Has Multiculturalism Failed? A Critical Analysis

Ciaran Thapar Has Multiculturalism Failed? A Critical Analysis.

Has Multiculturalism in Britain Failed?

A Critical Analysis.

Ciaran Thapar

1st May 2013

Final Year Undergraduate

Word Count: 9931

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of BSc in Economics and Politics

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies

University of Bristol

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Attestation

This dissertation contains no plagiarism, has not been submitted in whole or

in part for the award of another degree, and is solely the work of Ciaran

Thapar.

Signed………………………………………..

Name…………………………………

Date…………………………

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Abstract

This dissertation fundamentally responds to the widespread belief

that multiculturalism in Britain is ‘dead’ and has ‘failed’. This claim

has developed into a prominent narrative across the British media

and in contemporary political debate since the wake of the 2001

riots in northern English cities. Treating the riots as a turning point,

the development of the ‘narrative of failure’ over the last twelve

years will be mapped as it has gained salience from the

endorsement of scholars, politicians and journalists. In doing so,

the two main justifications that have been given to support the

belief that multiculturalism has failed will be highlighted.

The first justification will be identified as the claim that

multiculturalism has encouraged and exacerbated separatism

between communities, and the second as the claim that it has

fostered Islamic extremism in Britain. However, each will be

revealed to be invalid and will thus be nullified, respectively. Implicit

in both justifications is the misperception of the British model of

multiculturalism as ‘radical’, or, in other words, having not

encouraged the integration of ethnic minorities. This misperception

has been furthered by the emphasis of policies since 2001 upon

‘community cohesion’ and ‘Britishness’. But by analysing the

direction and policies of the New Labour government from 1997 to

2001, Britain’s multicultural model will be argued to have instead

been ‘moderate’, and thus cannot be claimed to have encouraged

or exacerbated separatism. Additionally, viewing the 2005 Islamic

extremist terrorist bombings in London as another turning point for

the narrative, it will be argued that the attack upon multiculturalism

has become interdependent with the perception that Muslims have

failed to integrate into British society. In seeing the rise of extremist

Islam as evidence for multiculturalism’s failure, the narrative has

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overlooked the impact that British foreign and anti-terrorism policies

have had on the British-Muslim community.

By nullifying both justifications that the narrative relies upon,

it will be concluded that multiculturalism in Britain has not failed.

Instead, it has become a scapegoat, blamed in times of domestic

uncertainty and insecurity after events that have revealed conflict

between Muslims and British society. Despite the rhetorical

denunciation that multiculturalism has received, it remains a

realistic political project.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents for ensuring that Britain’s culturally diverse society has always remained

central to my upbringing.

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Contents

Abbreviations 7

Introduction 8Methodology and Structure 8

Chapter 1: Introducing the ‘narrative of failure’ 121.1 - Identifying the first justification 12

1.2 - Identifying the second justification 18

Chapter 2: Nullifying the first justification 212.1 - Literature review 21

2.2 – ‘Radical’ and ‘moderate’ models of multiculturalism 24

2.3 – 1997-2001: New Labour and multiculturalism 27

2.4 – 2001: The misinterpretation of the northern riots reports 31

2.5 – ‘Britishness’, ‘community cohesion’ and integration 34

2.6 – Multiculturalism has not encouraged or exacerbated separatism 36

Chapter 3: Nullifying the second justification 373.1 – Literature review 37

3.2 – British-Muslim identity before 2001 40

3.3 - British-Muslims and multiculturalism pre-7/7 42

3.4 – Why blaming multiculturalism for Islamic extremism is invalid 46

3.5 - Multiculturalism has not fostered Islamic extremism in Britain 50

Conclusion 51

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Bibliography 53

Abbreviations

7/7 – The terrorist bombings in London on 7th July 2005

9/11 – The terrorist attacks in New York on the 11th

September 2001

CIC – Commission on Integration and Cohesion

CMEB – Commission for Multi-Ethnic Britain

CCRT – Community Cohesion Review Team

DCLG - Department for Communities and Local

Government

EHRC – Equality and Human Rights Commission

FAIR – Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism

MCB – Muslim Council of Britain

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Introduction

In a speech delivered to the Munich Security Council in February 2011,

the Prime Minister, David Cameron, referred to the “doctrine of state

multiculturalism” as having encouraged “segregated communities”. In

particular, he focused upon the Muslim community’s involvement with these

ills. He simultaneously condemned terrorism and extremist Islam and outlined

the need to “defeat the ideas that warp so many young minds” (Cameron,

2011). The speech was widely received as the most authoritative

denunciation of Britain’s model of multiculturalism to date. It epitomised the

broad argument of many commentators since the turn of the millennium that

have endorsed the belief that multiculturalism in Britain has ‘failed’. This belief

has been most significantly endorsed since the riots that occurred in northern

English cities in the summer of 2001. Other major events such as the 9/11

terrorist attacks in New York that year and the 7/7 terrorist bombings in

London in 2005 have contributed to the feeling of national insecurity and

resentment towards certain communities in Britain – particularly Muslims –

that are seen to have lived separate lives from mainstream society under

Britain’s model of multiculturalism. From the beginning, this dissertation will

seek to invalidate what will be referred to as the ‘narrative of failure’ and its

claim that multiculturalism in Britain has ‘failed’ by identifying and nullifying the

two main justifications given to support it.

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Methodology and Structure

The slant taken here is unique within the existing literature. Other

defenders of multiculturalism such as Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh, Andrew

Pilkington and Ali Rattansi have responded to the attackers of multiculturalism

by dismissing aspects of the claim of its ‘failure’. But no extensive study exists

that is exclusively focused upon identifying the elements of, and then

rejecting, the claim of ‘failure’. In other words, this dissertation seeks to

provide the first holistic and direct rejection of the narrative by means of

nullifying the reasons for its invalid development and the justifications that

support it.

There will not be independent research conducted for this dissertation

because it is not necessary for the analysis of the ‘narrative of failure’. All

relevant speeches and articles that allow the narrative to be mapped in

chapter 1 are easily available. Furthermore, the agendas, policies and reports

of the government and research/policy organisations from 1997 onwards

studied in chapters 2 and 3 are well documented. The lack of independent

research will alleviate any potential ethical pressures from the consideration of

this dissertation. Additionally, the research will be controlled to an exclusively

British setting, without including a comparative analysis of another country.

Although considering the situations in France, Germany or The Netherlands –

which have been argued to have gone through a similar ‘retreat’ from

multiculturalism (Joppke, 2004) – may offer a means of viewing the alleged

‘failure’ of multiculturalism in a wider context: here, the nullification of both

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justifications only requires the analysis of the British model and subsequent

criticisms of it.

All three chapters of this dissertation will be qualitative studies. Chapter

1 will identify the claim made by many commentators since 2001 that

multiculturalism in Britain has ‘failed’. The focus will be upon this time period

to most suitably reflect the development of the ‘narrative of failure’ from its

conception after the northern riots in 2001. By broadly analysing the

comments, articles, opinions and speeches of relevant commentators -

politicians, scholars, journalists and other critics - the two justifications given

to support the belief that multiculturalism has ‘failed’ will be identified,

respectively.

Chapter 2 will nullify the first of these justifications: the claim that

multiculturalism has encouraged and exacerbated separatism between

communities in Britain. The theoretical distinction between ‘radical’ and

‘moderate’ multiculturalism will be highlighted, before the New Labour

government’s multicultural agenda from 1997 to 2001 is mapped, including a

study of their policies and endorsement of the Runnymede trust’s Parekh

Report. This will identify the British model to have been ‘moderate’. After an

analysis of the reports released in response to the riots in 2001, the

subsequent justification given to support the claim of multiculturalism’s ‘failure’

and affiliated new calls for ‘Britishness’, ‘integration’ and ‘community cohesion’

will be revealed to have relied upon a misinterpretation of the British model as

‘radical’. The first justification will thus be rejected.

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Chapter 3 will nullify the second of the justifications: the claim that

multiculturalism has fostered Islamic extremism in Britain. The development of

the ‘British-Muslim’ identity will be described since its conception in the late

1980s. There will then be an analysis of the rise of two interdependent sub-

narratives that begun in 2001: firstly, the attack upon multiculturalism for

having allegedly encouraged separate (predominantly Muslim) communities

after the northern riots; and secondly, the increased fear of Islam after the

9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. These sub-narratives will be presented to

have invalidly merged by the 7/7 attacks in 2005, and in light of this, the

second justification will be nullified for three reasons. Firstly, the said merger

and interdependency has led the narrative to again falsely assume the British

model of multiculturalism to be ‘radical’ when it is in fact ‘moderate’. Secondly,

the justification overlooks the fact that the 7/7 bombers were integrated,

British-born Muslims. And thirdly, by blaming multiculturalism, this justification

will be shown to have disregarded other major factors that have contributed to

the rise of extremist Islam.

