Harman 1970_Sellars' Semantics

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Philosophical Review

Sellars' SemanticsAuthor(s): Gilbert HarmanSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 404-419Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183936 .

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS1

SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICSs a majorworkwhichdeservesto be, and will be, read and reread. It is also a difficult work,

particularly so in its opening chapters. The reader may wish to begin

with Chapter III, saving ChaptersI and II for last.In this review, I shall ignore much in the book in order to con-

centrate on what seems to me its most important and controversial

theses. These concern the nature of psychological states, meaning, andtruth, and are discussed n Chapters III-VI.

i. MeaningandMind.

How is the way that thought represents related to the way that

speech represents? One familiar answer is this: Speech is the lin-

guistic communication of thought. The sentence 'Sellars is wise' (S)can be used to representthat Sellars is wise only because the semanticand syntactic rules of English correlate S with the thought that Sellarsis wise. Representation in speech derives from representation in

thought.This answer does not account for linguistic representation in those

casesin which, as we say, one thinks out loud. In such casesone does

not use words to communicate one's thoughts. Indeed, it is difficult insuch cases to distinguishthe thought fromits expressionin speech. In

order to account for such cases, two strategies suggest themselves. Onetreats representationin thinking-out-loud as derivative from represen-tation in linguistic communication, which in turn derives from repre-sentation in thought. A second strategy treats representation in

thinking-out-loud on a par with representationin thinking that is notout loud.Sellars' theory of meaning is an elaboration of this second strategy.

Since all thought is representation, thought requires a system of

representation which one might call the language of thought. An

occurrence (or state) is the thought (belief, desire, hope, fear, and so

forth) for example, that Sellars is wise only if it represents that

Sellars is wise. Therefore, a theory of the nature of psychological

1 SciencendMetaphysics:ariationsn KantianThemes. y WilfridSellars.(New York,Humanities Press, i968. Pp. 246. $5.25.)

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS

states must include a theory of meaning for the language of thought.This theory may be considered a theory of meaning or a theory of thenature of psychological states, or both. It is the theory that meaning

is role in one's conceptual scheme and the theory that psychological

states are functional states.We are encouraged to view the language of thought by analogywith a game like chess. One's total psychological state at any moment

represents his position at that moment. Certain moves are appropriateresponses to observation,as when one accepts something as the result of

observation. Other moves result in action, as when one does something

because one has decided to do it. Still other moves are available, as in

inference. The meaning of an expression in the language of thought is

determined by the role it can play in the evidence-inference-action

language game; the nature of a particular psychological state or

occurrence is determined by its functional relations to the otherstates or occurrences that make up one's total psychological state (as

affected by observationand inferenceand as leading to action).

This view can be defended without appeal to thinking-out-loud;and it would continue to seem plausible even if one were to decidethat thinking-out-loud is not really thinking at all but is a kind of

rehearsal that derives from a more normal use of language in com-

munication. The phenomenon of thinking-out-loud does, however,

play a major role in Sellars' presentation of this theory, and I suspect

that he is thereby led into error. Let me elaborate.

Sellars advances his theory with an eye on the philosophical problemof our knowledge of other minds. His own solution to this problemtreatsthe hypothesis that people have thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears,

and so forth as a theory postulated to account for human behavior.

Furthermore, he claims that theoretical postulation always involves the

introduction of new theoretical predicates by analogy with predicates

previously available. In the present instance, the relevant properties

have to do with representation, and the relevant analogy is with

language. This cannot be language as used in communication, since

anyone who has the concept of the communication of thought mustalready have the relevant psychological concepts. Therefore, we are to

imagine a community whose inhabitants use language only to express

their thoughts in thinking-out-loud, intending-out-loud, and so forth.

The members of this community have no inkling of psychological

occurrences or states but are aware of episodes of (what we call)

thinking-out-loud, which they take to have a representational char-

acter. Thus they take expressions of their language to have a meaning

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GILBERT HARMAN

in the sense of role in the language game of thinking-out-loud. Equiv-

alently, they are able to give low-level explanations of human behavior

in terms of observed regularities involving observation, thinking-out-

loud, and action.

