HAITI After Elections Challenges for Preval First 100 Days - ICG 11 May 2006

8/6/2019 HAITI After Elections Challenges for Preval First 100 Days - ICG 11 May 2006

1/16

Policy BriefingLatin America/Caribbean Briefing N10Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 11 May 2006

Haiti after the Elections:Challenges for Prvals First 100 Days

I. OVERVIEWRen Prvals inauguration on 14 May 2006 opens acrucial window of opportunity for Haiti to move beyondpolitical polarisation, crime and economic decline. The

7 February presidential and parliamentary electionssucceeded despite logistical problems, missing tally sheetsand the after-the-fact reinterpretation of the electorallaw. There was little violence, turnout was high, and theresults reflected the general will. The 21 April secondround parliamentary elections were at least as calm, andalthough turnout was lower, the electoral machineryoperated more effectively. During his first 100 daysin office, the new president needs to form a governingpartnership with a multi-party parliament, show Haitianssome visible progress with international help and buildon a rare climate of optimism in the country.

Prval has a strong base in the parliament, although hisLespwa party has no majority and will need to reach outto form legislative alliances if it is to make good the chanceto overcome the divisive factors that have kept Haiti thehemispheres poorest country and a perennial candidatefor failed state status. The new president also needs tochoose a strong prime minister who is both committed tohis program and acceptable to a broad range of opinion.Both are essential steps if the paralysis that has afflictedrecent parliaments is to be avoided.

The Prval presidency likewise is dependent on stronginternational support. As president-elect he has travelledto the neighbouring Dominican Republic; to Brazil, Chileand Argentina; to the UN and to Washington; and toCuba, Venezuela and Canada. He has called for the UNpeacekeeping mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) to remainand has appealed before the Security Council and theOrganisation of American States (OAS) for long-termdevelopment aid. A ministerial conference in Brasilia on23 May is an opportunity to spell out his priorities to theinternational community and will be followed by a donorspledging conference in Port-au-Prince in July. Prvals

call for a 25-year governance and development pact isambitious but should generate at least a consensus on thelong-term nature of the peacebuilding enterprise.

Deep structural challenges still threaten what may beHaitis last chance to extricate itself from chaos anddespair, and action in the first 100 days is needed toconvey to Haitians that a new chapter has been openedin their history.

Security. It is essential to preserve the much

improved security situation in the capital since theend of January. In large part the improvement stemsfrom a tacit truce declared by some of the maingangs especially those in Cit Soleil whoseleaders support Prval. The new administrationand MINUSTAH should pursue efforts to combinereduced gang violence with rapid implementation ofhigh-profile interventions to benefit the inhabitantsof the capitals worst urban districts. Urgent actionis needed to disarm and dismantle urban and ruralarmed gangs through a re-focused Disarmament,Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program.

Policing. To deal with the threats posed byorganised criminal elements and drug-traffickers,the Haitian National Police (HNP) need to bereformed, professionalised and strengthened. Thegovernment and MINUSTAH must agree onimplementation of the Security Council mandatefor UN vetting and supervision of the HNP. A firstpriority will then be to purge it of corrupt officersand break up the police cells with links to criminalelements and political factions. That force, includingthe coast guard, will have to grow to some 15,000

by the end of Prvals term.

Political cohesion. Urgent measures are neededto help repair a social fabric badly damaged inrecent years by political polarisation, deepeningantipathies between the mass of the populationand the elite, worsening poverty and a generalisedsense of hopelessness. These include:

quickly meeting some of the high expectationsof the Prval supporters but also reachingout to organised middle and upper class and

business sectors who voted against him butwho in turn have the obligation now to meethim halfway;


2/16

Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Prvals First 100 Days

Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N10 Page 2

using the World Bank-sponsored PovertyReduction Strategy Plan to provide thefoundation for the national dialogue that nevermaterialised under the transitional government,one encompassing the substantial participationof the poor, grassroots community groups and

women; and discouraging at all costs any early return to

Haiti of former President Jean-BertrandAristide, which would undermine the newgovernment and instantly reignite politicalturmoil.

Economic renewal. Prval has declared his beliefthat economic development is heavily dependenton private investment, which requires at least thepromise of improved infrastructure and the socialand political stability provided by good governanceand solid institutions. A first step is to look at waysto resolve the electricity supply crisis in the capital.Education and employment-generation also arekey areas for immediate investment, particularlywhen students in some schools are being expelledbecause their parents, hit by high prices andeconomic stagnation, cannot pay for uniforms andschool fees.

Prval should press the World Bank, perhaps withthe support of the Inter-American DevelopmentBank, to help put in place systems for economic

governance that would allow him to make goodon his promise to root out corruption in publicadministration. He also needs to concentrate newpolicies and programs on improving the lot ofHaitis poor majority, particularly the traditionallyneglected rural poor.

Judicial Reform. All structures related to the ruleof law need comprehensive reform if there is to beinvestment in Haiti. A joint international andnational judicial panel should be formed to reviewquickly cases of political prisoners and those being

detained without trial. Significant numbers of the85 to 90 per cent of prisoners who have not yet beentried have been in jail longer than they would havebeen if given maximum sentences for their allegedcrimes. Justice reform is a long-term task but it muststart the day the Prval government takes office andhave full international support.

II. BACKGROUND

Faced with the prospect of large-scale clashes followingan escalating political crisis, former President Aristide waspressured to leave the country on 29 February 2004, andhis Fanmi Lavalas party government collapsed, replaced

by a transitional government headed by the then SupremeCourt chief justice, Boniface Alexandre, as presidentand Grard Latortue as prime minister. The UN SecurityCouncil authorised deployment of a Multinational InterimForce that was replaced in June 2004 by a Brazilian-ledpeacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH.1 In June 2005,

it was enlarged, and as of 31 March 2006 had 8,903uniformed personnel 7,151 troops, 1,752 police supported by more than 2,000 local and internationalcivilian personnel. It is headed by the SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General, JuanGabriel Valds.2

The transitional government failed to fully establish itsauthority in most provinces, where during 2004 andearly 2005 armed former rebels and ex-members of theHaitian Armed Forces (ex-FAdH) acted unlawfully assecurity providers. From the end of September 2004,armed gangs were increasingly active in many of thecapitals poor neighbourhoods. Many of the gangs weremanipulated by factions sympathetic to former PresidentAristide, others by anti-Aristide groupings, drug-traffickersor other criminal organisations and, in at least one instance,even elements of the business elite. Violent gang clashesover urban turf, politics and criminal enterprises and withMINUSTAH and the police (HNP) claimed hundreds oflives.3

In early 2005, MINUSTAH finallydeployed country-

wide and with a more robust approach ousted the armedformer rebels and ex-FAdH from provincial towns. Thetransitional government began distributing compensationpayments to former soldiers in lieu of back-pay for the tenyears since the FAdH was disbanded. Disarmament anddemobilisation of the ex-FAdH has been extremelylimited, however, so these groups retain a potential fordestabilisation in some communities. The security situationdeteriorated in Port-au-Prince, as gang activity and seriouscrime spread from the poor neighbourhoods, and for muchof 2005 the city was in a state of siege. A new phenomenon kidnapping for ransom reached epidemic proportions

in mid-year and again in December.

Although the organisation of elections for a new president,a parliament, municipal mayors and local governmentcouncils and assemblies was one of the transitionalgovernments main tasks, the process ran into innumerabledifficulties. Half a dozen dates for the presidential andlegislative elections were announced, then postponed.Partisan and personal rifts and disorganisation within thenine-person Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) accounted

1 UN Security Council Resolution 1529, 29 February 2004.2 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/facts.3 See Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report N13,Spoiling Security in Haiti, 31 May 2005.


3/16



for most delays. There were initially dysfunctional refusalsto coordinate with the OAS, which controlled voterregistration, and with MINUSTAH, which was responsiblefor security, provided technical electoral assistance,managed the finances, hired personnel and possessedvirtually all logistical resources. The OAS and MINUSTAH

had to negotiate almost daily for CEPs approval. Theappointment of Director General Jacques Bernard inOctober 2005 finally broke some of the bureaucraticlogjam.