The conclusion will acknowledge the two-pronged nullification of the

‘narrative of failure’ conducted in this dissertation to deduce that

multiculturalism in Britain has not failed. It will be suggested that instead

multiculturalism has been a scapegoat, blamed in times of domestic

uncertainty and insecurity after events that have largely revealed concerning

conflict between Muslims and British society. It will also agree that the future

of multiculturalism is rhetorically weak, as it has become embedded as a

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failure in the public narrative, but is nonetheless a reality that persists in its

‘moderate’ form.

Chapter 1: Introducing the ‘narrative of

failure’ and its two justifications

There has been a dominant narrative claiming British multiculturalism’s

‘failure’ that has grown since the beginning of the twenty first century.

Throughout this dissertation, this narrative will be referred to as the ‘narrative

of failure’ (Rattansi, 2012). Its mounting negativity is most significant in the

reactionary comments of politicians, scholars and journalists after the riots in

northern England in 2001 and extremist Islamic terrorist attacks committed in

London in 2005. Additionally, this trend is reflected in the fall in public support

for multiculturalism1. This chapter will view these two events, and the

reactionary comments of politicians, scholars and journalists to be the most

significant aspects of the narrative’s development. In doing so the full extent

to which commentators have claimed multiculturalism has failed, and their two

justifications for this claim, will be identified.

1.1 – Identifying the first justification

1 An Ipsos MORI poll found there to be a ‘common recognition that Britain is multicultural’ in 2002 (just after the riots), with 78% agreeing that it is important to respect the rights of minority groups (MORI, 2003). However, a poll in 2009 revealed ‘a clear weakening in support for multiculturalism’ (MORI, 2009: 1), with 38% of people inclined to see it as something which threatens the British way of life – for the first time more than the 30% that viewed it positively (MORI, 2009: 3).

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The first justification is the claim that British multiculturalism has

encouraged and exacerbated separatism between communities (Alagiah,

2006; Cameron 2007, 2008 and 2011; Goodhart, 2004; Malik 2001;

O’Donnell, 2007; Phillips 2005; Sacks, 2007). A recent study by Taylor-Gooby

and Waite, involving interviews with members of the House of Commons,

policy-reporters, researchers and senior academics, reveals all participants to

‘express concerns about the segregative effects of current multiculturalist

practice’ (Taylor-Gooby and Waite, 2013: 3; 10). This concern has been a

dominant part of the ‘narrative of failure’ since the riots in 2001.

Widely considered as a vital ‘turning point’ for the narrative (Modood,

2005: 62), the riots that occurred in northern cities in the summer of 2001 -

Oldham in May, Bradford in June and Leeds in July – ‘were to prove fateful

and, some might argue, fatal’ (Rattansi, 2011: 68) for multiculturalism in

Britain2. Neighbourhoods and schools in the most affected areas had become

at least perceived to be ‘all-White or all-Asian’ (Rattansi, 2011: 70). There was

an unavoidable common theme between all three sets of riots: the clear

existence of racial tension between the diverse communities3. The economic

2 The riots were shortly followed by the 9/11 attacks in New York, which had boldly symbolised a new, 21st century-era of increased fears for national security and religious separatism/extremism.3 The census in 2001 in Oldham reviewed 20 ‘wards’, with 15 of them being more than three quarters White and the remaining 5 considered ‘very mixed’ – the most mixed ward being Werneth, with 58% of its population being Black and Asian (CSSR, 2001).

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deprivation4, high levels of local institutional racism5 and the mounting conflict

between Muslim and White young men ‘venting their frustrations on each

other…as well as the police’ came together to produce the social unrest

(Pilkington, 2008).

After the riots the newly elected Home Secretary, David Blunkett, set

up a Home Office committee to analyse and respond to what had happened.

From this, a review team investigated the riots and came up with actions that

could ‘develop confident, active communities and social cohesion’ in response

(Denham, 2001: 1). Similar, more localised reports were written, too. In the

Ousely Report on Bradford, what caused the riots was immediately diagnosed

as ‘community fragmentation’ – placing much of the responsibility on the

alleged ‘self-segregation’ of Muslims in the area (Cantle, 2001; Modood 2005,

2007; Ousely 2001). All of the reports expressed the same surprise and

concern at the ‘depth of the polarisation in our towns and cities’ (CCRT, 2001:

9).

The widespread damage and cost of the riots, as well as the

uncertainty about what they symbolised, produced a surge of comment and

debate across the country regarding the status of British multiculturalism. The

Home Secretary, in a speech reflecting upon the findings of the reports,

reiterated the consensual opinion that the riots occurred because of ‘fractured’

4 All of the wards (districts) affected were among the 20% most deprived in the country, and some areas of Oldham and Burnley among the poorest 1% (Rattansi, 2011: 70).5 A Commission for Racial Equality report in the 1990s condemned Oldham council’s housing policies as racist. There were also a significant number of National Front/British National Party members who lived in the affected areas (Rattansi, 2011: 70).

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communities (Blunkett, 2001). He further made clear that he saw the

disturbances as reflective of the failure of past governments to control

immigration and integration (Pilkington, 2008). Indeed, after 2001 a broadly

dominant line of argument began to grow: that the multiculturalist settlement

had not worked for modern Britain (Kundnani, 2002). As the debate

progressed, for the first time even the ‘pluralistic centre-left’, that had

traditionally defended multicultural diversity, began offering a criticism of

multiculturalism (Modood, 2005: 63). Kenan Malik wrote an article for the

government-funded Commission for Racial Equality that attacked

multiculturalism, arguing that it had ‘helped to segregate communities far

more effectively than racism’ (Malik, 2001). Trevor Phillips, chair of the EHRC,

claimed that multiculturalism has encouraged ‘separateness’ across Britain

(Baldwin and Rozenberg, 2004). He labeled it ‘out of date’ (2004) and went on

to say:

My quarrel is not with those who like diversity. It is with those who want to

make a fetish of our historical differences to the point where multiculturalism,

as it is practiced, becomes ridiculous, or worse still, a dangerous form of

benign neglect and exclusion6.

A host of newspaper articles have since been lined with a similar

attitude. For example, David Goodhart7 argued in a controversial essay

published in Prospect that the diversity inspired by multiculturalism has gone

6 Connections, 2004/05 (magazine article)7 Traditionally, left-of-centre commentators have been supportive and defensive of multiculturalism. Thus David Goodhart’s (along with others such as Kenan Malik) criticism of the state of diversity and difference in Britain was particularly symbolic of the widespread adoption of the ‘narrative of failure’.

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so far in Britain that it has forced ‘sharing and solidarity’ to conflict (2004). He

has remained loyal to this view, having released a book in April 2013 that

retains his core anti-multiculturalist argument8. The Archbishop of York, Dr

John Sentamu, was reported in The Sunday Times to have announced that

multiculturalism has ‘betrayed the English’ (Gledhill, 2004), and just before

becoming Prime Minister, Gordon Brown wrote in The Daily Telegraph that

‘what was wrong with multiculturalism was not the recognition of diversity but

that it over-emphasized separateness at the cost of unity’ (Brown, 2007).

Other news reports since 2001 have featured the same attack upon

multiculturalism, especially after the terrorist attacks in 20059.

With the 9/11 attacks in New York having shocked the Western world

in 2001, the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005 was another major event that

contributed to the prominence of the debate regarding multiculturalism in

Britain, now factoring in the fears regarding religious extremism. The reactions

to the attacks produced a new wave of critics slaying multiculturalism, largely

because of claims that it had ‘aided an extremist Islamic discourse’ (Kepel,

2005). It thus continued to secure the already prominent view that

multiculturalism had encouraged and exacerbated segregation across the

country. Conservative MP David Davis agreed with Trevor Phillips, adding

8 The British Dream by David Goodhart was published 1st April 2013 and stands by the (widely criticised) fundamental argument expressed in his essay from 2004 that British society has been dismantled by mass immigration because of the tendency for human beings to be suspicious of outsiders.9 The exact same claims have been continually repeated over the last twelve years. For example, Ed West (Daily Telegraph), a decade after the riots, wrote that the multiculturalist system clearly ‘[drives] segregation’ (2011). Like David Goodhart, West has endorsed this opinion recently in his book, The Diversity Illusion (1st April 2013), in which he fiercely argues that multiculturalism and immigration have had negative overall effects on British society.