One day, a great genius, Jones, postulates the existence of inneroccurrences and states that are analogous to occurrences of and

dispositions to think-out-loud. These inner occurrences and states are

taken to be representationalin the same sense in which occurrences of

thinking-out-loud were taken to be representational. In other words,

Jones postulates an inner language game of thought analogous to the

outer language game of thinking-out-loud. In doing so he hopes to be

able to explain all behavior that could be explained on the older

theory as well as other behavior that could not be previouslyexplained.

Indeed, the theory works so well that it is taught to the other members

of the community. Jones then discovers that, for certain thoughts,beliefs, and so forth, one can be trained so that, when he thinks,

believes, and so forth that something is the case, he will be disposed to

think that he thinks, believes, and so forth that it is the case. So Jones

adds this fact to his theory.Sellars does not offer this story as historical truth; nor does he

suggest that it represents part of the development of a child's con-

ceptual scheme. He purports, instead, to reconstruct part of our

ordinary conceptual scheme, comparing his enterprise with that of

contract theorists in political philosophy. Presumably Sellars has in

mind the plight of a philosopher who has become skeptical about thevery intelligibility of ordinarytalk about mental statesand occurrences.

To bring such a philosopher back to sanity, Sellars offers the above

story to show how our ordinary conceptual framework could have

arisen in a perfectlyrational and intelligible way. Sellars can then say

that we talk exactly as descendants of the community in his story

would talk and that our talk is thereforejust as intelligible as theirs

would be.I think that Sellars' general approach to this sort of skepticism is

correct; but I also feel that doubts can be raised about his heavyreliance on the phenomenon of thinking-out-loud. It is not obvious that

thinking-out-loudis a kind of thinking. It seems equally plausible that

thinking-out-loud should be a kind of play-acting in which one, as it

were, pretends to be talking to someone. If the latter supposition is

correct, then thinking-out-lotld will not have the connections with

observation and action needed for Sellars'argument.

Furthermore, even if thinking-out-loud is a kind of thinking, there

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS

is not enough of it. One could not begin to account for human action in

terms of observation and particular instances of thinking-out-loud-or,

to make the same point in a different way, one cannot get a theory of

meaning for sentences uttered when one thinks-out-loud without

mentioning unexpressed psychological statesand occurrences.It is true that Sellars has not suggested inferring a psychological

theory from the present meager supply of instances of thinking-out-

loud. It would be enough for his purposes if we could imagine a

community in which thinking-out-loud were common enough to

allow the sort of moves he has in mind. But he underestimateswhat is

involved in imagining such a community. How a person responds to

observation, what inferences he makes, how he acts, and so forth

depend on his entire psychological state. There are no simple correla-

tions between particular occurrent thoughts, observations, and/or

actions. And the relevant states far outstrip any dispositions onemight have to think certain thoughts. So presumablywe must imaginethat the inhabitants of Sellars' Rylean community express aloud a

great deal of their psychological occurrences and states. This means

that we must not only envision them constantly saying things-in

general, many things at the same time-but we must also envision,for example, that a rough and ever-changing list of their beliefs,

desires, hopes, fears, and so forth is attached to them (perhaps as

tattoos).

My point is that, if we really must imagine all this in order to make

Sellars' reconstruction work, that particular reconstructionno longerseems the best way to answer the skeptic. Why not instead pointout that we can (partially) explain human behavior if we postulate the

existence of states and occurrences functionally related to each other,

to observation and to action? One would develop an account of

representation for these states and occurrences as an integral part of

one's theory of human behavior. This might conflict with Sellars'

view that theoriesmust introduce new predicatesthat are analogous to

old predicates, since the representational nature of psychological

states and occurrenceswould not on the revised account be analogousto anything that went before. If so, that is a problem for Sellars'

theory of theories. He needs to assume that one can come to conceive

instances of thinking-out-loud as representational without having

previous views about representation;and it is difficultforme to see why

one should suppose it harder thus to conceive theoretically postulated

statesand occurrences.I think that Sellars' general theory of meaning is correct: meaning,