Voter registration began slowly in April 2005, but bythe time it closed in November 2005, 3,535,025 morethan 80 per cent of those eligible had registered foridentification cards.4 For security reasons, a much lowernumber of voting centres than in previous elections 804compared to more than 1,200 in 2000 were established.Although one registration centre was in Cit Soleil, no

voting centre was opened in the sprawling slum, whichhas remained more or less a no-go area for the police andMINUSTAH. CEP members had no interest in boostingturnout there anyway, and residents were forced to vote innearby centres which they did in large numbers.

According to opinion polls, the clear favourite for thepresidency was Ren Prval, who held the office from1996 to 2001. Prval had been closely involved in theLavalas movement for political change that emerged inthe late 1980s and gave rise to the Aristide presidency in1990. He served as prime minister under Aristide in themonths preceding the September 1991 coup dtat. ThePrval presidency was marked by deteriorating relationswith his former ally, Aristide, and when asked by FanmiLavalas leaders in 2005 to stand as their candidate for thepresidency, he refused. Instead he forged a new politicalgroup, Lespwa (Hope in Creole), composed of twosmall parties that emerged from the now divided Lavalasmovement, the Open the Gate Party (PLB) and theEskanp/Korega,5 and two peasant organisations, KONPAand KOZEPEP, that Prval had helped establish with hisfriend, the broadcaster, Jean Dominique, in the late 1990s.6

4 According to the 2003 census, the total eligible voters (thoseover eighteen) was 4,448,065 but MINUSTAH commissioned ademographic analysis and concluded this was too high and thata more accurate estimate was between 3.4 and 3.7 million. Thatwas clearly an underestimate, however, since 3.5 million actuallyregistered.5 The Ef ak Solidarite pou Konstwi yon Altnativ NasyonalPopil/Koordinasyon Resistans Grandans (Eskanp-Korega -Effort and Solidarity to Build a Popular National Alternative/GrandAnse Resistance Coordination).6 Jean Dominique, the director of Radio Haiti Inter, was a vocalLavalas supporter, who in the late 1990s grew increasinglycritical of Aristide and the party. He was assassinated bypersons unknown in April 2000. KONPA is the abbreviation

Prvals prospects were enhanced by disqualification ongrounds of dual citizenship, forbidden by the constitutionfor elected officials of Dumarsais Simus, a multi-millionaire Haitian-American businessman popular due tohis rags-to-riches history and lack of ties with establishedparties.7 Another factor was the last-minute Fanmi Lavalas

decision to back Marc Bazin. Having failed to register thevery popular Father Grard Jean-Juste, because he facedcriminal charges, a faction of the party allied itself withBazin and backed him for the presidency. Jean-Juste wouldhave cut into Prvals high urban vote from neighbourhoodslike Cit Soleil and Bel-Air, though how much is far fromclear. By contrast, Bazin was remembered primarily asAristides main opponent in the 1990 election and primeminister during the 1991-1994 military regime.

Opinion polls suggested the other main contenders wouldbe the perennial challenger, Leslie Manigat, a Christian

Democrat who was briefly as president in 1988, aftercontroversial elections backed by the army and boycottedby most parties, and Charles Henri Baker, a businessmanand leader of the Group of 184 coalition of business,religious and non-governmental organisations thatspearheaded the anti-Aristide movement in 2003-2004.The Group of 184s official position was neutrality in theelections, and Baker had resigned from it to campaign asan independent. Popular with certain sections of themulatto elite in Ptionville, he improved his chances ofsupport from the poor, black majority by entering into atactical alliance with KONBA, the new party formedby peasant leader Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, head of thePapay Peasant Movement (MPP).8 Among the other 31contenders were party leaders who have been fixtures onthe political scene for twenty years without ever buildingeffective party machines, a coterie of Protestant ministers,and aspirants linked to the former military. Additionally,more than 40 parties put up 1,300 candidates to contest 30Senate seats (three for each of ten administrativedepartments) and 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.9

for Konfederasyon Nasyonal Peyizan Agrikl (NationalConfederation of Peasant Farmers), an organisation that grewout of the Association des Planteurs de la Plaine de Logne, apeasant organisation with which Prval and Dominique wereinvolved in the 1990s. KOZEPEP was also originally formed byPrval and Dominique in the Artibonite Department but nearlydissolved just after Aristides election in 2000. It was reformedas the Electoral Affairs Committee for Clean Elections, and afew months ago renamed as the Peasants Interests AffairsCommittee for Integration and Progress, again maintaining theCreole acronym of KOZEPEP.7 Another Haitian-American businessman, Samir Mourra, wasdisqualified for the same reason.8 Konbit pou Bati Ayiti, (Cooperative Action to Build Haiti). Thepartys acronym KONBA means fight or combat in Creole.9 The Senate and the Chamber of deputies together constitutethe National Assembly.


4/16



III. PRESIDENTIAL ANDPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

A. THE FIRST ROUNDFirst round presidential and legislative elections werefinally held on 7 February 2006. While internationalsexpressed concerns, including for violence, ahead oftime, in most respects the day was a success. By theend of January, 3.1 million people had collected theirvoter identification cards (approximately 90 per centof registered voters), and more than two million voted aturnout that compares favourably with recent generalelections.10 The high number of voters and reducednumber of voting centres, combined with logisticalproblems and poorly trained electoral staff, contributed

to chaotic scenes in some centres, particularly the eightmega centres in each of which between 16,276 and24,268 voters were registered.11 Many centres did notopen on time, and thousands had to wait in long lines forhours.12 Centres stayed open after 4 p.m. so those alreadyin line could vote but this meant it was already dark whencounting began, and lack of electricity in many centresclearly hampered that process. The positive attitude ofpoll workers, party workers, and domestic and internationalobservers in helping those bewildered by the confusionfind their way to a table to vote ultimately saved theday. Party workers generally also allowed voters with

registration cards to vote even if their names were not onthe specific voting table list.13

Serious incidents involving violence and the loss,destruction or theft of voting materials required a rerun atfourteen centres around the country. In Port-au-Prince, atacit truce declared by armed gangs in the weeks precedingthe elections was maintained, and there were no violentincidents.

Most observers national and international agreedthat what irregularities there were on the day were not

10 The numbers voting represented 60 per cent of registeredvoters, and 65 per cent of registered voters who had collectedtheir voter identification cards.11 Crisis Group interviews, MINUSTAH officials andinternational observers, Port-au-Prince, February 2006.12 Crisis Group observed the delays in Port-au-Prince, as did allnational and international monitoring teams. Interim Report No.2 November 1, 2005 through February 28, 2006, IFES LongTerm Election Observation Mission in Haiti (funded by theU.S.); International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections,Supplementary Report on the February 7, 2006, Elections,(funded by Canada), at http://www.mieeh-immhe.ca/media_apr0406_e.html; Crisis Group interviews, domestic monitoringgroups and UN and OAS elections teams, February 2006.13 Ibid.

serious and that compilation of the vote tallies (procs-verbaux) was mostly free and fair. The first suspicionsabout possible manipulation of the count with the aimof blocking a first round Prval victory were voiced onpublication of partial results as they became available.Two days after the election, the first partial results were

announced based on less than 15 per cent of the totalvote, from five departments. Largely from Port-au-Prince,they showed Prval with 61 per cent. As results frommore remote departments arrived at the tabulation centrein Port-au-Prince, his percentage was seen to be slipping.A feasible explanation was that, in contrast to previouselections when voter preferences were much the sameacross the country, there were significant regionalvariations. Specifically, the results indicated that whilePrval enjoyed massive popularity in the OuestDepartment, including Port-au-Prince and its suburbs,others were stronger in the provinces.14

Lespwa supporters were convinced, though, that the resultswere being manipulated to deprive Prval of the majorityhe needed for a first round victory. Suspicions focused onmissing tallies from a small but crucial number of votingcentres and the many invalid and blank ballots. Theseanomalies could perhaps partly be explained by the minimalvoter education campaign and mistakes by poorly trainedand exhausted poll workers, but in a climate of suspicionand mistrust that reflected five years of polarised politics,it was impossible to dispel allegations of fraud. Tensionsincreased when two of the nine CEP members allegedmanipulation in the media. Thousands of Prval supporterswent into the capitals streets in largely peaceful protestdemonstrations.

