Hamas in Power by Menachem Klein

8/10/2019 Hamas in Power by Menachem Klein

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Hamas in PowerAuthor(s): Menachem KleinReviewed work(s):Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 442-459Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330419 .Accessed: 02/11/2011 16:14

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Hamas in Power

Menachem Klein

This article challenges he static approach o Hamas as a simple undamentalistorganization y analyzing ts political documents. t shows that Hamas Islamistideology has not prevented t from moving rom fundamentalism o radicalism.Hamas has innovated ways of allowing its leaders to declare or acquiesce inpolitical positions that contradict ts undamentalist reed. Hamas accomplishedthis change in the course of a domestic debate. The international oycott of itsgovernment id not create the change Hamas began to talk in two voices be-fore winning he 2006 elections.

In his new book How to Cure a Fanatic, Amos Oz creates a dichotomy between fa-naticism on the one hand and pluralism and tolerance on the other. Fanatics, Oz writes,believe that a sacred or utopian end justifies all means. Zealous, simple-minded, andself-righteous, very often the fanatic can only count up to one, two is too big a figurefor him or her. ' Citing his childhood in Jerusalem and labeling himself a recoveredfanatic, Oz claims expertise in comparative fanaticism. Fanatics lack imagination andhumor, he maintains. Both these skills require relativism, the ability to see oneself asothers do, not only as one sees oneself. Instead, the fanatic imposes conformity and

uniformity. Fanaticism, Oz argues, is the desire to force other people to change.Hamas was established as a typical fundamentalist movement and, by defini-

tion, fundamentalists are fanatics. They are uncomplicated and despise diplomaticgimmicks. The Islamic Charter of 1988,2 Hamas' founding document, which calls forthe destruction of Israel, is a fundamentalist document. The Charter, and the horrificsuicide bombings that Hamas has perpetrated, have solidified the movement's fanaticalimage.

Since it entered the political arena, winning 76 of 132 seats in the 2006 Palestin-ian parliamentary elections, Hamas has given numerous indications that, in practice, ithas ceased to be a fanatic and fundamentalist organization, unable to distinguish be-tween principle and practice. It has demonstrated a willingness to change its positionson fundamental issues and even to take public stands in contradiction of its IslamicCharter. This does not mean that Hamas has become a moderate force. It has not re-voked the Islamic Charter, and its leaders continue to speak the language of fanaticism,alongside that of pragmatism. Such a dichotomy can be manifested in a single day bya single person, as was the case with the newly-elected Hamas Foreign Minister ofthe Palestinian Authority, Mahmud al-Zahar, on April 27, 2006. First, he declared thatIsrael would forever remain our enemy. On the other hand, he also said that he is notopposed to negotiating with Israel, if the talks can lead to satisfactory results. Neither

Dr. Menachem Klein is a Senior Lecturer n the Department f Political Science at Bar-Ilan University,Israel. His book, A Possible Peace Between Israel and Palestine: An Insiders'Account of the Geneva Initia-tive, is forthcoming n September y Columbia University Press.

1. Amos Oz, How to Cure a Fanatic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 51.2. Hamas, Islamic Charter, ttp://www.myisraelsource.com/content/charterhamas.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 61, NO. 3, SUMMER 2007


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HAMAS N POWER 443

does he object o third-party mediation n the terms of opening peace talks hat have astheir goal the achievement f justice for the Palestinians.3

According o Martin Seliger, a fundamental deology s comprised f a cluster ofprinciples f belief and absolute

goals,as well as a

perceivedmeans of

achieving hem.An operative deology, on the other hand, nvolves a justification ppended o a policythat s being implemented a policy whose political effects contradict r significantlydeviate from the overall vision. The two types of ideology also differ in their timedimension. The dominant ime range n fundamental deology is long-term, whereasoperative deology focuses upon the immediate past and future. The fundamentalistseeks far-reaching isionary nds, and sets policy accordingly, whereas he pragmatistminimizes he overall vision in his or her attempt o respond o the constraints f con-temporary ircumstances. nstead, he pragmatist opes to bring about mprovements

in the present eality, while confronting he political and social pressures n the contextof which the organization perates.4Seliger concludes hat he tension between undamental nd operative deologies

is especially evident n national movements. t is all the more powerful n a religiousnational organization uch as Hamas. The organization's eaders are forced to achieveimmediate oals at the expense of long-term bjectives. At the same time, they cannotentirely orsake heir principles. The result s a complex network of relations betweenthe two ideologies. There are three possible models for these relations. The two ide-ologies may complement ach other; one may dominate he other; and in relations ofconflict, here s a rift between he two. In most cases, politicians do not entirely avorthe total triumph f one of the ideologies, so they develop mechanisms f arbitrationand reconciliation hat bridge between he operative nd the fundamental. olitics thencenter around a constant process of reciprocal bargaining etween fundamental ndoperative deologies.

My aim here is to challenge he static approach o Hamas by analyzing Hamasdocuments and their contexts. My analysis shows that Hamas' Islamist deology hasnot prevented t from changing and moving rom undamentalism o radicalism. Hamasaccomplished his change in the course of a domestic debate. The organization wasable to manage ts crisis and resolve its internal disagreements without splitting. Theinternational oycott of its government id not create he change Hamas began tospeak n two voices before winning he 2006 elections. Neither was Fatah's eaction oits loss of power a constructive orce that encouraged Hamas o continue reforming tsideology and to move from radicalism oward pragmatism.

AGENTS OF POLITICAL CTION

From ts inception, Hamas has had both political goals and built-in methods bywhich t has pursued hose goals and adjusted tself to changing ircumstances. n otherwords, Hamas always had a number f political agents of change and agents of ac-

3. Tzvi Bar'el and Arnon Regular, Al-Zahar: Eini Mitnaged Lemasa Umatan m Israel [ I DoNot Oppose Negotiation with Israel, ,Ha'aretz, April 27, 2006.

4. Martin Seliger, Fundamental nd Operative deology: The Two Principal Dimensions of Politi-cal Argumentation, olicy Science, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 325-338.