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GILBERT HARMAN

or at least one kind of meaning, is role in one's conceptual schemethat is, role in the evidence-inference-action language game of thought.I also approve of Sellars' general method of hypothetical theory

constructionfor resolving the doubts of a philosopher who has become

worried with the thought that psychological concepts are meaningless,although I am less confident about this than about the theory ofmeaning. On the other hand, I am very doubtful about the details ofSellars' particular example of hypothetical theory construction,with its emphasis on thinking-out-loud. Furthermore, this emphasison thinking-out-loud can lead to an extremely misleading picture ofthought as talking to oneself. In particular, it suggests that when onethinks in language the words must pass through one's head, some-thing which need not happen. Therefore I want to emphasize the

independence of Sellars' general theory of meaning from his episte-

mological theses. We can have the former without the latter.

2. Semantic egularities.

With these preliminariesout of the way, we can turn our attention tocertain details of Sellars' theory. It treats mental states and occur-rences as representationsthat are functionally related to each other.

One's beliefs represent the world as one believes it is; one's desiresrepresent the world as one desires it to be; and so forth. Observationaffects one's beliefs; beliefs and desires are modified in inferenceand lead to action; and so forth. Sellarsspeakshere of various seman-tic regularities of which there are three basic sorts: observation-thought regularities, thought-thought regularities, and thought-action regularities. (He calls them world-language, language-language,and language-world regularities, where the relevant language is the

language of thought.) These regularities are semantic in the sensethat their existence is what gives various mental states and occurrenceswhatever representationalcharacter they have. We are not to think of

the regularities as deterministic laws of the form Whenever one

observesso-and-so,one comes to believe such-and-such or Wheneverone thinks this and also thinks that, one infers thus. Semantic regu-larities are, roughly speaking, statements of what it is possible forone to do and escape intellectual criticism (from oneself or others).Thus rules of inference do not tell one what under certain conditions he

must infer but ratherwhat he may infer.A problem arises here. If one believes that there are deductive and

inductive inferences, one is likely to conclude that deductive and

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS

inductive rules of inference are semantical rules in Sellars' sense.That may be so; but what rules are they? Some things that Sellarssayssuggest modus onenswould become the principle that: if one believesP and also believes If P, thenQ, one may believe Q. And it can seem

plausible that the meaning of logical terms such as if and allshould be a function of rules of inference,so construed.A difficulty here is that there is no such thing as deductive inference.

So-called deductive rules of inference are nothing of the sort. They aresimply transformationswhich take one or more statements into anotherstatement so that if the original statements are all true the resultingstatement is also true. Modusponensdoes not tell one what to believe.It is not the case that, if one believes P and also believes If P, thenQ,one may always believe Q, for perhapsone should give up P or If P, thenQ. In deductive logic, a contradiction entails anything. That does

not mean that, if some of one's beliefs are contradictory,one isjustifiedin believing anything. It is a pun to speak of inductive and deductiverulesof inferencein the same breath. If rules of inference correspondtolegitimate thought-thought connections, there are no deductive rules ofinference. Perhaps there are no rules of inference at all. One simplytries to maximize coherence by making the least change necessaryin one's antecedent beliefs,desires, and so forth.

A differentapproach would associate modus onenswith the principlethat one should not simultaneously believe P, If P, thenQ, and not-Q,and similarly for other so-called deductive rules of inference. Further-more, a law of nature such as lightnings alwaysollowedby thunderouldbe said to correspond to the principle that one should not both believethat at some time lightning occurred and also believe that no thunderoccurred shortly after that time. Sellars suggestsjust such an analysisfor this law of nature (V, 5).2 So this way of understanding his viewmay be truerto his intentions than the one deplored above.