One week after the election, after some 92 per cent of thetally sheets had been tabulated, including 4.3 per centblank votes and 7.4 per cent invalid votes, Prvals sharehad dipped slightly below 49 per cent. While somecandidates agreed that a second round would not be in thecountrys best interests, his nearest challenger, LeslieManigat, who had polled just 11 per cent, insisted on it. In

part because Lespwas partial tallies seemed to show afirst round win, Prval was just as intransigent, publiclydenouncing massive fraud or gross errors.15 The

14 In the Ouest Department, Prval polled 63 per cent, but inthe Nord-Ouest polled only 23 per cent, trailing Luc Fleurinord(MIRN) who had 26 per cent. In the Centre Department, Prvalhad 37 per cent, ahead of Charles Henri Baker, the independentallied with the local peasant leader Chavannes Jean-BaptistesKONBA party, who polled 18 per cent. In the Sud Department,Prval won 41 per cent, Chavannes Jeune (UNION), theBaptist leader, won 26 per cent. See http://www.cep-ht.org/avisresultats.pdf.15 An OAS quick count and a slow count by the NationalDemocratic Institute and its Haitian monitoring group that


5/16



discovery of ballot papers and vote tallies at the Truitierrubbish dump outside the capital further inflamed thesituation.16 After more pro-Prval street protests hadparalysed the capital and under pressure from diplomatsto resolve the crisis, the CEP chose to ignore the electorallaw stipulation that blank votes should be considered

valid, as protest votes, and apply the so-called Belgianformula of distributing the blank votes proportionallyamong all the candidates. This pushed Prvals total to 51per cent, and made him president-elect without a secondround.17

After subsequent reviews by MINUSTAH identifyingthe origins of most of the missing tally sheets, an argumentcould be made that Prvals vote even without the CEPruling might have topped 50 per cent. Although thedecision to use it was controversial because of when it wasmade, several international electoral experts concurred

that the Belgian formula was viewed as appropriate forthe case.18

Resolution of the crisis was welcomed in nearly allquarters, with the notable exception of Manigat, whodenounced the CEP decision and called on his party, theRDNP, to withdraw from the legislative elections inprotest. While most RDNP candidates ignored this, hiswife, Mirlande, who had received strong support in her

did not factor in blank votes also encouraged Prval to believe

he had crossed the 50 per cent threshold.16 Joseph Guyler Delva, Burned ballots inflame Haitianelection tensions, Reuters, 15 February 2006.17 While only two deputy seats were won outright in the firstround, it is hard to understand why the Belgian formula wasapplied in the presidential contest but not in the parliamentaryones.18 The CEP adopted a specific procedure for compiling blankballots for the presidential election. The Constitution providesthat the president, senators and deputies are elected by an absolutemajority of votes cast (ss. 90.1, 94.2, 134). Under the ElectoralDecree, the president, senators and deputies are elected by anabsolute majority of votes received in the first round, that is, 50

percent plus one of the valid votes cast (ss. 75, 81, 87). Undersection 185 of the Electoral Decree, however, unmarked ballotsare deemed valid and are compiled. In a two-round, absolutemajority electoral system, compiling blank ballots creates thepossibility of it beingmathematically impossible for a candidateto obtain an absolute majority of votes in the second round, whichruns counter to the Constitution. Within this legal framework,the CEP made the right decision by pro-rating the blank ballotsbased on the number of votes received by each presidentialcandidate. This approach, which nullifies the effect of the blankballots on the percentage received by each candidate, ensuredcompliance with the Constitution, which is the fundamental lawof the country. The IMMHE also notes that this approach is inkeeping with general international practice, although there are afew exceptions, such as in Colombia, where blank votes must,nevertheless, be expressly marked by the voter. SupplementaryReport on the February 7, 2006 Elections, op. cit.

bid for a Senate seat representing the Ouest Departmentand was well-placed to win a run-off, did withdraw. Thatwas unfortunate: she is a competent and principledpolitician, representing a significant sector of the middleclass, who would have enhanced the new legislature. Herwithdrawal was all the more disappointing as she was one

of the few women candidates who demonstrated voterappeal.19

Only four women were elected to the Senate and two tothe Chamber of Deputies, although two others are leadingafter the 21 April Chamber races and will be in the secondround run-off expected in June or July.20 Includingprominent women such as Manigat, Michele Pierre-Louis,Myriam Merlet, Maryse Pnette and many others in thePrval administration would signal a desire to improve therepresentation and role of women in the nations politics.21Haiti has had women as prime minister, foreign minister

and interim president in the recent past, and it is anticipatedthat additional women may be named to cabinet and othersenior posts in the new government. The minister forwomen made special efforts during the registration periodto get women on the voter rolls. They constituted 49.21 percent of total registered voters and were in a slight majorityin the Artibonite, Nord and Nord-Ouest departments.

19 Of the 54 candidates contesting 27 Senate seats in the second

round, seven were women: Mona Bernadeau (KONBA),Huguette Lamour (Fusion), Marie Ghislhaine Mompremier(Fusion), Melanie Charles Simon (GFCD), Eveline Cheron(Fanmi Lavalas), Marie Denise Claude (Fusion), and EdmondeSupplice Beauzile (Fusion). The latter three are members of theKowalisyon Ayisyn Fanm Lid (COHFEL/KOFL), a USAID-supported organisation encouraging womens participation inpolitics. Another three women were standing for the three Senateseats on which four districts in the Nord-Est Department werevoting for the first time because of disruptions in February. Nonemade it to the run-off. In the Deputy races, thirteen women madeit through the first round and were candidates for the 97seatscontested in the second round. See http://www.cep-ht.org/avis

resultats.pdf.20 Hugette Lamour (Nippes) and Edmonde Beauzile (Centre),both of FUSION, Eveline Cheron (Ouest), Fanmi Lavalas andCemephise Gilles (Nord), Lespwa, were elected to the Senate;Me Clunie Dumay and Marie Josie Etienne were elected to theChamber of Deputies and Gerandale Telusma and Ogline Pierrewill be in the second round run-off for the Chamber http://207.234.224.237/eis2da/21 Merlet is president of Enfofam (a womens association);Pierre-Louis is executive director of FOKAL (the Open SocietyInstitute in Haiti); Pnette was secretary of state for tourism inPrvals first administration. During Aristides first presidency,Claudette Werleigh served as foreign minister and later primeminister, and Marie-Michele Rey served as finance minister. Thetransition president in 1990 through the presidential electionwhich resulted in Aristides first election was Erta PascaleTrouillot, previously a judge.


