HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION …The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a...

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Selected Post-Earthquake Dispatches, 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. Date Title 19 April 28 HRDF and U.S. Southern Command are "Hot Topics" 16 March 24 Basic Questions and Answers for Members of the Press 15 March 20 Positions and Proposals for the Haitian Diaspora Forum, OAS 14 March 18 The Responsibilities of Foreign Donors to Haitians Abroad for

Earthquake Recovery 12 February 23 Unified Diaspora Response – “Mission Possible" 10 February 12 Listening to the Voice of Haitians Living Abroad Above the

Rumble of the Earthquake 08 February 10 HRDF Presentation: Earthquake Recovery - Mission Possible

07 January 27 “Mission Possible” - To Save Haiti or Save Haitians? 04 January 19 Post Earthquake Response to Haiti’s “Great South” 03 January 17 The Collision of Natural Forces & Human Weaknesses in Haiti 02 January 16 Ten Commandments for Responding to Environmental Refugees 01 January 15 Suggested Template for Coordinating Earthquake Response Teams

HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.org> Aldy Castor, M.D., President United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 Phone: 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064 fax 954.659.7957 [email protected] Haiti: 17, 2ème ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.461.5225

25, Rue Sténlo Vincent, Aquin

The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Ministère de la Planification et la Cooperation Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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For distribution April 28, 2010 on the Occasion of “Hot Topic” Discussion Group, Weston, Florida

Guest Speaker Colonel Joseph Napoli, United States Southern Command, Miami HRDF AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMMAND ARE “HOT TOPICS” As Americans, we are glad to have the capability within our armed forces to respond promptly and peacefully when other countries experienced disasters. In the case of the January earthquake in Haiti, the large Haitian-American community particularly appreciated the arrival of the USNS Comfort and its stay until last month, and the services of the parts of the Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) of the US Military Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Probably, few Americans knew of the existence of SOUTCOM HAP until the Haitian earthquake. On the other hand, many Haitians, including physicians, nurses of Haitian hospital and clinics have benefited from SOUTHCOM HAP over the years. Their presence, however, has been episodic not continuous. Patients who may have been seen and treated by American medical personnel may never again see a doctor or a nurse. Clearly, public health practices require continuity and this something that HRDF believes SOUTHCOM HAP could or even should have a role in. SOUTHCOM HAP AND HRDF 2004 - 2007 Until 2004, Haiti had not benefitted from SOUTHCOM HAP, while it regularly visited the rest of the hemisphere and invested heavily in disaster preparedness not just disaster response. Investment included clinics, schools, warehouses for emergency equipment and supplies and emergency operation centers. The entire mission amounted to millions of dollars a year. In February 2004, SOUTHCOM HAP added Haiti to its program for the Western Hemisphere. For this, it appropriately invited a select group of Haitian-American physicians, engineers, geographers, administrators social workers and other professionals to accompany, support and advise about its involvement in the humanitarian field in Haiti. This was a first for the US military. The mission purpose was to improve Haitians’ ability to respond to disasters, such as hurricanes that had recently struck the country. The teams - American military and Haitian-American advisors together - visited several cities and rural locations and assessed the adequacy and readiness of schools, hospitals, fire stations, civil defense and airfields. They met the American ambassador, the Haitian Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and interviewed community leaders throughout the departments of the West, North, Northwest and South. The assessment revealed a) the absence of pre-hospital emergency care and response training b) the absence or inadequacy of emergency room and intensive care units, c) the inadequacy of trained medical responders, d) here was no radio communication in the ambulances and e) fire services had no search

HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.org> Aldy Castor, M.D., President United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 ph 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064 fax 954.659.7957 [email protected] Haiti: 17, 2ème ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.443.3703

25, Rue Sténlo Vincent, Aquin ph/fax 509.245.4117


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and rescue capability. As a result, SOUTHCOM HAP contracted for significant health and safety improvements, including the renovation of the emergency wings, operating rooms, intensive care, radiology unit, and laboratory facilities. It also began the construction of an emergency operation center in Port-au-Prince. The intention was that these investments would accompany by education and training in emergency medicine, biomedical and disaster response. HRDF was a partner in all of this. To us, it was the Golden Age of SOUTHCOM HAP participation in Haiti because for the next three years SOUTHCOM HAP did not follow-up. SOUTHCOM AND HRDF FROM 2007 For many years, SOUTHCOM has conducted Medical Readiness Exercises (MEDRETES) in the western hemisphere. These exercises provide foreign field experience for American military personnel. Typically the exercises last from two weeks to three months. 2007 was the first MEDERETE in Haiti, and was done with the advice, coordination, teaching, treatment of patients and public relations of the Haitian Resource Development Foundation and the Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad. The two organizations also advised on helped locations and introduced SOUTHCOM to Haitian medical and community leaders. MEDERETES exercises continued, but without significant investments in Haitian health infrastructure. Then the earthquake struck this January. Haitians were neither prepared nor had sufficient health infrastructure to cushion the blow. As a result, American and other emergency responders had very few Haitian facilities where personnel could be accommodated, supplies safeguarded, and patients gathered. HRDF believes this is due to years of foreign service in Haiti without commensurate equity in Haiti. It is an unfortunate policy that could be changed to save lives and promote preparedness. THE FUTURE OF SOUTHCOM HAP IN HAITI? Two million or more Haitians, environmental refugees, are in dire need of more than simple humanitarian assistance. SOUTHCOM HAP has historically shown its concern and ability to do much more than emergency response, for example its sizable investments in Haiti in 2004. If these investments had continued into 2010, Haitians and Americans alike would have been in better shape to deal with this year’s earthquake. Haitians have always welcomed SOUTHCOM HAP investments in public health infrastructure and community development. To them, this is a more relevant definition of the term “humanitarian”. HRDF concurs, this deserves consideration among SOUTHCOM HAP and its Haitian-American partners. Thank you, Aldy Castor MD, President, Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF)

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Dispatch 16 March 24, 2010

Basic Questions and Answers for Members of the Press

What is the Haitian Resource Development Foundation? (please elaborate on why you founded this organization and what work it does for the people of Haiti)

In 1987, my friend Dr. Jacques Bartoli, a general practitioner residing in Haiti and myself an Obstetrician and gynecologist practicing in Lafayette Louisiana, decided to help Haitians because the country was trying to recover from many years of dictatorship. As physicians, we taught we could be of special health in the field of medical services, public health and education and the environment. We created the Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), so we could raise money for our work, hire staff, gather supplies and equipment, and recruit volunteers among the Haitian communities in the United States and Haiti.

On of our first projects, was to repair the Source Barrière, a natural spring high in the mountain above Aquin that provide drinking water to the people in the city. The nature of the problem was infiltration of dirty water into the delivery pipes. The result was water that was chronically contaminated. People were getting sick from using it. So HRDF, repair the lines, protected the source. Some of the money from the work come from people of Lafayette Louisiana. The work we stated there more that twenty years ago has been maintained and expanded by Aquin. It was very gratifying during my visit in early January, actually just before the earthquake, I have seen some workers renewing and expanding the spring box. Some of these workers were not even born when HRDF started that project. We are now two generation in health and environmental protection.

For another story, in 2004, after a series of very bad hurricanes, HRDF made a partnership with the Humanitarian Assistance Program of US Military Southern Command to improve the emergency response capability of some hospitals in Haiti, that were overwhelmed. Among them, was the Hôpital de la Communauté Haitienne in Frères neighborhood of Pétion-Ville, a large suburb of Port-au-Prince. A new trauma unit with operating room and an intensive care unit was made. Then, for more than a year, HRDF, in partnership with the Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad and Mole Saint Nicolas in Action, trained physicians, nurses and other paramedical personnel in emergency medicine. In fact this facility was made available to surgeons of the University of Miami field Hospital when they came to help Haitians after the January earthquake.

What were you doing in Haiti in January?

Stuart Leiderman, an environmental refugee and ecological restoration specialist from New Hampshire and I went to Haiti to survey, investigate and propose solutions for the environmental situation in Aquin, a south coastal city in Haiti. Aquin suffers from cycles of flash floods and droughts. It is unprotected from




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storms that approach from the sea and much of its mountainside has no forest. We returned to Port-au-Prince on January 11 and the next day we were caught in the earthquake. We return to Weston a week later, where we continued to coordinate and prepare teams for return trips.

What was it like to be in Haiti during and immediately following the earthquake? (Please share your fears, struggles, etc.) Stuart and I were having dinner at my friend Gilbert’s restaurant “La Plaisance.” It’s a restaurant where old friends meet to talk about everything and nothing, have a drink and a nice dinner. We were sitting outside at a kind of picnic table. It was getting to be twilight and we had just ordered. Imagine if you were with us, very relaxed. Suddenly, there was an apocalyptic noise, as if my head were tied to a railroad track in Times Square, New York City, during rush hour. Then the ground violently shook, I lost my balance. My first instinct was to run towards the building. Meanwhile, Stuart had ducked under the table. I saw the building falling towards me; I never saw anything like that. I ran to a big palm tree on my right at the edge of the yard. The shaking was continuing. I did not know if it would ever end. Then Stuart ran over to the tree and we just hung on. Slowly, the proprietors and the diners staggered into the yard wondering what happened. This generation of Haitians had never experienced an earthquake in their country. Probably, one hundred thousand had died in that minute of shaking. It became dark. Stuart and I walked to my sister’s school nearby. We found the building mostly destroyed. We discovered that she was trapped underneath the concrete slabs. Neighbors tried to help us, but she had to stay there overnight before anyone could help her escape. Our own apartment was still standing but some of the walls were cracked, so we slept outside in the courtyard with everyone that night and for several more nights. In the daylight hours, when I went out to find food and water, I saw a completely destroyed city, like a scene from a First World War movie. The national palace, the ministry buildings, the churches, schools, police stations, businesses, gas stations, hotels, hospitals and houses had fallen. On the second day, bodies wrapped in sheets appeared on the streets and sidewalks. There were growing piles of garbage and debris. There were no phone services. During those days, we went to the national civil defense office, to the general Hospital in Port-au-Prince, to the Community Hospital in Petion-Ville, to the field Hospital to the airport to help. We discovered there were a big mismatch between the availability of doctors and other relief workers, and the supplies and facilities they needed to do their job. So we helped matched them up. This is the kind of thing that HRDF has been doing for years, although never after an earthquake.

How had things changed upon returning to the island almost a month later? Where things getting better or worse? Yes things were getting worse. I saw more crumbling buildings and destruction because of the aftershocks. People were under makeshift tents all over the city. I could see, smell, hear, and palpate the human misery. What is stuck in my mind are the big green cadaveric aggressive flies all over the city. These flies came from the cadaver, buried underneath the rubbles. Every time, I tried to eat something the were allover my food.