Presumably, the basic principle on this second approach would bethat one should not believe things that cannot all be true. Logic orsciences tell us that certain things cannot be true together and we

thereby learn that we ought not to believe all of them. This suggests aconnection between the theory of meaning and the theory of truth,where before we were envisioning a connection between the theory ofmeaning and what we might call the theory of evidence. Thus thetheory of meaning is concerned with semantic regularities. These are

2 In thisandsubsequenteferences,he romannumeral eferso thechapter,thearabic otheparagraph.

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GILBERT HARMAN

normative principles telling one what one ought and ought not to

believe: one ought to believe what is true and one ought not to believewhat is not true.

There are, however, two different ways to answer the question

What should one believe? In one sense one should believe what istrue. In another sense one should believe what one has good reason

to think is true. Thus one might answer the question by providingeither a theory of truth or a theory of evidence. Either sort of theorycan be taken to be a theory of meaning, for one can plausibly maintain(at different times, in different contexts) both that meaning is de-termined by truth conditions and that meaning is determined by

evidential role in one's conceptual scheme. This is not to say that

theories of truth and evidence can be identified with each other.

Something can be true without being evident; something can be

evident without being true.I now want to consider the following puzzle about Sellars' view.

Sometimes he speaksof semantic rules as if they were principles of thetheory of truth. At other times he speaks of them as if they were

principles of the theory of evidence. The puzzle is whether he hasconfused two different sorts of principle or has rather found a way to

exploit certain connections between the two sorts of principle. I

think he has tried to do the latter; but I am not convinced that he hassucceeded.

Sellars'definition of truth is this:

for a propositionto be true is for it to be ... correctly assertable . .. in accor-dance with the relevant semantical rules, and on the basis of such additional,though unspecified, information as these rules may require.... True thenmeans semanticallyssertable ... and the varieties of truth correspond to therelevant arieties f semantical ule[IV, 26].

This can work only if semantically assertable means trulyassertable(in the language of thought) rather than justifiably assertable, and the

semantical rules are principles of the theory of truth rather than

principles of the theory of evidence. Other things that Sellars says,however, make it seem that semantical rules are principles of the

theory of evidence after all. For example, there are supposed to besemantical rules connecting observation and thought. Why bring in

observation if these rules are rules of truth rather than rules of evi-dence?

Everything depends on the exact nature of the rules connectingobservation and thought. Evidential rules would correlate stimulations

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS

(or how it looks to one) with specific thoughts. Truth rules might

correlate the actual (and not just apparent) observation of somethingwith a thought of that thing. Presumably Sellars has something like

the latter sort of rule in mind (cf. V, 36, 56). But whether he can thus

escape the charge of confusing truth and evidence is a question thatcan be answered only after some consideration of his complex andinteresting theory of truth.

3. Truth.

Roughly speaking Sellars' theory of truth is a synthesis of the

correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth. He holdsthat in one sense truth is always truth in a particular language or con-

ceptual scheme. Certain representationsare true in a particular con-

ceptual scheme C if and only if they correctly picture particular factsaccording to rules of projectionin C. Other representationsare true not

because they directly picture the facts but because of the way in which

they are related to representationsthat do picture the facts. Sellars also

claims that conceptual schemes may be more or less adequate in their

picturing resources and that it is the job of science to find better and

better theories, which is to say more and more adequate conceptualschemes. Ideally, science aims at theory that would provide completely

adequate pictures. Such a theory would give us the ultimate truth.

So on Sellars' view we can distinguish three sorts of truth: truth as

adequate picturing of facts in C; truth as coherence with the facts inC; and truth as C's degree of adequacy in providing accurate picturesof factscomparedwith that of other conceptual schemes.

For example, according to a rather simple atomic physics, the basic

physical facts would be facts about atoms, their size, shape, temporal-

spatial position, spinning, and so forth. Now consider all possible

representations (in some system of representation) of one or more

atoms of this or that shape, spatially-temporally related in such and

such ways, spinning one way or another, and so forth. We may think

of all such representationsas the atomic sentences of the language ofthe theory. They are true if and only if they correctly picture the

world-that is, if and only if they directly correspond to the atomic

facts. Furthermore,in an important sense these atomic facts are all the

facts there are. There are no facts over and above the atomic facts.