6/16



Breakdown of turnout by gender has not yet beenreleased.22

The third-placed candidate, with 8.2 per cent, CharlesHenri Baker had expected to do better23 but he wasabandoned during the campaign by some of his natural

business constituency, who backed Manigat or Prval.24For the other established party leaders, the results weredevastating. The social democrat Fusions Serge Gilles,the OPLs Paul Denis, and the Alyans Evans Paul eachpolled around 2.5 per cent, while the GFCDs HubertDeronceray and a host of other politicians who haveenjoyed media and diplomatic attention over the last tenyears or more won less than 1 per cent each. Deroncerayhas announced his retirement from active political life,and others may follow his lead. The rejection of thetraditional politicians was highlighted by the success ofChavannes Jeune,25 the Union Party leader who came

fourth with nearly 6 per cent of the vote. His popularity isbased on his coming from a background of poverty, hisability to communicate in small groups with peasantfarmers, and perhaps most significantly on the publicsappreciation of his position as a Baptist leader who ranone of the largest church-affiliated school programs ratherthan as a politician.26

While the CEP was generally praised for resolving thecrisis over the first round presidential results, its overallperformance was poor. From the start, it was plagued byinternal rivalries, ineptitude and charges of corruption andpartisanship. Many of the organisational problems withthe elections can be attributed to CEPs inadequateleadership.27 Its failings were exposed by increasingly

22 Interim Report No. 2 November 1, 2005 through February28, 2006, IFES Long Term Election Observation Mission inHaiti, p. 2. Also see the CEP website for full breakdown ofvoter registration, http://www.cep-ht.org/statistic.html.23 Let me be honest and say that Prval has as much chanceas a snowball in hell of winning any elections here. That I amcertain of, Charles Henri Baker, interview with the Caribbean

Media Corporation news agency, 6 February 2006.24 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, February 2006.25 Chavannes Jeune is a Baptist pastor and a leader of the MissionEvangelique Baptiste du Sud dHaiti. He was elected as leaderand presidential candidate of the political party, the NationalChristian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti (Union NationaleChrtienne Pour la Reconstruction dHati, UNCRH), in January2005. The UNCRH party is better known in Haiti as Union.26 Crisis group interview, Port-au-Prince, 15 February 2006.27 An example of CEP confusion was its contradictory decisionson blank ballots. During the presidential first round, it madea late night decision to use the Belgian system for distributingblank votes among the candidates, thereby permitting a firstround win since that method ended any doubt as to whetherPrval had passed the 50 per cent threshold. In the parliamentaryfirst round, CEP decided that blank votes were not to bedistributed to each candidate but assumed to be valid votes,

public disagreements between its nine members, and bythe resistance to Director General Bernards efforts atcoordination.28 The legislative second round and the smallnumber of re-run first round contests29 on 21 April werebetter organised and less problematic, not least becauseelection workers were more experienced, voter turnout

was lower, and ballot lists were smaller.

Once Prval takes office, the CEP may be dissolved,presenting an opportunity to form a more professionalsuccessor body free from the political rivalries that wereso damaging. A few second round legislative run-offsare due on 18 June, although that date is likely to slip.Municipal elections hopefully will be held at the sametime, although no final decision has been made, and localgovernment assembly elections are clearly now going to bedelayed substantially to a date yet to be determined. Theneed for a competent electoral administration is paramount.

Under the constitution, a permanent CEP can not comeinto being until after local elections, since the bottom-upnomination process for it must start with the local councils.However, a new provisional CEP to oversee the municipalelections could be formed, using the best of theprofessionals now working under Bernard, while theparliament prepared a law to establish a permanentadministrative electoral apparatus.

B. THE SECOND ROUND:The CEP reported that the second round parliamentaryelections on 21 April had a 30.8 per cent turnout, far lowerthan the first rounds 60 per cent but not an unusual declinein view of the lack of a presidential contest. Given thepaucity of civic education, funds for parties and candidates,and general absence of campaigning, it was a decent effortby citizens to make their voices heard.

The second round had 194 candidates running for theremaining 97 deputy seats and 54 for the 27 Senate seats.30

thereby making it more difficult for candidates to cross the 50per cent threshold and avoid a run-off. In the parliamentarysecond round, it decided the blank votes were to be consideredinvalid, and a candidate merely had to achieve a plurality. CrisisGroup telephone interview, Port-au-Prince, 4 May 2006.28 Bernard left Haiti for the U.S. on 19 February 2006, claiminghis life had been threatened. He returned two weeks laterdemanding that two members of the CEP be dismissed. This wasnot done but he has resumed administrative management of theelection process.29 Senate elections for three seats in the Nord-Est Departmentand fourteen deputy contests in various parts of the countrywere rerun because of ballot-paper errors, destruction of votesandprocs-verbaux and other discrepancies on 7 February.30 Two seats in the Chamber of Deputies were decided in thefirst round, none in the Senate.


7/16



The four districts in the Nord-Est Department redoing thefirst round will need to do a second round later. The finalranking of the senators in the second round is important,since the leading vote-getter in each department will servefor six years, the next highest for four years and the lowestof the three successful candidates for two years. Senators

will thereafter all be elected for six-year terms but thiswill allow a third of the seats to turn over every two years.

The unofficial Senate results show that eleven of the fifteencandidates Prvals Lespwa party ran were successful inseven departments. They were shut out in the Nord-Ouest,Sud and Nord-Est Departments. OPL won four seats,Fusion and Fanmi Lavalas three each and four other partiesone or two each.31

The unofficial and incomplete results for the Chamber ofDeputies show Prval far from a governing majority. While

Lespwa begins in the Senate with eleven of the sixteenvotes needed for a simple majority and can probably counton Fanmi Lavalas for another three, it has won only twentyseats in the lower Chamber, with Fanmi Lavalas addinganother five. To obtain a majority (50), it will need to reachout to other parties. It appears Fusion has won sixteenseats, Alyans eleven, OPL/KONBA ten, and Union six. Arange of parties holding four or fewer accounts for 21, withanother ten seats still uncertain.32

To a degree, smaller number of voters made it easy toavoid problems that plagued the first round. The authorities

also dealt with some of those problems, for example byhiring 1,000 additional guards for the mega centres,changing 29 sites and adding 26 annexes. The tally sheetswere checked at the eleven department-level electoraloffices (BEDs)33 to be sure that the tamper-proof bagswith ballots and tally sheets from the voting centreswere complete. MINUSTAH assigned 150 additionalinternational staff to supervise that process. The training ofthe 36,888 poll workers hired for the second round wentinto the week of the balloting but it appears that less thana half percent of the tally sheets failed to turn up at theBEDs and the Vote Tabulation Centre.34 The CEP isinvestigating seven official complaints of electoral lawviolations.

In the context of Haitis political polarisation, Prvalsneed to negotiate alliances, especially in the lower Chamber,can be positive since he will need to obtain buy-in from asubstantial portion of the opposition in order to move his

31 See full breakdown of election results at http://207.234.224.237/eis2da/.32 Prval has shown more inclination to try for an alliancewith OPL, Fusion and Alyans in parliament rather than withFanmi Lavalas.33 Because of its size the Ouest Department has two BEDs.34 Crisis Group interview, Port-au-Prince, April 2006.

program forward. If the opposition uses its leverage topursue policy goals rather than narrow partisanship, theentire process could benefit. It would be the kind of shiftin political paradigm Haiti desperately needs.

IV. THE CHALLENGESA. SECURITYSince January 2006, Port-au-Prince has experienceda welcome reduction in violence and crime, includingkidnapping. This reflects the support Prval enjoys from anumber of gang and community leaders in the poorerareas, in particular Cit Soleil. Soon after the election, onealleged gang leader, Augudson Nicolas (General Toutou),

announced that his followers would hand over their gunsto the government. Another, Amaral Duclona, who isconsidered one of Cit Soleils most powerful figures andis also often referred to as Haitis most wanted man,openly campaigned for Prval. He said he and his followerswanted peace but that their willingness to disarm woulddepend on implementation of a generalised disarmamentprogram.35 The new administration needs to takeadvantage of such support from gang leaders and theirsupporters in order to make the precarious peace a lastingone but the bottom line is that the illegal armed gangscannot be allowed to continue to operate.

Prval has said that Cit Soleils security problems cannotbe resolved by military means, and he wants to prioritiseimprovements in the dire socio-economic conditions.36 Atthe same time, Fanmi Lavalas grassroots leaders from CitSoleil say there is a willingness to work with the authoritiesto implement programs benefiting the poor. Two RenMomplaisir and John Joel Joseph are in continuing touchwith the transition team, with the former accompanyingPrval on some of his foreign travels, including tothe U.S. This is a bold but risky move. It gives the newadministration the line into the area it needs to implement

education, health and job-creation programs. If theprograms are not implemented quickly enough or fail toprevent a resumption of violence in Cit Soleil, however,the administrations association with these leaders willdamage its reputation with those who still maintain a deepantipathy to the Fanmi Lavalas party.