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that the government had promoted ‘distinctive identities’ over ‘common values

of nationhood’ (Jones, 2005). The attacks caused widespread discomfort

about Islam in Britain, and created an awareness of the ‘voluntary

segregation’ that some Muslim communities were allegedly endorsing (Porter,

2005). An increasing awareness socio-racial segregation across the country

had led to the conclusion that multiculturalism was to blame, and thus had

‘failed’.

Centre-Right politician David Cameron’s position as leader of the

Conservative Party and now Prime Minister has brought his comments about

multiculturalism to the forefront of the debate. Prior to being elected, in 2008

Cameron fiercely attacked multiculturalism as a state policy at a debate held

by the EHRC. He held it responsible for those born and raised in Britain that

“still feel completely divorced and alienated” from the mainstream. He claimed

that it aids those who oppose liberal values, and encourages “different

cultures within Britain to live separate lives” from others. He announced that

multiculturalism “is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results”

and “deliberately weakened” British identity (Cameron, 2008). Three years

later, as Prime Minister in 2011, he delivered a speech that has been received

as authoritative denunciation of multiculturalism10. The speech revitalised the

very same debate that had begun with the riots a decade beforehand. An

understanding of multiculturalism as a policy that excessively celebrates

‘difference’ has evidently led many commentators over the years to talk of it

as divisive and thus productive of segregation (Modood, 2011). The broad

10 It was particularly controversial in light of Cameron’s aim since becoming party leader to modernize the image of the Conservative party.

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engagement of critics claiming multiculturalism’s failure has cemented this

opinion as the dominant direction of the narrative. The belief that the model

has lead to separatism, a Britain of ‘monocultures’ living alongside one

another (Cantle, 2012), is the first justification of the ‘narrative of failure’.

1.2 – Identifying the second justification

The second justification of the narrative is the belief that

multiculturalism has failed because it has fostered extremist Islam in Britain.

Since well before the turn of the millennium there has been an undeniable

public awkwardness about British-Muslim identity and its compatibility with

contemporary British society (Parekh, 2008). The riots in 2001, the 7/7

bombings in 200511 and the framing of subsequent anti-terrorism policies

involved in combating the fears about a segregated, extremist sect of Islam

have contributed towards the ‘narrative of failure’ and its attack upon British

multiculturalism. The reports and the policies that were introduced in the years

following the riots not only aimed to build ‘community cohesion’ and resolve

the fragmentation demonstrated, but consistently referred to the ‘self

segregation’ of Muslims. For example, after the riots the government was

secretly warned of nine ‘hotspots’ of ‘decaying communities with large Muslim

populations’ where future disturbances were thought to be likely (Travis,

2006). The idea of multiculturalism was believed to be ‘creaking under the

11 Worth also noting are the failed attempted bombings that followed on the 21st July that year and the attacks on Glasgow international airport on 30th June 2007 (all perpetrated by Islamic extremists).

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weight of the culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands’ of Islam

(Meer and Modood, 2009: 476).

The attackers in London on 7th July 2005 were preaching extremist,

militant Islam12. On the day of the bombings Jack Straw, the Labour Foreign

Secretary, responded by noting the attacks had “all the hallmarks of Al-

Qaeda” (BBC, 2005). The ‘critical, sometimes savage, discourse’ claiming

multiculturalism’s death and/or failure reached a new peak in the wake of the

bombings (Modood, 2007: 11), and now ‘British public opinion largely agreed

on one thing: multiculturalism was dead and militant Islam had killed it off’

(Singh, 2005: 157). In the same way as the riots in 2001, the attacks

enhanced the relevance of the debate. Critics who had similarly argued that it

was to blame for the separatism between communities in Britain now began

holding multiculturalism responsible for the extremism demonstrated by the

bombings. The media were quick in response to the event. Mark Steyn wrote

in the Daily Telegraph that ‘the real suicide bomb is multiculturalism’ (2005).

William Pfaff argued in The Observer that the Britain-born bombers were the

result of ‘half a century [of] misguided and catastrophic’ policy’ that has

produced ‘a technologically educated but culturally and morally unassimilated

immigrant intelligentsia’ (2005). As the narrative had strengthened,

‘multiculturalism, segregation, violence and terrorism were being linked in the

12 Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay and Hasib Mir Hussain collectively killed 52 people and injured hundreds of others in suicide bombings on 7th July 2005 (BBC, 2006b)

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public imagination’ as the influence of the media’s reactionary blaming of

multiculturalism took its toll (Rattansi, 2011: 76).

Political commentators have since also contributed to the evolving

discourse as it has gained revitalised momentum in its condemnation of

multiculturalism. Michael Gove, in his book ‘Celsius 7/7’, argued that

multiculturalism has incubated the presence of Islamic extremism in Britain

and is therefore to blame for the bombings (Gove, 2006). Trevor Phillips gave

a speech in the wake of the attacks condemning multiculturalism again for

concentrating “far too much on the ‘multi’ and not enough on common culture”

and stated that Britain ‘[has] allowed tolerance of diversity to harden into

effective isolation of communities” (Phillips, 2005). Kenan Malik, a decade

after his response to the 2001 riots, developed his stance to argue that

multiculturalism had helped ‘clear a space’ for militant Islam (Malik, 2011).

This second justification of those arguing the failure of multiculturalism

was, again, epitomised by David Cameron’s 2011 speech in which he implied

that the terrorism committed by extremist young Muslim men in 2005 was

down to a “question of identity”. From the first few sentences he raised the

importance of stressing, “terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion

or ethnic group”13. He then almost exclusively referred to Islam and the perils

of extreme versions of the religion, particularly in relation to the problems with

British multiculturalism. He tied his argument that state multiculturalism has

encouraged “different cultures to live separate lives” with suggesting the need

13 Perhaps to rhetorically sterilize the content of the rest of the speech, ‘more than playing to the gallery’ (Klug, 2011: 3).

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to “provide a vision of society” that will make British-Muslims in particular feel

they want to belong to (Cameron, 2011). It is fitting that David Cameron, as

the current, Prime Minister referred to and combined both of the arguments

that have been used to justify the claim that multiculturalism has failed.

Chapter 2: Nullifying the first justification

Having identified the ‘narrative of failure’ and the two main justifications

that have been used to support it, this chapter will respond to the first of these

justifications. It will be revealed that the claim that multiculturalism has failed

because it has encouraged and exacerbated separatism between

communities in Britain has relied upon an invalid misinterpretation of the

British model. Because of this, the claim will be nullified. The arguments of

defenders of multiculturalism that feature in existing relevant literature will be

aggregated in order to do this.

2.1 - Literature Review

A ‘substantial empirical literature’ challenges the master narrative of

failure (Taylor-Gooby and Waite, 2013: 4). The arguments of Tariq Modood14

are prominent within this literature. Modood has centrally argued that

multiculturalism has not been ‘about separatism, fragmentation, anti-14 Tariq Modood is a Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at Bristol University (1997-). He is the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. He is one of the leading authorities on ethnic minorities in Britain.

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integration or anti-British nationality’ (Modood, 2005: 63). He argues that the

claims of it having encouraged separatism between communities, coupled

with the belief that there has been a ‘retreat from’ (Joppke, 2004: 253) or

‘death of’ (Kundnani, 2002) it are false, and sees the belief that

multiculturalism is ‘only about encouraging minority difference’ as invalidly

criticising an untrue, essentialist model not pursued in Britain. (Modood, 2011:

2). Indeed, he refers to other prominent commentators in order to validate

what he deems to be an accurate version of contemporary multiculturalism:

The multiculturalism in the writings of key theorists such as, Charles Taylor,

Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh and Anne Phillips and in the relevant documents,

laws and policies of Canada, Australia and Britain is aimed at integration. The

difference between the pro- and anti-multiculturalists lies not in the goal of

integration but, firstly, in the normative understanding of integration.15

Andrew Pilkington16 has directly responded to the narrative’s attack

upon multiculturalism, agreeing with Modood that it is a form of integration

and ‘an attractive and worthwhile political project’ (Pilkington, 2008; Modood,

2007). Pilkington maps the changing nature of racial discourse from what he

calls the ‘radical hour’ of New Labour’s first term in office (1997-2001) that

involved a particular focus upon anti-racism and identifying institutional

racism. He notes that the media reaction to the Runnymede trust-

commissioned Parekh Report (2000) and the riots in northern cities in 2001

steered the focus of the racial discourse towards a nationalist one ‘centered

15 Modood, 2012: 4116 Andrew Pilkington is a Professor of Sociology at Northampton University.

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on community cohesion and integration’ that has persisted since. He argues

that this change in focus has led to the attack upon a misperceived,

nonexistent ‘radical’ version of multiculturalism. By distinguishing between

‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ multiculturalism he concludes, in line with other

critics17, that no country in the West – especially Britain – has adopted a

‘radical’ model. Indeed like Modood, by identifying this perception as false, he

dismisses the idea that multiculturalism can seriously be seen as causing

segregation (2008).