The atomic factscompletely determine all otherfacts.

Thus the truth of all nonatomic representations s determined by the

set of true atomic representations. The point is obvious for truth-

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GILBERT HARMAN

functional compounds and universal and existential quantifications.

Consider also the way in which the truth of representationsof macro-

objects is a function of the truth of atomic representations.Given the

sort of atomism here envisioned, one could not imagine two possible

universessuch that the set of true atomic representations s the same inboth universes, although it is true in one universe but not in the other

that there is a table in such and such a place. That would not be

possible. The truth of representationsof macro-objects is completely

determined by the atomic facts. (This does not mean that representa-

tions of macro-objects are translatable into atomic representations

or even into quantificational and truth-functional compounds of

atomic representations.) Now consider lawlike statements about

atoms. Should one say that there are facts about laws over and above

facts about the position and so forth of the atoms? This becomes the

question whether there could be two universesthat contained the sameatoms in the same spatiotemporal positions and so forth, but that had

different laws. In the two universes, the same atomic representations,

truth-functional compounds, and quantifications would be true, but

different contrary-to-fact conditionals would hold. Can we envision

two different universes of this sort? I take it that Sellars thinks not.

And if not, the laws are determined by the atomic facts. Perhaps the

set of laws is the simplest or most coherent set that accounts for all

the true atomic representations,which is of course not to say that the

set of laws is the simplest or most coherent set that accounts for all the

evidence.Thus, with respect to the atomic theoryjust considered,one seems to

be able to make sense of the idea that certain representationsare true

because they correspond to or picture the facts, whereas others are

true because of their relationships to representationsthat picture the

facts. Sellars holds that in general both sorts of truth are relevant to

any conceptual scheme, since he holds that any such scheme dis-

tinguishes atomic representationsfrom others; and atomic representa-

ions are true if and only if they correctly picture the facts, whereas the

truth of other representationsis completely determined by the set oftrue atomic representations.

Sellars contraststhis much of his theory with what he calls Tarski-

Carnap semantics. The idea behind the latter approach is that a

theory of truth ought to offer a recursive characterization of denota-

tion, satisfaction,and truth which meets Tarski'scondition T. Consider

this formula:x is true if and only if p.

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SELLARS' SEMANTICS

Tarski'scondition requiresthat one's theory of truth should entail, for

every sentence of the language in question, an instance of the above-

displayed formulawith a name of that sentence replacing x and with a

translation of that sentence replacing p. These entailments give the

truth conditions for every sentence of the language. Thus, Snowis white is true if and only if snow is white; 2 + 2 = 4 is true if and

only if 2 + 2 = 4; Stealing is wrong is true if and only if stealing is

wrong; and so forth.

Now it is sometimes said that, because of these entailments, Tarski's

theory of truth is a version of the correspondencetheory. Sellars offers

two reasons for rejecting that suggestion. First, since relevant entail-

ments hold for every sentence in the language, this way of interpreting

Tarski's theory yields the claim that all truth is correspondence. But

Sellars wants to say that only some representationsare true because

they correspondto (or picture) the facts and that others are true, notbecause they directly correspond to the facts, but because of their

relationships to other representations that do directly correspond to

the facts.Because it attempts to offer a recursive characterization of truth,

however, Tarski's theory can also be interpreted as providing a

correspondencetheory somewhat similar to Sellars' picture theory of

truth. Things are complicated by the fact that Tarski envisions a

recursive characterization of satisfaction as well as of truth where

Sellars envisions a nonrecursive characterization of truth apart from

satisfaction. Still, in a recursive characterization of satisfaction andtruth, some expressionswill be said to be satisfied by certain sequencesor be true if and only if certain conditions obtain, where these condi-

tions do not refer to satisfactionor truth; and other expressionswill be

said to be satisfiedby certain sequencesor be true if and only if certain

conditions obtain, where these conditions do involve the satisfactionor

truth of other expressions. Obviously one can say that the former

expressionsare satisfiedor are true because they directly correspondto

(or picture) the facts, whereas the latter expressionsare satisfiedor are

true only because of their relationshipsto other expressions.This, however, brings us to Sellars' second reason for denying that

