Report on the investigation of

the grounding of

Happy Lady

off Shoebury Ness,

Thames Estuary

21 January 2001

Marine Accident Investigation BranchFirst Floor

Carlton HouseCarlton PlaceSouthampton

United Kingdom SO15 2DZ

Report No 21/2001

Extract from

The Merchant Shipping

(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 1999

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is todetermine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of lifeat sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportionliability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, toapportion blame.

CONTENTS

Page

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SYNOPSIS 1

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 2

1.1 Particulars of Happy Lady and accident 21.2 Background to the voyage 41.3 Narrative 41.4 Environmental information 61.5 Description of Happy Lady 71.6 The crew 81.7 The accident 101.8 Safety management system 10

SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 13

2.1 Aim 132.2 The accident 132.3 Safety management on change of ownership 14

SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 16

3.1 Findings 163.2 Causes 17

SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS 18

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AB Able Seaman

ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid

DNV Det Norske Veritas

ENE east-north-east

GPS Global Positioning System (satellite navigation)

HW High Water (PA)

ISM International Safety Management (Code)

kW Kilowatt - unit of power

LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas

m metre - unit of length

MAIB Marine Accident Investigation Branch

MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency

N North

NIS Norwegian International Ship Registry

PLA Port of London Authority

RINA Registro Italiano Navale

UTC Universal Co-ordinated Time

VTS Vessel Traffic Services

SYNOPSIS

The liquid petroleum gas (LPG) carrier Happy Ladygrounded on a mud bank in the River Thames estuary atabout 1040 (UTC) on 21 January 2001. The accidentwas reported to the MAIB in the early afternoon that dayand an investigation, which was carried out by MAIBinspector Captain Nick Beer, started immediately.

Happy Lady had anchored in designated anchorage Z4in the Thames estuary at about 2330 on 20 January. Apilot boarded at 0950 the following morning inpreparation for going alongside to discharge her cargoof 4,200 tonnes of butane at Coryton Terminal. Thestarboard anchor cable was heaved at about 0955, atwhich time it was leading on the port bow. Whileheaving, the cable became trapped between the

vessel’s prominent bulbous bow and her heavily raked stem on several occasions.

By manoeuvring the vessel, the master attempted to provide a better lead for thecable but, with the cable partially recovered, the anchor dragged in the strong east-south-easterly wind. She was set to the north and grounded on soft mud on a fallingtide. Despite attempts to refloat her, she remained aground over one tide. She wasrefloated with the assistance of two tugs at about 2130. There was no pollution, andshe sustained only superficial damage.

Intercon A/S is recommended to ensure that:

• Its on-board procedures are such that, when anchoring or raising the anchor instrong wind or tidal conditions close to shoal water, an officer is placed in chargeon the forecastle of Happy Lady;

• Every attempt is made to establish the correct lead of the cable before starting toheave up; and

• More effective procedures are put in place to avoid the cable becoming trappedbetween the bulbous bow and the rake of the stem.

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2

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 PARTICULARS OF HAPPY LADY AND ACCIDENT

Vessel’s name (and : Happy Lady (2000), Jade Star(1993) and

previous names) Pugliola (1994) (Figure 1)

Registered Owner : Crystal River Shipping Inc, Panama

Manager : Intercon A/S, Norway

Port of registry : Stavanger

Flag : Norway

Type : LPG Carrier

Built : 1993, Spain

Classification society : Det Norske Veritas

Construction : Steel

Length overall : 112m

Gross tonnage : 6,107

Engine power and type : 5,430kW, Wartsila 6 Cylinder Diesel

Service speed : 15 knots

Other relevant info : Bow thruster, 300kW Single Controllable Pitch Propeller

Accident details

Time and date : 1040 (UTC), 21 January 2001

Location of incident : 51° 30’.36N 000° 49’.79E; 0.28 nm ENE of Shoebury Beacon

Persons on board : 20

Injuries /fatalities : None

Damage : Superficial, no pollution

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Fig

ure

1

Happy Lady (previously named Pugliola)

Photo

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ph co

urte

sy of F

oto

Flite

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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE VOYAGE