Why did you return to Haiti? The first time, at the en of January Dr Wiener Leblanc a Haitian-American pediatrician from Weston, a HRDF board member and I retuned to Haiti to treat patients at the General Hospital and to coordinate the activities of physicians from the Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad

What is HRDF’s “Mission Possible”? Over the years, it seems that approximately half of all foreign aid to Haiti has gone directly to the National Government. These have been hundred of millions of dollars in grants and loans every year, primarily

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from other national governments such as the United States, France and Canada and from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The other half of foreign aid has been in the form of private charity and foundation money directly to Haitians in their communities. For more than twenty years, HRDF has been one of these donors. In this catastrophic time, it is a fair and very important question to ask which kind of aid has been more effective - money and other resources to “Haiti”, in other words to the government, or money and resources to “Haitians”, in other words the people and their communities? HRDF believes that the latter has been more effective. When it comes to suffering and survival, there has been little or no help from “Haiti”. A first example is civil defense. “Haiti” has permanently buried the operation and maintenance of the Direction of the Protection Civile, the focal point of emergency response for the country. It is only a small technical office within the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities without autonomy and legal framework, sufficient staffing, funding, and decision making authority. It also lacks the communication and implementation infrastructure to reach out and mobilize the entire country. It causes a sad and unnecessary sacrifice of Haitians. HRDF believes that the Direction of the Protection Civile should be elevated at least to a secretary status or preferably given its own ministry. Until then, we urge direct funding and training of local Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). As recently as October 2009, HRDF had successfully recruited and received the commitment of the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management for CERT in Haiti. Planning for their first visit to Haiti was being made when the earthquake struck. And in November, the firefighters of Limoges, France gave their first instruction in community emergency response, in Aquin on the southern coast. This is “Mission Possible” - saving “Haitians” not “Haiti”. The second example is Customs, the national government office responsible for the orderly oversight, receipt and passing through of all of the country’s imports, including humanitarian supplies. The consensus among the Humanitarian community and the Haitian Diaspora is that Haiti’s Customs does not work, even in noncatastrophic times. This is specifically asserted in a resolution of the Haitian Diaspora Unity Congress that convened in Miami this past August and is now a major concern of the Congress NGO Follow-up Committee chaired by HRDF. Unlike the first example, foreign aid donors and now the greatly expanded emergency response must send its supplies through Customs, i.e. through “Haiti” rather than directly to Haitians. This is a serious constraint. Direct access to communities must be immediately opened throughout the country. Millions of lives are on the line. “Mission Possible” in this case cannot wait for governmental customs reform. These are only two of many examples that are now forcing generous and professional responders around the world to ask a difficult question – Shall we save “Haiti” or save “Haitians”? HRDF believes the former is “Mission Impossible” while the latter is “Mission Possible”. This is because the country’s remaining viable assets are the people and the land they occupy. The government exists, but unfortunately it is not a viable asset.

What did you do during this last visit? (Please elaborate on CERT training, etc.) During the last trip, HRDF completed teaching part II of its CERT program, “Responding to Mass Casualty” in Aquin. There were fifty students, men and women, all residents of the city and communal sections of Aquin. Among them were members of Aquin Protection Civile, Red Cross, soccer teams, government officials, citizens groups, water management officials, and business people. All but one successfully completed the rigorous program and were awarded certificates of completion.

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The Creation of HRDF-CERT This experience led HRDF to create in July 2009 its own Community Emergency Response Team training program for Haitians. The purpose of the CERT Program in Haiti is to:

- Educate communities about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area, and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical operations.

- Use the training learned in the classroom and during exercises to assist others in their neighborhood or workplace following an event when professional responders are not immediately available to help.

- Encourage teams to complement emergency response agencies by taking a more active role in emergency preparedness projects in their community.

- Inform their communities on the existing emergency services

The HRDF-CERT Training Program 3 sessions, each meeting once a month for 3 days at the time. The sessions are:

- Safety

- Simulation of disasters

- Principles of organization: prevention, early alert, disaster

management, and mitigation

Participants

Haitians, from 18 to 30, who positively and actively participate in their communities and are likely to greatly benefit from their training.

Beneficiaries

The host populations who are continuously exposed to hazards and vulnerable to disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, earthquakes, landslides, building collapses, vehicular accidents, etc…

Results

Each program educate and train 50 Haitians, male and female, capable of coordinated response to a variety of danger in their communities. They pledged to maintain and improve their skills. HRDF typically selects among the graduates to serve as trainers in future programs.

Cost

The program is offered at no cost to the participants. Each training program cycle (3 sessions) costs HRDF approximately US$ 15,000 that includes staff expenses, teaching material, travel, student meals. Expenses are paid for through tax deductable contribution and grants to HRDF.

Expansion Potential

With existing staff and format, 16 trainings a year are possible at a cost of approx. US$ 200,000. Additional teams can be formed to offer even more programs per year.

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Limiting factors 1. Proximate limiting factor – HRDF is more that willing and capable to conduct more CERT training both in the southern region where it begins and around the country if funds were available. As mentioned above, US$ 200,000 would be enough to fully employ current staff and graduate approximately 800 HRDF-CERT students per year. It is an investment of US$ 250 per student. 2. Ultimate limiting factor – Imagine a team of 50 HRDF-CERT graduates with the knowledge to protect their community but without the requisite equipment, supplies, tools and replacement necessary to go into action. This is the ultimate limiting factor. Ideally, HRDF would add a forth session to its program where the team assembles, tests, uses and repairs a variety of vehicles, search and rescue equipment, emergency communications, computers, boats, earthmovers, bridges, drains, water filtration and sanitation apparatus, shelters, body bags, identification, etc. This requires capital investment that is not only used for education purposes but also becomes lifesaving assets in the community. HRDF cannot turn a blind eye to this ultimate limiting factor. And as most of these are not manufactured in Haiti, another source can be through in-kind gifts, such as from the surplus and excess property of foreign governments and aid agencies. Equipment needed to continue the Program - Personal protective equipments – booths, hard hats and helmets, heavy duty work gloves, eye glasses, back pack, protective jackets, chemical goggle vented, dust masks, - First aid Antiseptics and Ointments to treat all kinds of minor cuts, burns and abrasions - First Aid/Burn Cream , Isopropyl Alcohol, Alcohol cleansing pad, Antiseptic Cleansing Wipes (sting free), Antiseptic Cleansing Wipes (sting free), Cleansing Wipes & Toilettes, Hydrogen Peroxide, Hydrocortisone Cream, Povidone-Iodine Solution/ Wipes/ Swab sticks, Petroleum Jelly, Ammonia Inhalants/Smelling Salts SBS Sanitizing Gel, Triple Antibiotic Ointment, Insect Sting Relief Pads, Mineral Oil, Lubricating and Petroleum Jelly, Healing Sprays, Bite Relief , Bandages to treat minor cuts, abrasions, scratches and puncture wounds, such as Gauze Roll Bandages, Plastic Bandages, and First Aid Tape - First responder emergency kit: 12 hour light sticks – green, safety vests dark green w/ reflective trim, large mayday solar blanket, D size flashlights, batteries, 15 inch pry bars, lumber crayons, caution tape, hammers, jacks, extrication material - Automated External Defibrillators (AEDs), - Cots, Canopy, Tents, sleeping bags and blankets, Emergency Rain Gear: Ponchos, Rain Suits (Heavy Duty) for Adults & Children, Tarps for emergency Cover and Protection, - Communication equipments - megaphones with siren, Bull Horn – 16 Watt (600 Yard Range)Compasses, Weather thermometers, Magnifiers, Keychain straps, Whistles, commander walkie-talkies, Solar / Dynamo / Battery Powered Radio, cell phones, Battery-Free Cell Phone Chargers - Emergency storage items – duffle bags, cabinets

What’s next for HRDF?

The plan for the south of Haiti! [see below]

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POST EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE TO HAITI’S “GREAT SOUTH”

For twenty-three years, HRDF has had a strong presence in civil defense and emergency response training, health and environmental research and development in Haiti’s southern peninsula. Its headquarters are in Aquin, a coastal “commune” of 60,000 located on the Caribbean coast approximately midway between the larger cities Les Cayes and Jacmel. The south is rich in natural resources, much of the land is fertile, supplying large quantities of fresh produce to Port-au-Prince. HRDF intends to concentrate its effort in this southern region for several reasons: 1. The South is home to approximately a million Haitians. 2. The South has not been systematically assessed for damage, loss of life, condition of infrastructure, survival needs, etc. A few reports indicate significant needs and communities isolated. 3. A major east-west geological fault underlies under the entire region. 4. The epicenter of the recent earthquake was in the northeast quadrant of the South. 5. HRDF has viable, continuing partnerships in the South with disaster relief and community development entities including the United States Military Southern Command (SouthCom), agencies of the European Union, and several cities and organizations in France and Belgium. 6. The South is a significant “breadbasket” for Haitians and for high-value exports such as coffee and mangoes whose farmers will need help to prepare for the year’s planting, harvest and shipment. 2- HRDF’S PLAN OF ACTION At this point, we are calling our work “Mission Possible” for two reasons: First, HRDF for a long time had a “culture of preparedness” built into all its projects such as the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the medical training for physicians and nurses in emergency training, planning for catchment lakes, drinking water etc. This means careful design, budgeting, staffing and anticipating problems along the way because Haiti may be the most difficult place in the world to improve people’s living conditions. Second, especially after the earthquake, it is essential to have a positive attitude that recovery is and will be possible. There is no room for failure or pessimism. Those who have the culture of preparedness

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should have the responsibilities for leadership. Others who have been living in blind faith have become victims. We hope they survive but there is no guarantee. The whole country has so much to learn. If organizations such as HRDF are to accomplished “Mission Possible”, there are the usual requirements – adequate staff, headquarters here and in Haiti, equipment, mobility, program contributions. But there is also a unique requirement - a clear, detailed, practical and affordable definition of the “Reconstruction of Haiti” that everybody is calling for but no major power or relief organization has yet put forward. For example, where the refugees live? Who will be trusted with the donors’ money? What would be the system of check and balances? Will old cities be repaired or new ones built? Can the food, water and housing come from Haiti or will everything have to be imported? Questions like these obviously need to be answered first, then people hired, money spent, refugees cared for, etc. HRDF and its partners have some answers, and are building a brain trust in Weston, Florida to take this farther. In term of specific work, “Mission Possible” is comprised of both expended and new activities: Systematic and continuing assessment of medical and health care needs with status report to donors, suppliers and relief workers. For example, recent field visits earlier this month to the Hôpital in Croix des Bouquets, the Hôpital ….. in Petit-Goâve and the Hôpital Immmaculée Conception in les Cayes, has brought major pledges of equipment worth more than one million dollars for those three hospitals. Community emergency response teams (CERTS). These are nine-day professional training sessions in each communal section that need to be followed by distribution of equipment and team assignments. HRDF initiated its HRDF-CERTS program in Aquin last year and has secured the support of Florida State Emergency Management Division as partner. “Ecological sweat equity” for environmental refugees – People fleeing Port-au-Prince and other damaged areas need shelter and tools to resettle in safe areas and reestablish their lives. For this, HRDF proposes ecological restoration and disaster preparedness, vocational training in agriculture and fishery management for coastal zone cities. Partners include Cités Unies France and the Department des Hauts de Seine, France.

What can Weston and other south Florida communities do to help?

1- Awareness of Haiti – HRDF wants to make sure that the people of Weston and other southern Florida communities keep the people of Haiti in their minds, especially environmental refugees who still have no place to go, no belongings, no ability to support or feed themselves, and no assurance of being able to survive the months of rains and storms that are coming. The emergency continues.

2- Awareness of HRDF - HRDF wants to make sure that the people of Weston and other southern Florida communities know about us and that HRDF is a Weston-based organization with active projects that need their contributions, partnership and advice.

3- Our current needs - HRDF is tax-exempt and will be grateful for contribution. The address is 854 Marina Drive Weston, Florida 33327. We also need donation in of camping tents and laptops computers, so our staff in Haiti can continue their work and help the population at large, especially the students. Here in town, we also urgently need the free use of a car and an apartment, and office equipment, so we can keep and attract experts to work with us day by days and keep things going while others are in Haiti.

Anything else you would like to share with our readers about life in Haiti or relief efforts?

So far, Billions of dollars seem to have been collected after the earthquake. But almost none of it has gone to enable Haitian organizations like HRDF to do its work. We think that is unfair and unwise, especially because Haitians organizations have the advantage of culture, motivation and opportunity for success. People of Weston need to speak to their members of congress to require a portion of the relief money to go to qualify Haitian organizations. This would be a great help.