Tarski-Carnapsemantics providesany sort of correspondencetheory

of truth. Sellars claims (in effect) that the relation of satisfaction,

which plays an essential role in Tarski'saccount of truth for quantified

sentences,is not really a semantic relation at all. That is, he denies that

satisfaction is a relation between language and the world. Now it

seems to me that Sellars must be mistaken here, possibly because he

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GILBERT HARMAN

has not fully appreciated Tarski's theory. I shall sketch his argument

and say what I think is wrong with it.

Strictly speaking, one should say that an opensentence s satisfied by a

sequence of objects. For our purposes, however, we may think of a

predicateexpressionas satisfied by certain objectswhen it is true of them.Thus, is wise is satisfied by Tarski. Now Sellars says, in effect, that

what I have just said in the preceding sentence only appears to assert a

relation between language and the world. He argues that my claim

really asserts a relation between the expressions is wise and Tarski,

and he suggests that it would be more accurate to write it in any of the

following (for him equivalent) ways:

Is wise is satisfied by Tarski.

Is wise is true of Tarski.

Tarski 'is wise is true.Tarski is wise is true.

He concludes that, since on his analysis satisfaction is not a relation

between language and the world and since Tarski-Carnap semantics

must make essential use of satisfaction (or some equivalent notion),

Tarski-Carnap semantics does not show how language is related to

the world.

Notice that Sellars' analysis works only if every object that satisfies

any expression has a name; and recall that Tarski introduced the

notion of satisfaction in order to give truth conditions for quantified

sentences. He would not have had to do so if he had been able to

assume that all objects in the range of a quantifier have names in the

language, for if they do, one can make do with so-called substitutional

quantification. And indeed, Sellars' version of quantification is the

substitutional variety. Tarski did not want to assume, however,

that all objects in the range of the quantifiers have names and he

therefore had to introduce a notion of satisfaction that of necessity

cannot be analyzed in the way that Sellars suggests. So Sellars is

just wrong when he says that the relation of satisfaction in Tarski-Carnap semantics does not relate language and the world. On the

contrary, it works only because it does relate language and the world.

So far, I have explained the sense in which Sellars defends a corre-

spondence theory of truth for certain representations and a coherence

theory for others; and I have pointed out similarities between this

part of Sellars' theory and Tarski-Carnap semantics. I should now

mention some differences. First, since Tarski makes use of the notion of

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satisfaction, he is able to give truth conditions for referentially quan-

tified sentences, whereas Sellars, who does not make use of the notion of

satisfaction, will be able to give truth conditions only for substi-

tutionally quantified sentences. Now, Sellars claims that substitutional

quantification gives a better account of generalizations expressed inordinary language than referential quantification does. For one

thing, it allows quantification of the predicate without commitment to

universals. So perhaps no real objection to Sellars' theory arises here.

Second, Tarski requires that a truth characterization satisfy con-

dition T, referred to above. Sellars does not require this; and if I

understand his analysis of laws, the characterization of truth for

laws will not by itself entail all the necessary instances of the formula

x is true if and only ifp, where x is replaced by the name of a law and

p is replaced by a translation of that law into the language in which

one states the truth characterization. Since, however, there is noother generally accepted analysis of laws that satisfies condition T,

this cannot be held against Sellars' analysis, which on other counts

seems rather plausible.

Sellars does pretend to explain why Carnap is wise if and only if it

is true that Carnap is wise. He points out that It is true that Carnap

is wise means that Carnap is wise is (truly) assertable. (I suppress

complications involving Sellars' use of dot-quotes.) Therefore,

consider the following sequence of assertions (or thoughts): It is

true that Carnap is wise. (So) Carnap is wise. The first of these

assertions authorizes the assertion of the second. That, according to

Sellars, explains why we must agree that Carnap is wise if it is true

that Carnap is wise. But even if that much of Sellars' argument

could be accepted, he offers no further argument to show why we must

agree that Carnap is wise only if it is true that Carnap is wise. So he

does not offer any account of why Carnap is wise if and only if it is true

that Carnap is wise.