Intercon A/S assumed management of Pugliola in October 2000 on behalf of anew owner. The vessel was in drydock in Rotterdam at the time, and measureswere taken to change her name to Happy Lady and her registry from Panama tothe Norwegian International Ship Registry (NIS). Her classification society wasalso changed from the Italian ship registry, RINA, to the Norwegian DNV. Whenher certificates were all in order she sailed for her first voyage under her newowner on 9 November 2000. The crew comprised eastern European officersand Filipino ratings. She had successfully carried a number of cargoes betweennorth European ports prior to her arrival at the River Thames on 20 January witha cargo of 4,200 tonnes of butane, which had been loaded in Grangemouth andwas intended for the British Petroleum refinery at Coryton.

1.3 NARRATIVE (Times are UTC) (Headings are true)

Happy Lady arrived at the Sunk pilot station in the Thames estuary on theevening of 20 January after an uneventful 22 hour passage from Grangemouth.She had been due to berth at Coryton on arrival, but was instructed to anchor atZ4 anchorage off Shoebury Ness as there was thick fog at the berth (Figure 2Chart Extract).

Happy Lady dropped her starboard anchor in clear visibility in position 51° 29.7N000° 50.1E just south of the centre of the designated anchorage. She wasbrought up with four shackles of cable on deck in a charted depth of about 14m.

The pilot boarded the vessel at 0950 the following morning, 21 January, to takeher to berth at Coryton. Master/pilot information was exchanged, and it wasagreed that the master should manoeuvre the vessel while the anchor wasbeing lifted. The senior AB (the vessel did not carry a bosun) and a deck boywere stationed on the forecastle. The senior AB was in communication with themaster using a hand-held VHF radio. The vessel was heading into the wind,which was from the east-south-east, force 7 to 8. The tide had begun to ebb ata rate of about 1 knot.

The senior AB reported that the cable was leading on the port bow (10 o’clock)and there was moderate weight. The master instructed him to begin heaving.The engines were running with the controllable pitch propeller set on zero pitch.The cable was successfully heaved in a little way, with the load increasinggradually, and its lead changing further to port. At 1005 the senior AB reportedthat the windlass was having trouble heaving the cable. The master usedpropulsion, rudder and bow thruster to try to turn the vessel to port to provide abetter lead. However, although the vessel gradually turned from east-south-eastthrough north, the anchor cable continued to lead to port and astern, andfrequently became jammed in the angle between the rake of the stem and thebulbous bow.

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Figure 2

6

The chief officer was instructed to go forward at about 1020. The third officer,who was manning the bridge together with the master and a helmsman, plottedthe ship’s position on the chart and reported that she had moved to the north,towards the drying bank off Shoebury Ness. The master continued to swing thevessel to port and, as some slack appeared in the cable, the chief officerordered the cable to be heaved. At 1028 with the cable leading from thestarboard hawse pipe across and over the bulbous bow and then astern (8o’clock), the load again became so great that the windlass was unable to heave.

The third officer continued to plot the vessel’s position, reporting that she wasdragging her anchor steadily towards the bank. The vessel continued to swing,and occasionally the chief officer was able to heave more cable. At 1036, afterthe vessel’s head had reached about 275°, the chief officer reported that theanchor was visible near the surface but jammed on the port side of the bulbousbow. The master knew that the vessel was very close to the bank, andimmediately tried to manoeuvre astern into deeper water. However, despite hisefforts, the vessel did not move and, by 1041, he realised she was aground.The tide was falling.

The master called for tug assistance and continued to try to manoeuvre thevessel clear, while ballast tanks were sounded and some ballast was pumpedout.

A tug, Sun Surrey, was made fast at 1143 and some further attempts to refloatthe vessel were made, without success.

The vessel refloated, with the assistance of two tugs, at the next high water atabout 2130. She proceeded under her own power to Z4 anchorage, wherechecks revealed that she had apparently sustained no damage.

Happy Lady berthed at Coryton No 5 at about 1000 on 22 January where hercargo was discharged. She later sailed for Teesport to load, and from there toNorway, where an underwater inspection revealed that she had sustained nodamage.