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Positions And Proposals For The Haitian Diaspora Forum

“Contributing to a Strategic Plan for Reconstruction And Development In Haiti”

Organization of American States, Washington, D.C. March 21-23, 2010

1- HRDF AND THE EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE 2- HRDF PLAN OF ACTION 3- AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” FOR HAITIAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS

1- HRDF AND THE EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) was established more than twenty years ago and for the past ten years has been based in Weston, Florida, Port-au-Prince and Aquin, Haiti. Members of HRDF include physicians and surgeons such who are also specialized in teaching emergency medical response and community civil defense. Recently, HRDF has added partners who are specialists on saving the environment. HRDF has initiated numerous projects with the cooperation of civic leaders, Haitian and foreign organizations and since 2004 with the United States Military Southern Command when their humanitarian teams come to Haiti for medical outreach. Among the projects are: drinking water, establishment of a vocational school, teaching emergency medicine to physicians and nurses, as well as first response techniques to firefighters and other paramedical personnel. New projects include a fishery school, and mountainside catchment lakes to control flash floods. The total value of HRDF’s projects and contributions of equipments, supplies and medicine is more than 5 million dollars. HRDF is a fully tax-exempt organization in the Unite d States and is also recognized and registered in Haiti as a non-governmental organization. It was ironic that the week before the earthquake, my colleagues and I were working in a project of environmental protection for the city of Aquin. The evening of the 12 of January, we were dining outside a friend restaurant when the earthquake struck. A nice evening with friend suddenly became a catastrophe. We were forced to spend the next week in Port-au-Prince. Without telephone services and only a trickle of electricity, we used our time doing what HRDF does best, emergency response. But this was HRDF’s first earthquake. In a series of emailed dispatches to the outside world, we begin to answer and advise teams, network with Haiti’s civil defense and address the mismatch among physicians, supplies and facilities. The following week, a rescue plane took us to Florida where we continued working from Weston with all the comfort of home, but still worried for the country.




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2- HRDF’S PLAN OF ACTION At this point, we are calling our work “Mission Possible” for two reasons: First, HRDF for a long time had a “culture of preparedness” built into all its projects such as the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the medical training for physicians and nurses in emergency training, planning for catchment lakes, drinking water etc. This means careful design, budgeting, staffing and anticipating problems along the way because Haiti may be the most difficult place in the world to improve people’s living conditions. Second, especially after the earthquake, it is essential to have a positive attitude that recovery is and will be possible. There is no room for failure or pessimism. Those who have the culture of preparedness should have the responsibilities for leadership. Others who have been living in blind faith have become victims. We hope they survive but there is no guarantee. The whole country has so much to learn. If organizations such as HRDF are to accomplished “Mission Possible”, there are the usual requirements – adequate staff, headquarters here and in Haiti, equipment, mobility, program contributions. But there is also a unique requirement - a clear, detailed, practical and affordable definition of the “Reconstruction of Haiti” that everybody is calling for but no major power or relief organization has yet put forward. For example, where the refugees live? Who will be trusted with the donors’ money? What would be the system of check and balances? Will old cities be repaired or new ones built? Can the food, water and housing come from Haiti or will everything have to be imported? Questions like these obviously need to be answered first, then people hired, money spent, refugees cared for, etc. HRDF and its partners have some answers, and are building a brain trust in Weston, Florida to take this farther. In term of specific work, “Mission Possible” is comprised of both expended and new activities: Systematic and continuing assessment of medical and health care needs with status report to donors, suppliers and relief workers. For example, recent field visits earlier this month to the Hôpital in Croix des Bouquets, the Hôpital ….. in Petit-Goâve and the Hôpital Immmaculée Conception in les Cayes, has brought major pledges of equipment worth more than one million dollars for those three hospitals. Community emergency response teams (CERTS). These are nine-day professional training sessions in each communal section that need to be followed by distribution of equipment and team assignments. HRDF initiated its HRDF-CERTS program in Aquin last year and has secured the support of Florida State Emergency Management Division as partner. “Ecological sweat equity” for environmental refugees – People fleeing Port-au-Prince and other damaged areas need shelter and tools to resettle in safe areas and reestablish their lives. For this, HRDF has proposals for ecological restoration and disaster preparedness, vocational training in agriculture and fishery management for coastal zone cities. Partners include Cités Unies France and the Department des Hauts de Seine, France. 3. “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” FOR HAITIAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS Haitian Diaspora input to a conference is not the same as participation on the ground. And the world is full of concepts for saving Haitians. To do their work, Haitian Diaspora organizations require funds, discretion and authority, otherwise is “déjà vu all over again” Culture, Motives and Opportunities - HRDF may be considered highly evolved among professional Diaspora organizations, but it is not alone. There are hundreds, and they are a distinct class of NGOs in their shared culture, motives and opportunities. They work in and for Haitians years before, then during and after disasters. HRDF believes that these attributes – Haitian culture, motives and opportunities - are essential. Therefore, HRDF believes that great benefits come when the Diaspora organizations work in tandem with Haitians, mutually defining goals and objectives, expending money and materials, monitoring effectiveness and coalescing operations. Too often, donors and contractors ignore, forget or do not require this important working relationship. The results are typical of what we now see in Haiti’s earthquake zone - inefficiency, chaos and paralysis. This needs to be remedied.

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Foreign Contracts - To HRDF, these above terms of engagement are missing from foreign government contracts in Haiti, not just since the earthquake but over many years. Since January 12, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in just two months. A review of published contracts gives the impression that recipients are frequently non-competing, favored companies, or semi-public, religious, professional or other non-profit organizations that have little or no particular historical interest, concern or experience in working alongside Haitians. They are contractors pure and simple. As more and more reports emerge from Haiti, HRDF is seeing this as a typical, wasteful and prejudicial practice. And from the view of many Haitian-American organizations, it amounts to unfairness of humanitarian rights at the international level, reminiscent are reminiscent of racial prejudice and civil rights struggles fifty years ago in the United States. Without a doubt, Haitian Diaspora companies and organizations with appropriate experience and credentials should share the foreign donors’ contracts for relief work in Haiti. American Contracts - Where American government contracts for Haitian earthquake relief and recovery are concerned, all of them are paid for by American tax money. Thus, every citizen rightfully expects that: - Access to and use of money will be subject to law, not to someone’s personal discretion, - Requests for, justification, allocation and cost-benefit analysis of funding is a matter of public interest, and therefore should be transparent, - The basis for access to funds will be open, competitive and on the merits of the applicants and their proposals. Exceptions for extenuating circumstances should be strictly limited. Further, Haitian-Americans in particular ought to rightfully expect that: - Government contracts will acknowledge the Haitian Diaspora’s three special attributes for work in their country of origin, namely shared culture, motivation and opportunity. The government should find direct and unambiguous ways to make the most of these attributes to increase success. - Especially in the case of contracts for Haiti, something akin to the philosophy and practice of Affirmative Action is necessary to give the Haitian Diaspora minority a fair share of work and to use the aid money to help unify them with Haitians back home. - Plentiful contracts in the range of up to five million dollars each should be available to match the capabilities of most Haitian-American NGOs or companies. Monster contracts in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollar range should be subdivided and individually competed for. - Haitian-Americans companies and organizations with relevant capabilities should not be, as in the past, referred to major recipients to beg for subcontracts. - Regardless of their size and experience, the American government ought to be actively recruiting bonafide Haitian-American companies, professionals, and NGOs for work during this momentous tragedy. This is the precise time and opportunity when small companies and organizations likes these could grow and mature while helping their country of origin. Aldy Castor MD, President, Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF)

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The Responsibilities of Foreign Donors to Haitians Abroad for Earthquake Recovery From the point of view of Haitians living abroad, the past two months have been “déjà vu all over again.” Incipient stereotyping, unfairness and exclusion of Haitians Abroad from earthquake response policies, priorities, decisions, contracting, monitoring, quality control and evaluation are reminiscent of racial prejudice and civil rights struggles fifty years ago. DISASTERS, DIASPORA AND THE MARCH OF HISTORY 1. Disasters - Civilization, no matter how advanced, is vulnerable to disasters. The result has been a terrible toll in lives and property, especially in the so-called underdeveloped parts of the world. 2. Where does humanitarianism come from? - In the big picture, the most valuable product of civilization is the Family of Man. This is an overarching and unifying concept. It is multi-racial, multi-cultural, and multi-skilled, and shares a distinct “humanitarian trait” that compels people to help each other in times of trouble. 3. Mutual Aid – Looking more closely, within this trait is embedded in the principle of mutual aid. Today’s disaster responders may suddenly become tomorrow’s disaster’s victims and, conversely, today’s disaster survivors may be needed to respond to someone else’s disaster tomorrow. Thus, there are good reasons for everyone to a) prepare for disasters, b) be willing to respond, and c) maintain sufficient resources at their command. This is the principle of mutual aid. During disasters, the expectation and need for help on the one hand, and the ability to offer it on the other, is often strongest among those who share occupations, nationalities, culture, religion or types of suffering. And in the Haitian and Chilean earthquakes, of course, a huge number of teams of all kinds have crossed international borders in the same spirit of mutual aid. They fully expect that someday, Haitians may come to their rescue. 4. What about the Diaspora? - There is also mutual aid among national, cultural and ethnic Diaspora, such as Haitian-Americans, living outside their countries of origin. In general, Diaspora members have improved their lives and have become critical to the survival of poorer friends and families “back home.” In this regard, the United Nations High Level Dialog on Migration and International Development recognized Diaspora populations as economic life-savers because their remittances rival the size of foreign aid itself. Further, Diaspora a) Remind host countries that there is a world beyond their borders, b) Help interpret the meaning of events occurring in their homelands, and c) Help countries learn how to adapt to each other’s strengths and weaknesses, needs and trends.

HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.org> Aldy Castor, M.D., President United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 ph 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064 fx 954.659.7957 [email protected] Haiti: 17, 2ème ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.443.3703


The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Ministere de la Planification et la Cooperation Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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This kind of information and understanding is valuable and probably cannot be acquired any other way. So, wise democracies would best regard their Diaspora as valuable human resource. Diaspora participation in international disaster response is a good case in point. 5. Haitian Diaspora Resources – Three hundred years ago, Haiti’s African forebears became an intermingled population among indigenous and colonials in the Caribbean and the Americas. As history will have it, many chose to leave or were forced to flee. Today, hundreds of thousands of bright and successful Haitians live abroad, mostly in the United States. They are a significant portion of Haitian human resources in the world. Because of its accumulated but seldom acknowledged talent, some view the Haitian Diaspora as a kind of disembodied brain. It grows more intelligent with every emigrant student, graduate or professional who leaves the country. And among them are almost certainly some who anticipated the earthquake, advised against shoddy construction on dangerous land, and who could have mitigated the disaster given the authority and sufficient resources. Haiti can either borrow or transplant this intelligence. If borrowed, it would be for functional purposes - advisors, teachers, doctors, farmers, foresters, designers, etc. If transplanted, it would be for structural purposes - voters, land-owners, elected and appointed officials, etc. Either acquisition would benefit the country, especially now. INTRODUCING THE HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (HRDF) 1. More that twenty years of distinguished service - HRDF is a Haitian-American organization that also has active partnerships with European agencies, municipalities and citizen organizations. HRDF’s directors, staff, teachers, trainers and advisors have been both Haitian and non-Haitian. So in this way, it is intermingled in the world, the same as the Diaspora and the whole Haitian population at large. As an organization, HRDF maintains the capability to scale up to meet increased needs. A month ago, the Haitian Resource Development Foundation decided its earthquake response program. HRDF believes that Haiti’s most valuable assets are its people. Therefore, the welfare, resettlement and employment of the displaced - HRDF considers them environmental refugees - plus access to natural resources for food and shelter, are pre-eminent. HRDF has been seeking contributions, contracts and partners to carry out this program. 2. Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Teams - No matter how large the pool of first responders in the world, the severity of the earthquake effect has forced everyone to make a big decision - either scale up or get out of the way. This is reflected in the government of Haiti requests for long term rotations of doctors, engineers, inspectors and such rather than for short “fly-in and fly-out” sorties typical of the first weeks’ response. It is probably a wise decision, and HRDF concurs. But this puts much more emphasis on the need for team orientation, accommodations, supply lines and sustaining funds plus support of a distinctly Haitian nature. This includes a variety of services, including translation, interpretation, negotiation, mobilization, intervention, monitoring and evaluation. This implies interdisciplinary and intercultural teams and contracts. For example, when humanitarian teams of the United States Southern Command [SOUTHCOM] have come to Haiti over the years, they wisely used HRDF’s senior staff along with those of other Haitian-American organizations. The roles of Diaspora team members have been to a) help assess and select communities, b) introduce and link SOUTHCOM’s professionals to Haitian professionals and local populations, and c) work side by side with them. HRDF has worked in a similar fashion with the French on a variety of community development, environmental protection and education projects. With all these kinds of partnerships, HRDF receives full responsibility and funds for their implementation.