That concludes my discussion of Sellars' reconstruction of the

correspondence and coherence theories of truth and his discussion of

Tarski-Carnap semantics. I now want to say something aboutSellars' version of the pragmatic theory. He argues that whole con-

ceptual schemes may be more or less adequate, more or less true,

in the sense that they may provide more or less adequate pictures.

That is, from the point of view of some conceptual scheme that science

leads us to accept, we may find that there are no objects such as those

pictured in an earlier, more commonsensical scheme. The atomic

sentences of our earlier view describe the familar tables and chairs

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around us. Let us assume that science tells us that only atoms exist-that is, let us suppose that the atomic sentences of science pictureatoms and do not picture any tables and chairs. If there are onlyatoms, there are no tables or chairs, since a table is not an atom. A

table is not a set or even a sum of atoms. Perhaps it is a sum of ap-propriate time slices of atoms; but, by hypothesis, science tells us thereare only atoms and no sets, sums, or slices. The basic particulars of thecommon-sense framework do not correspond to any basic particularsin the scientific framework. In other words, the atomic sentences abouttables in the common-sense framework do not correspond to atomicsentences in the scientific framework. Presumably they correspond tononatomic sentences; and whereasthe truth conditionsforthe sentencesof the common-sense framework are a matter of whether or not thesesentences directly picture the facts, the truth conditions for the cor-

responding sentences in the scientific frameworkare complicated andrefer to other sentences of that framework.Thus, according to Sellars,there is a sense in which certain atomic representationsof tables in thecommon-sense frameworkare true, since corresponding representationsin the scientific framework are true. But in another sense, the atomicrepresentations of tables in the common-sense framework are in-adequate or not completely true, since they represent tables as basicparticulars whereas the (truer) representations of science representtablesas constructions.

Sellars claims that this vindicates the Kantian view that tables and

chairs and so forth are only appearances and not really things inthemselves. For Sellars, the things in themselves are whatever wouldbe pictured in the ideally adequate scientific theory; appearancesare basic particulars in the common-sense framework that are notbasic particulars in the ideal scientific framework but survive asconstructionsin that framework.This vindication of Kant is ingeniousand has a certain amount of intuitive appeal. I am, however, skepticalof the application of notions such as atomic entenceo actual languages,theories, or conceptual schemes apart from a particular way of for-

malizing that language, theory, or conceptual scheme. Theories canalways be formalizedin a number of differentways; and sentences thatturn out to be atomic in one formalization can be nonatomic inanother. Similarly, there will be various equivalent truth char-acterizations for a language (if there is one) such that on one char-acterization a sentence can turn out true because it directly correspondsto the facts but on another characterization the sentence can be trueonly because of its relationshipsto other sentences. I do not know what

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could be meant by the claim that one way of formalizing the theory, orof giving the truth characterization for the language, is correct ndothers incorrect; but Sellars will have to defend some such claim if histheory of truth is to have the interesting philosophical implications

thathe

wants it to have.The following problem seems especially serious. How can Sellars tellwhether atoms are basic particulars of the common-sense conceptualframework? Ordinary size physical objects can count as such particu-lars; why not very small physical objects? We know what transparentglass spheres are like. If such colorless physical objects are basicparticulars in our common-sense conceptual framework, why notextremely small colorlessphysical objects?Why should the introductionof atomic theory be consideredthe introduction of a new framework ofbasic particulars?

A defender of Sellars might reply that, even if science does not addnew basic particulars, it subtracts some of the old ones, since it tells usthat only atoms exist. But how is one to decide whether science deniesthe status of basic particular to clusters, configurations, sets, timeslices, sums, and even sums of time slices of atoms? Nothing thatSellars says seems to answer this question. To be sure, there arescattered cryptic remarks that may seem to bear on the subject (forexample, V, Io0). But cryptic remarks do not make an argument;indeed they make one suspicious that no argumentcan be given.