1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

The wind direction and speed measured on Happy Lady’s anemometer waseast-south-east, force 7 to 8. The master reported that the tide had begun toebb and was running at about 1 knot. High water at Southend was predicted tohave been at 1019 that morning, however, the PLA harbourmaster (lowerdistrict) confirmed that the tide can run away in the vicinity of Z4 before HWSouthend.

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1.5 DESCRIPTION OF HAPPY LADY

Happy Lady was an LPG carrier of 112m length overall and 6,107gt. She waslaunched in 1993 under the name of Jade Star but was brought into service asPugliola in 1994. Her name, ownership and management changed in October2000. At the time of the accident she was fully certificated under internationalregulations. She was designed with her superstructure aft, a heavily raked stemand large bulbous bow (Figure 3 Plan and Photograph).

Figure 3

Plan and photograph of Happy Lady’s bow

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The bridge had good visibility forward, and was well equipped with modernnavigational instruments which included a Racal Decca 2690 BT ARPA radar anda Racal Decca Mirans electronic chart system. The latter instrument was notoperational at the time of the accident. The main navigational instruments weresited in an “E” shaped console in the middle of the wheelhouse set back from thebridge front windows (Figure 4 Photograph). The console also housed thesteering and engine controls. There was a small chart table integral with the mainconsole on the starboard side and, in addition, there was a large chart tablesituated in the after starboard corner of the wheelhouse space. Two GPSreceivers were sited in the vicinity of the large chart table. Both GPS receiversretained a record of the vessel’s movement during the minutes preceding hergrounding (Figure 5 Photograph). The vessel was fitted with a course recorderwhich was inadvertently switched off at the time of the grounding.

1.6 THE CREW

Happy Lady carried a complement of 20 officers and crew. The officers were fromeastern Europe and the ratings were from the Philippines.

The master was 38 years old and a Russian national. He held a Russian “DeepSea Captain” certificate of competency, which he had gained in 1996. He hadserved on gas carriers since 1985. He had joined Happy Lady, along with most ofthe crew, in October 2000. He usually worked a routine of four months on duty,followed by four months leave.

The chief officer was a 41 year old Latvian national, who held a Class II certificateof competency. He had joined Happy Lady in October as second officer, and hadbeen promoted when the ship was in Grangemouth, three days before theaccident. He generally kept the 4 to 8 navigational watch. In this incident, he wasinstructed to go to the forecastle when the master realised there was a seriousproblem.

The senior able seaman, a 39 year old Filipino national, was in charge of theforecastle until the chief officer arrived. He held the unofficial position of “Key AB”on board which is similar to that of bosun.

The 21 year old deck boy was controlling the windlass while the anchor was beingrecovered.

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GPS showing track to grounding position and subsequent track back toanchorage

Figure 5

Wheelhouse console

Figure 4

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1.7 THE ACCIDENT

The drift of the vessel towards the sandbank was recorded both on the vessel’sGPS recorders and the PLA VTS’s radar system (Figure 6 PLA plot). It is clearthat Happy Lady dragged her anchor steadily at about 1.25 knots in a north-north-easterly direction between 1015 and the time of grounding at about 1040 (Figure7 Chart Extract). During this time the master was trying to clear the anchor cablewhich was leading over the bulbous bow and around the raked stem. The bellbook reveals that the master used various ahead and astern engine movements inaddition to the bow thruster and the rudder. He was unable to clear the anchorcable from the bulbous bow. The bow thruster was having little or no effect, andthe master had stopped using it by the time the vessel’s head had reached about300°.

1.8 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Intercon A/S appeared to have a well-developed safety management system inaccordance with the ISM Code. Its standard company system was transferredand modified as necessary to be suitable for the operation and risks associatedwith Happy Lady’s routes, design and crew, when it took over the vessel inOctober 2000. An interim safety management certificate was issued in Rotterdamon 2 November 2000. On change of ownership, all the previous records,including those associated with the safety management system which had been inplace and operating on board Pugliola under the previous owner, were removedfrom the vessel.

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Fig

ure

6

PLA plot

12

2325/20

1040

1025

1015

1005

Figure 7

SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS

2.1 AIM

The aim of this section is to examine the facts in order to determine the factorsthat underlay why a modern, well-equipped and well-manned vessel grounded inthis way.