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“AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” FOR HAITIAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS 1. Culture, Motives and Opportunities - HRDF may be considered highly evolved among professional Diaspora organizations, but it is not alone. There are hundreds, and they are a distinct class of NGOs in their shared culture, motives and opportunities. They work in and for Haitians years before, then during and after disasters. HRDF believes that these attributes – Haitian culture, motives and opportunities - are essential. Therefore, HRDF believes that great benefits come when the Diaspora organizations work in tandem with Haitians, mutually defining goals and objectives, expending money and materials, monitoring effectiveness and coalescing operations. Too often, donors and contractors ignore, forget or do not require this important working relationship. The results are typical of what we now see in Haiti’s earthquake zone - inefficiency, chaos and paralysis. This needs to be remedied. 2. Foreign Contracts - To HRDF, these above terms of engagement are missing from foreign government contracts in Haiti, not just since the earthquake but over many years. Since January 12, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in just two months. A review of published contracts gives the impression that recipients are frequently non-competing, favored companies, or semi-public, religious, professional or other non-profit organizations that have little or no particular historical interest, concern or experience in working alongside Haitians. They are contractors pure and simple. As more and more reports emerge from Haiti, HRDF is seeing this as a typical, wasteful and prejudicial practice. And from the view of many Haitian-American organizations, it amounts to unfairness of humanitarian rights at the international level, reminiscent are reminiscent of racial prejudice and civil rights struggles fifty years ago in the United States. Without a doubt, Haitian Diaspora companies and organizations with appropriate experience and credentials should share the foreign donors’ contracts for relief work in Haiti. 5. American Contracts - Where American government contracts for Haitian earthquake relief and recovery are concerned, all of them are paid for by American tax money. Thus, every citizen rightfully expects that: - Access to and use of money will be subject to law, not to someone’s personal discretion, - Requests for, justification, allocation and cost-benefit analysis of funding is a matter of public interest, and therefore should be transparent, - The basis for access to funds will be open, competitive and on the merits of the applicants and their proposals. Exceptions for extenuating circumstances should be strictly limited. Further, Haitian-Americans in particular ought to rightfully expect that: - Government contracts will acknowledge the Haitian Diaspora’s three special attributes for work in their country of origin, namely shared culture, motivation and opportunity. The government should find direct and unambiguous ways to make the most of these attributes to increase success. - Especially in the case of contracts for Haiti, something akin to the philosophy and practice of Affirmative Action is necessary to give the Haitian Diaspora minority a fair share of work and to use the aid money to help unify them with Haitians back home. - Plentiful contracts in the range of up to five million dollars each should be available to match the capabilities of most Haitian-American NGOs or companies. Monster contracts in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollar range should be subdivided and individually competed for. - Haitian-Americans companies and organizations with relevant capabilities should not be, as in the past, referred to major recipients to beg for subcontracts. - Regardless of their size and experience, the American government ought to be actively recruiting bonafide Haitian-American companies, professionals, and NGOs for work during this momentous tragedy. This is the precise time and opportunity when small companies and organizations likes these could grow and mature while helping their country of origin.

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Dispatch 12 February 23, 2010

Unified Diaspora Response – “Mission Possible" On February 13, just 10 days ago, the Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) published a dispatch to the international community explaining why the voices of Haitians living abroad should be heard above the rumble of the earthquake. The dispatch is attached as background. In it, HRDF asserts that Haitians living abroad: a. have a collective desire and growing commitment to have a role in Haiti’s future b. have demonstrated increasing professionalism and achievements in all fields urgently needed by earthquakes survivors c. have reasoned priorities and guidelines for making a transition to a modern democratic state d. are, in our view, the most logical as well as qualified candidates for formulating, receiving, implementing and evaluating foreign aid to Haiti At this point, these are the valuable assets Haitians living abroad bring to the table as individuals, groups, organizations, coalitions or what have you. Donors and decision-makers about Haiti’s fate would be well advised to recognize and take full advantage of these assets. However, we must put ourselves in the minds of those donors and decision-makers who have funds to allocate and authority to delegate. But for what? As so often discussed and published, international donors, world leaders and advisory groups are constantly searching for projects and programs that meet their perceived needs, criteria and performance standards. At this date, HRDF thinks that simple community development projects – more trees, more water wells, more solar panels, etc - are necessary but not sufficient. Million of people are in distress and in motion, their destinations are uncertain and their survival is in doubt. These are now the utmost concerns of donors and decision-makers. They would likely fund and delegate projects that address these concerns, not business as usual. We know that Diaspora organizations have many sweeping projects to help Haiti, even before the earthquake. We know that they have been advocating and waiting for recognition, funding and authority. Given that, donors and decision-makers, because of the earthquake, are feeling compelled to release long-held pledged funds now. Therefore, this is the time when Diaspora proposals should be adjusted to account for the earthquake’s impact and then laid on the table for immediate action.



The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Minisère de la Planification et la Cooperation Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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In this light, HRDF sees three categories of proposals, a) by subjects, for example environmental refugees and their resettlement, intensified agriculture and forestry, civil defense, land planning, b) by geography or jurisdiction, for example coastal zones, the Central Plateau, communal sections, and c) by scale, for example local (neighborhood, watershed), regional (metropolitan areas, countryside) and national (policy and enforcement for public education, building codes, taxation, civil service). This gives a straightforward three-dimensional structure for considering and meeting most if not all needs. HRDF believes that existing and contemplated proposals can be neatly assembled in this fashion during the Diaspora conferences being planned. Remember, Haitians living abroad have met repeatedly in the past few years to review Haitian problems and the needs for response. Dozens of resolutions for actions were made and agreed upon, such as those of the Florida Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group and the Congress of Haitian Diaspora Unity. Therefore, our efforts should be on working out a unified aid package. This means that participants will arrive with proposals in hand, ready for combining and polishing. To these must be added an overall budget, a timetable for completion and a trustworthy and efficient administrative structure. The package should be tested to win approval by the donors, decision-makers and the Haitian government. There is only one month until the planned Diaspora conference and less than another month to the United Nations conference, HRDF is available to consult with organizations in preparing proposals and supporting materials. Again, responders, victims and Haitians living abroad all share the same basic questions that must be answered – Who will be saved? Where will they live? What will they do for work? And, will they be better off than before the earthquake?

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Listening to the Voice of Haitians Living Abroad Above the Rumble of the Earthquake

The voice of Haitians living abroad has to be heard over the rumble of the earthquake. But the international community has had a chronic selective deafness toward – a) The collective desire and growing commitment to have a role in Haiti’s future. In 2005, the Florida Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group composed of Haitians living abroad recommended critically urgent actions, notably in disaster preparedness. As recently as August 2009, in Miami, more than three hundred and fifty (350) leaders and representatives again agreed on urgent matters, including restoration of the environment and decentralization for sustainable development and disaster prevention. b) The increasing professionalism and achievements of Haitians living abroad in science and technology, medicine, justice and enforcement, social and political action, education and media, business development and skilled trades. In southern Florida alone, the are four Haitian-Americans candidates for the United States Congress all of whom has risen from local and state political responsibilities. Haitian physicians and nurses from all over the world have been among the first responders to the earthquake victims. c) The reasoned priorities and guidelines for making a transition from an authoritarian society to a modern democratic state in the midst of growing population and dwindling resources. The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program of the Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) and the Lakou-Permaculture education and training program of The Haitian League are two examples well-designed for this difficult transition. d) Haitians living abroad - as individuals, enterprises and organizations – are the most logical as well as qualified candidates for formulating, receiving, implementing and evaluating foreign aid to Haiti. For instance, there are hundreds of Haitian Hometown Associations with personal, sustaining connections among Haitians living abroad and their communities back home. This is more extensive than any non-Haitian networks, and for development purposes, it may be more effective. Given all this, the world communities of governments, banks, investors, charitable donors and others cannot and should not continue to ignore, obstruct and exclude the participation of Haitians living abroad. The only questions that remain are:

1- How quickly can Haitians living abroad be brought into the picture? 2- At what range of programs, level of funding and duration can they assume leading roles? 3- What is the comparative advantage of Haitian-driven, administered and/or monitored foreign aid?

HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.org> Aldy Castor, M.D., President United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 ph 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064 fx 954.659.7957 [email protected] Haiti: 17, 2ème ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.443.3703

and 25, Rue Sténlo Vincent, Aquin ph/fx 509.245.4117

The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Minisère de la Planification et la Cooperation Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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HRDF acknowledges the generous offer of the Organization of the American States (OAS) to gather Haitian leaders abroad to make a strategy for Haiti’s future. We note that not even the United Nations Office of Special Envoy to Haiti has yet invited such participation after its year of existence. But what good is any strategy making without the means of implementation? In so many words: “Where is the beef?” Assuming that the world community is willing to listen to the voices of Haitians living abroad and recognizes their years of substantial initiatives, resolutions and readiness, the next step is entrusting them with meaningful tasks. Admittedly, the recommendation of the Florida Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group and the resolutions of the Diaspora Unity Congress were made prior to the horrendous earthquake. But, they can be adjusted and accelerated to meet the needs of environmental refugees and reconstruction. We think there is no need, nor time in one-and-a-half days, for creating a new strategy or a new federation. Responders, victims and Haitians living abroad, all share the same basic questions that must be answered – Who will be saved? Where will they live? What will they do for work? And, will they be better off than before the earthquake? - - - - - - - ,

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HRDF Presentation: “Earthquake Recovery: Mission Possible”

for the Hot Topics Discussion Group, Weston, Florida February 10, 2010

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting us tonight. The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) was established more than twenty years ago and for the past ten years has been based in Weston. Members of HRDF include physicians and surgeons such as me who are also specialized in teaching emergency medical response and community civil defense. Recently, HRDF has added partners who are specialists on saving the environment. Let me take this opportunity to introduce two colleagues – Dr Weiner Leblanc, from Weston, a retired pediatrician and Mr. Stuart Leiderman from New Hampshire whose work concerns environmental refugees and ecological restoration of damaged homelands, such as Haiti. In the next few minutes, I will briefly tell you about our experiences with the earthquake. HRDF has initiated numerous projects with the cooperation of civic leaders, Haitian and foreign organizations and since 2004 with the United States Military Southern Command when their humanitarian teams come to Haiti for medical outreach. Among the projects are: drinking water, establishment of a vocational school, teaching emergency medicine to physicians and nurses, as well as first response techniques to firefighters and other paramedical personnel. New projects include a fishery school, and mountainside catchment lakes to control flash floods. Mr. Leiderman and I were working in a project of environmental protection for the city of Aquin. For several days, we surveyed the environment, investigated the cause of problems and met with group of residents about what to do to avoid future disasters. When we came back to Port-au-Prince; I decided we will have dinner at my friend Gilbert’s restaurant “La Plaisance.” It’s a restaurant where old friends meet to talk about everything and nothing, have a drink and a nice dinner. We were sitting outside at a kind of picnic table. It was getting to be twilight and we had just ordered. Imagine if you were with us, very relaxed. Suddenly, there was an apocalyptic noise, as if my head were tied to a railroad track in Times Square, New York City, during rush hour. Then the ground violently shook, I lost my balance. My first instinct was to run towards the building. Meanwhile, Stuart had ducked under the table. I saw the building falling towards me; I never saw anything like that. I ran to a big palm