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444 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

tion.In classical Islam, religion s tied to politics.5 The connection s even tighter n

radical, undamentalist slam, which aims to achieve an unambiguous olitical goal -the overthrow f a heretical egime and ts replacement with Islamic rule. Furthermore,as a Palestinian movement, Hamas seeks national iberation rom Israeli occupation.Another agent s Hamas' principle of sabr (patience, orbearance). abr means endur-ance and staying power on the way to an Islamic Palestine. One of the most popularexpressions used by Hamas spokesmen and writers s Allah ma' al-sabarin, Godis with the patient. 6 he emphasis on patience allows Hamas o build itself up as amovement hat claims that t does not allow the present o be ground down between heglory of the past and the vision of the future. Hamas holds to its revolutionary oals butpushes them off into the long run. It supports he realization f partial objectives, dis-

tinguishing etween hose that are possible and hose that, n current ircumstances, reunrealistic. These latter ones will be achieved n generations o come. Searching or abalance between ts need to be effective here and now and ts need to remain aithful oits overarching deological and strategic oals, Hamas created a framework f time inwhich political activity and actical lexibility are he rule of the day. During his period,the movement upports he building of a Palestinian-Islamic ociety and state. It viewsthe liberation f the territories ccupied by Israel n 1967 as a stage n the liberation fPalestine as a whole.7

Since it was founded, Hamas has shown that t adjusts ts positions and displaysflexibility n light of the Palestinian onsensus n the Occupied Territories. Hamas sa political and social organization, o its activists encounter he general public eachday in its religious, educational, nd welfare nstitutions, nd are aware of what thepublic hinks. t could be said that he public-at-large s no less a foundation f Hamas'existence than the ideology of the movement and its leadership. n practice, Hamas'leadership as deferred o public opinion n the interpretation f the national nterest.The voice of the masses, n its view, is the expression f God's will. Therefore, Hamasaccepted he authority f the Palestinian Authority when it was founded n 1994, eventhough, n Hamas' view, t was born of the sin of the Oslo Accords. Hamas ubmitted othe Palestinian Authority ecause of the public's support f the latter and n obedienceto its taboo against civil war.8 Shaykh Yassin even headed an official Hamas delega-tion to the session of the PLO's Central Council n April 1999, thereby giving his own

5. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modem History (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1957), p. 36.

6. Uri Nir, Orekh Ruah VeKama ipukei Beinayim Patient and Few Interim Achievements ],

Ha'aretz, January 5, 1995.7. Reuven Paz, Sleeping with the Enemy: A Reconciliation Process As Part of Counter-Terrorism:

Is Hamas Capable of 'Hudna?' (Herzliya: The International Policy Institute or Counter-Terrorism,1998), p. 4; Jawad al-Hamadi and lyad Barghouthi, Dirasa fi'l-Fikr al-Siyyasi li-Harkat al-Maqa-wimah al-Islamiyya Hamas 1987-1996 [Studies n the Political Thought of Hamas 1987-1996] (Am-man: Markaz Dirasat al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1996), pp. 66, 120-122, 125-135.

8. Menachem Klein, Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations, Terrorism ndPolitical Violence, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 111-132; also published in Efraim Inbar andBruce Maddy-Weizman, ds., Religious Radicalism n the Greater Middle East (London: Frank Cass,1996), pp. 111-132.


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HAMAS IN POWER * 445

stamp of legitimacy o that body.9 A later nstance was the reaction o the terrorist t-tacks of September 11, 2001. In light of Palestinian nd international utrage againstIslamic terror, wo Hamas eaders, Isma'il Abu-Shanab nd Hasan Yusuf, announcedthat Hamas was prepared o suspend ts suicide attacks on condition hat Israel notattack t. They were unambiguous bout the reason or this offer the organizationacted n accordance with the Palestinian eople's nterests, nd suicide bombings werenow opposed o that nterest. The movement does not live on the moon ... and acts inaccordance with the national onsensus, hey declared. 0Another ase in point s whenHamas agreed o the tahadiyya, r calm, nitiated by Mahmud Abbas Abu Mazen) af-ter he was elected President f the Palestinian Authority n January 005. The purposewas to allow Israel o evacuate ts Gaza Strip settlements uietly he following summerand to enable he Palestinians o conduct ocal and general elections.

It is important o note that Hamas has a tradition of lively political debate nwhich ts members xpress positions hat differ rom hose of the Islamic Charter. venin its early years, some of the movement's entral igures, and especially ts charismaticleader and founding ather, Shaykh Yassin, voiced quite divergent iews (I will discussthis period at length elsewhere). They supported Hamas' participation n the parliamen-tary elections of 1996, and so for all intents and purposes made their peace with theestablishment f the Palestinian Authority y the Oslo Accords. They also mapped ut,in different ersions, he outlines of a hostile coexistence reaty with Israel, conditionedon Israeli withdrawal o its borders on the eve of the 1967 War. Shaykh Yassin spokeof a cease-fire asting 10-15 years, to be renewed automatically, n exchange or a fullIsraeli withdrawal rom the territories t occupied n 1967. Hamas would not, however,recognize Israel, give up the right of Palestinian efugees to return o their originalhomes, or cease to call for the liberation f the 1948 erritories that part of Manda-tory Palestine hat became he state of Israel after he cease-fire agreements f 1949.

The effectiveness of these agents varies with Hamas' circumstances. The OsloAccords and the Palestinian nd international upport hey received were the kind of

9. Hamas: Divrey Hasheikh Yassin Batelevisia Hayu Gibuv Devarim Lelo Shahar [ Hamas:Shaykh Yassin Statements n Israeli TV Were Nonsense ], Ha 'aretz, May 5, 1996; Bechor Gai, Han-hagat HaHamas Bashtahim Maskima Lehimana Mepeilut Tzvait Mitoch Ezori Harashut [ HamasLeadership n the Teritorries Agrees to Hold Armed Struggle from the Palestinian Authority Areas ],Ha'aretz, October 10, 1995; Yerah Tal and Amira Hass, CNN: Erev Nission Hahitnakshut HetziaHamas Lelsrael Hafsakat Hapiguim L-10 Shanim [ CNN: On the Eve of the Assassination Trial,Hamas Offered to Israel to Stop the Attacks ], Ha'aretz, October 6, 1997; Amira Hass, Hamas:Hamafteah Lahafuga Beyedi Israel [ Hamas: he Key to Ceasefire s in Israel's Hand ], Ha'aretz,October 8, 1997; Danny Rubinstein, Rantisi Hetzia Hasakat Esh Yamim Ahadim Lifnei HapiguaBamidrahov Rantisi Offered Ceasefire Few Days Before the Attack in the Pedestrian ], Ha'aretz,

9, 1997; Israil wa-Amrica Turahiban Israel and America Congratulate ], l-Quds, April 30 1999,p. 1; Al-Malik Husayn: Naqaltu Ila Israil Ard Hamas [ King Husayn: I Delivered Hamas' Offer toIsrael ], Al-Quds, October 9, 1997; Al-Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Za 'im Hamas Liatba ihi Tawq'i HudnaMa' Isra'il Mumkin Hamas Leader Shaykh Ahmad Yassin to His Followers: It's Possible to Signa Ceasfire ], al-Wassat, November 1, 1993, pp. 10-19; Al-Wasat TunshirAwraq Hamas al-Sirriyya[ Al-Wasat Reveals Hamas' Secret Documents ], Al-Wasat, December 25, 1995, pp. 16-18; Al-Wa-sat Tunshir Awraq Hamas al-Sirriyya Al-Wasat Reveals Hamas' Secret Documents ], Al-Wasat,January 1, 1996.

