Hence, debt levels have escalated (The National Center for Public

Policy and Higher Education, 2008).

To summarize, liberal regimes provide tremendous opportunities for

individuals who comply with the requirements of knowledge society (e.g.,minimally accepted level of academic ability, ambition to succeed, readiness to

embrace lifelong learning). Those who fail to meet these requirements carry a

heavy burden. The Economic Council of Canada has emphasized this weakness

of a liberal market model:

A drawback of this excessive emphasis on individualism is that certain

people may lack the resources or influence to compete equally in the

learning system and the labour market. This weakness can be tempered

by the high level of accessibility of the system, which opens up a wide

range of opportunities to everyone. However, individuals are largely leftalone to confront the world that surrounds them. (Economic Council of

Canada, 1992, 46)

Conservative welfare regimes, by contrast, provide better conditions for

those who will never attain tertiary level credentials. The attitudes in these

countries are shaped by remainders of an ideology that assigns individuals to

their proper place in society. Educational streaming is a powerful mechanism

of social reproduction. It is taken for granted that students from different

social/educational backgrounds have different educational and career trajec-

tories, but because of the de-commodified welfare provisions of these regimes

the lower social estates still enjoy comparatively high standards of living.

The extensive system of vocational training in most conservative countries

plays an important role in providing an alternative training route for academic

low achievers. Graduates of the apprenticeship system enjoy a higher social

status and better labour market chances than do individuals in the liberal

welfare regimes without tertiary education. This characteristic of conservative

regimes contributes to the comparatively high level of equitable living

conditions, but it comes at a high price. The other side of the coin is an

education system that constrains expansion of learning at the tertiary level and

discourages the ambitions of students who struggle to meet the requirements ofelite secondary schools with selection mechanisms that start as early as age 10


46



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years. As Lehmann (2005) points out, this system has been criticized as

outdated and archaic [and] narrowly skills-based which has not yet addressedthe more broadly defined demands of new work places (p. 119). The

consequence of maintaining patterns of sponsored mobility (Turner, 1960)

even at the fringe of a knowledge based economy is that that conservative

welfare regimes lag in expanding their systems of postsecondary education,

whereas most other parts of the world move ahead. Advocates of extensive

vocational training at the secondary level emphasize the danger of over-

education and highlight the need for labour market planning. In the past, this

strategy was relatively successful. The lack of tertiary graduates could easily be

compensated by an ample supply of graduates of vocational training. Two

recent trends could endanger this pattern. First, the expansion of a knowledge-based economy depends much more on a growing supply of tertiary graduates

(Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003) to assume jobs in a world increasingly

defined as one of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000). This is in contrast to solid

modernity characterized by Fordist type regimes of past decades. Second,

globalization of labour markets will advance the standardization of, and need

for, education certificates. It is questionable if the conservative regimes will be

successful in maintaining their niche.

Trade-offs and higher education

Our findings suggest that the trade-off hypothesis is confirmed through a

comparison of liberal and conservative welfare regimes. However, it appears

that social-democratic welfare regimes seem to avoid some of the trade-offs

faced by liberal and conservative countries. The socially embedded human

capital approach of these countries allows for expansion of higher education

without neglecting those parts of the age cohort who are unable or unwilling to

make use of that opportunity. Unlike the laissez-faire approach of liberal

regimes, there is a certain degree of social engineering in balancing and

adjusting supply and demand of higher learning opportunities by fostering the

development of both general and specific skills. For example, all Nordic

countries limit their seats for research universities through Numerus Clausus.10

The commitment to de-commodification strategies results in resistance toward

introducing tuition fees. Hence, those who are talented do not need to invest

their own resources for the direct cost of their higher education. Only countries

within social-democratic welfare regimes maintain a no fee philosophy that

spread globally during the late 1960s but were subsequently reversed in most

countries. Although there are no fees, the high level of public spending results

in significantly higher total expenditures for tertiary education (as a percentageof GDP) than in all conservative regimes, where in most cases public


47



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expenditures are supplemented by admittedly low tuition fees. This

pattern, however, depends on belief systems that have evolved over manydecades, encompassing not only egalitarian values but also a high trust in

public administration (and hence an unparalleled readiness to pay high taxes).

The question remains to what extent this Nordic exceptionalism can be

maintained in an area of declining national sovereignty. The global trend in the

last three decades has been to emphasize the benefits of markets and to reduce

the tax base of governments. The Nordic countries have not been excluded

from this trend. As in most countries, public expenditures as a proportion of

GDP have also dropped in the social-democratic regimes (OECD, 2008b).

Hence, the policy response to the subsidization, coverage, and public cost

trilemma, as specified by Ansell (2008) may change.Another issue of concern is the amount of debt carried by graduates, which

is similar to levels held by graduates in liberal regimes, hence not confirming

our hypothesis in this regard. Such debt loads are somewhat surprising, given

that university students in social-democratic regimes do not pay fees. However,

the generous conditions for student loans allow students in these countries a

high standard of living, for example living independently from their parents

and not being obligated to work while completing their studies.