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tree on my right at the edge of the yard. The shaking was continuing. I did not know if it would ever end. Then Stuart ran over to the tree and we just hung on. Slowly, the proprietors and the diners staggered into the yard wondering what happened. This generation of Haitians had never experienced an earthquake in their country. Probably, one hundred thousand had died in that minute of shaking. It became dark. Stuart and I walked to my sister’s school nearby. We found the building mostly destroyed. We discovered that she was trapped underneath the concrete slabs. Neighbors tried to help us, but she had to stay there overnight before anyone could help her escape. Our own apartment was still standing but some of the walls were cracked, so we slept outside in the courtyard with everyone that night and for several more nights. In the daylight hours, when I went out to find food and water, I saw a completely destroyed city, like a scene from a First World War movie. The national palace, the ministry buildings, the churches, schools, police stations, businesses, gas stations, hotels, hospitals and houses had fallen. On the second day, bodies wrapped in sheets appeared on the streets and sidewalks. There were growing piles of garbage and debris. There were no phone services. During those days, we went to the national civil defense office, to the general Hospital in Port-au-Prince, to the Community Hospital in Petion-Ville, to the field Hospital to the airport to help. We discovered there were a big mismatch between the availability of doctors and other relief workers, and the supplies and facilities they needed to do their job. So we helped matched them up. This is the kind of thing that HRDF has been doing for years, although never after an earthquake. Also at the airport, we saw the Israeli flags above there field hospital and rescue team, and were reminded of the big things that a small country can do. We want to make more of this relationship that has a history of more than sixty years, to the founding of the State of Israel. Eventually, several days later, on the 17

th, a private rescue plane offered a flight to Fort Pierce, Florida.

We drove from there to Weston and resumed working from here. A week later, Wiener and I flew back to Haiti for four days work as physicians at different hospitals. What I saw was even worse than the days immediately after the earthquake because a second earthquake has destroyed more of the country and killed many of the original survivors. The deaths were now probably more the 200.000 and the environmental refugees were now more than a million. People were fleeing the cities for the countryside, to place like Aquin that were unprepared for housing and feeding them. This is the disaster after the earthquake. This is where Weston’s HRDF has to go into action again. At this point, we are calling our work “Mission Possible” for two reasons: 1- HRDF for a long time had a “culture of preparedness” built into all its projects such as the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the medical training for physicians and nurses in emergency training, planning for catchment lakes, drinking water etc. This means careful design, budgeting, staffing and anticipating problems along the way because Haiti may be the most difficult place in the world to improve people’s living conditions. 2- Especially after the earthquake, it is essential to have a positive attitude that recovery is and will be possible. There is no room for failure or pessimism. Those who have the culture of preparedness should have the responsibilities for leadership. Others who have been living in blind faith have become victims. We hope they survive but there is no guarantee. The whole country has so much to learn. If organizations such as HRDF are to accomplished “Mission Possible”, there are the usual requirements – adequate staff, headquarters here and in Haiti, equipment, mobility, program contributions. But there is also a unique requirement - a clear, detailed, practical and affordable definition of the “Reconstruction of Haiti” that everybody is calling for but no major power or relief organization has yet put forward. Essentially there have been flying in band-aids. They have not been asking or deciding where the

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refugees live? Who will be trusted with the money? What would be the check and balances? Will old cities be repaired or new cities built? Can the food, water and housing come from Haiti or everything have to be imported? Questions like these obviously need to be answered soon. HRDF and its partners have some answers but very lithe influence. A brain trust from Weston, however, taking these questions one by one and reaching upward to decision makers in Florida, the United States, Canada, Europe and Haiti could help achieve “Mission Possible”. So the same as you invited us here to meet with you, we invite you and all of Weston to meet with us. Thank you very much. Aldy Castor MD, President Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF)

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Dispatch 7 January 27, 2010

HRDF’s “Mission Possible” – To Save Haiti or Save Haitians?

Over the years, it seems that approximately half of all foreign aid to Haiti has gone directly to the National Government. These have been hundred of millions of dollars in grants and loans every year, primarily from other national governments such as the United States, France and Canada and from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The other half of foreign aid has been in the form of private charity and foundation money directly to Haitians in their communities. For more than twenty years, HRDF has been one of these donors. In this catastrophic time, it is a fair and very important question to ask which kind of aid has been more effective - money and other resources to “Haiti”, in other words to the government, or money and resources to “Haitians”, in other words the people and their communities? HRDF believes that the latter has been more effective. When it comes to suffering and survival, there has been little or no help from “Haiti”. A first example is civil defense. “Haiti” has permanently buried the operation and maintenance of the Direction of the Protection Civile, the focal point of emergency response for the country. It is only a small technical office within the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities without autonomy and legal framework, sufficient staffing, funding, and decision making authority. It also lacks the communication and implementation infrastructure to reach out and mobilize the entire country. It causes a sad and unnecessary sacrifice of Haitians. HRDF believes that the Direction of the Protection Civile should be elevated at least to a secretary status or preferably given its own ministry. Until then, we urge direct funding and training of local Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). As recently as October 2009, HRDF had successfully recruited and received the commitment of the State



The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Ministère de la Planification et la Coopération Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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of Florida Division of Emergency Management for CERT in Haiti. Planning for their first visit to Haiti was being made when the earthquake struck. And in November, the firefighters of Limoges, France gave their first instruction in community emergency response, in Aquin on the southern coast. This is “Mission Possible” - saving “Haitians” not “Haiti”. The second example is Customs, the national government office responsible for the orderly oversight, receipt and passing through of all of the country’s imports, including humanitarian supplies. The consensus among the Humanitarian community and the Haitian Diaspora is that Haiti’s Customs does not work, even in noncatastrophic times. This is specifically asserted in a resolution of the Haitian Diaspora Unity Congress that convened in Miami this past August and is now a major concern of the Congress NGO Follow-up Committee chaired by HRDF. Unlike the first example, foreign aid donors and now the greatly expanded emergency response must send its supplies through Customs, i.e. through “Haiti” rather than directly to Haitians. This is a serious constraint. Direct access to communities must be immediately opened throughout the country. Millions of lives are on the line. “Mission Possible” in this case cannot wait for governmental customs reform. These are only two of many examples that are now forcing generous and professional responders around the world to ask a difficult question – Shall we save “Haiti” or save “Haitians”? HRDF believes the former is “Mission Impossible” while the latter is “Mission Possible”. This is because the country’s remaining viable assets are the people and the land they occupy. The government exists, but unfortunately it is not a viable asset. - - - - - - -

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Working with Haitians: The Need for a New Operational Approach

Aldy Castor, M.D., Haitian Resource Development Foundation hrdf.org

Copyright December 2009 Everyone was frustrated by the slowly-moving outbound customs line at Port-au-Prince International Airport. Suddenly, there was a commotion, with ensuing pushes, cries, insults, even police intervention. Three hours later, the same travelers, passing through Miami International’s long customs line, were behaving like angels. A friend later explained to me this dichotomist Haitian behavior: “If somebody explains Haiti to you and you understand it, his explanation is inaccurate”. I. UNCERTAINTY AND THE PROBLEM OF DEGRADED GOVERNANCE I-A. Uncertainty Causes Socio-organizational Instability In Haiti, from the highly-polished halls of the National Palace to the plainly-plastered walls of the country's one hundred thirty-three communes [townships], the element of uncertainty can always be found near the center of relations. It is indeed a toxic element, directly accountable for Haiti's instability and socio-organizational dysfunction. To those who are familiar, Haitian life is starkly uncertain, even at its core. For example, Haiti is prone to earthquakes. The whole population lives atop the fault lines of three massive rock plates that have been moving across the ocean floor for eons of years, taking everyone and everything with them. Haitians are never certain when these plates will snap or crunch and cause the next earthquakes, nor how bad they will be. While the eventuality is certain, the when and where are secret held far beneath the surface. In a similar vein, but man-made, the Haitian economy is not its own. There is a paralyzing trade deficit. The markets for and availability of goods are generally unpredictable and set by outside forces. What comes into the country is often undesirable, unaffordable, unreliable, uncontrollable, unrepairable and/or undisposable. Even for charitable shipments, there is great uncertainty whether, when and at what cost in bribes their donated food, clothing, medicine, vehicles and supplies will be received, passed through customs and completely delivered. In the context of governance, uncertainty is defined as the space corresponding to what could be called numerous "regulatory fault-lines" that imperil the attainment of officially-stated objectives - policy making, programming, implementation, verification and enforcement - about everything from decentralization, to building codes, to banking and investment transactions, to universal public education, to energy and judicial reform. In practice, uncertainty provides areas, even chasms, where functionaries can conceal

HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.org> Aldy Castor, M.D., President United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 Ph 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064, fax 954.659.7957 [email protected] Haiti: 17, 2ème ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.443.3703

25, Rue Sténlo Vincent, Aquin ph/fx 509.245.4117


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selfish objectives that may oppose or subvert official intent. In turn, this lessens the predictability of governance - due process, accurate records, informed transactions, etc. I-B. Uncertainty in the "Imaginary" Plane How it began is itself uncertain, but by now uncertainty in Haiti is culturally-embedded. It is a system of social organization and transformation typified by disorder, inconsistency, illegibility and misunderstanding, and endless repetitions and combinations of these. It ensnares the whole cast of characters - government, citizens, businesses, organizations, churches, professions, peacekeepers, visiting humanitarians and development specialists - and then permits them to introduce, practice and prolong uncertainty for their own benefit. Eventually, everyone plays. Personal interests are concealed or revealed as needed, and operates on several planes. In Haiti the most fundamental plane of uncertainty is a system rooted in what could be called "the imaginary." This imaginary strengthens the characters' appreciation of their freedom when faced with the rationalities, constraints and routines generated by the modern world. An example is the Constitutional mandate for decentralized governance. At every opportunity, the central government, without itself being centralized, advocates the principle of decentralization. Basically, the central government that many Haitians refer to as “The Republic of Port-au-Prince” does not have the interest or organizational structure and capability to run the country as the Constitution requires. Yet leaders profess, and citizens are led to believe, that decentralization exists, or soon will. This is a perfect example of uncertainty in the imaginary plane. The imaginary is also found at the level of administrative jurisdictions and the precise but non-relational representation structure. Geographically, within the whole country there are "departments" that roughly correspond to states or provinces. Within them are "arrondissements" that roughly correspond to counties. Within them are "communes" that roughly correspond to townships, and within them are the smallest jurisdictions, "communal sections," that roughly correspond to villages. Article 17 of the Constitution prescribes the layers of representative legislature. There is a national two-house Parliament comprised of Deputies from eighty-three designated electoral districts, and Senators from the nine geographically-determined departments. Then there are several subsidiary bodies: - At the level of communal sections, there is a) an Administrative Council (CASEC) and a Communal Assembly (ASEC). Both have daily contact among citizens throughout the countryside. The central Government, however, barely recognizes communal sections and cannot imagine decentralizing to that scale. So looking downward, the dysfunctional illusion is perpetuated. Looking upward, the CASEC and ASEC and citizenry are not fooled but nonetheless continue to accede to the fiction. This is sad because, for a small country no bigger than Maryland or New Hampshire, the sum total of communal sections actually could give Haitians the substance and identity that promotes their development and differentiation. - To complete the representational structure, there is a body of delegates from the cities (“villes”) and one from the various municipal councils (“conseils”). Although the communes have the authority to tax, the majority of citizens, not themselves paying much in taxes to the communes, habitually call upon them for public services year after year, but knowing full well that the councils have little or no fiscal or human resources at their command. Nor do they have practical control over the physical territory within their bounds. So functionally, the councils are also imaginary entities, “virtual government.” I-C. The Impact of Uncertainty on Individuals To those who find themselves on the receiving end of uncertainty, the experience is disorienting. Eventually, because "nothing good ever seems to happen," the eventual realization is of a mortal threat to