10. Amira Hass, Bahamas Lokchim Becheshbon Hadrisha Lehafsik Hapiguim [ Hamas Takesinto Account the Demand to Hold the Attacks ], Ha'aretz, September 23, 2001.


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circumstance hat confront Hamas with the need to come to terms with the PLO's suc-cess, or else become irrelevant. Another entirely different et of circumstances ameinto being in 2000 - Fatah's decline, ncreasing public support f Hamas, and Israel'sunilateral withdrawal rom Southern Lebanon.

DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION

At the beginning f 2002, Egypt sought o achieve an internal Palestinian oncordon a long-term ceasefire with Israel. The initiative was the subject of debate withinHamas. Hamas eader 'Abd al-'Aziz Rantisi conditioned ceasefire on the end of theoccupation nd the creation of a balance of terror with Israel. The conflict was betweenunequal ides, Rantisi acknowledged, nd the public was weary of the struggle, but the

Palestinians hould not surrender nd agree o a unilateral essation of hostilities. Pub-lic opinion should be respected only with regard o deferring he campaign o liberatethe 1948 territories, ot with regard o the 1967 territories. n contrast, sma'il Abu-Shanab, one of the founders of Hamas, ook a more moderate nd diplomatic osition.The Palestinians hould declare a unilateral easefire n order o reveal he true ace ofSharon and the road map, he conditions aid down by President Bush for restartingnegotiations etween he Palestinians nd Israel o achieve a final status agreement.

This effort stalemated ntil 2005 when, with Israel's mpending unilateral with-drawal rom the Gaza Strip, Hamas accepted he Egyptian proposal. The question hatpreoccupied Hamas was what role it would have in the regime after he withdrawal. na document hey wrote and sent to Hamas activists, Isma'il Haniyya and Mahmud l-Zahar, wo of the movement's enior eaders n the Gaza Strip and ater Prime Ministerand Foreign Minister, espectively, distinguished etween, on the one hand, an Israeliwithdrawal onducted s part of an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, ncludingsecurity understandings bout acting against heir movement, and on the other hand,a withdrawal without an agreement. A withdrawal n the framework f an agreementwould not allow Hamas o participate n running he Gaza Strip, because Hamas wouldboycott any agreement with Israel. In that case, it would seek to make political gainsoutside governing nstitutions through ts presence on the street and the enlistmentof public opinion. But if the withdrawal were entirely unilateral, Hamas would allowits members o be integrated nto Palestinian Authority ministries and administrativebodies in the liberated Gaza Strip. They could also run n local and labor union elec-tions, and oin military and police units n traditional olice roles, but not in positionsthat nvolved cooperation with Israel. At this stage, the Hamas eadership till did notsanction participation n Palestinian Authority eneral elections.'2

Hamas decided o take part n the elections because t wanted o take advantage f

its growing popularity, nd also as an insurance olicy against repressive measures hatthe Palestinian Authority was liable to take against t. Building on its success in localelections, Hamas wanted o take advantage f popular upport or its claim that Israel's

11. Amira Hass, HaDiagnoza shel HaDoctor Rantisi [ Dr. Rantisi's Diagnosis ], Ha'aretz,June 20, 2003.

12. Amon Regular, Hamas: Nishtatef Bashilton Raq Behitnatqut Had Tzdadit Hamas: We WillEnter the Authority Only if Israel Disengages Unilaterally ], Ha 'aretz, August 15, 2004.


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HAMAS N POWER 447

unilateral withdrawal rom the Gaza Strip was a response o the armed truggle t andIslamic Jihad had waged. Fatah's policy of negotiation nd diplomacy had not gottenIsrael out of Gaza, Hamas argued. Furthermore, atah was losing support because ofits internal chaos, corruption, nd the dysfunction of the institutions f

government,manned mostly by Fatah members and supporters. Hamas also feared that, after theelections, President Abbas and his military apparatus ould, n response o Israeli andAmerican pressure, move to suppress he organization. Unlike his predecessor, Yasir'Arafat, Abbas xplicitly opposed he armed ntifada. His election after Arafat's eathimpelled Hamas o seek a political nsurance policy in the form of parliamentary m-munity.

As election day approached, Hamas ound tself faced with an increasing umberof dilemmas. Should it hold fast to its pure ideology or, at the very least, not block

the possibility of implementing he Islamic Charter? hould t officially end its armedstruggle n exchange or entering he political system? Did its participation n the elec-tions not grant egitimacy o the Oslo Accords? Organizationally, amas considered owhat extent he burden f building a political party tructure would weigh on itself, andwhether t was worthwhile n order o expand ts social and educational-religious orkvia a political party hat would be part of the establishment. he organization's oalwas to be represented n Parliament, n the oversight branch of government, ot theexecutive branch.'3 s a whole, Hamas knew where t was going and was aware of theorganizational nd ideological price it would have to pay for full politicization. Therewere two ways of thinking n the organization. he extreme position was supported ythe outsiders Hamas officials outside he Occupied Territories Khalid Mish'aland 'Imad al-'Alami. It viewed the armed struggle as the major ool and sought tominimize he price of politicization. The diplomatic-pragmatic pproach was supportedamong the outsiders by Mish'al's deputy, Abu Marzuq, nd by the insiders Hasan Yus-suf and Isma'il Haniyya. This latter group wanted Hamas o integrate ompletely ntothe Palestinian overning ystem and into the PLO. Some prominent nsiders, uch asMahmud l-Zahar, acillated between hese two approaches. Muhammad Nazzal saidthat Hamas did not want to come to power by parliamentary eans, was not preparedto participate n a government ased on the Oslo principles, nd did not want o negoti-ate with Israel.

In putting ogether ts slate of candidates, Hamas had to decide whether o be-come more lexible n its positions and ts discourse. The question was whether ts cen-tral eaders would become part of the list or would be left outside of the political wampso that they could preserve heir ideological purity. nstead of placing ts leaders onthe slate, Hamas considered unning a list of technocrats nd second-tier members ofthe organization, which could be overseen by remote control. The danger of doing this

was that the ideological eaders could lose their authority r find themselves at oddswith the politicians elected by the public. The Hamas eadership hus decided, afterdue deliberation, o place its senior eaders Isma'il Haniyya, Mahmud al-Zahar, Ha-mid Beitawi of Nablus, Shaykh Hasan Yusuf of Ramallah, nd Ahmad Baher of Gaza)on the list, alongside prominent igures rom its charitable nd religious-educational

13. Nazal li-l-Ayyam: Hamas Lan Tusharik Fi'l-Hukuma Nazzal to Al-Ayyam: Hamas WillNot Join the Cabinet ], Al-Ayyam, March 15, 2005, p. 1.