While pursuing engagement directly with communityleaders and indirectly with gang leaders willing to renounce

35 Jim Loney, Joy greets Prval victory in violent Haiti slum,Reuters, 16 February 2006.36 Radio Solidarit interview, 3 February, 2006; Haitispresident-elect meets with Rice, Mbeki, Agence France-Presse,13 March 2006.


8/16



violence and participate in community regeneration projects,the Prval government will simultaneously need to reassertthe rule of law in Cit Soleil and other poor areas of thecapital. A first step would be to re-establish a police (HNP)presence in Cit Soleil. The withdrawal of MINUSTAHsJordanian regiment from its deployment on the outskirts

of Cit Soleil and its replacement by a Latin Americancontingent would be another significant contribution toimproved relations between the local population and theauthorities. Differences of language, culture and approachhave made it hard for the Jordanians to handle the urbancomplexities, particularly when they have been the targetof sniper and other attacks. As a result, they have beencriticised for using excessive firepower in denselypopulated areas, particularly following the killing of twoof their members.

There has not yet been any real disarmament, demobilisation

and reintegration (DDR) program. In part this is due to thedifficulties of implementation in the absence of a peaceaccord, a reconciliation process, or a political agreementwith the elements that support the armed groups.37However, the new administrations standing in areas likeCit Soleil suggest prospects are much improved. Prvaland MINUSTAH need to act quickly on DDR. Withregard to the ex-FAdH, the transitional governmentfocused on disbursing back-pay, and some minimal DDRhas taken place. This never moved, however, from somepartial payments more than a year ago to a completedprocess of registration, turn-in of weapons, identificationand dismantlement of command structures and monitoringof reintegration. Some ex-FAdH were introduced intothe police after questionable vetting and training.38

The new government should link disbursement of anystill owed payments to the handover of weapons and fulldismantling of any organised structures. Similar tangibleresults and agreed deadlines should be imposed on theDDR process in urban slums. No one should be allowedon the streets with heavy weapons other than police andall small arms should be licensed.

As part of the effort to deprive illegal armed groups ofrevenue from drug-trafficking and other smuggling andinterrupt illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons,at least one port should be secured by MINUSTAH,criminal elements removed and, in concert with the Prvalgovernment, run jointly for a brief period while donorshelp the new government restructure the operation.After evaluation, the experience could be replicated inother ports. Spoilers involved in smuggling and customs

37 Crisis Group interview, Desmond Molloy, MINUSTAH,March 2006.38 See Crisis Group Special Briefing, Update on Haiti for theUN Security Council, 8 April 2005, and Crisis Group Report,Spoiling Security in Haiti, op. cit.

evasion and political entities linked with criminal networksare active at most ports, but Gonaves, Saint-Marc, FortLibert and Miragone would be good candidates for anUN-run process of restructuring and reform, which wouldalso assist the government by bringing in revenuesotherwise lost to corruption and smuggling. Similar

controls at key border crossings with the DominicanRepublic would likewise be beneficial.

B. POLICINGThe threats posed by hard-core criminal elements, thosewith links to drug-trafficking and former rebels fromthe 2004 uprising39 who fail to disarm require aconcentrated enforcement strategy. The first step shouldbe a determined and coherent program to reform,professionalise and enlarge the HNP.

HNP strength is estimated at 4,500, though the officialfigure, following graduation of three police academyclasses, is more than 6,000. The imprecision is indicativeof the problems confronting the Haitian authoritiesand MINUSTAH in attempts to reform the HNP.MINUSTAHs registration of HNP personnel should havebeen completed in March 2006 as precondition for seriousvetting. Although the HNP chief, Mario Andrsol, said hebelieves 25 per cent of his officers are corrupt and shouldbe dismissed, the transitional government showed littleinterest. The protest from Haitian nationalists in late

February when Prime Minister Latortue signed anagreement giving MINUSTAH greater control over theHNP illustrated the issues sensitivity.40 Facing criticismfor perceived surrender of sovereignty, the transitionalgovernment unfortunately announced it would delayimplementation until Prval took office. The newgovernment must take advantage of the major commitmentthe UN has made to have MINUSTAH quickly proceedwith vetting, beginning with the HNP leadership andworking through the ranks.

Andrsol showed leadership by volunteering to be the

first vetted. The process must seek to identify not justthose involved in criminal activity, corruption and human

39 In Gonaives in late March and early April 2006, formermembers of the so-called Cannibal Army were involved inviolent clashes with HNP and MINUSTAH forces and attackeda police station in an effort to free one of its leaders.40 Crisis Group telephone interview, New York, 22 February2006. The agreements title is Arrangement on the monitoring,restructuring and reforming of the Haitian National Police (HNP)and the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, publicorder and public safety in Haiti Supplement to the Agreementbetween the United Nations and the Government of HaitiConcerning the Status of the United Nations Stabilisation Missionin Haiti (MINUSTAH).


9/16



rights violations but also members of cells with politicalties.41 Two ex-FAdH officers with political aspirations,former Fanmi Lavalas Senator Dany Toussaint andex-rebel leader Guy Philippe, have close links withHNP elements that need to be broken if the force is bereformed.

The HNP is demoralised, its infrastructure in need ofrepair. The entire institution needs reinforcing, andthe process cannot start soon enough. The UN police(UNPOL) should extend monitoring and coaching of HNPofficers in the field and locate in HNP stations, rather than

just visit. MINUSTAHs mandate expires on 15 August.The new one should clearly detail an expanded UNPOLrole and an increase in its numbers by a factor of two orthree, as requested by Prval, particularly specialists andFrench-speakers.

Closer monitoring and accompaniment of HNP officers inthe field is necessary both to instil new approaches, bestpractices and human rights values, and to help restorepublic confidence. Improved work conditions and salaries,as well as welfare benefits such as health and life insuranceand perhaps housing assistance, should be an essential partof the reform package and organised with performanceincentives.42 Salaries averaging around $100 monthly should be increased in order to reward competence andhonesty, reduce corruption and attract new, better-qualityrecruits. If UNPOL officers are to share premises with theHNP, as they should, police stations need to renovated.

The international community has a crucial role to play inhelping the new government meet the policing challenge.Donors need to guarantee funding, including for a long-term program of recruitment and training to produceup to 15,000 new, non-politicised officers. Member statesare reluctant to second police to UN missions but Haitiscase is urgent. Particularly those with French-speakingpolice and police of Haitian background, such as theU.S. and Canada, must act to fill UNPOL ranks. WhileCanada has sent 80 officers to UNPOL, including aRoyal Canadian Mounted Police officer who heads the

division, the U.S. has sent only 49, far fewer than it could.

C. POLITICAL1. Prval reaching outPrvals landslide victory gives him a mandate toimplement his campaign pledges to eliminate corruption,establish security and reform the police and judiciary

41 Crisis Group interview, Graham Muir, UNPOL, 23 February2006.42 Crisis Group interview, Dennis Modeste, OAS Mission toHaiti, 17 February 2006.

in order to create a climate receptive to the privateinvestment required for economic development.43 It is aprogram on which nearly all Haitians can agree, and hiselection support, while predominantly among the poor,also included middle class and private sector components.One of his main political challenges is the weight of

expectations across the spectrum of society.

Reflecting his broad appeal, the president-elect hasassembled a heterogeneous team of advisers. These includemembers of his earlier administration, such as former PrimeMinister Jacques-Edouard Alexis, former ForeignMinister Fritz Longchamp, and Robert Manuel, the formersecretary of state for public security who resigned in 1999following a concerted campaign by elements within theFanmi Lavalas Party to take control of the HPN. Alsopresent are Charles Suffrard, the KOZEPEP peasantleader, and members of the two small political parties in

the Lespwa alliance, such as Joseph Jasmin, the formerEskanp deputy for the Nord Department in the 1995-1999Parliament.44 Prval also enjoys the close support ofprominent private sector personalities such as Pierre Lger,the successful vtiver producer from Les Cayes. Onthree of his foreign trips since the election, Prval wasaccompanied by private sector delegations, membersof which responded positively to his approach and ideas.However, the new president will only be able to satisfyhis diverse supporters if he receives sustained internationalhelp.