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life and limb. At that point, one can only fight or flee. This already embedded in Haitian culture; there can be serious, violent repercussions. Historically, Haitians grow up to see the world through a syncretic lens - “marronnage” [the country's escape from slavery], denial and placing blame elsewhere. This is a complex perception resulting from three centuries of colonial servitude followed by almost two centuries of home-grown, paternalistic tyranny and repression. Over time, this popularized governance by discretionary favoritism and negligence. It also whittled down the concept of "citizens" to nothing more than disempowered individuals concerned only for maintaining their own status in the thick of things. From both ends of the civic spectrum, the political system became one of “every man for himself.” 1-D The Geographical Impact of Uncertainty Because of the considerable element of uncertainty in how it operates, and the consequent inability to form and conduct policy, the Central State and even the communes expose their assets – people, landmarks, water, soil, coasts, interior, agricultural and forest products - to appropriation by third parties. These parties include private businesses inside and outside the country, nongovernmental organizations, churches, banks and foreign aid donors. For example: - Large foreign aid donors typically establish or even dictate the terms of reference for Central State actions. The current Poverty Reduction Strategy is largely a work product of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund adopted almost verbatim by the Government of Haiti. The emphasis on narrow-purpose groundwater wells all over the country rather than multi-purpose aboveground catchments lakes for irrigation and municipal water supply has come primarily from overseas actors, not from popular debate and decision by Haitian citizens. - At the local level, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and churches frequently and freely “adopt” a town or community as their principal aid focus, pouring labor, money and supplies into them while ignoring the similar needs and potentials of adjacent communities even along the same road or in the same watershed. Between France and Haiti, the so-called decentralized cooperation system offers certain but not all localities technical reinforcement, and between the United States and Haiti, the Sister Cities relationship, for example, is typically between highly-selected citizens associations. These are essentially forms of development favoritism that uncertain governance allows to flourish. The result is lumpy development across the country, exacerbating rather than smoothing differences and privileges from community to community. - Further, once rooted in a locality, NGOs, missionaries and others seem to be tempted to extend their development blessings across the country in a kind of manifest destiny or path-of-least-resistance process. They might go first where the government presence and function is absent or uncertain at best. It is not meant here to broadly condemn the presence of foreign assistance actors, but to show how the element of uncertainty in governance can lead to extremely unbalanced relations, with eventual detriment to the populace, its culture, natural resources and self-determination. 1-E Haiti’s Diaspora Lastly, many in the Haitian Diaspora are moved by and dedicated to addressing Haiti’s plight, but largely as individuals or as small groups such as hometown associations that are good at thinking small rather than large, and formulating tasks rather than strategies. As a result, their initiatives are largely “band-aids” rather than cures; the sum of these parts will never be equal to the whole. As a result, “A lot of money gets spent in Haiti, but little of it gets spent on Haiti.” II. RESTORING QUALITY GOVERNANCE In a democracy, the role of the State is to maintain a balance between interests and incentives, ethics and opportunities. And it is the job of the political powers that run the State to use that balance to regulate society’s institutions and economy for everyone’s benefit, not just for a privileged class. The result of balance and regulation is “quality of governance.” Elements of certainty in government posture,

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policies and procedures improve the quality of governance, while elements of uncertainty degrade governance. As described above, the pervasive presence and practice of uncertainty by members of the Haitian State have considerably degraded the quality of governance. This needs to be faced, remedied and the balance restored. For many reasons, it is recommended that Haitians begin to address this at the local levels – communes and communal sections. The hypothesis is that the fewer uncertainties of governance that exist at the local territorial level and the more organized and widespread this certainty of governance become, the more the Central State will become obligated to certainty as a way to strengthen its sovereign powers. In this strategy, therefore, a return to quality governance nationally rests in grassroots initiative. II-A The New Approach II-A-1 New management prospects First stage - Determine a representative sample of communes and communal sections to constitute a diversified panel from which other communes can be spun off, based on a modelling of practices. This model of developing innovation around “clusters of innovators” refers back to Schumpeter’s theory of destruction and creation of value. This might serve as a basis for the constant creation of freshly added-value. Second stage – Conduct an audit within each commune to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of human resources and technical capability. Third stage - From the conclusions of the audit, draw up an “institutional reinforcement plan.” This stage is essential, since without such a plan there can be neither increase in skills nor the establishment of management procedures. The institutional reinforcement plan will accordingly cover two aspects to be developed concomitantly. The first concerns the establishment of an “administrative temporality management.” The second deals with a training plan for the elected officials and the mayor office managerial staff. Indeed, it is advisable to combine the training plan and the management procedures to avoid the protagonists getting out of step and possibly rejecting the arrangements being proposed. The idea is to establish a “learning organization” approach within a virtuous circle. As regards the “administrative temporality management” aspect, three dimensions must be kept in mind: a) Introducing memory management. The analogy is of a human suddenly struck with amnesia, losing their bearings and having great difficulty facing the future. The same is true of societies and civilisations that must be able to recover and organize their collective memory. In Haiti, establishing an “archive management system” within the communes and communal sections is paramount. b) Introducing a process of management, decisions and deliberations so as to meet two criteria - motivation and the publication of proceedings. As a side-effect, the democratic process will be noticeably strengthened. c) Introducing a project management system so that local officials and their staffs can look out several years, providing a view of future development. Fourth stage - The local development plan. It is critical that local authorities have (or regain) control of their future, with the ability to steer and coordinate the various players (NGOs, businesses, donors, etc.) operating in their territories (communes and communal sections). The institutional reinforcement plan, described above, combines training for local officials in a new management setting. Together, they make it possible to introduce and perfect a local development plan. Remember, the problem is not the lack of initiative but the lack of coordination.

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The development plan will cover all spheres of competence of a local government, such as welfare and education, local town planning, water, sewage, garbage collection, etc. Forward-planning arrangements, say three successive five-year plans, might be devised. The development and implementation of the plans would need to be constantly reviewed and readjusted. Plans made at the communal section and communal levels will point the way for departmental and whole-country planning. Indeed, the combined goals and objectives of the local plans will be measured against and fitted into a national plan prepared by the Central State. II-B The Implementing Operators Development (and restoration) plans must eventually be implemented. This requires willingness, know-how and resources, expressed through a contracting procedure. Three categories of participants are imagined: - The first are the contracting local authorities, e.g. town councils that will serve as contracting authorities. As they are currently fragile (underfunded, understaffed, under-savvy), they could be supported by professional contracting deputies who will assist in preparing plans and specifications, issuing requests for proposals, evaluating bids, etc. The International Cities Network for Haiti might be a good source of expertise for this. - The second are a certain number of prime contractors or project supervisors responsible for carrying out sets of projects according to the plans and specifications of communes and communal sections. - The third are the numerous potential subcontractors, Haitian and non-Haitian, who will compete for individual projects and work under the supervision of prime contractors. The indispensable re-grading that must take place between the contracting authorities and the prime contractors means that they will be genuine practitioners, not theoreticians and management academics. - - - - - - - This paper is summarized from the December 10, 2009 presentation given to technical advisers of the United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti, former President Bill Clinton. It was prepared by Aldy Castor, MD, and President of the Haitian Resource Development Foundation, by representatives of the City of Suresnes (France). Thanks to Stuart Leiderman for his perception of ecological threat! Background material for the theoretical framework of the document as presented: Paranoïa et Mythomanie en Haïti, Docteur Louis Mars, 1937 Théorie de la forme (Theory of form), Georg Simmel Sociologie, étude des formes de la socialisation, P.U.F., 1999 (Sociology, study of forms of socialisation) Sociologie des organisations (Sociology of organisations) Théorie de l'acteur stratégique et système d'action concret (Theory of the strategic player) and (system of concrete action) Michel Crozier et Erhard Friedberg, "L'Acteur et le système" (1972) (The actor and the system) Erhard Friedberg, Livre: "Le pouvoir et la règle" (1993), (Book: The power and the rule) 3er/ théorie de la régulation sociale (Theory of social regulation) Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Les Règles du jeu: L'action collective et la régulation sociale, Armand Colin, Paris, 1997 (The rules of the game: Collective Action and Social regulation)

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POST EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE TO HAITI’S “GREAT SOUTH”

For twenty-three years, HRDF has had a strong presence in civil defense and emergency response training, health and environmental research and development in Haiti’s southern peninsula. Its headquarters are in Aquin, a coastal “commune” of 60,000 located on the Caribbean coast approximately midway between the larger cities Les Cayes and Jacmel. The south is rich in natural resources, much of the land is fertile, supplying large quantities of fresh produce to Port-au-Prince. HRDF intends to concentrate its effort in this southern region for several reasons: 1. The South is home to approximately a million Haitians. 2. The South has not been systematically assessed for damage, loss of life, condition of infrastructure, survival needs, etc. A few reports indicate significant needs and communities isolated. 3. A major east-west geological fault underlies under the entire region.




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4. The epicenter of the recent earthquake was in the northeast quadrant of the South. 5. HRDF has viable, continuing partnerships in the South with disaster relief and community development entities including the United States Military Southern Command (SouthCom), agencies of the European Union, and several cities and organizations in France and Belgium. 6. The South is a significant “breadbasket” for the whole country and for high-value export products such as coffee and mangoes whose farmers will need assistance to prepare for a full year of agricultural productivity, harvest and shipment. HRDF has three major thrusts in the South: Systematic and continuing assessment of medical and health care needs with status report to donors, suppliers and relief workers. For example, recent field visits earlier this month to the Hôpital in Croix des Bouquets, the Hôpital ….. in Petit-Goâve and the Hôpital Immmaculée Conception in les Cayes, has brought major pledges of equipment worth more than one million dollars for those three hospitals. Community emergency response teams (CERTS). These are nine-day professional training sessions in each communal section that need to be followed by distribution of equipment and team assignments. HRDF initiated its HRDF-CERTS program in Aquin last year and has secured the support of Florida State Emergency Management Division as partner. “Ecological sweat equity” for environmental refugees – People fleeing Port-au-Prince and other damaged areas need shelter and tools to resettle in safe areas and reestablish their lives. For this, HRDF has proposals for ecological restoration and disaster preparedness, vocational training in agriculture and fishery management for coastal zone cities. Partners include Cités Unies France and the Department des Hauts de Seine, France. - - - - - - - .