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institutions, wives of prisoners and of men killed by Israel, and professionals whohad ties to Hamas, even if they were not full-fledged activists. The result was a partythat did not advocate he rule of religious figures but which was certainly a party ofreligious people. It was composed of officials and activists employed by Hamas and tsassociated organizations, et ones who did not play manifestly eligious roles. Of themovement's 4 candidates n Hebron, Tulkarem, nd Gaza, seven had doctoral degreesand three masters degrees most of these taught slamic tudies), our were engineers rdoctors, and six were prisoners r relatives of prisoners r people killed n the Intifada.Only two were professional oliticians.'4

Hamas' entire leadership hus decided to construct a party n which the move-ment's leadership provided he principal political weight. They also decided to runon a platform hat diverged rom the Islamic Charter see below), even if they did not

renounce t. Hamas entered he election campaign united, meaning hat t was able toexert party discipline over ts members. t fielded he same number f candidates s thenumber f seats t sought o contest, hus guaranteeing hat none of its supporters' oteswent to waste. Fatah, n contrast, was divided. Members and supporters ngry at notbeing included on the official ist of candidates an on competing lates or as indepen-dents. Jerusalem, or example, had six seats n the Palestine Legislative Council PLC),two of which were reserved or Christians. Hamas, assuming t had ittle support mongChristians, an our candidates. All four were elected. Fatah an six official candidates,but another 19 independent andidates were identified with Fatah. The city of Gaza had

eight seats, and Hamas won all of them. Fatah had eight official candidates, ut another16 members f Fatah an here as independents. 5Hamas went nto the election seekingto do as well as it could, never magining hat t would defeat Fatah o decisively.

On the eve of the elections, he common wisdom n Hamas was that Fatah wouldwin and he new Palestinian abinet would renew alks with Israel. n that case, Hamas'leaders wondered, hould they join the government? Did Hamas want to veto the re-sults of negotiations, r the very fact of engaging n them? Al-Zahar and most of theexternal eaders objected o membership n a government hat would negotiate withIsrael, and this position was accepted, with some conditions, by Haniyya and Abu Mar-zuq. Al-Zahar nd his colleagues argued hat Hamas hould be a strong and aggressiveopposition and ally itself with the Popular Front or the Liberation f Palestine, Fatahrebels, and ndependents. hose who took the second approach elieved hat he move-ment could join a Fatah government, aking control of important ocial and economicministries, n condition hat hey could veto any diplomatic nitiative with Israel. f themovement's enior leaders refused to join the government, he ministerial portfolioscould be taken by professional igures who were tied to Hamas and who enjoyed public

14. Al-Zahar wa-Haniyya wa-Siam wa Yusuf Fi Muqadimat Qimat Hamas Li'l-intikhabat al-Zahar, Haniyya, Siam and Yussuf on the Top of Hamas List ], Al-Ayyam, December 1, 2005, p. 1;

Hama.s Tunshir Asma' Murashihiha Hamas Publishes Its List ], Al-Ayyam, December 5, 2005,p. 1; Amon Regular, Hamushim MehaFatah Hishtaltu Al Misradei Va'adat Habehirot [ FatahArmed Men Took Over the Elections Committee Offices ], Ha'aretz, December 14, 2005; AmonRegular, HaMatarah: 60 Ahuzho MeMoshavei HaParliament, Lo Batu'ah Shehi Dimyonit [ TheGoal: 60% of Parliament Seats, Not Sure It's Impossible ], Ha'aretz, December 11, 2005.

15. Amon Regular, HaFatah Mefutzal HaHamas Tzafui Leharviach Fatah s Divided, HamasIs Expected to Gain ]. Ha 'aretz, January 24, 2006.


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HAMAS IN POWER * 449

prestige.'6In conclusion, he development f the Hamas eadership's iews on organization-

al issues shows that t has deliberately evised positions as the movement has becomemore deeply involved n politics. It also shows that he issues under debate hemselveschanged. The debate over organizational-political uestions did not divide the move-ment despite heir disagreements nd despite heir undamentalist tarting oint. On thecontrary, he organizational ramework rew even stronger as a result. Deep involve-ment in national politics moved the focus of activity n the Palestinian erritories ndobliterated he wedge between the outside leaders (Hamas' Political Bureau and topleadership) nd the inside leaders who operate he organization nd maintain ontactwith the public at large) that had previously characterized he debate within Hamas.The geographic divide between outside and inside was replaced n two ways: first by

the difference between radicals and pragmatists n both places; and second, by thedivision between ts cabinet and PLC members whose main concern s political andsemi-independent rmed groups with operational rientation hat do not always ollowthe instructions f the movement's eadership.'7

IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEISLAMIC CHARTER ND HAMAS' POLITICAL OCUMENTS

The political documents roduced y Hamas are not cut from a single fabric. Mostof them are collective and authoritative ocuments laced n the movement's ame be-fore Palestinian nd international olitical actors. 8 minority are drafts eaked o themedia - with the leaks themselves being evidence of disagreements.'9 n addition,there are statements iven to Arab and international media, expressing positions thatdiverge rom the Charter. he plurality of voices proves that there s no close centralpolicing of ideas n Hamas. At the same time, Hamas members tand united behind anydocument r approach with the leadership's mprimatur. here have been no splits, andno one disagreed when Haniyya and al-Zahar resented documents hat diverge rom

the Islamic Charter efore potential oalition partners, n the table of the President ndParliament, nd in an official letter to the Secretary-General f the United Nations.20

16. Regular, HaMatarah: 60 Ahuzho; al-Zahar wa-Haniyeh; Arnon Regular, Hamas Mit-moded Be-56 Rashuiot Umitlabet Legabi Hemshech Hapiguim Hamas Runs in 56 Localities andDebates on Continuing Attacks ], Ha'aretz, September 29, 2005.

17. Tzvi Bar'el, When Yussuf Al-Qoqa Became Shahid, Ha 'aretz, June 20, 2006.18. Isma'il Haniyya, Nass al-Bayan al-Wizari wa-al-Tashkiliyya l-Wizariyya i-Hukumat Hani-

yya [ Text of the Ministerial Agreement and the Formation of the Ministry of the Haniyya Govern-

ment ], http://www.maannews.net/ar/do.php?name=News&file=print&sid=23249; sma'il Haniyya,Mashru' al-Barnamaj al-Siyyasi li-Hukumat l-Itilaf al-Watani Plan of the Political Program of

the National Coalition Government ], http://www.palestine-info.net/Arabic/palestoday/report2006_I/1 6_3_06.html and http://wwwjmcc.org/new/06/mar/hamasprog2.htm.