Prvals relations with the party of the previous electedgovernment, the Fanmi Lavalas, are ambivalent. Althoughmuch of its 2000 vote switched to Lespwa, the barringof the candidacy of the imprisoned Jean-Juste and thedecision of one of its factions to ally with the unpopularMarc Bazin were significant contributing factors, andPrval cannot take further support for granted. He hasstressed that he was never a member of the party and hascriticised the corruption of its government. He has goodlinks with some grassroots Fanmi Lavalas leaders but healso has other bases of support, particularly among therural poor.

During the pro-Prval protests in Port-au-Prince in the daysbefore his victory was announced, some demonstratorschanted that a vote for Prval brought the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide closer. But while ties between parts of

43 In an address to the OAS on 29 March 2006, President-electPrval said: We must reform the state to build the nation, restorenational production, develop and value human resources,and re-establish a favourable climate for investment.http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/speeches.asp.44 The Eskanp party emerged from the splintering of the LavalasPolitical Platform (PPL) in 1996-1997 and joined an anti-neo-liberal bloc in the Parliament.


10/16



the capitals poor and the ousted president have endured,they will fade as time passes, especially if the newgovernment can deliver on some of the popularexpectations. In an interview with the BBC from SouthAfrica on 23 February 2006, Aristide interpreted theelection as an indication of the electorates wish for his

return to Haiti. That appears an effort to re-write historysince Aristide originally called for a boycott. His widelyreported remarks had a destabilising effect. When pressedby reporters about Aristide, Prval repeated earlier remarksabout the constitution both allowing all Haitians to leaveand enter the country and giving them recourse to law the latter a barely veiled reference to cases frequentlyrumoured as being prepared against Aristide for corruptionand misappropriation of government funds.

At the end of February, South African representativessuggested Aristide would soon return. In response,

diplomats representing some of the countries involved inthe Haitian transition and peacekeeping suggested an earlyreturn would destabilise an already highly fragile country.At the inauguration of Chilean President Michelle Bachelet,President Thabo Mbeki was urged by other heads ofstates and foreign ministers to head off the polarising andpotentially conflict-producing impact of an Aristide return.And, in early April, South African Foreign MinisterNkosazana Dlamini-Zuma said any decision would be putoff until the new Haitian government was established andcould consider the issue.

In attempting to forge alliances to assemble a workingmajority in the new parliament, Prval and Lespwareportedly have received positive responses fromChavannes Jeunes UNCRH and the social democraticFusion. However, it appears that formal coalition buildingwill only be concluded once legislative election results arefinal. Diplomats should use their contacts to impress uponall candidates and party leaders that regardless of whowins, the results need to be accepted with good grace, sincemost observers now have described the elections to havebeen generally fair and free. The importance of giving thenew government a chance and of a constructive oppositionshould be firmly underscored. A decision on holding thedelayed municipal and local elections is unlikely until thenew parliament is in place. Experts indicate that councilelections in some 140 municipalities can be held relativelysoon but it may be necessary to postpone village-levelelections until new district lines are drawn.45

2. National dialogueThe traditional parties poor results in the presidentialelection (except Manigats RDNP) and the increasing

attraction exercised by the Group of 184s platform for

45 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, February 2006.

civil society among the private sector highlight the needfor a genuine national dialogue process. For decades, largesections of society have been left outside the decision-making process, without any stake in planning the countrysfuture. If the new government is to develop the consensusand cooperation needed to address its challenges, national

dialogue cannot be left to the parties and the betterorganised, Port-au-Prince-based, civil society organisations,although they are essential. Other parts of civil society,particularly peasant organisations and groups representingthe rural and urban poor, must not only be encouraged toparticipate fully but also be given the means to do so. TheWorld Banks intention to help Haiti develop a PovertyReduction Strategy Paper should serve as a driving forcefor that dialogue, which will need the people as a wholeto help define development priorities for reducing ruralpoverty.

D. ECONOMICIn his address to the UN Security Council on 29 March2006, Prval said Haiti is a country waiting to be builtand called for additional funds to confront urgent problemsof poverty, unemployment and infrastructure. Hisadministration will need immediate financial support toaddress the effects of recent vehicle fuel price rises and toallow it to resolve the electricity supply crisis that has leftmost of the capital without light for weeks. Perhaps some

way could be found to convince businesses to provide atcost the surplus electricity most can produce from theirprivate generators. Increased transport costs have a knock-on effect on the prices of everyday commodities, and day-long blackouts seriously hamper economic activity. Bothare eroding the fragile optimism present since theelection. In early 2004, the new transitional governmentwon valuable breathing space when a U.S. Agency forInternational Development grant allowed it to procurefuel for electricity generating stations and restore thecapitals supply. Aid should be provided to allow thePrval government to do the same and to offer some

reprieve to rural communities. Similarly, financial supportis needed so it can find some way of subsidising the priceof tap-tap public transport.46

More generally, the governments immediate challenge isto secure rapid disbursement of foreign aid to fund high-profile, rapid impact public works programs and createtens of thousands of new jobs in both urban and rural areas.Haiti needs to insure that more is done to spur off-farmincome generation in rural areas and stem the migration toPort-au-Prince that makes urban governance ever moreuncertain. Effective economic governance mechanisms

46 Colourful privately-run buses called tap-taps are themajor public transport.


11/16



will be key to enabling donor funds to flow more quickly.It is a measure of the urgency of the need to create new

jobs as a way of preserving the fragile stability that Prvalhas repeatedly stressed the desirability of the U.S.Congress passing the HOPE Act to allow garmentsassembled in Haiti preferential access to the American

market. The boost such legislation would give to theHaitian garment assembly industry is estimated at up to80,000 new jobs.47 Prval, when he met with PresidentBush, also cited improving opportunities for Haitianchildren and U.S. support for public works projects ashigh priorities.48

The World Bank-sponsored donors meeting in July needsto agree on the necessity of revamping the InterimCooperation Framework, developed hastily in early 2004,with minimal civil society involvement, as a transitionalmeasure. Although extended through 2007, it will be

reviewed following a stocktaking that is being preparedfor the Brasilia ministerial meeting this month. It will befurther updated for the July donors pledging meeting inPort-au-Prince based on the new governments priorities.A new coordinating mechanism for a short and medium-term economic development strategy should be establishedto operate with maximum participation and in a fullytransparent manner. In addition, the new government needsdonor help to plan and, in particular, to use foreign aid ina fully transparent fashion. It should ask the World Bankfor the same kind of economic governance assistancecurrently given to Liberia, where a Governance andEconomic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)both advances the presidents goals of fighting corruptionand building state institutions and coordinates donorfunding through a more transparent budget process.49

Haitis education system remains a disaster area. At least40 per cent, and some estimates say 65 per cent, of school-age children are not in school; less than 40 per cent gopast seventh grade; and barely half the 45,000 teachersare reported to have a ninth grade education.50 Perhaps85 per cent of students in school must attend privateinstitutions because the public education system has beengiven little priority, has virtually no resources and is heldin low regard. Standards are not comprehensively enforced,texts not universally available, and education is largely by

47 Less Poverty, More Hope Ren Prval, Miami Herald,29 March 2006.48 CRS Report for Congress, Latin America and the Caribbean:Issues for the 109th Congress, updated 29 March 2006,Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 27.49 On GEMAP, see Crisis Group Africa Report N98,

Liberias Elections: Necessary but Not Sufficient, 7 September2005.50 The role of the private sector in rebuilding Haiti, sponsoredby the Inter-American dialogue, Inter-American DevelopmentBank (IADB) and Canada (CIDA), September 2005.

rote. Reform is badly needed at every level. The immediatecrisis is that since the vast majority of schools require fees,and the economy is abysmal, many schools are expellingstudents for failure to pay. This must be high on the agendafor action.51

Prval has signalled his intention to move quickly to assistagricultural producers, in recognition that while this sectoris still the main source of livelihoods for two-thirds of thepopulation, 80 per cent of those live below the povertyline. During his campaign, he spoke of repeating theinitiative of his first presidency to reduce the price offertilizers as a means to relieve pressures on peasantfarmers and boost the output of staple food crops.