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The Collision of Natural Forces and Human Weaknesses in Haiti

The result of the earthquake in Haiti is a collision of natural forces and human weaknesses. On the one side, you have the prehistoric creation of the Earth, where large parts of its massive rock crust are always in motion on the continents and beneath the ocean. Originally, most landmasses were once joined but now they are apart, continents and islands alike. These are ancient forces beyond the control of human being - earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, thunder and lightning. We can try to understand them, but we need to be out of their way. This brings up the second part of the equation, human weaknesses. 1. Ignorance – Haitian scientists know the history of earthquakes in the Caribbean, but this information has not filtered down to the Haitian people. For example, what do you think that Haitian parents have been telling their children when they cry and are afraid about what just happened? Can they explain the truth? or make up a story? or just change the subject? This is particularly difficult when even such an earthquake hardly ever occurs. This is different than the seasonal hurricanes. Haitians are overcoming their ignorance of hurricanes. They waterproof their houses, they move away from rivers, they stock food and water for the storm season that comes every year. So now, they must overcome their ignorance about earthquakes, because earthquakes produce complex emergencies. 2. Simplicity – Haitians often construct large buildings without good architectural design or engineering. They often use whatever materials are available, instead of demanding the highest quality for each purpose. this occurs among the poor and the rich as well. 3. Blind Faith - Generally, Nature is good to Haiti. There is rainfall, fresh water, fish,. fruits and vegetables fall into children’s hands naturally. Nature also has its own affairs separate from people. It cracks the Earth open, raises and collapses mountains. At the same time, it gives Haitians a little comfort from the sun, the birds and the bees. So Haitians cannot take blind faith that Nature will only give the good things. Therefore, the whole country must get together to replace their current weakness with strength. That’s what HRDF stands for: Each of the four words are important strengths that Haitians now need. HAITIAN – There are now nine million Haitians in the country itself and approx. three million outside of the country. The strength of Haiti is in every Haitian on Earth. Twelve million, soon to be fifteen million.




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RESOURCE – Anything that Haitians can acquire from anywhere in the world and put it to good use – it could be, for example, a computer, a doctor, a tractor, a windmill, or an idea – becomes a resource for the country. Haitians have not yet discovered all the resources available to them. When they do, that will be their greatest strength. Among the resources of HRDF are: Partnerships – For twenty-three years, HRDF has combined with significant institutions, charities, professional societies such as - communities of the Wallone Region of Belgium, - The European Union, - Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas - Florida Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group - International Foundation for Electoral Systems, - US Agency for International Development, - Mole St. Nicolas (Haiti) in Action, - Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad, - the City of Suresnes, France, - Cités Unies, France, - the Department des Hauts-de-Seine, France, - the U.S. Southern Command. - Firefighters from Limoges, France The City of Aquin in Southern Haiti - Aquin has served as the Haitian headquarters of HRDF for twenty-three years. HRDF is lucky to have this beautiful and peaceful part of Haiti to help it do its work over the years. Universities of the world such as: - Southern University in Baton Rouge, - Loyola University in New Orleans, - University of Louisiana in Lafayette,

- Florida International University, Miami - University of Brest, France - University of Angier, France

HRDF constantly draws on their professors and students for advice and answers to its questions. They are especially strong resources for use after this earthquake. Right now, we need a lot of advice and a lot of answers. For example, - Shall we move millions of Haitians out of harm’s way? - Can locations for new communities be quickly found, designed and inhabited? - What can be made of all the rubble in the cities after the earthquake? - How quickly can community emergency response teams be trained and equipped? DEVELOPMENT - “Development” is how you use the combination of resources at your command. We are talking about more than band-aids. Development is about making the transition from weakness to strength, from ignorance to knowledge, from chaos to organization, and especially from blind faith to preparedness and civil defense. FOUNDATION – A foundation is more than the first rock in the ground. A foundation has to have the whole structure in mind. A foundation for a one-story house cannot later support two more stories. A foundation in an earthquake zone may not even support one story. HRDF is comprised of experienced people, technical know-how, mobility, quick response, adaptability, communication, demonstration projects, monetary contributions from Haitians and non-Haitians all over the world. This makes the strongest concrete for a Haitian foundation.

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Ten Commandments for Responding to Environmental Refugees

[Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 15, 2010, Americans HRDF Director Dr. Aldy Castor <[email protected]> of Florida and environmental refugees and ecological restoration specialist Stuart Leiderman <[email protected]> of New Hampshire were at HRDF headquarters in Port-au-Prince at the above address. Right before the earthquake, they had returned from a week’s work in the southern coastal city of Aquin, continuing HRDF’s work with residents on disaster preparedness, ecological restoration, flood control and mountainside catchment lakes. The following was drafted in response to requests for guidance in preparing, bringing and maintaining appropriate relief for Haitian earthquake survivors whom Castor and Leiderman consider environmental refugees. They welcome your questions and comments.] The Haitian Earthquake has caused a “complex emergency” involving most of the country’s population and most of its natural environment. As defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a complex emergency is a “humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program”. In the case, the violence has come from the depths of the Earth rather than from the barrels of guns, and the international response must also address the damaged environment before the survivors can reinhabit their homeland. Therefore both the country’s population its natural environment must be understood and addressed by the visiting teams. For example, it will not be sufficient to treat people in a hospital and send them “home,” because they probably have nowhere to go. Seen this way, environmental refugees suffer more greatly than other categories of refugees. Humanitarian response is necessary but not sufficient. Thus, the following “ten commandments” for responding to environmental refugees are offered to help responders move beyond “necessary” and closer to “sufficient.” 1. Know before you go. In the best of times, it may usually take a week or more preparation for every day’s work in Haiti, depending on whether the work will be for education, construction, health services, environmental research, etc. Post-earthquake, plan on devoting much more time in preparation for each day you will be “on the ground.” Especially because much of the population is or will be in motion, in search of security, supplies and settlement, there must be more precise knowledge of people, places, roadways, access and egress, their interrelations and potential reactions to your presence. 2. If you are a highly specialized humanitarian team, for example a group of surgeons, you will probably be more effective by partnering with a specialized environmental team that may complement



The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501(c)3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Ministère de la Planification et la Coopération Externe under the number B-0167. HRDF’s mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haiti’s resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

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your work. For example, an environmental team with expertise in Haitian traditional medicine may help your patients recover more quickly from surgery. 3. No matter what the specialties, all teams should include some members with humanitarian understanding and experience, e.g. with social psychology, grief counseling, family and community dynamics, and some members with environmental expertise, e.g. with water, sanitation, waste management and resettlement needs. This is because many teams may find themselves working all alone in certain areas. It cannot be assumed that one sided response, either humanitarian or environmental, will be sufficient and keep anyone alive for very long. 4. The magnitudes and quality of disaster conditions encountered in Haiti will likely be many times worse than previously encountered elsewhere. Therefore, the teams should be many times more experienced, cautious, funded, supplies and backed up than usual. For example, search and rescue teams in Haiti will not only encounter building debris but large amounts of uncollected garbage, raw and decomposed human waste, and infectious dust and dirt that cannot be avoided. 5. Teams must include articulate and observant Haitian nationals who can bridge and make the best of the inevitable wide gaps in language, literacy, comprehension, stamina, availability and use of technology, performance standards and procedures, and punctuality. For example, where sometimes a team’s sophisticated, high-tech or big -approach may work best, and at other times a native Haitian approach may prove to be superior. This cannot be predicted. 6. Think twice before putting environmental refugees back where they were before disaster struck them. The goal should always be to return them to places that are safer, healthier and more functional than before, in other words, ecologically restored. 7. Teams must stay focused. They cannot allow their mission to be distracted, corrupted, or politicized by the refugees, by the government, by business interest or by any others. 8. Teams should build elements of sustainability into their missions. Investments in infrastructure must also fully include resources for continued operation, maintenance and transfer of knowledge. 9. Every team should have an exit strategy. Preparation and placement for egress can take as much time, energy and expense as the process of insertion and staying in-country. 10. Each team mission should have at least two goals. First, to give teams members the satisfaction of solving problems in their fields of expertise. Second, to bring pride and confidence to the survivors, in this case helping Haitians become independent, ecological, prepared and ultimately capable of assembling and sending their own teams when disastrous natural and manmade events cause environmental refugees in other parts of the world. - - -

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Suggested Template for Coordinating Earthquake Response Teams

Thank you for your generous and important offer of response teams! Imagine the worst condition you ever worked under and multiply by 10. This factor 10 is high because of the population density, the destruction of much governmental, public and private infrastructure and the general lack of coordination as of now. Answering the following questions will help you for your trip. They follow the same formula for investigations and journalism: who? what? where? when? why? how? how many? how much? how fast? etc. We want you to be as certain and as well prepared as you can possibly be. HRDF will be willing to help you over any sticking points and uncertainties. Please stay in touch with us. Logistics coordination is at this time is of paramount importance. 1. What are your teams specialties? Where and when are these most needed? 2. Will there be men and women in your group? If so, does this create separate requirements or problems and is this reasonable given conditions? 3. Do any of your staff have potential health or psychological problems which could be exacerbated by conditions and, if they surface, will this place unacceptable burdens on the remainder of the team and those who support you? 4. Will they bring supplies and equipment necessary to perform their specialties? If so, for how long? If not, where do you expect to secure and is this reasonable? 5. Do you require power for your work? If so, is this available (with possibly fuel to run) and for how long? 6. Do you have a re-supply plan for when your initial materials run out? If not, what will you do in the interim until they can be secured? 7. Where will they reside? Is there sufficient food and water? What of sanitation? 8. Do you intend for people to come to you or you to them? In either case, how do you assume transportation will work? 9. How will you publicize your services, especially if specialized as opposed to general trauma?




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10. What will you do with patients once you have done for them what you can? What will you do with the dead? Will you assume any responsibility for feeding or sheltering patients after immediate care is provided? 11. How do you intend to provide security for personnel, drugs, food, water, fuel, etc? 12. Do you have an ironclad agreement (possibly even written by someone with authority) or confidence that the things you cannot provide or bring can be secured once in-country or on site? Thank you, Aldy Castor M.D. <[email protected]> President, Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) with Stuart Leiderman, Environmental Refugees & Ecological Restoration <[email protected]> and additions from David Land <[email protected]>

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Working with Haitians: The Need for a New Operational Approach Aldy Castor, M.D., Haitian Resource Development Foundation hrdf.org Copyright 2009 Everyone was frustrated by the slowly-moving outbound customs line at Port-au-Prince International Airport. Suddenly, there was a commotion caused by two quite well-built individuals, with ensuing pushes, cries, insults, even police intervention. Three hours later, the same travelers, passing through Miami International’s long customs line, were behaving like angels. A friend later explained to me this dichotomist Haitian behavior: “If somebody explains Haiti to you and you understand it, his explanation is inaccurate”. I. UNCERTAINTY AND THE PROBLEM OF DEGRADED GOVERNANCE I-A. Uncertainty Causes Socio-organizational Instability In Haiti, from the highly-polished halls of the National Palace to the plainly-plastered walls of the country's one hundred thirty-three communes [townships], the element of uncertainty can always be found near the center of relations. It is indeed a toxic element, directly accountable for Haiti's instability and socio-organizational dysfunction n. To those who are familiar, Haitian life is starkly uncertain, even at its core. For example, Haiti is prone to earthquakes. The whole population lives atop the fault lines of three massive rock plates that have been moving across the ocean floor for eons of years, taking everyone and everything with them. Haitians are never certain when these plates will snap or crunch and cause the next earthquakes, nor how bad they will be. While the eventuality is certain, the when and where are secret held far beneath the surface. In a similar vein, but man-made, the Haitian economy is not its own. There is a paralyzing trade deficit. The markets for and availability of goods are generally unpredictable and set by outside forces. What comes into the country is often undesirable, unaffordable, unreliable, uncontrollable, unrepairable and/or undisposable. Even for charitable shipments, there is great uncertainty whether, when and at what cost in bribes their donated food, clothing, medicine, vehicles and supplies will be received, passed through customs and completely delivered. In the context of governance, uncertainty is defined as the space corresponding to what could be called numerous "regulatory fault-lines" that imperil the attainment of officially-stated objectives - policy making, programming, implementation, verification and enforcement - about everything from decentralization, to building codes, to banking and investment transactions, to universal public education, to energy and judicial reform. In practice, uncertainty provides areas, even chasms, where functionaries can conceal selfish objectives that may oppose or subvert official intent. In turn, this lessens the predictability of governance - due process, accurate records, informed transactions, etc. I-B. Uncertainty in the "Imaginary" Plane How it began is itself uncertain, but by now uncertainty in Haiti is culturally-embedded. It is a system of social organization and transformation typified by disorder, inconsistency, illegibility and misunderstanding, and endless repetitions and combinations of these. It ensnares the whole cast of characters - government, citizens, businesses, organizations, churches, professions, peacekeepers, visiting humanitarians and development specialists - and then permits them to introduce, practice and prolong uncertainty for their own benefit. Eventually, everyone plays. Personal interests are concealed or revealed as needed, and operates on several planes. In Haiti the most fundamental plane of uncertainty is a system rooted in what could be called "the imaginary." This imaginary strengthens the characters' appreciation of their freedom when faced with the rationalities, constraints and routines generated by the modern world.