19. Isma'il Haniyya, Al-Mabadi'al- Ama i-Barnamaj Hukumat Hamas [ Principles f the Pro-gram of the Hamas Government ], al-Ayyam and al-Quds, March 12, 2006. Isma'il Haniyya, al-Mabadi al-'Ama li-Barnamij Hukumat Hamas [ Principles of the Program of the Hamas Govern-ment, Draft B], http://www.ynet.co.il in Hebrew).

20. Mahmud al-Zahar, Letter written by Palestinian Minister or Foreign Affairs to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, http://wwwjmcc.org/new/06/apr/zahharlet.htm, pril 4, 2006.


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This demonstrates that the movement has procedures for making decisions in a waythat allows its members to stand together despite their disagreements.

The differences between the party's platform and the Islamic Charter do not rep-resent an attempt at deception or the empty and unconsidered use of words. They area product of a change and modification of lines of thought as a part of the processby which Hamas has become a political movement. It is important to stress that theIslamic Charter was not revoked by Hamas, but at the same time it is impossible toignore the fact that it is not cited in any of the movement's political texts. This is nota trivial matter, given the Charter's constitutive status as Hamas' founding document.The failure to refer to it is an admission of the inconsistency - if not the contradiction- between the Charter and Hamas' current political documents. It could be arguedthat they constitute two different, coexistent levels of discourse, a division of laborbetween strategy and tactics. The Charter, in this reading, states matters of principle,while the political documents address practice. But analysis of the contents of the twotypes of documents proves that, in some cases, there are sharp discrepancies betweenthem. They are much sharper than they could be if indeed a dichotomy between theoryand practice was enforced by a strong central leadership in which there were really noserious disagreements.

Hamas did not run in the elections under its own name. Instead, the slate it spon-sored was called the Change and Reform Party. Change and Reform's 2006 platform iswritten in an idiom that stands in sharp contrast to the high, idealistic language of theIslamic Charter of 1988. The Charter contains many quotes from the Qur'an and fromHasan al-Banna, the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. These make the text intoan all-encompassing vision or prophecy. In the Change and Reform platform, however,only the epigraph is from the Qur'an. The time dimension of the Islamic Charter isahistorical, encompassing everything from the time of the Prophet Muhammad to thepresent day. The present is not presented as a legitimate framework of time on its ownterms; it is linked to the past and recreates it. The constitution that appears in the Char-ter is the Qur'an, and dying in the name of Allah is the movement's most sublime aspi-ration. None of this appears in the party platform. Neither does the platform contain theCharter's declaration of the goal of establishing a Muslim state.

The Charter is a classically radical and fundamentalist document, focused en-tirely on prophecy and war. But the party platform is focused on Palestinian society'scurrent circumstances. The Charter places great emphasis on jihad - holy war. It pres-ents jihad as the only solution to the Palestinian problem and as a personal obligationof every Muslim. But the party platform uses the term ihad only once - in the 12th ofits 20 sections, devoted to the issue of women, and in the context of women's equalityin the jihad. The platform opposes normalization with Israel, calls for halting militarycooperation with it, and declares that the occupation is to be opposed by all means. Theauthors of the platform chose only to hint at military actions and the armed struggle,and also left the door open to legitimizing the diplomatic process - something un-thinkable to the authors of the Islamic Charter.

Emphasizing the need to liberate the 1967 territories, the platform states that theparty does not give up the Palestinian right to the 1948 territories nor the demand to al-low all refugees to return o their homes and property. The distinction between the 1967and 1948 territories was the basis of the PLO's staged plan of 1974 and contradicts one


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HAMAS N POWER 451

of the fundamental rinciples of the Palestinian Charter, which stated hat Palestine sa single, integral unit. A similar principle, n the framework f a religious discourse,appears n the Islamic Charter.2 hen the party platform makes this distinction, tcontradicts his principle. At the same time, it is

importanto note that he

discrepancybetween the two texts is not unbridgeable it can be done using the same methodsthat the PLO developed n the mid-1970s n order o link the staged plan with its owncharter.22

The Islamic Charter was meant o be a substitute or and counter-document o thePalestinian Charter, ublished by the PLO n 1964. In contrast o the Islamic Charter'sintention of creating an alternative o the PLO, Hamas wants to enter the PLO. Theparty platform mphasizes he PLO's primacy ver the Palestinian Authority nd statesthat the PLO should direct the Palestinian Authority. Hamas demands hat the Fatah

leadership dhere o the understandings eached between t and Fatah at their talks inCairo n March 2005,23 and accept nto the PLO's nstitutions he same proportion fHamas representatives hat the movement achieved n the elections. Hamas hoped toachieve a majority n the PLO by allying with Fatah's xternal opposition and use thisto influence he conduct of affairs n the Palestinian Authority. Hamas did not conceivethat he opposite would happen, and that Fatah, after osing the elections, would blockHamas' way into the PLO and use the PLO to exert its influence over a PalestinianAuthority ed by Hamas.

The Islamic Charter tresses pan-Islamic nd pan-Arab oals, and sees Hamas asthe vanguard n their achievement. Religion, and the religious deal, are the supremevalues n the Charter, which acks any pragmatic r quotidian imension. Patriotism x-ists only within a religious ramework. he text directs ts gaze out towards he conflictwith the enemy. When the Charter ooks inward, t sees society only from the angle ofcombat that s, it seeks to prepare ociety to battle srael and he West and educate tsyoung people n Islamic values. The election platform, n contrast, ocuses on the issuesof Palestinian ociety, areas n which Hamas has proved tself more successful han Fa-tah and the Palestinian Authority. The platform promises a war on poverty, rime, andcorruption, s well as administrative eform, tronger ocal government, nd reductionof the central government's owers. This is further proof that Hamas was preparing

21. Hamas' Islamic Charter eems to preclude any eventual recognition of Israel hrough ts Article11: The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqfthroughout he generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce t or part of it, orabandon t or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no Arab Kingor President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right, nor has that right any organization orthe aggregate of all organizations, be they Palestinian or Arab, because Palestine is an Islamic Waqf

throughout all generations and to the Day of Resurrection. But the PLO Covenant, though ustifieddifferently, also precluded compromise so long as the PLO adhered strictly to it. Both movementshave moved away gradually rom the romantic and holistic view expressed in each of their foundingdocuments. Hamas, Islamic Charter, ttp://www.myisraelsource.com/content/charterhamas.