On the eve of his trip to Brazil, Prval visited the sugarrefinery at Darbonne, near the southern town of Logane,that had been refitted and brought into operation with

Cuban aid during his first presidency. He declared hewould seek Brazilian technical expertise to help modernisethe once thriving sugar sector. Further internationalassistance is needed to support production andcommercialisation of traditional (coffee, cacao, essentialoils) and non-traditional (vegetables, mangoes and otherfruit) export crops and products. A determined approachto developing sustainable agriculture must also addressthe ecological disaster. An alternative to the use of charcoal the cooking fuel for the bulk of the population isurgently needed because deforestation and soil erosionhave made Haiti one of the most environmentally degradedplaces in the world. Ethanol and bio-diesel fuel from localproducts as well as methanol gas have been discussedas options. Given the countrys recent history with floods,environmental protection as part of a natural disasterprevention and response capability is critical.

The president-elect has emphasised rapid urban job-creation and stimulating agricultural production with anemphasis on South-South cooperation and technicalassistance, while still acknowledging the importance of thegarment assembly sector. This ambitious approach hassomething to offer a variety of sectors of society and withdetermined international effort could both secure popularsupport for the government and turn the economy around.Prval and his advisors also need an offer of additionalstaff and management assistance to help them take overthe government apparatus in the first weeks. Internationalaid needs to be disbursed even before the July donorsconference to fund Prvals short-term economicinitiatives; there is some indication that Canada, the U.S.,the Inter-American Development Bank and the WorldBank are taking steps to do that.52

51 Crisis Group interviews, Washington, April 2006.52 Canada announced a new $48 million grant to Haiti duringPrvals visit, 1 May 2006. It is to be used for a local


12/16



E. JUSTICE REFORMThe new governments first task is to remedy the harmdone by the transitional government. The recent reportby the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights(IACHR) noted that past international efforts to attackdeficiencies in the justice system had failed to producelasting change.53 It also noted that 85 to 90 per cent ofcurrent prisoners, including children, are awaiting trials.54More than a few have been in jail longer than themaximum sentences of the crimes for which they werecharged or for which they have been detained but not yetcharged. The IACHR condemned these violations ofdue process.55 For this reason and to demonstrate itscommitment to the rule of law the incoming governmentshould quickly address the cases of the leading imprisonedFanmi Lavalas figures, including former Prime Minister

Yvon Neptune, former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privertand party activists such as Annette Auguste and JacquesMathelier. One solution to this delicate issue would be toappoint a commission (including international jurists) toreview the cases and decide if these and other long-term,pre-trial detainees should be brought to court or released.

Politicisation of the justice sector also has a flip side thehighly questionable release of suspected or even convictedcriminals under dubious circumstances. An investigationshould be launched at once into all cases in whichindividuals have been freed without a full judicial

process, with a view to attacking impunity. The IACHRspecifically questioned the release of Louis-Jodel

development program ($20 million), a project to strengthenthe parliament ($5 million), several organisations promotingdemocracy and human rights ($5 million) and debt relief($18 million), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.The World Bankannounced a new $16 million grant for rural roads on 11 April2006. http://web.worldbank.org/. The IADB announced it hasmore than $554 million still available in unexpended financingfor Haiti and in a Washington meeting with him Bank President

Luis Alberto Moreno pledged to marshal all available resourcesto expedite project execution and to assist Haitian authoritiesin improving the governments capacity to manage foreignassistance. http://www.iadb.org. The U.S. Congress, with bi-partisan support, is close to adding $40 million to an emergencyspending bill, which should provide support to the Prvalgovernment within weeks of his inauguration for policeand justice reform, jobs and health. Crisis Group interviews,Washington, April 2006.53 Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Aheadfor Haiti and the International Community 2005, Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights (IAHCR), 26 October 2005.54 On 29 March 2006, the National Ombudsmans Office (Office

National Protecteur du Citoyen) stated that 92 per cent ofthe prison population is being held in prolonged preventativedetention.55 IACHR, op.cit. pp. vi, 65-71.

Chamblain and Jackson Joanis, who had been convictedin absentia for the murder of Antoine Izmery.56 It also hasbeen reported that police officers who were arrested inconnection with the Martissant massacre in August 2005have been released. But in the longer term, the conditionsallowing the justice system to be manipulated should

be addressed, including low pay scales, inadequatetraining and resources, lack of judicial independence,politicisation in tenure, inadequate security and noeffective professional review.

The several international assistance programs over the pasttwo decades have failed to strengthen a woefully weakunderlying institutional structure, due in part to the short-term nature of some projects and associated funding, theabsence of ongoing technical and other support and lackof coordination. A new judicial reform process needs toaddress all these failings, and the process must succeed

because, as the head of a leading Haitian human rightsorganisation said, if the judicial system does not work,there cannot be progress in any other sector.57

Local human rights organisations must be consulted inthe design of comprehensive judicial reform. At the sametime, the judiciary must urgently be provided with the basicfacilities and resources necessary to perform its functions,including training and oversight. Judges need re-training,and new judges need to be recruited and trained, so theEcole de la Magistrature should be quickly re-opened.Another urgent priority is to end impunity for past humanrights violations. One way would be to establish a specialpanel or chamber of the civilian courts at which well-trained,well-paid, and well-protected judges and prosecutors, withspecialist international assistance, perhaps including theIACHR, would review the most notorious cases.58

V. CONCLUSIONThe unexpected success of the 7 February and 21 Aprilelections and the victory of Ren Prval have given Haiti

56 Ibid, pp. 75-76. Chamblain, then a member of a paramilitaryforce known as FRAPH, and Joanis, then a member of theFAdH, were convicted in absentia in 1995 for the Izmerymurder. During the transitional government, both turnedthemselves in and were acquitted after the High Court rejectedthe initial order for a trial by jury and ordered a judicial trial atwhich the Appeals Court judge found insufficient evidence.57 Crisis Group interview, Pierre Esperance, National HumanRights Defense Network (RNDDH), Port-au-Prince, 18February 2006.58 Crisis Group interviews, Thierry Fagart, MINUSTAH humanrights section, Port-au-Prince, 21 February 2006, and DanielleSaada, MINUSTAH justice section, Port-au-Prince, 28February 2006.


13/16



the chance to put years of instability, violence andeconomic decline behind it. The new presidents first 100days are crucial for securing democratic government andbeginning the long process of social and economic renewal.The incoming administration faces an array of challenges,and it is essential the international community provides

the funding and other aid to help it attend quickly to themost urgent. Perhaps the greatest is that Haitians haveenormous expectations that the government will rapidlychange their miserable living conditions.

President Prval and donors should consider someimmediate actions the week after the inauguration:

announcing the start of an UNPOL vettingcommission to review the HNP, starting from thetop with Mario Andrsol and continuing throughall ranks, regardless of when they joined the force;

announcing appointment of a combinedinternational/Haitian commission of jurists, withInter-American Commission on Human Rightshelp, to review cases with serious due processimplications, including those of former PrimeMinister Neptune and of other individuals detainedeither without charge or without trial and thosereleased under questionable circumstances;

immediate steps to increase the numbers of hoursof electricity in Port-au-Prince and other cities;

as a first step toward education reform, strengtheningpublic education and universal primary educationannouncing a commission, including bothinternational experts and former Haitian educationministers, to review expulsions from schools dueto the inability of families to pay fees;

either reinvigorating or forming a new DDRCommission, including MINUSTAH and otherinternational experts, to prepare plans to achievewithin six months disarmament and demobilisationof illegal armed groups, whether ex-FAdH orurban gangs, linked to appropriate social reinsertion;

and requesting that the upcoming ministerial and donors

meetings adopt a support strategy with at least aten-year horizon and goals of security, justice andeconomic growth, prioritising rural development,decentralisation and poverty reduction.