Ali Rattansi18 has added an extension to these arguments. He notes

that debates about multiculturalism have been plagued by a tendency to see it

in a dated, ‘culturally essentialist’ form; that is, ‘with simplistic versions of

ethnic minority cultures...having a small number of unchanging characteristics

and as being tightly bound entities’ (Rattansi, 2011: 27). In line with Pilkington

he acknowledges the significance of the narrative’s call for ‘community

cohesion’ after 2001, and identifies it as an insecure reaction to the ‘polarised’

and ‘fractured’ communities found in the investigative reports that followed the

northern riots (Rattansi, 2012). Furthermore, Rattansi views the narrative’s

redirection towards ‘new integrationism’ in Britain after this time as the result

of a false criticism of multiculturalism. After a close reading of the said reports

he concludes categorically that ‘multiculturalism is not blamed for the creation

of segregation and fractured communities’ (Rattansi, 2011: 74).

17 For example, Will Kymlicka argues that ‘multicultural integration’ remains a live option for Western democracies. (Kymlicka, 2012: 1)18 Ali Rattansi is a visiting Professor in Sociology at City University, London. He is an expert on multiculturalism, identity and racism in Britain.

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2.2 – ‘Radical and ‘moderate’ models of

multiculturalism

There has been a significant misconception of Britain’s model of

multiculturalism that has materialized in the public narrative since the riots in

2001. This misconception is a result of the heterogeneity surrounding

multiculturalism and how it is understood. Steven Vertovec summarises this,

acknowledging that,

Multiculturalism is associated with many – sometimes divergent, sometimes

overlapping -- discourses, institutional frameworks and policies invoking the

term in rather different ways…it may refer to a demographic description, a

broad political ideology, a set of specific public policies, a goal of institutional

restructuring, a mode of resourcing cultural expression, a general moral

challenge, [and] a set of new political struggles.19

The complicated, multi-faceted and subjective elements of

multiculturalism make the attainment of a universally accepted definition for it

very difficult. Indeed, as Meer and Noorani put it, ‘[multiculturalism]

encapsulates a vast corpus of contested meanings’ (2006: 197). However, all

interviewees in Taylor-Gooby and Waite’s recent paper agreed that the core

understanding of multiculturalism is a “respect for diversity” (2013). Further

than this, a distinction can be highlighted. Bhikhu Parekh defended the

CMEB’s account of British multiculturalism put forward in ‘The future of multi-

19 Vertovec, 2001: 3.

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ethnic Britain (The Parekh Report)’ (2000) by criticising writers that have

attacked multiculturalism, noting that they tend to ‘homogenize it’s different

forms, equate it with one particular strand of it, and end up misunderstanding

those who do not fit [their] simplistic version of it’ (Parekh, 2006: 349). It is

precisely this tendency that has been the driving force behind the narrative’s

false interpretation of, and attack upon, multiculturalism in Britain since the

turn of the millennium.

By claiming that British multiculturalism has failed because of its

encouragement of separatism, the narrative has fundamentally misconceived

the British model to be what Andrew Pilkington refers to as ‘radical’

multiculturalism. This perception understands the model to deem it

‘unnecessary for policies that acknowledge different identities to be

accompanied by others that seek to inculcate an overarching national identity’

(Pilkington, 2011: 6). In other words, the ‘radical’ model stresses the

recognition of difference as its primary motivation, and disregards the

significant integration of minorities into a common identity. Tariq Modood –

along with other theorists including Parekh, Will Kymlicka and Rattansi –

identifies ‘essentialism’ to be a fundamental component of this misconception.

He articulates that within the perception of the narrative, ‘the positing of

immigrant cultures, which need to be respected, defended, publicly supported

and so on, is said to appeal to the view that cultures are discrete, frozen in

time, impervious to external influences, homogeneous and without internal

dissent’ (Modood, 1998: 378). Supporting this, Will Kymlicka criticises the

tendency of the narrative to perceive British multiculturalism as a dated ‘3S’

25


model - ‘saris, samosas and steel drums’ (Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, 2000). He

considers this as an oversimplified ‘caricature’ of multiculturalism and an

example of this essentialism that anti-multiculturalists have prematurely relied

upon to justify their claims (Kymlicka, 2012: 5).

As already highlighted, the ‘master narrative’ has been accelerated by

major events such as the riots in 2001 and the terrorist bombings in 2005. Its

discourse has been secured as the dominant side of the debate through the

increased attention it has received from different influential figures: politicians

(Brown and Cameron), policy-people (Phillips), commentators (Goodhart and

Malik) and a huge number of journalists. Those that have denounced

multiculturalism as a ‘failure’ have often simultaneously characterised its

existence in Britain as being outdated or in ‘retreat’ (Abbas, 2005; Appleyard,

2006; Joppke 2004; Singh, 2005). This widespread belief, upheld by the

conviction of these commentators and governed by a broad essentialist

stance, has rendered the term “multiculturalism” ‘heavily freighted with

associations of groupism and segregation’ (Taylor-Gooby and Waite, 2013:

11). The narrative has invalidly perceived Britain’s model of multiculturalism

as ‘radical’, and in turn held it responsible for the segregation and separatism

that has been identified across the country.

The model of multiculturalism that has been pursued in Britain is what

Pilkington distinguishes as ‘moderate’ multiculturalism. He describes this

model in contrast to the ‘radical’ model as seeing

26


policies that recognize and accommodate minority identities (for example being

Muslim) as working in tandem with policies that promote a national identity that

embraces these distinct identities (such as being British)20

With ‘moderate’ multiculturalism there is no emphasis upon separatism

between ethnic and cultural communities. As Meer, Modood and Parekh, as

well as political philosopher Charles Taylor21 have put it – in line with most

other defenders of multiculturalism - the concerns of ‘dialogue and

communication’ and the ‘[challenging of] people to evaluate the strengths and

weaknesses of their own cultures’ is central the theoretical framework of

British multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012; Modood, 2008; Parekh,

2006; Taylor 1992). This ‘moderate’ multiculturalism is the model that was

distinctly endorsed by the Labour government that came to office in 1997.

2.3 – 1997-2001: New Labour and multiculturalism

Tony Blair and his Labour government came into office in 1997 after

nearly two decades of being in opposition. The Conservative government

under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and John Major (1990-1997) had been

limitedly supportive of the increasing multiculturalist agenda that had started

20 Pilkington, 2011: 6.21 In his 1992 essay ‘The politics of recognition’, which is widely considered to be a founding account of multiculturalism, Charles Taylor stressed the notion that modern identities are not just formed based on positions within society (or within a ‘social hierarchy’) but are formed with an intrinsic dependence upon dialogue with others. That is, he argued that cultures are fluid and develop by overlapping, fusing with and learning from one another. This is an early acknowledgement that both essentialism and separatism are incompatible with the late 20th century direction of multiculturalism.

27


in the late 1950s and 1960s22. Many consider the survival of multiculturalism

that continued to flourish throughout the skeptical Conservative years23 to be

because of local authorities and schools that had established discussion,

acceptance and cooperation in answer to the cultural diversity that

communities increasingly faced. In 1997, the newly elected Prime Minister,

Tony Blair, immediately emphasized the plural and dynamic character of

modern Britain by using the slogan ‘Cool Britannia’ and talking about his

rebranding of the nation (Modood, 2005: 1). The New Labour project lay

within the capacity of Britain’s consensual multiculturalism, and it was soon

celebrated ‘as one aspect of a young and vibrant country, a hub of ideas,

goods, services, people and cultures’ (Schnapper, 2011: 78).

The most significant element that New Labour’s election brought to

British multiculturalism was the renewed concern with equality and anti-

racism: the ‘radical hour’ (Pilkington, 2008) or ‘multicultural moment’ (Meer

and Modood, 2009: 477). Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, set up the

MacPherson inquiry in 1997 investigating the death of Stephen Lawrence24.

The report in 1999 identified ‘institutional racism’ in the Metropolitan Police,

defining it as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate

and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic

22 This is when the first significant actions were taken to accommodate the immigrants that were entering the country. For example, the Race Relations Acts, introduced in 1965, 1968 and 1976 by the Labour government, took ethnic minorities into account with policies such as the establishment of specially designed training and services for different racial groups.23 The Conservative government was not as embracing of the multiculturalist agenda as Labour governments have been because of fears that it was undermining the traditional British identity (Rattansi, 2011).24 Stephen Lawrence was a Black youth murdered in a racially motivated attack in 1993.

