GWLecture2

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    Part IIa: Paper 1General Equilibrium and

    Welfare Economics

    Dr Snje Reiche

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    O utline

    Robinson Crusoe Model Social optimal outcome Competitive equilibrium Books: Cowell Ch 6.3, Varian Ch 32

    Model of Exchange: Edgeworth BoxAnalysis Books: Cowell Ch. 7.2.3-7.3.2 Varian Ch 31-31.7

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    Robinson Crusoe Model

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    Robinson Crusoe ModelO ne individual on an island who both consumes and produces.

    Simplest model because only one consumer and one producer.

    As a consumer : consumes leisure and eats coconuts

    As a producer: uses labour to produce coconuts withsome given technology

    Distinguish Social O ptimumfrom

    Competitive Equilibrium

    Recognises interdependence betweenconsumption and production choices,

    and maximises social welfare.Choices madeseparately subjectto prices for leisure andcoconuts

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    Social O ptimum(recognising both consumer and producer)

    z H f cto subject zcu zc !,max, ,a L u c z f H z cP! -

    First-order conditions:

    P!x

    xc

    zcuc ,: z H f z

    zcu z !x

    x ',: P

    z H f

    c

    zcu z

    zcu

    !

    x

    xx

    x'

    ,

    ,

    Marginal Rateof

    Substitution

    MarginalProduct of

    Labour:Marginal Rateof

    transformationof leisure into

    coconuts

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    C

    Labour: H

    - z

    H

    f( H - z)

    Social IndifferenceCurve

    MRS = MRT

    This is the optimal choice

    but this tells us nothing about the behaviour of markets

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    Competitive Equilibrium

    As a consumer: z H w pcto subject zcu zc

    ! T ,max,

    ,a L u c z H z pcP T ! -

    because R.C. owns the firm

    Income fromworking

    Key assumption is price taking behaviour.

    So, choice of c and z will not change p and w

    p

    c

    zcuc P!

    x

    x ,:

    w

    z

    zcu z P!

    x

    x ,:

    pw

    c

    zcu z

    zcu

    !

    x

    xx

    x

    ,

    ,

    Marginal Rateof Substitution

    Real wage:financial rate of

    transformation

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    As a producer: w L L p f

    L!T max

    L = H - zAgain, price taking behaviour.So, choice of L does not change p and w

    0!

    x

    xw

    L

    L f p

    Marginal Rate of Transformation

    Real wage:financial rate of transformation

    pw

    L

    L f !x

    x

    Also, firms hire labour until the marginal product of labour is equal to the real wage.

    Note also that only relative price is important

    Consumer: MRS = w/pProducer: MRT = w/p

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    H ave satisfied optimality , but is this a competitive equilibrium?

    NO , because not necessarily feasible.

    C

    Labour: H - z

    H

    f( H - z)

    pw /

    pw

    MRT !

    pw

    MRS !

    Excessdemand

    Excess Supply

    pT

    wage too low

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    C

    Labour: H - z H

    f( H - z)

    pw /

    L*

    H igher wage, lower price

    Competitive equilibrium is defined by price ratio

    which clears markets, given that agents optimise

    c*Choices in

    Competitive Equilibrium

    are the same as inSocial O ptimum

    Competitive Equilibrium

    is efficient

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    O ptimality: (1) c and z are chosen to maximise u( c, z)subject to

    (2) L is chosen to maximise

    z H w pc e T w L L p f !T

    Feasibility:

    Assumptions: (1) Price-taking behaviour (2) No externalities

    (3) No uncertainty

    ( )c f L!

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    Exchange and Edgeworth Box

    B y

    B x

    A y

    A x eeee Endowments

    yand xGoods

    Band AC onsumers

    ,,,

    O ptimality: Utility maximisation

    Feasibility: B A B

    y A y

    B A B x

    A x

    y yee

    x xee

    !

    !

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    O ptimisation by A

    A y y

    A x x

    A y

    A x

    A A

    y x

    e pe p y p x pto subject

    y xu A A

    !

    ),(max,

    ][),( A y A

    x y A

    y x A

    x A

    y p x p pe pe y xu L ! % P

    y A

    A A

    x A

    A A

    p y

    y xu p

    x y xu

    PP !x

    x!x

    x ),(;

    ),(First order conditions:

    y

    x

    A

    A A

    A

    A A

    p p

    y y xu

    x y xu

    !

    xx

    xx

    ),(

    ),(

    similarly for B

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    B xy

    y

    x A xy MRS p

    p MRS !!So, optimality :

    But not necessarily feasible :

    Use Edgeworth Box

    O A

    O B

    x

    y

    I A

    I B

    e

    B x

    A x ee

    B

    y A

    y ee

    Trade can lead toincreased utility for both individuals

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    What happens in the market?

    O A

    O B

    x

    y

    I A

    I B

    e

    B A

    Excesssupply

    Excessdemand

    y

    x

    p p

    price of x is too low

    Note: change in p x willhave a wealth effect:changes the value of

    endowments

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    O A

    O B

    x

    y

    e

    A= B

    y

    x

    p p

    Competitive Equilibrium

    Price Adjustment: B x A x B A x ee x x XD !

    q

    o"

    x x

    x x

    p XD

    p XD

    ,0

    ,0

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    O A

    O B

    x

    y

    Contract Curve and the Core

    1e 2e

    3e

    Contract Curve:Locus of points of

    tangency between MRS

    Need price vector that passes through

    endowment and is tangential to indifferencecurves on the contract curve.

    Core: set of allocations on thecontract curve thatare better than e2for both A and B

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    Competitive equilibrium: a price vector and allocationwhich is optimal and feasible .

    Individuals and firms are price-takers, so possible tooptimise, but the market does not clear, so noequilibrium.

    Shown in R.C. model and model of exchange.

    Core: set of allocations that cannot be blocked by anycoalition. As number of people increases, core shrinks.In the limit the core is equal to the set of equilibria.

    Summary