The first orders of business for Prval need to bemaintaining the improved security situation andimplementing programs that address the underlying causesof urban violence and crime. Mending the politicaldivisions that widened during the two years of transitionalgovernment is a crucial aspect of this. The Fanmi Lavalasparty and its supporters and the virulently anti-Aristidemiddle and upper classes need to put aside their mutual

antipathy and give the new government constructivesupport. Prval has stated that he sees quick impact socio-economic programs to improve the daily living conditionsof the poor majority as an essential contribution to socialand political stability. He requires strong internationalsupport: rapidly disbursed funds and technical assistance.

An overhaul of the HNP and fast progress with DDR aretwo priority areas for MINUSTAH. Prval has imploredthe UN and states contributing personnel to MINUSTAHto remain in Haiti, and member states must resist the urgeto reduce their participation. Disengagement at this stagewould be extremely short-sighted and likely result inrenewed instability and conflict requiring futureintervention in even worse circumstances. The most cost-effective investment now for the UN, the OAS and theirmember states is to ensure stabilisation and security sothat the Prval government can turn, with their help, to

institution-building, rule of law, governance and povertyreduction via economic development.

Haitis established political parties and the politically-engaged sectors of the Port-au-Prince elite must takestock following the rebuke delivered by the electorate on7 February. Party leaders must realise that they will onlyget votes in future if they address the hopes and aspirationsof large numbers of people in a realistic way. The poor arethe majority, and sections of the elites need to recognisethat those Haitians have full voting rights and now expectchanges that will improve their lives. Otherwise, Haiticould become the hemispheres first permanent failedstate.

All involved in the political arena need to acknowledgethat the incoming government offers a real opportunityfor Haiti to break out of a downward spiral but it needsconstructive and sustained support. If this governmentfails, state and all its people will fail with it.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 11 May 2006


14/16



APPENDIX A

MAP OF HAITI

Grand-GosierBanane

Anse--Pitres

Belle-Anse

Cayes-Jacmel Marigot

Logne

Gressier

Carrefour

Kenscoff

Ganthier

Fond Parisien

Fonds-Verrettes

Ption-Ville

Thomazeau

Arcahaie

Magasin

Pointe--Raquette

Grande-Saline

La Chapelle

Saut-d'Eau

Verrettes

Dessalines

Saint Michelde l'Attalaye

Saint-Raphal

Petite-Rivire-de-l'Artibonite

Mirebalais

SavenetteBaptiste

Belladre

Thomassique

Thomonde

Cerca-la-Source

Cerca Carvajal

Bahon

PlaisanceTerre-Neuve

Gros-Morne

Palmiste

Limb

Port-Margot

Aculdu Nord

Marmelade

Grande Rivire du NordDondon

Ennery

Anse-RougeBaie de Henne

BombardopolisPilate

Le Borgne

St. Louis de Nord

Anse--Foleur

Bassin-Bleu

Jean-Rabel

Mle St.-Nicolas

Mont-Organis

Pignon La Victoire

Vallires

Trou-du-NordMilot

Caracol

Limonade

QuartierMorin

Plainedu Nord

SainteSuzanne

Phaton

Perches

FerrierOuanaminthe

Ranquitte

Massade

Cornillon

Lascahobas

Duvalierville

Croix desBouquets

BainetCtes-de-ferCteauxPort--Piment

La Cahouane

Chardonnires

Tiburon

Les Irois

Moron

Jrmie

Port-de-Paix

TrouBonbon

Abricots

Dame-Marie

Les Anglais

Anse d'HainaultSource Chaude

Chambellan

BaradresPetite Rivires

de Nippes Petit-Gove Grand-Gove

Vieux Bourgd'Aquin

Aquin

L'Asile

Cavaillon

Maniche

Roseaux

PestelCorail

Anse--Veau

Petit Trou de Nippes

TorbeckRoch--Bateau

Port-Salut

St.-Jeandu Sud

Chantal

Camp-Perrin St. Louisdu Sud

ThiotteJacmel

Miragone

Les Cayes

Trouin

La Vallede Jacmel

Fort-Libert

Cap-Hatien

Saint-Marc

Gonaves

Hinche

Jimani

Dajabn

MonteCriste

ta

ng

Saum

tre

Cap Raymond

PointeOuest

PointeFantasque

Pointe deMontrouis

Pointe de la Grande-Pierre

GrandePointe

Cap--Foux

Cap Saint-Nicolas

PointeJean-Rabel

LE VACHE

LES CAYMITESPRESQU'LE

DES BARADRES

LE DELA GONVE

LE DELA TORTUE

Lac dePligre

Baie deMancenille

Baie dela Tortue

Baie deGrand-Pierre

Baie deJacmel

Canal deSaint-Marc

Canal dela Gonve

Canal de la Tortue

Golfe de la Gonve

Baiede

Henne

A T L A N T I C O C E A N

C A R I B B E A N S E A

O U E S T

C E N T R E

N O R D - E S T

A R T I B O N I T E

N O R D

N O R D - O U E S T

S U D - E S T

S U D

G R A N D E - A N S E N I P P E S

DOM

INICAN

REPUBLIC

CUBA

PORT-

AU-

PRINCE

74o

20o 20o

19o19o

18o 18o

73o 72o

74o 73o 72o

The boundaries and namesshown on this map do notimply official endorsementor acceptance by the UnitedNations.

Map No. 3855 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONSJune 2004

Department of Peacekeeping OperationsCartographic Section

H A I T I

HAITI

Town, vil lage

International boundary

Departmental boundary

Main road

National capital

Departmental seat

Airport

Secondary road

300 10 20

2010 25 mi

40 km

0 5 15


15/16



APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is anindependent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation,with nearly 120 staff members on five continents, workingthrough field-based analysis and high-level advocacyto prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts are located within or close bycountries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence ofviolent conflict. Based on information and assessmentsfrom the field, it produces analytical reports containingpractical recommendations targeted at key international

decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinctregular update on the state of play in all the most significantsituations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributedwidely by email and printed copy to officials inforeign ministries and international organisations andmade available simultaneously on the website,www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely withgovernments and those who influence them, includingthe media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate

support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board which includes prominentfigures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, businessand the media is directly involved in helping to bringthe reports and recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chairedby the former European Commissioner for ExternalRelations Christopher Patten and Boeing's Senior Vice-President, International Relations, Thomas Pickering, andits President and Chief Executive since January 2000 hasbeen former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it isbased as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow.The organisation currently operates fifteen field offices(in Amman, Belgrade, Bishkek, Bogot, Cairo, Dakar,Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria,Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over50 crisis-affected countries and territories across fourcontinents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Cted'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe;

in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea,Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; inEurope, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova,Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the wholeregion from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America,Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti.

Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governmental departments and agencies

currently provide funding: Australian Agency forInternational Development, Austrian Federal Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade, Canadian International Development Agency,Canadian International Development Research Centre,Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry ofForeign Affairs, European Union (European Commission),Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry ofForeign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Departmentof Foreign Affairs, Japanese International CooperationAgency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NewZealand Agency for International Development, Republicof China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RoyalDanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal NorwegianMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for ForeignAffairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,United Kingdom Department for InternationalDevelopment, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include CarnegieCorporation of New York, Compton Foundation, FloraFamily Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundacin DARAInternacional, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund,Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthurFoundation, Moriah Fund, Charles Stewart MottFoundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and PamelaOmidyar Fund, David and Lucile Packard Foundation,Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, RockefellerFoundation, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, SarloFoundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fundand Viva Trust.

May 2006

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org


16/16

HAITI After Elections Challenges for Preval First 100 Days - ICG 11 May 2006

Documents

Transcript of HAITI After Elections Challenges for Preval First 100 Days - ICG 11 May 2006