28


background’ (MacPherson, 1999). It encouraged the government to take

greater account for diversity and racism in the police and schools. Clarifying

the endorsement of the report to the House of Commons on 24 th February

199925, Jack Straw announced reforms of the police force to better reflect

diversity in Britain, and an amendment to the 1976 Race Relations Act to

grant greater powers to the Commission for Racial Equality26 (CRE). The

official recognition by the government that institutional racism existed in

Britain was a ‘radical development’ (Pilkington, 2008) and symbolised the

direction of New Labour’s aim of integrating ethnic minorities whilst

maintaining strong, cooperative national unity (Schnapper, 2011: 79). This

balance fundamentally demonstrated the practice of a ‘moderate’

multiculturalism.

The Labour government endorsed the report published in 2000 by the

CMEB, a commission set up by the Runnymede Trust, called ‘The future of

multi-ethnic Britain (The Parekh Report)’, chaired by Bhikhu Parekh. However,

it was received with an outburst of media hysteria. The report was an

extensive study that most importantly defined Britain as “both a community of

citizens and a community of communities”, and aimed to achieve “a collective

life in which the spirit of civic goodwill, shared identity and common sense of

belonging goes hand in hand with love of diversity” (CMEB, 2000: ix). Despite

this, it was fervently attacked for its suggestion that the concept of

‘Britishness’ had ‘systemic, largely unspoken, racial connotations’ (Travis,

2000). The many headlines responding to the report over the days of its

25 H. of C. Parl. Deb., Vol. 326, col. 392, 24 February 1999.26 This later became the Commission for Equality and Human Rights.

29


release included: ‘”British” is a racist word, says report’, ‘What an insult to

history and our intelligence’, ‘They are doing their best to destroy Britain’s

history’ and ‘It’s stupid to brand True Brits as racist’. Evidently, the

overwhelming media reception tended to view the report in a highly negative

way (Pilkington, 2008). The Conservative opposition, led by William Hague,

aligned itself with this critical movement (Schnapper, 2011: 82). The main

criticisms were based on a selective reading of the report, paying almost

exclusive attention to its desire to rethink the national story. To many the

report represented a divisive anti-Britishness and, fuelled by anxiety and

perhaps resentment towards the focus of anti-racism since 1997, it signaled

the ‘first signs of a backlash’ towards multiculturalism (Pilkington, 2008).

The Parekh report has since been widely regarded as the most

comprehensive modern overview of race and multiculturalism in Britain

(Modood, 2007; Taylor-Gooby and Waite, 2013; Vertovec, 2001). A closer

reading of the report shows it to predominantly support ‘forging a meta-

membership of Britishness under which diversity could be sustained’,

containing over 140 policy recommendations (Meer and Modood, 2009: 477),

including an emphasis on the mitigation of discrimination. Although it

acknowledged a controversial linkage of ‘Britishness’ to racialism, the broad

direction of the report was an endorsement of multiculturalism as a form of

integration in line with a strong national identity. Indeed, Parekh himself

pointed out in the report that the integration of minorities in Britain had already

been mostly successful even if discrimination remained (CMEB, 2000). Jack

Straw clarified New Labour’s support for most of the conclusions but said “he

30


firmly [believed] that there is a future for Britain and a future for Britishness”

(Straw, 2000).

In its first term in office, New Labour valued anti-racism and what Nam-

Kook Kim describes as ‘deliberative multiculturalism’, emphasizing ‘rational

dialogue with mutual respect in a tolerant multi-nation tradition’ (Kim, 2011:

127). The government was developing Britain’s ‘moderate’ multiculturalism

that was able to embrace diversity within a framework of British nationalism

(Farrar 2012; Pitcher, 2009). Official support for the Parekh report, along with

the introduction of acts and policies that stressed good race relations and

integration, rather than separatism, demonstrated this. The defensive media

and public rejection of the Parekh report in 2000, however, signaled the

changing perception of this model. The riots that occurred in the following

year secured the conception of a new narrative that would falsely view a

‘radical’ multiculturalism to have encouraged separatism between different

communities in Britain (Pilkington, 2008).

2.4 – 2001: the misinterpretation of the northern riots

reports

The reports27 commissioned by the government in response to the riots

that occurred in Oldham, Bradford and Leeds in the summer of 2001 were

‘crucial in setting the stage for a sustained critique of multiculturalism’

27 The Cantle, Ouseley, Ritchie and Denham reports were the main publications in immediate response to the riots, all released just after the summer of 2001.

31


(Rattansi, 2011: 69). They were quick to commonly identify social

fragmentation and separatism between communities – including the ‘self-

segregation’ of Muslims – as the main reason behind the unrest (Schnapper

2011: 86). In his report, Lord Ouseley depicted Bradford as a city where the

population lived in fear (Ouseley, 62001: 6). The Cantle report, Community

Cohesion, reinforced this, identifying ‘parallel lives’ led by Whites and Asians,

noting that ‘there has been little attempt to develop clear values which focus

on what it means to be a citizen of modern multi-racial Britain’ (Cantle, 2001:

9).

It is clear from the beginning of the reports that ‘the problem’ with the

areas under study had already been identified before the investigations had

begun. Ouseley points out in the foreword to his report that his ‘Race Review’

team had been given the brief to discover why ‘community fragmentation

along social, cultural, ethnic and religious lines’ was occurring in Bradford

(Ouseley, 2001: 5). The government, media and public ‘digested, interpreted,

and re-worked the findings and recommendations of the reports into an

assault on multiculturalism’ (Rattansi, 2011: 69). Inequality was no longer a

critical concern: the central issue of the debate was that of cultural integration

(Pilkington, 2008). In response to the separatism of communities

demonstrated by the riots, Britain’s ‘moderate’ multiculturalism that had been

distinctly promoted by New Labour was marginalized along with its emphasis

upon anti-racism.

32


Interestingly, after a close reading of the reports, Ali Rattansi concludes

categorically that ‘none of [them] blame multiculturalism for the events or the

underlying social factors’ demonstrated (2011: 74). He notes that

multiculturalism is hardly mentioned directly in the reports on Oldham and

Burnley. Going further, he suggests that all the reports imply the need for

more multiculturalism – especially in education, local authority practices and

employment (Rattansi, 2011: 73). Ouseley’s Race Review team on Bradford

criticised the pre-1997 government for sidelining multiculturalist measures in

schools, highlighting the limited teaching of ‘different cultures and faiths

among our diverse multi-cultural communities’ (Ouseley, 2001). Additionally,

the Oldham panel was ‘shocked’ by the racism it found amongst Whites

against Asians, and found the discrimination in housing allocation by the

council and selective anti-Asian local media reporting significantly damaging

(Ritchie, 2001). Essentially, the reports implied that the multicultural policies

and measures that already existed in local communities needed rethinking

and extending as solutions to the problems found – but not, as the dominant

narrative would suggest, that they had caused the problems. The conclusions

of the reports justifiably identified social fragmentation and separatism in the

northern cities affected. But by suggesting that the alleged divisiveness of

multicultural policies was responsible for the riots, the reaction of the

government, media and commentators over the following years was

contradictory to the findings of the reports. The celebration of multiculturalism

that was such a strong feature of Labour’s first term diminished after 2001 and

was soon overtaken by the dominant view of the ‘narrative of failure’ that it

was ‘dead’ and had failed Britain’s communities.

33


2.5 - ‘Britishness’, ‘community cohesion’ and

integration

The same critical narrative that was spawned by the invalid blaming of

multiculturalism for the riots in 2001 has developed into a common rhetoric

that presents British multiculturalism as a dead and failed project.

Announcements of politicians, subsequent changes in policy and the

arguments of prominent commentators all now point instead towards

integration, ‘community cohesion’ and ‘Britishness’ in what has been called

the ‘civic turn’ (Modood, 2012a; Mouritsen 2008). This redirection of the

narrative began with the Labour government’s second term in office and

continues to be supported by the Coalition government28. Evidence of this

demonstrates the longevity of the narrative’s misperception of the British

multicultural model as ‘radical’ rather than its true ‘moderate’ form.

There has been a continued concern after 2001 that a lacking

commonality of ‘Britishness’ exists between citizens from the diverse range of

ethnic backgrounds in Britain. Immediately after the riot reports the Home

Secretary, David Blunkett, announced plans for citizenship and English

classes for immigrants. A White paper was released in early 2002 entitled

Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain that

proposed a national debate on civic identity, followed by the Nationality,

28 Most prominently demonstrated by David Cameron in his speech in February 2011.

34


Immigration and Asylum Bill that enforced stricter requirements for immigrants

(Schnapper, 2011: 90). In the same year an advisory group29 was set up to

formulate citizenship ceremonies and contribute further to defining a new,

united ‘Britishness’. Over the last decade the widespread view that British

society needs a stronger national identity has persisted. Gordon Brown

demonstrated this in two speeches (2004 and 2006) in which he extensively

described the need to re-imagine Britishness30 (Pilkington, 2008).