The issue of loans11 reflects the different attitudes of the three welfare

regimes in a nutshell. Conservative regimes have either no loan schemes for

students or comparatively restrictive conditions. As a consequence, a highproportion of students work while studying to cover their costs of living. For

example, Euro student data (Orr, 2008, 119) reveal that the employment rate

of all students during the academic term is 4675%12 in conservative regimes

compared to 4356% in social-democratic regimes (119). The need to self-

finance results in less time available for students to devote to their studies

(Orr, 2008, 121). Both liberal and social-democratic regimes foster their

expansionist education strategies by providing loans to students. They differ,

however, in the prerequisites for receiving loans and the restrictions for which

students may make use of the money. In liberal regimes, students need loans to

cover the fees for tuition and living expenses. In social-democratic regimes,

students need loans only for the latter.

Outliers

Although we emphasize the relationship between educational policies and

welfare regimes, we recognize that additional (independent) factors influence

education policy, and result in identified outliers. For example, the welfare

regime typology does not explain within regime differences such as, forexample, educational expansion between North America and the UK. North


48



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America, and in particular the US, has been a pioneer in expansion of upper

secondary and tertiary education (Goldin and Katz, 2008). The UK was alaggard (not only compared with the US, but until the 1980s also with

most European countries). The UK has a well-entrenched class system, and a

historically stronger tradition of sorting students (e.g., into O and A levels).

Also in the UK, a large proportion of the school population historically exited

school at age 15 years or engaged in apprenticeships; as such, it was far slower

to expand from an elite to mass higher-education system. Likewise, the

Netherlands13 differs in many respects from the patterns observed in other

conservative regimes. Nor does Finland fit neatly into the social-democratic

framework. We believe that these outliers do not invalidate our thesis of a

systematic relationship between welfare regimes and patterns of educationpolicy. Further investigation of these questions would not only contribute

to a better understanding of this relationship, but of the welfare typology

itself. The addition of countries from southern Europe and post-socialistic

regimes in future analyses will further strengthen the analytical power of

this theory.

Conclusion

The focus of this paper has been on the refinement of an analytical frameworkfor cross-national comparisons. We argue that combining the analysis of

higher education and welfare policies furthers our understandings of national

differences in both areas. Our focus is not on making normative judgements

about the superiority or the deficiencies of the various national clusters.

However, it is an intriguing question to ask whether some regimes are

better equipped than others for the challenges of a knowledge-based

economy.

We conclude with a general observation about policy change. To a certain

degree, each country is open to new dynamics; however, it is also bound by

different historical forces and follows distinct trajectories from which it cannot

easily or quickly diverge. Policy makers who intend to change this direction

should be aware of this inertia. Adopting policy strategies from other contexts

requires careful consideration of the underlying societal structures and

traditions. The first step for governmental and educational policy makers is

to recognize that their respective countries fit into a particular regime

framework. Second, they need to assess the goals for higher education and

the extent to which these goals are in line with current path dependencies.

Third, they need to take the courageous step of aligning higher education

policies with desired goals and outcomes which may require stepping beyondthe bounds of a given welfare regime framework.


49



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Notes

1 Other authors have demonstrated that systematic differences among welfare regimes exist at the

secondary level. Allmendinger and Leibfried (2003) have identified four worlds of competence

production on the basis of Programme for International Student Assessment data (PISA), three

of which align with Esping-Andersens welfare typology. Social democratic regimes combine

high levels with low variation of these competences. Liberal regimes have both high levels and

high variation of competences. Conservative regimes combine low levels with high variation of

competences. The three worlds of human capital production described by Iversen and Stephens

(2008) match the three regimes that we employ in this article. However, Iversen and Stephens

focus on skill formation primarily at the secondary level.

2 We use the terms higher education and tertiary education interchangeably.

3 The concept of social estates refers to the broad divisions of society throughout the history of

Europe. Originally the concept distinguished nobility, clergy, and commons. In contemporarysociety it refers to the almost impermeable social divisions between upper, middle, and lower

classes in some countries (Cox, 1945), which Allmendinger and Leibfried (2003) describe as

adherence to a traditional feudal notion of class (p. 63).

4 Tertiary-type A credentials are earned at institutions defined as largely theory-based and are

designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programmes and

professions with high skill requirements (OECD, 2006b). Tertiary-type B credentials are earned

at institutions that are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and focus on practical,

technical or occupational skills for direct entry in the labour market (p. 15).

5 The proportion of the age group enrolled in general or vocational education is a proportion of

total enrolments in upper secondary education. These two figures do not necessarily add up to

100% because in some countries students are enrolled in pre-vocational programs.

6 Japan was excluded from the analysis because the traditions of Asian countries deserve an

analysis in their own right. As rapid social and economic changes in Ireland may distort the

analysis, we have not included it.

7 See footnote 3.

8 One pattern (Japan) is not relevant in our context.

9 Owing to the nature of the data, it was necessary to use a ranking procedure. We follow the

tenets of Greenacre (2007) to form the ranks. Because of the small sample size and the

categorical nature of the variables, it is not possible to conduct either factor or cluster analyses.

10 A Numerus Clausus approach specifies restrictions to admissions in those countries where

certification earned at the secondary level entitle individuals to tertiary entry.

11 We consider only state supported loans, not other types of loans such as private loans with

banks.12 Italy, at 39%, is an outlier among the conservative countries.

13 Goodin et al. (1999) locate the Netherlands in the social democratic regime category, which

indicates that this country is not easy to label.

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HE Policy and Welfare Regimes

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