So much, then, for Sellars' theory of truth. I want now to return to

the issue raised at the end of the preceding section: does Sellars confusethe theory of evidence with the theory of truth? I want to argue that,because Sellars identifies semantical rules both as the rules of truth andas the rules of the language game of thought, he is guilty of exactly thisconfusion. To identify the rules of truth with those of the languagegame of thought is (i) to identify rules which indicate how the truth ofcertain representationsdepends on the truth of other representationswith rules of inference that permit one to go from certain thoughts toothers. It is also (2) to identify rules which indicate how the truth of

certain representations depends on whether they correspond to orpicture the facts with rules that permit one to have certain thoughtsgiven certain observations. (Recall that the rules of the language ofthought must be understood to tell one what is truly to be thought andnot what one might be justified in thinking.) Sellars wishes, however(in V, 92), to deny that picturing is always associated with observa-tionality, since he wishes to assert that singular statements in thelanguage of microphysics ... constitute pictures of microphysical

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objects and events. He agrees that no singular statement aboutmicrophysical particles can occur in a language entry transition, orobservation ; but he claims that this is not an objection to thepicturing of microparticles.

This objection assumes . . . that statements which are basic as the constituentsof pictures must also be epistemically basic in the sense that they formulateobservable states of affairs. It is, indeed, true of the common-sense frameworkthat statements which are basic in one sense are also basic in the other. Yetthe two sensesof basic are different, and a transcendental philosophy whichrises to a level of abstraction which distinguishes the generic character ofepistemic concepts (e.g. language entry transition, conceptual picture, object)from the specific forms they take in common-sense discourse will not assumethat the basic constituents of conceptual pictures must be statements of thekind which occur as conceptual responsesto sensory stimulation.

But this also shows that a transcendentalphilosophy must not identifythe rules of truth with the rules of the language game of thought, ifthese latter rules must include rules for language entry transitionsexpressing appropriate responsesto observation.

I can sum up my objection as follows. Any conceptual scheme mustbe representableas a language game of thought that includes, amongother things, appropriate responses to observation. The rules of thegame that determine which responsesare in this sense appropriate areepistemic rules rather than truth rules. The game, its epistemic rules,

and his position in the game determine the meaning of representations

in a person's language of thought, and thereby determine what will andwhat will not count as a good translation of representationsor sen-tences of the language of thought into some other language. Given allthat, one might attempt to give a characterization of truth for thelanguage of thought that satisfies a condition similar to Tarski'scondition T. (Recall that one can obtain a characterization of truth-in-L that satisfies condition T only if one can translate sentences of Linto the language in which one gives the truth characterization.)The truth characterization provides truth rules for the language

(game) of thought. Both epistemic rules and truth rules have a rightto be considered semantical rules ; so both sorts of rule might becalled the semantical rules of the language (game) of thought. It is notclear, however, which rules Sellars wants to call the semantical rules.He has a choice. First, he could say that semantical rules in his senseare epistemic rules. That would allow language entry transitions tobe identified with responsesto observation; but it would also mean thattruth could not be identified with semantic assertability (assertability

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in accordance with the semantical rules). Second, he could say thatsemantical rules in his sense are truth rules. Then truth would besemantic assertability; but language entry transitions wouldrepresent picturing rather than responsesto observation. Furthermore,

it is somewhat less clear in what sense the semantical rules in thissecond sense would be rules a person follows, and can be observed tofollow, in playing the language game of thought; for this second sort ofrule is a rule of the game only in the sense that it can be associated iththe game.

I cannot say what choice Sellars would make between these al-ternatives; and I am not sure that he does not have another alternativein mind. I hope he will clarify this matter in future writings.3

GILBERT HARMAN

PrincetonUniversity

3 Work on this review was supported in part by the National ScienceFoundation.

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