The bombings in 2005 drastically added to the belief that certain ethnic

and religious groups – Muslims in particular – were not part of a cohesive

national identity. Defining Britishness and pushing for ‘community cohesion’

continued to be stressed in the rhetoric and policies of the government. A

fierce attack upon multiculturalism across the media31, and in parliament took

place and as a result a ‘toughening of the public discourse about integration’

took place (Schnapper, 2011: 104). This new ‘integrationism’ was epitomised

by the launch of the CIC in August 2006. Announcing this launch the

Secretary of State for Communities, Ruth Kelly, made clear to migrants ‘their

responsibility to integrate and contribute to the local community’ (Kelly, 2006).

The same hard-line tone was utilized by Tony Blair in his ‘Our Nation’s Future’

speech in December that year. Furthermore, a CIC report in June 2007

emphasized ‘local-level integration’, recommending policies that gave priority

to groups making links between communities rather than separate groups

(CIC, 2007). Implicit in the report’s proposals was the view that had secured 29 Chaired by the political theorist Sir Bernard Crick.30 Brown stated in 2006: "We have to be clearer now about how diverse cultures which inevitably contain differences can find the essential common purpose also without which no society can flourish." (BBC, 2006a)31 Featured in sections 1.1 and 1.2, pp. 11-19.

35


itself in the debate regarding Britain’s multicultural model: that multiculturalism

and integration are in opposition (Pilkington, 2008). The belief in this

opposition certainly demonstrated an untrue ‘radical’ understanding of

multiculturalism.

This contradictory misperception of those that denounce

multiculturalism whilst endorsing integration falsely sees the British model as

‘radical’, and this has continued with the Coalition government. In a speech in

2009, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi spoke for the Conservative party in clarifying

this. She deemed multiculturalism to be “forcing Britain’s diverse communities

to still define themselves as different” and stated that “state multiculturalism is

not integration, is not unifying and is not the British way” (Warsi, 2009). David

Cameron’s speech in February 2011 reiterated this. Additionally, on 21st

February 2012 the Communities Secretary, Eric Pickles, officially marked the

‘death’ of multiculturalism before launching the coalition policy statement:

‘Creating the Conditions for Integration’ (DCLG, 2012). Whether this particular

recurring rhetoric announcing the end or failure of multiculturalism matches

the reality of the Coalition government’s policies has been disputed (see

Conclusion, p. 52).

2.6 – Multiculturalism has not encouraged or

exacerbated separatism

36


Pro-multiculturalists have consistently supported both re-imagining

Britishness and the integration of minorities as credible steps towards a civil,

cohesive society (Pilkington, 2008; Modood, 2005 and 2012a; Parekh, 2006).

Furthermore, both of these considerations were practiced before 2001 under

New Labour’s deliberative, ‘moderate’ multiculturalism. But the increasing

endorsement of these steps in the rhetoric and policies of both the New

Labour and Coalition governments as alternatives to multiculturalism

demonstrates the ‘narrative of failure’ to have assumed a dichotomy between

‘civic integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ (Meer and Modood, 2009: 477).

Because ‘moderate’ multiculturalism does not entertain this dichotomy – in

fact, it actively rejects it – the criticism of the narrative is invalid as it has

falsely understood British multiculturalism to be ‘radical’. Indeed, increased

segregation and separatism between communities has been demonstrated

since the turn of the millennium32. But by holding the British model of

multiculturalism responsible for this, the ‘narrative of failure’ is falsely

attacking a ‘straw man’ (Pilkington, 2011: 6).

Chapter 3: Nullifying the second

justification

32 In their report ‘Sleepwalking to Segregation? Challenging myths about race and migration’, Ludi Simpson and Nissa Finney find that segregation and separatism between communities in Britain has decreased since the early 1990s. More specifically, they dismiss there to have been any self-segregation or encouraged isolation of the minority communities in the areas affected by the northern riots in 2001. Instead, they note that the White populations are far more likely to isolate themselves than South Asians or Muslims in particular. Indeed, this paper has contributed to the debate by suggesting that even the claim that minority segregation/separatism exists is a ‘myth’, let alone that it has been encouraged by multiculturalism (Finney and Simpson, 2009).

37


This chapter will respond to the second justification of the ‘narrative of

failure’ identified in chapter 1. The claim that multiculturalism has failed

because it has fostered Islamic extremism in Britain will be revealed as

invalid. This is because it not only relies upon an invalid misinterpretation of

the ‘moderate’ British model, but also overlooks other factors that have

undoubtedly contributed to the rise of Islamic separatism and extremism

across Britain, particularly since the turn of the millennium. Again, the

arguments featured in existing literature will be collated and endorsed in order

to conduct this second nullification.

3.1 - Literature Review

The dominant argument of the critics defending multiculturalism against

this second justification is that the attack upon multiculturalism in Britain is

invalid as it has merely become an attack upon the faltering identity of

allegedly non-integrating British-Muslims, and the militant sect of Islam that

seems to have stemmed from this. Shane Brighton states the consensual

view that the ‘new direction’ of the multicultural narrative has come to focus

upon the Muslim community (2007: 11). Chris Allen33 maps the development

of Islamophobia since before the turn of the millennium, noting that prominent

opponents of multiculturalism who have contributed to the ‘narrative of failure’

33 Chris Allen is a lecturer in Social Policy and Politics and Birmingham University.

38


relied upon ‘the climate of fear and anxiety’ after 7/7 in a ‘post-Rushdie 34,

post-9/11’ context to ‘try and legitimise their agenda’. He contends that:

Whilst multiculturalism, such critics argue on the surface at least, elevates

difference and therefore enhances segregation, what underpins and clearly

informs those arguments and provides legitimisation is the insistence and

inference upon the ‘problems’ – perceived or otherwise – of Britain’s Muslims35.

He concludes that multiculturalism cannot be considered as a failure

because it has merely become the medium through which ‘a covert attack’ is

being delivered on the ‘presence, role and responsibilities of Muslims…and

the perceived problems that these – rather than multiculturalism – are

presenting’ (Allen, 2007: 22). Indeed, this conclusion supports his broader

view that Islamophobia has become caught up in separate debates that

render it more dangerously implicit than ever before (Allen, 2007).

Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood and Bhikhu Parekh (2008) support this,

highlighting that ‘the relationship between Muslims and multiculturalism in

Britain has become increasingly interdependent’, particularly after the riots in

2001 (Meer and Modood, 2009: 486). Extending Allen’s argument, Modood

has deemed this as an unfair ‘simplistic linkage’ (2008: 17), maintaining that

‘contrary to the multiculturalism blamers…[Islamic extremism] is nothing to do

with the promotion of multiculturalism’ but is, at least in part, a result of the

34 The ‘Rushdie affair’ is the term used in the literature to refer to the violent backlash of Muslims in Britain in 1989 against Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses. It is considered as one of the first most significant moments of collective British-Muslim political agency.35 Allen, 2007: 13

39


British government’s divisive foreign policies (2007: 139). Indeed, blaming

multiculturalism overlooks other potential factors that have caused the

apparent incompatibility of a British-Muslim identity with the ideals of British

society. For example, after closely studying the British government’s anti-

terrorism policy, Derek Mcghee36 makes an ardent case:

It is fact that anti-terrorism laws and the Islamophobic flavour of media and

political discourses since 9/11 have impacted negatively upon Muslim

communities in Britain…and amplified their sense of insecurity37.

He contends that the suspicious surveillance of Muslims by the

government and the ‘us/them’ binary that the ‘war on terror’ relies upon is

antagonizing and thus ‘radicalizing’ those that are intended to be moderated

(Mcghee, 2008: 144). Among other reasons, this has exacerbated the

insecurity and disunity in Britain, particularly in Muslim communities. The

relationship between this insecurity and the subsequent attack on

multiculturalism has been an insidious driving force that has its roots in the

evolution of British-Muslim identity.

3.2 – British-Muslim identity before 2001

In the late 1980s the first most significant example of specifically

Muslim political activism in Britain was demonstrated after the release of

36 Derek Mcghee is Deputy Head of Social Sciences at Southampton University and has published numerous books focusing on citizenship, human rights and security.37 Mcghee, 2008: 146

40


Salman Rushdie’s controversial novel, The Satanic Verses (1989). This

marked the beginning of a process in which external and internal motivations

have established the prominence of a British-Muslim identity (Werbner, 2000).