2.2 THE ACCIDENT

The master’s efforts to clear the anchor cable from the bulbous bow wereunsuccessful initially. It is impossible to establish the precise lead of the cable,and thus the reason why the master’s efforts failed. However a combination ofwind, tidal stream, the tension in the cable, and propulsion and bow thrustermovements kept the anchor cable leading astern down her port side, despite themaster’s efforts. The fact that both the master and pilot reported that the bowthruster had little, or no effect, suggests that the cable was probably looped overthe bulbous bow and leading under the vessel’s hull. The anchor was, therefore,probably to starboard of the vessel despite the apparent lead of the cable to port.In these circumstances the port swing induced by the master only exacerbatedthe situation, causing load to remain on the cable and the cable to remain caughtover the bulbous bow. The vessel effectively swung around on her anchor. Hadthe master been aware of all the relevant facts when he began to heave theanchor cable at 0955, he might have realised that first he needed to come asternbefore manoeuvring, to place and keep the cable to starboard of the bulb.Instead he made assumptions regarding the position of the anchor, and did notask the third officer to confirm they were correct.

In such circumstances, the master needed precise information on which to base asuccessful strategy. Accurate information was required from two sources: firstlyfrom the third officer on the bridge, who, armed with the precise position in whichthe anchor was dropped, should have been able to provide the anchor’s relativebearing from the vessel’s current position; secondly, the senior crew member onthe forecastle needed to give precise information about the lead and tension ofthe cable, including the steepness of the cable and whether it was tight againstthe vessel’s hull. This information was important for the master to be able tojudge what action he needed to take to reduce the weight on the cable andcorrect the lead. Subsequently, the master needed frequent reports to enable himto judge the success, or otherwise, of his manoeuvres.

On many vessels, one of the chief officer’s traditional roles is to be in charge ofthe forecastle during anchor operations. Due to reduced manning and hectic portroutines with additional calls on chief officers’ time, it is now commonplace for thisduty to be delegated. On board Happy Lady the duty had been assigned to oneof the seamen, which was contrary to the management company’s standinginstructions. In normal circumstances, and when everything goes according to

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plan, an experienced able seaman is able to perform the role adequately. If,however, something goes wrong, it requires someone who is suitably qualified andable to use experience, technical knowledge and judgment, to be in charge. It isoften too late to call that person. In any case a seaman of one nationality,communicating over the radio to a master of another nationality, and using thelanguage of a third, is not a sound basis on which to obtain adequate andaccurate information. In view of the vessel’s proximity to the shore and the verystrong wind conditions which prevailed on 21 January, the chief officer shouldhave been on the forecastle from the outset.

In the event, enough cable had been raised to allow the vessel to start draggingher anchor before the chief officer arrived on the forecastle. The PLA’s radarrecording indicates she started to do so at about 1005 when the charted waterdepth was about 14m. Once momentum had built up she dragged steadilytowards the shore at a rate of about 1.25 knots. The master had beenpreoccupied with trying to manoeuvre the vessel to clear the anchor cable and,thinking he had time to clear the cable and then manoeuvre clear of the shoalwater, he concentrated on this, rather than ensuring the vessel remained in safewater. He could, and perhaps should, have dropped the port anchor before he gotto the point of no return. In the event, when the anchor became visible near thesurface and the ship’s heading was about 275°, she was probably aground, andbeing held firmly against the bank by the wind. The tide was falling.

Had the chief officer been aware of the danger the vessel was in from the momenthe arrived on the forecastle, it might have increased the urgency with which heundertook his task. The master tried, in the meantime, to extricate himself fromthe predicament by using some large engine movements; but without success.He could then do no more than call for tugs and try pumping out some ballast, butthis was more in the hope of being able to refloat than having any expectation ofsuccess.

2.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP

Since leaving Rotterdam under new ownership in November 2000, Happy Ladyhad used her anchors a number of times. On two occasions, including theincident on 21 January, the anchor had become trapped in the angle between thebulbous bow and the sharp rake of the stem. On the first occasion, off a Frenchport in December, only the anchor became trapped. On 21 January, the cablejammed under tension initially and prevented the windlass from heaving, but thiswas followed by a repetition of the previous problem with the anchor gettingcaught.