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An example is the Constitutional mandate for decentralized governance. At every opportunity, the central government advocates the principle of decentralization without itself being centralized. Basically, the central government that many Haitians refer to as “The Republic of Port-au-Prince” does not have the interest or organizational structure and capability to run the country as the Constitution requires. Yet leaders profess, and citizens are led to believe, that decentralization exists, or soon will. This is a perfect example of uncertainty in the imaginary plane. The imaginary is also found at the level of administrative jurisdictions and the precise but non-relational representation structure. Geographically, within the whole country there are "departments" that roughly correspond to states or provinces. Within them are "arrondisements" that roughly correspond to counties. Within them are "communes" that roughly correspond to townships, and within them are the smallest jurisdictions, "communal sections," that roughly correspond to villages. Article 17 of the Constitution prescribes the layers of representative legislature. There is a national two-house Parlement comprised of Deputies from eighty-three designated electoral districts, and Senators from the nine geographically-determined departments. Then there are several subsidiary bodies: - At the level of communal sections, there is a) an Administrative Council (CASEC) and a Communal Assembly (ASEC). Both have daily contact among citizens throughout the countryside. The central Government, however, barely recognizes communal sections and cannot imagine decentralizing to that scale. So looking downward, the dysfunctional illusion is perpetuated. Looking upward, the CASEC and ASEC and citizenry are not fooled but nonetheless continue to accede to the fiction. This is sad because, for a small country no bigger than Maryland or New Hampshire, the sum total of communal sections actually could give Haitians the substance and identity that promotes their development and differentiation. - To complete the representational structure, there is a body of delegates from the cities (“villes”) and one from the various municipal councils (“conseils”). Communes have the authority to tax, but rarely and insufficiently exercise this prerogative. The majority of citizens, not themselves paying much in taxes to the communes, habitually call upon them for public services year after year, but knowing full well that the councils have little or no fiscal or human resources at their command. Nor do they have practical control over the physical territory within their bounds. So functionally, the councils are also imaginary entities, “virtual government.” I-C. The Impact of Uncertainty on Individuals To those who find themselves on the receiving end of uncertainty, the experience is disorienting. Eventually, because "nothing good ever seems to happen," the eventual realization is of a mortal threat to life and limb. At that point, one can only fight or flee. When this is embedded (already embedded) in Haitian culture, there can be serious, violent repercussions. Historically, Haitians grow up to see the world through a syncretic lens - “marronnage” [the country's escape from slavery], denial and placing blame elsewhere. This is a complex perception resulting from three centuries of colonial servitude followed by almost two centuries of home-grown, paternalistic tyranny and repression. Over time, this popularized governance by discretionary favoritism and negligence. It also whittled down the concept of "citizens" to nothing more than disempowered individuals concerned only for maintaining their own status in the thick of things. From both ends of the civic spectrum, the political system became one of “every man for himself.”

1-D The Geographical Impact of Uncertainty Because of the considerable element of uncertainty in how it operates, and the consequent inability to form and conduct policy, the Central State and even the communes expose their assets – people, landmarks, water, soil, coasts, interior, agricultural and forest products - to appropriation by third parties.

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These parties include private businesses inside and outside the country, nongovernmental organizations, churches, banks and foreign aid donors. For example: - Large foreign aid donors typically establish or even dictate the terms of reference for Central State actions. The current Poverty Reduction Strategy is largely a workproduct of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund adopted almost verbatim by the Government of Haiti. The emphasis on narrow-purpose groundwater wells all over the country rather than multi-purpose aboveground catchment lakes for irrigation and municipal water supply has come primarily from overseas actors, not from popular debate and decision by Haitian citizens. - At the local level, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and churches frequently and freely “adopt” a town or community as their principal aid focus, pouring labor, money and supplies into them while ignoring the similar needs and potentials of adjacent communities even along the same road or in the same watershed. Between France and Haiti, the so-called decentralized cooperation system offers certain but not all localities technical reinforcement, and between the United States and Haiti, the Sister Cities relationship, for example, is typically between highly-selected citizens associations. These are essentially forms of development favoritism that uncertain governance allows to flourish. The result is lumpy development across the country, exacerbating rather than smoothing differences and privileges from community to community. - Further, once rooted in a locality, NGOs, missionaries and others seem to be tempted to extend their development blessings across the country in a kind of manifest destiny or path-of-least-resistance process, going first where the government presence and function is absent or uncertain at best. This has been experienced in the far western parts of the northern and southern peninsulas, the north west being physically closer to Cuba than to Port-au-Prince and the southern tip being likewise closer to Jamaica. It is not meant here to broadly condemn the presence of foreign assistance actors, but to show how the element of uncertainty in governance can lead to extremely unbalanced relations, with eventual detriment to the populace, its culture, natural resources and self-determination. 1-E Haiti’s Diaspora Lastly, many in the Haitian Diaspora are moved by and dedicated to addressing Haiti’s plight, but largely as individuals or as small groups such as hometown associations that are good at thinking small rather than large, and formulating tasks rather than strategies. As a result, their initiatives are largely “band-aids” rather than cures; the sum of these parts will never be equal to the whole. Granted, periodic conferences and congresses have called for unified action. But they have not demonstrated the necessary organizing and fundraising acumen to influence or resolve national policy (e.g. dual citizenship, fast-track investment procedures and judicial reform), or fields of concern (e.g. reforestation, eradication of disease, full literacy and repatriation of migrant workers). Thus their resolutions are, in a sense, “unfunded (and undirected) mandates.” There is not so much an absence of critical thinking and desire for action but an absence of capability and direction. In particular, while there may be an emerging “voice of the Diaspora,” there is not a commensurate “voice of the villages” so that projects match development needs and priorities. As a result, “A lot of money gets spent in Haiti, but little of it gets spent on Haiti.” II. RESTORING QUALITY GOVERNANCE In a democracy, the role of the State is to maintain a balance between interests and incentives, ethics and opportunities. And it is the job of the political powers that run the State to use that balance to regulate society’s institutions and economy for everyone’s benefit, not just for a privileged class. The result of balance and regulation is “quality of governance.” Elements of certainty in government posture, policies and procedures improve the quality of governance, while elements of uncertainty degrade governance. As described above, the pervasive presence and practice of uncertainty by members of the Haitian State have considerably degraded the quality of governance. This needs to be faced, remedied and the balance restored.

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For many reasons, it is recommended that Haitians begin to address this at the local levels – communes and communal sections. The hypothesis is that the fewer uncertainties of governance that exist at the local territorial level and the more organized and widespread this certainty of governance become, the more the Central State will become obligated to certainty as a way to strengthen its sovereign powers. In this strategy, therefore, a return to quality governance nationally rests in grassroots initiative. II-A The New Approach II-A-1 New management prospects First stage - Determine a representative sample of communes and communal sections to constitute a diversified panel from which other communes can be spun off, based on a modelling of practices. This model of developing innovation around “clusters of innovators,” refers back to Schumpeter’s theory of destruction and creation of value. This might serve as a basis for the constant creation of freshly added-value. Second stage – Conduct an audit within each commune to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of human resources and technical capability. Third stage - From the conclusions of the audit, draw up an “institutional reinforcement plan.” This stage is essential, since without such a plan there can be neither increase in skills nor the establishment of management procedures. The institutional reinforcement plan will accordingly cover two aspects to be developed concomitantly. The first concerns the establishment of an “administrative temporality management.” The second deals with a training plan for the elected officials and the mayor office managerial staff. Indeed, it is advisable to combine the training plan and the management procedures to avoid the protagonists getting out of step and possibly rejecting the arrangements being proposed. The idea is to establish a “learning organization” approach within a virtuous circle. As regards the “administrative temporality management” aspect, three dimensions must be kept in mind: a) Introducing memory management. The analogy is of a human suddenly struck with amnesia, losing their bearings and having great difficulty facing the future. The same is true of societies and civilisations that must be able to recover and organize their collective memory. In Haiti, establishing an “archive management system” within the communes and communal sections is paramount. b) Introducing a process of management, decisions and deliberations so as to meet two criteria - motivation and the publication of proceedings. As a side-effect, the democratic process will be noticeably strengthened. c) Introducing a project management system so that local officials and their staffs can look out several years, providing a view of future development. Fourth stage - The local development plan. It is critical that local authorities have (or regain) control of their future, with the ability to steer and coordinate the various players (NGOs, businesses, donors, etc.) operating in their territories (communes and communal sections). The institutional reinforcement plan, described above, combines training for local officials in a new management setting. Together, they make it possible to introduce and perfect a local development plan. Remember, the problem is not the lack of initiative but the lack of coordination. The development plan will cover all spheres of competence of a local government, such as welfare and education, local town planning, water, sewage, garbage collection, etc. Forward-planning arrangements, say three successive five-year plans, might be devised. The development and implementation of the

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plans would need to be constantly reviewed and readjusted. Plans made at the communal section and communal levels will point the way for departmental and whole-country planning. Indeed, the combined goals and objectives of the local plans will be measured against and fitted into a national plan prepared by the Central State. II-B The Implementing Operators Development (and restoration) plans must eventually be implemented. This requires willingness, know-how and resources, expressed through a contracting procedure. Three categories of participants are imagined: - The first are the contracting local authorities, e.g. town councils, that will serve as contracting authorities. As they are currently fragile (underfunded, understaffed, under-savvy), they could be supported by professional contracting deputies who will assist in preparing plans and specifications, issuing requests for proposals, evaluating bids, etc. The International Cities Network for Haiti might be a good source of expertise for this. - The second are a certain number of prime contractors or project supervisors responsible for carrying out sets of projects according to the plans and specifications of communes and communal sections. - The third are the numerous potential subcontractors, Haitian and non-Haitian, who will compete for individual projects and work under the supervision of prime contractors. The indispensable re-grading that must take place between the contracting authorities and the prime contractors means that they will be genuine practitioners, not theoreticians and management academics. - - - - - - - This paper is summarized from the December 10, 2009 presentation given to technical advisers of the United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti, former President Bill Clinton. It was prepared by Aldy Castor, M.D., President of the Haitian Resource Development Foundation, by representatives of the City of Suresnes (France) including Deputy Mayor Jean-Louis Testud, and Territorial Administrator and Managing Director of Suresness Philippe François. Background material for the theoretical framework of the document as presented: Théorie de la forme (Theory of form) Georg Simmel Sociologie, étude des formes de la socialisation, P.U.F., 1999 (Sociology, study of forms of socialisation) Sociologie des organisations (Sociology of organisations) Théorie de l'acteur stratégique et système d'action concret (Theory of the strategic player) and (system of concrete action) Michel Crozier et Erhard Friedberg "L'Acteur et le système" (1972) (The actor and the system) Erhard Friedberg Livre : "Le pouvoir et la règle" (1993) (Book: The power and the rule) 3er/ théorie de la régulation sociale (Theory of social regulation) Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Les Règles du jeu : L'action collective et la régulation sociale, Armand Colin, Paris, 1997 (The rules of the game: Collective Action and Social regulation)

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