Previously homogenized in the public racial discourse as ‘Asian’, the political

agency demonstrated by Muslims during the ‘Rushdie Affair” meant that the

community has since been regarded in Britain to belong to a ‘Muslim’ master

identity. Respondents of the ‘Muslim elite’ in Britain interviewed by Ahmad

and Evergeti agreed that the British-Muslim identity has since gained cultural

and political salience in response to national and international events: the Gulf

wars, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Western political interference in

Muslim countries and the atrocities of 9/11 and 7/7 (Ahmad and Evergeti,

2010: 1702).

Over the 1990s the Muslim identity was thus emerging. The Muslim

Parliament of Britain was set up in 1992 by known radical, Kalim Siddiqui, and

this was a challenge to both the authority of the British state and the

deteriorating belief that British-Muslims were fully adapting to the values of

British society. In the same year as the establishment of the MCB, in early

1997 the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia38 was set up, and

a corresponding Runnymede report was published in November called

Islamophobia: A challenge for us all, launched by Jack Straw39. The report

was the first comprehensive investigation into anti-Islamic hostility in Britain,

and included a range of recommendations for tackling the problem as it

becam e ‘more explicit’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997). Allen notes that the report 38 Under the chairmanship of Professor Gordon Conway of Imperial College London.39 The concern of the report epitomised the New Labour government’s focus upon anti-racism (see section 2.3, pp. 26-30)

41


brought the word ‘Islamophobia’ into the ‘everyday common parlance and

discourses of both the public and political spaces’ where it has strongly

remained since (2007: 2). Additionally, the Forum Against Islamophobia and

Racism (FAIR) pressure group began lobbying in 2001. These developments

symbolised both the recognition of an anti-Islamic feeling in Britain as well as

a widespread doubt concerning the compatibility of Islam/Muslim identity with

British values.

3.3 – British-Muslims and multiculturalism pre-7/7

Between the northern riots in 2001 and the 7/7 bombings in 2005, a

focus on ‘the degree of loyalty of Muslim communities to Britain’ increasingly

featured as a core element of the developing narrative criticizing the state of

multiculturalism and ‘Britishness’ (Schnapper, 2011: 92). Against a backdrop

of Western panic and insecurity following the terrorist attacks committed by

Islamic extremists in New York on the 11th September 2001, and the ensuing

war in Afghanistan, the reports investigating the riots in Britain were released.

Although they identified ‘polarised communities’ of both White and Asian

ethnicity, the recurring specific reference to the ‘self-segregation’ of Muslim

communities suggested that the most significant cause-for-concern about the

separatism demonstrated by the riots was the apparent refusal of mainly

Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims to integrate (Cantle, 2001; Ouseley,

2001).

42


Furthermore, anti-terror laws were established by Parliament in the

weeks following 9/11 in order to crack down on terrorist activity. For the first

time, radical Muslim organisations were openly under surveillance and

targeted by intelligence agencies (Meer and Modood, 2009: 487). A general

public resentment towards Muslims ensued40. Government activity had to

respond to both the concern of domestic separatism from the riots as well as

the new potential threat of terrorism. The two contexts were simultaneously

demonstrating a significant preoccupation with Muslims in Britain. In an

attempt to console the defensive Muslim community, Tony Blair addressed

them in parliament saying, “Neither you nor Islam is responsible for this; on

the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism, and we ask you

as friends to make common cause with us in defeating this barbarism”41.

Ironically, using the words ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘you’, this seemed to be addressing a

rhetorical ‘other’ rather than a cohesive community and shared ‘Britishness’

that New Labour was promoting. Indeed, it added to the perception of British-

Muslim identity as separate and non-integrated after the northern riots, and

potentially dangerous after 9/11.

This concerned perception of the sub-narrative grew and became

intertwined with the perception that multiculturalism had ‘failed’. The title of a

controversial article written by Norman Lamont42 in 2002, ‘Down with

multiculturalism, book-burning and fatwas’ in The Daily Telegraph explicitly

linked the founding event of the British-Muslim identity (the Rushdie affair)

40 Several mosques and individual Muslims across Britain were attacked in the weeks following 9/11 (Wintour and Carter, 2001).41 H. of C. Parl. Deb., 14 September 2001, Vol. 372, col. 604.42 Former Chancellor of the Exchequer

43


with the modern concern over Islamic extremism and multiculturalism. Slaying

the British model for its reduction of ‘Britishness’, his negative focus was

placed upon the apparent refusal of certain communities to adhere to ‘our’

values and laws in Britain (Lamont, 2002). Meanwhile, Tony Blair had led

Britain into the Iraq War. This had a contradictory impact on British-Muslim

identity:

On the one hand, Muslims were included in the large non-parliamentary

opposition to the war, and therefore espoused a mainstream cause. On the

other hand, alienation from the government’s foreign policy led to a possibly

dangerous rift between many British Muslims and the society in which they

lived.43

The majority of the British population opposed the war44. But the

unanimous anger of Muslims in particular was clear, and the tension between

them and the government heightened (Schnapper, 2011: 94). After terrorist

attacks targeting British interests in Istanbul in November 2003, Dennis

Macshane, the Europe Minister, announced an ultimatum to British-Muslim

community leaders:

It is the British way – based on political dialogue and non-violent protests – or it

is the way of the terrorists, against which the whole democratic world is

uniting.45

43 Schnapper, 2011: 93.44 An Ipsos MORI poll found over 65% of the British public to be against sending troops into Iraq without proof of them hiding weapons of mass destruction (MORI, 2003).45 Quoted in Jones, G. (2003) article in The Daily Telegraph, ‘Muslims round on ‘British way’ minister’.

44


This presented a simplistic binary labeling of Muslims as either

integrated pro-British or extremist anti-British. It is widely argued that this

essentialist dichotomy has persisted in the Western media’s portrayal of

British-Muslims since (Mcghee, 2008; Sundas, 2008).

After the 2001 riots, the belief that Muslim communities were not

integrating into British society implied that the alleged separatism encouraged

by a perceived ‘radical’ multiculturalism was to blame. The increasing

awareness and fear of extremist Islamic terrorism had grown with and

become attached to this belief after 9/11. The pre-7/7 tension in Britain had

thus been built upon two closely intertwined sub-narratives. The first of these

was the consensual belief that multiculturalism had failed because of the non-

integration and separatism of Muslims. The second was the post-9/11

‘explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural dysfuntionality’ as the reason for the

rise of extremism and, by extension, terrorism46 (Meer and Modood, 2009:

487). The 7/7 bombings in 2005 provided mutual legitimization for both of

these sub-narratives, and converted the general perception in Britain from

considering Muslims as a ’culturally threatening but manageable presence’ to

developing a ‘morbid fear of them’ (Parekh, 2008: 11).

3.4 – Why blaming multiculturalism for extremist Islam

is invalid

46 This was heightened by the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 that killed 191 people (BBC, 2004).

45


Meer and Modood conclude that the net outcome of these two

intertwined sub-narratives after the 7/7 attacks has been ‘a coupling of

diversity and anti-terrorism agendas that has implicated contemporary British

multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain’s security woes’ (2009: 487). This

coupling has resulted in the ‘narrative of failure’ as a reaction of the public

discourse to try and combat the legitimization of fear and insecurity that has

stood since the bombings47 (Fekete, 2011; Modood, 2007). This ‘savage

discourse’ in the media from July 2005 onwards immediately condemned

multiculturalism to have failed (see section 1.2, p. 17), for example, Gilles

Kepel wrote that the multicultural consensus had been ‘smashed to

smithereens’ by the bombings (2005). There was a particularly widespread

confusion over why the attacks were committed by British-born Muslims

(Race, 2008: 2). The alleged ‘failure’ of multiculturalism, based on the newly

constructed claim that it had fostered Islamic extremism, quickly provided an

answer to this confusion. This claim has persisted in the narrative since,

demonstrated by David Cameron in his 2008 and 2011 speeches. However, it

is invalid for three main reasons.

Firstly, by holding multiculturalism responsible for an extremist Islamic

ideology, the second justification of the ‘narrative of failure’ has relied upon

the invalid first justification nullified in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Journalists, commentators and politicians continued to note the bombings as

47 This was worsened by the abortive bombings on 21st July 2005, the alleged conspiracy in August 2006 to blow up 10 places (all in London) and the attempted bombing of August 2007 in Glasgow (Pilkington, 2008).

46


evidence that Britain was both ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ (Phillips, 2005)

as well as that multiculturalism had ‘fanned the flames of Islamic extremism’

(Malik, 2005). The interdependency between these two sub-narratives that

have grown simultaneously since the events of 2001 has caused the

‘narrative of failure’ to thus make its second justification from an extension of

the invalid first one. This extension is that multiculturalism has fostered

extremist Islam because it has encouraged/exacerbated Muslim communities

to live separately from others. Of course, the claim that British multiculturalism

has encouraged or exacerbated communities assumes a misinterpretation of

the British model as ‘radical’. This was dismissed in chapter 2 where British

multiculturalism was modeled as ‘moderate’. Because of the reliance upon

this extension from the invalid first claim, the second justification that this

chapter is concerned with is a fallacy.