The vessel is known to have a tendency to ride up over the anchor. Because verysimilar problems had occurred on two occasions, in two months, it is highly likelythat under her previous owners it had also occurred. However, the previousmanager had received no such reports. No ISM documentation was passed over

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when the ship was sold, and thus the new owner was unaware of the vessel’ssafety and maintenance history. Had the master been fully aware of any inherentproblems associated with heaving the anchor cable he might have acteddifferently to prevent this accident.

Although there is no evidence to indicate problems with heaving the anchor cablebefore the change of ownership, the incident does highlight the importance ofrecording such events, and passing them on to subsequent owners. One of themajor benefits of the ISM Code is that lessons from incidents, and the steps takento adjust procedures as a result, could be lost on change of ownership, withpotentially serious consequences. In the MAIB’s opinion, the maintenance andsafety history should be considered an integral part of a vessel and should betransferred to a new owner.

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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS

3.1 FINDINGS

3.1.1 Happy Lady was fully certificated according to national and internationalrules. [1.2]

3.1.2 At the time of the accident the wind was from the east-south-east force 7 to8 and the tide had begun to ebb. [1.3, 1.4]

3.1.3 The chief officer was not on the forecastle when heaving began, and wasonly sent forward once the problem had arisen. He was unaware of therisk of grounding. Had he been appraised of this it might have affected theurgency with which he tried to resolve the difficulty. [1.3, 2.2]

3.1.4 The crew on the forecastle had trouble heaving the anchor cable as itfrequently became jammed in the angle between the rake of the stem andthe bulbous bow. [1.3, 1.6]

3.1.5 By about 1005 enough cable had been raised to allow the vessel to startdragging her anchor in the strong wind. [2.2]

3.1.6 Happy Lady dragged her anchor steadily towards the shore between about1005 and 1036. [1.7]

3.1.7 The third officer plotted the position of the vessel frequently and reportedher drift. [1.3]

3.1.8 Despite his attempts to manoeuvre the vessel to clear the anchor from thebow, the master was unable to do so. [2.2]

3.1.9 On change of ownership all the previous ISM records were removed fromthe vessel. [1.8]

3.1.10 Happy Lady’s anchor had become jammed over the bulbous bow on twooccasions in the two months she had been operated by Intercon A/S. [2.3]

3.1.11 It is likely that this was a common problem on Happy Lady although hermaster had been unaware of it. [2.3]

3.1.12 Happy Lady sustained no damage, and there was no pollution as a resultof the accident. [1.3]

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3.2 CAUSES

3.2.1 The Initiating Cause

The initiating cause of the accident was a misjudgment by the master. Despitebeing aware that the vessel was dragging her anchor steadily towards shoalwater, he believed he could heave in the anchor in time to move into safe water.

3.2.2 Underlying Causes

The design of the fore part of the vessel allowed the anchor cable to jam betweenthe rake of the stem and the bulbous bow in certain circumstances. [1.3,2.3]

An able seaman, rather than an officer, was in charge on the forecastle in a verystrong wind, and while very close to shoal water when heaving began. [2.2]

The master made assumptions regarding the position of the anchor, and did notask the third officer to confirm they were correct. [2.2]

The master’s attempts to clear the anchor cable were unsuccessful because hedid not know where the anchor lay. [2.2]

The master was unaware of any inherent problems with heaving the anchorcable. [2.3]

The master concentrated on trying to clear the anchor cable rather than ensuringthe vessel stayed in safe water. [2.2]

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SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS

Intercon A/S is recommended to:

1. Ensure that:

• Its onboard procedures are such that, when anchoring or raising the anchor in strongwind or tidal conditions close to shoal water, an officer is placed in charge on theforecastle of Happy Lady;

• Every attempt is made to establish the correct lead of the cable before starting toheave up; and

• More effective procedures are put in place to avoid the cable becoming trappedbetween the bulbous bow and the rake of the stem.

Note: Further Action

The MAIB intends to publish a summary of this report and ensure that it is circulated tothose in the marine industry who are instrumental in the operational design and buildingof vessels such as Happy Lady.

Marine Accident Investigation BranchMay 2001

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