22. Klein, Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations.23. Under which Fatah and Hamas agreed upon a ceasefire with Israel, as well as the ability of

Hamas to run in the local and general.elections and the terms under which Hamas would integrateinto the PLO. I'lan al-Qahira yu'akid darurat istikmal al-islahat al-shamila [ Cairo DeclarationStresses the Need to Conclude Comprehensive Reforms ], al-Quds, March 18, 2005, p. 1.


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itself to be an opposition party hat would exploit ts gains n local elections o strike atthe establishment ed by Fatah.

The section of the Islamic Charter evoted o education addresses nly religiouseducation, alongside study of the enemy so as to know how to fight t effectively. Thesociety described n the Charter s a dedicated, ohesive, religious society at war. Thatis not the nature of the society that appears n the party platform, which is describedas open and exposed to the West. The platform ecognizes he current haracter f Pal-estinian society as heterogeneous nd not religiously extreme. t supports democraticprocedures nd freedom of expression. The platform lso recognizes he fact that Pal-estinian society seeks Western higher education. The platform does not reject modernWestern ducation, but restricts t to the technological ield. It distinguishes betweenunacceptable Western values and Western echnology, which should be adopted. This

is an artificial distinction dating from the 181 century, at the painful time when theIslamic world found itself facing the West's military might. The distinction did notsucceed in preventing Westernization nd secularization. The use of the same tropetoday testifies o the lack of a better alternative. he platform s positive on freedom ofthought and expression, but it is not tolerant f Western alues or culture and calls forpurging hem rom the educational ystem.24 t views the family as the cultural unit thateducates, nstills values, and passes on the nation's heritage and history o the youngergeneration.25 his differs rom open, secular, Western ociety, n which the family andthe head of the family lose their places to other socializing agents, such as the street

and mass culture cons. In Western ociety, according o the platform, ach individualdecides what s good for him. The party ears the penetration f secular Western aluesand seeks to shut the doors of the home and the family to keep such influences out.

In the legal sphere, he party platform tates hat Shari'a (Islamic religious uris-prudence) hould become the major ource of legislation. n this, the party rejected hecommon slamist logan of Islam s the solution nd the demand o impose the entireShari'a here and now. Instead, he platform ites a formulation ccepted n Arab coun-tries ruled by non-Islamist egimes. With he clear goal of functioning s an aggressiveopposition party hat exposes the Fatah regime's weak points, the platform tates itsallegiance o the rule of law. It promises o replace emporary aws, promulgated y thePLC until permanent egislation ould be passed.26 t also promises o end military andadministrative narchy, nd the practice of holding prisoners without rial, establish astrong and independent udiciary not subject to the dictates of the executive branch,establish a strong supreme court, guarantee reedom of speech and communication,and recognize ndividual ights. In all of these provisions, Hamas sought not only tohighlight Fatah's neptitude, ut also to insure ts own freedom of action n the face ofpossible oppression by the Fatah regime. For the same reason, he platform ites the

24. It is interesting o note that, while the party platform devotes a great deal of space to education,Haniyya included only one general sentence on the subject in his inauguration peech. He said onlythat the educational system needed to be revitalized, and that it had to be developed through he useof new research, while preserving self-identity.

25. The Islamic Charter estricts women to classic female roles as mothers who raise fighters andas housewives, while the party platform speaks of gender equality.

26. Nathan J. Brown, Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine (Berke-ley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 94-137.


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Hamas' op officials voice a variety of positions on political questions, and it isnot unusual o hear contradictory oices. Most of the disagreement enters on whetherHamas may itself negotiate a permanent tatus agreement with Israel, and under what

conditions. Hamassees no obstacle to Fatah

officials,President Abbas irst and fore-

most, carrying ut negotiations, f the talks ead to different esults han n the past. Inlight of the failure of the previous negotiations, he burden f proof ies with those whoadvocate a solution to the Palestinian problem without resorting o armed resistance.They should present heir achievements nd Hamas will then study he matter.30

The Hamas eadership s prepared n principle o reach nterim r partial rrange-ments with Israel, ncluding he establishment f a Palestinian tate within the 1967borders.3 he strategic oal is to liberate Palestine, but f Israel has a proposal o makein that direction n the framework f negotiations n which we can achieve even some

of our rights we will think t over, al-Zahar has declared.32 partial agreement,serving as a stage n a process, s acceptable o Hamas on condition hat t be approvedby the people. Partial ealization oes not obviate rights and does not mean sacrificingthe right of return o territories hat have not been liberated.33

Similarly, here s no debate within Hamas about the possibility of negotiatingover day-to-day affairs, such as transit permits or merchandise nd workers, and thetransfer f the tax monies that Israel collects for the Palestinian Authority. Accordingto PLC member Yehiya Musa, such matters will be dealt with pragmatically.34 ha-lid Mish'al declared: We will not recognize he occupation, but we are realistic andpragmatic nd know that hings are done by agreement nd gradually. Hamas will dealwith the Palestinian Authority's bligations pragmatically, ithout giving up its prin-ciples. 35

Continuation f the ceasefire does not require negotiation ecause t is the main-tenance of an existing situation. But, Hamas says, it is conditioned n Israeli reciproc-ity. The principle f armed esistance oes not mean hat he timing of attacks annot beaffected by practical onsiderations, nd a ceasefire does not mean conceding he rightto resist by all means, and the right o respond o Israeli aggression. The ceasefire s ameans, ust as armed esistance s a means, and not an end in itself.36

Khalid Mish'al and al-Zahar ejected direct alks with Israel on a permanent ta-tus agreement n the grounds hat his would constitute ecognition f the occupation.They declared hat Hamas will not agree to an end of hostilities, will not agree todisarm, and will not change ts fundamental ositions hat all of Palestine s holy Mus-lim territory nd that there should be no negotiations with Israel.37 ut two members

30. Haniyya, al-Mabadi al-A'ma.31. Arnon Regular, AlZahar Meayem.

32. Al-Jazeera, October 22, 2005, in American Task Force for Palestine Daily News, October 24,2005; Amira Hass, Efshar Lahsokh Dam VeZeman; Azvu Otanu BeGevulot 67 VeLo Tehiyeh Lachem'Avodah You Can Save Blood and Time, Leave Us in '67 Borders and You Will Not Have to Oper-ate ], Ha'aretz, Febuary 5, 2006.

33. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi l-'Ama; Haniyya, Nas al-Biyan.34. Hass, Efshar Lahsokh.35. Amon Regular, Mishal: Nityahes Ma'asit Leheskemim Haqayamim Mishal: We Will Re-

late Practically o the Existing Agreements ], Ha'aretz, January 29, 2006.36. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi l- 'Ama; Haniyya, Al-Mabadi l-A'ma Draft B).37. Regular, AlZahar Meayem.


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HAMAS N POWER 455

of the PLC, Muhammad Abu-Tir and Yehiya Musa, did not categorically eject directnegotiations with Israel. According o the pragmatic iew in Hamas, negotiating withIsrael s not a matter f principle, nor s it deplorable. Negotiations re a way of achiev-ing national goals. In contrast, hose who forbid negotiations with Israel maintain hatconducting direct talks constitutes a violation of the red line. Israeli withdrawal willbe achieved by negotiations hrough a third party and not by direct talks with Israel.In light of these disagreements, he spokesmen or the pragmatic pproach mphasizethose positions on which they will not compromise, nd where talks with Israel needto lead to a complete withdrawal o the June 4, 1967 lines, including n Jerusalem,release of all prisoners, nd dismantlement f the separation ence.38

These documents tress the return of refugees to the homes and property heylost. However, Hamas does not insist on a mass return ll at once. The documents tate

that any partial eturn does not mean concession on the right of return o other parts ofthe land. If there should be a proposal hat ensures he realization f national nterests,it can be the subject of negotiation.39 ccording o Hamas, he right of return s an indi-vidual right hat negotiators ave no right o concede or exchange or collective return.Hamas made this principle part of is unilateral easefire tahadiyya, alm) of March2005, which Hamas declared n conjunction with Fatah. Fatah had to agree to thisprovision, ven though t contradicted he platform n which 'Abbas was elected n thepresidential lections three months previously. Hamas' approach lso runs counter othe Arab League's peace plan a contradiction f which Hamas s well aware. Hamasfaces a dilemma between he importance t attaches o the right of return nd the im-portance t attaches o the Arab and Muslim world as Palestine's trategic epth. Hamashas no way to bridge his gap and s grappling with how to accept he Arab plan.

Hamas eaders who would permit alks with Israel stress the style and structureof the negotiations hey would engage in, in contrast with those Fatah conducted. Bylaying out its own red lines, it implies that Fatah has overstepped hem. Hamas nevertires of voicing its fundamental riticism of Fatah's onduct. This is of redoubled m-portance ecause of the political contest Hamas s engaged n against Hamas and Presi-dent 'Abbas.

This emphasis on the difference with Fatah s apparent ven in the position ofHamas eaders on the type of accord hat does not require negotiation ut rather onsti-tutes a continuation f the situation reated by the unilateral easefire declared by eachof the contending ides in April 2005. Hamas portrays atah as holding back on attackson Israel and displaying diplomatic and military weakness by giving up the armedstruggle as Israel continues o engage in military aggression. Hamas declares hat itsown ceasefire s conditioned n the absence of attacks by Israel.

Hamas pokesmen tress he need to conduct ontacts with Israel differently rom

38. Regular, Mispar 2; Arnon Regular, Haniyeh: Lo Nevater Al Yerushalyim Vehashiva[ We Will Not Give Up Jerusalem and the Right of Return ], Ha'aretz, January 27, 2006; Regular,

Mishal: Nityahes; Arnon Regular, Iran Hetzia Siyua Kalkali Larashut Behnhagat Hamas [ IranOffers Economic Aid to Hamas-Led Authority ], Ha'aretz, Febuary 23, 2006; Hass, Efshar Lah-sokh; Khaled Mish'al: La Salam Qabal al-Insihab al-Israeli Min al-Aradi al-Muhtala A'm 1967'[ Khalid Mish'al: No Peace Before Israeli Withdrawal rom 1967 Occupied Territories ], Al-Quds,March 5, 2006; Haniyya, Al-Mabadi' al-'Ama; Haniyya, Nass al-Bayan.

39. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi' l- 'Ama; Haniyya, Al-Mabadi' l- 'Ama Draft B).


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what the PLO has done. The PLO negotiated rom a position of inferiority, o Israelcould dictate the outcome and maintain he occupation. Hamas, on the other hand,wants negotiations ased on a position of equality and mutual obligations.Y0 his struc-ture enables Hamas to view the Arab and Muslim world as an alternative trategicdepth, n place of the one that Fatah ought o construct n Europe and the US. Hamasstresses this in order o underline hat t differs from Fatah.4 We do not provide po-litical positions ree of charge, aid Haniyya.42 imilar o this is its attitude o agree-ments signed between Israel and the Fatah government. Hamas seeks to show that itwill not trudge blindly down the rut dug by Fatah. Hamas eaders emphasize hat heseagreements will be examined n light of the interests f the Palestinian eople and willnot automatically bligate the Hamas government.43 amas makes similar argumentsabout the recognition of international ecisions on the Palestinian ssue laid on their

doorstep by 'Abbas, Arab eaders, and he international ommunity. Hamas pokesmensay that hey must be selective with regard o the content of these decisions, rather hanaccept them without discrimination, ecause some run counter o the interests of thePalestinian eople. Furthermore, srael s in any case not acting n accord with them, sothere s no point to acceptance.44

In other places, the formulation s that the Hamas government will accord hemgreat respect, while protecting he interests of the Palestinian people.45Here Hamashints at its willingness o accept, n practice, at least some existing decisions. It under-stands hat t cannot play international olitics and entirely gnore the accepted rules

of the game. This contrasts with the Islamic Charter, which ndicates hat, according oHamas, Islamic Palestine dwells alone and takes no account of other nations. Hamasspokesmen declare hat heir movement s prepared o cooperate with the internationalcommunity o bring an end to the occupation, o remove Israeli settlements, and tobring Israel o withdraw ully to the 1967 lines. Then calm and stability will prevail nthe region.4 Foreign Minister l-Zahar made he point more explicitly o UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, saying that Hamas sought to open a constructive ialogue withthe Quartet the four-party ody, composed of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia,charged with promoting President Bush's road map and brokering peace agreement.

In short, Hamas eeks to follow the diplomatic oute, with the purpose of achiev-ing peace and stability n the area. It is Israel's actions and aggression hat are makingit impossible o achieve a peace based on a two-state olution, according o al-Zahar'sletter. Al-Zahar's tatements assume that Arab and Islamic strategic depth s insuffi-cient, and that t needs international acking n order o cope with its negative mage,the boycott of the movement, and the US and Western prohibition gainst diplomaticcontacts with Hamas. Prime Minister Haniyya gave expression o this in the speech he

40. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi' al-'Ama (Draft B); Hass, Efshar Lahsokh; Khaled Mish'al: LaSalam Qabal al-Insihab al-Israeli.