Another reason why an extension from the first justification is invalid is

because the narrative overlooks the fact that the attackers were actually

integrated, British-born Muslims (Race, 2008: 3). The official Home Office

report describing the bombers records that:

There is little in their backgrounds which mark them out as particularly

vulnerable to radicalization…Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were apparently well

integrated into British society48.

Although the attacks did demonstrate the prominence of extremist

Islam in Britain, the terrorists’ lives do not provide evidence that British-

48 Home Office, 2006: 31.

47


Muslims – even these violent extremists – were necessarily failing to

integrate. On the contrary, the fact that educated49, apparently quite normal

British citizens were motivated to indulge in such mass violence suggests that

the reasons behind the terrorist attacks are much more complex than simply

whether domestic multicultural policies have failed to integrate Muslim

communities or not50 (Modood, 2007: 150). Seeing 7/7 and the lives of the

bombers as proof that multiculturalism has failed to integrate Muslims is thus,

again, invalid.

Finally, the claim is invalid because blaming multiculturalism’s ‘failure’

for the rise of extremist Islam overlooks several other undeniable realities that

contributed to the motivations of the terrorism committed in 2005. Modood

sees the main contributor to be the foreign policy of the British government,

particularly in Muslim countries (2007: 139). The Home Office report after 7/7

considered the leader of the attackers, Mohammad Sidique Khan’s, video

statement first aired on the Arabic television channel, Al Jazeera, on 1

September 2005 to be the best indication for why the group committed the

attacks (2006: 19). In this statement Khan announced:

“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities

against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 49 The Home Office report identified all of the bombers to be educated to college or university levels. Khan, the leader, was a teacher and youth worker who had impressed teachers and parents who had worked with him (Hasan, 2011). They were all British born (Home Office, 2006).50 A recent 2012 study by Essex University, over ten years on from the initial claims of non-integration after the riots, revealed that the perception of non-Muslims that Muslims struggle with their British identity is inaccurate. It found that 83% of Muslims are proud to be British, compared to 79% of the general public, and that 86.4% of Muslims feel they belong in Britain, slightly more than the 85.9% of Christians (Moosavi, 2012)

48


directly responsible…until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and

torture of my people we will not stop this fight.”51

Here, Khan is quite boldly revealing the attacks to be out of sheer

resentment towards the British government for its foreign policy agenda in

Muslim countries. Convincing recognition of this was then shown in a 2006

open letter to Tony Blair signed by three Muslim MPs, three peers and 38

organisations including the MCB. The Prime Minister was warned that the

government’s foreign policy in Iraq and Israel52 offers ‘ammunition to

extremists’, and that the anti-terrorism agenda was too focused on domestic

policy (i.e. increased surveillance on Muslim organisations) rather than

realizing how policies abroad have aggravated Muslim communities in Britain

(Woodward and Bates, 2006). Adding to the divisive nature of this reality,

Derek Mcghee argues that the preoccupation with domestic anti-terrorism

after 9/11, combined with the ‘virtual, multinational and invisible nature of the

Al-Qaeda network’ has resulted in all Muslims becoming suspects where they

are classified as either ‘extremist’ or ‘moderate’ (2008:46-48). A political

culture now exists in Britain – which he stresses has mainly grown in the

years following 7/7 - that constructs ‘all Muslims as potential

extremists/enemies unless proven differently…[and] renders their right to

remain in Britain conditional’ (Mcghee, 2008: 49). Both the foreign and

domestic anti-terrorism policies of the British government have undoubtedly

impacted upon the attitudes and sense of ‘Britishness’ of Muslims in Britain,

51 M. S. Khan quoted in the Home Office report, 2006: 19.52 When Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006, Tony Blair refused to call for a ceasefire. The war was fought for a month and was estimated to have cost the lives of 1191 Lebanese citizens and 159 Israelis (Phillips, 2010).

49


and yet are completely separate from the policies of multiculturalism. As

Hasan puts it, ‘terrorism is a political problem, not a cultural problem’ (2011). It

is therefore invalid to blame multiculturalism for the rise of extremist Islam

when there are other undeniable factors that have fostered the capacity for

Islamic extremism and thus terrorism (Meer and Modood, 2009; Modood,

2007; Parekh, 2008).

3.5 – Multiculturalism has not fostered Islamic

extremism in Britain

Since mid-2001, when 9/11 and the northern riots occurred, two

narratives have grown and become ‘interdependent’ in Britain (Meer and

Modood, 2009). The 7/7 attacks in 2005 committed by Islamic terrorists, who

were perceived by many to be separatist, non-integrated products of

multiculturalism, legitimized the common belief that the British multicultural

model had failed. Firstly, however, this belief invalidly perceives Britain’s

model of multiculturalism as ‘radical’ when, as modeled in chapter 2, it is

‘moderate’ and has thus not encouraged or exacerbated the separatism of

Muslim communities. Secondly, by holding multiculturalism responsible for the

7/7 bombings for having encouraged separate Muslim communities, it is

overlooked that the attackers themselves were in fact British-born Muslims,

and were officially recognized to have integrated into British society. Finally,

blaming multiculturalism’s ‘failure’ for the prominence of Islamic extremism

disregards other major factors (namely foreign policy and domestic anti-

50


terrorism policy) that have contributed to its presence in contemporary British

society. These three reasons invalidate the claim that multiculturalism has

fostered Islamic extremism, and thus nullify the second justification of the

‘narrative of failure’.

Conclusion

This dissertation has identified and invalidated the ‘narrative of failure’

that has developed since 2001. Chapter 1 identified the first justification that

has supported the narrative as the belief that multiculturalism has encouraged

and exacerbated separatism between communities in Britain. It identified the

second justification as the belief that multiculturalism has fostered extremist

Islam. In the two subsequent chapters, by nullifying these two justifications, it

is evident that multiculturalism has not failed. The revealed existence of an

invalid attack upon multiculturalism that has grown and persisted since 2001

suggests that there are other reasons for the consensual belief of the

narrative. The premature blaming of multiculturalism for the ills that were

demonstrated by both the northern riots in 2001 and the 7/7 London bombings

in 2005, and the increasing focus of the British media, government and public

perception on not just extremist Islam but Muslims generally, reveal the attack

upon multiculturalism to be the response of a society seeking answers.

Essentially, multiculturalism has become a scapegoat, blamed in an

atmosphere of cumulating concern after shocking domestic events. The claim

51


that multiculturalism has failed has rendered it as what Liz Fekete53 calls a

‘whipping boy’ to ‘explain away’ economic and social crises (2011). Revealed

by the narrative’s constant referral to British-Muslims and national identity, the

attack upon multiculturalism has simultaneously become a ‘coded’ attack

upon the perceived reluctance of Muslims to integrate into British society

(Parekh, 2008). Additionally, the attack has been motivated by the fear of a

rising extremist Muslim identity that, having secretly leant itself to the terrorist

activity of Al-Qaeda in 2005, evidently hovers ‘just under the surface’ in Britain

(Race, 2008: 3).

David Cameron’s announcement of the failure of multiculturalism in

2011 and developments in ideas about British identity and integration since

imply that this ‘narrative of failure’ is now firmly embedded in the public

imagination and multicultural debate. It will undoubtedly continue to be

suggested in the coming years that the multiculturalism project has been

abandoned in favor of a stronger ‘Britishness’, ‘community cohesion’ and

integration. However, the findings of this dissertation suggest that despite this

rhetorical denunciation that acts as a symbolic dismissal of some of the ills of

contemporary British society, the reality is that ‘moderate’ multiculturalism has

continued to be consistently pursued54. The reality for British multiculturalism

in 2013 is that instead of a ‘wholesale ‘retreat’…it has, and continues to be,

subject to a productive critique that is resulting in something best

53 Dr Liz Fekete is the Executive Director of the Institute of Race Relations.54 Pauline Schnapper argues that ‘’he policies…implemented locally as part of the multiculturalist ethos, such as policies towards religion in schools or rights for specific communities such as the Sikhs, were not reversed’. The main features of local multiculturalism have remained in place, whether in schools, hospitals or other public services. (2011: 108).

52


characterised as a ‘civic rebalancing’’ (Meer and Modood, 2009: 2). In other

words, British multiculturalism has not failed, but continues to persist as a

reality55. It has been rethought and reformed, but not abandoned.

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Has Multiculturalism Failed? A Critical Analysis

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