41. Haniyya, Mashru' al-Barnamaj; Haniyya, Al-Mabadi l- 'Ama.42. International Crisis Group, Palestinians, Israelis and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the

Brink, Middle East Report, No. 54 (June 2006), p. 9.43. Haniyya, Mashru' al-Barnamaj; Haniyya, al-Mabadi al-'Ama.44. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi'al-'Ama.45. Haniyya, Nass al-Bayan; Haniyya, Mashru' al-Barnamaj.46. Haniyya, Mashru' al-Barnamaj.


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HAMAS N POWER 457

made when he presented his cabinet. There he addressed he pan-Arab fforts to helpthe Palestinian people achieve their rights. He stated that his government welcomedany Arab nitiative hat would bring about he establishment f a fully sovereign Pal-estinian state with its capital n Jerusalem. n other words,

Haniyya acceptedhe

ArabLeague's peace plan, without he section that dealt with refugees and without an endto claims against srael. He even notes that Israel rejected he plan. His claim, then, sthat he obstacle o the Arab League plan s not Palestinian, ut Israeli.47 ater, DeputyPrime Minister Nasser al-Din Shair and Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad confirmedthat Hamas was debating whether o adopt he Arab League plan, but the question ofrecognizing srael s rejected. We are for solutions which do not renounce Palestinianprinciples. 48

A similar contradiction an be seen in statements made by PLC member Riad

Mustafa. He declared: I say unambiguously Hamas does not and never will recog-nize Israel. But, following hat, he said that President Abbas had the right o negotiatewith Israel. If negotiations by the President an produce a peace agreement, nd if apopular eferendum pproves t, the Palestinian ational nstitutions will endorse hemeven if it includes Palestinian ecognition of Israel; we would of course accept theirverdict. 49

Alongside heir declarations hat Hamas will not recognize srael, he movement'sspokesmen lso voice an opposite position hat does not, in principle, ule out recogni-tion of Israel. Member of Parliament ehia Musa, for example, has made four contra-dictory claims. First, he said, recognition s not impossible n principle, but it cannotbe presented o Hamas as a precondition or ending the financial and political boycottof the organization. econd, negotiation oes not first require ecognition; alks can beheld between enemies. Third, t is impossible o recognize Israel because recognitionmeans egitimizing he circumstances f its founding, and of all the actions t has takento harm he Palestinians nd dispossess them of their and. This final sweeping under-standing of recognition contradicts his previous claims, as well as his final one: thePLO has in any case already ecognized srael, so the question s no longer germane.50Hamas' official documents propose another olution to the recognition question. Ac-cording o these, the question will not be decided by Hamas. Since recognition wouldcome in the name of the entire Palestinian people, the decision would be made in aplebiscite o be conducted mong all Palestinians.5'

Hamas officials have made frequent use of the term end of the occupation,term hat s part of the Middle Eastern nd nternational olitical exicon. For the PLOand the rest of the world, the term signifies the two-state olution and the occupationreferred o is that of the territories srael acquired n the war of 1967. In the Hamasdiscourse,52 here s a question as to whether t refers o the end of the occupation f the

1967 territories r also to the territories hat became he state of Israel n 1948 as theIslamic Charter maintains. To put it another way, the question s whether ccupation s

47. Haniyya, Nass al-Bayan.48. Agence France Presse, April 26, 2006.49. International Crisis Group, Palestinians, sraelis and the Quartet, . 9.50. Hass, Efshar Lahsokh.51. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi' l- 'Ama.52. Haniyya, Al-Mabadi'al-'Ama.


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a fundamental haracteristic f Israel, meaning hat ending he occupation equires hepolitical destruction f Israel, or whether Hamas recognizes Israel as a state like anyother state within ts 1948 borders, which then proceeded o occupy territories n 1967.This question s linked to the issue of Palestinian elf-determination. o what extentdoes actual Palestinian elf-determination as opposed to historical ies) apply to the1967 territories lone? Israel's reluctance o end the occupation f all the 1967 territo-ries, as opposed o just some of them, makes t difficult o distinguish etween he stateof Israel and the occupation, nd pushes Hamas n the direction f the Islamic Charter.This question does not always arrive because t is context-dependent, nd n most casesthe context s an agreement egarding he 1967 territories, ied together with stress onthe Palestinian onnection o the 1948 territories.53

Hamas began using the word peace nly slowly it was not at first part of the

organization's ocabulary. The first to use the word, hesitantly, was Khalid Mish'al,during his official visit to Moscow in March 2006. There he declared hat, f the redlines were met - that s, if Israel would state ts willingness o withdraw o the 1967borders, llow the refugees o return, ismantle he separation ence, and ree all Pales-tinian prisoners then we, for our part, will take significant teps to ensure peace. 54The term appeared ubsequently hree imes n the speech hat Prime Minister Haniyyamade when he presented his cabinet o Parliament. Haniyya said that his governmentexpects the international ommunity, nd the Quartet n particular, o act to achieve acomprehensive nd just peace in the region. His government will make every pos-

sible effort o reach a just peace in the region, a peace that will end the occupation ndrestore he rights of their Palestinian wners. 55 oreover, he term peace appearsseveral imes in the letter hat al-Zahar ent to the UN Secretary-General:

We also expect from he international ommunity .. to work with this government... on the path towards achieving peace and stability n the region ... Our govern-ment is ready o start a serious and constructive ialogue with the United Nationsand with the various countries of the world to reinforce world peace and securityand to achieve peace and stability n our region on the basis of a just and compre-

hensive solution ... We like all other people in the world are looking forward oliving in peace and security.56

It should be noted that he word peace ppears here without any mention of anadjacent Israel, as in the Fatah formation. However, the letter implies that a two-statesolution is acceptable to Hamas, since it declares that the occupation will totally de-stroy any hopes to achieve the settlement and peace based on the two-state solution. 57

CONCLUSION

Despite its fundamentalist rigins, Hamas has developed its own arbitration

53. Haniyya, Mashru' al-Barnamaj.54. Mish'al La Salam.55. Haniyya, Nass al-Bayan.56. al-Zahar, Letter written by Palestinian Minister for Foreign Affairs.57. al-Zahar, Letter written by Palestinian Minister for Foreign Affairs.


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mechanism o negotiate he middle ground between ts religious deology and ts needto play the political game and, now, to govern. While retaining ts authoritative tate-ment of its fundamentalist reed, he Islamic Charter, t has innovated ways of allowing

its leaders o declare or acquiesce n political positions hat contradict ts creed.

Hamas in Power by Menachem Klein

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Transcript of Hamas in Power by Menachem Klein